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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein

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Wittgenstein,TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus(Gutenbergonlineedition)

Project Gutenberg's Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, by Ludwig of our language is misunderstood. The whole sense of the book

Wittgenstein This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no might be summed up the following words: what can be said at all

costandwithalmostnorestrictionswhatsoever.Youmaycopyit, can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass

give it away or reuse it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg overinsilence.

LicenseincludedwiththiseBookoronlineatwww.gutenberg.org Thustheaimofthebookistodrawalimittothought,orrather

Title: Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus Author: Ludwig Wittgenstein nottothought,buttotheexpressionofthoughts:forinordertobe

Release Date: June 11, 2009 [EBook #5740] Language: English abletodrawalimittothought,weshouldhavetofindbothsidesof

Charactersetencoding:ASCII the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what

*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TRACTATUS cannotbethought).

LOGICOPHILOSOPHICUS*** Itwillthereforeonlybeinlanguagethatthelimitcanbedrawn,and

ProducedbyMatthewStapleton,andDavidWidger. whatliesontheothersideofthelimitwillsimplybenonsense.

I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of

other philosophers. Indeed, what I have written here makes no

TRACTATUSLOGICO

claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is

thatitisamatterofindifferencetomewhetherthethoughtsthatI

havehadhavebeenanticipatedbysomeoneelse.

PHILOSOPHICUS IwillonlymentionthatIamindebtedtoFrege'sgreatworksandof

thewritingsofmyfriendMrBertrandRussellformuchofthestimu

lationofmythoughts.

ByLudwigWittgenstein Ifthisworkhasanyvalue,itconsistsintwothings:thefirstisthat

thoughts are expressed in it, and on this score the better the

thoughts are expressedthe more the nail has been hit on the

headthegreaterwillbeitsvalue.HereIamconsciousofhaving

Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has fallenalongwayshortofwhatispossible.Simplybecausemypow

himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in itor at ersaretooslightfortheaccomplishmentofthetask.Mayothers

leastsimilarthoughts.Soitisnotatextbook.Itspurposewould comeanddoitbetter.

beachievedifitgavepleasuretoonepersonwhoreadandunder Ontheotherhandthetruthofthethoughtsthatareherecommu

stoodit. nicatedseemstomeunassailableanddefinitive.Ithereforebelieve

The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I be myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of

lieve,thatthereasonwhytheseproblemsareposedisthatthelogic theproblems.AndifIamnotmistakeninthisbelief,thenthesec

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ondthinginwhichtheofthisworkconsistsisthatitshowshowlit 1.21Eachitemcanbethecaseornotthecasewhileeverythingelse

tleisachievedwhentheseproblemsaresolved. remainsthesame.

L.W.Vienna,1918

2.Whatisthecaseafactistheexistenceof

statesofaffairs.

2.01Astateofaffairs(astateofthings)isacombinationofobjects

(things).

Contents 2.011Itisessentialtothingsthattheyshouldbepossibleconstitu

entsofstatesofaffairs.

1.Theworldisallthatisthecase.

2.Whatisthecaseafactistheexistenceofstatesofaffairs. 2.012Inlogicnothingisaccidental:ifathingcanoccurinastateof

3.Alogicalpictureoffactsisathought. affairs,thepossibilityofthestateofaffairsmustbewrittenintothe

4.Athoughtisapropositionwithasense. thingitself.

5.Apropositionisatruthfunctionofelementarypropositions. 2.0121Itwouldseemtobeasortofaccident,ifitturnedoutthata

6.Thegeneralformofatruthfunctionis[p,E,N(E)]. situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its

7.Whatwecannotspeakaboutwemustpassoverinsilence. own.Ifthingscanoccurinstatesofaffairs,thispossibilitymustbe

inthemfromthebeginning.(Nothingintheprovinceoflogiccanbe

destiny?

merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibili

tiesareitsfacts.)Justaswearequiteunabletoimaginespatialob

jectsoutsidespaceortemporalobjectsoutsidetime,sotoothereis

noobjectthatwecanimagineexcludedfromthepossibilityofcom

1.Theworldisallthatisthecase.

bining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of

1.1Theworldisthetotalityoffacts,notofthings. affairs,Icannotimaginethemexcludedfromthepossibilityofsuch

1.11Theworldisdeterminedbythefacts,andbytheirbeingallthe combinations.

facts. 2.0122Thingsareindependentinsofarastheycanoccurinallpos

1.12Forthetotalityoffactsdetermineswhatisthecase,andalso siblesituations,butthisformofindependenceisaformofconnex

whateverisnotthecase. ionwithstatesofaffairs,aformofdependence.(Itisimpossiblefor

words to appear in two different roles: by themselves, and in

1.13Thefactsinlogicalspacearetheworld.

propositions.)

1.2Theworlddividesintofacts.

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statesofaffairs.(Everyoneofthesepossibilitiesmustbepartofthe maybefromtherealone,musthavesomethingaformincom

"new natureoftheobject.)Anewpossibilitycannotbediscoveredlater. monwithit.

possibility 2.01231IfIamtoknowanobject,thoughtIneednotknowitsex 2.023Objectsarejustwhatconstitutethisunalterableform.

cannot be ternalproperties,Imustknowallitsinternalproperties.

discovered 2.0231Thesubstanceoftheworldcanonlydetermineaform,and

later?" 2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible notanymaterialproperties.Foritisonlybymeansofpropositions

how so? statesofaffairsarealsogiven. thatmaterialpropertiesarerepresentedonlybytheconfiguration

2.013Eachthingis,asitwere,inaspaceofpossiblestatesofaffairs. ofobjectsthattheyareproduced.

This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing 2.0232Inamannerofspeaking,objectsarecolourless.

withoutthespace. 2.0233 If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinc

2.0131Aspatialobjectmustbesituatedininfinitespace.(Aspatial tion between them, apart from their external properties, is that

point is an argumentplace.) A speck in the visual field, thought it theyaredifferent.

need not be red, must have some colour: it is, so to speak, sur 2.02331Eitherathinghaspropertiesthatnothingelsehas,inwhich

rounded by colourspace. Notes must have some pitch, objects of casewecanimmediatelyuseadescriptiontodistinguishitfromthe

thesenseoftouchsomedegreeofhardness,andsoon. othersandrefertoit;or,ontheotherhand,thereareseveralthings

2.014Objectscontainthepossibilityofallsituations. that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which

2.0141Thepossibilityofitsoccurringinstatesofaffairsistheform case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them. For it there is

ofanobject. nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since other

wiseitwouldbedistinguishedafterall.

2.02Objectsaresimple.

2.024 The substance is what subsists independently of what is the

2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a

case.

statement about their constituents and into the propositions that

describethecomplexescompletely. 2.025Itisformandcontent.

2.021Objectsmakeupthesubstanceoftheworld.Thatiswhythey 2.0251Space,time,colour(beingcoloured)areformsofobjects.

cannotbecomposite. 2.026 There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable

2.0211Iftheyworldhadnosubstance,thenwhetheraproposition form.

hadsensewoulddependonwhetheranotherpropositionwastrue. 2.027Objects,theunalterable,andthesubsistentareoneandthe

2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world same.

(trueorfalse). 2.0271Objectsarewhatisunalterableandsubsistent;theirconfigu

rationiswhatischangingandunstable.

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2.0272Theconfigurationofobjectsproducesstatesofaffairs. 2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to

2.03Inastateofaffairsobjectsfitintooneanotherlikethelinksof oneanotherinadeterminateway.

achain. 2.141Apictureisafact.

2.031Inastateofaffairsobjectsstandinadeterminaterelationto 2.15Thefactthattheelementsofapicturearerelatedtoonean

oneanother. other in a determinate way represents that things are related to

2.032 The determinate way in which objects are connected in a one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its ele

stateofaffairsisthestructureofthestateofaffairs. mentsthestructureofthepicture,andletuscallthepossibilityof

thisstructurethepictorialformofthepicture.

2.033Formisthepossibilityofstructure.

2.151Pictorialformisthepossibilitythatthingsarerelatedtoone

2.034Thestructureofafactconsistsofthestructuresofstatesof

anotherinthesamewayastheelementsofthepicture.

affairs.

2.1511 That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right

2.04Thetotalityofexistingstatesofaffairsistheworld.

outtoit.

2.05Thetotalityofexistingstatesofaffairsalsodetermineswhich

2.1512Itislaidagainstrealitylikeameasure.

statesofaffairsdonotexist.

2.15121 Only the endpoints of the graduating lines actually touch

2.06 The existence and nonexistence of states of affairs is reality.

theobjectthatistobemeasured.

(We call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their

nonexistenceanegativefact.) 2.1514Soapicture,conceivedinthisway,alsoincludesthepictorial

relationship,whichmakesitintoapicture.

2.061Statesofaffairsareindependentofoneanother.

2.1515Thesecorrelationsare,asitwere,thefeelersofthepicture's

2.062Fromtheexistenceornonexistenceofonestateofaffairsit

elements,withwhichthepicturetouchesreality.

isimpossibletoinfertheexistenceornonexistenceofanother.

2.16Ifafactistobeapicture,itmusthavesomethingincommon

2.063Thesumtotalofrealityistheworld.

withwhatitdepicts.

2.1Wepicturefactstoourselves.

2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it

2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence depicts,toenabletheonetobeapictureoftheotheratall.

andnonexistenceofstatesofaffairs.

2.17Whatapicturemusthaveincommonwithreality,inorderto

2.12Apictureisamodelofreality. be able to depict itcorrectly or incorrectlyin the way that it

2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corre does,isitspictorialform.

spondingtothem. 2.171 A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial

life imitates

2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representa picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything col

art? tivesofobjects. oured,etc.

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it. compareitwithreality.

2.173Apicturerepresentsitssubjectfromapositionoutsideit.(Its 2.224Itisimpossibletotellfromthepicturealonewhetheritistrue

standpointisitsrepresentationalform.)Thatiswhyapicturerepre orfalse.

sentsitssubjectcorrectlyorincorrectly. 2.225Therearenopicturesthataretrueapriori.

2.174Apicturecannot,however,placeitselfoutsideitsrepresenta

tionalform.

2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common 3.Alogicalpictureoffactsisathought.

with reality, in order to be able to depict itcorrectly or incor 3.001'Astateofaffairsisthinkable':whatthismeansisthatwecan

rectlyinanywayatall,islogicalform,i.e.theformofreality. pictureittoourselves.

2.181Apicturewhosepictorialformislogicalformiscalledalogical 3.01Thetotalityoftruethoughtsisapictureoftheworld.

picture.

3.02Athoughtcontainsthepossibilityofthesituationofwhichitis

2.182Everypictureisatthesametimealogicalone.(Ontheother thethought.Whatisthinkableispossibletoo.

hand,noteverypictureis,forexample,aspatialone.)

3.03Thoughtcanneverbeofanythingillogical,since,ifitwere,we

2.19Logicalpicturescandepicttheworld. shouldhavetothinkillogically. logical as

2.2 A picture has logicopictorial form in common with what it de 3.031ItusedtobesaidthatGodcouldcreateanythingexceptwhat in logos

picts. would be contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is that we could (thought)?

2.201Apicturedepictsrealitybyrepresentingapossibilityofexis notsaywhatan'illogical'worldwouldlooklike.

tenceandnonexistenceofstatesofaffairs. 3.032Itisasimpossibletorepresentinlanguageanythingthat'con

2.202Apicturecontainsthepossibilityofthesituationthatitrepre tradicts logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its coordinates a

logic in

sents. figurethatcontradictsthelawsofspace,ortogivethecoordinates

what

2.203Apictureagreeswithrealityorfailstoagree;itiscorrector ofapointthatdoesnotexist.

sense?

incorrect,trueorfalse. 3.0321Thoughastateofaffairsthatwouldcontravenethelawsof

2.22 What a picture represents it represents independently of its physics can be represented by us spatially, one that would contra

truthorfalsity,bymeansofitspictorialform. venethelawsofgeometrycannot.

2.221Whatapicturerepresentsisitssense. 3.04Itathoughtwerecorrectapriori,itwouldbeathoughtwhose

2.222Theagreementordisagreementoritssensewithrealitycon possibilityensureditstruth.

stitutesitstruthorfalsity.

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3.05Aprioriknowledgethatathoughtwastruewouldbepossible 3.1432Insteadof,'Thecomplexsign"aRb"saysthatastandstobin

only it its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without therelationR'weoughttoput,'That"a"standsto"b"inacertain

anythingatocompareitwith). relationsaysthataRb.' what's the

difference?

3.1Inapropositionathoughtfindsanexpressionthatcanbeper 3.144Situationscanbedescribedbutnotgivennames.

ceivedbythesenses. 3.2Inapropositionathoughtcanbeexpressedinsuchawaythat

3.11 We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or writ elementsofthepropositionalsigncorrespondtotheobjectsofthe

ten,etc.)asaprojectionofapossiblesituation.Themethodofpro thought.

jectionistothinkofthesenseoftheproposition. 3.201 I call such elements 'simple signs', and such a proposition

3.12Icallthesignwithwhichweexpressathoughtapropositional 'completeanalysed'.

sign.Andapropositionisapropositionalsigninitsprojectiverela 3.202Thesimplesignsemployedinpropositionsarecallednames.

tiontotheworld.

3.203Anamemeansanobject.Theobjectisitsmeaning.('A'isthe

3.13 A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, samesignas'A'.)

but does contain the possibility of expressing it. ('The content of a

3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the

proposition'meansthecontentofapropositionthathassense.)A

configurationofsimplesignsinthepropositionalsign.

propositioncontainstheform,butnotthecontent,ofitssense.

3.221Objectscanonlybenamed.Signsaretheirrepresentatives.I

3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements

canonlyspeakaboutthem:Icannotputthemintowords.Proposi

(thewords)standinadeterminaterelationtooneanother.Apro

tionscanonlysayhowthingsare,notwhattheyare.

positionalsignisafact.

3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the require

3.141Apropositionisnotablendofwords.(Justasathemeinmu

mentthatsensebedeterminate.

sicisnotablendofnotes.)Apropositionisarticulate.

3.24Apropositionaboutacomplexstandsinaninternalrelationto

3.142Onlyfactscanexpressasense,asetofnamescannot.

apropositionaboutaconstituentofthecomplex.Acomplexcanbe

3.143Althoughapropositionalsignisafact,thisisobscuredbythe givenonlybyitsdescription,whichwillberightorwrong.Apropo

usualformofexpressioninwritingorprint.Forinaprintedproposi sitionthatmentionsacomplexwillnotbenonsensical,ifthecom

tion, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a plexdoesnotexits,butsimplyfalse.Whenapropositionalelement

propositional sign and a word. (That is what made it possible for signifiesacomplex,thiscanbeseenfromanindeterminatenessin

Fregetocallapropositionacompositename.) thepropositionsinwhichitoccurs.Insuchcasesweknowthatthe

3.1431Theessenceofapropositionalsignisveryclearlyseenifwe proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation

imagineonecomposedofspatialobjects(suchastables,chairs,and forgeneralitycontainsaprototype.)Thecontractionofasymbolfor

books)insteadofwrittensigns. acomplexintoasimplesymbolcanbeexpressedinadefinition.

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definition:itisaprimitivesign. canbeconstruedaspropositionalvariables.(Evenvariablenames.)

3.261 Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that 3.315Ifweturnaconstituentofapropositionintoavariable,there

servetodefineit;andthedefinitionspointtheway.Twosignscan isaclassofpropositionsallofwhicharevaluesoftheresultingvari

not signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other is ableproposition.Ingeneral,thisclasstoowillbedependentonthe

definedbymeansofprimitivesigns.Namescannotbeanatomized meaning that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the

bymeansofdefinitions.(Norcananysignthathasameaninginde originalproposition.Butifallthesignsinitthathavearbitrarilyde

pendentlyandonitsown.) termined meanings are turned into variables, we shall still get a

3.262Whatsignsfailtoexpress,theirapplicationshows.Whatsigns classofthiskind.Thisone,however,isnotdependentonanycon

slurover,theirapplicationsaysclearly. vention,butsolelyonthenatureoftheproposition.Itcorresponds

toalogicalformalogicalprototype.

3.263Themeaningsofprimitivesignscanbeexplainedbymeansof

elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that stood if the mean 3.316 What values a propositional variable may take is something

ingsofthosesignsarealreadyknown. thatisstipulated.Thestipulationofvaluesisthevariable.

3.3Onlypropositionshavesense;onlyinthenexusofaproposition 3.317 To stipulate values for a propositional variable is to give the

doesanamehavemeaning. propositions whose common characteristic the variable is. The

stipulationisadescriptionofthosepropositions.Thestipulationwill

3.31 I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an

thereforebeconcernedonlywithsymbols,notwiththeirmeaning.

expression(orasymbol).(Apropositionisitselfanexpression.)Eve

Andtheonlythingessentialtothestipulationisthatitismerelya

rything essential to their sense that propositions can have in com

description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified.

monwithoneanotherisanexpression.Anexpressionisthemarkof

Howthedescriptionofthepropositionsisproducedisnotessential.

aformandacontent.

3.318LikeFregeandRussellIconstrueapropositionasafunctionof

3.311 An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions

theexpressionscontainedinit.

inwhichitcanoccur.Itisthecommoncharacteristicmarkofaclass

ofpropositions. 3.32Asigniswhatcanbeperceivedofasymbol.

3.312Itisthereforepresentedbymeansofthegeneralformofthe 3.321 So one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be

propositionsthatitcharacterizes.Infact,inthisformtheexpression commontotwodifferentsymbolsinwhichcasetheywillsignifyin

willbeconstantandeverythingelsevariable. differentways.

3.313Thusanexpressionispresentedbymeansofavariablewhose 3.322Ouruseofthesamesigntosignifytwodifferentobjectscan

valuesarethepropositionsthatcontaintheexpression.(Inthelim neverindicateacommoncharacteristicofthetwo,ifweuseitwith

itingcasethevariablebecomesaconstant,theexpressionbecomes twodifferentmodesofsignification.Forthesign,ofcourse,isarbi

aproposition.)Icallsuchavariablea'propositionalvariable'.

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trary. So we could choose two different signs instead, and then 3.33Inlogicalsyntaxthemeaningofasignshouldneverplayarole.

whatwouldbeleftincommononthesignifyingside? It must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning

3.323 In everyday language it very frequently happens that the the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be

samewordhasdifferentmodesofsignificationandsobelongsto presupposed.

differentsymbolsorthattwowordsthathavedifferentmodesof 3.331FromthisobservationweturntoRussell's'theoryoftypes'.It

significationareemployedinpropositionsinwhatissuperficiallythe canbeseenthatRussellmustbewrong,becausehehadtomention

same way. Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for themeaningofsignswhenestablishingtherulesforthem.

identity,andasanexpressionforexistence;'exist'figuresasanin 3.332Nopropositioncanmakeastatementaboutitself,becausea

transitiveverblike'go',and'identical'asanadjective;wespeakof propositionalsigncannotbecontainedinitself(thatisthewholeof

something, but also of something's happening. (In the proposition, the'theoryoftypes').

'Greenisgreen'wherethefirstwordisthepropernameofaper

3.333Thereasonwhyafunctioncannotbeitsownargumentisthat

sonandthelastanadjectivethesewordsdonotmerelyhavedif

the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argu

ferentmeanings:theyaredifferentsymbols.)

ment,anditcannotcontainitself.Forletussupposethatthefunc

3.324 In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily pro tionF(fx)couldbeitsownargument:inthatcasetherewouldbea

duced(thewholeofphilosophyisfullofthem). proposition 'F(F(fx))', in which the outer function F and the inner

3.325 In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has

languagethatexcludesthembynotusingthesamesignfordiffer the form O(f(x)) and the outer one has the form Y(O(fx)). Only the

entsymbolsandbynotusinginasuperficiallysimilarwaysignsthat letter'F'iscommontothetwofunctions,buttheletterbyitselfsig

havedifferentmodesofsignification:thatistosay,asignlanguage nifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of 'F(Fu)'

that is governed by logical grammarby logical syntax. (The con wewrite'(do):F(Ou).Ou=Fu'.ThatdisposesofRussell'sparadox.

ceptualnotationofFregeandRussellissuchalanguage,though,it 3.334 The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we

istrue,itfailstoexcludeallmistakes.) knowhoweachindividualsignsignifies.

3.326 In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe 3.34 A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Ac

howitisusedwithasense. cidental features are those that result from the particular way in

3.327Asigndoesnotdeterminealogicalformunlessitistakento which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are

getherwithitslogicosyntacticalemployment. thosewithoutwhichthepropositioncouldnotexpressitssense.

3.328Ifasignisuseless,itismeaningless.ThatisthepointofOc 3.341 So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions

cam'smaxim.(Ifeverythingbehavesasifasignhadmeaning,then thatcanexpressthesamesensehaveincommon.Andsimilarly,in

itdoeshavemeaning.) general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can

servethesamepurposehaveincommon.

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all symbols that signified it had in common. Thus, one by one, all logicalplace.

kindsofcompositionwouldprovetobeunessentialtoaname. 3.411Ingeometryandlogicalikeaplaceisapossibility:something

3.342 Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, this canexistinit.

much is not arbitrarythat when we have determined one thing 3.42 A proposition can determine only one place in logical space:

arbitrarily,somethingelseisnecessarilythecase.(Thisderivesfrom neverthelessthewholeoflogicalspacemustalreadybegivenbyit.

theessenceofnotation.) (Otherwisenegation,logicalsum,logicalproduct,etc.,wouldintro

3.3421Aparticularmodeofsignifyingmaybeunimportantbutitis duce more and more new elements in coordination.) (The logical

alwaysimportantthatitisapossiblemodeofsignifying.Andthatis scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The

generallysoinphilosophy:againandagaintheindividualcaseturns forceofapropositionreachesthroughthewholeoflogicalspace.)

out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case 3.5Apropositionalsign,appliedandthoughtout,isathought.

disclosessomethingabouttheessenceoftheworld.

3.343 Definitions are rules for translating from one language into

another. Any correct signlanguage must be translatable into any 4.Athoughtisapropositionwithasense.

other in accordance with such rules: it is this that they all have in

4.001Thetotalityofpropositionsislanguage.

common.

4.022 Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of

3.344Whatsignifiesinasymboliswhatiscommontoallthesym

expressingeverysense,withouthavinganyideahoweachwordhas

bolsthattherulesoflogicalsyntaxallowustosubstituteforit.

meaning or what its meaning isjust as people speak without

3.3441 For instance, we can express what is common to all nota knowing how the individual sounds are produced. Everyday lan

tionsfortruthfunctionsinthefollowingway:theyhaveincommon guage is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated

that,forexample,thenotationthatuses'Pp'('notp')and'pCg'('p than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it

org')canbesubstitutedforanyofthem.(Thisservestocharacter whatthelogicoflanguageis.Languagedisguisesthought.Somuch

izethewayinwhichsomethinggeneralcanbedisclosedbythepos so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to

sibilityofaspecificnotation.) infertheformofthethoughtbeneathit,becausetheoutwardform

3.3442Nordoesanalysisresolvethesignforacomplexinanarbi oftheclothingisnotdesignedtorevealtheformofthebody,but

trary way, so that it would have a different resolution every time forentirelydifferentpurposes.Thetacitconventionsonwhichthe

thatitwasincorporatedinadifferentproposition. understandingofeverydaylanguagedependsareenormouslycom

3.4Apropositiondeterminesaplaceinlogicalspace.Theexistence plicated.

ofthislogicalplaceisguaranteedbythemereexistenceofthecon 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in phi

stituentsbytheexistenceofthepropositionwithasense. losophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we

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cannotgiveanyanswertoquestionsofthiskind,butcanonlypoint relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.

out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and ques They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.

tionsofphilosophersarisefromourfailuretounderstandthelogic (Like the two youths in the fairytale, their two horses, and their

of our language. (They belong to the same class as the question lilies.Theyareallinacertainsenseone.)

whetherthegoodismoreorlessidenticalthanthebeautiful.)And 4.0141Thereisageneralrulebymeansofwhichthemusiciancan

it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not prob obtainthesymphonyfromthescore,andwhichmakesitpossibleto

lemsatall. derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record,

4.0031 All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in and,usingthefirstrule,toderivethescoreagain.Thatiswhatcon

Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of stitutestheinnersimilaritybetweenthesethingswhichseemtobe

showingthattheapparentlogicalformofapropositionneednotbe constructedinsuchentirelydifferentways.Andthatruleisthelaw

itsrealone. ofprojectionwhichprojectsthesymphonyintothelanguageofmu

4.01Apropositionisapictureofreality.Apropositionisamodelof sicalnotation.Itistherulefortranslatingthislanguageintothelan

realityasweimagineit. guageofgramophonerecords.

4.011Atfirstsightapropositiononesetoutontheprintedpage, 4.015Thepossibilityofallimagery,ofallourpictorialmodesofex

for exampledoes not seem to be a picture of the reality with pression,iscontainedinthelogicofdepiction.

which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first 4.016Inordertounderstandtheessentialnatureofaproposition,

sighttobeapictureofapieceofmusic,norourphoneticnotation weshouldconsiderhieroglyphicscript,whichdepictsthefactsthat

(the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech. And yet these sign itdescribes.Andalphabeticscriptdevelopedoutofitwithoutlosing

languagesprovetobepictures,evenintheordinarysense,ofwhat whatwasessentialtodepiction.

theyrepresent. 4.02Wecanseethisfromthefactthatweunderstandthesenseof

4.012Itisobviousthatapropositionoftheform'aRb'strikesusasa apropositionalsignwithoutitshavingbeenexplainedtous.

picture.Inthiscasethesignisobviouslyalikenessofwhatissigni 4.021 A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a

fied. proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I under

4.013Andifwepenetratetotheessenceofthispictorialcharacter, standthepropositionwithouthavinghaditssenseexplainedtome.

weseethatitisnotimpairedbyapparentirregularities(suchasthe 4.022 A proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how

use[sharp]ofand[flat]inmusicalnotation).Foreventheseirregu thingsstandifitistrue.Anditsaysthattheydosostand.

laritiesdepictwhattheyareintendedtoexpress;onlytheydoitina

4.023Apropositionmustrestrictrealitytotwoalternatives:yesor

differentway.

no.Inordertodothat,itmustdescriberealitycompletely.Apropo

4.014 A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, sitionisadescriptionofastateofaffairs.Justasadescriptionofan

andthesoundwaves,allstandtooneanotherinthesameinternal objectdescribesitbygivingitsexternalproperties,soaproposition

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describesrealitybyitsinternalproperties.Apropositionconstructs 4.0311 One name stands for one thing, another for another thing,

aworldwiththehelpofalogicalscaffolding,sothatonecanactu and they are combined with one another. In this way the whole

allyseefromthepropositionhoweverythingstandslogicallyifitis grouplikeatableauvivantpresentsastateofaffairs.

true.Onecandrawinferencesfromafalseproposition. 4.0312Thepossibilityofpropositionsisbasedontheprinciplethat

4.024Tounderstandapropositionmeanstoknowwhatisthecase objectshavesignsastheirrepresentatives.Myfundamentalideais

if it is true. (One can understand it, therefore, without knowing that the 'logical constants' are not representatives; that there can

whetheritistrue.)Itisunderstoodbyanyonewhounderstandsits benorepresentativesofthelogicoffacts.

constituents. 4.032Itisonlyinsofarasapropositionislogicallyarticulatedthatit

4.025Whentranslatingonelanguageintoanother,wedonotpro is a picture of a situation. (Even the proposition, 'Ambulo', is com

ceedbytranslatingeachpropositionoftheoneintoapropositionof posite:foritsstemwithadifferentendingyieldsadifferentsense,

the other, but merely by translating the constituents of proposi andsodoesitsendingwithadifferentstem.)

tions.(Andthedictionarytranslatesnotonlysubstantives,butalso 4.04Inapropositiontheremustbeexactlyasmanydistinguishable

verbs,adjectives,andconjunctions,etc.;andittreatsthemallinthe partsasinthesituationthatitrepresents.Thetwomustpossessthe

sameway.) samelogical(mathematical)multiplicity.(CompareHertz'sMechan

4.026Themeaningsofsimplesigns(words)mustbeexplainedtous icsondynamicalmodels.)

if we are to understand them. With propositions, however, we 4.041Thismathematicalmultiplicity,ofcourse,cannotitselfbethe

makeourselvesunderstood. subjectofdepiction.Onecannotgetawayfromitwhendepicting.

4.027 It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be 4.0411.If,forexample,wewantedtoexpresswhatwenowwriteas

abletocommunicateanewsensetous. '(x). fx' by putting an affix in front of 'fx'for instance by writing

4.03Apropositionmustuseoldexpressionstocommunicateanew 'Gen.fx'itwouldnotbeadequate:weshouldnotknowwhatwas

sense.Apropositioncommunicatesasituationtous,andsoitmust beinggeneralized.Ifwewantedtosignalizeitwithanaffix'g'for

be essentially connected with the situation. And the connexion is instance by writing 'f(xg)'that would not be adequate either: we

preciselythatitisitslogicalpicture.Apropositionstatessomething shouldnotknowthescopeofthegeneralitysign.Ifweweretotry

onlyinsofarasitisapicture. to do it by introducing a mark into the argumentplacesfor in

4.031Inapropositionasituationis,asitwere,constructedbyway stance by writing '(G,G). F(G,G)' it would not be adequate: we

of experiment. Instead of, 'This proposition has such and such a shouldnotbeabletoestablishtheidentityofthevariables.Andso

sense,wecansimplysay,'Thispropositionrepresentssuchandsuch on.Allthesemodesofsignifyingareinadequatebecausetheylack

asituation'. thenecessarymathematicalmultiplicity.

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4.0412Forthesamereasontheidealist'sappealto'spatialspecta ment,etc.etc.Butinordertobeabletosaythatapointisblackor

cles'isinadequatetoexplaintheseeingofspatialrelations,because white, I must first know when a point is called black, and when

itcannotexplainthemultiplicityoftheserelations. white:inordertobeabletosay,'"p"istrue(orfalse)',Imusthave

4.05Realityiscomparedwithpropositions. determined in what circumstances I call 'p' true, and in so doing I

determine the sense of the proposition. Now the point where the

4.06Apropositioncanbetrueorfalseonlyinvirtueofbeingapic

simile breaks down is this: we can indicate a point on the paper

tureofreality.

evenifwedonotknowwhatblackandwhiteare,butifaproposi

4.061Itmustnotbeoverlookedthatapropositionhasasensethat tionhasnosense,nothingcorrespondstoit,sinceitdoesnotdesig

is independent of the facts: otherwise one can easily suppose that nate a thing (a truthvalue) which might have properties called

trueandfalsearerelationsofequalstatusbetweensignsandwhat 'false'or'true'.Theverbofapropositionisnot'istrue'or'isfalse',

they signify. In that case one could say, for example, that 'p' signi as Frege thought: rather, that which 'is true' must already contain

fiedinthetruewaywhat'Pp'signifiedinthefalseway,etc. theverb.

4.062 Can we not make ourselves understood with false proposi 4.064 Every proposition must already have a sense: it cannot be

tionsjustaswehavedoneuptillnowwithtrueones?Solongasit given a sense by affirmation. Indeed its sense is just what is af

isknownthattheyaremeanttobefalse.No!Forapropositionis firmed.Andthesameappliestonegation,etc.

trueifweuseittosaythatthingsstandinacertainway,andthey

4.0641 One could say that negation must be related to the logical

do;andifby'p'wemeanPpandthingsstandaswemeanthatthey

placedeterminedbythenegatedproposition.Thenegatingproposi

do,then,construedinthenewway,'p'istrueandnotfalse.

tion determines a logical place different from that of the negated

4.0621 But it is important that the signs 'p' and 'Pp' can say the proposition. The negating proposition determines a logical place

samething.Foritshowsthatnothinginrealitycorrespondstothe withthehelpofthelogicalplaceofthenegatedproposition.Forit

sign'P'.Theoccurrenceofnegationinapropositionisnotenough describes it as lying outside the latter's logical place. The negated

tocharacterizeitssense(PPp=p).Thepropositions'p'and'Pp'have propositioncanbenegatedagain,andthisinitselfshowsthatwhat

opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same isnegatedisalreadyaproposition,andnotmerelysomethingthat

reality. ispreliminarytoaproposition.

4.063Ananalogytoillustratetheconceptoftruth:imagineablack 4.1Propositionsrepresenttheexistenceandnonexistenceofstates

spotonwhitepaper:youcandescribetheshapeofthespotbysay ofaffairs.

ing,foreachpointonthesheet,whetheritisblackorwhite.Tothe

4.11Thetotalityoftruepropositionsisthewholeofnaturalscience

fact that a point is black there corresponds a positive fact, and to

(orthewholecorpusofthenaturalsciences).

thefactthatapointiswhite(notblack),anegativefact.IfIdesig

nate a point on the sheet (a truthvalue according to Frege), then 4.111Philosophyisnotoneofthenaturalsciences.(Theword'phi

this corresponds to the supposition that is put forward for judge losophy'mustmeansomethingwhoseplaceisaboveorbelowthe

naturalsciences,notbesidethem.)

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4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Phi with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside

losophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical theworld.

workconsistsessentiallyofelucidations.Philosophydoesnotresult 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in

in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of them.Whatfindsitsreflectioninlanguage,languagecannotrepre

propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy sent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by

andindistinct:itstaskistomakethemclearandtogivethemsharp means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality.

boundaries. Theydisplayit.

4.1121Psychologyisnomorecloselyrelatedtophilosophythanany 4.1211 Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occurs in

other natural science. Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of itssense,twopropositions'fa'and'ga'showthatthesameobjectis

psychology.Doesnotmystudyofsignlanguagecorrespondtothe mentioned in both of them. If two propositions contradict one an

studyofthoughtprocesses,whichphilosophersusedtoconsiderso other,thentheirstructureshowsit;thesameistrueifoneofthem

essentialtothephilosophyoflogic?Onlyinmostcasestheygoten followsfromtheother.Andsoon.

tangled in unessential psychological investigations, and with my

4.1212Whatcanbeshown,cannotbesaid.

methodtoothereisananalogousrisk.

4.1213 Now, too, we understand our feeling that once we have a

4.1122Darwin'stheoryhasnomoretodowithphilosophythanany

signlanguageinwhicheverythingisallright,wealreadyhaveacor

otherhypothesisinnaturalscience.

rectlogicalpointofview.

4.113Philosophysetslimitstothemuchdisputedsphereofnatural

4.122Inacertainsensewecantalkaboutformalpropertiesofob

science.

jects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural

4.114Itmustsetlimitstowhatcanbethought;and,indoingso,to properties:andinthesamesenseaboutformalrelationsandstruc

what cannot be thought. It must set limits to what cannot be tural relations. (Instead of 'structural property' I also say 'internal

thoughtbyworkingoutwardsthroughwhatcanbethought. property'; instead of 'structural relation', 'internal relation'. I intro

4.115Itwillsignifywhatcannotbesaid,bypresentingclearlywhat ducetheseexpressionsinordertoindicatethesourceoftheconfu

canbesaid. sionbetweeninternalrelationsandrelationsproper(externalrela

4.116Everythingthatcanbethoughtatallcanbethoughtclearly. tions),whichisverywidespreadamongphilosophers.)Itisimpossi

Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly. 4.12 ble,however,toassertbymeansofpropositionsthatsuchinternal

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot propertiesandrelationsobtain:rather,thismakesitselfmanifestin

representwhattheymusthaveincommonwithrealityinorderto thepropositionsthatrepresenttherelevantstatesofaffairsandare

be able to represent itlogical form. In order to be able to repre concernedwiththerelevantobjects.

sent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves

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4.1221 An internal property of a fact can also be bed a feature of 4.126 We can now talk about formal concepts, in the same sense

thatfact(inthesenseinwhichwespeakoffacialfeatures,forex that we speak of formal properties. (I introduce this expression in

ample). order to exhibit the source of the confusion between formal con

4.123Apropertyisinternalifitisunthinkablethatitsobjectshould ceptsandconceptsproper,whichpervadesthewholeoftraditional

notpossessit.(Thisshadeofblueandthatonestand,eoipso,inthe logic.) When something falls under a formal concept as one of its

internalrelationoflightertodarker.Itisunthinkablethatthesetwo objects,thiscannotbeexpressedbymeansofaproposition.Instead

objects should not stand in this relation.) (Here the shifting use of itisshownintheverysignforthisobject.(Anameshowsthatitsig

the word 'object' corresponds to the shifting use of the words nifiesanobject,asignforanumberthatitsignifiesanumber,etc.)

'property'and'relation'.) Formalconceptscannot,infact,berepresentedbymeansofafunc

tion,asconceptspropercan.Fortheircharacteristics,formalprop

4.124Theexistenceofaninternalpropertyofapossiblesituationis

erties,arenotexpressedbymeansoffunctions.Theexpressionfor

notexpressedbymeansofaproposition:rather,itexpressesitself

aformalpropertyisafeatureofcertainsymbols.Sothesignforthe

inthepropositionrepresentingthesituation,bymeansofaninter

characteristicsofaformalconceptisadistinctivefeatureofallsym

nalpropertyofthatproposition.Itwouldbejustasnonsensicalto

bolswhosemeaningsfallundertheconcept.Sotheexpressionfora

assertthatapropositionhadaformalpropertyastodenyit.

formal concept is a propositional variable in which this distinctive

4.1241 It is impossible to distinguish forms from one another by featurealoneisconstant.

sayingthatonehasthispropertyandanotherthatproperty:forthis

4.127Thepropositionalvariablesignifiestheformalconcept,andits

presupposesthatitmakessensetoascribeeitherpropertytoeither

valuessignifytheobjectsthatfallundertheconcept.

form.

4.1271 Every variable is the sign for a formal concept. For every

4.125Theexistenceofaninternalrelationbetweenpossiblesitua

variablerepresentsaconstantformthatallitsvaluespossess,and

tions expresses itself in language by means of an internal relation

thiscanberegardedasaformalpropertyofthosevalues.

betweenthepropositionsrepresentingthem.

4.1272Thusthevariablename'x'isthepropersignforthepseudo

4.1251Herewehavetheanswertothevexedquestion'whetherall

conceptobject.Wherevertheword'object'('thing',etc.)iscorrectly

relationsareinternalorexternal'.

used,itisexpressedinconceptualnotationbyavariablename.For

4.1252Icallaseriesthatisorderedbyaninternalrelationaseries example,intheproposition,'Thereare2objectswhich...',itisex

offorms.Theorderofthenumberseriesisnotgovernedbyanex pressedby'(dx,y)...'.Whereveritisusedinadifferentway,thatis

ternal relation but by an internal relation. The same is true of the asaproperconceptword,nonsensicalpseudopropositionsarethe

seriesofpropositions'aRb','(d:c):aRx.xRb','(dx,y):aRx.xRy.yRb', result. So one cannot say, for example, 'There are objects', as one

andsoforth.(Ifbstandsinoneoftheserelationstoa,Icallbasuc might say, 'There are books'. And it is just as impossible to say,

cessorofa.) 'Thereare100objects',or,'Thereare!0objects'.Anditisnonsensi

caltospeakofthetotalnumberofobjects.Thesameappliestothe

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words 'complex', 'fact', 'function', 'number', etc. They all signify 4.2 The sense of a proposition is its agreement and disagreement

formal concepts, and are represented in conceptual notation by withpossibilitiesofexistenceandnonexistenceofstatesofaffairs.

variables,notbyfunctionsorclasses(asFregeandRussellbelieved). 4.21 The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition,

'1isanumber','Thereisonlyonezero',andallsimilarexpressions assertstheexistenceofastateofaffairs.

arenonsensical.(Itisjustasnonsensicaltosay,'Thereisonlyone1', 4.211Itisasignofaproposition'sbeingelementarythattherecan

asitwouldbetosay,'2+2at3o'clockequals4'.) benoelementarypropositioncontradictingit.

4.12721 A formal concept is given immediately any object falling 4.22 An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a

underitisgiven.Itisnotpossible,therefore,tointroduceasprimi concatenation,ofnames.

tive ideas objects belonging to a formal concept and the formal

4.221Itisobviousthattheanalysisofpropositionsmustbringusto

conceptitself.Soitisimpossible,forexample,tointroduceasprimi

elementarypropositionswhichconsistofnamesinimmediatecom

tiveideasboththeconceptofafunctionandspecificfunctions,as

bination.Thisraisesthequestionhowsuchcombinationintopropo

Russelldoes;ortheconceptofanumberandparticularnumbers.

sitionscomesabout.

4.1273 If we want to express in conceptual notation the general

4.2211Eveniftheworldisinfinitelycomplex,sothateveryfactcon

proposition, 'b is a successor of a', then we require an expression

sistsofinfinitelymanystatesofaffairsandeverystateofaffairsis

forthegeneraltermoftheseriesofforms'aRb','(d:c):aRx.xRb','(d

composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be

x,y):aRx.xRy.yRb',...,Inordertoexpressthegeneraltermofase

objectsandstatesofaffairs.

riesofforms,wemustuseavariable,becausetheconcept'termof

that series of forms' is a formal concept. (This is what Frege and 4.23Itisonlyinthenexusofanelementarypropositionthataname

Russell overlooked: consequently the way in which they want to occursinaproposition.

expressgeneralpropositionsliketheoneaboveisincorrect;itcon 4.24Namesarethesimplesymbols:Iindicatethembysingleletters

tainsaviciouscircle.)Wecandeterminethegeneraltermofaseries ('x', 'y', 'z'). I write elementary propositions as functions of names,

offormsbygivingitsfirsttermandthegeneralformoftheopera sothattheyhavetheform'fx','O(x,y)',etc.OrIindicatethemby

tion that produces the next term out of the proposition that pre theletters'p','q','r'.

cedesit. 4.241 When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I ex

4.1274Toaskwhetheraformalconceptexistsisnonsensical.Forno press this by putting the sign '=' between them. So 'a = b' means

propositioncanbetheanswertosuchaquestion.(So,forexample, thatthesign'b'canbesubstitutedforthesign'a'.(IfIuseanequa

the question, 'Are there unanalysable subjectpredicate proposi tiontointroduceanewsign'b',layingdownthatitshallserveasa

tions?'cannotbeasked.) substitute for a sign a that is already known, then, like Russell, I

4.128 Logical forms are without number. Hence there are no pre writetheequationdefinitionintheform'a=bDef.'Adefinition

eminent numbers in logic, and hence there is no possibility of phi isaruledealingwithsigns.)

losophicalmonismordualism,etc.

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tationaldevices.Theystatenothingaboutthemeaningofthesigns withtruthpossibilitiesofelementarypropositions.

'a'and'b'. 4.41 Truthpossibilities of elementary propositions are the condi

4.243 Can we understand two names without knowing whether tionsofthetruthandfalsityofpropositions.

theysignifythesamethingortwodifferentthings?Canweunder 4.411 It immediately strikes one as probable that the introduction

stand a proposition in which two names occur without knowing ofelementarypropositionsprovidesthebasisforunderstandingall

whethertheirmeaningisthesameordifferent?SupposeIknowthe other kinds of proposition. Indeed the understanding of general

meaningofanEnglishwordandofaGermanwordthatmeansthe propositionspalpablydependsontheunderstandingofelementary

same:thenitisimpossibleformetobeunawarethattheydomean propositions.

thesame;Imustbecapableoftranslatingeachintotheother.Ex

4.42 For n elementary propositions there are ways in which a

pressionslike'a=a',andthosederivedfromthem,areneitherele

propositioncanagreeanddisagreewiththeirtruthpossibilities.

mentarypropositionsnoristhereanyotherwayinwhichtheyhave

sense.(Thiswillbecomeevidentlater.) 4.43Wecanexpressagreementwithtruthpossibilitiesbycorrelat

ingthemark'T'(true)withthemintheschema.Theabsenceofthis

4.25Ifanelementarypropositionistrue,thestateofaffairsexists:

markmeansdisagreement.

if an elementary proposition is false, the state of affairs does not

exist. 4.431 The expression of agreement and disagreement with the

truth possibilities of elementary propositions expresses the truth

4.26 If all true elementary propositions are given, the result is a

conditions of a proposition. A proposition is the expression of its

complete description of the world. The world is completely de

truthconditions.(ThusFregewasquiterighttousethemasastart

scribed by giving all elementary propositions, and adding which of

ing point when he explained the signs of his conceptual notation.

themaretrueandwhichfalse.Fornstatesofaffairs,therearepos

ButtheexplanationoftheconceptoftruththatFregegivesismis

sibilities of existence and nonexistence. Of these states of affairs

taken:if'thetrue'and'thefalse'werereallyobjects,andwerethe

anycombinationcanexistandtheremaindernotexist.

argumentsinPpetc.,thenFrege'smethodofdeterminingthesense

4.28Therecorrespondtothesecombinationsthesamenumberof of'Pp'wouldleaveitabsolutelyundetermined.)

possibilitiesoftruthandfalsityfornelementarypropositions.

4.44 The sign that results from correlating the mark 'I' with truth

4.3TruthpossibilitiesofelementarypropositionsmeanPossibilities possibilitiesisapropositionalsign.

ofexistenceandnonexistenceofstatesofaffairs.

4.441Itisclearthatacomplexofthesigns'F'and'T'hasnoobject

4.31Wecanrepresenttruthpossibilitiesbyschemataofthefollow (or complex of objects) corresponding to it, just as there is none

ingkind('T'means'true','F'means'false';therowsof'T's'and'F's' corresponding to the horizontal and vertical lines or to the brack

under the row of elementary propositions symbolize their truth ets.Thereareno'logicalobjects'.Ofcoursethesameappliestoall

possibilitiesinawaythatcaneasilybeunderstood): signsthatexpresswhattheschemataof'T's'and'F's'express.

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'judgementstroke''|'islogicallyquitemeaningless:intheworksof cal.Theyarepartofthesymbolism,muchas'0'ispartofthesym

Frege (and Russell) it simply indicates that these authors hold the bolismofarithmetic.

propositionsmarkedwiththissigntobetrue.Thus'|'isnomorea 4.462 Tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality.

componentpartofapropositionthanis,forinstance,theproposi Theydonotrepresentanypossiblesituations.Fortheformeradmit

tion'snumber.Itisquiteimpossibleforapropositiontostatethatit allpossiblesituations,andlatternone.Inatautologytheconditions

itself is true.) If the order or the truthpossibilities in a scheme is of agreement with the worldthe representational relations

fixedonceandforallbyacombinatoryrule,thenthelastcolumnby cancel one another, so that it does not stand in any representa

itselfwillbeanexpressionofthetruthconditions.Ifwenowwrite tionalrelationtoreality.

this column as a row, the propositional sign will become '(TTT)

4.463 The truthconditions of a proposition determine the range

(p,q)' or more explicitly '(TTFT) (p,q)' (The number of places in the

thatitleavesopentothefacts.(Aproposition,apicture,oramodel

lefthandpairofbracketsisdeterminedbythenumberoftermsin

is,inthenegativesense,likeasolidbodythatrestrictsthefreedom

therighthandpair.)

of movement of others, and in the positive sense, like a space

4.45FornelementarypropositionsthereareLnpossiblegroupsof bounded by solid substance in which there is room for a body.) A

truthconditions.Thegroupsoftruthconditionsthatareobtainable tautology leaves open to reality the wholethe infinite wholeof

fromthetruthpossibilitiesofagivennumberofelementarypropo logicalspace:acontradictionfillsthewholeoflogicalspaceleaving

sitionscanbearrangedinaseries. nopointofitforreality.Thusneitherofthemcandeterminereality

4.46 Among the possible groups of truthconditions there are two inanyway.

extreme cases. In one of these cases the proposition is true for all 4.464Atautology'struthiscertain,aproposition'spossible,acon

the truthpossibilities of the elementary propositions. We say that tradiction'simpossible.(Certain,possible,impossible:herewehave

thetruthconditionsaretautological.Inthesecondcasethepropo thefirstindicationofthescalethatweneedinthetheoryofprob

sition is false for all the truthpossibilities: the truthconditions are ability.)

contradictory.Inthefirstcasewecallthepropositionatautology;in

4.465Thelogicalproductofatautologyandapropositionsaysthe

thesecond,acontradiction.

same thing as the proposition. This product, therefore, is identical

4.461 Propositions show what they say; tautologies and contradic withtheproposition.Foritisimpossibletoalterwhatisessentialto

tions show that they say nothing. A tautology has no truth asymbolwithoutalteringitssense.

conditions, since it is unconditionally true: and a contradiction is

4.466 What corresponds to a determinate logical combination of

true on no condition. Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.

signs is a determinate logical combination of their meanings. It is

(Likeapointfromwhichtwoarrowsgooutinoppositedirectionsto

onlytotheuncombinedsignsthatabsolutelyanycombinationcor

one another.) (For example, I know nothing about the weather

responds.Inotherwords,propositionsthataretrueforeverysitua

whenIknowthatitiseitherrainingornotraining.)

tioncannotbecombinationsofsignsatall,since,iftheywere,only

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(And what is not a logical combination has no combination of ob

jectscorrespondingtoit.)Tautologyandcontradictionarethelimit

propositions.(Anelementarypropositionisatruth

ingcasesindeedthedisintegrationofthecombinationofsigns. functionofitself.)

4.4661 Admittedly the signs are still combined with one another 5.01 Elementary propositions are the trutharguments of proposi

even in tautologies and contradictionsi.e. they stand in certain tions.

relationstooneanother:buttheserelationshavenomeaning,they 5.02 The arguments of functions are readily confused with the af

arenotessentialtothesymbol. fixesofnames.Forbothargumentsandaffixesenablemetorecog

4.5 It now seems possible to give the most general propositional nizethemeaningofthesignscontainingthem.Forexample,when

form: that is, to give a description of the propositions of any sign Russellwrites'+c',the'c'isanaffixwhichindicatesthatthesignasa

languagewhatsoeverinsuchawaythateverypossiblesensecanbe wholeistheadditionsignforcardinalnumbers.Buttheuseofthis

expressedbyasymbolsatisfyingthedescription,andeverysymbol signistheresultofarbitraryconventionanditwouldbequitepos

satisfying the description can express a sense, provided that the sible to choose a simple sign instead of '+c'; in 'Pp' however, 'p' is

meaningsofthenamesaresuitablychosen.Itisclearthatonlywhat not an affix but an argument: the sense of 'Pp' cannot be under

isessentialtothemostgeneralpropositionalformmaybeincluded stood unless the sense of 'p' has been understood already. (In the

in its descriptionfor otherwise it would not be the most general nameJuliusCaesar'Julius'isanaffix.Anaffixisalwayspartofade

form.Theexistenceofageneralpropositionalformisprovedbythe scriptionoftheobjecttowhosenameweattachit:e.g.theCaesar

factthattherecannotbeapropositionwhoseformcouldnothave of the Julian gens.) If I am not mistaken, Frege's theory about the

beenforeseen(i.e.constructed).Thegeneralformofaproposition meaning of propositions and functions is based on the confusion

is:Thisishowthingsstand. betweenanargumentandanaffix.Fregeregardedthepropositions

4.51SupposethatIamgivenallelementarypropositions:thenIcan of logic as names, and their arguments as the affixes of those

simplyaskwhatpropositionsIcanconstructoutofthem.Andthere names.

Ihaveallpropositions,andthatfixestheirlimits. 5.1Truthfunctionscanbearrangedinseries.Thatisthefoundation

4.52 Propositions comprise all that follows from the totality of all ofthetheoryofprobability.

elementarypropositions(and,ofcourse,fromitsbeingthetotality 5.101Thetruthfunctionsofagivennumberofelementaryproposi

of them all ). (Thus, in a certain sense, it could be said that all tionscanalwaysbesetoutinaschemaofthefollowingkind:(TTTT)

propositionsweregeneralizationsofelementarypropositions.) (p,q)Tautology(Ifpthenp,andifqthenq.)(pzp.qzq)(FTTT)(p,

4.53Thegeneralpropositionalformisavariable. q)Inwords:Notbothpandq.(P(p.q))(TFTT)(p,q)":Ifqthenp.(q

zp)(TTFT)(p,q)":Ifpthenq.(pzq)(TTTF)(p,q)":porq.(pCq)

(FFTT)(p,q)":Notg.(Pq)(FTFT)(p,q)":Notp.(Pp)(FTTF)(p,q)":

porq,butnotboth.(p.Pq:C:q.Pp)(TFFT)(p,q)":Ifpthenp,and

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ifqthenp.(p+q)(TFTF)(p,q)":p(TTFF)(p,q)":q(FFFT)(p,q)": 5.131Ifthetruthofonepropositionfollowsfromthetruthofoth

Neitherpnorq.(Pp.Pqorp|q)(FFTF)(p,q)":pandnotq.(p.Pq) ers, this finds expression in relations in which the forms of the

(FTFF) (p, q) ": q and not p. (q. Pp) (TFFF) (p,q) ": q and p. (q. p) propositionsstandtooneanother:norisitnecessaryforustoset

(FFFF)(p,q)Contradiction(pandnotp,andqandnotq.)(p.Pp.q. uptheserelationsbetweenthem,bycombiningthemwithonean

Pq) I will give the name truthgrounds of a proposition to those other in a single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are in

truthpossibilitiesofitstruthargumentsthatmakeittrue. ternal,andtheirexistenceisanimmediateresultoftheexistenceof

5.11 If all the truthgrounds that are common to a number of thepropositions.

propositionsareatthesametimetruthgroundsofacertainpropo 5.1311 When we infer q from p C q and Pp, the relation between

sition, then we say that the truth of that proposition follows from thepropositionalformsof'pCq'and'Pp'ismasked,inthiscase,by

thetruthoftheothers. ourmodeofsignifying.Butifinsteadof'pCq'wewrite,forexam

5.12 In particular, the truth of a proposition 'p' follows from the ple,'p|q.|.p|q',andinsteadof'Pp','p|p'(p|q=neitherpnorq),

truthofanotherproposition'q'isallthetruthgroundsofthelatter then the inner connexion becomes obvious. (The possibility of in

aretruthgroundsoftheformer. ference from (x). fx to fa shows that the symbol (x). fx itself has

generalityinit.)

5.121 The truthgrounds of the one are contained in those of the

other:pfollowsfromq. 5.132Ifpfollowsfromq,Icanmakeaninferencefromqtop,de

duce p from q. The nature of the inference can be gathered only

5.122Ifpfollowsfromq,thesenseof'p'iscontainedinthesense

from the two propositions. They themselves are the only possible

of'q'.

justification of the inference. 'Laws of inference', which are sup

5.123Ifagodcreatesaworldinwhichcertainpropositionsaretrue, posed to justify inferences, as in the works of Frege and Russell,

thenbythatveryacthealsocreatesaworldinwhichallthepropo havenosense,andwouldbesuperfluous.

sitionsthatfollowfromthemcometrue.Andsimilarlyhecouldnot

5.133Alldeductionsaremadeapriori.

createaworldinwhichtheproposition'p'wastruewithoutcreat

ingallitsobjects. 5.134 One elementary proposition cannot be deduced form an

other.

5.124Apropositionaffirmseverypropositionthatfollowsfromit.

5.135Thereisnopossiblewayofmakinganinferenceformtheex

5.1241 'p. q' is one of the propositions that affirm 'p' and at the

istenceofonesituationtotheexistenceofanother,entirelydiffer

sametimeoneofthepropositionsthataffirm'q'.Twopropositions

entsituation.

areopposedtooneanotherifthereisnopropositionwithasense,

that affirms them both. Every proposition that contradicts another 5.136Thereisnocausalnexustojustifysuchaninference.

negateit. 5.1361Wecannotinfertheeventsofthefuturefromthoseofthe

5.13 When the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of present.Beliefinthecausalnexusissuperstition.

others,wecanseethisfromthestructureoftheproposition.

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ing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if tions.

causalitywereaninnernecessitylikethatoflogicalinference.The 5.152Whenpropositionshavenotruthargumentsincommonwith

connexionbetweenknowledgeandwhatisknownisthatoflogical one another, we call them independent of one another. Two ele

necessity.('Aknowsthatpisthecase',hasnosenseifpisatautol mentarypropositionsgiveoneanothertheprobability1/2.Ifpfol

ogy.) lowsfromq,thentheproposition'q'givestotheproposition'p'the

5.1363 If the truth of a proposition does not follow from the fact probability1.Thecertaintyoflogicalinferenceisalimitingcaseof

thatitisselfevidenttous,thenitsselfevidenceinnowayjustifies probability.(Applicationofthistotautologyandcontradiction.)

ourbeliefinitstruth. 5.153 In itself, a proposition is neither probable nor improbable.

5.14 If one proposition follows from another, then the latter says Eitheraneventoccursoritdoesnot:thereisnomiddleway.

morethantheformer,andtheformerlessthanthelatter. 5.154 Suppose that an urn contains black and white balls in equal

5.141Ifpfollowsfromqandqfromp,thentheyareoneandsame numbers (and none of any other kind). I draw one ball after an

proposition. other,puttingthembackintotheurn.BythisexperimentIcanes

5.142Atautologyfollowsfromallpropositions:itsaysnothing. tablish that the number of black balls drawn and the number of

whiteballsdrawnapproximatetooneanotherasthedrawcontin

5.143Contradictionisthatcommonfactorofpropositionswhichno

ues.Sothisisnotamathematicaltruth.Now,ifIsay,'Theprobabil

propositionhasincommonwithanother.Tautologyisthecommon

ityofmydrawingawhiteballisequaltotheprobabilityofmydraw

factor of all propositions that have nothing in common with one

ingablackone',thismeansthatallthecircumstancesthatIknowof

another.Contradiction,onemightsay,vanishesoutsideallproposi

(includingthelawsofnatureassumedashypotheses)givenomore

tions: tautology vanishes inside them. Contradiction is the outer

probability to the occurrence of the one event than to that of the

limit of propositions: tautology is the unsubstantial point at their

other.Thatistosay,theygiveeachtheprobability1/2ascaneasily

centre.

begatheredfromtheabovedefinitions.WhatIconfirmbytheex

5.15IfTristhenumberofthetruthgroundsofaproposition'r',and perimentisthattheoccurrenceofthetwoeventsisindependentof

ifTrsisthenumberofthetruthgroundsofaproposition's'thatare thecircumstancesofwhichIhavenomoredetailedknowledge.

atthesametimetruthgroundsof'r',thenwecalltheratioTrs:Tr

5.155Theminimalunitforaprobabilitypropositionisthis:Thecir

thedegreeofprobabilitythattheproposition'r'givestothepropo

cumstancesofwhichIhavenofurtherknowledgegivesuchand

sition's'.5.151Inaschemaliketheoneabovein

suchadegreeofprobabilitytotheoccurrenceofaparticularevent.

5.101,letTrbethenumberof'T's'inthepropositionr,andletTrs,

5.156Itisinthiswaythatprobabilityisageneralization.Itinvolves

bethenumberof'T's'inthepropositionsthatstandincolumnsin

a general description of a propositional form. We use probability

whichthepropositionrhas'T's'.Thenthepropositionrgivestothe

onlyindefaultofcertaintyifourknowledgeofafactisnotindeed

propositionstheprobabilityTrs:Tr.

complete,butwedoknowsomethingaboutitsform.(Aproposition

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alwaysacompletepictureofsomething.)Aprobabilityproposition tionanditsresulthaveincommonisjustthebasesthemselves.)

isasortofexcerptfromotherpropositions. 5.241 An operation is not the mark of a form, but only of a differ

5.2Thestructuresofpropositionsstandininternalrelationstoone encebetweenforms.

another. 5.242Theoperationthatproduces'q'from'p'alsoproduces'r'from

5.21Inordertogiveprominencetotheseinternalrelationswecan 'q', and so on. There is only one way of expressing this: 'p', 'q', 'r',

adoptthefollowingmodeofexpression:wecanrepresentapropo etc. have to be variables that give expression in a general way to

sition as the result of an operation that produces it out of other certainformalrelations.

propositions(whicharethebasesoftheoperation). 5.25 The occurrence of an operation does not characterize the

5.22Anoperationistheexpressionofarelationbetweenthestruc senseofaproposition.Indeed,nostatementismadebyanopera

turesofitsresultandofitsbases. tion,butonlybyitsresult,andthisdependsonthebasesoftheop

5.23Theoperationiswhathastobedonetotheonepropositionin eration.(Operationsandfunctionsmustnotbeconfusedwitheach

ordertomaketheotheroutofit. other.)

5.231 And that will, of course, depend on their formal properties, 5.251Afunctioncannotbeitsownargument,whereasanoperation

ontheinternalsimilarityoftheirforms. cantakeoneofitsownresultsasitsbase.

5.232Theinternalrelationbywhichaseriesisorderedisequivalent 5.252Itisonlyinthiswaythatthestepfromonetermofaseriesof

totheoperationthatproducesonetermfromanother. formstoanotherispossible(fromonetypetoanotherinthehier

archiesofRusselland Whitehead). (Russell and Whitehead did not

5.233Operationscannotmaketheirappearancebeforethepointat

admit the possibility of such steps, but repeatedly availed them

which one proposition is generated out of another in a logically

selvesofit.)

meaningful way; i.e. the point at which the logical construction of

propositionsbegins. 5.2521 If an operation is applied repeatedly to its own results, I

speakofsuccessiveapplicationsofit.('O'O'O'a'istheresultofthree

5.234Truthfunctionsofelementarypropositionsareresultsofop

successive applications of the operation 'O'E' to 'a'.) In a similar

erationswithelementarypropositionsasbases.(TheseoperationsI

senseIspeakofsuccessiveapplicationsofmorethanoneoperation

calltruthoperations.)

toanumberofpropositions.

5.2341Thesenseofatruthfunctionofpisafunctionofthesense

5.2522AccordinglyIusethesign'[a,x,O'x]'forthegeneraltermof

of p. Negation, logical addition, logical multiplication, etc. etc. are

the series of forms a, O'a, O'O'a,.... This bracketed expression is a

operations.(Negationreversesthesenseofaproposition.)

variable:thefirsttermofthebracketedexpressionisthebeginning

5.24Anoperationmanifestsitselfinavariable;itshowshowwecan oftheseriesofforms,thesecondistheformofatermxarbitrarily

getfromoneformofpropositiontoanother.Itgivesexpressionto

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immediatelyfollowsxintheseries. functionsarealwaysidenticalwhenevertheyareoneandthesame

5.2523 The concept of successive applications of an operation is truthfunctionofelementarypropositions.

equivalenttotheconcept'andsoon'. 5.42ItisselfevidentthatC,z,etc.arenotrelationsinthesensein

5.253 One operation can counteract the effect of another. Opera which right and left etc. are relations. The interdefinability of

tionscancanceloneanother. Frege'sandRussell's'primitivesigns'oflogicisenoughtoshowthat

theyarenotprimitivesigns,stilllesssignsforrelations.Anditisob

5.254Anoperationcanvanish(e.g.negationin'PPp':PPp=p).

viousthatthe'z'definedbymeansof'P'and'C'isidenticalwiththe

5.3 All propositions are results of truthoperations on elementary onethatfigureswith'P'inthedefinitionof'C';andthatthesecond

propositions.Atruthoperationisthewayinwhichatruthfunction 'C'isidenticalwiththefirstone;andsoon.

is produced out of elementary propositions. It is of the essence of

5.43Evenatfirstsightitseemsscarcelycrediblethatthereshould

truthoperationsthat,justaselementarypropositionsyieldatruth

follow from one fact p infinitely many others, namely PPp, PPPPp,

functionofthemselves,sotoointhesamewaytruthfunctionsyield

etc.Anditisnolessremarkablethattheinfinitenumberofproposi

afurthertruthfunction.Whenatruthoperationisappliedtotruth

tions of logic (mathematics) follow from half a dozen 'primitive

functions of elementary propositions, it always generates another

propositions'. But in fact all the propositions of logic say the same

truthfunction of elementary propositions, another proposition.

thing,towitnothing.

Whenatruthoperationisappliedtotheresultsoftruthoperations

on elementary propositions, there is always a single operation on 5.44 Truthfunctions are not material functions. For example, an

elementarypropositionsthathasthesameresult.Everyproposition affirmation can be produced by double negation: in such a case

istheresultoftruthoperationsonelementarypropositions. does it follow that in some sense negation is contained in affirma

tion?Does'PPp'negatePp,ordoesitaffirmporboth?Thepropo

5.31 The schemata in 4.31 have a meaning even when 'p', 'q', 'r',

sition'PPp'isnotaboutnegation,asifnegationwereanobject:on

etc.arenotelementarypropositions.Anditiseasytoseethatthe

the other hand, the possibility of negation is already written into

propositionalsignin4.442expressesasingletruthfunctionofele

affirmation. And if there were an object called 'P', it would follow

mentary propositions even when 'p' and 'q' are truthfunctions of

that'PPp'saidsomethingdifferentfromwhat'p'said,justbecause

elementarypropositions.

the one proposition would then be about P and the other would

5.32 All truthfunctions are results of successive applications to not.

elementarypropositionsofafinitenumberoftruthoperations.

5.441Thisvanishingoftheapparentlogicalconstantsalsooccursin

5.4Atthispointitbecomesmanifestthatthereareno'logicalob the case of 'P(dx). Pfx', which says the same as '(x). fx', and in the

jects'or'logicalconstants'(inFrege'sandRussell'ssense). caseof'(dx).fx.x=a',whichsaysthesameas'fa'.

5.442 If we are given a proposition, then with it we are also given

theresultsofalltruthoperationsthathaveitastheirbase.

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5.45 If there are primitive logical signs, then any logic that fails to 5.453Allnumbersinlogicstandinneedofjustification.Orrather,it

show clearly how they are placed relatively to one another and to mustbecomeevidentthattherearenonumbersinlogic.Thereare

justifytheirexistencewillbeincorrect.Theconstructionoflogicout nopreeminentnumbers.

ofitsprimitivesignsmustbemadeclear. 5.454 In logic there is no coordinate status, and there can be no

5.451Iflogichasprimitiveideas,theymustbeindependentofone classification.Inlogictherecanbenodistinctionbetweenthegen

another.Ifaprimitiveideahasbeenintroduced,itmusthavebeen eralandthespecific.

introducedinallthecombinationsinwhichiteveroccurs.Itcannot, 5.4541Thesolutionsoftheproblemsoflogicmustbesimple,since

therefore, be introduced first for one combination and later rein theysetthestandardofsimplicity.Menhavealwayshadapresen

troduced for another. For example, once negation has been intro timent that there must be a realm in which the answers to ques

duced,wemustunderstanditbothinpropositionsoftheform'Pp' tions are symmetrically combineda priorito form a self

andinpropositionslike'P(pCq)','(dx).Pfx',etc.Wemustnotintro containedsystem.Arealmsubjecttothelaw:Simplexsigillumveri.

duceitfirstfortheoneclassofcasesandthenfortheother,sinceit

5.46 If we introduced logical signs properly, then we should also

wouldthenbeleftindoubtwhetheritsmeaningwerethesamein

haveintroducedatthesametimethesenseofallcombinationsof

bothcases,andnoreasonwouldhavebeengivenforcombiningthe

them;i.e.notonly'pCq'but'P(pCq)'aswell,etc.etc.Weshould

signsinthesamewayinbothcases.(Inshort,Frege'sremarksabout

also have introduced at the same time the effect of all possible

introducingsignsbymeansofdefinitions(inTheFundamentalLaws

combinationsofbrackets.Andthusitwouldhavebeenmadeclear

ofArithmetic)alsoapply,mutatismutandis,totheintroductionof

thattherealgeneralprimitivesignsarenot'pCq','(dx).fx',etc.but

primitivesigns.)

themostgeneralformoftheircombinations.

5.452 The introduction of any new device into the symbolism of

5.461Thoughitseemsunimportant,itisinfactsignificantthatthe

logicisnecessarilyamomentousevent.Inlogicanewdeviceshould

pseudorelations of logic, such as C and z, need bracketsunlike

notbeintroducedinbracketsorinafootnotewithwhatonemight

real relations. Indeed, the use of brackets with these apparently

call a completely innocent air. (Thus in Russell and Whitehead's

primitive signs is itself an indication that they are not primitive

PrincipiaMathematicathereoccurdefinitionsandprimitivepropo

signs.Andsurelynooneisgoingtobelievebracketshaveaninde

sitionsexpressedinwords.Whythissuddenappearanceofwords?

pendent meaning. 5.4611 Signs for logical operations are punctua

Itwouldrequireajustification,butnoneisgiven,orcouldbegiven,

tionmarks.

sincetheprocedureisinfactillicit.)Butiftheintroductionofanew

device has proved necessary at a certain point, we must immedi 5.47Itisclearthatwhateverwecansayinadvanceabouttheform

atelyaskourselves,'Atwhatpointsistheemploymentofthisdevice ofallpropositions,wemustbeabletosayallatonce.Anelemen

nowunavoidable?'anditsplaceinlogicmustbemadeclear. tarypropositionreallycontainsalllogicaloperationsinitself.For'fa'

saysthesamethingas'(dx).fx.x=a'Whereverthereiscomposite

ness,argumentandfunctionarepresent,andwherethesearepre

sent, we already have all the logical constants. One could say that

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the sole logical constant was what all propositions, by their very ifwethinkthatwehavedoneso.)Thusthereasonwhy'Socratesis

nature, had in common with one another. But that is the general identical' says nothing is that we have not given any adjectival

propositionalform. meaning to the word 'identical'. For when it appears as a sign for

5.471 The general propositional form is the essence of a proposi identity, it symbolizes in an entirely different waythe signifying

tion. relation is a different onetherefore the symbols also are entirely

different in the two cases: the two symbols have only the sign in

5.4711 To give the essence of a proposition means to give the es

common,andthatisanaccident.

senceofalldescription,andthustheessenceoftheworld.

5.474 The number of fundamental operations that are necessary

5.472Thedescriptionofthemostgeneralpropositionalformisthe

dependssolelyonournotation.

descriptionoftheoneandonlygeneralprimitivesigninlogic.

5.475 All that is required is that we should construct a system of

5.473Logicmustlookafteritself.Ifasignispossible,thenitisalso

signs with a particular number of dimensionswith a particular

capableofsignifying.Whateverispossibleinlogicisalsopermitted.

mathematicalmultiplicity.

(Thereasonwhy'Socratesisidentical'meansnothingisthatthereis

no property called 'identical'. The proposition is nonsensical be 5.476Itisclearthatthisisnotaquestionofanumberofprimitive

cause we have failed to make an arbitrary determination, and not ideas that have to be signified, but rather of the expression of a

because the symbol, in itself, would be illegitimate.) In a certain rule.

sense,wecannotmakemistakesinlogic. 5.5Everytruthfunctionisaresultofsuccessiveapplicationstoele

5.4731 Selfevidence, which Russell talked about so much, can be mentary propositions of the operation '(T)(E,....)'. This opera

come dispensable in logic, only because language itself prevents tionnegatesallthepropositionsintherighthandpairofbrackets,

everylogicalmistake.Whatmakeslogicaprioriistheimpossibility andIcallitthenegationofthosepropositions.

ofillogicalthought. 5.501Whenabracketedexpressionhaspropositionsasitsterms

5.4732Wecannotgiveasignthewrongsense. andtheorderofthetermsinsidethebracketsisindifferentthenI

indicateitbyasignoftheform'(E)'.'(E)'isavariablewhosevalues

5,47321Occam'smaximis,ofcourse,notanarbitraryrule,norone

aretermsofthebracketedexpressionandthebaroverthevariable

that is justified by its success in practice: its point is that unneces

indicatesthatitistherepresentativeofallitsvaluesinthebrackets.

sary units in a signlanguage mean nothing. Signs that serve one

(E.g.ifEhasthethreevaluesP,Q,R,then(E)=(P,Q,R).)Whatthe

purposearelogicallyequivalent,andsignsthatservenonearelogi

valuesofthevariableareissomethingthatisstipulated.Thestipu

callymeaningless.

lationisadescriptionofthepropositionsthathavethevariableas

5.4733 Frege says that any legitimately constructed proposition theirrepresentative.Howthedescriptionofthetermsofthebrack

musthaveasense.AndIsaythatanypossiblepropositionislegiti eted expression is produced is not essential. We can distinguish

matelyconstructed,and,ifithasnosense,thatcanonlybebecause threekindsofdescription:1.Directenumeration,inwhichcasewe

wehavefailedtogiveameaningtosomeofitsconstituents.(Even cansimplysubstituteforthevariabletheconstantsthatareitsval

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ues;2.Givingafunctionfxwhosevaluesforallvaluesofxarethe tooitismanifestthat'q:pCPp'saysthesamethingas'q',that'pC

propositions to be described; 3. Giving a formal law that governs Pq'saysnothing.

the construction of the propositions, in which case the bracketed 5.514Onceanotationhasbeenestablished,therewillbeinitarule

expressionhasasitsmembersallthetermsofaseriesofforms. governingtheconstructionofallpropositionsthatnegatep,arule

5.502 So instead of '(T)(E,....)', I write 'N(E)'. N(E) is the nega governing the construction of all propositions that affirm p, and a

tionofallthevaluesofthepropositionalvariableE. rulegoverningtheconstructionofallpropositionsthataffirmporq;

5.503Itisobviousthatwecaneasilyexpresshowpropositionsmay andsoon.Theserulesareequivalenttothesymbols;andinthem

beconstructedwiththisoperation,andhowtheymaynotbecon theirsenseismirrored.

structed with it; so it must be possible to find an exact expression 5.515Itmustbemanifestinoursymbolsthatitcanonlybeproposi

forthis. tionsthatarecombinedwithoneanotherby'C','.',etc.Andthisis

5.51IfEhasonlyonevalue,thenN(E)=Pp(notp);ifithastwoval indeed the case, since the symbol in 'p' and 'q' itself presupposes

ues,thenN(E)=Pp.Pq.(neitherpnorg). 'C','P',etc.Ifthesign'p'in'pCq'doesnotstandforacomplexsign,

thenitcannothavesensebyitself:butinthatcasethesigns'pCp',

5.511 How can logicallembracing logic, which mirrors the

'p. p', etc., which have the same sense as p, must also lack sense.

worldusesuchpeculiarcrotchetsandcontrivances?Onlybecause

Butif'pCp'hasnosense,then'pCq'cannothaveasenseeither.

they are all connected with one another in an infinitely fine net

work,thegreatmirror. 5.5151Mustthesignofanegativepropositionbeconstructedwith

that of the positive proposition? Why should it not be possible to

5.512 'Pp' is true if 'p' is false. Therefore, in the proposition 'Pp',

express a negative proposition by means of a negative fact? (E.g.

whenitistrue,'p'isafalseproposition.Howthencanthestroke'P'

supposethat"a'doesnotstandinacertainrelationto'b';thenthis

makeitagreewithreality?Butin'Pp'itisnot'P'thatnegates,itis

mightbeusedtosaythataRbwasnotthecase.)Butreallyevenin

ratherwhatiscommontoallthesignsofthisnotationthatnegate

thiscasethenegativepropositionisconstructedbyanindirectuse

p.Thatistosaythecommonrulethatgovernstheconstructionof

ofthepositive.Thepositivepropositionnecessarilypresupposesthe

'Pp','PPPp','PpCPp','Pp.Pp',etc.etc.(adinf.).Andthiscommon

existenceofthenegativepropositionandviceversa.

factormirrorsnegation.

5.52IfEhasasitsvaluesallthevaluesofafunctionfxforallvalues

5.513Wemightsaythatwhatiscommontoallsymbolsthataffirm

ofx,thenN(E)=P(dx).fx.

bothpandqistheproposition'p.q';andthatwhatiscommonto

all symbolsthat affirm eitherpor q istheproposition'pCq'.And 5.521 I dissociate the concept all from truthfunctions. Frege and

similarly we can say that two propositions are opposed to one an Russell introduced generality in association with logical productor

other if they have nothing in common with one another, and that logical sum. This made it difficult to understand the propositions

every proposition has only one negative, since there is only one '(dx).fx'and'(x).fx',inwhichbothideasareembedded.

propositionthatliescompletelyoutsideit.ThusinRussell'snotation

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5.522Whatispeculiartothegeneralitysignisfirst,thatitindicates 5.53IdentityofobjectIexpressbyidentityofsign,andnotbyusing

a logical prototype, and secondly, that it gives prominence to con a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of

stants. signs.

5.523Thegeneralitysignoccursasanargument. 5.5301 It is selfevident that identity is not a relation between ob

5.524 If objects are given, then at the same time we are given all jects. This becomes very clear if one considers, for example, the

objects.Ifelementarypropositionsaregiven,thenatthesametime proposition '(x) : fx. z. x = a'. What this proposition says is simply

allelementarypropositionsaregiven. thatonlyasatisfiesthefunctionf,andnotthatonlythingsthathave

acertainrelationtoasatisfythefunction,Ofcourse,itmightthen

5.525Itisincorrecttorendertheproposition'(dx).fx'inthewords,

besaidthatonlyadidhavethisrelationtoa;butinordertoexpress

'fxispossible'asRusselldoes.Thecertainty,possibility,orimpossi

that,weshouldneedtheidentitysignitself.

bilityofasituationisnotexpressedbyaproposition,butbyanex

pression's being a tautology, a proposition with a sense, or a con 5.5302Russell'sdefinitionof'='isinadequate,becauseaccordingto

tradiction. The precedent to which we are constantly inclined to it we cannot say that two objects have all their properties in com

appealmustresideinthesymbolitself. mon.(Evenifthispropositionisnevercorrect,itstillhassense.)

5.526Wecandescribetheworldcompletelybymeansoffullygen 5.5303Roughlyspeaking,tosayoftwothingsthattheyareidentical

eralizedpropositions,i.e.withoutfirstcorrelatinganynamewitha isnonsense,andtosayofonethingthatitisidenticalwithitselfis

particularobject. tosaynothingatall.

5.5261Afullygeneralizedproposition,likeeveryotherproposition, 5.531ThusIdonotwrite'f(a,b).a=b',but'f(a,a)'(or'f(b,b));and

iscomposite.(Thisisshownbythefactthatin'(dx,O).Ox'wehave not'f(a,b).Pa=b',but'f(a,b)'.

tomention'O'and's'separately.Theyboth,independently,standin 5.532AndanalogouslyIdonotwrite'(dx,y).f(x,y).x=y',but'(dx).

signifyingrelationstotheworld,justasisthecaseinungeneralized f(x, x)'; and not '(dx, y). f(x, y). Px = y', but '(dx, y). f(x, y)'. 5.5321

propositions.)Itisamarkofacompositesymbolthatithassome Thus,forexample,insteadof'(x):fxzx=a'wewrite'(dx).fx.z:(dx,

thingincommonwithothersymbols. y). fx. fy'. And the proposition, 'Only one x satisfies f( )', will read

5.5262 The truth or falsity of every proposition does make some '(dx).fx:P(dx,y).fx.fy'.

alteration in the general construction of the world. And the range 5.533Theidentitysign,therefore,isnotanessentialconstituentof

thatthetotalityofelementarypropositionsleavesopenforitscon conceptualnotation.

struction is exactly the same as that which is delimited by entirely 5.534 And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation

general propositions. (If an elementary proposition is true, that pseudopropositionslike'a=a','a=b.b=c.za=c','(x).x=x','(dx).

means,atanyrate,onemoretrueelementaryproposition.) x=a',etc.cannotevenbewrittendown.

5.535 This also disposes of all the problems that were connected

with such pseudopropositions. All the problems that Russell's

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'axiomofinfinity'bringswithitcanbesolvedatthispoint.Whatthe Moore,etc.)thesepropositionshaveactuallybeenconstruedinthis

axiomofinfinityisintendedtosaywouldexpressitselfinlanguage way.)

throughtheexistenceofinfinitelymanynameswithdifferentmean 5.542Itisclear,however,that'Abelievesthatp','Ahasthethought

ings. p',and'Asaysp'areoftheform'"p"saysp':andthisdoesnotin

5.5351 There are certain cases in which one is tempted to use ex volveacorrelationofafactwithanobject,butratherthecorrela

pressionsoftheform'a=a'or'pzp'andthelike.Infact,thishap tionoffactsbymeansofthecorrelationoftheirobjects.

penswhenonewantstotalkaboutprototypes,e.g.aboutproposi 5.5421Thisshowstoothatthereisnosuchthingasthesoulthe

tion, thing, etc. Thus in Russell's Principles of Mathematics 'p is a subject,etc.asitisconceivedinthesuperficialpsychologyofthe

proposition'whichisnonsensewasgiventhesymbolicrendering presentday.Indeedacompositesoulwouldnolongerbeasoul.

'pzp'andplacedasanhypothesisinfrontofcertainpropositionsin

5.5422 The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, 'A

ordertoexcludefromtheirargumentplaceseverythingbutpropo

makes the judgement p', must show that it is impossible for a

sitions. (It is nonsense to place the hypothesis 'p z p' in front of a

judgementtobeapieceofnonsense.(Russell'stheorydoesnotsat

proposition, in order to ensure that its arguments shall have the

isfythisrequirement.)

rightform,ifonlybecausewithanonpropositionasargumentthe

hypothesis becomes not false but nonsensical, and because argu 5.5423 To perceive a complex means to perceive that its constitu

mentsofthewrongkindmakethepropositionitselfnonsensical,so ents are related to one another in such and such a way. This no

that it preserves itself from wrong arguments just as well, or as doubtalsoexplainswhytherearetwopossiblewaysofseeingthe

badly,asthehypothesiswithoutsensethatwasappendedforthat figureasacube;andallsimilarphenomena.Forwereallyseetwo

purpose.) different facts. (If I look in the first place at the corners marked a

and only glance at the b's, then the a's appear to be in front, and

5.5352Inthesamewaypeoplehavewantedtoexpress,'Thereare

viceversa).

nothings',bywriting'P(dx).x=x'.Butevenifthiswereaproposi

tion, would it not be equally true if in fact 'there were things' but 5.55Wenowhavetoanswerapriorithequestionaboutallthepos

theywerenotidenticalwiththemselves? sible forms of elementary propositions. Elementary propositions

consistofnames.Since,however,weareunabletogivethenumber

5.54 In the general propositional form propositions occur in other

of names with different meanings, we are also unable to give the

propositionsonlyasbasesoftruthoperations.

compositionofelementarypropositions.

5.541Atfirstsightitlooksasifitwerealsopossibleforoneproposi

5.551Ourfundamentalprincipleisthatwheneveraquestioncanbe

tiontooccurinanotherinadifferentway.Particularlywithcertain

decidedbylogicatallitmustbepossibletodecideitwithoutmore

formsofpropositioninpsychology,suchas'Abelievesthatpisthe

ado. (And if we get into a position where we have to look at the

case'andAhasthethoughtp',etc.Foriftheseareconsideredsu

worldforananswertosuchaproblem,thatshowsthatweareona

perficially,itlooksasifthepropositionpstoodinsomekindofrela

completelywrongtrack.)

tion to an object A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell,

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5.552The'experience'thatweneedinordertounderstandlogicis 5.5561Empiricalrealityislimitedbythetotalityofobjects.Thelimit

not that something or other is the state of things, but that some alsomakesitselfmanifestinthetotalityofelementarypropositions.

thingis:that,however,isnotanexperience.Logicispriortoevery Hierarchiesareandmustbeindependentofreality.

experiencethatsomethingisso.Itispriortothequestion'How?' 5.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be

notpriortothequestion'What?' elementary propositions, then everyonewho understands proposi

5.5521Andifthiswerenotso,howcouldweapplylogic?Wemight tionsintheirCformmustknowIt.

put it in this way: if there would be a logic even if there were no 5.5563Infact,allthepropositionsofoureverydaylanguage,justas

world,howthencouldtherebealogicgiventhatthereisaworld? they stand, are in perfect logical order.That utterly simple thing,

5.553Russellsaidthatthereweresimplerelationsbetweendiffer whichwehavetoformulatehere,isnotalikenessofthetruth,but

ent numbers of things (individuals). But between what numbers? the truth itself in its entirety. (Our problems are not abstract, but

Andhowisthissupposedtobedecided?Byexperience?(Thereis perhapsthemostconcretethatthereare.)

nopreeminentnumber.) 5.557Theapplicationoflogicdecideswhatelementarypropositions

5.554Itwouldbecompletelyarbitrarytogiveanyspecificform. thereare.Whatbelongstoitsapplication,logiccannotanticipate.It

5.5541Itissupposedtobepossibletoanswerapriorithequestion isclearthatlogicmustnotclashwithitsapplication.Butlogichasto

whetherIcangetintoapositioninwhichIneedthesignfora27 beincontactwithitsapplication.Thereforelogicanditsapplication

termedrelationinordertosignifysomething. mustnotoverlap.

5.5542 But is it really legitimate even to ask such a question? Can 5.5571 If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there

wesetupaformofsignwithoutknowingwhetheranythingcancor are,thentheattempttodosomustleadtoobviousnonsense.5.6

respondtoit?Doesitmakesensetoaskwhattheremustbeinor Thelimitsofmylanguagemeanthelimitsofmyworld.

derthatsomethingcanbethecase? 5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its

5.555 Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions limits.Sowecannotsayinlogic,'Theworldhasthisinit,andthis,

quiteapartfrom their particularlogical forms.Butwhenthereisa but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were

system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is im excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it

portant for logic and not the individual symbols. And anyway, is it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world;

really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I foronlyinthatwaycoulditviewthoselimitsfromtheothersideas

can invent? What I have to deal with must be that which makes it well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot

possibleformetoinventthem. thinkwecannotsayeither.

5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary 5.62Thisremarkprovidesthekeytotheproblem,howmuchtruth

propositions.Wecanforeseeonlywhatweourselvesconstruct. there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct;

only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my

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world:thisismanifestinthefactthatthelimitsoflanguage(ofthat soul,withwhichpsychologydeals,butratherthemetaphysicalsub

languagewhichaloneIunderstand)meanthelimitsofmyworld. ject,thelimitoftheworldnotapartofit.

5.621Theworldandlifeareone.

5.63Iammyworld.(Themicrocosm.)

6.Thegeneralformofatruthfunctionis[p,E,N(E)].

5.631Thereisnosuchthingasthesubjectthatthinksorentertains

ideas.IfIwroteabookcalledTheWorldaslfoundit,Ishouldhave Thisisthegeneralformofaproposition.

toincludeareportonmybody,andshouldhavetosaywhichparts 6.001Whatthissaysisjustthateverypropositionisaresultofsuc

weresubordinatetomywill,andwhichwerenot,etc.,thisbeinga cessive applications to elementary propositions of the operation

methodofisolatingthesubject,orratherofshowingthatinanim N(E)

portant sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be men 6.002Ifwearegiventhegeneralformaccordingtowhichproposi

tionedinthatbook. tions are constructed, then with it we are also given the general

5.632Thesubjectdoesnotbelongtotheworld:rather,itisalimit form according to which one proposition can be generated out of

oftheworld. anotherbymeansofanoperation.

5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? 6.01Thereforethegeneralformofanoperation/'(n)is[E,N(E)]'(n)

Youwillsaythatthisisexactlylikethecaseoftheeyeandthevisual (=[n,E,N(E)]).Thisisthemostgeneralformoftransitionfromone

field. But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual propositiontoanother.

fieldallowsyoutoinferthatitisseenbyaneye. 6.02Andthisishowwearriveatnumbers.Igivethefollowingdefi

5.6331Fortheformofthevisualfieldissurelynotlikethis nitionsx=/0xDef.,/'/v'x=/v+1'xDef.So,inaccordancewiththese

5.634Thisisconnectedwiththefactthatnopartofourexperience rules,whichdealwithsigns,wewritetheseriesx,/'x,/'/'x,/'/'/'x,...,

isatthesametimeapriori.Whateverweseecouldbeotherthanit in the following way /0'x, /0+1'x, /0+1+1'x, /0+1+1+1'x,.... There

is.Whateverwecandescribeatallcouldbeotherthanitis.Thereis fore,insteadof'[x,E,/'E]',Iwrite'[/0'x,/v'x,/v+1'x]'.AndIgivethe

noaprioriorderofthings. followingdefinitions0+1=1Def.,0+1+1=2Def.,0+1+1+1=3

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are Def.,(andsoon).

followed out strictly, coincideswith purerealism.The selfofsolip 6.021Anumberistheexponentofanoperation.

sism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the 6.022Theconceptofnumberissimplywhatiscommontoallnum

realitycoordinatedwithit. bers,thegeneralform of a number. The concept of number is the

5.641Thustherereallyisasenseinwhichphilosophycantalkabout variablenumber.Andtheconceptofnumericalequalityisthegen

the self in a nonpsychological way. What brings the self into phi eralformofallparticularcasesofnumericalequality.

losophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical 6.03Thegeneralformofanintegeris[0,E,E+1].

self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human

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6.031Thetheoryofclassesiscompletelysuperfluousinmathemat tautology when combined in this shows that they possess these

ics. This is connected with the fact that the generality required in structuralproperties.

mathematicsisnotaccidentalgenerality. 6.1201Forexample,thefactthatthepropositions'p'and'Pp'inthe

6.1Thepropositionsoflogicaretautologies. combination '(p. Pp)' yield a tautology shows that they contradict

6.11Thereforethepropositionsoflogicsaynothing.(Theyarethe oneanother.Thefactthatthepropositions'pzq','p',and'q',com

analyticpropositions.) binedwithoneanotherintheform'(pzq).(p):z:(q)',yieldatautol

ogyshowsthatqfollowsfrompandpzq.Thefactthat'(x).fxx:z:

6.111 All theories that make a proposition of logic appear to have

fa'isatautologyshowsthatfafollowsfrom(x).fx.Etc.etc.

content are false. One might think, for example, that the words

'true' and 'false' signified two properties among other properties, 6.1202Itisclearthatonecouldachievethesamepurposebyusing

andthenitwouldseemtobearemarkablefactthateveryproposi contradictionsinsteadoftautologies.

tion possessed one of these properties. On this theory it seems to 6.1203Inordertorecognizeanexpressionasatautology,incases

be anything but obvious, just as, for instance, the proposition, 'All wherenogeneralitysignoccursinit,onecanemploythefollowing

roses are either yellow or red', would not sound obvious even if it intuitivemethod:insteadof'p','q','r',etc.Iwrite'TpF','TqF','TrF',

weretrue.Indeed,thelogicalpropositionacquiresallthecharacter etc. Truthcombinations I express by means of brackets, e.g. and I

isticsofapropositionofnaturalscienceandthisisthesuresignthat use lines to express the correlation of the truth or falsity of the

ithasbeenconstruedwrongly. whole proposition with the truthcombinations of its truth

6.112Thecorrectexplanationofthepropositionsoflogicmustas arguments, in the following way So this sign, for instance, would

signtothemauniquestatusamongallpropositions. representthepropositionpzq.Now,bywayofexample,Iwishto

examinethepropositionP(p.Pp)(thelawofcontradiction)inorder

6.113 It is the peculiar mark of logical propositions that one can

todeterminewhetheritisatautology.Inournotationtheform'PE'

recognize that they are true from the symbol alone, and this fact

iswrittenasandtheform'E.n'asHencethepropositionP(p.Pp).

contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic. And so too it is a

reads as follows If we here substitute 'p' for 'q' and examine how

very important fact that the truth or falsity of nonlogical proposi

theoutermostTandFareconnectedwiththeinnermostones,the

tionscannotberecognizedfromthepropositionsalone.

result will be that the truth of the whole proposition is correlated

6.12 The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows withallthetruthcombinationsofitsargument,anditsfalsitywith

theformallogicalpropertiesoflanguageandtheworld.Thefact noneofthetruthcombinations.

that a tautology is yielded by this particular way of connecting its

6.121 The propositions of logic demonstrate the logical properties

constituents characterizes the logic of its constituents. If proposi

ofpropositionsbycombiningthemsoastoformpropositionsthat

tionsaretoyieldatautologywhentheyareconnectedinacertain

say nothing. This method could also be called a zeromethod. In a

way,theymusthavecertainstructuralproperties.Sotheiryieldinga

logical proposition, propositions are brought into equilibrium with

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one another, and the state of equilibrium then indicates what the things.Anungeneralizedpropositioncanbetautologicaljustaswell

logicalconstitutionofthesepropositionsmustbe. asageneralizedone.

6.122 It follows from this that we can actually do without logical 6.1232Thegeneralvalidityoflogicmightbecalledessential,incon

propositions;forinasuitablenotationwecaninfactrecognizethe trastwiththeaccidentalgeneralvalidityofsuchpropositionsas'All

formalpropertiesofpropositionsbymereinspectionoftheproposi men are mortal'. Propositions like Russell's 'axiom of reducibility'

tionsthemselves. arenotlogicalpropositions,andthisexplainsourfeelingthat,even

6.1221If,forexample,twopropositions'p'and'q'inthecombina iftheyweretrue,theirtruthcouldonlybetheresultofafortunate

tion 'p z q' yield a tautology, then it is clear that q follows from p. accident.

Forexample,weseefromthetwopropositionsthemselvesthat'q' 6.1233 It is possible to imagine a world in which the axiom of re

followsfrom'pzq.p',butitisalsopossibletoshowitinthisway: ducibilityisnotvalid.Itisclear,however,thatlogichasnothingto

wecombinethemtoform'pzq.p:z:q',andthenshowthatthisisa dowiththequestionwhetherourworldreallyislikethatornot.

tautology. 6.124 The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the

6.1222Thisthrowssomelightonthequestionwhylogicalproposi world, or rather they represent it. They have no 'subjectmatter'.

tionscannotbeconfirmedbyexperienceanymorethantheycanbe Theypresupposethatnameshavemeaningandelementarypropo

refutedbyit.Notonlymustapropositionoflogicbeirrefutableby sitionssense;andthatistheirconnexionwiththeworld.Itisclear

any possible experience, but it must also be unconfirmable by any thatsomethingabouttheworldmustbeindicatedbythefactthat

possibleexperience. certaincombinationsofsymbolswhoseessenceinvolvesthepos

6.1223 Now it becomes clear why people have often felt as if it session of a determinate characterare tautologies. This contains

wereforusto'postulate'the'truthsoflogic'.Thereasonisthatwe the decisive point. We have said that some things are arbitrary in

canpostulatetheminsofaraswecanpostulateanadequatenota thesymbolsthatweuseandthatsomethingsarenot.Inlogicitis

tion. onlythelatterthatexpress:butthatmeansthatlogicisnotafield

inwhichweexpresswhatwewishwiththehelpofsigns,butrather

6.1224Italsobecomesclearnowwhylogicwascalledthetheoryof

oneinwhichthenatureoftheabsolutelynecessarysignsspeaksfor

formsandofinference.

itself. If we know the logical syntax of any signlanguage, then we

6.123Clearlythelawsoflogiccannotintheirturnbesubjecttolaws havealreadybeengivenallthepropositionsoflogic.

oflogic.(Thereisnot,asRussellthought,aspeciallawofcontradic

6.125Itispossibleindeedpossibleevenaccordingtotheoldcon

tionforeach'type';onelawisenough,sinceitisnotappliedtoit

ceptionoflogictogiveinadvanceadescriptionofall'true'logical

self.)

propositions.

6.1231 The mark of a logical proposition is not general validity. To

6.1251Hencetherecanneverbesurprisesinlogic.

be general means no more than to be accidentally valid for all

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6.126Onecancalculatewhetherapropositionbelongstologic,by 6.127 All the propositions of logic are of equal status: it is not the

calculatingthelogicalpropertiesofthesymbol.Andthisiswhatwe case that some of them are essentially derived propositions. Every

do when we 'prove' a logical proposition. For, without bothering tautologyitselfshowsthatitisatautology.

aboutsenseormeaning,weconstructthelogicalpropositionoutof 6.1271 It is clear that the number of the 'primitive propositions of

others using only rules that deal with signs. The proof of logical logic'isarbitrary,sinceonecouldderivelogicfromasingleprimitive

propositionsconsistsinthefollowingprocess:weproducethemout proposition, e.g. by simply constructing the logical product of

ofotherlogicalpropositionsbysuccessivelyapplyingcertainopera Frege's primitive propositions. (Frege would perhaps say that we

tionsthatalwaysgeneratefurthertautologiesoutoftheinitialones. should then no longer have an immediately selfevident primitive

(Andinfactonlytautologiesfollowfromatautology.)Ofcoursethis proposition.ButitisremarkablethatathinkerasrigorousasFrege

wayofshowingthatthepropositionsoflogicaretautologiesisnot appealedtothedegreeofselfevidenceasthecriterionofalogical

atallessentialtologic,ifonlybecausethepropositionsfromwhich proposition.)

theproofstartsmustshowwithoutanyproofthattheyaretautolo

6.13 Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirrorimage of the

gies.

world.Logicistranscendental.

6.1261 In logic process and result are equivalent. (Hence the ab

6.2Mathematicsisalogicalmethod.Thepropositionsofmathemat

senceofsurprise.)

icsareequations,andthereforepseudopropositions.

6.1262Proofinlogicismerelyamechanicalexpedienttofacilitate

6.21Apropositionofmathematicsdoesnotexpressathought.

therecognitionoftautologiesincomplicatedcases.

6.211 Indeed in real life a mathematical proposition is never what

6.1263Indeed,itwouldbealtogethertooremarkableifaproposi

wewant.Rather,wemakeuseofmathematicalpropositionsonlyin

tion that had sense could be proved logically from others, and so

inferencesfrompropositionsthatdonotbelongtomathematicsto

toocouldalogicalproposition.Itisclearfromthestartthatalogical

others that likewise do not belong to mathematics. (In philosophy

proof of a proposition that has sense and a proof in logic must be

thequestion,'Whatdoweactuallyusethiswordorthisproposition

twoentirelydifferentthings.

for?'repeatedlyleadstovaluableinsights.)

6.1264 A proposition that has sense states something, which is

6.22 The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the

shownbyitsprooftobeso.Inlogiceverypropositionistheformof

propositionsoflogic,isshowninequationsbymathematics.

aproof.Everypropositionoflogicisamodusponensrepresentedin

signs. (And one cannot express the modus ponens by means of a 6.23Iftwoexpressionsarecombinedbymeansofthesignofequal

proposition.) ity,thatmeansthattheycanbesubstitutedforoneanother.Butit

mustbemanifestinthetwoexpressionsthemselveswhetherthisis

6.1265 It is always possible to construe logic in such a way that

the case or not. When two expressions can be substituted for one

everypropositionisitsownproof.

another,thatcharacterizestheirlogicalform.

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ble negation. It is a property of '1 + 1 + 1 + 1' that it can be con themethodofsubstitution.Forequationsexpressthesubstitutabil

struedas'(1+1)+(1+1)'. ityoftwoexpressionsand,startingfromanumberofequations,we

6.232Fregesaysthatthetwoexpressionshavethesamemeaning advance to new equations by substituting different expressions in

but different senses. But the essential point about an equation is accordancewiththeequations.

that it is not necessary in order to show that the two expressions 6.241 Thus the proof of the proposition 2 t 2 = 4 runs as follows:

connectedbythesignofequalityhavethesamemeaning,sincethis (/v)n'x=/vxu'xDef.,/2x2'x=(/2)2'x=(/2)1+1'x=/2'/2'x=/1+

canbeseenfromthetwoexpressionsthemselves. 1'/1+1'x=(/'/)'(/'/)'x=/'/'/'/'x=/1+1+1+1'x=/4'x.6.3Theex

6.2321Andthepossibilityofprovingthepropositionsofmathemat plorationoflogicmeanstheexplorationofeverythingthatissubject

icsmeanssimplythattheircorrectnesscanbeperceivedwithoutits tolaw.Andoutsidelogiceverythingisaccidental.

being necessary that what they express should itself be compared 6.31Thesocalledlawofinductioncannotpossiblybealawoflogic,

withthefactsinordertodetermineitscorrectness. sinceitisobviouslyapropositionwithsense.Nor,therefore,can

6.2322Itisimpossibletoasserttheidentityofmeaningoftwoex itbeanapriorilaw.

pressions. For in order to be able to assert anything about their 6.32Thelawofcausalityisnotalawbuttheformofalaw.

meaning, I must know their meaning, and I cannot know their 6.321'Lawofcausality'thatisageneralname.Andjustasinme

meaningwithoutknowingwhetherwhattheymeanisthesameor chanics, for example, there are 'minimumprinciples', such as the

different. lawofleastaction,sotooinphysicstherearecausallaws,lawsof

6.2323 An equation merely marks the point of view from which I thecausalform.

consider the two expressions: it marks their equivalence in mean 6.3211 Indeed people even surmised that there must be a 'law of

ing. leastaction'beforetheyknewexactlyhowitwent.(Here,asalways,

6.233 The question whether intuition is needed for the solution of whatiscertainaprioriprovestobesomethingpurelylogical.)

mathematicalproblemsmustbegiventheanswerthatinthiscase 6.33Wedonothaveanaprioribeliefinalawofconservation,but

languageitselfprovidesthenecessaryintuition. ratheraprioriknowledgeofthepossibilityofalogicalform.

6.2331 The process of calculating serves to bring about that intui 6.34 All such propositions, including the principle of sufficient rea

tion.Calculationisnotanexperiment. son, tile laws of continuity in nature and of least effort in nature,

6.234Mathematicsisamethodoflogic. etc.etc.alltheseareaprioriinsightsabouttheformsinwhichthe

6.2341Itistheessentialcharacteristicofmathematicalmethodthat propositionsofsciencecanbecast.

it employs equations. For it is because of this method that every 6.341 Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form

propositionofmathematicsmustgowithoutsaying. onthedescriptionoftheworld.Letusimagineawhitesurfacewith

irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of pic

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description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply

squaremesh,andthensayingofeverysquarewhetheritisblackor withonesystemofmechanicsthanwithanother.

white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the de 6.343 Mechanics is an attempt to construct according to a single

scription of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have planallthetruepropositionsthatweneedforthedescriptionofthe

achievedthesameresultbyusinganetwithatriangularorhexago world.

nal mesh. Possibly the use of a triangular mesh would have made

6.3431 The laws of physics, with all their logical apparatus, still

thedescriptionsimpler:thatistosay,itmightbethatwecouldde

speak,howeverindirectly,abouttheobjectsoftheworld.

scribe the surface more accurately with a coarse triangular mesh

thanwithafinesquaremesh(orconversely),andsoon.Thediffer 6.3432Weoughtnottoforgetthatanydescriptionoftheworldby

ent nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. meansofmechanicswillbeofthecompletelygeneralkind.Forex

Mechanicsdeterminesoneformofdescriptionoftheworldbysay ample,itwillnevermentionparticularpointmasses:itwillonlytalk

ing that all propositions used in the description of the world must aboutanypointmasseswhatsoever.

be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositionsthe 6.35Althoughthespotsinourpicturearegeometricalfigures,nev

axiomsofmechanics.Itthussuppliesthebricksforbuildingtheedi erthelessgeometrycanobviouslysaynothingatallabouttheirac

fice of science, and it says, 'Any building that you want to erect, tual form and position. The network, however, is purely geometri

whatever it may be, must somehow be constructed with these cal;allitspropertiescanbegivenapriori.Lawsliketheprincipleof

bricks, and with these alone.' (Just as with the numbersystem we sufficientreason,etc.areaboutthenetandnotaboutwhatthenet

mustbeabletowritedownanynumberwewish,sowiththesys describes.

temofmechanicswemustbeabletowritedownanypropositionof 6.36Iftherewerealawofcausality,itmightbeputinthefollowing

physicsthatwewish.) way:Therearelawsofnature.Butofcoursethatcannotbesaid:it

6.342 And now we can see the relative position of logic and me makesitselfmanifest.

chanics.(Thenetmightalsoconsistofmorethanonekindofmesh: 6.361 One might say, using Hertt:'s terminology, that only connex

e.g. we could use both triangles and hexagons.) The possibility of ionsthataresubjecttolawarethinkable.

describing a picture like the one mentioned above with a net of a 6.3611 We cannot compare a process with 'the passage of time'

givenformtellsusnothingaboutthepicture.(Forthatistrueofall thereisnosuchthingbutonlywithanotherprocess(suchasthe

suchpictures.)Butwhatdoescharacterizethepictureisthatitcan workingofachronometer).Hencewecandescribethelapseoftime

bedescribedcompletelybyaparticularnetwithaparticularsizeof onlybyrelyingonsomeotherprocess.Somethingexactlyanalogous

mesh. Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of applies to space: e.g. when people say that neither of two events

Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world: but what (whichexcludeoneanother)canoccur,becausethereisnothingto

doestellussomethingaboutitistheprecisewayinwhichitispos causetheonetooccurratherthantheother,itisreallyamatterof

Page34of41

L.Wittgenstein,TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus(Gutenbergonlineedition)

ourbeingunabletodescribeoneofthetwoeventsunlessthereis the ancients is clearer in so far as they have a clear and acknowl

somesortofasymmetrytobefound.Andifsuchanasymmetryisto edgedterminus,whilethemodernsystemtriestomakeitlookasif

befound,wecanregarditasthecauseoftheoccurrenceoftheone everythingwereexplained.

andthenonoccurrenceoftheother. 6.373Theworldisindependentofmywill.

6.36111 Kant's problem about the right hand and the left hand, 6.374 Even if all that we wish for were to happen, still this would

which cannot be made to coincide, exists even in two dimensions. onlybeafavourgrantedbyfate,sotospeak:forthereisnological

Indeed,itexistsinonedimensionalspaceinwhichthetwocongru connexionbetweenthewillandtheworld,whichwouldguarantee

ent figures, a and b, cannot be made to coincide unless they are it, and the supposed physical connexion itself is surely not some

movedoutofthisspace.Therighthandandthelefthandareinfact thingthatwecouldwill.

completely congruent. It is quite irrelevant that they cannot be

6.375Justastheonlynecessitythatexistsislogicalnecessity,sotoo

madetocoincide.Arighthandglovecouldbeputonthelefthand,

theonlyimpossibilitythatexistsislogicalimpossibility.

ifitcouldbeturnedroundinfourdimensionalspace.

6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at

6.362Whatcanbedescribedcanhappentoo:andwhatthelawof

thesameplaceinthevisualfieldisimpossible,infactlogicallyim

causalityismeanttoexcludecannotevenbedescribed.

possible,sinceitisruledoutbythelogicalstructureofcolour.Letus

6.363 The procedure of induction consists in accepting as true the thinkhowthiscontradictionappearsinphysics:moreorlessasfol

simplestlawthatcanbereconciledwithourexperiences. lowsaparticlecannothavetwovelocitiesatthesametime;thatis

6.3631Thisprocedure,however,hasnologicaljustificationbutonly to say, it cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say,

apsychologicalone.Itisclearthattherearenogroundsforbeliev particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be

ingthatthesimplesteventualitywillinfactberealized. identical. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary

6.36311Itisanhypothesisthatthesunwillrisetomorrow:andthis propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction. The

meansthatwedonotknowwhetheritwillrise. statementthatapointinthevisualfieldhastwodifferentcoloursat

thesametimeisacontradiction.)

6.37Thereisnocompulsionmakingonethinghappenbecausean

otherhashappened.Theonlynecessitythatexistsislogicalneces 6.4Allpropositionsareofequalvalue.

sity. 6.41Thesenseoftheworldmustlieoutsidetheworld.Intheworld

6.371Thewholemodernconceptionoftheworldisfoundedonthe everythingisasitis,andeverythinghappensasitdoeshappen:init

illusion that the socalled laws of nature are the explanations of novalueexistsandifitdidexist,itwouldhavenovalue.Ifthereis

naturalphenomena. anyvaluethatdoeshavevalue,itmustlieoutsidethewholesphere

ofwhathappensandisthecase.Forallthathappensandisthecase

6.372 Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them

is accidental. What makes it nonaccidental cannot lie within the

as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past

ages.Andinfactbotharerightandbothwrong:thoughtheviewof

Page35of41

L.Wittgenstein,TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus(Gutenbergonlineedition)

world,sinceifitdiditwoulditselfbeaccidental.Itmustlieoutside present.Ourlifehasnoendinjustthewayinwhichourvisualfield

theworld. hasnolimits.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. 6.4312Notonlyistherenoguaranteeofthetemporalimmortality

Propositionscanexpressnothingthatishigher. ofthehumansoul,thatistosayofitseternalsurvivalafterdeath;

6.421Itisclearthatethicscannotbeputintowords.Ethicsistran but,inanycase,thisassumptioncompletelyfailstoaccomplishthe

scendental.(Ethicsandaestheticsareoneandthesame.) purpose for which it has always been intended. Or is some riddle

solvedbymysurvivingforever?Isnotthiseternallifeitselfasmuch

6.422Whenanethicallawoftheform,'Thoushalt...'islaiddown,

of a riddle as our present life? The solution of the riddle of life in

one'sfirstthoughtis,'AndwhatifIdo,notdoit?'Itisclear,how

space and time lies outside space and time. (It is certainly not the

ever,thatethicshasnothingtodowithpunishmentandrewardin

solutionofanyproblemsofnaturalsciencethatisrequired.)

the usual sense of the terms. So our question about the conse

quences of an action must be unimportant.At least those conse 6.432Howthingsareintheworldisamatterofcompleteindiffer

quences should not be events. For there must be something right enceforwhatishigher.Goddoesnotrevealhimselfintheworld.

about the question we posed. There must indeed be some kind of 6.4321Thefactsallcontributeonlytosettingtheproblem,nottoits

ethicalrewardandethicalpunishment,buttheymustresideinthe solution.

actionitself.(Anditisalsoclearthattherewardmustbesomething 6.44Itisnothowthingsareintheworldthatismystical,butthatit

pleasantandthepunishmentsomethingunpleasant.) exists.

6.423Itisimpossibletospeakaboutthewillinsofarasitisthesub 6.45Toviewtheworldsubspecieaeterniistoviewitasawholea

jectofethicalattributes.Andthewillasaphenomenonisofinter limitedwhole.Feelingtheworldasalimitedwholeitisthisthatis

estonlytopsychology. mystical.

6.43Ifthegoodorbadexerciseofthewilldoesaltertheworld,it 6.5 When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the

can alter only the limits of the world, not the factsnot what can questionbeputintowords.Theriddledoesnotexist.Ifaquestion

beexpressedbymeansoflanguage.Inshorttheeffectmustbethat canbeframedatall,itisalsopossibletoanswerit.

itbecomesanaltogetherdifferentworld.Itmust,sotospeak,wax

6.51Scepticismisnotirrefutable,butobviouslynonsensical,whenit

andwaneasawhole.Theworldofthehappymanisadifferentone

tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt

fromthatoftheunhappyman.

can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an

6.431 So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an answerexists,andanansweronlywheresomethingcanbesaid.

end.

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have

6.4311 Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience beenanswered,theproblemsofliferemaincompletelyuntouched.

death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration Ofcoursetherearethennoquestionsleft,andthisitselfisthean

buttimelessness,theneternallifebelongstothosewholiveinthe swer.

Page36of41

L.Wittgenstein,TractatusLogicoPhilosophicus(Gutenbergonlineedition)

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