Abakada Guro Party List, et al vs Exec. Sec.

Ermita

Facts: On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.
Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government from
implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning
the constitutionality of the new law.

The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6: That the
President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006,
raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:

(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year
exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);

or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-
half percent (1%)

Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT rate is an
abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is not covered by
Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods
and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation
since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government
and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to
cause, influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent.
Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation.

Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power? NO

Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the
authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power
and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its
delegation.

The exceptions are:

(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution

(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution

(c) delegation to the people at large

(d) delegation to local governments

(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient standard is
one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it.

In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of facts
upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a
specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon
factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used in the
common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be evaded by
the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are
present.

Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a fact---
whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.

In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is
acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to
gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His
function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of
the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must
be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is
frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a
law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power to tax but the mere
implementation of the law.

Facts:

Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist
that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions
since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate
Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power
generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the
sale of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for
sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on
provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict
because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist.

Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT.

Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337s stand- by authority to the Executive to
increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary
of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory
power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended
analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making.

Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege,
it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove.

Issue:

Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional?

Held:

The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation,
revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose
or concur with amendments.

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either
of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare
the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the
means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he
possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to
properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.

In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a
VAT-registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the
Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More
importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom.
So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such
end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional
bounds.

The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

SM LAND INC. v. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORITY (BCDA) & ARNEL PACIANO D. CASANOVA

To increase government prospects, participation in joint ventures has been incentivized by

granting rights and advantages to the Original Proponent in the Competitive Challenge phase of a
Swiss Challenge. Faithful observance of these provisions of law that grant the aforesaid rights, may
it be sourced from a bilateral contract or executive edict, aids in improving government reliability.
Allowing government agencies to retract their commitments to the project proponents will
essentially render inutile the incentives offered to and have accrued in favor of the private sector
entity. Without securing these rights, the business community will be wary when it comes to forging
contracts with the government.

Pursuant to Republic Act (RA)No. 7227 (Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the BCDA
opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio South Property. Jumping on the opportunity,
SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to the BCDA an unsolicited proposal for the development of the lot
through a Public-Private Joint Venture Agreement which was accepted by the BCDA. However, the
BCDA clarified that its act should not be construed to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture
agreement with SMLI but only constitutes an authorization to conduct detailed negotiations with
SMLI and iron out the terms and conditions of the agreement. Afterwards, upon arriving at
mutually acceptable terms and conditions, a Certification of Successful Negotiations (Certification)
was issued by the BCDA and signed by both parties with the provisions that the BCDA undertook to
subject SMLIs Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge and committed itself to commence the
activities for the solicitation for comparative proposals.

Then, instead of proceeding with the Competitive Challenge, the BCDA corresponded with SMLI
stating that it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional proposal to improve the original offer,
with the assurance that the BCDA will nonetheless respect any right which may have accrued in
favor of SMLI.

In turn, SMLI increased the total secured payments with an upfront payment. Without responding to
SMLIs new proposal, the BCDA sent a memorandum to the Office of the President (OP) categorically
recommending the termination of the Competitive Challenge. Alarmed by this development, SMLI
urged the BCDA to proceed with the Competitive Challenge as agreed upon. However, the BCDA, via
the assailed Supplemental Notice No. 5, terminated the Competitive Challenge altogether.

In the meantime, the BCDA issued in favor of SMLI a check without explanation attached to it but its
value corresponds to the proposal security posted by SMLI, with interest. SMLI attempted to return
the check but to no avail. The BCDA caused the publication of an Invitation to Bid for the
development of the subject property. This impelled SMLI to file an Urgent Manifestation with
Reiterative Motion to Resolve SMLIs Application for Temporary Restraining Order UST Law
Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction. The Court issued the TRO
prayed for by SMLI and enjoined BCDA from proceeding with the new selection process for the
development of the property.

For its part, SMLI alleged in its petition that the Certification issued by the BCDA and signed by the
parties constituted a contract and that under the said contract, BCDA cannot renege on its
obligation to conduct and complete the Competitive Challenge. The BCDA relies chiefly on the
reservation clause in the Terms of Reference (TOR),which mapped out the procedure to be followed
in the Competitive Challenge, which allegedly authorized the agency to unilaterally cancel the
Competitive Challenge. BCDA add that the terms and conditions agreed upon are disadvantageous to
the government, and that it cannot legally be barred by estoppel in correcting a mistake committed
by its agents.

ISSUE:
Was the BCDA correct in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5, which unilaterally aborted the
Competitive Challenge, and in subjecting the development of the project to public bidding?

RULING:
No.SMLI has the right to a completed Competitive Challenge pursuant to the Detailed Guidelines for
Competitive Challenge Procedure for Public-Private Joint Ventures (NEDA JV Guidelines) and the
Certification issued by the BCDA.

The reservation clause adverted to by the BCDA cannot, in any way, prejudice said right.

NEDA promulgated the NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which detailed two (2) modes of selecting a
private sector Joint Venture partner: by competitive selection or through negotiated agreements.
Competitive selection involves a selection process based on transparent criteria, which should not
constrain or limit competition, and is open to participation, by any interested and qualified private
entity. Furthermore, it is well to point out that after BCDA accepted the unsolicited proposal of SMLI
and after both parties herein successfully concluded the detailed negotiations on the terms and
conditions of the project, SMLI acquired the status of an Original Proponent. An Original Proponent,
per the TOR, pertains to the party whose unsolicited proposal for the development and privatization
of the subject property through Joint Venture with BCDA has been accepted by the latter, subject to
certain conditions, and is now being subjected to a Competitive Challenge. In this regard, SMLI
insists that as an Original Proponent, it obtained the right to a completed Competitive Challenge.

A scrutiny of the NEDA JV Guidelines reveals that certain rights are conferred to an Original
Proponent. As correctly pointed out by SMLI, these rights include the right to the conduct and
completion of a competitive challenge.

By their mutual consent and in signing the Certification, both parties, in effect, entered into a
binding agreement to subject the unsolicited proposal to the Competitive Challenge. Evidently, the
Certification partakes of a contract wherein BCDA committed itself to proceed with the Third Stage
of the process and simultaneously grants SMLI the right to expect that the BCDA will fulfill its
obligations under the same. The preconditions to the conduct of the Competitive Challenge having
been met, what is left, therefore, is to subject the terms agreed upon to a Competitive Challenge.

Pangasinan Transport Co. vs. Public Service Commission

GR NO. 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS:

This is a case on the certificate of public convenience of petitioner Pangasinan Transportation Co.
Inc (Pantranco). The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the province of Pangasinan and Tarlac, Nueva Ecija and Zambales. On
August 26, 1939, Pantranco filed with the Public Service Commission (PSC) an application to
operate 10 additional buses. PSC granted the application with 2 additional conditions which was
made to apply also on their existing business. Pantranco filed a motion for reconsideration with the
Public Service Commission. Since it was denied, Pantranco then filed a petition/ writ of certiorari.

ISSUES:

Whether the legislative power granted to Public Service Commission:

- is unconstitutional and void because it is without limitation
- constitutes undue delegation of powers

HELD:

The challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional because it is a
proper delegation of legislative power, so called Subordinate Legislation. It is a valid delegation
because of the growing complexities of modern government, the complexities or multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws. All
that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use of
discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the promotion of
public interests in a proper and suitable manner.

The Certificate of Public Convenience is neither a franchise nor contract, confers no property rights
and is a mere license or privilege, subject to governmental control for the good of the public. PSC
has the power, upon notice and hearing, to amend, modify, or revoked at any time any certificate
issued, whenever the facts and circumstances so warranted. The limitation of 25 years was never
heard, so the case was remanded to PSC for further proceedings.

In addition, the Court ruled that, the liberty and property of the citizens should be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights that he asserts but the tribunal must
consider the evidence presented. When private property is affected with a public interest, it ceased
to be juris privati or private use only.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA)

Petitioner: Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.

Respondents:
1. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
2. Minister of Labor and Employment
3. Abdul Basar (Hearing Officer)
4. Kathleen D. Saco
Ponente: Cruz, J.

Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985.

His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the
POEA.

The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but
by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance.

The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties
ruled in favour of the complainant.

The petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated
December 10, 1986 is hereby LIFTED. It is so ordered.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the POEA had jurisdiction over the case as the husband was not an overseas
worker.
2. Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of
non-delegation of legislative power.

Held:
1. Yes. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order No.
797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of Filipinos
and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of
the Labor Code in 1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with
"original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-
employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." These cases, according to the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas
Employment issued by the POEA, include, claims for death, disability and other benefits arising out
of such employment.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the
POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984.
This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping
companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

2. No. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is
not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

GENERAL RULE: Non-delegation of powers; exception

It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law
shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative
cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is
not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative. The
delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. Rationale
for Delegation of Legislative Power The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of
government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of the problems attendant upon
present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from
its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields.

Power of Subordinate Legislation

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly
applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their
attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to
entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of
the statute. This is called the power of subordinate legislation.

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in statute by
filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation.

Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and quasijudicial.
The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, and the second enables
them to interpret and apply such regulations.

KMU v. GARCIA
239 SCRA 386

FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators
to charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one
year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was
opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant
and unreasonable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based
on the order of the LTFRB

HELD:
The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of
public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in
order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the
provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue
delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated
cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing
the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave
the riding public at the mercy of transport operators.

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Jesus Garcia, Jr., LTFRB, Provincial Bus Operators Association
of the Philippines (PBOAP)
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
Kapunan, J.

FACTS:
public utilities privately owned and operated businesses whose service are essential to the
general public; enterprises which specially cater to the needs of the public and conducive to their
comfort and convenience
DOTC Sec. issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman allowing
provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of 1 year
PBOAP pursuant to Memo. Cir. it filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-
board increase of eight and a half centavos (P0.085) per kilometer for all types of provincial buses
with a minimum-maximum fare range of fifteen (15%) percent over and below the proposed basic
per kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary,
first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) minimum per kilometer fare for
aircon buses, was sought
respondent LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase in accordance with a
specified schedule of fares on a straight computation method
DOTC Sec. issued Department Order No. 92-587 defining the policy framework on the
regulation of transport services. It provides inter alia that Passenger fares shall also be
deregulated, except for the lowest class of passenger service (normally third class passenger
transport) for which the government will fix indicative or reference fares. Operators of particular
services may fix their own fares within a range 15% above and below the indicative or reference
rate.
LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009 promulgating the guidelines for the
implementation of DOTC Department Order No. 92-587, which provides, among others, that:
The issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience is determined by public need. The presumption
of public need for a service shall be deemed in favor of the applicant, while burden of proving that
there is no need for the proposed service shall be the oppositors.

The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per cent for provincial buses and
jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the authorized fare to be replaced by
an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare range
PBOAP - availing itself of the deregulation policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus
operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribed fare without first having filed a
petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public hearing, announced a fare increase of
twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares
KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus fares.

ISSUE: WON the above memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the DOTC and the LTFRB which,
among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the
prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing
and approval thereof by said agency is in violation of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, and in derogation of
LTFRBs duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus
operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of
public convenience and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the
proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec.
20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be just and reasonable

HELD: Yes.
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads:
Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have
power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act,
subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof,
as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed,
observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its
discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any
hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice
to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service
equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business,
the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such
operator for the purpose of fixing the rates.
LTFRB is authorized under EO 202, s. 1987 to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically
review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of
public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles
LTFRB not authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or
other public service
authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and
above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of
legislative authority
rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation where he will
continue to operate at a loss; rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to
cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments
CPC - authorization granted by the LTFRB for the operation of land transportation services
for public use as required by law. Pursuant to Section 16(a) of the Public Service Act, as amended,
the following requirements must be met before a CPC may be granted, to wit: (i) the applicant must
be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or co-partnership, association or joint-stock
company constituted and organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 per centum of its
stock or paid-up capital must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines; (ii) the applicant must be
financially capable of undertaking the proposed service and meeting the responsibilities incident to
its operation; and (iii) the applicant must prove that the operation of the public service proposed and
the authorization to do business will promote the public interest in a proper and suitable manner;
there must be proper notice and hearing before the PSC can exercise its power to issue a CPC
LTFRB Memorandum Circular No. 92-009, Part IV is incompatible and inconsistent with
Section 16(c)(iii) of the Public Service Act which requires that before a CPC will be issued, the
applicant must prove by proper notice and hearing that the operation of the public service proposed
will promote public interest in a proper and suitable manner. On the contrary, the policy guideline
states that the presumption of public need for a public service shall be deemed in favor of the
applicant.
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be
in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect
its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
FACTS:
The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which
penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law
and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and
held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal
to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid?
HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an
executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the
issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the
legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate
rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards,
which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.

PEOPLE v MACEREN

FACTS
- Section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in
fishing.
- The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters.
- Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario
were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It was alleged that they
engaged in electro fishing.
- Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court dismissed the case. CFI affirmed. The lower court
held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or
poisonous substance as contemplated in section II of the Fisheries Law. The lower court further held
that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful.

ISSUE/S
1. WON the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources exceeded his authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84

HELD
1. YES.
Ratio The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to
carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute

Reasoning The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing,
a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in
the said law is electro fishing specifically punished.

Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex
situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the
standards that the law prescribes

Disposition Decision affirmed

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS
This is a petition to review a decision of Auditor General denying petitioners claim for quarters
allowance as manager of the National Abaca and other Fibers Corp. (NAFCO).

Petitioner was general manager in 1949 of NAFCO with annual salary of P15,000.00

NAFCO Board of Directors granted P400/mo. Quarters allowance to petitioner amounting to P1,650
for 1949.

This allowance was disapproved by the Central Committee of the government enterprise council
under Executive Order No. 93 upon recommendation by NAFCO auditor and concurred in by the
Auditor general on two grounds:
a) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managers salary to P15,000/year.
b) NAFCO is in precarious financial condition.

ISSUES: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 exercising control over Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations (GOCC) implemented under R.A. No. 51 is valid or null and void.
Whether or not R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential control over GOCCs is Constitutional.

DECISION: R.A. No. 51 is constitutional. It is not illegal delegation of legislative power to the
executive as argued by petitioner but a mandate for the President to streamline GOCCs operation.
Executive Order 93 is valid because it was promulgated within the 1 year period given. Petition for
review DISMISSED with costs.

CERVANTES vs AUDITOR GENERAL

91 SCRA 359
Delegation to Administrative Agencies
Sufficiency of Standards

FACTS: It appears that petitioner was in 1949 the manager of the NAFCO with a salary of P15,000 a
year.
By a resolution of the Board of Directors of this corporation approved on January 19 of that year, he
was granted quarters allowance of not exceeding P400 a month effective the first of that month.
Submitted the Control Committee of the Government Enterprises Council for approval, the said
resolution was disapproved on August 3, 1949.

The Government Enterprises Council was created by the President under Executive Order No. 93
pursuant to Republic Act No. 51, authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to
effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose
of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. The petitioner challenged the
action of the Government Enteprises Council, contending that Executive Order No. 93 was an undue
delegation of power.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 93 is null and void because it is based on a law that is
unconstitutional as an illegal delegation of legislative power to the President

RULING: No. As to the first ground, the rule is that so long as the Legislature "lays down a policy and
a standard is established by the statute" there is no undue delegation. Republic Act No. 51 in
authorizing the President of the Philippines, among others, to make reforms and changes in
government-controlled corporations, lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to
meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent government of
the Philippines and to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operations. The standard
was set and the policy fixed. The President had to carry the mandate. This he did by promulgating
the executive order in question which, tested by the rule above cited, does not constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power.

RATIO: Delegation to Administrative Agencies. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.

To "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency" is a sufficient standard.

Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the
respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public
funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have
the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is
denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such
control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to
create a new one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with
the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was
vested in him by the Constitution.

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

15 SCRA 569 Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test

In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this was
purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:

The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change
the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may
require

The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims
that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed
by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed except by Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a municipality which is composed of several
barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?

The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were barred from
being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a municipality can
be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress
has delegated such power to create municipalities to the President.

ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue
of Sec. 68 of the RAC.

HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law,
it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this
case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.

Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may require which
would mean that the President may exercise such power as the public welfare may require is
present, still, such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first
place, what the phrase as the public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately
precedes hence, the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the seat of
government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires and NOT the creation
of municipality.

The Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).

Adminstrative Law
Arellano Univeristy School of Law
aiza ebina/2015

BALBUENA vs SECRETARY OF EDUCATION

110 Phil 150
Sufficiency of Standards

FACTS: Section 1 of R.A. No. 1265 requires all educational institutions to observe daily flag
ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the
Philippine National Anthem. Section 2 thereof authorizes and directs the Secretary of Education to
issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony.

Petitioners, members of the religious sect "Jehovah's Witnesses," challenged the constituionality of
the Act by virtue of which the Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8 (prescribing
compulsory flag ceremony in all schools), as an undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the requirements of simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the
singing of th national anthem constitute an adequate standard

RULING: Yes. the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and
dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when contrasted
with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest", "public welfare", interest of
law and order, "justice and equity" and the substantial merits of the case", or "adequate and efficient
instruction." That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to
the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that
will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the
manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the
delegation is intended to achieve.

RATIO: "Simplicity and dignity" is a suficient standard.

BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA), represented by its National President

(BOCEA National Executive Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner, "vs."HON. MARGARITO B.
TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in
his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in her capacity as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Respondents.
NOTE: This case is long so it's a two page digests. There were three issues that were raised as to
constitutionality.
FACTS:
1. On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No.
9335.
2. RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC).
3. The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.
4. The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue
targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee
(DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in
proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
5. Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are tainted with
constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its members, petitioners, directly
filed the present petition against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his
capacity as BOC Commissioner, and Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).
6. In 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection
District Performance Contracts7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-
and-file employees to sign.
7. BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the Governments own
policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big businesses, the occurrence of natural
calamities and because of other economic factors.
8. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced and forced to sign the Performance
Contract. They also alleged they were threatened that if they do not sign their respective
Performance Contracts, they would face possible reassignment, reshuffling, or worse, be placed on
floating status.
9. This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA asserted that in view
of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and their adverse effects on the
constitutional rights of BOC officials and employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. The Issues
ISSUE/S: (1) Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board
(2) Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEAs members to:
(a) equal protection of laws,
(b) security of tenure and
(c) due process; and
(3) Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.

HELD:
1. No. In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative power to
various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the
volume and variety of interactions in todays society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate
laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the
need to delegate to administrative bodies the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in their
specialized fields the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given statute
and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate
legislation is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.32
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2)
the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits
of the delegates authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it
is to be implemented. At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
"public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and
welfare". In this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.33 The Court finds that R.A. No.
9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms and conditions, and
that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEAs supposition of undue delegation of
legislative power to the Board.
2. No. a. On Equal Protection The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary. With respect to
RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the optimization of the revenue-generation capability
and collection of the BIR and the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in the law
should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the BIR and the BOC
because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the national
government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function
of being the instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions
taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under
RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37

b. Security of Tenure
RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from
the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence
in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil service laws. The
action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with
substantive and procedural due process.38

c. Due Process
BOCEAs apprehension of deprivation of due process finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A.
No. 9335.40 The concerned BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue
collection and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly give due
consideration to all relevant factors41 that may affect the level of collection. In the same manner,
exemptions42 were set, contravening BOCEAs claim that its members may be removed for
unattained target collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an
employees right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is not deprived of him.43
In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service
without according him his constitutional right to due process.

3. No. R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a
bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.451avvphi1

R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict
punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination
of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply
protected.

Adminstrative Law
Arellano Univeristy School of Law
aiza ebina/2015

US vs ANG TANG HO
43 Phil 1
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
FACTS: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An
Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of
which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise
resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with
the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purpose of this Act.

Section 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders and decrees
promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.

Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price
at which rice should be sold and penalizing the violation thereof.

On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the
sale of rice at an excessive price. Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that
the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

The defendant questions the validity of the proclamation by the Governor-General pursuant to Act
No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold confers an
unconstitutional delegation of powers

RULING: Yes. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is
left to the discretion of the Governor-General.

The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons
the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause,"
and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of the Governor-General.

The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or
corn." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. It does not specify or define what is
a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency
measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

All these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the Governor-General. The law is thus
incomplete as a legislation.

It is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Before
any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at
any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be
no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime.

That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it
must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued
the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was not a crime.
The Governor-General cannot, by proclamation, determine what act shall constitute a crime or not.
That is essentially a legislative task.

RATIO: Allocation of governmental powers. - The doctrine declares that governmental powers are
divided among the three (3) departments of government, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and
broadly operates to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive powers to the executive
department, and judicial powers to the judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from
exercising or invading the powers of another.

---

Tatad v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 124360, November 5, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PUNO, J.:

I. THE FACTS

Petitioners assailed 5(b) and 15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act
of 1996.

5(b) of the law provided that tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on imported crude oil at the rate of
three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . .
On the other hand, 15 provided that [t]he DOE shall, upon approval of the President, implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As far as
practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable . . .

Petitioners argued that 5(b) on tariff differential violates the provision of the Constitution
requiring every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.

They also contended that the phrases as far as practicable, decline of crude oil prices in the world
market and stability of the peso exchange rate to the US dollar are ambivalent, unclear and
inconcrete since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry.

Petitioners also assailed the Presidents E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry in February 1997. They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the implementation of full
deregulation.

Finally, they asserted that the law violated 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting
monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition

II. THE ISSUES

1. Did 5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution?
2. Did 15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180 unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372
void.]

1. NO, 5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. [T]he title
need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the
subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is
supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less
on imported petroleum.

2. NO, 15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to execute laws
does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds
of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, viz: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when it reaches
the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there
must be adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. It will be noted
that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of
March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of March 1997
is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the
law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to the
President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words as far as practicable, declining and stable should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled
and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines practicable as meaning
possible to practice or perform, decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as
meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of
executive discretion that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the
validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.

3. YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only enumerated two factors to be
considered by the Department of Energy and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining, and (2) the time when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the
depletion of the OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering full
deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show that some of our legislators wanted
to impose as a pre-condition to deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by R.A. No.
8180 when it considered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation
of this extra factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department considered
anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the exchange
rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the
Executive department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any
right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power
to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny, indeed, to
transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a strict
scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of
agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with
the factors of decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the
US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by
the Executive department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal
consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its
importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O.
No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.

4. YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated 19, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.

[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and controlled by an oligopoly, a
foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil
market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and
Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works
to their immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and
cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New
players that intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of
their own will have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with
them will suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be
competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it
will induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is
to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy disincentives.
Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our
downstream oil industry is an idle dream.

The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron, Shell and Caltex against
prospective new players. Petron, Shell and Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement
of R.A. No. 8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors again will find
compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of
storage facilities and the cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is to
further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition and enhance the control of the
market by the three (3) existing oil companies.

Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined as . . . selling or offering to
sell any product at a price unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers
to the detriment of competitors. Respondents contend that this provision works against Petron,
Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in
isolation. Its validity is interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of new
players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory pricing on the part of the dominant
oil companies is encouraged by the provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Text-
writer Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that will give a firm monopoly
profits in the future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however, if the market is flooded
with new entrants as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory pricing
will be profitable only if the market contains significant barriers to new entry.

As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers
which discourage new players to enter the market. Considering these significant barriers
established by R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of PETRON, SHELL
and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a
chilling reality. Petitioners charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anti-competitive is not
without reason.

[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal held that the offending
provisions of the law so permeated its essence that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions
on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal props of R.A. No.
8180. Congress could not have deregulated the downstream oil industry without these provisions.]

CASE: International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc., et.al. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines), et.al. (G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301 and 209430)
DATE: 8 December 2015
PONENTE: J. Villarama, Jr.

BACKGROUND

In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed Executive Order (EO) No. 430 creating the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) which was tasked to identify and evaluate
potential hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering experiments and introducing new
species and genetically engineered organisms and recommend measures to minimize risks.
In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety Guidelines which governs the regulation of
the importation or introduction, movement and field release of potentially hazardous biological
materials in the Philippines. The same was followed by the Guidelines on Planned Release of
Genetically Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
On 29 December 1993, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force. This is a
multilateral treaty recognizing the great potential of modern biotechnology for human well-
being if developed and used with adequate safety measures for the environment and human
health.
In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
(Cartagena Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to ensure an adequate level of safe
transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology.
The Philippines signed the same on May 24 of the same year.
In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA) issued DA Administrative Order No. 08
which provides rules and regulations for the importation and release into the environment of
plants and plant products derived from the use of modern biotechnology.
On 17 March 2006, EO No. 514 (EO 514) entitled, Establishing the National Biosafety
Framework (NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its Implementation, and Strengthening the
NCBP was issued. It expressly provides that DAO 2002-08, NCBP Guidelines on the Contained
Use of GMOs, except for provisions on potentially harmful exotic species which were repealed,
and all issuances of the Bureau of Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on products of modern
biotechnology, shall continue to be in force and effect unless amended by the issuing
departments or agencies.

FACTS
 On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of Undertaking was executed between International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the
Philippines Los Baos Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI) and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI),
in pursuance of a collaborative research and development project on eggplants that are
resistant to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies involved were UPLB through its
Institute of Plant Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company (MAHYCO) of India, Cornell
University and the Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) of USAID.
The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-resistant crop subject of the field trial was
described as a bio-engineered eggplant. The crystal toxin genes from the soil bacterium
Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to produce the protein
CrylAc which is toxic to target insect pests. The latter is said to be highly specific to
lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer (FSB), the most destructive insect pest of
eggplant.
NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of Contained Experiment which was conducted from
2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the conduct of experiment, all the biosafety
measures have been complied with and no untoward incident has occurred.
On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety
permits to UPLB.
Field testing commenced on various dates in the following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North
Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay,
Laguna.
On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.) filed
a petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus with prayer for the issuance
of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) alleging that the Bt talong field trials
violate their constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed study on the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt corn,
local scientists likewise attested to the harmful effects of GMOs to human and animal
health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target species
- There is a failure to comply with the required public consultation under Sections 26 and
27 of the Local Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the precautionary principle, it being a classic
environmental case where scientific evidence as to the health, environmental and
socio-economic safety is insufficient or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation
indicates reasonable grounds for concern that there are potentially dangerous effects
on human health and the environment
The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace, et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) from processing for field testing and registering as
herbicidal product Bt talong in the Philippines, stopping all pending field testing, and
ordering the uprooting of planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to submit
to an environmental impact statement system under the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR-EMB); (2) to
submit an independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk assessment, field tests report, and
regulatory compliance reports; (3) to submit all issued certifications on public
information, public consultation, public participation and consent from the LGUs affected
by the field testing; (4) to submit an acceptable draft of an amendment of the NBF and
DAO 2002-08; and (5) for BPI of DA to conduct balanced nationwide public information
on the nature of Bt talong and Bt talong field trial, and a survey of its social acceptability.
On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB,
ordering them to file a verified return.
 The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
- All environmental laws were complied with, including public consultations in the
affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of
Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt talong are irrelevant in the field trial stage as
none of the eggplants will be consumed by humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing as they do not stand to suffer any direct
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply since the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study to ensure that the field trials have no significant and negative
impact on the environment
SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the case to the Court of Appeals.
On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the following procedural issues before the CA: (1)
whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2)
whether the petition has been rendered moot and academic by the alleged termination of the
Bt talong field testing; and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable controversy
CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012, resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess
legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it is capable of repetition yet evading review;
and (3) the alleged non-compliance with environmental and local government laws present
justiciable controversies for resolution by the court.
On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the
precautionary principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (the Rules) finds relevance in the case.
CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI
rejecting the argument that CA violated UPLBs right to academic freedom. The writ stops the
field trials of Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong research. Thus, there is no
assault on academic freedom.
CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the theory that introducing a genetically
modified plant into our ecosystem is an ecologically imbalancing act.
Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to reverse
the CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of field trials for Genetically Modified
eggplants.

ISSUES

1. WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing

2. WON the case is moot and academic
3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
administrative remedies
4. WON the law on environmental impact statement/assessment applies on projects involving
the introduction and propagation of GMOs in the country
5. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission committed by the public respondents in the
processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt talong field testing
6. WON the Precautionary Principle applies

RULING

1. Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases which allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases. The provision
on citizen suits in the Rules collapses the tradional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature, and aims to further encourage the protection of the
environment.

2. No. The case falls under the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the
mootness principle, the human and environmental health hazards posed by the introduction of a
genetically modified plant which is a very popular staple vegetable among Filipinos is an issue of
paramount public interest.

3. No. The provisions of DAO 2002-08 do not provide a speedy or adequate remedy for the
respondents to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised in this case
that pertain to laws and rules for environmental protection, thus Greenpeace, et.al. is justified in
coming to the Supreme Court.

4. Yes. EO 514 mandates that concerned departments and agencies, most particularly
petitioners DENR-EMB, BPI and FPA, to make a determination whether the EIS system should apply
to the release of GMOs into the environment and issue joint guidelines on the matter.

The Philippine EIS System (PEISS) is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect
impacts of a project on the biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts
are addressed by appropriate environmental protection and enhancement measures. It aids
proponents in incorporating environmental considerations in planning their projects as well as in
determining the environments impact on their project. There are six stages in the regular EIA
process. The proponent initiates the first three stages while EMB takes the lead in the last three
stages. Public participation is enlisted in most stages.

Even without the issuance of EO 514, GMO field testing should have at least been considered for EIA
under existing regulations of EMB on new and emerging technologies, to wit:
g) Group V (Unclassified Projects): These are the projects not listed in any of the groups, e.g.
projects using new processes/technologies with uncertain impacts. This is an interim category
unclassified projects will eventually be classified into their appropriate groups after EMB evaluation.
(Emphasis supplied)

All government agencies as well as private corporations, firms and entities who intend to undertake
activities or projects which will affect the quality of environment are required to prepare a detailed
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prior to undertaking such development activity.

An environmentally critical project (ECP) is considered by the EMB as likely to have significant
adverse impact that may be sensitive, irreversible and diverse and which include activities that
have significant environmental consequences.

In this context, and given the overwhelming scientific attention worldwide on the potential hazards
of GMOs to human health and the environment, their release into the environment through field
testing would definitely fall under the category of ECP.

5. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related DA order are not the only legal bases
for regulating field trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly provides that the NBF
applies to the development, adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies, measures and
guidelines and in making biosafety decisions concerning the research, development, handling and
use, transboundary movement, release into the environment and management of regulated articles.

The NBF requires the use of precaution, as provided in Section 2.6 which reads:

2.6. Using Precaution. In accordance with Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration of 1992 and the
relevant provisions of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, in particular Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11
(par. 8), the precautionary approach shall guide biosafety decisions. The principles and elements of
this approach are hereby implemented through the decision-making system in the NBF.
It likewise contains general principles and minimum guidelines that the concerned agencies are
expected to follow and which their respective rules and regulations must conform with. In cases of
conflict in applying the principles, the principle of protecting the public interest and welfare shall
always prevail, and no provision of the NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and
mandate of heads of departments and agencies to consider the national interest and public welfare
in making biosafety decisions.

Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more transparent, meaningful and participatory public
consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the posting and publication of notices and
information sheets, consultations with some residents and government officials, and submission of
written comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply adhered to the procedures laid down by DAO
2002-08 and no real effort was made to operationalize the principles of NBF in the conduct of field
testing of Bt talong. Said failure means that the DA lacks mechanisms to mandate applicants to
comply with international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the DAO 2002-08 should be
declared invalid.

Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty. Segui of the EMB was evasive in answering the
questions on whether his office undertook the necessary evaluation on the possible environmental
impact of Bt talong field trials and the release of GMOs into the environment in general. While he
initially cited lack of budget and competence as reasons for their inaction, he later said that an
amendment of the law should be made since projects involving GMOS are not covered by
Proclamation No. 2146, entitled Proclaiming Certain Areas and Types of Projects as
Environmentally Critical and Within the Scope of the Environmental Impact Statement System
Established Under Presidential Decree No. 1586.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication of the DENR-EMBs lack of serious attention to
their mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental assessments are done and impacts
identified in biosafety decisions.

Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST, DENR, DA and DOH to ensure the allocation of funds
for the implementation of the NBF as it was intended to be a multi-disciplinary effort involving the
different government departments and agencies.

The petitioners government agencies clearly failed to fulfil their mandates in the implementation of
the NBF.

6. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany in the 1960s, expressing the
normative idea that governments are obliged to foresee and forestall harm to the environment.
The Rules incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20, which states:

SEC.1. Applicability. When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link
between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle
in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of
the doubt.

SEC 2. Standards for application. In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors,
among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or
future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected.
When the features of uncertainty, possibility of irreversible harm, and possibility of serious harm
coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is strongest. The Supreme Court found all three (3)
conditions present.

While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific
studies revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic benefits from Bt crops and plants,
adverse effects on the environment associated with the use of GE technology in agriculture, and
serious health hazards from consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country like the
Philippines, the natural and unforeseen consequences of contamination and genetic pollution would
be disastrous and irreversible.

Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of
risk assessment and public consultation, including the determination of the applicability of the EIS
requirements to the GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the application of the
precautionary principle.

There exists a preponderance of evidence that the release of the GMOs into the environment
threatens to damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites, and eventually the health of
our people once the Bt eggplants are consumed as food.

Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme Court ruled that the principles of the NBF need
to be operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the concerned departments and agencies
before allowing the release into the environment of genetically modified eggplant.

Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs from stakeholders, including marginalized
famers, not just the scientific community. This proceeds from the realization that acceptance of
uncertainty is not only a scientific issue, but is related to public policy and involves an ethical
dimension.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is permanently enjoined.

2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing, propagation and commercialization, and
importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined until a new administrative order is promulgated in
accordance with law.

Digests
Marcos burial: Ocampo vs. Enriquez (majority opinion digest)
Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al., G.R. No. 225973; Rep. Edcel
C. Lagman vs. Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea, G.R. No. 226097, November 8, 2016

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte
publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB").

On August 7, 2016, Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, General Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani. Duterte won the May 9, 2016 election and
formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacanan Palace.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernest C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine Army
regarding the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

ISSUES

1) Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed
memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement
his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violate the
Constitution, domestic and international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their
cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement
as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be
brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

RULING

The petitions must be dismissed.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the
excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military
cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his
wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse
in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that political
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

Locus standi

Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.

Petitioners cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public funds,
without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by either express or implied
provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.

Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or potential injury
which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their interest in this case is too general
and shared by other groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.
Petitioners also failed to prove that the case is of transcendental importance. At this point in time,
the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally established as a national military cemetery and
declared a national shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and other
aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-seven (27) years since his death and
thirty (30) years after his ouster have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to
demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.

As to petitioners Senator De Lima and Congressman Lagman, they failed to show that the burial of
Marcos encroaches on their prerogatives as legislators.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies

Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to their claim of lack of
plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing
to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary ofNational
Defense. The Secretary of National Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if
warranted, considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his order. Questions on
the implementation and interpretation thereof demand the exercise of sound administrative
discretion, requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of
the Secretary, they could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).

Hierarchy of Courts

While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of
facts, but can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining
order and injunction when proven necessary.

Substantive issues

I. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the
law of jurisprudence

While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its entirety should not be
interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial
Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision considering that a law
should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied therein.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To
complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders, memoranda, and
instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and
employees; workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle
blowing and reporting; and client feedback program

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Constitution is also
misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of educational institutions in
teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art.
XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of
Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.

The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the
Chief Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution
Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into execution the
law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature and is
intimately related to the other executive functions. It is best construed as an imposed obligation, not
a separate grant of power. The provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the
cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.

There is no violation of RA 289

Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that the
LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the
LNMB is distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land
subject matter of President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by President
Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos' Proclamation No. 208.
The National Pantheon does not exist at present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to
appropriate any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is
indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a singular
interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and
patriots.

Furthermore, to apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent and the brave" or
"hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the burial of each
and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the OSG that the proposed
interment is not equivalent to the consecration of Marcos' mortal remains. The act in itself does not
confer upon him the status of a "hero." Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer, the purpose
of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer to the people
buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
"hero." Lastly, petitioners' repeated reference to a "hero's burial" and "state honors," without showing
proof as to what kind of burial or honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is
speculative until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public respondents.

RA 10639 is not violated

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are
not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to
extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our
legislators could have easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the
LNMB as a "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is silent and
should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is simply not there. It is irregular, if
not unconstitutional, for Us to presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law.
That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.

The enforcement of the HRVV s' rights under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no causal connection
and legal relation to the law. The subject memorandum and directive of public respondents do not
and cannot interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the Commission.
More importantly, the HRVVs' entitlements to the benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other
domestic laws are not curtailed. R.A. No. 10368 does not amend or repeal, whether express or
implied, the provisions of the Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375.
There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws

The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting
through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petitioners admit it or not,
the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds
of the present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that the preservation and
popularization of our history is not the sole responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and
collective endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.

Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights Victims' Claims
Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the memorialization of HRVV s, the National
Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical
Institute (NHJ), is mandated to act as the primary government agency responsible for history and is
authorized to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine history.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD 105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105, the
LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition
that the LNMB is implicitly covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in
the future as National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior
to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, 138
the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent
leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under
the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and hallowed" refer to the
LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither
does it negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women buried or will
be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war dead, " as originally contemplated
by President Magsaysay in issuing Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the
interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and
cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.

The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO, which is
empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is under the supervision and
control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the Office of the President.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be
limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the
alleged 1992 Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is free to amend,
revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies
which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in
carrying out his mandate.

Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve for public use and
for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall
remain subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. At present, there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in
which the LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The
allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-in-
Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of
Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the
public use requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the
burial is granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.

Likewise, President Duterte's determination to have Marcos' remains interred at the LNMB was
inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation. Presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty prevails over petitioners' highly disputed factual allegation that, in the
guise of exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually motivated by utang na
loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad utang (payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-
evident, petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of their claim. They failed.
Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained

Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of
Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; ( c) Secretaries of National Defense; (
d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; ( e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military personnel
of the AFP to include active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and
CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or combat related activities; (g)
Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (i) Government Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists and other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of National Defense; and G)
Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of
Former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff.

Similar to AFP Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in the LNMB: (a)
Personnel who were dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b)
Authorized personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude.

In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the AFP Regulations G 161-375
remains to be the sole authority in determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at
the LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former Presidents Corazon C.
Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did
not revise the rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The validity of AFP
Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff
acting under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of the President.

AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the absence of clear and unmistakable
showing that it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly providing incomplete,
whimsical, and capricious standards for qualification for burial at the LNMB.

It is not contrary to the "well-established custom," as the dissent described it, to argue that the word
"bayani" in the LNMB has become a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the
LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not automatically attach to its
feature as a military cemetery and to those who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated,
the purpose of the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither been to confer
to the people buried there the title of "hero" nor to require that only those interred therein should be
treated as a "hero."
In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up through the years. Since 1986,
the list of eligible includes not only those who rendered active military service or military-related
activities but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their significant contributions to
the Philippine society (such as government dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief,
Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In 1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of
National Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the extension of burial
privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be restricted in order to be consistent with the
original purpose of the LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is indubitable
that Marcos had rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-Chief, a
legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor
awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a
President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on
the other positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition
that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all good, he was
not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.

Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the disqualifications
stated in AFP Regulations G 161-3 7 5. He was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense
involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active military
service.

The fact remains that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense involving moral
turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a person shall not be held to answer for
a criminal offense without due process of law.

Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no property right to safeguard
because even if one is eligible to be buried at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the
privilege to be interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the Commander-
in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until
then, such inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.

Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of equal protection clause are not
met. 181 In this case, there is a real and substantial distinction between a military personnel and a
former President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles of War attach only to
the members of the military. There is also no substantial distinction between Marcos and the three
Philippine Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and Macapagal). All of them
were not convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. In addition, the classification between a
military personnel and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation No. 208 and
P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine for military memorials, it is also an active
military cemetery that recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred therein.

Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO expressly recognized him
as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was
dishonorably discharged from military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987
(Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95
and 97 of the Articles of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire military
career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.

The word "service" in AFP Regulations G 161-375 should be construed as that rendered by a military
person in the AFP, including civil service, from the time of his/her commission, enlistment,
probation, training or drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the AFP. Civil
service after honorable separation and retirement from the AFP is outside the context of "service"
under AFP Regulations G 161-375.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency during the EDSA
Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military
service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987
Constitution only enshrines the principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not
being a military person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President can hardly be
deemed "dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from the service" as contemplated by AFP
Regulations G 161-375. Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra-
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond the ambit of judicial review, let
alone a mere administrative regulation.

IIt is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office by the people through the so-
called EDSA Revolution. Said political act of the people should not be automatically given a particular
legal meaning other than its obvious consequence - that of ousting him as president. To do
otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous and perilous path of having to make choices from
multifarious inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is not the function
of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact implications or significance of the number of votes
obtained in elections, or the message from the number of participants in public assemblies. If the
Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not
acrimonious, debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding stars - clear
constitutional and legal rules - not by the uncertain, ambiguous and confusing messages from the
actions of the people.
---

DOH v Philip Morris

Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs Jose Luis Alcuaz

December 20, 2011 No comments
180 SCRA 218 Political Law Delegation of Power Administrative Bodies

By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to construct and operate such ground facilities as needed
to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground
terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like
Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT.

Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and
regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has
placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire
permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the
necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC
based its power to fix the rates on EO 546.

PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and
holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service
communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required,
hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC.
PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of
NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and
adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order
mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative
body.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power.

HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the
requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which
conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power.
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground
that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has
prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.

Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act
must both be non-confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the
legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes
unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature
is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement
as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied.

However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process
since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.

CASE DIGEST : PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging

rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose
AlcuazCommissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the
power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then
Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196
issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme Court said that
although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are
meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a
legislative character. Respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial
adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions.
It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely
incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said
that While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory
procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority
to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the
petitioner

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

PONENTE: Peralta

TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9
(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates
and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the peoples right to
suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to
elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per station
airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for
candidates television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a
prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits
on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands.
There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible,
then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in
languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself
a form of suppression of his political speech.

GSIS VS . V ELASCO AND M OLINA

GR. No. 170463

Feb. 2, 2011

FACTS: Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them
under preventive suspension for 90 days, for their alleged participation in a demonstration held by
GSIS employees. In a letter, respondent Molina requested the GSIS Senior Vice President for the
implementation of his step increment. The SVP denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No.
372 issued by petitioner GSIS Board which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its
implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step
increment and promotion.

Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board
Resolution No. 306 approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees.
Respondents request was again denied because of their pending administrative case.

Later, petitioner GSIS Board issued Resolution No. 197 approving the following policy
recommendations:

B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending administrative case

To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from the
following during the pendency of the case:

a) Promotion;

b) Step Increment;

xx

Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 03-108389). Respondents claimed that they were denied the
benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought to
restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372.

The trial court granted respondents petition for prohibition. Petitioners filed an MR. The trial court
denied petitioners motion, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-108389 (lies with the
CSC and not with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19.
2. Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President and
General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside
the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition
Petitioners argue that the CSC, not the trial court, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 03-108389
because it involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners point out that the trial court should have
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from
further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.

Sec. 4. Where petition filed. The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the SC or, if it related to acts or omissions
of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over
the territorial area as defined by the SC. It may also be filed in the CA whether or not the same is in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves
the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA. (Emphasis supplied)

Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from
Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said
resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents petition for
prohibition.

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction
because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office in
Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.
Section 18 of BP 129 provides:

SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define
the territory over which a branch of the RTC shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined
shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the
MeTCs, MTCs, and MCTCs over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power
herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of
the different parts of the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as
possible. (Emphasis supplied)

In line with this, the SC issued Administrative Order No. 3 defining the territorial jurisdiction of the
RTCs in the National Capital Judicial Region, as follows:

a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila over the City of Manila only.

b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City over Quezon City only.

c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City over Pasay City only.

xx

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the SC,
the CA, the Sandiganbayan or the RTC, as the case may be. It is also a personal action because it does
not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced
and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff
before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila, the petition could properly be filed in the City
of Manila. The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay,
Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Paraaque, Las Pias, Muntinlupa, and
Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of prohibition
issued by the RTC sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not
err when it took cognizance of respondents petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over
the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

G.R. No. 170463 : February 2, 2011

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNM ENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General M anager,
Petitioners, v. ALBERT M . VELASCO and M ARIO I. M OLINA, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct for their alleged
participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees, and placed them under preventive
suspension for 90 days.

Respondents asked that they be allowed to avail of certain employee privileges but were denied
because of their pending administrative case.

Petitioner promulgated Resolutions 372 and 197 disqualifying employees with pending
administartive case from step increment and other benefits and privileges. Respondents claimed
that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative
cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without
hearing.

In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents petition for prohibition,
restraining petitioners from implementing the above resolutions.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court, and not the Civil Service Commission, has jurisdiction.

Whether or not the resolutions need to be filed with the UP Law Center to be valid.

Whether or not a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending
administrative cases from the grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits is
unconstitutional.
HELD:

Petition is partially meritorious.

REMEDIAL LAW: Jurisdiction for prohibition

First Issue:

Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from
Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said
resolutions. Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents petition for
prohibition.

Also, the petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case
may be. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. Therefore, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents petition for
prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

Second Issue:

CIVIL LAW: Validity of regulations

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law
Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. Interpretative regulations
and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative
agency and not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center. The assailed resolutions
pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for
the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Third Issue:

LABOR LAW: Preventive suspension

If an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like an employee on approved
vacation leave without pay, then it is only fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee
who was preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive suspension is not a penalty.
An employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving
the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not
yet been resolved or dismissed.

Also, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.

Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative
case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and, after serving the same
number of days of their suspension, entitled to the grant of step increment.

DENIED.

ASTEC VS . ERC S EPTEMBER 18, 2012

FACTS: The Petitioners BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I, QUEZELCO II, and PRESCO are rural electric
cooperatives established under P.D. 269 or the National Electrification Administration Decree. The
Petitioners are no-profit organizations engaged in the distribution of electricity. On 8 December
1994, R.A. 7832 was enacted, which imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of system loss that the
rural electric cooperatives may charge to their customers. Pursuant to said law, the Energy
Regulatory Board issued Orders on 19 February 1997 and 25 April 1997provisionally authorizing
the petitioners and other rural electric cooperatives to use a prescribed

formula or the computation of the Purchased Power Adjustment (PPA). On 8 June 2001, R.A. 9136
or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA
abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC). In an Order dated 17
June 2003, the ERC noted that the PPA formula which was approved by the ERB was silent on
whether the PPA formula approved by the ERB was based on gross or net of discounts. For
uniformity, the ERC ruled that for past PPAs, power cost shall still be based ongross while for
future PPAs, power cost shall be based on net.

Several rural electric cooperatives filed motions for reconsideration on the following grounds: 1)
that they are non-profit organizations such that their rates do not include any possible extra
revenue except the discounts; and 2) that they are burdened with expenses in their continuing
expansion programs for rural electrification. On 14 January 2005, the ERC issued an Order, in
which it stressed that the purchased power cost is a pass though cost to customers and, therefore,
the rural electric cooperatives should only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost
of power purchased from power suppliers. Consistent with this, any discounts extended to rural
electric cooperatives must necessarily be extended to end- users by charging only the net cost of
purchased power.

The ERC then directed the Petitioners to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-users
arising from the implementation of R.A. 7832.The motions for reconsideration filed by the
Petitioners were denied by the ERC.

Court of Appeals: denied the petitions for review of the rural electric cooperatives, and affirmed the
Orders of the ERC directing the various rural electric cooperatives to refund their respective over-
recoveries.

ISSUE 1:
Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power
suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of 1) publication, 2) non-submission to the U.P. Law
Center, and their 3) retroactive application.

HELD:

1) No, publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines. The policy guidelines of
the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers give no real consequence more
than what the law itself has already prescribed.

RATIO:

1) Publication is a basic postulate of procedural due process. The purpose of publication is to duly
inform the public of the contents of the laws which govern them and regulate their activities. Art. 2
of the Civil Code, as amended by E.O. No. 200, as well as E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987
both provide that[l]aws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise
provided.

2) Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order
to be effective. In Tanada vs. Tuvera, the S.C. held: ALL statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are
presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly
conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

3) Exceptions to the requirement of publication:

3.1. An interpretative regulation, to be effective, needs nothing more than its bare issuance for it
gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. It adds nothing to
the law and does not affect the substantial rights of any person.

3.2 A regulation that is merely internal in nature. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the general public.

3.3 Letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency concerning rules or guidelines to be

followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties

4) The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 and its IRR,
particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power. The policy guidelines did not modify,
amend or supplant the IRR.

4.1. ERCs policy guidelines on the treatment of discounts merely interpret the cost of purchased
power as a component of the PPA formula under R.A. 7832s IRR. The guidelines merely affirmed
the plain and unambiguous meaning of cost in said IRR. Cost is an item of outlay, and must
therefore exclude discounts since these are not amounts paid or charged for the sale of electricity,
but are reductions in rates.

4.2. ERCs policy guidelines uphold and preserve the nature of the PPA formula. The nature of the
PPA formula precludes an interpretation that includes discounts in the computation of the cost of
purchased power. The PPA formula is an adjustment mechanism the purpose of which is purely for
the recovery of cost.

HELD:

2) As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts
extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be
effective.

RATIO:

1) The Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule adopted by an agency to be filedwith the U.P.
Law Center to be effective.

2) However, in Board of Trustees of the GSIS v. Velasco, it was held that not all rules and regulations
adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law
Center. (Paragraph 9 (a) of the Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules andRegulations
Filed with the U.P. Law Center)

G.R. No. 192117 : Septem ber 18, 2012

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES, INC. (ASTEC),

BATANGAS I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (BATELEC I), QUEZON I ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVE, INC. (QUEZELCO I), and QUEZON II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(QUEZELCO II), Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY COM M ISSION, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - x

G.R. No. 192118 : September 18, 2012

CENTRAL LUZON ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC. (CLEA) and PAMPANGA RURAL
ELECTRIC SERVICE COOPERATIVE, INC. (PRESCO), Petitioners, v. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Batangas I Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC I), Quezon I Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(QUEZELCO I), Quezon II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (QUEZELCO II) and Pampanga Rural Electric
Service Cooperative, Inc. (PRESCO) are rural electric cooperatives established under P.D. No. 269.
BATELEC I, QUEZELCO I and QUEZELCO II are members of the Association of Southern Tagalog
Electric Cooperatives, Inc. (ASTEC). PRESCO is a member of the Central Luzon Electric Cooperatives
Association, Inc. (CLECA). BATELEC I, et al. are engaged in the distribution of electricity.

On 8 December 1994, R.A. No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 was enacted. The law imposed a cap on the recoverable rate of
system loss that may be charged by rural electric cooperatives to their consumers. The IRR of R.A.
No. 7832 required every rural electric cooperative to file with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB),
on or before 30 September 1995, an application for approval of an amended Power Purchase
Agreement (PPA) Clause incorporating the cap on the recoverable rate of system loss to be included
in its schedule of rates.

On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was also
enacted. Section 38 of the EPIRA abolished the ERB, and created the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). The ERC issued an Order which provides that rural electric cooperatives should
only recover from their members and patrons the actual cost of power purchased from power
suppliers. The ERC also ordered BATELEC, et al. to refund their respective over-recoveries to end-
users. In addition, the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor mechanism" in the computation
of the over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to be remitted to their consumers.

Thus, BATELEC I, et al. moved to reconsider the said orders but the ERC denied the same. On appeal,
the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders.

Hence, this petition. BATELEC I, et al. aver that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of publication,
non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive application.

ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed orders are invalid for non-publication, non-submission to the
U.P. Law Center and for their retroactivity?

HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.

CIVIL LAW: publication of laws

Procedural due process demands that administrative rules and regulations be published in order to
be effective. In Tada v. Tuvera, this Court articulated the fundamental requirement of publication,
thus: "We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a
valid delegation."

There are, however, several exceptions to the requirement of publication. First, an interpretative
regulation does not require publication in order to be effective. The applicability of an interpretative
regulation "needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed." It "adds nothing to the law" and "does not affect the
substantial rights of any person." Second, a regulation that is merely internal in nature does not
require publication for its effectivity. It seeks to regulate only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the general public. Third, a letter of instruction issued by an administrative agency
concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties
does not require publication in order to be effective.

The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are
interpretative regulations. Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines. As
interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended
by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court recognized the basic rule "that no statute, decree,
ordinance, rule or regulation (or even policy) shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly
stated so." A law is retrospective if it "takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing
laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of
transactions or consideration already past." The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are not retrospective. The policy guidelines did not take away
or impair any vested rights of the rural electric cooperatives. Furthermore, the policy guidelines of
the ERC did not create a new obligation and impose a new duty, nor did it attach a new disability.

However, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No. 7832 as it serves as an
additional numerical standard that must be observed and applied by rural electric cooperatives in
the implementation of the PPA. In light of these, the grossed-up factor mechanism does not merely
interpret R.A. No. 7832 or its IRR.It is also not merely internal in nature. The grossed-up factor
mechanism amends the IRR by providing an additional numerical standard that must be observed
and applied in the implementation of the PPA. The grossed-up factor mechanism is therefore an
administrative rule that should be published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center in order to be
effective.

As previously stated, it does not appear from the records that the grossed-up factor mechanism was
published and submitted to the U.P. Law Center. Thus, it is ineffective and may not serve as a basis
for the computation of over-recoveries. The portions of the over-recoveries arising from the
application of the mechanism are therefore invalid. Furthermore, the application of the grossed-up
factor mechanism to periods of PPA implementation prior to its publication and disclosure renders
the said mechanism invalid for having been applied retroactively.

PARTLY GRANTED

P EOPLE VS Q UE P O L AY C ASE D IGEST

Font: First Order Expanded

Type of Pen: Sheaffer Calligraphy Pen Broad

G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to
the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange
as required by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said
circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability.
The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do
not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a
law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect
and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.

People vs Que Po Lay Case Digest

G.R. No. L-6791

Facts: Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him
guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20. The charge was that the appellant who was in
possession of foreign exchange failed to sell to the Central Bank through its agents within one day
following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. He appeals basing on
the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette and that consequently,
said circular had no force and effect.

Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it effective?

Whether the respondent is guilty of violating the said Circular 20?

Held: The Court agrees that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars,
regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said
two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect.

Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank
in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming
effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. The Court further contends
that appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found
to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

CAW AD VS ABAD
G.R. No. 207145
July 28, 2015

FACTS
PPHAI Philippine Public Health Association
DBM Department of Budget and Management
DOH Department of Health
CSC Civil Service Commission
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of
Public Health Workerswas signed into law in order to promote the social and economic well-being of
health workers, their living and working conditions and terms of employment, to develop their skills
and capabilities to be better equipped to deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage
those with proper qualifications and excellent abilities to join and remain in government service.

Accordingly, public health workers (PHWs) were granted the following allowances and benefits,
among others:

Section 20. Additional Compensation. - Notwithstanding Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, public
health workers shall receive the following allowances: hazard allowance, subsistence allowance,
longevity pay, laundry allowance and remote assignment allowance.

Pursuant to Section 355 of the Magna Carta, the Secretary of Health promulgated its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) in July 1992. Thereafter, in November 1999, the DOH, in collaboration
with various government agencies and health workers' organizations, promulgated a Revised IRR
consolidating all additional and clarificatory rules issued by the former Secretaries of Health dating
back from the effectivity of the Magna Carta.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondents issuance of DBM-DOH Joint Circular No.1, s.2012 is null and void for
being an undue exercise of legislative powers?

RULING
The Court finds the petition partly granted. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the
hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305 and Section 7.1.5
(a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that
an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under an existing law is not eligible
for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is declared UNENFORCEABLE. The
validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual exposure to danger
for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and the
entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is
UPHELD.