1174

Juntilla vs Fontanar
(136 SCRA 624)

Facts: Herein plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney on course from
Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was driven by driven by defendant Berfol
Camoro and registered under the franchise of Clemente Fontanar. When the jeepney
reached Mandaue City, the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle.
In the process, the plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
vehicle. Plaintiff suffered a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from the injuries
he suffered on his left arm, right thigh, and on his back.

Plaintiff filed a case for breach of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu
City. Defendants, in their answer, alleged that the tire blow out was beyond their
control, taking into account that the tire that exploded was newly bought and was only
slightly used at the time it blew up.

Issue: Whether or not the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event?

Held: No. In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
was not independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the
negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers
should teach drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed
limits, and to know the correct measures to take when a tire blows up thus insuring the
safety of passengers at all tines.

NPC v. CA
Facts:
At the height of the typhoon Kading, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat
Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents
blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by
petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises
diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the
residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between
the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the
risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of
the nature of damnum absque injuria.
Issues:
(1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon
is a fortuitous event
(2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
(3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria
Held:
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or
an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention
in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation
between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on
quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not
have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence
is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. In the
case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners can not
escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss and
damage.
(2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one
to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take
precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed
to responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated
the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As
it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned,
which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did
not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly
sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in their
second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them from
liability.
(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in
view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty
and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their
negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end
does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are
not entitled to counterclaim.

Mindex Resources Development vs Ephraim Morillo Facts

1.

Private respondent Ephraim Morillo and petitioner Mindex Resources Corporation

entered into a verbal agreement for the lease of the former's 6 x 6 ten-wheeler cargo
truck for use in Mindex's mining operations in Binaybay, Bigaan, San Teodoro,
Oriental Mindoro. 2.
Unfortunately, the truck was burned by unidentified persons while it was parked
unattended at Sitio Aras, Bigaan, San Teodoro, Oriental Mindoro, due to mechanical
trouble. 3.

The incident resulted in a lawsuit where the trial court found petitioner responsible for
the destruction or loss of the leased 6 x 6 truck and ordered it to pay respondent a.

the balance of the unpaid rental for the 6 x 6 truck with interest at 12 percent from
June 22, 1994 (the rendition of the judgment) up to the payment of the amount b.

costs of repair and overhaul of the said truck, with interest rate of 12 percent until
fully paid; and c.

P20,000 as attorney's fees for compelling respondent to secure the services of

counsel in filing his complaint. 4.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's ruling that petitioner was
not without fault for the loss and destruction of the truck and, thus, liable therefor. 5.

Hence, the present petition. Petitioner contended that the burning of the truck was a
fortuitous event, for which it should not be held liable pursuant to Article 1174 of the
Civil Code.

Issue: WON the burning of the truck was a fortuitous event?

Ruling

No

The Supreme Court denied the petition. According to the Court, in order for a
fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. When the effect, is
found to be partly the result of a person's participation whether by active intervention,
neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the
rules applicable to acts of God. 2.

The records clearly showed that petitioner failed to exercise reasonable care and
caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
Petitioner fell short of ordinary diligence in safeguarding the leased truck against the
accident, which could have been avoided in the first place.

Metro Concast Steel Corporation vs. Allied Bank

Facts : Metro Concast, a corporation duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of Philippine laws and engaged in the business of manufacturing steel, through
its officers, herein individual petitioners, obtained several loans from Allied Bank.
These loan transactions were covered by a promissory note and separate letters of
credit/trust receipts.
Metro Concast failed to settle the aforementioned promissory note and thrust
receipts. Allied Bank sent demand letters through its counsel, but to no avail.

In order to settle their debts, Metro Concast offered the sale with Allied bank of their
remaining assets but the latter refused, Allied bank suggested to sell those materials
but there are no takers so it was reduced into a scrap.

Peakstar then, was interested to purchase those scrap metals. So Peakstar

obligated itself to purchase the scrap metals payable in 10 monthly installments. But,
unfortunately, peakstar failed to do so.

Metro concast assevarated that their failure to pay their obligations with allied bank
must be considered as force majuere since peakstars failure to pay them was
beyond their control, and therefore their obligations shall be deemed settled.

RTC dismissed the complaint>CA reversed RTCs ruling and order the petitioners
to solidarily pay allied bank, plus interest and legal fees.

ISSUE : WON peakstars failure to fulfill their obligations with Metro concast be
considered as force majuere./ WON their obligation is extiguished by reason of force
majuere.

HELD :
NO. Peakstars breach of obligation cannot be considered as foruitiuous event or
force majuere to extinguish Metro Concasts obligation with allied bank.

To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:

(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply
with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be
foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a
normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss.

Here, Peakstars breach is clearly not impossible to forsee or independent of human

will.