Richards

v. Washington Terminal Co.

233 U.S. 546 (1914) May 4, 1914
U.S. Supreme Court

FACTS: The plaintiff is and has been since the year 1901 the owner of Lot 34 in Square 693 in the
City of Washington. The rear windows upon all the floors of the house open in the direction of the
railroad tracks that lead from defendant's tunnel. The trains frequently pass in and out of the tunnel
without stopping, but trains also very often stop at or near a switch tower that is situate near the center
of Square 693.

Plaintiff's property has been damaged by the volumes of dense black or gray smoke, and also by dust
and dirt, cinders and gases, emitted from the trains while passing over the tracks and in or out of the
tunnel, or standing upon the tracks near the signal tower. His house was pleasant and comfortable for
purposes of occupation before the construction of the tunnel and tracks, but since then it has not only
depreciated in value, but the tenant removed therefrom, and plaintiff was obliged to occupy the house
himself by reason of his inability to rent it. The property has depreciated from a value and the rental
value per month. The furniture and other belongings in the house have been depreciated, all of which
depreciation is due to the presence of smoke, cinders, and gases emitted from passing trains and from
the mouth of the tunnel, which smoke, cinders, and gases.

The defendant, the Washington Terminal Company, is the owner of the tunnel and of the tracks
therein, but its ownership of tracks ceases at the south portal. The tracks extending therefrom in a
southwesterly direction are owned and used by other railroad companies, but the movement of the
trains is controlled by defendant.

The tunnel and the tracks leading from it across Square 693 were located and constructed and are now
maintained under the authority of Acts of Congress of February 12, 1901, and February 28, 1903, 31
Stat. 774, c. 354; 32 Stat. 909, c. 856, in accordance with plans and specifications approved by those
acts. No claim is made by plaintiff that the tunnel, the tracks in Square 693, and the trains operated
therein and thereon were constructed, operated, or maintained in a negligent manner, and it is
conceded that the tunnel and tracks were built upon property acquired by purchase or condemnation
proceedings, and were constructed under authority of the acts of Congress and of permits issued by
the Commissioners of the District of Columbia.

ISSUE: W/N the acts of Congress be liable for damages?

HELD: An owner of property near the portal of a tunnel in the District of Columbia constructed
under authority of Congress, while not entitled to compensation for damages caused by the usual
gases and smoke emitted from the tunnel by reason of the proper operation of the railroad, is entitled
to compensation for such direct, peculiar and substantial damages as specially affect his property and
diminish its value.

The courts correctly held them to be damnum absque injuria; but that with respect to such damage as
is attributable to the gases and smoke emitted from locomotive engines while in the tunnel, that these
gases and smoke materially contribute to injure the furniture and to render the house less habitable
than otherwise it would be, there is a right of recovery.

The acts of Congress referred to, followed by the construction of the tunnel and railroad tracks
substantially in the mode prescribed, had the effect of legalizing the construction and operation of the
railroad, so that its operation, while properly conducted and regulated, cannot be deemed to be a
public nuisance. Yet it is sufficiently obvious that the acts done by defendant, if done without
legislative sanction, would form the subject of an action by plaintiff to recover damages as for a
private nuisance.

While the owners of a railroad constructed and operated for the public use, although with private
property for private gain, are not, in the absence of negligence, subject to action in behalf of owners
of neighboring private property for the ordinary damages attributable to the operation of the railroad,
a property owner may be entitled to compensation for such special damages as devolve exclusively
upon his property and not equally upon all the neighboring property.

P RO V I NCE O F CAM ARI NE S SU R, vs . THE CO U RT O F AP P E ALS

[G.R. No. 103125. May 17, 1993

FACTS:
In heirs of Juancho Ardana, there was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to
be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was
affected by the land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need under the facts
of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another
purpose or engage in a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the
expropriation after noting that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the
taking of 8,970 square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable
reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to
the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
The Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.
337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the community invaluable information and technology
on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution.

However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines
Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.

The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of

Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such power
only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129).

ISSUE: Whether the Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands

HELD:
 The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of
Executive Order No. 129 - A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of agricultural land
for the
 purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating authority. While those rules
vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification submitted by the
land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes confering the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot

be broadened or constricted by implication.

The petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of

Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the Province
of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b) orders the
trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or
reclassify private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.

PLDT petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[G.R. No. 88404. October 18, 1990.]

FACTS: In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to build radio
stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express
Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National
Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of
Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among
others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to
exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCIs
shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? not specified in the
case); that such transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise
which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not PLDTs petition should prosper.

HELD: No.

1. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It
should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A
franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The
determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege
has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo
warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing
a quo warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place.

The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise.
There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere transfer
of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the
transfer involves more than 40% of the corporations stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The

transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from
Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee
(ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the
sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation
as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since
stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not,
however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the
original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise
granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The
franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual
succession.

Sumulong v Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

expropriation requisites for expropriation met but denied petitioners with due process of hearing

Facts: Petitioner files motion for reconsideration on the lower court decision allowing expropriation
of their parcel of land in favor to the National Housing Authority without due process of law. They
assail the constitutionality of PD 1224 (Policy on Expropriation of Private Property for Socialized
Housing Upon Payment of Just Compensation) allowing the taking of properties regardless of size
and no matter how small the area to be expropriated, social housing being the purpose of
condemnation is not really for public purpose, and violation of procedural due process as immediate
taking of possession of property without due process of hearing.

Issue: Whether or not due process of law was observed in the expropriation process.

Held: The court ruled that the purpose of expropriation for socialized housing project is a valid
justification for public purpose since housing is a basic need. The size of the area to be expropriated is
not subject to question as long as it satisfied the public purpose of expropriation. However, the court
held that the petitioners were denied of due process of law for being deprived of the conduct of
hearing and notice upon its order for the immediate possession and taking of the land by NHA.

In order to justify expropriation the following requisites must be satisfied:

1. public use/purpose
2. just compensation

Although the court issued the immediate possession of the land with just compensation to the
petitioners and meeting the requisite for public use, the petitioners were denied with the due process
of expropriation proceeding which is a basic and fundamental right of the petitioner.