PROPERTY

Accretion;

A
ll
u
vion (2001)
For many years, the Rio Grande river deposited soil along itsbank, beside the titled land of Jose. In time,
such depositreached an area of one thousand square meters.
W
ith thepermission of Jose, Vicente cultivated the said area. Ten yearslater, a big flood occurred in
the river and transferred the
1000
square meters to the opposite bank, beside the land of
A
gustin. The land transferred is now contested by Jose and
A
gustin asriparian owners and by Vicente who claims ownership by prescription.
W
ho should prevail,?
W
hy? (5%)
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
ose should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion,belongs by right of accretion to Jose, the
riparian owner (
A
rt.
4
57 CC).
W
hen, as given in the problem, the very same area" was "transferred" by flood waters to the opposite bank, itbecame
an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by Jose who has two years to remove it (
A
rt.
4
5
9
, CC). Vicente's claimbased on prescription is baseless since his possession was by mere tolerance
of Jose and, therefore, did not adversely affectose's possession and ownership (
A
rt. 537, CC). Inasmuch ashis possession is merely that of a holder, he cannot acquire thedisputed area
by prescription.
A
cc
retion
;

A
v
u
lsion (2003)
 A
ndres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. Hisland, however, has gradually diminished in area
due to thecurrent of the river, while the registered land of Mario on theopposite bank has gradually increased in
area by 2
00
squaremeters.(a)
W
ho has the better right over the 2
00
-square meter areathat has been added to Marios registered land, Mario or
A
ndres?(b) May a third person acquire said 2
00
-square meter land by prescription?
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
a. Mario has a better right over the 2
00
square meters increasein area by reason of accretion, applying
A
rticle
4
57 of the New Civil Code, which provides that to the owners of landsadjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters.
A
ndres cannot claim that the increase in Marios land is hisown, because such is an accretion and not result of the
suddendetachment of a known portion of his land and its attachmentto Marios land, a process
called avulsion. He can no longerclaim ownership of the portion of his registered land which wasgradually
and naturally eroded due to the current of the river,because he

CIVIL LAW
Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics
(Year 1990-2006)
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
Ramon has acquired the land by acquisitive prescription, andbecause of laches on the part of Rosario.
Ramon's possessionof the land was adverse because he asserted sole ownershipthereof and never
shared the harvest therefrom. His adversepossession having been continuous and uninterrupted for
morethan 3
0
years, Ramon has acquired the land by prescription.Rosario is also guilty of laches not having
asserted her right tothe harvest for more than
40
years.
O
wnershi
p
;
Co-
O
wnershi
p
;

P
res
c
ri
p
tion (2002)
Senen and Peter are brothers. Senen migrated to Canada early while still a teenager. Peter stayed
in
B
ulacan to take care of their widowed mother and continued to work on the Family farm even after her
death. Returning to the country some thirty years after he had left, Senen seeks a partition of the
farm to gethis share as the only co-heir of Peter. Peter interposes
hisopposition, contending that acquisitive prescription hasalready set in and that estoppel lies to
bar the action forpartition, citing his continuous possession of the property for at least
10
years, for almost 3
0
years in fact. It is undisputedthat Peter has never openly claimed sole ownership of theproperty. If he ever had
the intention to do so, Senen wascompletely ignorant of it.
W
ill Senens action prosper? Explain.(5%).
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
Senens action will prosper.
A
rticle
494
of the New Civil Codeprovides that no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owneror co-heir against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as heexpressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership
nornotified Senen of his having repudiated the same.
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
Senens action will prosper. This is a case of implied trust. (
A
rt
1441
, NCC) For purposes of prescription under the conceptof an owner (
A
rt. 5
40
, NCC). There is no such concept here.Peter was a co-owner, he never claimed sole ownership of theproperty. He is
therefore estopped under
A
rt.
14
3
1
, NCC.
O
wnershi
p
;
Co-
O
wnershi
p
;
Re
d
em
p
tion (1993)
In
19
37,
A
obtained a loan of P2
0
,
000
.
00
from the NationalCity
B
ank of New York, an
A
merican-owned bank doing business in the Philippines. To guarantee payment of hisobligation,
A
constituted a real estate mortgage on his 3
0
-hectare parcel of agricultural land. In
19
3
9
, before he couldpay his obligation.
A
died intestate leaving three children.
B
, ason by a first marriage, and C and D, daughters by a secondmarriage. In
1940
, the bank foreclosed the mortgage fornon-payment of the principal obligation.
A
s the only bidder atthe extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the bank bought the property and was later
issued a certificate of sale. The war supervened in
1941
without the bank having been able to obtain actualpossession of the property which remained with
A
's threechildren who appropriated for themselves the income from it.In
1948
,
B
bought the property from the bank using themoney he received as back pay from the U.S. Government, and
utilized the same in agribusiness. In
19
6
0
,as
B
's business flourished, C and D sued
B
for partition andaccounting of the income of the property, claiming that asheirs of their father they were co-
ownersthereof and offering to reimburse
B
for whatever he had paidin purchasing the property from the bank. In brief, how willyou answer the complaint
of C and D, if you were engaged by D as his counsel?
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
A
s counsel of
B
, I shall answer the complaint as follows:
W
hen
B
bought the property, it was not by a right of redemption sincethe period therefore had already expired.
Hence,
B
bought theproperty in an independent unconditional sale. C and D are notco-owners with
B
of the property. Therefore, the suit of C andD cannot prosper.
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
A
s counsel of
B
, I shall answer the complaint as follows: Fromthe facts described, it would appear that the Certificate of
salehas not been registered. The one-year period of redemptionbegins to run from registration. In this case, it has not
yet evencommenced. Under the Rules of Court, the property may bereleased by the Judgment debtor or his
successor in interest.(Sec. 2
9
, Rule 27). It has been held that this includes a jointowner.
(Ref. Magno vs.Ciola, 61 Phil. 80).
O
wnershi
p
;
Co-
O
wnershi
p
;
Re
d
em
p
tion (2000)
A
mbrosio died, leaving his three daughters,
B
elen, Rosario andSylvia a hacienda which was mortgaged to the PhilippineNational
B
ank due to the failure of the daughters to pay thebank, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the hacienda
wassold to it as the highest bidder. Six months later, Sylvia won thegrand prize at the lotto and used part of it
to redeem thehacienda from the bank. Thereafter, she took possession of thehacienda and refused to share
its fruits with her sisters,contending that it was owned exclusively by her, having boughtit from the
bank with her own money. Is she correct or not?(3%)
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
Sylvia is not correct. The 3 daughters are the co-owners of thehacienda being the only heirs of
A
mbrosio.
W
hen the property was foreclosed, the right of redemption belongs also to the 3daughters.
W
hen Sylvia redeemed the entire property beforethe lapse of the redemption period, she also
exercised the rightof redemption of her co-owners on their behalf.
A
s such she isholding the shares of her two sisters in the property, and all thefruits corresponding thereto, in
trust for them. Redemption by one co-owner inures to the benefit of all
(Adille v. CA.157SCRA 455).
Sylvia, however, is entitled to be reimbursed theshares of her two sisters in the redemption price.
O
wnershi
p
;
Co-
O
wnershi
p
;
Re
d
em
p
tion (2002)
A
ntonio,
B
art, and Carlos are brothers. They purchased fromtheir parents specific portions of a parcel of
land as evidencedby three separates deeds of sale, each deed referring to aparticular lot in meter
and bounds.
W
hen the deeds werepresented for registration, the Register of Deeds could notissue separate certificates of Title
had to be issued, therefore, inthe names of three brothers as coowners of the entire property. The
situation has not changed up to now, but each of thebrothers has been receiving rentals exclusively from
the lotactually purchased by him.
A
ntonio sells his lot to a thirdperson, with notice to his brothers. To enable the buyer tosecure a new title in

CIVIL LAW
Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics
(Year 1990-2006)
his name, the deed of sale was made to refer to undivided Salvador, a timber concessionaire, built on his lot ai
nterest in the property of the seller (
A
ntonio), with the metesand bounds of the lot sold being stated.
B
art and Carlos reactedby signifying their exercise of their right of redemption as coowners.
A
ntonio in his behalf and in behalf of his buyer,contends that they are no longer coowners, although the
titlecovering the property has remained in their names as such. May
B
art and Carlos still redeem the lot sold by
A
ntonio? Explain.(5%)
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
No, they may not redeem because there was no Coownershipamong
A
ntonio,
B
art, and Carlos to start with. Their parentsalready partitioned the land in selling separate portions
tothem. The situation is the same as in the case
Si v. Court of Appeals, (342 SCRA 653 [2000]).
P
ossession (1998)
Using a falsified manager's check, Justine, as the buyer, wasable to take delivery of a second hand
car which she had justbought from United Car Sales Inc. The sale was registered withthe Land
Transportation Office.
A
week later, the sellerlearned that the check had been dishonored, but by that time,ustine was
nowhere to be seen. It turned out that Justine hadsold the car to Jerico, the present possessor who knew
nothing about the falsified check. In a suit by United Car Sales, Inc.against Jerico for recovery of
the car, plaintiff alleges it hadbeen unlawfully deprived of its property through fraud andshould,
consequently, be allowed to recover it without having to reimburse the defendant for the price the
latter had paid.Should the suit prosper? [5%
]

SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car. However,since Jerico was not guilty of any fraud and
appears to be aninnocent purchaser for value, he should be reimbursed for theprice he paid. This is without
prejudice to United Car Sales,Inc. right of action against Justine.
A
s between two innocentparties, the party causing the injury should suffer the loss. Therefore, United
Car Sales, Inc. should suffer the loss.
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act of estafashould be deemed to come within the
meaning of unlawfuldeprivation under
A
rt. 55
9
, Civil Code, as without it plaintiff would not have parted with the possession of its car.
AN
OTH
ER AN
SW
ER:
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and Jerico is abuyer in good faith.
AN
OTH
ER AN
SW
ER:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is delivered by theseller to the buyer without reservation of ownership,
theownership is transferred to the buyer. Therefore in the suit of United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for the
recovery of the car,the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover the car withoutreimbursing the
defendant for the price that the latter paid.
(EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos, 184 SCRA 614, April 26, 1990)
P
ro
p
erty
;
Real vs
.

P
ersonal
P
ro
p
erty (1995)
warehouse where he processes and stores his timber forshipment.
A
djoining the warehouse is a furniture factory owned by N
A
RR
A
MIX of which Salvador is a majority stockholder. N
A
RR
A
MIX leased space in the warehouse where it placed its furniture-making machinery.
1
. How would you classify the furniture-making machinery asproperty under the Civil Code? Explain.2.
Suppose the lease contract between Salvador andN
A
RR
A
MIX stipulates that at the end of the lease themachinery shall become the property of the lessor,
will youranswer be the same? Explain.
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
1
. The furniture-making machinery is movable property because it was not installed by the owner of the
tenement. To become immovable under
A
rt.
41
5 (5) of the NCC, themachinery must be installed by the owner of the tenement.
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
It depends on the circumstances of the case. If the machinery was attached in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot beseparated from the tenement without breaking the material orcausing deterioration
thereof, it is immovable property [
A
rt.
41
5 (3), NCC
]
. However, if the machinery can be transportedfrom place to place without impairment of the tenement to which
they were fixed, then it is movable property. [
A
rt.
41
6(
4
), NCC
]

SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
2. It is immovable property.
W
hen there is a provision in thelease contract making the lessor, at the end of the lease, ownerof the
machinery installed by the lessee, the said machinery isconsidered to have been installed by the lessor
through thelessee who acted merely as his agent. Having been installed by the owner of the tenement, the
machinery became immovable.under
A
rt.
41
5 of the NCC.
(Davao Sawmill v. Castillo 61 Phil.709)
P
ro
p
erty
;
Real vs
.

P
ersonal
P
ro
p
erty (1997)
Pedro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated inMalolos,
B
ulacan. In
19
73, he mortgaged the land to thePhilippine National
B
ank (PN
B
) to secure a loan of P
100
.
000
.
00
. For Pedro's failure to pay the loan, the PN
B
foreclosed on the mortgage in
1980
, and the land was sold atpublic auction to PN
B
for being the highest bidder. PN
B
secured title thereto in
198
7.In the meanwhile, Pedro, who was still in possession of theland, constructed a warehouse on the
property. In
1988
, thePN
B
sold the land to Pablo, the Deed of Sale was amended in
1989
to include the warehouse.Pedro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a complaintto annul the
amended Deed of Sale before the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City, where he resides, against
both the PN
B
and Pablo. The PN
B
filed a motion to dismiss the complaintfor improper venue contending that the warehouse is
realproperty under
A
rticle
41
5(
1
) of the Civil Code and thereforethe action should have instead been filed in Malolos,
B
ulacan.Pedro claims otherwise. The question arose as to whether the warehouse should be
considered as real or as personalproperty.

CIVIL LAW
Answers to the BAR as Arranged by Topics
(Year 1990-2006)
If consulted, what would your legal advice be? latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to t
he
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil isan immovable by nature under
A
rt.
41
5(
1
) and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the same, which is what the purpose of
the complaint to annul the amendedDeed of Sale amounts to, should be the place where
theproperty is located, or the RTC of
B
ulacan.
ADD
ITIO
NAL AN
SW
ER
 S
:
1
.
B
uildings are always immovable property, and even in theinstances where the parties to a contract seem to
have dealt with itseparate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise doesit change its
character as immovable property.
A
building is animmovable even if not erected by the owner of the land. The only criterion is union or
incorporation with the soil.
(Ladera vs.Hodges (CA) 48
O.G. 4374) (Reyes and Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. 2. p.7)
2. The warehouse built by Pedro on the mortgaged property isreal property within the context of
A
rticle
41
5 of the New CivilCode, although it was built by Pedro after the foreclosure sale without the
knowledge and consent of the new owner whichmakes him a builder in bad faith, this does not alter
thecharacter of the warehouse as a real property by incorporation.It is a structure which cannot be removed without
causing injury to the land. So, my advice to Pedro is to file the case withthe RTC of
B
ulacan, the situs of the property,
(
Note: If the examinee does not mention that the structure was built by a builder in bad faith, it should be
given full credit).
Sower
;
Goo
d
Faith/
B
a
d
Faith (2000)
Felix cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to sugar cane,believing it to be his own.
W
hen the crop was eight monthsold, and harvestable after two more months, a resurvey of theland showed that it
really belonged to Fred.
W
hat are theoptions available to Fred? (2%)
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
ER:
A
s to the pending crops planted by Felix in good faith, Fredhas the option of allowing Felix to
continue the cultivation andto harvest the crops, or to continue the cultivation and harvestthe
crops himself. In the latter option, however, Felix shallhave the right to a part of the expenses of cultivation
and to apart of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of possession. (
A
rt. 5
4
5 NCC),
 AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
Since sugarcane is not a perennial crop. Felix is considered asower in good faith.
B
eing so,
A
rt.
448
applies. The optionsavailable to Fred are: (a) to appropriate the crop after paying Felix the indemnity under
A
rt. 5
4
6, or (b) to require Felix topay rent.
Us
u
fr
u
c
t (1997)
On
1
January
1980
, Minerva, the owner of a building, grantedPetronila a usufruct over the property until
01
June
1998
whenManuel, a son of Petronila, would have reached his 3
0
thbirthday. Manuel, however, died on
1
June
1990
when he wasonly 26 years old.Minerva notified Petronila that the usufruct had beenextinguished by
the death of Manuel and demanded that theformer. Petronila refused to vacate the place on the
groundthat the usufruct in her favor would expire only on
1
June
1998
when Manuel would have reached his 3
0
th birthday andthat the death of Manuel before his 3
0
th birthday did notextinguish the usufruct.
W
hose contention should beaccepted?
SUGG
E
ST
ED AN
SW
 ER:
Petronila's contention is correct. Under
A
rticle 6
0
6 of the CivilCode, a usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before athird person reaches a certain age
shall subsist for the numberof years specified even if the third person should die unlessthere is
an express stipulation in the contract that statesotherwise. In the case at bar, there is no express stipulation
thatthe consideration for the usufruct is the existence of Petronila's son. Thus, the general rule and not the
exceptionshould apply in this case.
AL
T
ERNA
TIV
E AN
SW
ER:
This is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Manuel until he reaches 3
0
yrs. of age with Petronila serving only as a conduit, holding the property in trust for his benefit. The death of
Manuel at the age of 26 therefore, terminated theusufruct.