Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Court has declared that the state policy on the heinous offense of rape is clear and unmistakable. Under certain circumstances, some of them present in this case,
the offender may be sentenced to a long period of confinement, or he may suffer death. The crime is an assault on human dignity. No legal system worthy of the name
can afford to ignore the traumatic consequences for the unfortunate victim and grievous injury to the peace and good order of the community.1

Rape is particularly odious, one which figuratively scrapes the bottom of the barrel of moral depravity, when committed against a minor. 2

In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is always scrutinized with extreme
caution.3

In the present case, there are certain particulars which impelled the court to devote an even more painstaking and meticulous examination of the facts on record and a
similarly conscientious evaluation of the arguments of the parties. The victim of rape in this case is a minor below twelve (12) years of age. As narrated by her, the
details of the rape are mesmerically sordid and repulsive. The victim was peddled for commercial sex by her own guardian whom she treated as a foster father. Because
the complainant was a willing victim, the acts of rape were preceded by several acts of lasciviousness on distinctly separate occasions. The accused is also a most
unlikely rapist. He is a member of Congress. Inspite of his having been charged and convicted by the trial court for statutory rape, his constituents liked him so much
that they knowingly re-elected him to his congressional office, the duties of which he could not perform.

Statutory rape committed by a distinguished Congressman on an eleven (11) year old commercial sex worker is bound to attract widespread media and public attention.
In the words of accused-appellant, "he has been demonized in the press most unfairly, his image transmogrified into that of a dastardly, ogre, out to get his slimy hands
on innocent and nave girls to satiate his lustful desires."4 This Court, therefore, punctiliously considered accused-appellants claim that he suffered "invidiously
discriminatory treatment." Regarding the above allegation, the Court has ascertained that the extensive publicity generated by the case did not result in a mistrial; the
records show that the accused had ample and free opportunity to adduce his defenses.

This is an appeal from the decision5 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, convicting accused-appellant
Romeo Jalosjos of two (2) counts of statutory rape, and in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, for six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, also known as the Child Abuse
Law.

There were six (6) other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, where the accused-appellant was acquitted of the
charges of acts of lasciviousness for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 16, 1996, two (2) informations for the crime of statutory rape; and twelve (12) for acts of lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, were filed against accused-appellant. The accusatory portion of said informations for the
crime of statutory rape state:

In Criminal Case No. 96-1985:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of
the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 18, 1996 at Room No.1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar against her will, with
damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

In Criminal Case No. 96-1986:

 The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11) year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR, accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of
the crime of RAPE defined and penalized under Art. 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about June 20, 1996 at Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with (sic) eleven year old minor Rosilyn Delantar
against her will, with damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

For acts of lasciviousness, the informations8 under which accused-appellant was convicted were identical except for the different dates of commission on June 14, 1996;
June 15, 1996; June 16, 1996; June 20, 1996; June 21, 1996; and June 22, 1996, to wit:

The undersigned, upon prior sworn complaint by the offended party, eleven (11)-year old minor ROSILYN DELANTAR accuses ROMEO JALOSJOS of the
crime of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Special Protection of
Children against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, committed as follows:

That in the evening of June 14, 1996, or thereabout, in Room No. 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City, Metro-Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kiss, caress and fondle
said complainant's face, lips, neck, breasts, whole body, and vagina, suck her nipples and insert his finger and then his tongue into her vagina,
place himself on top of her, then insert his penis in between her thighs until ejaculation, and other similar lascivious conduct against her will, to
her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1988; 96-1990; and 96-1993, there were added averments that on the different dates, the accused gave the complainant P10,000.00,
P5,000.00 and P5,000.00 respectively.

Upon arraignment on January 29, 1997, accused-appellant refused to enter a plea. Hence, the trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him. At the trial, the prosecution
presented eight (8) main witnesses and seven (7) rebuttal witnesses as well as documentary evidences marked as Exhibits A to EEEE, inclusive of submarkings. The
defense, on the other hand presented twenty-six (26) witnesses. Its documentary evidence consists of Exhibits 1 to 153, inclusive of submarkings. The records of the
case are extremely voluminous.

The Peoples version of the facts, culled mainly from the testimony of the victim, are as follows:

Maria Rosilyn Delantar was a slim, eleven-year old lass with long, straight black hair and almond-shaped black eyes. She grew up in a two-storey apartment in Pasay
City under the care of Simplicio Delantar, whom she treated as her own father. Simplicio was a fifty-six year old homosexual whose ostensible source of income was
sellinglongganiza and tocino and accepting boarders at his house. On the side, he was also engaged in the skin trade as a pimp.

Rosilyn never got to see her mother, though she had known a younger brother, Shandro, who was also under the care of Simplicio. At a very young age of 5, fair and
smooth-complexioned Rosilyn was exposed by Simplicio to his illicit activities. She and her brother would tag along with Simplicio whenever he delivered prostitutes
to his clients. When she turned 9, Rosilyn was offered by Simplicio as a prostitute to an Arabian national known as Mr. Hammond. Thus begun her ordeal as one of the
girls sold by Simplicio for sexual favors.

Rosilyn first met accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, sometime in February 1996 at his office located near Robinsons Galleria. Rosilyn and Simplicio were brought
there and introduced by a talent manager by the name of Eduardo Suarez. Accused-appellant promised to help Rosilyn become an actress. When he saw Rosilyn,
accused-appellant asked how old she was. Simplicio answered, "10. She is going to be 11 on May 11." Accused-appellant inquired if Rosilyn knows how to sing.
Simplicio told Rosilyn to sing, so she sang the song, "Tell Me You Love Me." Accused-appellant then asked if Rosilyn has nice legs and then raised her skirt up to the
mid-thighs. He asked if she was already menstruating, and Simplicio said yes. Accused-appellant further inquired if Rosilyn already had breasts. When nobody
answered, accused-appellant cupped Rosilyns left breast. Thereafter, accused-appellant assured them that he would help Rosilyn become an actress as he was one of the
producers of the TV programs, "Valiente" and "Eat Bulaga."

Simplicio and Suarez then discussed the execution of a contract for Rosilyns movie career. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, said that he would adopt Rosilyn and
that the latter would have to live with him in his condominium at the Ritz Towers. Before Simplicio and Rosilyn went home, accused-appellant gave Rosilyn P2,000.00.

The second time Rosilyn met accused-appellant was at his condominium unit, located at Room 1702, Ritz Towers, Makati City. Accused-appellant and Simplicio
discussed the contract and his plan to finance Rosilyns studies. Accused-appellant gave Simplicio P500.00, thereafter, Rosilyn, Shandro and Simplicio left.

The third meeting between Rosilyn and accused-appellant was also at Ritz Towers to discuss her acting career. Accused-appellant referred the preparation of Rosilyns
contract to his lawyer, who was also present. After the meeting, Simplicio and Rosilyn left. As they were walking towards the elevator, accused-appellant approached
them and gave Rosilyn P3,000.00.

On June 14, 1996, at about 8:30 to 9:00 p.m., Simplicio and Rosilyn returned to accused-appellants condominium unit at Ritz Towers. When accused-appellant came
out of his bedroom, Simplicio told Rosilyn to go inside the bedroom, while he and accused-appellant stayed outside. After a while, accused-appellant entered the
bedroom and found Rosilyn watching television. He walked towards Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips, then left the room again. Simplicio came in and bid her
goodbye. Rosilyn told Simplicio that accused-appellant kissed her to which Simplicio replied, "Halik lang naman."

Rosilyn was left alone in the bedroom watching television. After some time, accused-appellant came in and entered the bathroom. He came out clad in a long white T-
shirt on which was printed the word, "Dakak." In his hand was a plain white T-shirt. Accused-appellant told Rosilyn that he wanted to change her clothes. Rosilyn
protested and told accused-appellant that she can do it herself, but accused-appellant answered, "Daddy mo naman ako." Accused-appellant then took off Rosilyns
blouse and skirt. When he was about to take off her panties, Rosilyn said, "Huwag po." Again, accused-appellant told her, "After all, I am your Daddy." Accused-
appellant then removed her panties and dressed her with the long white T-shirt.

The two of them watched television in bed. After sometime, accused-appellant turned off the lamp and the television. He turned to Rosilyn and kissed her lips. He then
raised her shirt, touched her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and cried out, "Tama na po." Accused-appellant stopped. He continued to
kiss her lips and fondle her breasts. Later, accused-appellant told Rosilyn to sleep.

The following morning, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant whom she found bent over and kissing her. He told her to get up, took her hand and led her to the
bathroom. He removed Rosilyns shirt and gave her a bath. While accused-appellant rubbed soap all over Rosilyns body, he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger
into her vagina. After that, he rinsed her body, dried her with a towel and applied lotion on her arms and legs. Then, he dried her hair and told her to dress up. Rosilyn
put on her clothes and went out of the bathroom, while accused-appellant took a shower.

Accused-appellant ate breakfast while Rosilyn stayed in the bedroom watching television. When accused-appellant entered the room, he knelt in front of her, removed
her panties and placed her legs on his shoulders. Then, he placed his tongue on her vagina. Thereafter, he gave Rosilyn P10,000.00 and told his housemaid to take her
shopping at Shoemart. When she returned to the Ritz Towers, Simplicio was waiting for her. The two of them went home. Rosilyn narrated to Simplicio what accused-
appellant did to her, and pleaded for him not to bring her back to the Ritz Towers. Simplicio told her that everything was alright as long as accused-appellant does not
have sexual intercourse with her.

That same evening, at around 9:00 to 9:30 in the evening, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. After Simplicio left, accused-appellant removed
Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with the same long T-shirt. They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant sat beside Rosilyn and kissed her on the lips.
He made Rosilyn lie down, lifted her shirt above her breasts, and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, accused-appellant removed his own clothes, placed his penis
between Rosilyns thighs and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated on her thighs. Thereafter, accused-appellant kissed her and told her to sleep.

The next day, June 16, 1996, accused-appellant roused her from sleep and bathed her. Again, he rubbed soap all over her body, washed her hair, and thereafter rinsed her
body and dried her hair. While accused-appellant was bathing Rosilyn, he asked her to fondle his penis while he caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her
vagina. After their shower, accused-appellant ate breakfast. He gave Rosilyn P5,000.00 and told her to just wait for Simplicio in the condominium unit. On their way
home, Simplicio told Rosilyn that if accused-appellant tries to insert his penis into her vagina, she should refuse.

At around 8:00 p.m. of June 18, 1996, Simplicio brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. They found accused-appellant sitting on the bed in his bedroom. Simplicio told
Rosilyn to approach accused-appellant, then he left. Accused-appellant took off Rosilyns clothes and dressed her with a long T-shirt on which was printed a picture of
accused-appellant and a woman, with the caption, "Cong. Jalosjos with his Toy." They watched television for a while, then accused-appellant lay beside Rosilyn and
kissed her on the lips. He raised her shirt and parted her legs. He positioned himself between the spread legs of Rosilyn, took off his own shirt, held his penis, and poked
and pressed the same against Rosilyns vagina. This caused Rosilyn pain inside her sex organ. Thereafter, accused-appellant fondled her breasts and told her to sleep.

When Rosilyn woke up the following morning, June 19, 1996, accused-appellant was no longer around but she found P5,000.00 on the table. Earlier that morning, she
had felt somebody touching her private parts but she was still too sleepy to find out who it was. Rosilyn took a bath, then went off to school with Simplicio, who arrived
to fetch her.

The next encounter of Rosilyn with accused-appellant was on June 21, 1996, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening in his bedroom at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant
stripped her naked and again put on her the long shirt he wanted her to wear. After watching television for a while, accused-appellant knelt beside Rosilyn, raised her
shirt, caressed her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. Then, he clipped his penis between Rosilyns thighs, and made thrusting motions until he ejaculated.
Thereafter, Rosilyn went to sleep.

The next day, June 22, 1996, Rosilyn was awakened by accused-appellant who was kissing her and fondling her sex organ. She, however, ignored him and went back to
sleep. When she woke up, she found the P5,000.00 which accused-appellant left and gave the same to Simplicio Delantar, when the latter came to pick her up.

On June 29, 1996, Rosilyn again went to the Ritz Towers. During that visit, accused-appellant took photographs of Rosilyn. He asked her to pose with her T-shirt pulled
down thereby exposing her breasts. He also took her photographs with her T-shirt rolled up to the pelvis but without showing her pubis, and finally, while straddled on a
chair facing the backrest, showing her legs.

Before Rosilyn went to sleep, accused-appellant kissed her lips, fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina. The following morning, she woke up and
found the P5,000.00 left by accused-appellant on the table. She recalled that earlier that morning, she felt somebody caressing her breasts and sex organ.

On July 2, 1996 at 7:00 p.m., Rosilyn and Simplicio returned to the Ritz Towers. Rosilyn had to wait for accused-appellant, who arrived between 12:00 to 1:00 a.m. He
again dressed her with the long white shirt similar to what he was wearing. While sitting on the bed, accused-appellant kissed her lips and inserted his tongue into her
mouth. He then fondled her breasts and inserted his finger into her vagina, causing her to cry in pain. Accused-appellant stopped and told her to sleep.
The next morning, accused-appellant bathed her again. While he soaped her body, he fondled her breasts and inserted his finger in her vagina. Rosilyn felt pain and
shoved his hand away. After bathing her, accused-appellant had breakfast. Before he left, he gave Rosilyn P5,000.00. As soon as Simplicio arrived, Rosilyn gave her the
money and then they left for school.

On July 20, 1996, Simplicio again brought Rosilyn to the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant was waiting in his bedroom. He took off Rosilyns clothes, including her
panties, and dressed her with a long T-shirt similar to what he was wearing. After watching television, accused-appellant kissed Rosilyn on the lips, inserted his tongue
in her mouth and fondled her breasts. Then, he made Rosilyn lie on the bed, spread her legs apart and placed a pillow under her back. He inserted his finger in her
vagina and mounted himself between her legs with his hands rested on her sides. After that, he lifted his shirt, then pointed and pressed his penis against her vagina.
Accused-appellant made thrusting motions, which caused Rosilyn pain. Thereafter, accused-appellant told her to sleep.

In the early morning of July 21, 1996, Rosilyn felt somebody touching her sex organ, but she did not wake up. When she woke up later, she found P5,000.00 on the
table, and she gave this to Simplicio when he came to fetch her.

On August 15, 1996, Rosilyn and Simplicio went to the Ritz Towers at around 7:00 p.m. Accused-appellant was about to leave, so he told them to come back later that
evening. The two did not return.

The following day, Rosilyn ran away from home with the help of Yamie Estreta, one of their boarders. Yamie accompanied Rosilyn to the Pasay City Police, where she
executed a sworn statement against Simplicio Delantar. Rosilyn was thereafter taken to the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an investigation, which eventually led to the filing of criminal charges against accused-appellant.

On August 23, 1996, Rosilyn was examined by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas at Camp Crame. The examination yielded the following results:

EXTERNAL AND EXTRAGENITAL

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breasts are conical with pinkish brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft

GENITAL

There is moderate growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On
separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy type hymen, with shallow healed laceration at 3 o'clock position and deep healed laceration at 8 o'clock
position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal
canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is firm and closed.

CONCLUSION:

Subject is in non-virgin state physically.

There are no external signs of application of any form of violence.9

During the trial, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that it was his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, whom Rosilyn had met, once at
accused-appellants Dakak office and twice at the Ritz Towers. Accused-appellant insisted that he was in the province on the dates Rosilyn claimed to have been
sexually abused. He attributed the filing of the charges against him to a small group of blackmailers who wanted to extort money from him, and to his political
opponents, particularly Ex-Congressman Artemio Adaza, who are allegedly determined to destroy his political career and boost their personal agenda.

More specifically, accused-appellant claims that on June 16, 1996, he was on the Philippine Airlines (PAL) 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog. He stayed in
Dipolog until June 18, 1996. He submitted in evidence airline ticket no. 10792424,10 showing that he was on board Flight PR 165; the said flights passengers
manifest,11 where the name JALOSJOS/RM/MR appears; and photographs showing accused-appellants constituents welcoming his arrival and showing accused-
appellant talking with former Mayor Hermanico Carreon and Fiscal Empainado.

Accused-appellant further alleges that on June 28, 1996, he again took the 9:40 a.m. flight from Manila to Dipolog City. On the same flight, he met Armando Nocom of
the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Upon arrival and after talking to his representatives, he proceeded to his residence known as "Barangay House" in Taguinon, Dapitan, near
Dakak Beach resort, and spent the night there.

On June 29, 1996, accused-appellant attended the fiesta at Barangay San Pedro. He stayed in the house of Barangay Captain Mila Yap until 5:30 p.m. Then, together
with some friends, he visited the Rizal Shrine and the Pirate Bar at Dakak Beach Resort. Thereafter, he retired in the "Barangay House" in Taguilon.

On June 30, 1996, accused-appellant alleges that he attended a city-wide consultation with his political leaders at the Blue Room of Dakak, which lasted till the
afternoon. In the evening, he went home and slept in the "Barangay House."

On July 1, 1996, he attended the whole day celebration of Dipolog Day. He spent the night in the "Barangay House."
On July 2, 1996, he attended the inauguration of the reception hall of Dakak Beach Resort. The blessing ceremony was officiated by Assistant Parish Priest Adelmo
Laput.

On July 3, 1996, he was the guest in the inaguration of the 3rd Engineering District of Dapitan City. After the mass, he visited the Jamboree site in Barangay Taguilon,
Dapitan City.

He further contended that after his arrival in Dipolog on June 28, 1996, there was never an instance when he went to Manila until July 9, 1996, when he attended a
conference called by the President of the Philippines.

Accused-appellant likewise alleged that on July 21, 1996, he took the 5:00 a.m. flight of PAL from Manila to Dumaguete City. From there, he was flown by a private
plane to Dipolog, where he stayed until the President of the Philippines arrived.

To buttress the theory of the defense, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos testified that he was the one, and not accused-appellant, whom Rosilyn met on three occasions. These
occurred once during the first week of May 1996, at accused-appellants Dakak office where Rosilyn and Simplicio Delantar were introduced to him by Eduardo
Suarez, and twice at the Ritz Towers when he interviewed Rosilyn, and later when Rosilyn and Simplicio followed up the proposed entry of Rosilyn into the show
business.

Dominadors admission of his meetings with Rosilyn on three instances were limited to interviewing her and assessing her singing and modeling potentials. His
testimony made no mention of any sexual encounter with Rosilyn.

After trial, the court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y
GARCIA, as principal in the two (2) counts of statutory rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby declared
CONVICTED in each of these cases.

2. Accordingly, he is sentenced to:

2a. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of these cases.

2b. indemnify the victim, MA. ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral damages for each
of the cases.

3. In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992 and 96-1993, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, as principal in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized under Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 otherwise known as the Child Abuse Law. He is hereby declared CONVICTED in each of these cases;

4. Accordingly he is sentenced to:

4.a. suffer in each of the cases an indeterminate prison term of from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its
medium period, as maximum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum;

4.b. indemnify the victim, MA ROSILYN DELANTAR, in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) as moral damages for each of the
cases;

5. In Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997 and 96-1998, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of the accused, ROMEO JALOSJOS y GARCIA, in six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness. Therefore, on the ground of reasonable doubt, the accused in
these cases is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.12

Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends:

A.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT,
CONSIDERING THE ATTENDANT INDICIA OF INCONSISTENCIES AND UNTRUTHS.

B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CONFLICTING STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

D.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR LESS THAN TWELVE YEARS OF AGE
WHEN THE CLAIMED INCIDENTS ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE.

E.

THE TRIAL COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RAPE WAS COMMITTED AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.13

In this jurisdiction, the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases is scrutinized with utmost caution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires no
less than moral certainty beyond any scintilla of doubt. This applies with more vigor in rape cases where the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and is not allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. As an inevitable consequence, it is the rape victim herself that is actually
put on trial. The case at bar is no exception. Bent on destroying the veracity of private complainants testimony, the errors assigned by accused-appellant, particularly
the first three, are focused on the issue of credibility.

Accused-appellant makes much of his acquittal in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1991, 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, 96-1997, and 96-1998, for acts of lasciviousness.
According to him, the fact that the trial court sustained his defense of alibi in the said cases only shows that Rosilyn concocted her stories and the rest of her testimony
ought not to be believed. Stated differently, accused-appellant urges the application of the doctrine of "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" (false in part, false in
everything).14

The contention is without merit. Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute rule of law and is in fact rarely applied in modern jurisprudence.15 Thus, in People v.
Yanson-Dumancas,16 citing People v. Li Bun Juan,17 this Court held that:

... In this connection it must be borne in mind that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not an absolute one, and that it is perfectly reasonable to
believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts. In People vs. Keller, 46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222-3223,
the following was quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1 Moore on Facts, p. 23:

"18. Testimony may be partly credited and partly rejected. --- Trier of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has said; they may accept
some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts and circumstances to be the truth
Even when witnesses are found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they deem worthy of belief." (p. 945) 18

Being in the best position to discriminate between the truth and the falsehood, the trial court's assignment of values and weight on the testimony of Rosilyn should be
given credence. Significantly, it should be borne in mind that the issue at hand hinges on credibility, the assessment of which, as oft-repeated, is best made by the trial
court because of its untrammeled opportunity to observe her demeanor on the witness stand.

On the demeanor and manner of testifying shown by the complainant, the trial court stated:

Guided by the foregoing principles, this court found no reason why it should not believe Rosilyn when she claimed she was raped. Testimonies of rape
victims especially those who are young and immature deserve full credence (People v. Liquiran, 228 SCRA 62 (1993) considering that "no woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a public trial if she was not motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished." (People v. Buyok, 235 SCRA 622 [1996]).

When asked to describe what had been done to her, Rosilyn was able to narrate spontaneously in detail how she was sexually abused. Her testimony in this
regard was firm, candid, clear and straightforward, and it remained to be so even during the intense and rigid cross-examination made by the defense
counsel.19

Accused-appellant next argues that Rosilyns direct and redirect testimonies were rehearsed and lacking in candidness. He points to the supposed hesitant and even
idiotic answers of Rosilyn on cross and re-cross examinations. He added that she was trained to give answers such as, "Ano po?", "Parang po," "Medyo po," and "Sa
tingin ko po."

Accused-appellants arguments are far from persuasive. A reading of the pertinent transcript of stenographic notes reveals that Rosilyn was in fact firm and consistent
on the fact of rape and lascivious conduct committed on her by accused-appellant. She answered in clear, simple and natural words customary of children of her age.
The above phrases quoted by accused-appellant as uttered by Rosilyn are, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, typical answers of child witnesses like her.
At any rate, even assuming that Rosilyn, during her lengthy ordeals on the witness stand, may have given some ambiguous answers, they refer merely to minor and
peripheral details which do not in any way detract from her firm and straightforward declaration that she had been molested and subjected to lascivious conduct by
accused-appellant. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that even the most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes and confused statements. At times, far from
eroding the effectiveness of the evidence, such lapses could, indeed, constitute signs of veracity.20

Then, too, accused-appellant capitalizes on the alleged absence of any allegation of rape in the five (5) sworn statements executed by Rosilyn as well as in the
interviews and case study conducted by the representatives of the DSWD. In particular, accused-appellant points to the following documents:

(1) Sworn statements dated August 22 and 26, 1996, executed before SPO5 Milagros A. Carrasco of the Pasay City Police;

(2) Sworn statements dated September 5, 11, and 19, 1996, executed before NBI Agents Cynthia L. Mariano and Supervising NBI Agent Arlis E. Vela;

(3) The Initial Interview of Rosilyn by the DSWD dated August 30, 1996;

(4) DSWD Final Case Study Report dated January 10, 1997.

It must be stressed that "rape" is a technical term, the precise and accurate definition of which could not have been understood by Rosilyn. Indeed, without the
assistance of a lawyer, who could explain to her the intricacies of rape, she expectedly could not distinguish in her affidavits and consequently disclose with proficient
exactitude the act or acts of accused-appellant that under the contemplation of law constitute the crime of rape. This is especially true in the present case where there
was no exhaustive and clear-cut evidence of full and complete penetration of the victims vagina. It may well be that Rosilyn thought, as any layman would probably
do, that there must be the fullest penetration of the victims vagina to qualify a sexual act to rape.

In People v. Campuhan,21 we ruled that rape is consummated "by the slightest penetration of the female organ,i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
penis." There need not be full and complete penetration of the victims vagina for rape to be consummated. There being no showing that the foregoing technicalities of
rape was fully explained to Rosilyn on all those occasions that she was interviewed by the police, the NBI agents and DSWD social workers, she could not therefore be
expected to intelligibly declare that accused-appellants act of pressing his sex organ against her labia without full entry of the vaginal canal amounted to rape.

In the decision of the trial court, the testimony on one of the rapes is cited plus the courts mention of the jurisprudence on this issue, to wit:

Q: You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart,
what else did he do?

A: He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko." (Italics supplied)

Q: And, after doing that: "Idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko"; what else did he do?

A: After that, "Itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko." (underscoring supplied)

(pp. 23, 25 to 30, TSN, 16 April 1997)

It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that rape can be committed even without full penetration of the male organ into the vagina of the woman. It is
enough that there be proof of the entrance of the male organ within the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. (People vs. Mangalino, 182 SCRA 329;
People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535; People vs. Bacani, 181 SCRA 393). "Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the female organ suffices to warrant
a conviction." (People vs. Galimba, G.R. No. 111563-64, February 20, 1996 citing People vs. Abonada, 169 SCRA 530). Hence, with the testimony of
Rosilyn that the accused pressed against ("idiniin") and pointed to ("itinutok") Rosilyns vagina his sexual organ on two (2) occasions, two (2) acts of rape
were consummated.22

Moreover, it must be borne in mind that Rosilyns purpose in executing the affidavits on August 22 and 26, 1996 before the Pasay City Police was to charge Simplicio
Delantar, not accused-appellant. As aptly pointed out by the trial court, it is preposterous to expect Rosilyn to make an exhaustive narration of the sexual abuse of
accused-appellant when he was not the object of the said complaint.

Additionally, Rosilyns statements, given to the NBI on September 11 and 19, 1996, concerned mainly the identification of pictures. There was thus no occasion for her
to narrate the details of her sexual encounter with accused-appellant.

As to the interviews and studies conducted by the DSWD, suffice it to state that said meetings with Rosilyn were specially focused on the emotional and psychological
repercussions of the sexual abuse on Rosilyn, and had nothing to do with the legal actions being prepared as a consequence thereof. Thus, the documents pertaining to
said interviews and studies cannot be relied upon to reveal every minute aspect of the sexual molestations complained of.

At any rate, the inconsistencies between the affidavits and Rosilyns testimony, if at all they existed, cannot diminish the probative value of Rosilyns declarations on
the witness stand. The consistent ruling of this Court is that, if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit of a witness and her testimonies given in open court, the
latter commands greater weight than the former.23
In the third assigned error, accused-appellant attempts to impress upon this Court that Rosilyn gave the name Congressman Romeo Jalosjos as her abuser only because
that was the name given to her by the person to whom she was introduced. That same name, accused-appellant claims, was merely picked up by Rosilyn from the name
plate, plaque, and memo pad she saw on accused-appellants office desk. Accused-appellant presented his brother, Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos, in an attempt to cast doubt
on his culpability. It was Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos who allegedly met and interviewed Rosilyn at the Dakak office. In advancement of this theory, accused-appellant
cites the fact that out of a total of 16 pictures presented to Rosilyn for identification, she picked up only 4, which depict Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. In the same vein,
accused-appellant claims that the resulting cartographic sketch from the facial characteristics given by Rosilyn to the cartographer, resembles the facial appearance of
Dominador "Jun" Jalosjos. Accused-appellant also points out that Rosilyn failed to give his correct age or state that he has a mole on his lower right jaw.

Contrary to the contentions of accused-appellant, the records reveal that Rosilyn positively and unhesitatingly identified accused-appellant at the courtroom. Such
identification during the trial cannot be diminished by the fact that in her sworn statement, Rosilyn referred to accused-appellant as her abuser based on the name she
heard from the person to whom she was introduced and on the name she saw and read in accused-appellants office. Verily, a persons identity does not depend solely on
his name, but also on his physical features. Thus, a victim of a crime can still identify the culprit even without knowing his name. Similarly, the Court, in People v.
Vasquez,24ruled that:

It matters little that the eyewitness initially recognized accused-appellant only by face [the witness] acted like any ordinary person in making inquiries
to find out the name that matched [appellants] face. Significantly, in open court, he unequivocally identified accused-appellant as their assailant.

Even in the case of People v. Timon,25 relied upon by accused-appellant to discredit his identification, this Court said that even assuming that the out-of-court
identification of accused-appellant was defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it.

In light of the foregoing, Rosilyns failure to identify accused-appellant out of the 16 pictures shown to her does not foreclose the credibility of her unqualified
identification of accused-appellant in open court. The same holds true with the subject cartographic sketch which, incidentally, resembles accused-appellant. As noted
by the trial court, accused-appellant and his brother Dominador Jalosjos have a striking similarity in facial features. Naturally, if the sketch looks like Dominador, it
logically follows that the same drawing would definitely look like accused-appellant.

Likewise, Rosilyns failure to correctly approximate the age of accused-appellant and to state that he has a mole on the lower right jaw, cannot affect the veracity of
accused-appellants identification. At a young age, Rosilyn cannot be expected to give the accurate age of a 56 year-old person. As to accused-appellants mole, the
Solicitor General is correct in contending that said mole is not so distinctive as to capture Rosilyns attention and memory. When she was asked to give additional
information about accused-appellant, Rosilyn described him as having a "prominent belly." This, to our mind, is indeed a more distinguishing feature that would
naturally catch the attention of an eleven year-old child like Rosilyn.

In his fifth assigned error, accused-appellant insists that the words "idinikit," "itinutok," and "idiniin-diin," which Rosilyn used to describe what accused-appellant did to
her vagina with his genitals, do not constitute consummated rape. In addition, the defense argued that Rosilyn did not actually see accused-appellants penis in the
supposed sexual contact. In fact, they stressed that Rosilyn declared that accused-appellants semen spilled in her thighs and not in her sex organ.

Moreover, in his Reply Brief, accused-appellant, citing People v. Campuhan, argued that, assuming that his penis touched or brushed Rosilyns external genitals, the
same is not enough to establish the crime of rape.

True, in People v. Campuhan,26 we explained that the phrase, "the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is
sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge," means that the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labia of the
female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum. We further elucidated that:

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora, labia minora,
the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the
surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the
outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hairs but has many
sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. 27

In the present case, there is sufficient proof to establish that the acts of accused-appellant went beyond "strafing of the citadel of passion" or "shelling of the castle of
orgasmic potency," as depicted in the Campuhan case, and progressed into "bombardment of the drawbridge [which] is invasion enough," 28 there being, in a manner of
speaking, a conquest of the fortress of ignition. When the accused-appellant brutely mounted between Rosilyns wide-spread legs, unfetteredly touching, poking and
pressing his penis against her vagina, which in her position would then be naturally wide open and ready for copulation, it would require no fertile imagination to belie
the hypocrisy claimed by accused-appellant that his penis or that of someone who looked like him, would under the circumstances merely touch or brush the external
genital of Rosilyn. The inevitable contact between accused-appellants penis, and at the very least, the labia of the pudendum of Rosilyn, was confirmed when she felt
pain inside her vagina when the "idiniin" part of accused appellants sex ritual was performed.

The incident on June 18, 1996 was described by Rosilyn as follows:

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And, after kissing your lips; after kissing you in your lips, what else did he do?
A. After that, he was lifting my shirt.

Q. Now, while he was lifting your shirt, what was your position; will you tell the court?

A. I was lying, sir.

Q. Lying on what?

A. On the bed, sir.

Q. And, after lifting your shirt, what else did he do?

A. He spread my legs sir.

Q. And, after spreading your legs apart; what did he do?

A. After that, he lifted his shirt and held his penis.

Q. And while he was holding his penis; what did he do?

A. He pressed it in my vagina.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

May we request that the vernacular be used?

A. Tapos po, idinikit-dikit po niya yong ari niya sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:

May I respectfully move that the word: "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko," be incorporated?

Q. And while he was doing that; according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari mo;" what did you feel?

A. I was afraid and then, I cried.

Q. Will you tell the Court why you felt afraid and why you cried?

A. Because I was afraid he might insert his penis into my vagina.

Q. And, for how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, which according to you, "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"

COURT:

Place the Tagalog words, into the records.

A. Sandali lang po yon.

Q. What part of your vagina, or "ari" was being touched by the ari or penis?

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You said that you felt I withdraw that question. How did you know that Congressman Jalosjos was doing, "idinikit-dikit niya yung ari niya sa ari
ko?"

A. Because I could feel it, sir.

Q. Now, you said you could feel it. What part of the vagina in what part of your vagina was Congressman Jalosjos, according to you, "idinikit-dikit
niya yong ari niya sa ari mo?"
A. In front of my vagina, sir.

Q. In front of your vagina? O.K.; will you tell the Court the position? Will you describe the position of Congressman Jalosjos when he was doing that.
"Idinikit-dikit niya sa ari ko?"

A. Ide-demonstrate ko po ba?

FISCAL ZUNO:

Q. Can you demonstrate?

xxx xxx xxx

A. He was holding me like this with his one hand; and was holding his penis while his other hand, or his free hand was on the bed.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. ZUNO:

Now, according to you, you dont know how to say it; or what was done to you. Now, will you tell the Court how can you describe what was done
to you?

A. After he "dinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; itinutok naman niya ito."

Q. O.K. you said "itinutok niya ito;" what else did he do?

PROS. ZUNO:

She is now trying to describe.

COURT:

Translate.

A. He seems to be "parang idinidiin po niya."

Q. Now, what did you feel, when according to you; as I would quote: "parang idinidiin niya?"

A. Masakit po.

Q. And, just to make it clear in Tagalog: Ano itong idinidiin niya?

COURT:

Q. Sabi mo itinutok. Nakita mo bang itinutok?

A. I saw him na nakaganuon po sa ano niya.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. O.K., clarify. You said "nakaganuon siya" what do you mean by "nakaganuon siya?"

A. He was holding his penis, and then, that was the one which he itinutok sa ari ko.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And, when you said "idinidiin po niya;" to which you are referring? What is this "idinidiin niya?"

A. Idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko.

 Q. And what did you feel when you said: he was "idinidiin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko?"

A. Masakit po.

COURT:

The answer is "masakit po."

Proceed.

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. Where did you feel the pain?

A. Inside my ari po. (Sa loob po ng ari ko.)

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. ZUNO:

Q. And then, after that, what else did he do

A. After that, he touched my breast, sir.

Q. And, after touching your breast, what did he do?

A. And after that I felt that he was (witness demonstrating to the court, with her index finger, rubbing against her open left palm)

Q. And after doing that, what else did he do?

A. After that, he instructed me to go to sleep.

xxx xxx xxx

A. I put down my clothes and then, I cried myself to sleep, sir.

Q. Why did you cry? Will you tell the court, why did you cried after putting down your clothes?

A. Because I felt pity for myself. (Naaawa po ako sa sarili ko.)

xxx xxx x x x.

(Emphasis supplied.)29

Even the July 20, 1996 encounter between Rosilyn and accused-appellant would not tax the sketchy visualization of the nave and uninitiated to conclude that there was
indeed penile invasion by accused-appellant of Rosilyns labia. On that occasion, accused-appellant was similarly ensconced between the parted legs of Rosilyn, except
that, this time, Rosilyn was conveniently rested on, and elevated with a pillow on her back while accused-appellant was touching, poking and pressing his penis against
her vagina. Topped with the thrusting motions employed by accused-appellant, the resulting pain felt by Rosilyn in her sex organ was no doubt a consequence of
consummated rape.

The pertinent portions of Rosilyns account of the July 20, 1996 incident is as follows:

PROS. ZUNO:

xxx xxx xxx

Q. The moment when Cong. Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, what was your position?

INTERPRETER:
 The witness is asking he (sic) she has to demonstrate?

FISCAL ZUNO:

Q. Ipaliwanag mo lang?

A. My back was rested on a pillow and my legs were spread apart.

Q. You said that when Congressman Jalosjos inserted his finger into your vagina, your back was rested on a pillow and your legs were spread wide apart,
what else did he do?

A. He lifted his shirt, and held his penis; and again "idinikit-dikit niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."

Q. And what did you feel when he was doing that which according to you and I would quote in Tagalog: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko?"

A. I was afraid sir.

Q. And, after doing that: "idinikit-dikit niya yong ari niya sa ari ko," what else did he do?

A. After that, "itinutok niya po yong ari niya at idiniin-diin niya ang ari niya sa ari ko."

Q. You said: "Congressman Jalosjos itinutok niya yong ari niya sa ari ko; at idiniin-diin niya yong ari niya sa ari ko;" Now, while he was doing that act,
what was the position of Congressman Jalosjos?

A. His two (2) hands were on my side and since my legs were spread apart; he was in-between them, and doing an upward and downward movement.

(Witness demonstrated a pushing, or pumping movement)

Q. For how long did Congressman Jalosjos perform that act, pushing or pumping movement while his penis, or "ang ari niya ay nakatutok at idinidiin-
diin yong ari niya sa ari mo?"

A. I dont know.

Q. And what did you feel when Congressman Jalosjos was making that movement, pushing, or pumping?

A. I felt pain and then I cried.

Q. Where did you feel the pain?

A. Inside my vagina, sir.

xxx xxx x x x.30

The childs narration of the rape sequence is revealing. The act of "idinikit-dikit niya" was followed by "itinutok niya xxx at idiniin-diin niya." The "idiniin-diin niya"
was succeeded by "Masakit po." Pain inside her "ari" is indicative of consummated penetration.

The environmental circumstances displayed by the graphic narration of what took place at the appellants room from June 14 to June 16 and June 21 to June 22, 1996
are consistent with the complainants testimony which shows that rape was legally consummated.

In the case of People v. Campuhan, the victim put up a resistance --- by putting her legs close together --- which, although futile, somehow made it inconvenient, if not
difficult, for the accused-appellant to attempt penetration. On the other hand, the ease with which accused-appellant herein perpetrated the sexual abuse, not to mention
the absence of time constraint, totally distinguishes the instant case from Campuhan. Here, the victim was passive and even submissive to the lecherous acts of accused-
appellant. Thus, even assuming that his penis then was flaccid, his act of holding, guiding and assisting his penis with his one hand, while touching, poking and pressing
the same against Rosilyn's vagina, would surely result in even the slightest contact between the labia of the pudendum and accused-appellant's sex organ.

Considering that Rosilyn is a self-confessed sex worker, and the circumstances of the alleged sexual assault at bar, the defense argued that it is highly improbable and
contrary to human experience that accused-appellant exercised a Spartan-like discipline and restrained himself from fully consummating the sexual act when there was
in fact no reason for him not to do so. In the same light, the defense likewise branded as unnatural the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant contented himself
with rubbing his penis clipped between her thighs until he reached orgasm and desisted from fully penetrating her, when Rosilyn was then entirely at his disposal.
The defense seems to forget that there is no standard form of behavior when it comes to gratifying ones basic sexual instinct. The human sexual perversity is far too
intricate for the defense to prescribe certain forms of conduct. Even the word "perverse" is not entirely precise, as what may be perverse to one may not be to another.
Using a child of tender years who could even pass as ones granddaughter, to unleash what others would call downright bestial lust, may be utterly nauseating and
repulsive to some, but may peculiarly be a festive celebration of salacious fantasies to others. For all we know, accused-appellant may have found a distinct and
complete sexual gratification in such kind of libidinous stunts and maneuvers.

Nevertheless, accused-appellant may not have fully and for a longer period penetrated Rosilyn for fear of perpetrating his name through a child from the womb of a
minor; or because of his previous agreement with his "suking bugaw," Simplicio Delantar, that there would be no penetration, otherwise the latter would demand a
higher price. This may be the reason why Simplicio Delantar gave his mocking fatherly advice to Rosilyn that it is bad if accused-appellant inserts his penis into her sex
organ, while at the same time ordering her to call him if accused-appellant would penetrate her. Such instance of penile invasion would prompt Simplicio to demand a
higher price, which is, after all, as the Solicitor General calls it, the peculiarity of prostitution.

The defense contends that the testimony of Rosilyn that accused-appellant ejaculated on her thighs and not in her vagina, only proves that there was no rape. It should
be noted that this portion of Rosilyns testimony refers to the June 15 and 21, 1996 charges of acts of lasciviousness, and not the rape charges. In any event, granting
that it occurred during the twin instances of rape on June 18 and July 20, 1996, the ejaculation on the victims thighs would not preclude the fact of rape.

There is no truth to the contention of the defense that Rosilyn did not see the penis of accused-appellant. As can be gleaned from the above-quoted portions of the
transcripts, Rosilyn unequivocally testified that accused-appellant held his penis then poked her vagina with it. And even if she did not actually see accused-appellants
penis go inside her, surely she could have felt whether it was his penis or just his finger.

We now come to the issue of whether or not Rosilyn was below twelve (12) years of age at the time the rape complained of occurred. To bolster the declaration of
Rosilyn that she was then eleven years old, the prosecution presented the following documents:

(1) Rosilyns birth certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;31

(2) Rosilyns baptismal certificate showing her birthday as May 11, 1985;32

(3) Master List of Live Births stating that Ma. Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 to Librada Telen as the mother; 33

(4) Marked pages of the Cord Dressing Room Book;34

(5) Summary of the Cord Dressing Book, showing her birthday as May 11, 1985 and her parents (Librada Telen and Simplicio Delantar) patient file number
(39-10-71);35

(6) Record of admission showing her parents patient number (39-10-71) and confinement at the Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital from May 5-14, 1985. 36

It is settled that in cases of statutory rape, the age of the victim may be proved by the presentation of her birth certificate. In the case at bar, accused-appellant contends
that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial court because said birth certificate has already been ordered cancelled and expunged
from the records by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893, dated April 11, 1997. 37 However, it appears that the said
decision has been annulled and set aside by the Court of Appeals on June 10, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 45289. The decision of the Court of Appeals was appealed to
this Court by petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 140305. Pending the final outcome of that case, the decision of the Court of Appeals is presumed valid and can
be invoked as prima facie basis for holding that Rosilyn was indeed eleven years old at the time she was abused by accused-appellant.

However, even assuming the absence of a valid birth certificate, there is sufficient and ample proof of the complainants age in the records.

Rosilyns Baptismal Certificate can likewise serve as proof of her age. In People v. Liban,38 we ruled that the birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, any other documentary
evidence that can help establish the age of the victim, such as the baptismal certificate, school records, and documents of similar nature, can be presented.

And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn are inadmissible to prove her age, the Master List of Live Births and the
Cord Dressing Book of Dr. Jose Fabella Memorial Hospital where Rosilyn was born are sufficient evidence to prove that her date of birth was May 11, 1985. These
documents are considered entries in official records, admissible as prima facie evidence of their contents and corroborative of Rosilyns testimony as to her age.

Thus, Rule 130, Section 44, of the Rules of Court states:

Entries in official records. --- Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty especially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Africa v. Caltex, et al., (Phil), Inc., et al.,39 the Court laid down the requisites for the application of the foregoing rule, thus:

(a) That the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;
 (b) That it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and

(c) That the public office or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
through official information.

In order for a book to classify as an official register and admissible in evidence, it is not necessary that it be required by an express statute to be kept, nor that the nature
of the office should render the book indispensable; it is sufficient that it be directed by the proper authority to be kept. Thus, official registers, though not required by
law, kept as convenient and appropriate modes of discharging official duties, are admissible.40

Entries in public or official books or records may be proved by the production of the books or records themselves or by a copy certified by the legal keeper thereof. 41 It
is not necessary to show that the person making the entry is unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order that the entry may be admissible in evidence, for his
being excused from appearing in court in order that public business be not deranged, is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay rule. 42

Corollary thereto, Presidential Decree No. 651, as amended by P.D. No. 766,43 mandates hospitals to report and register with the local civil registrar the fact of birth,
among others, of babies born under their care. Said Decree imposes a penalty of a fine of not less that P500.00 nor more than P1,000.00 or imprisonment of not less
than three (3) months nor more than six (6) months, or both, in the discretion of the court, in case of failure to make the necessary report to the local civil registrar.

Hence, under the above-cited P.D. 651, as amended, in connection with Rule 30, Section 44, of the Rules of Court, it is clear that the Cord Dressing Room Book where
the fact of birth, name of the mother and other related entries are initially recorded, as well as the Master List of Live Births of the hospital, are considered entries in
official record, being indispensable to and appropriate modes of recording the births of children preparatory to registration of said entries with the local civil registrar, in
compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.

It matters not that the person presented to testify on these hospital records was not the person who actually made those entries way back in 1985, but Amelita Avenante,
the records custodian of the hospital in 1995. To reiterate, these records may be proved by the presentation of the record itself or by a certified copy or the legal keeper
thereof. Proof of the unavailability of the person who made those entries is not a requisite for their admissibility. What is important is that the entries testified to by
Avenante were gathered from the records of the hospital which were accomplished in compliance with a duty specifically mandated by law.

Therefore, the Cord Dressing Room Book and the Master List of Live Births of the hospital are admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.

The preparation of these hospital documents preceded that of the birth and baptismal certificates of Rosilyn. They establish independent and material facts prepared by
unbiased and disinterested persons under environmental circumstances apart from those that may have attended the preparation of the birth and baptismal certificates.
Hence, these hospital records, to reiterate, are sufficient to support the testimony of Rosilyn as to her age.

Consequently, the testimony of Simplicio Delantar that the entries in the birth certificate of Rosilyn are false and that he merely made them up, particularly her date of
birth, was correctly disregarded by the trial court. It should be noted that the criminal charges for child abuse filed by Rosilyn against him was the direct cause of his
incarceration. This raises a possibility that Simplicio falsely testified in the present case, to get even with Rosilyn.

Likewise, the trial court correctly disregarded the testimonies of Gloria Binay and Angelito Intruzo because the defense failed to prove that they were knowledgeable as
to the circumstances of Rosilyns birth. Their testimonies consist mainly of observations tending to show that Rosilyns appearance belie her claim that she was born on
May 11, 1985.

In the four instances of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed on June 29, June 30, July 2, and July 3, 1996 (Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1994, 96-1995, 96-1996, and
96-1997, respectively), the trial court acquitted accused-appellant on the ground of reasonable doubt as the defense was able to prove that accused-appellant was not in
Manila but either in Dipolog or Dapitan City at the time the lascivious acts were supposedly committed. The evidence of the defense established that accused-appellant
flew to Dipolog on June 28, 1996, and stayed there until July 9, 1996.

In Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1991 and 96-1998, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness allegedly committed both in the early mornings of June 19 and July 21, 1996,
Rosilyn merely testified that she felt somebody touching her private part but failed to identify the person who was performing those lecherous acts as she was too sleepy
to wake up. Hence, accused-appellant was likewise acquitted in these cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.

With respect, however, to the acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 15 and 22, 1996, and in the evening of June 14, 15, 18, and 21, 1996, as well as
the rape perpetrated on June 18, 1996 and July 20, 1996, accused-appellant failed to account for his whereabouts. A careful review of the pertinent transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that accused-appellant did not give any testimony as to where he was at the time these crimes were committed. Clearly, therefore, the trial
court correctly disregarded his unsubstantiated defense of denial, which cannot prevail over his positive identification by Rosilyn as the culprit.

As regards the charge of acts of lasciviousness committed in the morning of June 16, 1996, accused-appellant claimed that it was impossible for him to have committed
the same because he flew to Dipolog on that day. The records disclose, however, that accused-appellants flight was at 9:40 a.m. The possibility, therefore, of accused-
appellants having performed the lascivious acts on the victim before he went off to the airport is not at all precluded. For his failure to prove the physical impossibility
of his presence at the Ritz Towers in the morning of June 16, 1996, when the sexual abuse of Rosilyn was committed, his defense of alibi must fail.

Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610, states:

 Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse. --- Children, whether male or female, who for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion
or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; Provided,
That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraphs 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x . (Emphasis supplied.)

In People v. Optana,44 the Court, citing the case of People v. Larin,45 explained the elements of the offense of violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse
Law, as follows:

1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected other sexual abuse.

3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for
money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Under RA 7610, children are "persons
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of their age or mental disability or condition."

"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section 32 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 7610, as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants acts of kissing Rosilyn on the lips, fondling her breast, inserting his finger into her vagina and placing his penis between her
thighs, all constitute lascivious conduct intended to arouse or gratify his sexual desire. Hence, the trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant of violation of
Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, charging him with the above-
described lascivious acts.

The penalty for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, or the Child Abuse Law, where the victim is below 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

The records show that on at least nine (9) separate occasions, the accused-appellant inserted his finger into the complainants vagina. These insertions took place in
1996. A year later, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape law of 1997. It does not apply to this case but it indicates state policy on rape. The Revised
Penal Code is now amended to read as follows:

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1. By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied.)

Indicative of the continuing state policy towards rape, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 now classifies the crime as an offense against persons. Any public prosecutor, not
necessarily the victim or her parents, can prosecute the case.
The penalties for the crime of rape in the light of various circumstances, which are now set forth and contained in Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, have also
been increased.

Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed on accused-appellant the maximum penalty of fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, which is within the medium period of reclusion temporal medium, pursuant to our ruling in Dulla v.
Court of Appeals.46 Notwithstanding that R.A. 7610 is a special law, accused-appellant may enjoy a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be taken within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code.47However, the trial court erroneously fixed the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence at eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period. In the aforesaid case of Dulla,48 we held that the penalty next lower in degree
to reclusion temporal medium is reclusion temporal minimum, the range of which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, for violation of Article III, Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate sentence of twelve years (12) and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

At the time of commission of the crimes complained of herein in 1996, statutory rape was penalized under Section 11 of R.A. 7659, which amended Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:

When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx.

In statutory rape, mere sexual congress with a woman below twelve years of age consummates the crime of statutory rape regardless of her consent to the act or lack of
it. The law presumes that a woman of tender age does not possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Thus, it was held that
carnal knowledge of a child below twelve years old even if she is engaged in prostitution is still considered statutory rape. The application of force and intimidation or
the deprivation of reason of the victim becomes irrelevant. The absence of struggle or outcry of the victim or even her passive submission to the sexual act will not
mitigate nor absolve the accused from liability.49

In the case at bar, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of Rosilyn. Moreover, the prosecution successfully
proved that Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the time she was sexually abused. As such, the absence of proof of any struggle, or for that matter of consent or
passive submission to the sexual advances of accused-appellant, was of no moment. The fact that accused-appellant had sexual congress with eleven year-old Rosilyn is
sufficient to hold him liable for statutory rape, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As to accused-appellant's civil liability, the amount of moral damages awarded by the trial court for each count of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A.
7610 should be increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00.50On the other hand, the award of the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of statutory rape
was correct.

In People v. Lor,51 citing the cases of People v. Victor,52 and People v. Gementiza,53 we held that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil indemnity ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. Said civil indemnity is mandatory upon finding of the fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which are based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 54 Hence, accused-appellant should be
ordered to pay the offended party another P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape and acts of lasciviousness.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1985 and 96-1986 finding accused-appellant Romeo Jalosjos
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, is AFFIRMED. Likewise,
the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62 in Criminal Case Nos. 96-1987, 96-1988, 96-1989, 96-1990, 96-1992, and 96-1993, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness in six counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, the indeterminate penalty of twelve years (12) and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen
(15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Ma. Rosilyn Delantar, the
additional amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness. Finally, the award of moral damages for each count of
acts of lasciviousness is increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., CJ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ALSTER INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC., CREAMSHIP MANAGEMENT
INC., EL GRANDE SHIPPING CORP., EASTGATE (INT'L.) MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., FILIPINAS KALAYAAN OVERSEAS SHIPPING CORP.,
INTERWORLD SHIPPING CORP., JZEL COMPANY, INC. , LAINE SHIPPING AGENCY CORP., MARINERS SERVICES, CORP., MARITIME
SERVICES & MGT., INC., MID OCEAN (PHILS.) MARINE AGENCY, OCEAN EAST AGENCY CORP., PASIA-PHIL. GROUP, INC., PHIL. MARINE
CONSULTANT INC., SEASTAR MARINE SERVICES, INC., TSM SHIPPING (PHILS.) INC., TRANS-MED (MANILA) CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, HON. NIEVES CONFESSOR AND THE HON. FELICISIMO JOSON, respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all licensed
manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of
1994, of the Governing Board" of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05, series of 1994, on the
grounds that:

(1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's
compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.

(2) Even granting that the POEA has that power, it, nevertheless, violated the standards for its exercise.

(3) The resolution and the memorandum circular are unconstitutional because they violate the equal protection and non-
impairment of obligation of contracts clauses of the Constitution.

(4) The resolution and the memorandum circular are not, valid acts of the Governing Board because the private sector
representative mandated by law has not been appointed by the President since the creation of the POEA.

Governing Board Resolution No. 01, issued on 14 January 1994, 1 read as follows:

GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF 1994.

WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Administration to afford protection to Filipino overseas contract workers, including seafarers and their
families, promote their interest and safeguard their welfare;

WHEREAS, the Administration under its mandate has the power and function to secure the best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino
contract workers land ensure compliance therewith;

WHEREAS, the minimum compensation and other benefits in cases of death, disability and loss or damage to crew's effects provided under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers which was revised in 1989 are now becoming very much lesser than the prevailing
international standards and those given to unionized seafarers as provided by their collective bargaining agreements;

WHEREAS, the Tripartite Technical Working Group convened for the purpose of deliberating the compensation and benefits provided under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers has recommended for the upgrading of the said compensation and benefits;

WHEREAS, for the interest of Filipino seafarers and their families, there is an urgent need to improve and realign the minimum compensation
and other benefits provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers in order to keep them at par with prevailing
international standards and those provided under collective bargaining agreements.

NOW, THEREFORE, the POEA Governing Board, in a meeting duly convened, hereby resolves to amend and increase the compensation and
other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract
for Seafarers which shall henceforth read as follows:
 I. Section C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine
Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of
twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

Where the death is caused by warlike activity while sailing within a declared warzone or war risk area, the compensation
payable shall be doubled. The employer shall undertake appropriate warzone insurance coverage for this purpose.

xxx xxx xxx

III. The maximum rate provided under Appendix I-A shall likewise be adjusted to US$50,000 regardless of rank and
position of the seafarer.

IV. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits herein provided shall apply to any Filipino seafarer on board
any vessel, provided, that the cause of action occurs after this Resolation takes effect.

V. This Resolution shall take effect after sixty (60) days from publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

Memorandum Circular No. 05, issued on 19 January 1994 2 by POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson and addressed to all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies,
shipownersl managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, informed them .that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and other
benefits in Part II, Section C. paragraph 1; Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Appendix 1-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contracts for Seafarers, which
adjustments took effect on 20 March 1994, and that:

VI. Upon effectivity, the new compensation and other benefits shall apply to any Filipino seafarer already on-board any
vessel provided, that the case of action occurs after the said compensation and benefits take effect;

The Tripartite Technical Working Group mentioned in the Resolution, which convened on 7 January 1994, was composed of the following:

1. DA Crescencio M. Siddayao, POEA

2. Dir. Angeles T. Wong, POEA
3. Dir. Jaime P. Jimenez; POEA
4. Dir. Lorna O. Fajardo, POEA
5. OIC Salome Mendoza, POEA
6. Capt. Gregorio Oca, AMOSUP
7. Atty, Romeo Occena, PSU-ALUI-TUCP
8. Mr. Vicente Aldanese, FAME
9. Capt. Emmanuel L. Regio, PAMSS
10. Atty. Rexlito Bermudez, COMMA
11. Atty. Alexandro W. Cruje, POEA
12 Hr. Jay Rosauro Baluyot, POEA
13. Ms. Magdalena Sarcos, POEA
14. Atty. Augusto Arreza, FSA 3

In their, comment. the public respondents contend that the petition is without merit and should de dismissed because (a) the issuance of the challenged resolution and
memorandum circular was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation which this Court had sustained in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA; 4 (b) the "non-appointment" of the third member of the Governing Board bees not necessarily invalidate the acts of the Board, for it has been
functioning "under the advisement of t the Tripartite Technical Working Group which group is incidentally constituted by the private sector, i.e., seafarer employers
and/or associations of manning agencies including herein petitioner," for which reason "the third member complement . . . has been substantially represented by said
technical working group"; 5 and(d) the consensus on the increase in the rates of compensation and other benefits was arrived at after appropriate consultations with the
shipowners and the private sector; the Board therefore soundly exercised its discretion.

In view of the importance of the issues raised, we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The petitioners while
the public respondents opted to adopt their comment as their memorandum.

The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented by the
public respondents, brushed aside by this Court inEastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA. 6 The petitioner in that , case assailed the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 02 of the POEA (effective February 1984) which prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the
hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas. The challenged resolution and memorandum overseas employment circular here merely further amended Memorandum Circular
No. 02, which was earlier amended in 1989 per Memorandum Circular No. 41, 7 series of 1989.

In sustaining the rule-making authority of the POEA and in holding against the claimed infirmity of delegation of legislative power, Eastern first
considered the history of the charter of the POEA and then discussed separately the above constitutional issues thus:
 [T]he petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It
contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation
represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:

. . . The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern
the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract
substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.

The second challenge is more serious as it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may been forced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. . . .

...

The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of
the legislative power because of the many instances when delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have
to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and
more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception.

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad
problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious not to say,
specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned
to them.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of
subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such
as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

...

Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The podel contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA, (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the
model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is
discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights
of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices.8

The POEA mandate referred to as providing the reasonable standard for the exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority is found in the statement of powers and
functions of the said office in paragraph (a), Section 4 of E.O. 797, to wit:

(a) The Administration shall formulate and undertake in coordination where necessary with the appropriate entities concerned, a systematic
program for promoting and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration domestic manpower requirements,
and to protect their rights to fair and equitable employment practices. It shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including
money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including seamen. This adjudicatory function shall be, undertaken in appropriate circumstances in consultation with the
Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines. The governing Board of the Administration, as hereinunder provided, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration.

It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter
may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 9 This
is the principle of subordinate legislation which was discussed by this Court in People vs. Rosenthal 10 and in Pangasinan Transportation vs. Public Service
Commission. 11 Thus in Calalang vs. Williams, 12 this Court stated:

In the case of People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation vs.
The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation
of powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the
principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering
the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of
greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of
the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to the sufficient
and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed. 13

There is, as well, no merit to the claim that the assailed resolution and memorandum circular violate the equal protection and contract clauses of the Constitution. To
support its contention of in equality, the petitioners claim discrimination against foreign shipowners and principals employing Filipino seamen and in favor of foreign
employers employing overseas Filipinos who are not seamen. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not
violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. 14 There can be no dispute about
the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and
limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

Nor is there-merit; in the claim that the resolution and memorandum circular violate the contract clause of the Bill of Rights.

The executive order creating the POEA was enacted to further implement the social justice provisions of the 1973. Constitution, which have been greatly enhanced and
expanded in the 1987 Constitution by placing them under a separate Article. 15 The Article on Social Justice was aptly described as the "heart of the new Charter" by the
President of the 1986 Constitution Commission, retired Justice-Cecilia Muoz-Palma. 16 Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state
and requires the extensive use of such power. 17 In Calalang vs. Williams, 18 this. Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on social justice thus:

Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the Humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means
the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the
community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and
of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with
respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects
within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not
prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare
of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them. 19

Verily, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be
established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the
circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 20 And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of
the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest. Article 1700 thereof expressly provides:

Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts lust
yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot
be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police
power to the contract clause.

The last issue concerns the contention that without the appointment by the President of the third member of the governing board, the POEA cannot legally function and
exercise its powers. This contention merits scant consideration. Section 4 of E.O. No. 797 indubitably declares the immediate creation of the POEA. Thus upon the
effectivity of E.O. No. 797, the POEA attained its juridical personality. The appointment of the third member "who shall be well versed, in the field of overseas
employment," provided for in paragraph (b) of the said Section, was not meant to be a sine gua non to the birth of the POEA, much less to the validity of the acts of the
Board. As a matter of fact, in the same paragraph the President is given the "discretion [to] designate a Deputy Administrator as the third member of the Board."

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M.
UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the
NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES
ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE
OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as
Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute
and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at
the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so.
We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land
Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial
proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did
not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and
(3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the
Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence,
unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills
of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through
such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law,
nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the
Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy
or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between
nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer
of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal
delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts
Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and
that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to
the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which
the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern
Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a
new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to
conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith." 4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is
required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every
other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354,
which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be
expressly included in the title of the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882
and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee
Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
 enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have
differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses
and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this
question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which
new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nayson the final reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became
R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify
that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the
Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the
franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications
Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the
Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or
hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in
unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty
of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on
Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or
because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally
enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking
privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight
to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the
criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the
courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a
waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no
question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously,
the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others
less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank
mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as
the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to
P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable
volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all,
(like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic
surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no
substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating
the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which
it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should
not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while
we may concede the need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized in
the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee,
which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of
the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among the services it should be
prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives
substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the
Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen
this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal
service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine
the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the
contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things
similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of
laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be
accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a
fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law
imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar
as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land
Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-29646 November 10, 1978

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner,

vs.
HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.

Angel C. Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C. Chaves & Jose Laureta for petitioner.

Sotero H. Laurel for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review tile decision dated September 17, 1968 of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of winch reads.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6 37 of the City of
Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is made permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.

Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.

(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA

Judge 1

The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J.
Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2

City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:

AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF
MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. 3

Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons
employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or
in kind.

Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than
P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5

On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I,
denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No.
6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void. 6

In this petition, Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho assigned the following as his grounds for wanting the ordinance declared null and void:

1) As a revenue measure imposed on aliens employed in the City of Manila, Ordinance No. 6537 is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the
uniformity in taxation;
 2) As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit,
which is out of proportion to the cost of registration and that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide and/or limit the action of the Mayor, thus,
violating the fundamental principle on illegal delegation of legislative powers:

3) It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. 7

On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and
void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction. 8

Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the following
as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's decision of September 17,1968: 9

THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537
VIOLATED THE CARDINAL RULE OF UNIFORMITY OF TAXATION.

II

RESPONDENT JUDGE LIKEWISE COMMITTED A GRAVE AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537
VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE AGAINST UNDUE DESIGNATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

III

RESPONDENT JUDGE FURTHER COMMITTED A SERIOUS AND PATENT ERROR OF LAW IN RULING THAT ORDINANCE NO. 6537
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because the
rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise of the
police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in nature.

The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that the
first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and
approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00 as
employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is
obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.

The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed
alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive

Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit, enumerates
no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of
building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful. 10

In Chinese Flour Importers Association vs. Price Stabilization Board, 11 where a law granted a government agency power to determine the allocation of wheat flour
among importers, the Supreme Court ruled against the interpretation of uncontrolled power as it vested in the administrative officer an arbitrary discretion to be
exercised without a policy, rule, or standard from which it can be measured or controlled.

It was also held in Primicias vs. Fugoso 12 that the authority and discretion to grant and refuse permits of all classes conferred upon the Mayor of Manila by the Revised
Charter of Manila is not uncontrolled discretion but legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law.

Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to
him by the ordinance.

The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens. 13

The trial court did not commit the errors assigned.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Santos and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Castro, C.J., Antonio and Aquino, Fernando, JJ., concur in the result.

Concepcion, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void
for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials
and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.

The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole
recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be
interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government.

As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National
Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public
policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).

With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have
been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local
governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fernandez which affirms the lower court's judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila null and void
for the reason that the employment of aliens within the country is a matter of national policy and regulation, which properly pertain to the national government officials
and agencies concerned and not to local governments, such as the City of Manila, which after all are mere creations of the national government.

The national policy on the matter has been determined in the statutes enacted by the legislature, viz, the various Philippine nationalization laws which on the whole
recognize the right of aliens to obtain gainful employment in the country with the exception of certain specific fields and areas. Such national policies may not be
interfered with, thwarted or in any manner negated by any local government or its officials since they are not separate from and independent of the national government.

As stated by the Court in the early case of Phil. Coop. Livestock Ass'n. vs. Earnshaw, 59 Phil. 129: "The City of Manila is a subordinate body to the Insular (National
Government ...). When the Insular (National) Government adopts a policy, a municipality is without legal authority to nullify and set at naught the action of the superior
authority." Indeed, "not only must all municipal powers be exercised within the limits of the organic laws, but they must be consistent with the general law and public
policy of the particular state ..." (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd sec. 367, P. 1011).

With more reason are such national policies binding on local governments when they involve our foreign relations with other countries and their nationals who have
been lawfully admitted here, since in such matters the views and decisions of the Chief of State and of the legislature must prevail over those of subordinate and local
governments and officials who have no authority whatever to take official acts to the contrary.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.

Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace
court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following
information was filed against him:

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-
named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his
possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons
adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos
(P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered
Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this
Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial,
municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian
tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine
of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are
"jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their
instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues
raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often
with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.

As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their
concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of
civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less
fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance
afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American
period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:
 In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and
firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce
civilized customs.

Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their
advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of
civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of
Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with
civilized communities through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right
of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace
and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and
applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and
Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to
meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural
equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to
the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the
observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act
was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-
Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any
prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But
this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where
much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in
Rubivs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United
States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or
property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case
(Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439, 442).

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote
the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an
individual, the same must be upheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth
and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people
with a view to a greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as
there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true
equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney
impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers,
doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life
or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant
a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional
scheme of our government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does
exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority
to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle
of salus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the
Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests
of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.