Republic of the Philippines

Municipal Trial Court

City of Davao
Branch 1

EFREN TE, CIVIL CASE NO. 12345

Plaintiff,

-versus- For: UNLAWFUL DETAINER

CARLO MAMAC,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------
--x

POSITION PAPER FOR THE DEFENDANT

Defendant Carlo Mamac, through counsel, respectfully
states:

PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Efren Te is of legal age, Filipino, married, with
residence and postal address at Mahogany Subdivision,
Bangkal, Davao City where he may be served with notices
and other court processes.

2. Defendant Carlo Mamac is of legal age, Filipino, single,

with residence and postal address at Mahogany Subdivision,
Bangkal, Davao City where he may be served with notices
and other court processes.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1. This is a civil case for unlawful detainer filed by Efren Te
against Carlo Mamac for allegedly refusing to vacate the
house and lot owned by Plaintiff.

Page 1 of 10
 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1. Plaintiff owns a house and lot situated in Bangkal,
Davao City containing an area of, more or less, 200 square
meters, covered by TCT No. T-14344.1

2. Sometime in January 2008, Plaintiff went to Manila for a

job interview. Meanwhile, Plaintiff asked Defendant to look
after his house. The Defendant agreed. Plaintiff stayed in
Manila for more than a month. While Plaintiff was there,
Defendant would sometimes stay in the house for a day or
two; other times he would stay for a week. When Plaintiff
returned in the last week of February 2008, he told the
Defendant that his newfound job required him to stay there
most of the time. Hence, he offered the house and lot for
lease to Defendant.

3. On March 8, 2008, Plaintiff and Defendant executed a

10-year contract of lease at the rental rate of 17,000.00 per
month. Based on the lease contract, Defendant was to use
the premises exclusively for residential purposes. 2

4. Furthermore, it was stipulated in the agreement that

the lease may be terminated upon mutual consent of the
parties and upon written notice communicated by the lessee
to the lessor within thirty days prior to the expiration of the
term.

5. Since the commencement of the lease until now,

Defendant has been paying the rental fee to Mr. Edward Te,
brother of the Plaintiff, who was authorized by the latter to
receive the payment.3 From March 8, 2008 up to the
institution of the complaint, Defendant has been religiously
paying the monthly rentals and was, in fact, never remiss in
his monetary obligation to Plaintiff.4

6. Sometime in June 2016, Plaintiff intimated to Defendant

that he is going to take possession of the house and lot.
Defendant reminded him that their contract was not to
expire until March 8, 2018.

1
Exhibit 1 (Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14344).
2
Exhibit 2 (Contract of Lease).
3
Exhibit 3 (Special Power of Attorney executed by Plaintiff granting his
brother Mr. Edward Te to receive the rental payment).
4
Exhibit 4 (Rent Summary Sheet).
Page 2 of 10
 7. On July 15, 2016, in utter disregard of the term of the
lease, Defendant received a letter from plaintiff demanding
him to vacate the property.5

8. On August 1, 2016, the case was referred to the Lupong

Tagapamayapa. At the meeting between Plaintiff and
Defendant before the Barangay, Defendant reiterated that
he will not move out as the lease has not yet expired. Worse,
he has had no opportunity to look for a new house, owing to
Plaintiffs sudden demand to vacate. Both Plaintiff and
Defendant were not able to settle the matter amicably,
prompting the Barangay to issue a Certificate to File Action. 6

9. Subsequently, on January 21, 2017, Defendant received

summons from the Municipal Trial Court of Davao City,
informing him of the instant case filed by Plaintiff against
him.

ISSUES
The resolution of the case hinges on the following
issues:

I. Whether or not Plaintiff has a cause of action against

Defendant; and

II. Whether or not Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees

and litigation expenses, and cost of the suit that
Plaintiff prayed for.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

I. PLAINTIFF HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT

Between the oral

agreement and the
written contract of
lease, the latter
prevails.

1. Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 9. Evidence of written agreements.

When the terms of an agreement have been
5
Exhibit 5 (Demand Letter sent by Plaintiff to Defendant).
6
Exhibit 6 (Certificate to File Action).
Page 3 of 10
 reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

2. The rule, formally known as the Parol Evidence Rule, is

meant to prevent the contracting parties from changing the
tenor of their agreement when such agreement has been
reduced into writing. In Norton Resources and Devt Corp. v.
All Asia Bank Corp.,7 the Supreme Court elucidated:

The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or

contradiction of the terms of a written instrument
by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that, at or before the execution of the parties'
written agreement, other or different terms were
agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of
the written contract. When an agreement has
been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be
permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged
practices which, to all purposes, would alter the
terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not
found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned.

3. Plaintiff alleged that based on his agreement with

Defendant, the latter was allowed to occupy the property to
serve as caretaker while Plaintiff was employed in Manila;
and that Defendant should vacate the premises once the
Plaintiff will use the house and lot.

4. That is only half the story. While there was an initial oral
agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant, it was
superseded by the execution of the Contract of Lease.

5. In their Contract of Lease, Plaintiff agreed to allow

Defendant to occupy the house and lot for a period of ten
years, and in return, Defendant agreed to pay 17,000.00
per month as rent.

6. Plaintiff cannot claim now that their agreement was to

make Defendant as caretaker only by relying on a mere oral
agreement. The Contract of Lease disproves such claim.

7
G.R. No. 162523, Nov. 25, 2009.
Page 4 of 10
Defendant has the
right to possess the
house and lot as the
lease has not yet
expired.

7. The special civil action for unlawful detainer has the

following essential requisites:

a. Initially, the possession of the property by the

defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff.

b. Eventually, the possession became illegal upon the

plaintiffs notice to the defendant of the termination of
the latters right of possession.

c. Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the

property and deprived the plaintiff of the latters
enjoyment.

d. Within one year from the making of the last demand on

the defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the Complaint for ejectment. 8

8. Plaintiff failed to establish the essential requisite that

Defendants possession of the house and lot became illegal.
Contrary to Plaintiffs claim, the Defendants possession of
the house and lot was by virtue of a lease contract.

9. The lease will expire on March 8, 2018. Yet Plaintiff sent

a letter to Defendant on July 15, 2016 demanding that the
latter vacate the house and lot, in utter contravention of the
lease. But the demand letter does not, by itself, have the
effect of terminating the Defendants right of possession.
Hence, Defendant is still the lawful possessor of the house
and lot.

Although Plaintiff can

terminate the lease
contract before its
expiration, there is no
reason for him to do so.

8
Republic of the Philippines v. Sunvar Realty Devt Corp., G.R. No.
194880, Jun. 20, 2012.
Page 5 of 10
 10. To be sure, though, the following provisions in the
lease contract entitle the Plaintiff to terminate the lease long
before its expiration:

xxx

1. PURPOSES: That premises hereby leased shall

be used exclusively by the LESSEE for residential
purposes only and shall not be diverted to other
uses. It is hereby expressly agreed that if any time
the premises are used for other purposes, the
LESSORS shall have the right to rescind this
contract without prejudice to its other rights under
the law;

xxx

6. RIGHT OF EJECTMENT: That if for two (2)

consecutive months, the LESSEE has failed to pay
the stated monthly rental, the LESSOR shall have
the right to eject the LESSEE from the leased
premises without prejudice to file a corresponding
civil action. In addition thereto, the LESSOR also
have the right to padlock the premises in the
event of the said failure of the LESSEE;

7. SUB-LEASE: That the LESSEE shall not directly

or indirectly sublet, allow, or permit the leased
premises to be occupied in whole or in part by any
person, form or corporation, neither shall the
LESSEE assign its rights hereunder to any other
person or entity and no right of interest thereto or
therein shall be conferred on or vested in anyone
by the LESSEE without the LESSORS written
approval;

11. Since Defendant occupied the house and lot in

2008, he has not violated any of those terms. He has used it
exclusively for residential purposes.

12. Neither has Defendant been remiss in his

obligation to pay the monthly rental. As a matter of fact,
Defendant has been diligently paying the rent. Not even
once did he fail to pay.

13. Nor did Defendant sub-lease, allow, and permit

other person to occupy the premises. Defendant has not,

Page 6 of 10
and does not intend to, assign his rights to any other person
or entity.

14. Hence, there is no reason for Plaintiff to terminate

the lease contract way before its expiration.

II. PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO

ATTORNEYS FEES AND OTHER FORMS OF
DAMAGES

1. Since Plaintiff has no cause of action against the

Defendant, there is thus no basis for the award of attorneys
fees and other forms of damages for which Plaintiff prayed.

2. Even if Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages, such

award is limited only to rentals or reasonable compensation
for the use of the property. Under Rule 70, Section 17 of the
Rules of Court, the trial court can award an amount
representing arrears of rent or reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises if it finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true.

3. In Teraa v. De Sagun,9 the Supreme Court explained the

rationale for limiting the kind of damages recoverable in an
unlawful detainer in this wise:

The rule is settled that in forcible entry or unlawful

detainer cases, the only damage that can be
recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the
leased property. The reason for this is that in such
cases, the only issue raised in ejectment cases is
that of rightful possession; hence, the damages
which could be recovered are those which the
plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor,
or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the property, and not the damages
which he may have suffered but which have no
direct relation to his loss of material possession.

4. Furthermore, an action for reimbursement or for

recovery of damages cannot be joined with the action for
ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a
full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a
special civil action which requires a summary procedure. The

9
G.R. No. 152131, Apr. 29, 2009.
Page 7 of 10
joinder of the two actions is specifically enjoined by Section
5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

PRAYER
Wherefore, Defendant respectfully prays of the
Honorable Court:

1. To dismiss the complaint, with costs against plaintiff;

and

2. To order Plaintiff to pay attorneys fees in the amount of

20,000.00.

Defendant also prays for other just and equitable reliefs.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

City of Davao, Philippines, February 4, 2016.

Doe, Jr. and Associates

Counsel for Defendant
Door 5, Bermejo Bldg., Magallanes St., Davao City
8000, Philippines

By:

Jane A. Doe
Roll No. 65263
IBP O.R. 1345460 (for FY 2016)
06-14-16 DAVAO CHAPTER
Davao City
PTR 2007957 06-27-16, PTO Dvo. City
TIN 365920123
MCLE (Admitted to the Bar in 2016)

Page 8 of 10
 VERIFICATION

I, CARLO MAMAC, single, of legal age, Filipino, and a resident

of Mahogany Subdivision, Bangkal, Davao City, after being
sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:

1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case.

2. I have caused the foregoing Position Paper to be

prepared and, aside from reading it myself, I have
caused it also to be read and translated to me in my
dialect for my better understanding.

3. I certify that the allegations in the foregoing Position

Paper are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge and/or based on authentic records.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand,

this 4th day of February, 2017, in the City of Davao.

CARLO MAMAC
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, in the City of

Davao, this 4th day of February, 2017, affiant having
exhibited to me his Commission on Elections ID with Voters
Identification No. 6318-0079A-L0849AAI10000 issued by the
Commission on Elections.

LEX S. BATAS
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2017
PTR CY 2016-2017 SC 1629013 12/09/15
ROLL NO. 8236
Lifetime IBP No. 398515 9/28/07

Page 9 of 10
Doc. No. 35;
Page No. 25;
Book No. X;
Series of 2017.

Page 10 of 10