Book Reviews 439

Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, by Martha C.

Nussbaum. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. xv + 413. H/b
19.95.
This book, Nussbaum says, is about the psychological foundations of liberal-
ism (p. 16). It constructs a public myth of equal humanity, to substitute for
other pernicious myths that have long guided us (p. 17). She understands by a
liberal society, one based on the recognition of the equal dignity of each indi-
vidual, and the vulnerabilities inherent in a common humanity (p. 18). The
idea of vulnerability is closely connected to the idea of emotion because
emotions are responses to vulnerability in which we register the dam-
ages we have suered, might suer, or failed to suer. We need law pre-
cisely because we are vulnerable to harm and damage in many ways (p. 6).
According to Nussbaum, then, the ideas of vulnerability, emotion, and law are
intertwined, and one aim of the book is to give an account of their connec-
tions.
Her account is intended to replace the prevailing pernicious myths about
emotions in general and disgust and shame in particular because they are pro-
found threats to the existence and stability of a liberal political culture (p. 16).
She aims at removing stigma and hierarchy wherever they occur and at oer-
ing a convincing rationale for public policy in general toward traditionally
stigmatized and marginalized groups (p. 17). These groups include women,
homosexuals, African-Americans, felons, and the disabled.
Nussbaums account of emotions prominently involves psychoanalytic
materials. Although many people do not have a high regard for psychoanaly-
sis, she nevertheless uses it as persuasive forms of humanistic interpretation
that people with an interest in human life can accept without accepting the
claim of psychoanalysis to be a science. Following Winnicott, the prominent
object-relation psychoanalytic theorist, she sees psychoanalysis as closely
linked to poetry and literature, a mode of imaginative understanding as
stories about the human condition (p. 342). The psychological foundation of
liberalism, Nussbaums public myth, rests on the stories she tells about the
human condition.
One of these stories is about disgust, which is typically unreasonable,
embodying magical ideas of contamination and impossible aspirations to
purity, immortality, and nonanimality (p. 14). If, then, we nd Brussels
sprouts, cockroaches, or the abuse of animals disgusting, we should be deeply
suspicious of these unreasonable magical ideas and impossible aspirations
because they endanger Nussbaums public myth: the sound foundation of lib-
eralism.
Another story is about shame, which is closely connected to an infantile
demand for omnipotence and the unwillingness to accept neediness. Shame is,
like disgust, a way of hiding from our humanity that is both irrational in the
normative sense, embodying a wish to be a type of creature one is not, and
unreliable in the practical sense, frequently bound up with narcissism and an

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005

440 Book Reviews

unwillingness to recognize the rights and duties of others (p. 15). Instead of
being ashamed of forgetting your mothers birthday or of being bored by
Proust, you should desist from your infantile demands and face your needi-
ness, otherwise you will be unwilling to recognize the rights and duties of oth-
ers.
Nussbaum tries to avoid such absurd implications of what she says by dis-
tinguishing between shame that is warranted by ones culpable omission or
commission and shame that is unjustiably imposed on oneself. Shame, there-
fore, may be good or bad. This is obviously true, but equally obviously useless
in avoiding absurdities unless it is clearly specied how good and bad shame
are to be distinguished. I have found no such specication in this book. The
result is that Nussbaum can simply fob o any counterexample to her view
about bad shame by declaring it to be an instance of good shame.
Nussbaum says that her ndings about disgust are very well supported by
experimental research and that my analysis of shame [is] similarly based
on sociological data (p. 342). She claims that she relies on psychoanalytic
materials when they are consistent with other empirical data (p. 13). Both
these claims are false.
The main experimental research to which Nussbaum appeals in support of
her view that disgust is typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of
contamination (p. 14) is that of Paul Rozin and his collaborators. Her view is
that disgust presents profound threats to the existence and stability of a liberal
political culture (p. 16). Rozins conclusion, however, is that we believe that
US disgust may be guarding against threats to an individualist, rights-based
social order (Handbook of Emotions, New York: Guilford Press, 2000, p. 648)
and that disgust has evolved from a mechanism for avoiding harm to the
body to a mechanism for avoiding harm to the soul (Handbook, p. 650). The
experimental work on disgust to which Nussbaum appeals thus leads to a con-
clusion diametrically opposite to her own: disgust is not a threat to a liberal
political culture, as Nussbaum claims, but a protection against such threats.
The sociological data on which Nussbaum relies also conspicuously fail to
provide what her views about shame sorely need. She says in the sections on
shame I use sociological studies of shame and stigma, above all the work of
Irving (sic) Goman (I quote from her response to a previous version of this
review). The work of Goman from which Nussbaum, derives her sociologi-
cal data is Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity, (Englewood
Clis, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963). She does not mention that the book was pub-
lished over 40 years ago, during which years momentous social changes have
occurred rendering such data as there were obsolete; that the book was then a
research proposal, not a report of research Goman has done; that the mate-
rial in the book is entirely anecdotal; that no reason is given why these anec-
dotes rather than others were selected for inclusion; and that the book
provides no evidence showing that the anecdotes represent the view of any
group and are not the idiosyncratic opinions of some individuals. Nor does

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005

 Book Reviews 441

Nussbaum bother to mention that the book is about the stigmatization of

social groups without regard to whether the stigmatization is warranted.
Surely, the stigmatization of murderers, paedophiles, sadists, or terrorists, for
instance, is justied, whereas stigmatization based on race, religion, or physi-
cal handicap is morally objectionable. No one can reasonably follow Nuss-
baum in trying to remove stigma and hierarchy wherever they occur (p. 17).
I have and will continue to cite what Nussbaum says because it is scarcely
credible that a reputable author would publish such absurd pronouncements,
blatant inconsistencies, unreliable references, and prolix purple prose in place
of argument as it is my sad task to document. Here are some few examples of
the many absurdities. In general we do not condone any homicide not com-
mitted in self-defense (p. 39)who are the we who do not condone homi-
cide in war, voluntary euthanasia, suicide, or crime prevention? Tears are the
one human bodily secretion that is not found disgusting (p. 89) like the
milk of nursing mothers? If someone nds that disgusting, we can no doubt
nd someone who is disgusted by tears. English has no aectively strong
adjective with which to express anger (p. 104) enraged, frenzied, furious,
and wrathful are apparently not strong enough? Only recently have women
been permitted to show their legs (p. 113) as shown by women who were
ballet dancers, peasants, slaves, nude bathers in Roman baths or in Scandina-
vian saunas, not to mention native American, African, and South Sea Island
women? The idea of normalcy is like a surrogate womb, blotting out intrusive
stimuli from the world of dierence (p. 219) like the surrogate womb of
having normal blood pressure, walking at a normal pace, or being not more
than normally annoyed at silly nonsense? The stigmatizing behavior in which
all societies engage is typically an aggressive reaction to infantile narcissism
and the shame born of our own incompleteness (p. 219)the real motive for
imprisoning criminals, hospitalizing the insane, or publicizing the depreda-
tions of politicians is then infantile narcissism? Shame, I argued, pertains to a
trait or feature of the person, whereas guilt pertains to an act (p. 229)such
as being ashamed when caught in the act of lying or feeling guilty for having
the trait or feature of being quick to anger or of being an inattentive parent?
[Martha] Stewarts success can be attributed in large part to the shame she
induces in messy ordinary women (p. 242)so much for selling them goods
they like and want to buy? Human beings are deeply troubled about being
human We are ashamed of this awkward condition (p. 336) as, for
instance, were Bach, Hume, Montaigne, Mozart, Picasso, Rabelais, Shake-
speare, or Voltaire?
From these absurd pronouncements I turn to some examples of the incon-
sistencies in which this book abounds. On p. 14 we nd: Disgust is typically
unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination. But on p. 128 we
are told: Even if disgust at feces does have to be learned, it is a universal prop-
erty in all human societies, and it is a reasonable response to unpleasant sen-
sory properties. On p. 23 we get a list of the basic emotions: joy, grief, fear,

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005

442 Book Reviews

anger, hatred, pity or compassion, envy, jealousy, hope, guilt, gratitude, shame,
disgust, and love. But on p. 6 we have: Emotions are responses to damages
we have suered, might suer, or luckily have failed to suer. Nussbaum does
not say how this could possibly t joy, hope, gratitude, and love. On p. 51 we
read: compassionate emotion must include the eudaimonistic judgment; that
is, the thought that the person in question is important to the person who has
the emotion. Our emotions take their stand where we are, from the perspective
of our most signicant concerns. We grieve for those for whom we care, not
for those for whom we dont care. We fear for calamities that may befall our-
selves or those for whom we care, not distant calamities. But on p. 55 she says,
Compassion can provide crucial underpinning for foreign aid and other
eorts toward global justice. Foreign aid and global justice, however, are
intended to help people we do not know. If compassion must include the
eudaimonistic judgement, it cannot possibly be a crucial underpinning for
foreign aid and global justice. And the inconsistency is not removed by show-
ing that compassion can motivate foreign aid and global justice, for there is a
long way to go from can to must. On p. 14 we learn about disgust that its
thought-content is typically unreasonable not in line with human life as we
know it. But on p. 336 Nussbaum says that disgust and primitive shame are
probably in some measure inevitable parts of human development. Disgust
serves a useful role in steering us away from danger.
These absurdities and inconsistencies arise out of Nussbaums dubious
method of presentation in this book. She begins with a provocative general
claim, such as that disgust and shame present profound threats to the exist-
ence and stability of a liberal political culture (p. 16). Then she oers consider-
ations in support of a platitude, such as that some cases of disgust and shame
are bad. And then takes herself to be entitled to conclude that she has sup-
ported the general claim. The absurdities I note are those of the general claim.
The inconsistencies are between the general claim and the platitude.
To these absurdities and inconsistencies I must add two examples of the
unreliability of Nussbaums references. On p. 320 there is an epigraph from
Anne Hollander: The permanent shortening of skirts was the most necessary
step in furthering the modernization of women. I hope this was meant to be
funny. In any case, Nussbaums reference to it on p. 336 is: my epigraph from
Anne Hollander connects a certain rejection of shame and disgust about
the female body to the possibility of womens equality as citizens. The epi-
graph makes no mention of shame and disgust, it points to no connection at
all between these emotions and womens equality, and it bears no relation to
what Nussbaum says about it.
On pp. 779 Nussbaum criticizes Devlins appeal to disgust. She asks two
questions that she claims Devlin should and does not answer: Why does Dev-
lin think disgust a reliable basis for lawmaking? and Even if we grant him that
there are some vices that, suciently disseminated, would erode societys
capacity to function, why should we suppose that disgust is a reliable index of

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005

 Book Reviews 443

which activities have that property? (p. 78). Devlin makes clear, however, that
he regards disgust as an indication of the moral judgement of society, not of
lawmaking. And he gives as a reason why disgust is a reliable index of activities
that erode societys capacity to function that it expresses the moral judgment
of society [which] must be something about which any twelve men and
women drawn at random might after discussion be expected to be unanimous
(Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Criminal Law, in The Enforcement of Morals,
London: Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 17, 15). Devlins answers may be
unsatisfactory, but he certainly gives them, and Nussbaums claim that he does
not is egregious misrepresentation.
The book is permeated with moral fervour and intrusive personal anec-
dotes. It tells about Nussbaums athletic endeavours, where she spends the
summers, the apartment she lives in, her reaction to a bat, her having a part-
ner, a sister, a daughter, and a cleaning woman, her embarrassment or lack of it
in using the toilet, her political fantasies, and her mothers misfortune and
death. Running through the book is a barely controlled indignation at societys
failure to conform to Nussbaums passionately held views. Intended or not,
these anecdotes and the perfervid tone serve as rhetorical stratagems to disarm
or bully the reader and divert attention from the abject failure of the case
Nussbaum is making.
In making that case, Nussbaum endlessly appeals to the psychological com-
monplace that disgust and shame may express morally objectionable social
norms and irrational drives. She ignores the equally obvious corollary that dis-
gust and shame may be perfectly reasonable reactions to people, practices, or
actions that are shameful and disgusting. What makes them so are not social
norms and psychological dispositions but the fact that they violate basic con-
ditions of human well-being and breach the bulwark protecting civilized life.
Regarding such violations as disgusting and shameful is reasonable and mor-
ally right, and so is using the law to prohibit them. Disgust and shame may
also be irrational and immoral. But to suspect all disgust and shame because
some are deplorable is an elementary mistake that no amount of passionate
intensity can excuse.
An equally elementary mistake is Nussbaums reliance on psychological
considerations for the criticism of beliefs, norms, or laws. The mistake is
deeper than relying on a highly questionable psychoanalytic theory and mis-
representing psychological and sociological data. The mistake is that the psy-
chological causes that lead people to form or to accept beliefs, norms, or laws
are not the reasons on the basis of which these beliefs, norms, or laws can be
criticized. Causes are one thing, reasons another. It may be that all revolution-
aries are motivated by an unresolved Oedipal conict, all social protest is
prompted by yearning to return to the womb, and all political activism on
behalf of downtrodden groups is a projection of ones insecurity. But even if
this were so, it would leave unanswered the question of whether or not a par-
ticular revolution, protest, or cause was justied. That question must be

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005

444 Book Reviews

answered by adducing reasons concerning the justice or injustice of the condi-

tions that the revolution, protest, or cause challenges, not by advancing psy-
chological explanations about the motivation of the challengers. Just imagine
how indignant would Nussbaum rightly be if one deliberated about the merits
of her views on the basis of speculating about her birth trauma, toilet training,
or Oedipus complex. Yet she does just this to those who dier from her about
what is disgusting and shameful.
No less egregious is the use Nussbaum makes of what she calls the public
myth of equal humanity. According to her, a liberal society is based on this
myth. She ignores that many well-known liberals reject this myth, as do, for
instance, John Stuart Mill, Frankfurt, Hayek, Matson, Nozick, and Raz. She
ignores that many of her fellow egalitarians, such as Rawls, Nagel, and Dwor-
kin, think that a liberal society must be based on reasons, not on a myth that
lacks factual foundation. She is unaware that her myth commits those who
accept it to the absurdity of treating criminals and their victims, terrorists and
their hostages, benefactors of humanity and its scourges as having equal
worth. And she rejects Mills perfectionism (p. 331) and the communitarian
views of others (p. 340) simply because they are contrary to her egalitarian
myth. It does not occur to her that the conict between the egalitarian myth
and the ubiquitous disgust, shame, and what she calls pernicious hierarchies
that exist in all known societies might be a reason for rejecting the egalitarian
myth, rather than suspecting all disgust, shame, and hierarchy. Nussbaums
argument against inegalitarian views is to show that they are inegalitarian,
and take that as a sucient reason for rejecting them. Instead of oering rea-
sons, she dogmatically asserts the controversial and heavily criticized assump-
tion on which her views rest.
I respect some of Nussbaums other work and regret having to be highly
critical of this self-indulgent and careless book whose self-righteous moraliz-
ing is an unacceptable substitute for a reasoned case.

2041 Cook Road john kekes

Charlton, NY 12019
USA
jonkekes@nycap.rr.com
doi:10.1093/mind/fzi439

Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays, by Philip Pettit. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 2002. Pp. xii + 410. H/b 60.00, P/b 18.99.
This volume is a collection of essays by Philip Pettit, all originally published
between 1990 and 2001. The volume forms part of a trend among some pub-
lishers to reprint a selection of articles by an internationally renowned philos-
opher still in their prime with the aim of making that philosophers work
available to a wider audience than the increasingly small number of people

Mind, Vol. 114 . 454 . April 2005 Mind Association 2005