GONZALEZ III V OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
BRION, J.:
These two petitions have been because they raise a common thread of
issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from
office herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of
the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the
Ombudsman.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed before
PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.)
Rolando Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M.
Kalaw also filed a similar charge before the Office of the City Prosecutor,.
While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of
the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of
petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to
said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct
was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et at al in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city
Prosecutor was dismissed upon a finding that the material allegations
made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at
all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged."
Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution
recommending the dismissal without prejudice of the administrative
case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to
appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However,
upon the recommendation of petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding
P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza et al guilty of Grave Misconduct was
approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a
motion for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman
Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office it remained pending for final
review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself
reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic
murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others
and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the
blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the Incident
Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine
accountability for the incident through the conduct of public hearings and
executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales
committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of
their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without
any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman-prescribed rules to
resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The inaction is gross,
considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was
dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife Clarita D.
Garcia, their sons and several unknown persons with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied
Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong
prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However, the
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government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit
("PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA
compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to
get off the hook notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong
evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of
Representatives' Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the
PLEBARA. The Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee
Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of appropriate
charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts and/or omissions tantamount
to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which
are violations under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds
for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
These cases primarily seek to declare as unconstitutional Section
8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners insist that they should be solely and directly subject to
the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise
administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman.
2. Won granting the President the powerto remove a Deputy
Ombudsmandiminishes theindependence of the Office of the
Ombudsman
3. WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct
HELD:
First Issue:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrativedisciplinary power over a
DeputyOmbudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive. While
the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and
covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the
exception only of those officials removable by impeachment such authority
is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be
solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section
8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious
construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had intended the
Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary
jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in
enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same
Organic Act was to provide for an external authority, through the person of
the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least
diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman
over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended to address the
lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy
may try to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
Moreover, the Power of the President toRemove a Deputy
Ombudsmanand a Special Prosecutor isImplied from his Power to
Appoint.
By granting express statutorypower to the President to removea
Deputy Ombudsman and aSpecial Prosecutor, Congressmerely filled
an obvious gap inthe law. While the removal of the Ombudsman himself
is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment
under Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional
provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section
8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law without running
afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the
Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes Congress to provide for the
removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and
Special Prosecutor, who are not subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President toRemove a Deputy Ombudsmanand a
Special Prosecutor isImplied from his Power toAppoint. In giving the
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that
is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint
the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. The integrity and
effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that affect the general
morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial
importance in relation to the President's own role as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore,
to grant the President concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy
Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.
Second Issue
NO. Granting the President the Powerto Remove a Deputy
Ombudsmandoes not Diminish theIndependence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The independence which the Office of the Ombudsman is
vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing
its constitutional mandate to be a protector of the people. What the
Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially,
political independence. This means nothing more than that "the terms of
office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the
office" are "reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."
Third Issue:
WoN dismissal of Gonzalez III was correct
No.His removal must be for any of the grounds provided in the removal of
the ombudsman. the alleged ground of betrayal of public trust was not
present in his case.
Congress laid down two restrictions on the Presidents exercise of such
power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal
of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the
removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due
process.
Petitioner Gonzales may not beremoved from office where the
questioned acts, falling short ofconstitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's act of directing the PNP-
IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without
citing any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation
of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of
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concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the
"champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case was
turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S Insp. Mendoza even
without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that
the decision was immediately implemented; or that the motion for
reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months
cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's undue interest in
the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge,
social ties or business affiliation with any of the parties to the case
that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no
evidence at all of any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement of administrative
accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the
findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not amount to a
betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested
with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner as Deputy
Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and
serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vestedwith statutory authority to
proceedadministratively against petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine
theexistence of any of the grounds forher removal from office as
providedfor under the Constitution and theOmbudsman Act.
DISPOSITIVE
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the
President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of
backwages corresponding to the period of suspension effective
immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner.
In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-
B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts
and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a
betrayal of public trust, in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman
Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the
Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
OTHER DOCTRINES
Absence of motion of reconsideration; effect of. The omission of the filing
of a motion for reconsideration poses no obstacle for the Courts review of
its ruling on the whole case since a serious constitutional question has
been raised and is one of the underlying bases for the validity or invalidity
of the presidential action. If the President does not have any constitutional
authority to discipline a Deputy Ombudsman and/or a Special Prosecutor
in the first place, then any ruling on the legal correctness of the OPs
decision on the merits will be an empty one. In other words, since the
validity of the OPs decision on the merits of the dismissal is inextricably
anchored on the final and correct ruling on the constitutional issue, the
whole case including the constitutional issue remains alive for the
Courts consideration on motion for reconsideration. Emilio A. Gonzales III
v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito
N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Congress; power to determine modes of removal from office of public
officers; must be consistent with the core constitutional principle of
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. The intent of the framers
of the Constitution in providing that all other public officers and employees
may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment
in the second sentence of Section 2, Article XI is to prevent Congress from
extending the more stringent rule of removal only by impeachment to
favoured public officers. Contrary to the implied view of the minority, in no
way can this provision be regarded as blanket authority for Congress to
provide for any ground of removal it deems fit. While the manner and
cause of removal are left to congressional determination, this must still be
consistent with constitutional guarantees and principles, namely: the right
to procedural and substantive due process; the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure; the principle of separation of powers; and the principle
of checks and balances. The authority granted by the Constitution to
Congress to provide for the manner and cause of removal of all other
public officers and employees does not mean that Congress can ignore the
basic principles and precepts established by the Constitution. Emilio A.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v.
Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.
Constitutional bodies; concept of independence. The independence
enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics they do not owe their
existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of
the Constitution intended that these independent bodies be insulated
from political pressure to the extent that the absence of independence
would result in the impairment of their core functions. The deliberative
considerations abundantly show that the independent constitutional
commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be
independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political
influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is
not scarce on how the independence granted to these bodies prevents
presidential interference. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President,
etc., et al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R.
No. 196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
Gross negligence; concept of; not present when Deputy Ombudsman
reviews a case for nine days. Gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to
act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully
and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as
other persons may be affected. In case of public officials, there is gross
negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. The Deputy
Ombudsman cannot be guilty of gross neglect of duty and/or inefficiency
since he acted on the case forwarded to him within nine days. The OPs
ruling that Gonzales had been grossly negligent for taking nine days,
instead of five days as required for Hearing Officers, is totally
baseless.Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et
al./Wendell Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No.
196231/G.R. No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
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Impeachment; concept of. Impeachment is the most difficult and
cumbersome mode of removing a public officer from office. It is, by nature,
a sui generis politico-legal process that signals the need for a judicious and
careful handling as shown by the process required to initiate the
proceeding; the one-year limitation or bar for its initiation; the limited
grounds for impeachment; the defined instrumentality given the power to
try impeachment cases; and the number of votes required for a finding of
guilt. Emilio A. Gonzales III v. Office of the President, etc., et al./Wendell
Bareras-Sulit v. Atty. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 196231/G.R.
No. 196232, January 28, 2014.
MORALES V CA AND BINAY
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
immemorially acknowledged so to be[.]
Facts:
Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal cases in
connection with the allegation that he is involved in anomalous
activities attending the procurement and construction phases of
the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his
previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively
liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired during
his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.
The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under
preventive suspension.
The CA granted Binays prayer for TRO enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order.
According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue a
TRO considering that if it were established that the acts subject
of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed
during his prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine,
Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be
administratively charged.
Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to
administrative cases,
(1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the
term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct;
(2) an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the
right to remove him therefor; and
(3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed
to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers.
Issue: WoN CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the
WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine
Ruling:
No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the
abandonment is prospective in effect.
No. The CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases enunciating
the condonation doctrine. By merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the
CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution.
However, the condonation doctrine should be abandoned.
There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support it.
The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution,
AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense.
In fact the LGC and the RRACCS precludes condonation since
in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such
post.
There is no presumption in any statute or procedural rule
that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, do so with
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any.
In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. Condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is
to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of an act
that is unknown.
However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application. It should be,
as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon
should be respected.
(LONGER VERSION)
Morales v CA and Binay
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers of
the City Government of Makati charging them with
administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty,
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
criminal cases for violation of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents. Binay, Jr. was
alleged to be involved in anomalous activities attending the
procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking
Building project, committed during his previous and present
terms as City Mayor of Makati.
The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order, placing
Binay Jr., et al., under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB
Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the preventive suspension order.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding
Pea, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor. Citing
Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, it found that it was more prudent on
its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the
matter and seriousness of the issues raised, considering that if
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it were established that the acts subject of the administrative
cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his prior
term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-
election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.
Binays contention:
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor
of Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his
re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him moot and
academic.
In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension
from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
The Ombudmans contentions:
The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing
preventive suspension orders.
Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by before it during the
administrative proceedings.
There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
TRO and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned, but the
abandonment is prospective in effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was
correctly issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents on
the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied
forgiveness of an offense, especially by treating the offender as
if there had been no offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting
the right to remove him therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. In which case, as
 there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time,
the Court, resorted to American authorities and found
that the weight of authorities seems to incline toward
the rule denying the right to remove one from office
because of misconduct during a prior term.
4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.
Also, it would not apply to appointive officials since, as to them,
there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
1. There is really no established weight of authority in the US
favoring the doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of the
condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascual's judicious re-examination.
a. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust.
3. The concept of public office, under the 1987 Constitution,
AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary requirement of
ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT ALL TIMES is
PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that an elective local
official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact
that he was elected to a second term of office, or even
another elective post.
4. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense.
5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the
notion. In fact the Local Government Code and the RRACCS
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local
official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be
re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post.
6. If condonation of an elective official's administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then
the same should have been provided by law under our
governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm. No such
presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. At a
conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of
an act that is unknown.
8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be
condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application. It should be, as a general rule, recognized as
"good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected.
JOSE C. MIRANDA vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 154098. July 27, 2005.
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PUNO,J.
Good Faith - - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees
Summary: Mayor Miranda was placed under preventive suspension but
while suspended, he allegedly did official acts. Ombudsman then filed
before the Sandiganbayan an Information charging Mayor Miranda of
Usurpation of Authority which is punishable under the RPC.
Sandiganbayan then ordered a 90-day preventive suspension against
Mayor Miranda. Mayor Miranda questioned the length of the preventive
suspension and argued that it is repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by
the LGC. Also, he raised the defense that he did official acts in good faith
believing that he can already reassume his position. The SC first held that
Miranda cannot anymore question the sufficiency of the Information as he
is already estopped due to his act of entering his plea. Also, the allegations
in the Information are sufficient enough to raise the issue of WON he
committed fraud against the government. On the issue of the legality of the
90-day period, the SC upheld its validity as the suspension is based on the
Ombudsman Law and not from the LGC. The differences between the said
laws were also explained. As to purpose, the limit in the LGC is motivated
by the prevention of being influenced by political will; the same is not a
concern in the Ombudsman Law since It is a constitutional body. Also, the
Ombudsman law provides for more stringent requirements before a public
officer may be preventively suspended; the requirements provided in the
LGC are more lenient. Accordingly, due to these differences, it cannot be
said that the other is repugnant to the other law.
Doctrine:
Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law,
the suspension of a public officer by the Sandiganbayan is
mandatory after a determination has been made of the validity
of the Information. Once the information is found to be sufficient
in form and substance, then the Court must issue the order of
suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts
about it.
The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No.
3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense
involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense
involving public funds or property. Nothing limits Section 13 only
to acts involving fraud on public funds or property.
Also, the difference between suspensions by the Ombudsman
and the President, governor and mayor under the LGC are
clear. The latter are political personages and so the possibility
of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose
preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the
other hand, is given the independence of the office which is
protected by the Constitution.
The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the
preventive suspension by the Ombudsman, the evidence of
guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or
employee should involve dishonestly, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the
charges should warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case
filed against him.
On the other hand, the LGC requirements for suspension (at
any time after the issues are joined), are that (a) there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of
culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of the offense so warrants, or
(d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence.

FACTS:
The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of
Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for 6 months for
alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, but while suspended, he
allegedly did official acts. Subsequently, Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro
filed a Complaint for usurpation of authority or official functions against
Mayor Miranda with the Office of the Ombudsman. Sandiganbayan then
ordered a 90-day preventive suspension against Mayor Miranda. Mayor
Miranda questioned the length of the preventive suspension and argued
that it is repugnant to the 60-day limit imposed by the LGC. Also, he raised
the defense that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and that
he did official acts in good faith believing that he can already reassume his
position. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he
received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez
instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the
same.
Ombudsman then filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information
against Mayor Miranda for violation of Art. 177 RPC, penalizing
usurpation of authority.
Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation in light of the
manifestations made by prosecution and defense counsel.
After reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Coquia
recommended the dismissal of the case and held that Miranda
reassumed his office in good faith and on mistake of fact due to
the difficult questions of law involved.
Ombudsman Desierto referred Coquias resolution to the
Ombudsmans Chief Legal Counsel for review. The Chief Legal
Counsel disagreed with Coquia and recommended the filing of
the case against Mayor Miranda based on the following
grounds:
o That Mayor Miranda;s invocation of good faith was
belied by the fact that he received a memorandum
from the DILG informing him that his view of the
preventive suspension period was untenable and
that he should serve out its remaining period
o That Miranda violated the orders of both the
Ombudsman and the DILG
Ombudsman Desierto addopted the recommendation of the
Chief Legal Counsel and the case was re-raffled.
Subsequently, the prosecution filed an amended Information
with the Sandiganbayan, to which the Mayor Miranda
interposed a negative plea
The prosecution then filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion
to suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Sec. 13 RA
3018 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
o Mayor Miranda opposed this motion on the ground
that the offense of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Art. 177 RPC is not embraced by
Sec. 13 RA 3019
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution suspending Mayor
Miranda from office for 90 days based on the finding that he
violated Art. 177 RPC which involves fraud. It was further held
that Mayor Mirandas act fell within the catch-all provision or
for any offense involving fraud upon government
Mayor Mirandas MR was denied, hence this petition
ISSUES:
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Issue # 1: WON the acts alleged in the complaint falls under the scope of
Sec. 131 RA 3019 (Yes)
Ratio # 1:
Sec. 13 RA 3019 cannot be limited only to acts involving fraud
on public funds or property. Sandiganbayan properly construed
Sec. 13 RA 3019 as covering two types of offenses:
o Any offense involving fraud on the government; and
o Any offense involving public funds or property
In the case at bar, Mayor Mirandas act fell within the catch-
all provision or for any offense involving fraud upon
government
o Fraud upon government was committed when Mayor
Miranda allegedly assumed the duties and
performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor
under pretense of official position
o Mayor Mirandas acts in assuming the duties and
function of the Office of the Mayor despite his
suspension from said office resulted to a clear
disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation
in the affairs of the government as the employees,
as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is
the head of the Office.
SC held that this actuation constitutes
fraud which in the general sense is
deemed to comprise anything calculated
to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another or by which an undue and
unconscious advantage is taken of
another
Also, the rule is that under Sec. 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after a determination has been made of the
validity of the Information.
o In the case at bar, there is no doubt that the
information filed is valid and Mayor Miranda in fact
acquiesced to the validity of the Information when he
pleaded not guilty.
Further, the acts alleged in the Information constitute fraud
upon government or public funds or property, as required by
law.
o When accused-mayor appointed persons in various
positions, he indirectly dealt with the city's funds as
those persons appointed will be given their
respective salaries, benefits and other monetary
consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out
of the city's funds.
o Additionally, when he performed acts pertaining to
the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers,
and payment of other expenses which is subject to
1 Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.In the event that such convicted officer, who may
have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall
be liable to restitute the same to the Government.
 proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of Issue # 3: WON suspension issued in this case violated the 60-day
the city. limit imposed by the LGC (No)
However, the dissenting opinion presents another view on this Ratio # 3:
issue and holds that there was actually no fraud.
o The dissent holds that: In the case at bar, the SC expressly stated that its decision was
it would be fraud of public funds if these rendered without subscribing to the petitioners claim that the
public officials just collected their LGC as been violated. The Court only ruled that the
salarieswithout rendering service to the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a
government. 6-month preventive suspension since it was admitted that the
that "fraud upon government" must be documents required were already obtained by 19 July 1999 or
read so as to require that malversation of 24 days after the imposition of the preventive suspension.
funds was committed. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension was imposed
o In answering the dissent, SC said that adopting the was already served.
dissenting opinion's line of reasoning would render The dissent also cited the Rios case. The SC answered that
superfluous the phrase "fraud upon government" as said case is not applicable in the case at bar since the powers
malversation is subsumed by "any offense involving of the Sandiganbayan were at issue in that case, not those of
public funds or property." the Ombudsman as in this case.
Moreover, the SC is not convinced that Mayor Miranda o It is also worth noting that Rios cited Sec. 63 LGC as
reassumed office under an honest belief that he was no its legal basis wherein it is clear from the provision
longer under preventive suspension. that it is only meant as a cap on the discretionary
o In Mayor Mirandas affidavit, he admitted that he power of the President, governor and mayor to
refused to leave his position despite the impose excessively long preventive suspensions.
memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez and left The Ombudsman, on the other hand, is not
only a few days after recceipt thereof due to the subject to political pressure given the
coercion of the PNP. This contradicts his assrtion independence of the office which is protected by
that he immediately complied with the memorandum no less that the Constitution.
of Undersecretary Sanchez.
o As the SC said in various cases, if petitioner (and his LGC vs Ombudsman Law: Difference in the requirements for
counsel) had an iota of respect for the rule of law, suspension to be valid (from Hagad case)
they should have assailed the validity of the order of
suspension in court instead of taking the law into Ombudsman Law LGC
their own hands. Requirements to the evidence of there is
justify preventive guilt should be reasonable
Issue # 2: WON the suspension is proper (yes) suspension of a strong, and ground to
public official the charge believe that the
Ratio # 2: against the respondent has
officer or committed the
It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the employee act or acts
Sandiganbayan. Under Sec. 13 RA 3019, this suspension is should involve complained of
mandatory if the Information is sufficient. dishonestly, the evidence of
On the other hand, the dissent argues that the Information is
oppression or culpability is
insufficient rendering the suspension invalid.
grave strong
o The SC pointed out the fact that Mayor Miranda
misconduct or the gravity of
entered his plea and that it is a basic rule that
entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner neglect in the the offense so
may have to the validity of the information unless the performance of warrants, or
case falls under the exceptions. duty; the
o Also, in determining the sufficiency of the that the continuance in
information, the test is whether the crime is charges should office of the
described in intelligible terms with such particularity respondent
warrant
as to apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty,
removal from could influence
of the offense charged. The Information in the case
at bar satisfied this test especially when it is stated the service; or the witnesses
therein the specific acts which constitute usurpation the or pose a
of official functions. respondent's threat to the
If the purpose of the preventive suspension was to enable continued stay safety and
the investigating authority to gather documents without in office would integrity of the
intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents' prejudice the records and
submission, we can only conclude that this purpose was
case filed other evidence
already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension of
petitioner. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is against him
already strong, even without conceding that initially it was weak,
it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is
and definitely longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than
make its legitimate case against petitioner. six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of

7|Page
 such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the
Ombudsman was indubitably within the limit provided by its
enabling law. This enabling law has not been modified by the
legislature.
In answering the dissent that the difference between the two laws
violates the equal protection clause, SC holds that there is
substantial distinction to justify it.
o The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with
unique safeguards to ensure immunity from political
pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal
autonomy,fixed term of office and classification as an
impeachable officer.
Disposition: Sandiganbayan decision affirmed; Mayor Miranda
suspended for 90 days
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. DECHAVEZ
G.R. NO 176702 November 13, 2013
BRION, J
FACTS: Dechaves served as the president of the Negros State College of
Agriculture (NSCA) from 2001 until his retirement in April 2006. On May 5,
2002, on a Sunday, Dechavez with his wife drove the college service
Suzuki Vitara to go to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. On their way back
to the NSCA, they figured in a vehicular accident resulting in minor injuries
to them and damage to the vehicle. To claim insurance, Dechavez
executed an affidavit before the GSIS which subsequently granted
Dechavez's claims amounting to P308,000.00, while the NSCA
shouldered P71,000.00 as its share in the vehicle's depreciation expense.
On November 11 2002, 20 faculty and staff of the NSCA asked the COA to
conduct an audit investigation of NSCAs expenditures in the accident. The
COA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Hence the complainants
went before the Ombudsman, Visayas, charging Dechavez with
Dishonesty under Section 46(b)(l), Chapter 6, Tile I of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The Ombudsman dismissed Dechavez from the service with
all accessory penalties after finding him guilty. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied. On appeal, the CA reversed the
Ombudsmans findings. It found that complainants failed to sufficiently
show that Dechavez had deliberately lied in his May 10, 2002 affidavit.
Dechavez sufficiently proved that he went on an official tip. MR likewise
denied. The Ombudsman argues that the guilt of Dechavez has been
proven by substantial evidence -the quantum of evidence required in
administrative proceedings. It likewise invokes its findings and posits that
because they are supported by substantial evidence, they deserve great
weight and must be accorded full respect and credit. Dechavez counters
that the petition raises factual issues that are improper for a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. He adds that the present case has
been mooted by his retirement from the service on April 9, 2006, and
should properly be dismissed.
Issues: (1) Can the SC review questions of facts under Rule 45?
(2) Did Dechavezs retirement render moot the present case?
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Held. (1) Yes. The rule that the Court will not disturb the CA' s findings of
fact is not an absolute rule that admits of no exceptions. A notable
exception is the presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among
the tribunals' rulings on questions of fact. The case before us squarely falls
under this exception as the tribunals below made two critical conflicting
factual findings.
(2) No. Retirement from the service during the pendency of an
administrative case does not
render the case moot and academic. The jurisdiction that was Ours at the
time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by the mere
fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the
pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce
the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications.
OCA vs. Juan: Resignation is not a way out to evade
administrative liability when facing administrative sanction. The resignation
of a public servant does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he or she shall still be answerable.
Baquerfo v. Sanchez: Cessation from office of respondent by
resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the
administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service
nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic. The
jurisdiction that was this Court's at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent
public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case.
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of
the respondent save only where death intervenes and the action does not
survive.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. ULDARICO P. ANDUTAN, JR.
G.R. No. 164679. July 27, 2011.
BRION,J.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Memorandum directing all non-career officials or those
occupying political positions to vacate their positions, Andutan resigned
from the DOF as the former Deputy Director of the One-Stop Shop Tax
Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the DOF. Subsequently, Andutan, et
al. were criminally charged by the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau
(FFIB) of the Ombudsman with Estafa through Falsification of Public
Documents, and violations RA 3019. As government employees,
Andutan et al. were likewise administratively charged of Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, Falsification of Official Documents and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The criminal and
administrative charges arose from anomalies in the illegal transfer of Tax
Credit Certificates (TCCs) to Steel Asia, among others. The Ombudsman
found the respondents guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty. Having been
separated from the service, Andutan was imposed the penalty of forfeiture
of all leaves, retirement and other benefits and privileges, and perpetual
disqualification from reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including government owned and
controlled agencies or corporations. The CA annulled and set aside the
decision of the Ombudsman, ruling that the latter should not have
considered the administrative complaints because: first, Section 20 of
R.A. 6770 provides that the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it
believes that x x x [t]he complaint was filed after one year from the
occurrence of the act or omission complained of; and second, the
administrative case was filed after Andutans forced resignation
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770 prohibit the Ombudsman from
conducting an administrative investigation a year after the act was
committed.
2. Whether the Ombudsman has authority to institute an administrative
complaint against a government employee who had already resigned.
HELD:
1. No. Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not
prescribe. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the
character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers
and employees, the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or
employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation
of the publics faith and confidence in our government. Clearly, Section 20
of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting an
administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the
time the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the
administrative case was filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in
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Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was well within its discretion to conduct the
administrative investigation.
2. No. The Ombudsman can no longer institute an administrative case
against Andutan because the latter was not a public servant at the time the
case was filed. It is irrelevant, according to the Ombudsman, that Andutan
had already resigned prior to the filing of the administrative case since the
operative fact that determines its jurisdiction is the commission of an
offense while in the public service. The SC observed that indeed it has
held in the past that a public officials resignation does not render moot an
administrative case that was filed prior to the officials resignation.
However, the facts of those cases are not entirely applicable to the present
case. In the past cases, the Court found that the public officials subject of
the administrative cases resigned, either to prevent the continuation of a
case already filed or to pre-empt the imminent filing of one. Here, neither
situation obtains. First, Andutans resignation was neither his choice nor of
his own doing; he was forced to resign. Second, Andutan resigned from his
DOF post on July 1, 1998, while the administrative case was filed on
September 1, 1999, exactly one year and two months after his resignation.
What is clear from the records is that Andutan was forced to resign more
than a year before the Ombudsman filed the administrative case against
him. If the SC agreed with the interpretation of the Ombudsman, any
official even if he has been separated from the service for a long time
may still be subject to the disciplinary authority of his superiors, ad
infinitum. Likewise, if the act committed by the public official is indeed
inimical to the interests of the State, other legal mechanisms are available
to redress the same.