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Suggested citation:
The Nature Conservancy. 2013. Fishery buy-ins: Applying rights-based incentive agreements to
sustainable fishery interventions. The Nature Conservancy. Narragansett, Rhode Island. 15pp.
Contributing authors: Jay Udelhoven a, Carmen Revenga b, Andrea Moreno c and Ben Gilmer d
a, b, c
The Nature Conservancy
d
Downstream Strategies
Cover photo: Local community members surveying the Koon MCA site, Indonesia; J. Udelhoven 2012.
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CONTENTS
Overview ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Report objective and scope............................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Report audience ............................................................................................................................. 2
1.3 MCAs defined ................................................................................................................................. 2
1.4 The rationale for fishery buy-ins .................................................................................................... 3
2.0 Analysis process and framework ............................................................................................................ 3
3.0 Findings................................................................................................................................................... 3
3.1 Number and distribution of MCA projects ..................................................................................... 3
3.2 General findings related to the MCA elements ............................................................................. 4
3.3 Types and examples of fishery buy-ins .......................................................................................... 5
3.3.1 Fishing Rights Acquisitions .................................................................................................. 5
3.3.2 Fishing and Aquaculture Rights Contracting ....................................................................... 6
3.3.3 Government Permitted Fishing and Aquaculture Rights .................................................... 6
4.0 Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 7
4.1 Lessons learned from existing fishery buy-ins ............................................................................... 8
4.2 Recommended practices based on MCA elements ....................................................................... 8
4.3 Final points ................................................................................................................................... 11
5.0 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................. 11
6.0 References ............................................................................................................................................ 11
Appendix 1: Fishing Rights Acquisition Case Study: New England Groundfish Permit Banking ................. 13
Appendix 2: TURF Contracting Case Study: Chilean Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries Project ............... 14
Appendix 3: Govt.-Permitted Aquaculture Rights Case Study: Oyster Restoration, Washington, U. S. ..... 15
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Summary Report
Overview
The Nature Conservancy and partners assessed the use of rights-based incentive agreements
[i.e. Marine Conservation Agreements (MCAs)] in ocean and coastal conservation broadly, and in
sustainable fishery interventions specifically, for over ten years beginning in the early 2000s. Two-
hundred-sixty-five field projects were identified in 30 countries, including 63 projects involving one of
three types of fishery buy-ins. The fishery buy-ins included: 1) acquisitions of private fishing rights,
vessels, and gear; 2) contracting of private fishing and aquaculture rights; and 3) government-permitted
fishing and aquaculture rights. As illustrated through case studies in the United States and Chile,
conservation entities used a variety of rights-based fisheries management scenarios to obtain or direct
fishery-related rights and assets. In doing so, conservation entities directly engaged fishermen,
businesses, local communities, and regulatory agencies over the long term while testing and
institutionalizing fishery reforms and recovery. Most identified projects possessed, or could employ, the
seven major elements of MCAs, including: 1) contractual arrangements; 2) conservation goals; 3) right-
holders; 4) conservation commitments; 5) quid pro quo exchanges; 6) conservation entities; and 7)
direct or indirect economic incentives. Lessons learned and recommended practices are proposed for
new fishery buy-in projects based on information gained from interviews, project documents, site visits,
and literature.
1.0 Introduction
Acquisitions of fishery permits, vessels and gear by government agencies (commonly referred to as
fishery buy-backs) have been used with mixed success to decrease fishing pressure, habitat impacts,
and by-catch throughout the world (Curtis and Squires 2007). Recently, The Nature Conservancy (TNC)
and other conservation entities have employed similar strategies as a means to buy-in to fisheries and
subsequently catalyze fishery reform. The fishery buy-ins have utilized various rights-based incentive
agreements, broadly termed Marine Conservation Agreements (MCAs), to solidify the fulfillment of
conservation commitments and delivery of economic incentives.
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practices that we hope will help catalyze, benefit and improve the likelihood of success of new fishery
buy-in projects.
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3.0 Findings
3.1 Number and distribution of MCA projects
TNC and partners identified 265 field projects in 30 countries which included or likely included,
either explicitly or implicitly, the seven MCA elements (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Field projects were
implemented by NGOs, businesses, and government agencies. Project totals include de facto MCAs
(DMCAs), which are rights-based incentive agreement projects that are not primarily intended to
achieve conservation, but do so as a consequence of intended activities (e.g. in some cases,
aquaculture). The total number of confirmed and probable MCA projects reported here, however, is
likely lower, sometimes substantially, than the actual number of MCA projects occurring within the
identified geographies because: 1) a single reported MCA project may have included more than one
physical site or contractual arrangement; and 2) a single conservation entity may have had numerous
MCA projects, but reported only a single MCA. As a result, the number of MCA projects per country may,
but does not necessarily, represent where MCA projects are most prevalent. Given the above caveats,
geographies that dominated the findings, by accounting for 61% of the identified MCA projects, were
Mexico (90), Indonesia (43), and the United States (31).
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were not always needed to achieve project goals. Right-holders included, but were not limited to,
private individuals and entities, user and community groups, and government agencies. Right-holders
established and fulfilled conservation commitments in exchange for the delivery of economic incentives
provided by conservation entities. Conservation commitments made by right-holders included
commitments to: 1) take actions; 2) refrain from actions; and/or 3) transfer rights and responsibilities.
Economic incentives provided by conservation entities included: 1) required payments for the MCA
itself; 2) offsets for lost opportunity costs; and 3) additional incentives needed to garner community
support or otherwise motivate decision makers and other stakeholders. The specific type of economic
incentives provided to right-holders involved direct cash payments, community infrastructure and
utilities, social services, capacity building and training, market creation and access, and in-kind technical
assistance, among others. Lessons learned and recommended practices based on these findings are
summarized in the Discussion section of this report.
6 39 18 167 35 265
Below are brief descriptions of the three basic scenarios under which fishery buy-ins are being
implemented, including: 1) acquisition and management of privately-held fishing rights; 2) contractual
management of privately-held fishing and aquaculture rights; and 3) direct implementation of
government-issued fishing and aquaculture rights. Appendices 1, 2 and 3 provide case studies
illustrating how specific fishery buy-in projects are unfolding. The case studies do not necessarily
represent best practices, but are included here to illustrate the practical application of fishery buy-ins. It
is important to note that MCA project implementers (including case study implementers) are learning
through implementation and, as such, the applications of MCAs in fishery buy-ins are ever evolving and
adapting. Lessons we believe we have learned in the past and are currently learning at present will likely
continue to be refined as projects develop.
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consummated using purchase and sale agreements, sales contracts, and other forms of transaction
agreements. Fishing rights, and in some cases, fishing vessels and gear, were transferred to the
conservation entities. The assets were then held or deployed to support more sustainable fishing
practices. When acquisitions did not include vessels and gear, conservation entities sometimes included
contract clauses that specified how vessels and gear could be used in the future so as not to undermine
the projects conservation goals. Conservation entities also included contract clauses that prevented
fishermen from returning to fishing (with time, species, and/or location dependent restrictions) even if
the fishermen transferred vessels and gear to the conservation entities.
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study). Projects in Indonesia and the U.S. focused on shellfish while projects in Mexico included finfish
and shellfish. In most cases, the permits and associated terms and conditions served as the contract
which obligated the parties and defined roles and responsibilities. Permits could, however, be
accompanied by separate documents that detail how the associated rights can be used.
In the simplest scenario, after receiving permits conservation entities would refrain completely from
fishing or implementing aquaculture activities. This, in theory, would reduce the total amount of fishing
pressure, by-catch, and/or habitat impacts that would otherwise take place if the permits were used for
their originally conceived purposes. Abstaining from fishing or culturing species under these conditions
has sometimes been referred to as implementing a reverse fishing or aquaculture license. A project in
Kiribati has been referred to as a reverse fishing license, but in application is actually an area-based
agreement wherein the government agreed to restrict fishing without issuing the associated fishing
permits to the conservation entity (Niesten and Shelley 2013). A reverse fishing license or aquaculture
strategy would only be viable as a harvest reduction strategy if limits on the total number of permits
were set and enforced. While possible, we did not uncover any MCA projects that did exactly this, thus
none were used to directly reduce fishing pressure. The 18 MCA field projects in this category employed
the associated fishing and aquaculture rights, but did so in more conservation-minded ways. Of the 18
projects, one project obtained a fishing permit and 17 projects obtained aquaculture-related permits.
In terms of aquaculture, permits were used in two distinct ways: seven permits were used by non-
governmental organizations to restore shellfish habitat and 10 permits were used by aquaculture
businesses to cultivate, harvest, and sell shellfish. While the aquaculture businesses sought profit
returns, they also needed to protect their infrastructure and cultured species from interference by
humans and to ensure that the areas within and affecting their operations possessed sufficiently good
water quality and relatively undisturbed natural environments. In protecting and managing the
aquaculture sites and surrounding areas, at least one aquaculture business was making de facto
contributions to the conservation of biodiversity by limiting illegal and destructive fishing and preventing
unauthorized infrastructure and uses from occurring in areas much larger than the aquaculture site
itself. While the list of real and perceived negative impacts from some types of aquaculture is long
(Klinger and Naylor 2012), many of the impacts had been reduced and many of the above-mentioned
conservation gains could be magnified. This project and nine other business-led aquaculture projects
suspected of making similar contributions were thus classified as de facto MCAs (DMCAs).
4.0 Discussion
Rights-based fisheries management (RBFM) , which includes the assignment of fishery-related rights
to private fishermen through mechanisms such as individual transferable quotas, catch shares, limited
access privileges, and TURFs, is recognized as a potential solution to over-fishing and destructive fishing
(Costello 2012). The simple allocation of fishing rights by itself, however, is not likely to recover fisheries,
lead to the long-term sustainability of fisheries, or lead to the sustainable management of marine
ecosystems (Arnason 2012, Costello 2012, Essington et al. 2012, Nowlis and Van Benthem 2012, Preau
et al. 2012, Rieser et al. 2013). Additional actions beyond the allocation of rights are thus needed to
secure fishery access and incentivize fishermen to take risks on new gear and practices, explore new
markets, participate in research, and collaborate with other fishermen. Research completed by TNC and
partners documented how conservation entities have successfully used RBFM as a platform to buy into
fisheries through MCAs, engaging fishermen, businesses, local communities, and regulatory agencies
over extended periods of time while catalyzing fisheries reform and recovery.
Below we identify lessons learned and recommended practices based primarily on practitioner
interviews, project documents, site visits, and a limited review of published literature.
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4) Conservation entities should employ an individual project champion (who can personally
commit to achieving project success) and a knowledgeable and experienced attorney (who can
prepare the contractual arrangement). Both the conservation entity and project champion
should have field experience and knowledge of the identified fishery or aquaculture operation
as well as profound relationships with relevant stakeholders.
Note that government agencies may be involved in fishery buy-ins in one of three ways: 1)
as right-holders (i.e. resource owners or fishery/aquaculture program managers); 2) as
conservation entities (i.e. entities with conservation-related sustainable fishery goals); or 3) as
indirect stakeholders (i.e. entities that could affect or be affected by projects). If directly
involved as right-holders or conservation entities, government agencies may assess, develop,
approve and/or implement projects. If indirectly involved, government agencies may still have
oversight roles to ensure the parties to the agreement are treating each other fairly, have
identified and accounted for all necessary issues and requirements, and are generally acting in
accordance with the law. Regardless of the specific role of government, relevant government
agencies should be consulted and given opportunities for input at several points during the
fishery buy-in evaluation, development, and implementation process.
5) Conservation commitments, generally falling into one of three categoriesfishing or
aquaculture rights sales, contracting, or permittingshould be within right-holders abilities,
explicitly stated within contractual arrangements, and include long-term monitoring and
enforcement protocols.
6) Exchange options should include the explicit quid pro quo delivery of economic incentives (by
conservation entities) periodically and predictably over the life of the agreement after
conservation commitment milestones are achieved (by right-holders). The exchange options
should also include contingencies, such as reductions and deferrals of economic benefits, for
non-compliance.
7) Economic incentives should include: required payments for any acquisition or lease; negotiated
offset payments for any lost opportunity costs; and any additional incentives needed to garner
community support or otherwise motivate decision makers and other stakeholders. Also, if
fishermen are no longer expected to fish, alternative livelihood conditions, such as when and
how funding, training, capacity building, and performance monitoring will be completed, should
be included within the incentives package.
While we believe the above lessons learned and recommended practices are equally valuable for
developed countries as well as developing and emerging countries, there are some distinctions to be
made. Table 3 compares and contrasts some of the major distinctions practitioners should be aware of
regarding the recommended practices. When evaluating the applicability of the lessons learned and
recommended practices presented here, practitioners should always consider country and site-specific
circumstances that may affect fishery buy-in development and implementation.
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5.0 Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the Walton Family Foundation who graciously provided funding that
made much of this research and report possible. While it is impractical to list all of the individuals who
contributed substantively to the entirety of this work, special thanks are due to individuals who
contributed to the concept development, geographic and site-based research and reprot preparation,
many of whom are also helping to implement rights-based incentive agreement field projects, including,
but not limited to: Michael Bell, Peter Bryant, Diana Bermudez, Nirari Cardenas, Eleanor Carter, Chuck
Cook, Robert Deacon, Fernando Ghersi, Mary Gleason, Lynne Hale, Abdul Halim, Jerry Knecht, Kathryn
Labrum, Layla Osman, Fabian Sanchez, Geoffrey Smith, and Lotus Vermeer. We would also like to thank
several anonymous reviewers.
6.0 References
Arnason, R. (2012) Property Rights in Fisheries: How Much Can Individual Transferable Quotas
Accomplish? Review of Environmental Economics and Policy. 6(2): 217-236.
Beck, M., Marsh, T., Reisewitz, S. and Bortman, M. (2004) New tools for marine conservation: the leasing
and ownership of submerged lands. iology. 18(5): 12141223.
Beck, M., Fletcher, K. and Hale, L. (eds). (2005) Towards Conservation of Submerged Lands: The Law and
Policy of Conservation Leasing and Ownership. The Nature Conservancy, Roger Williams University,
and Rhode Island Sea Grant. Narragansett, Rhode Island, 39 pp.
Bryant, E. and Fletcher, K. (2006) Exploring a new strategy for marine protection: private conservation of
tidelands in Massachusetts. Ocean and Coastal Law Journal. 12(1): 15-42.
Costello, C. (2012) Introduction to the Symposium on Rights-Based Fisheries Management. Review of
Environmental Economics and Policy. 6(2): 212-216.
Curtis, R. and Squires, D. (eds). (2007) Fisheries Buybacks. Blackwell Publishing. Ames, Iowa, 267 pp.
Deacon, R. and Parker, D. (2009) Encumbering harvest rights to protect marine environments: a model
of marine conservation easements. The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
53: 37-58.
Essington, T., Melnychuk, M., Branch, T. et al. (2012) Catch shares, fisheries, and ecological stewardship:
a comparative analysis of resource responses to a rights-based policy instrument. Conservation
Letters. 5(3): 186195.
FAO. (2011) Fisheries management. 4. Marine protected areas and fisheries. FAO Technical Guidelines
for Responsible Fisheries No. 4, Suppl. 4. United Nations. Rome, 198 pp.
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Forest Trends and The Katoomba Group. (2010) Payments for Ecosystem Services: Getting Started in
Marine and Coastal Ecosystems: A Primer. Whitmore Group, Washington, D.C., 80 pp.
Gleason, M., Feller, E., Merrifield, M., et al. (In press) A transactional and collaborative approach to
reducing impacts from bottom trawling. Conservation Biology.
Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board. (2011) Fisheries industry at a glance. Agribusiness update.
Jakarta, 8 pp. Accessed June 3, 2013, online at: http://www.bkpm.go.id/img/file/fisheries.pdf.
Klinger, D. and R. Naylor. 2012. Searching for Solutions in Aquaculture: Charting a Sustainable Course.
Annual Review of Environment and Resources. 2012. 37:24776.
LoBue, C. and Udelhoven, J. (2013) Private ownership of underwater lands in Great South Bay, New
York: a case study in degradation, restoration and protection. Marine Policy. 41: 103-109.
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. (2011) Designing Qualitative Research. 5th Edition. SAGE Publications, Inc.
Thousand Oaks, California, 321 pp.
Milne, S. and Niesten, E. (2009) Direct payments for biodiversity conservation in developing countries:
practical insights for design and implementation. Oryx. 43(04): 530-541.
Niesten, E. and Shelley, P. (2013) Protecting Paradise. In: Underwater Eden: saving the last coral
wilderness on earth (eds G. Stone and D. Obura), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 107
121.
Nordlund, L., Kloiber, U., Carter, E. and Riedmiller, S. (2013) Chumbe Island Coral Park - governance
analysis. Marine Policy. 41: 110-117.
Nowlis, J. andd Van Benthem, A. (2012) Do Property Rights Lead to Sustainable Catch Increases? Marine
Resource Economics. 27: 89-105.
Preau, J., Doyen, L., Little, L. and Thbaud, O. (2012) The triple bottom line: Meeting ecological,
economic and social goals with individual transferable quotas. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management. 63(3): 419434.
Rieser, A., Watling, L. and Guinotte, J. (2013) Trawl fisheries, catch shares and the protection of benthic
marine ecosystems: Has ownership generated incentives for seafloor stewardship? Marine Policy.
40: 7583.
Sommerville, M., Jones, J. and Milner-Gulland, E. (2009) A revised conceptual framework for payments
for environmental services. Ecology and Society. 14(2): 34.
Svensson, P., Rodwell, L. and Attrill, M. (2009) Privately Managed Marine Reserves as a Mechanism for
the Conservation of Coral Reef Ecosystems: A Case Study from Vietnam. AMBIO: A Journal of the
Human Environment. 38(2): 72-78.
Teh, L.C.L., Teh, L.S.L. and Chen Chung, F. (2008) A private management approach to coral reef
conservation in Sabah, Malaysia. Biodiversity Conservation. 17(13): 3061-3077.
The Nature Conservancy. (2011) Permit Banks: A Strategy for Viable and Sustainable Fisheries
Overview and Recommendations. The Nature Conservancy. Brunswick, Maine, 8 pp. Accessed June
3, 2013, online at:
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/areas/gulfofmaine/howwework/permit
-banking-white-paper.pdf.
The Nature Conservancy and Conservation International. (2012) Practitioners Field Guide for Marine
Conservation Agreements: Integrating Rights-based Incentive Agreements into Ocean and Coastal
Conservation Efforts. Final V2. The Nature Conservancy. Narragansett, Rhode Island, 120 pp.
Wilson, J., Darmawan, A., Subijanto, J., Green, A. and Sheppard, S. (2011) Scientific design of a resilient
network of marine protected areas. Lesser Sunda Ecoregion, Coral Triangle. Asia Pacific Marine
Program. Denpasar, Indonesia, Report 2/11: 96 pp.
Wunder S. (2007) The efficiency of payments for environmental services in tropical conservation.
Conservation Biology. 21(1): 4858.
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Appendix 1: Fishing Rights Acquisition Case Study: New England Groundfish Permit Banking
A successful multi-species fishery for over a century, the Northeast groundfish fishery in the United
States included cod (Gadus morhua, Gadidae), halibut (Hippoglossus hippoglossus, Pleuronectidae), haddock
(Melanogrammus aeglefinus, Gadidae), white hake (Urophycis tenius, Phycidae), flounder (Pleuronectes spp.,
Pleuronectidae), and Pollock (Pollachius virens, Gadidae), among others. Fish were harvested using bottom
trawls, gillnets, hand lines, traps, pots, long lines and dredges. By the early to mid-1990s, many groundfish
stocks in the region became severely depleted. In 2010 a new catch share system was established that
included fishing quota allocations. That same year, TNC and several conservation partners (including the
Penobscot East Resource Center and Island Institute) initiated a permit banking project aimed at: 1)
supporting collaborative research with fishermen on more selective gear; 2) improving scientific
understanding regarding key habitats and groundfish distributions; 3) providing fishermen incentives to use
more sustainable fishing practices; and 4) helping secure long-term access to the fishery for inshore boats
and traditional fishing communities. To implement the project, formal and explicit rights-based incentive
agreements were employed. With fishermen as privilege-holders, the contractual MCA mechanisms included
purchase and sale agreements and lease-back fishing agreements.
Similar to an earlier TNC initiative in California that acquired fishing permits (Deacon and Parker 2009,
Gleason et al. In Press), TNC and partners purchased a total of four federal groundfish permits from willing
sellers within the New England groundfish fishery. Of the four permits, some were purchased jointly between
the partners while others were purchased by individual entities. In 2013, TNC owned a single permit and had
operational agreements on the use of the three other permits. With hundreds of permits within the fishery,
the permits acquired under this project made up less than 5% of the total quota. However, the project was
able to use a small amount of quota as leverage to make significant improvements within the overall fishery
because many of the fishing companies operated on the very edge of profitability. As a result, the
opportunity for fishermen to obtain additional quota (even if small) from the project was significant in terms
of business viability.
Under the project, fishing quota associated with the acquired permits was made available to fishermen
subject to specific conditions. Pounds of quota for specific species within the fishery were leased to
fishermen who held valid fishing permits and vessels for the fishery and were seeking additional quota.
Quota from the acquired permits was leased under three scenarios: 1) fishermen who participated in
research received quota for free; 2) fishermen who agreed to use modified gear and/or practices received
quota at below-market rate; and 3) fishermen who agreed to no additional constraints received quota for
close to fair market value. For example, quota from one permit was leased to commercial fishermen and
used to collect information on the relative abundance and distribution of groundfish species in poorly
sampled parts of the project area. This information is being used to support an effort to develop a finer-scale
stock assessment of groundfish species in the region. Quota from another permit was leased to commercial
fishermen and used to research trawling modifications that increased selectivity and reduced impacts on
sensitive marine habitats.
While other existing permit banking entities protected fishing access for local communities, TNC and
partners evaluated the possibility of formally establishing a new permit banking entity (TNC 2011). The new
banking entity would assume ownership over the project-acquired permits in addition to permits acquired by
other entities in the future. Fishing communities, state agencies, conservation groups, and others would be
able to purchase permits from willing sellers on the open market, contribute quota associated with the
permits to the permit bank, and subsequently utilize the quota to leverage conservation and socio-economic
gains through fishing leases. The agreed upon leases would provide fishermen incentives to use more
sustainable fishing techniques and would also ease the transition to a new management system. While the
permit bank-issued fishing agreements would continue to help implement research and gear modifications,
the permit bank would also maintain fishing access for local communities by retaining ownership of the
fishing permits in perpetuity. While the option remains viable, to date, the New England Groundfish Permit
Banking project continues to progress without having formally established a new permit banking entity.
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Appendix 2: TURF Contracting Case Study: Chilean Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries Project
In Chile, between 1985 and 1995, an overfishing crisis in the abalone (Concholepas concholepas,
Muricidae) fishery led to regional and national fishing closures and to the establishment of a TURF
policy. Chile now has over 700 multi-species TURFs, which involve approximately 22% of the 86,000
artisanal fishermen in the country. This is one of the largest TURF-based co-management systems in the
world and provides secure access to coastal benthic resources for artisanal fishermen. Each TURF
provides exclusive rights to fishermens associations for harvesting benthic invertebrate species (and, in
some cases, algae) in a limited and well defined nearshore area. Fishermens associations must submit
baseline analyses and management plans for targeted species before TURF requests are approved. The
analyses and plans, however, do not guarantee sustainable management of the TURFs. Once a TURF is
granted, TURF-holders are free to design their own allocation systems and to distribute related quota
among its members. While rights associated with TURFs do not apply to finfish, finfishing is allowed
inside TURF areas under specific conditions (i.e. baseline analyses and management plans for targeted
species must be developed).
One local fishermens association, the Chaihuin Fishers Union, oversees three TURFs within
estuarine and open rocky coastal areas adjacent to TNCs Valdivia Coastal Reserve. The Chaihuin Fishers
Unions TURFs include harvesting rights for species such as abalone, sea urchin (Loxechinus albus,
Parechinidae) several limpet species (Fissurella spp., Fissurellidae), and Chilean mussel (Mytilus chilensis,
Mytilidae). An agreement was established in 2011 between the Chaihuin Fishers Union, Conservacion
Marina (a local marine conservation organization), and TNC regarding the management of one of the
TURFs which had been subjected to a high degree of exploitation. The agreement, while not legally
binding as the parties can withdraw without penalty if they wish, was established for an initial four-year
term and is automatically renewable for four additional years. The goal of the agreement was to
demonstrate how initial establishment of a NTZ and subsequent restoration could improve the long-
term ecological and economic performance of the TURF fisheries. The NTZ designation was in
recognition of the areas central role in serving as a spawner sanctuary and thus sustaining the fishery
over time
While TURF-related user rights remained with the fishers union, parties to the agreement
committed to: 1) designating the entire TURF as a NTZ, which applied to all commercial species, for an
initial three-year period (subsistence shoreline collection by community members was allowed); 2)
restoring productivity of over-exploited species within the TURF by developing and implementing a long-
term management plan leading to the protection and sustainable use of TURF resources and by
undertaking scientific research and monitoring; 3) under the guise of the management plan,
establishing, monitoring, and enforcing future zoned areas within the TURF; 4) securing project funding,
in part through eco-tourism and other value-added products; 5) increasing awareness, education and
outreach to disseminate lessons learned; 6) building capacity and training for the fishermens
association; and 7) supporting follow-up studies required by the national fisheries service. The project is
currently in its third year of implementation with project partners steadily moving toward the
achievement of the agreement milestones.
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15