HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.

BROOKS as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or

and KARL BECK, petitioners, fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means
vs. of committing the offense," which is described in the applications
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS Code."
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void,
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court
CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
Quezon City, respondents. were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners
in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
and Juan T. David for petitioners. papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction,
respondents. and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining Respondents-
CONCEPCION, C.J.: Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
margin1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
several judges2 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding
issued, on different dates, 3 a total of 42 search warrants against the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit: In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
showing all business transactions including disbursements regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and and seizures.
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary any one were invaded, they were the rights of
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants.
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded.
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7 been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with
authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the
aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an
residences of petitioners herein. alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the
personal defendants but
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein embraces only the corporation whose property was
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States,
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an petitioners herein.
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in petitioners herein.1wph1.t
their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this
it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of
the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the
evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult
to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it,
even though by legal means.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
None of these requirements has been complied with in the this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein offense."
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for
the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, business transactions including disbursement receipts,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts
performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein,
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
applications without reference to any determinate provision of the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
said laws or openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights
that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-
Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and
things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of
the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the
issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other
legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this
approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing
that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the
language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is
that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass
against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows
that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be
repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court
had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held
and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense,
the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to
be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. 20After reviewing
previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are
led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to
evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority,
inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as
without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter
of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the
time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held
that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition.
The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against
the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of
the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine
an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized
by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its
most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced
to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . .
..
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State
tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints
on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state
officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is
enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other
basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no
longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses
to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason
and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less
than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and,
to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter,
but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for
a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is
probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its
issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence
of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power,
for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power
of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in
Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches
304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are
effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so
include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed
courts of federal courts of the United States. 22 and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers pronouncement as to costs.
and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been
Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in It is so ordered.
the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of
June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach Sanchez, JJ., concur.
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and
amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court on
petitioners herein. this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of
the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners;
to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we
agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express
our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for
determination in appropriate cases in the future.
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are
therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the
authority of the said search warrants were consequently
illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs.
People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
 4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and
and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant
said residences is made permanent; and of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon
move for the suppression of the documents, papers and the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have the
effects seized in the places other than the three residences requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of
adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the other than their family residences.
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the
searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future." almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction and
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have
the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which I invariably regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the
am not in accord. Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare,
at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the
other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are
and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as
even the exacerbating passions and prejudices inordinately follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives
generated by the environmental political and moral developments "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or
of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying constructive of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the
down the law not only for this case but as well for future cases and "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the
future generations. All the search warrants, without exception, in sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely
this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing."
are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the
Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show
unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente, that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally,
things and effects seized from places other than their residences, to followed by the designation, "the President and/or General
my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants
the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three
warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or
"the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2, 1962).
The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually
made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under
the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to
bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as
persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of
their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend
of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of
which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to
the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to
the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on
December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it
his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the
security a man relies upon when he places himself or his
property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his
home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he
is protected from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And
when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk
drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be
secure from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable
seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not
tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers,
the purloining of the petitioner's private papers in Gouled, or
the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over
the years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts
in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either
foresee or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth
Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408
(December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
72 S. Ct. 93 (November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records
and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for
return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold
interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and
leasehold interests have been sufficiently set forth in their motion
for reconsideration and need not be recounted here, except to
emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for
practically all the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts;
Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard;
1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or
furnished such offices; or had paid for the filing cabinets in which
the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the
controlling stock of the corporations involved. The petitioners'
proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return
and suppression of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court
delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched
premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of
the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court said
(362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the
lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is
unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the
body of private property law which, more than almost any
other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those
distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See
Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying
out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305.
Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee,"
"invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not
be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately
referable to constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs.
United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to have
standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs. United
States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were
seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the
corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents
seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and
property, "either his own or the corporation's was entitled to
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure
were unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of
seized article and the suppression of the evidence so
obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either
the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary standing
to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But in MacDonald
vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined
by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest
may expect the shelter of the rooftree he is under against criminal
intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432
U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States,
362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step further.
Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but
the Court nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected
him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately
on premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant organizer,
sole stockholder and president of a corporation had standing in a
mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and
suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F
2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court conclude that the
defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he
had a sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he
had an adequate interest in the premises searched (just like in the
case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's
book and records. Looking to Jones, the court observed:
 Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify
one as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been
precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and
seizure of the corporation's books and records merely
because the appellant did not show ownership or possession
of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest
in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two
notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment; the
defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that
several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The
Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files
in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed
to the custodian of his files. The Government contended that the
petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the
subpoena was directed against the custodian. The court rejected
the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as
not to enable the question of unreasonable search and
seizure to be escaped through the mere procedural device of
compelling a third-party naked possessor to produce and
deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily
directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States
vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant
had stored with an attorney certain files and papers, which
attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing
of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of
the records at his home in the country and on a farm which,
according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and
business papers together with corporate books and records of
certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at
bar). Nevertheless, the search in Birrell was held invalid by the
court which held that even though Birrell did not own the premises
where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the
return of all the papers and properties seized. The court, relying
on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp.
870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in
question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell.
The only person suggested in the papers as having violated
the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the
records as having been used "in committing a violation of
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the
mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search
warrant was captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell
M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership,
gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even
before Jones. (p. 199)
 If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices, warehouses
possession of the records stored with Dunn, it matters not and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d applications filed in securing the void search warrants and (b)
498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
(1951). categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully
seized papers, documents and things are personal/private of the
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision. lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately
The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the effecting the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate
papers were seized from premises not petitioners' family And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the
residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY DIRECTED petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
of documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
search. In the case at bar, the petitioners connection with the mentioned in the void search warrants.
premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent not criminal in origin or nature.
that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal
capacity or under their personal control.

Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should

order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether
from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or
places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in
their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to
the petitioners.

If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and

things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila,
Branch 33 and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P.
Fernandez, Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D.
Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano D. Valencia for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied the petitioner's
motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20
April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier
order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of
the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
(WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search
warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION
OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of
the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his
application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged,
among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient
reasons to believe that NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be
found at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines,
Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control
or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and
ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be
used as the means of committing an offense which the said
NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the
following premises of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military
Science and Tactics at the ground floor and
other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio
Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other
rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it
to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant
should be issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of
the law to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court
the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio
C. Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a
"Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to
before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles declared,
inter alia, as follows:
Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw,
the applicant for a Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and
Special Action Division, Western Police
District.
Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines at Anonas St.,
Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject
of our surveillance and observation during the
past few days.
 Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in
the said premises is kept the following
properties subject of the offense of violation
of PD No. 1866 or intended to be used as a
means of committing an offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after
examining under oath applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW
and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES that there are good
and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta.
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, properties which are subject of the
above offense or intended to be used as the means of
committing the said offense.

c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons
with ammunitions?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person
or persons who has or have control of the
above-described premises?
A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente,
President of the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines.
Q: How do you know that said property is
subject of the offense of violation of Pres.
Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as
the means of committing an offense?
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
at any time in the day or night of the premises of
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more particularly
(a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics
at the ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b)
office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor, and forthwith
seize and take possession of the following personal
properties, to wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.

A: Sir, as a result of our continuous and bring the above described properties to the
surveillance conducted for several days, we undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
gathered information from verified sources
that the holder of said firearms and On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant
explosives as well as ammunitions aren't was enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre,
licensed to possess said firearms and Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8
ammunition. Further, the premises is a school Commander.
and the holders of these firearms are not
students who were not supposed to possess In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a
firearms, explosives and ammunition. member of the searching team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a
cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a bulging brown
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately
Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the pertinent portions of which read as follows: wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a)
one (1) pc.M33 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.
M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live); and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423 The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as
Fragmentation hand grenade (live). such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness based on mere hearsay. 16
was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search
warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground
describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific that it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No. within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based
19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5 Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente
"has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described
The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." On
and Legal Affairs Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had the other hand, in his supporting deposition, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles
filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he filed a supplemental motion to declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days,
quash. 8 they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the
said fire arms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, denying words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the
9

the petitioner's motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the
motion for reconsideration 10 was likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
April 1988. information from other sources or persons.

Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major
decided a question of substance in a manner not in accord with law or Dimagmaliw stated that he verified the information he had earlier
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, or that the respondent Judge received that petitioner had in his possession and custody the t there is
gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction, in nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant
issuing the disputed orders. verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion
that he found such information to be a fact. He might have clarified this
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is point if there had been searching questions and answers, but there were
to be determined personally by the judge, after examination under oath or none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. 12 The probable cause must be in connection with one specific What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the
offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally only support to P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and is based on hearsay. For, it avers that they (presumably, the police
under oath, the complainant and any witness he may produce, on facts authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several days of the
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information
together with any affidavits submitted. 14 from verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and
explosives are not licensed to possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as
determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant required by the Rules of Court. As held in Roan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere
or in a supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that
and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath it was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the form of searching questions and answers." On the contrary, the questions
personal knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As
and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent
person whom one considers to be reliable. Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent in
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a
Angeles, in his deposition, do not come up to the level of facts of his general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid
personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held liable search warrant."
for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned
search warrant. Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites,
applying for a search warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the
person whom I consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by warrant the supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live
him in connection with his activities as a money lender, challenging fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the
usurious rate of interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
insufficient for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search
there had been a report to the affiant by a person whom lie considered warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are
reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent books, correspondence and stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the
records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of issuing individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both
a search warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of meaningful and effective.
P/ Major Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that
search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case: it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that
there were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within PUP.
the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the application for search warrant
probable cause. and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched as the
premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As observed by
Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of respondent Judge: 24
the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the
Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative
other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be with the title of PD 1866 can only mean that illegal
searched sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives, have
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so
there were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP. much so that the second and third are forthrightly species of
illegal possession of firearms under Section (1) thereof It
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the has long been a practice in the investigative and
ground that it was issued in violation of the rule that a search warrant can prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime
be issued only in connection with one specific offense. The search warrant of illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued without explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.' The
any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does
when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses. not recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal
possession of firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, Where the warrants involved were issued upon
23
ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of
applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named explosives. Neither is the filing of three different
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court held that no the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts
specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, is to file a single information for illegal possession of
and that it would be a legal hearsay of the highest order to convict firearms and ammunitions. This practice is considered to be
anybody of a "Violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, in accordance with Section 13, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules
Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without reference to any on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A complaint or
determinate provision of said laws and codes. information must charge but one offense, except only in
those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was punishment for various offenses. Describably, the servers
captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, did not search for articles other than firearms, ammunitions
etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is
in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is
etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to therefore valid and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)
ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the
explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the
particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered
gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular
possession of firearms is penalized under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:
illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it
cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws 3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays,
on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of
possession of items destructive of life and property are related offenses or and acted upon by any judge of the court having jurisdiction
belong to the same species, as to be subsumed within the category of of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
 shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the
satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely
provides for a guideline, departure from which would not necessarily affect
the validity of an otherwise valid search warrant.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search
Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to

Ricardo Y. Abando, a member of the searching team, were seized in the
washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP, are ordered delivered to the
Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 101216-18 June 4, 1993 CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, SONIA DICHOSO y VINERABLE
and JAIME PAGTAKHAN y BICOMONG, accused.
REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for accused-appellant.
while that in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91) states:
That on or about February 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo,
Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver,
give way (sic) to another and distribute dried marijuana
fruiting tops, leaves and seeds, a dangerous drug, without
being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

DAVIDE, JR., J.: Accused Jaime Pagtakhan was charged with illegally possessing a
regulated drug (shabu) and, thus, violating Section 16, Article III of the
Accused Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag appeals from the 11 June 1991 Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, in an information which was docketed
Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City in as Criminal Case No. 6710-SP (91) in the court a quo.
Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case No. 6712-SP
(91) 1 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Accused Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because, in the
Article III and Section 4, Article II, respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act words of the trial court, she "cannot be located." The records do not show
4

of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, and sentencing him in each of the that the trial court took further steps to have her arrested.
said cases to suffer the penalty of "reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit." The three (3) cases were consolidated for joint trial in Branch 30 of the
RTC of San Pablo City and trial proceeded as against accused Jaime
The informations in the above criminal cases were filed against Redentor Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso after the two had entered a plea of not
Dichoso and his wife Dichoso y Vinerable on 8 March 1991. guilty upon arraignment. NARCOM agents S/Sgt. Iluminado Evangelista,
Sgt. Fabian Gapiangao, CIC Rolando Bisenio and P/Maj. Rosalinda Royales,
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP the forensic chemist, testified for the prosecution. Accused Redentor
(91) reads as follows: Dichoso and Jaime Pagtakhan, as well as barangay captain Francisco
Calabia, testified for the defense. The latter identified a Sinumpaang
That on about February 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Salaysay in which he denounced the veracity of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D"
5

Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this and his signatures therein.
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver, follows:
give way (sic) to another and distribute 1.3 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) and 6 decks On February 22, 1991, the Narcotics Command of the 4th
of aluminun foil of shabu, a regulated drug without being Regional Unit stationed at Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo
authorized by law. City applied for a search warrant to be issued on the house
of spouses Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso located at
Farconville Subd., Phase II, San Pablo City. After searching
questions on the applicant and his deponent the Court was
satisfied that there existed probable cause to believe that
indeed said spouses were keeping, selling and using an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(sic) (shabu) and marijuana in said residence. Consequently,
Search Warrant No. 028 was issued by the Court (Exhibit
"A").
On February 23, 1991, (Saturday) at about 2:00 P.M. at the
local NARCOM stationed at Interior M. Paulino St., San Pablo
City, T/Sgt. Iluminado Evangelista, the local District
Commander organized a team to serve Search Warrant No.
028 upon the spouses Redentor Dichoso and Sonia Dichoso
residing at Farconville Subd., Phase II, San Pablo City.
Evangelista, the team leader, was with S/Sgt. Fabian
Gapiangao, Sgt. Antonio Tila, CIC Rolando Besinio, Police
Officer Michael Exconde and a driver. Upon approaching said
residence the team met an old man and Evangelista
introduced himself and his companions as Narcom agents
duly armed with a search warrant. Evangelista asked for
Redentor and Sonia and the old man opened the gate into
the Dichoso compound for the Narcom Agents. The old man
led them to the Nipa house where inside Redentor, Jaime
Pagtakhan and two other persons were sitting near a small
table with suspected shabu and paraphernalia on top
thereof. Taken aback the foursome did not move.
Evangelista told them that they were Narcom agents, and
that they should not make any move and they had with
them a search warrant to serve. He then asked Sgt. Tila, a
team member, to fetch for the barangay chairman (sic). In
the meantime Evangelista served a copy of the search
warrant to Redentor. After about 15 to 20 minutes Chairman
Francisco Calabia arrived and was met by Evangelista who
forthwith showed him a copy of the said warrant. Calabia
read the search warrant and explained the contents thereof
to Redentor.
Thereafter, the search ensued inside the nipa house.
Evangelista discovered 200 grams more or less of suspected
marijuana wrapped in plastic inside a cabinet which was
standing on the right side upon entering the door of the
nipa house. Likewise discovered by him inside the cabinet
are six (6) decks of suspected shabu wrapped in an
aluminun foil and the "Golden Gate" notebook (Exhibit F)
containing the list of suspected customers of dangerous and
regulated drugs together with the corresponding quantity
and prices. From Pagtakhan's right hand, Evangelista
recovered a small quantity of suspected shabu.
Then, the search was shifted to the main house of the
Dichosos. However, the search produced negative results.
Evangelista instructed Besinio to collect the confiscated
items recovered at the nipa house of the Dichosos. Besinio
separately wrapped the items whereupon he and Gapiangao
made markings on the same. Besinio also put the names of
Redentor and Sonia inside some of the pages of Exhibit "F".
The team then got from the main house a plastic bag where
all the confiscated items were put. Besinio sat in a corner of
the nipa house and prepared in his own handwriting the
PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit "B") attesting to the result of the
search conducted by the NARCOM team listing thereon the
different confiscated items, another PAGPAPATUNAY (Exhibit
"C") attesting to the lawful manner the search was
conducted, and the Receipt (Exhibit "D"), all dated February
23, 1991. Said exhibits were alternately given to Calabia
who read the contents thereof before voluntarily affixing his
signatures thereon. Then, he explained to Redentor and
Pagtakhan the contents of said exhibits. Afterwhich,
Redentor likewise voluntarily affixed his signatures thereon.
(Exhibits B-1, C-1 and D-3). Pagtakhan also affixed his
signatures on Exhibit "B" and "D" opposite the items
confiscated in his possession by Evangelista. A certain
Angelito Ancot affixed his signature on Exhibits B and C also
as witness. Redentor was then given a copy each of Exhibits
B, C and D (Exhibits B-4, C-4 and D-4). Subsequently,
Calabia and the Narcom team left the Dichoso residence.
Said team brought with them for further investigation at
their headquarters Redentor, Pagtakhan and the two other
persons found inside the nipa house. Said two other persons
who were later known to be a certain "Jun" and a certain
Bayani Salamat were set free by the Narcom after having
convinced the investigators that they were innocent visitors
 or house guests of Redentor. Evangelista prepared a letter
addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Vicente Lim,
Calamba, Laguna, requesting examination of the
confiscated drugs. At about 9:50 P.M. of that same day
accused Redentor and Pagtakhan executed their separate
waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with
the assistance of counsel (Exhibits "J" and "K").
On February 25, 1991 (Monday) the Narcom made a return
of the search warrant and inventory to the Court (Exhibit E).
On February 26, 1991 (Tuesday) Besinio handcarried the
confiscated items to the PNP Crime Laboratory (Exhibits "L"
and "L-2") for examination. That same day P/Major
Rosalinda L. Royales, Forensic Chemist concluded, after
qualitative examination, that the one (1) transparent plastic
bag containing 1.3 grams of suspected methamphetamine
hydrochloride (sic) (shabu) placed in a plastic bag with
markings and the six (6) foils containing 0.3 grams of
suspected metamphetamine hydrochloride (sic) (shabu)
wrapped in a foil and placed in a plastic bag with markings
gave positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(sic) (shabu). Additionally, the one (1) aluminum foil
containing 0.02 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(sic) (shabu) placed in a plastic bag with markings as
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby
renders judgment in Criminal Case No. 6710-SP finding
JAIME PAGTAKHAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged in the Information, hereby sentences him to
suffer the straight penalty of Six (6) years and one (1)
of prision mayor and to pay the costs. In case he files an
appeal, the bailbond for his provisional liberty is hereby
fixed at double the amount of his present bailbond.
In Criminal Cases Nos. 6711-SP and 6712-SP, the Court
hereby renders judgment finding accused REDENTOR
DICHOSO y DAGDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged in the Informations, hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and the
costs of suit. 8
Acting upon the ex-parte motion of the Assistant City Prosecutor, the trial
court, in its Order of 25 June 1991, 9clarified the sentence imposed on
accused Dichoso by declaring that the sentence of reclusion
perpetua refers to each of the two (2) cases against him, and amended
the decision by inserting the words "in each case" after the words "to
suffer" and before the words "the penalty" in the decretal portion thereof.
Accused Redentor Dichoso filed a Notice of Appeal. 10

confiscated from Pagtakhan gave positive results for

methamphetamine hydrochloride [sic] (shabu) and the one The records does not disclose that accused Jaime Pagtakhan appealed
(1) light green plastic bag containing 103.7 grams of from the decision. The transmittal letter of the clerk of court of the RTC,
suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops, crushed leaves and dated 7 August 1991, does not make any reference to Criminal Case No.
seeds wrapped in a newspaper gave positive results for 6710-SP(91) and its original record was not forwarded to this Court. 11
marijuana (Exhibits M, series). 6
Nevertheless, the docket section of this Court entered in the docket the
On 17 June 1991, the trial court promulgated its decision, 7 dated 11 June three (3) criminal cases in the court below and numbered them as G.R.
1991, finding Jaime Pagtakhan and Redentor Dichoso guilty as charged. Nos. 101216-18, erroneously including in the cover of the rollo the name
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: of Jaime Pagtakhan as an accused-appellant.

On the basis of the evidence on record, the Court finds that In the Appellant's Brief filed on 5 February 1992, 12 accused Redentor
Redentor Dichoso violated Section 15, Article III and Section Dichoso, henceforth referred to as the Appellant, urges this Court to
4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Also, it is the finding reverse the decision because the trial court erred in:
of the Court that Jaime Pagtakhan violated Section 16 of
said Act. Both of them should be made to suffer the I. . . . NOT QUASHING SEARCH WARRANT NO. 028 AND
consequences of their unlawful acts. DISMISSING THE CASE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
 II. . . . CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF released without being interrogated. To bolster his claim, appellant cites
ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND/OR PLANTED EVIDENCE. the testimony of Barangay Captain Calabia that the search which yielded
the shabu, marijuana and drug paraphernalia was conducted even before
III. . . . ADMITTING PROSECUTION'S EXHIBITS B, C AND D his arrival, that when he arrived, the seized articles were already on the
WITHOUT THE ACCUSED BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL. table, and that the appellant was already handcuffed. Calabia also
assailed the veracity of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D".
IV. . . . CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS OF
EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that (1) Exhibit "B"
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the result of the search conducted by the
NARCOM team and listing the items confiscated), (2) Exhibit "C"
V. . . . COMPLETELY DISREGARDING ACCUSED'S EVIDENCE (a "Pagpapatunay" attesting to the lawful manner of the search), and (3)
THAT THE LAND AND NIPA HUT FROM WHERE THE Exhibit "D" (the Receipt for Property Seized) are inadmissible in evidence
PROHIBITED, REGULATED (sic) AND SETS OF since he signed them while under police custody without having been
PARAPHERNALIAS (sic) WERE ALLEGEDLY CONFISCATED accorded his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. These
BELONG TO ANOTHER PERSON. 13 exhibits, he argues, constitute uncounselled extrajudicial confessions.

In support of the first and second assigned errors which are jointly
discussed, appellant contends that Search Warrant No. 028, obtained and
executed by the NARCOM agents, is a general warrant because it was
issued for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 as amended" and did not specify the particular offense which he
violated under the said law, contrary to the requirements prescribed by
the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that it was issued in violation
of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." It was, he asserts,
issued for three (3) possible offenses, viz.: (a) illegal possession of
marijuana dried leaves, (b) illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and (c) illegal possession of opium pipe and other
paraphernalia for prohibited drug. He then argues, following this Court's
ruling in Stonehill vs. Diokno 14 which condemned general warrants and
barred the admission of any evidence obtained by virtue thereof, that the
articles seized from the nipa house could not be used as evidence against
him and be made the basis of his conviction.
Appellant further claims that he was framed by the police officers. He
states that a certain Jun planted the deck of shabu found on the table
where he and his companions were gathered around. Jun allegedly placed
the shabu there after asking permission to use it, then he went out to
meet Sgt. Evangelista and the members of the NARCOM team outside the
house. Jun purportedly did not return to the hut anymore, leaving his
friend Bayani Salamat behind. Appellant and Jaime Pagtakhan were also
allegedly handcuffed immediately, while Salamat was not and was, in fact,
In his fourth assignment of error, appellant alleges that he cannot be
convicted for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, for unlawfully selling,
delivering and giving away to another, and distributing 1.3 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and dried marijuana leaves, fruit
tops and seeds since he was not caught "in flagrante." He posits the view
that in the light of the definition of "delivering" and "selling" in Section 2 of
the Act, only the overt acts of unlawfully selling, delivering, dispensing,
transporting and distributing prohibited and regulated drugs are
punishable under Sections 4 and 15 of the said Act, respectively. He points
out that according to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, mere intention is
not a crime. He further argues that Exhibit "F" cannot be a basis for his
conviction because (1) the alleged transactions mentioned therein are
undetermined and could refer to a loan, chattel mortgage or sale, but not
to the dispensing and delivering of shabu and marijuana as the lower
court presumed; (2) the names of Redentor Dichoso of "Redy Dichoso" and
Sonia Dichoso appearing in the said notebook were entered or written by
CIC Orlando Besinio himself, and without such entry, there is nothing
therein which would associate it with the appellant; and (3) it is
inadmissible in evidence because it is not among the items particularized
in the search warrant. He concludes this assigned error with a claim that
the trial court erred in holding that a considerable quantity of shabu and
marijuana was found in his residence because 1.3 grams of shabu and six
(6) decks of aluminum foil of shabu can by no means be characterized as
"considerable," especially taking into account his admission that he
sometimes uses shabu.
In his last assigned error, appellant asserts that the nipa house and the lot
where it is located do not belong to him but to his brother, Abner Dichoso,
hence, the search conducted therein was unconstitutional and illegal and
the items obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Appellee, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, refutes the arguments
raised by the appellant and prays that We affirm the assailed decision.
We shall now pass upon the assigned errors and the arguments adduced
in support thereof.
On the validity of the search warrant: In its entirety, the search warrant in
question reads as follows:
possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried
marijuana leaves and Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias (sic) stored inside the
nipa hut within the compound of their residence at
Farconville Sub., Phase II, San Pablo City which should be
seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
at reasonable hour of the day or night of the premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of
the above-stated marijuana leaves, shabu and sets of
paraphernalias (sic) and bring the same to the undersigned
to be dealt with as the law directs.

Republic of the Philippines Witness my hand this 22nd day of February, 1991, at San
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Pablo City.
4th Judicial Region, Branch 30
San Pablo City (SGD.) J.
AUSBERTO B.
People of the Philippines, JARAMILLO, JR.
Plaintiff, (TYP) J.
AUSBERTO B.
-versus- SEARCH WARRANT No. 028 JARAMILLO, JR.
Judge 15
REDENTOR DICHOSO -for-
and SONIA DICHOSO It is clear that the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general search
of Farconville Sub., VIOLATION OF RA 6425 warrant because while it is for "Violation of RA 6425 known as the
Phase II, San Pablo known as the "Dangerous "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1992 as amended," the body thereof, which is
City, Drugs Act of 1972" as amended controlling, particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and specifies the offense involved, viz., illegal possession of
Respondents. marijuana and shabu and paraphernalia in connection therewith. These
are evident from the clause, "are illegally in possession of undetermined
SEARCH WARRANT quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalias stored inside the nipa
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW: hut within the compound of their residence at Farconville Sub., Phase II,
San Pablo City."
G r e e t i n g s:
Appellant's contention that the search warrant in question was issued for
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
examining under oath, T/Sgt. Iluminada S. Evangelista and Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
his witness Marlon Alcayde that there is probable cause to suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
believe that the above-named defendants are illegally in marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search
warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following
this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law
that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
"prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for
the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
In Olaes vs. People, 16 which was cited by the Solicitor General, We
sustained a search warrant similarly captioned and rejected the argument
of the petitioner therein that it was a general warrant, thus:
The petitioners claim that the search warrant issued by the
respondent judge is unconstitutional because it does not
indicate the specific offense they are supposed to have
committed. There is, therefore, according to them, no valid
finding of probable cause as a justification for the issuance
of the said warrant in conformity with the Bill of Rights. In
support of this argument, they cite Stonehill v. Diokno,
where Chief Justice Concepcion struck down the search
warrants issued therein for being based on the general
allegation that the petitioners had committed violations of
"Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code." . . .
xxx xxx xxx
We have examined the search warrant issued in the instant
case and find it does not come under the strictures of the
Stonehill doctrine. In the case cited, there was a bare
reference to the laws in general, without any specification of
the particular sections thereof that were alleged to have
been violated out of the hundreds of prohibitions contained
in such codifications. There is no similar ambiguity in the
instant case.
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states
that it is in connection with "Violation of RA 6425, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," it is clearly
recited in the text thereof that 'There is probable cause to
believe that Adolfo Olaes alias "Debie" and alias "Baby" of
No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in
their possession and control and custody of marijuana dried
stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations
which is the subject of the offense stated above." Although
the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding
for probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the "place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
The rationale We laid down in Prudente vs. Dayrit 17 holds true in the
instant case. There, We upheld the validity of a search warrant assailed as
having been allegedly issued for more than one (1) offense since it did not
contain any reference to any particular provision of P.D. No. 1866 that was
violated, when allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses. We said:
In the present case, however, the application for search
warrant was captioned: "For violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.)." While the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case
was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms,
etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term, "etc."
referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the
search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal
possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of
the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD
No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call
for its invalidation on this score.
Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized
under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot be
overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various
laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of
life and property are related offenses or belong to the same
 species, as to be subsumed within the category of illegal RECEIPT RECEIVED" in Exhibit "D." By such descriptive words, appellant
possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. . . . was in fact made to admit that he is the owner of the articles seized
(Exhibit "B"), the house searched (Exhibit "C") and the articles inventoried
We, therefore, agree with the Solicitor General that the search warrant in in the receipt (Exhibit "D"). Thus, while it may be true that the appellant
question contains fatal infirmity that may justify its invalidation. was not asked specific questions regarding the vital issue of ownership,
Bisenio obtained an admission from the former through the said exhibits.
Since Search Warrant No. 028 is valid, the articles seized by virtue of its This was a clever way of circumventing the aforesaid Constitutional rights
execution may be admitted in evidence. Consequently, the trial committed to counsel and to remain silent. Admittedly, at the time Bisenio prepared
no error in denying the appellant's motion to quash the said warrant and the exhibits, the appellant was already in the effective custody of the
refusing to dismiss the informations filed against him. NARCOM agents deprived in a significant way of his freedom of action. The
preparation of the exhibits substituted, for all legal intents and purposes,
Frame-Up: This Court rejects the appellant's claim that he was framed. the custodial interrogation.
This defense requires strong and convincing evidence because of the
presumption that the law enforcement agents acted in the regular There was no need of requiring the appellant to sign documents similar to
performance of their official duties. 18 Appellant failed to rebut this Exhibits "B" and "C." As to Exhibit "D," which is the receipt for property
presumption. He did not even attempt to prove that the NARCOM agents seized, it is a document required by Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of
who obtained the search warrant, conducted the search and recovered the Court to be given by the seizing officer to the lawful occupant of the
prohibited drugs had motives other than to enforce the law and stem the premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made. It is true
menace of drug addiction and trafficking which has already reached an that in People vs. Olivares, 23 We made the following statements:
alarming level and has spawned a network of incorrigible, cunning and
dangerous operations. 19 It may be stressed here that the defense of Exhibits "A" and "L" which identically show the specimen
frame-up can be easily fabricated and the accused in drugs cases almost signatures, are also admissible. These documents are part
always take refuge in such a defense. 20 and parcel of a mandatory and normal procedure followed
by the apprehending and seizing police officers. In these
Furthermore, as correctly noted by the Solicitor General, appellant's claim three Exhibits, the accused-appellant did not give any
of a frame-up only concerns the deck of shabu allegedly taken out of the statement against his own interest. The mere signing of
pocket of one Jun who asked for and was readily permitted by the documents did not amount to Olivares' subjection to a
appellant to use shabu on that occasion. It does not concern, much less custodial investigation wherein an accused is required to
explain, the origin of the other prohibited drugs and paraphernalia seized give statements about his involvement in the offense and
during the search. wherein the right to be informed of his rights to silence and
to counsel would otherwise be invoked. (People v. Rualo,
Admissibility of Exhibits "B," "C" and "D": There is merit to the appellant's 152 SCRA 635 [1987]). Guilt is proved by other evidence.
claim that Exhibits "B," "C" and "D" partake of the nature of uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions made while under the custody of the NARCOM Yet, as explicitly indicated therein, Olivares "did not give any statement
agents and, therefore, violative of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 against his own interest," unlike in the case of the appellant whose name
Constitution. 21 These exhibits are not "simply inventories or receipts of Bisenio described as the owner.
articles seized from appellant" as the appellee wants this Court to
believe. 22 A clearer examination thereof shows that CIC Rolando Bisenio, Nevertheless, the above discussions do not alter the result of this appeal.
who prepared them, deliberately wrote, in bold letters below the name As correctly stated by the appellee, these exhibits were not appreciated by
REDENTOR D. DICHOSO (over which the appellant was made to sign) the the trial court as extrajudicial confessions but merely as proof that the
words "MAY-ARI" in Exhibit "B" and "MAY-ARI BAHAY" in Exhibit "C," while articles therein enumerated were obtained during the search which, by the
the word "OWNER" is printed below the sub-heading "COPY OF THE
way, was sufficiently established by the testimonies of the NARCOM and his family have been using the nipa house as a resting place even
agents independently of the said exhibits. before the search. 29

Seizure of Exhibit "F": It is contended by the appellant that Exhibit "F," the Any doubt as to the appellant's control over the nipa house where the
brown notebook containing the entries of names and figures, should not seized articles were recovered is wiped out by the testimony of the
have been admitted in evidence because it was not one of those defense's own witness, Francisco Calabia, who affirmed that the appellant
specifically mentioned in the warrant, hence, its seizure was unjustified. and his wife Sonia Dichoso actually reside therein while Redentor's parents
This so-called warrant rule that only those listed in the search warrant and brother reside in the big house. 30
may be seized which the appellant claims to have been enunciated in
1920 in Uy Khetin vs. Villareal. 24 and which he now summons to his And now to the culpability of the appellant. He contends that he could not
rescue, is not without exceptions. Among such exceptions is the plain view be held guilty under Section 15, Article III (for unlawful sale of shabu) and
doctrine enunciated in Harris vs. United States 25 and Coolidge vs. New under Section 4, Article II (unlawful sale of marijuana) of the Dangerous
Hampshire 26 which has been adopted in our jurisdiction. 27 Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case No. 6712-
SP(91), respectively, because he was not caught in the act of selling or
In Harris, the Federal Supreme Court of the United States of America ruled: delivering shabu and marijuana, and that the finding of guilt against him
was based solely on Exhibit "F" which, according to the trial court,
It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view "contains conclusive proof of Redentor's unlawful business of selling shabu
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have and marijuana to customers, which included Pagtakhan and Bayani
that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in Salamat."
evidence. Ker v. California, 374 US 23, 42-43, 10 L ed 2nd
726, 743, 83 S Ct 1623 (1963); United States v. Lee, 274 US After a careful review and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court
559, 71 L ed 2nd 1202, 47 S Ct 746 (1927); Hestor v. United finds that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a
States, 265 US 57, 68 L ed 2d 898, 44 S Ct 445 (1924). conviction for unlawful sale of shabu in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91)
and for unlawful sale of marijuana in Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91).
We are not, however, inclined to rule that the foregoing exception applies There is, however, overwhelming evidence which establishes with moral
to this case, for the reason that the search warrant was not for unlawful certainty the guilt of the appellant for illegal possession of shabu and
sale of shabu or marijuana but for unlawful possession thereof as shall be marijuana under Section 16, Article III and Section 8, Article II,
hereinafter discussed and that the notebook per se is not an article respectively, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
possession of which is illegal or criminal. Exhibit "F" proves neither sale
nor possession. In convicting the appellant as charged, the trial court relied mainly on
Exhibit "F", which it considered as "conclusive proof" of the appellant's
Ownership of the House Searched: The view of the appellant that the drug pushing, and the ruling in People vs. Toledo. 31 It said:
search was illegal and the articles seized thereby cannot be used against
him in evidence since he does not own the nipa house searched or the lot Redentor may claim that no evidence exists to show that he
wherein it was built, is unmeritorious. It is not necessary that the property was drug pushing i.e., selling, delivering, giving way (sic) to
to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the another and distributing shabu and marijuana. The Court is
search warrant is issued; it is sufficient that the property is under his not convinced. Exhibits "F" among other things was found
28
control or possession. It was established, even by the defense's own inside his nipa house where, according to Calabia, the said
evidence, that the appellant and his spouse have been using the said nipa spouses reside. Redentor exercised control and custody of
house. He admitted that the nipa house is actually part of and adjacent to Exhibit F. He is commonly referred to by his nickname
the big or main house in the Dichoso residential compound, and that he "Redy" which incidentally appears in some pages of Exhibits
F. Pagtakhan, on the other hand, answers to the nickname
 "Jimmy" which also appears in Exhibit F. Bayani Salamat,
one of the companion (sic) of Redentor inside the nipa
house at the time the Narcom agents arrived, also appears
to be a customer of Redentor (see pages 2 and 3 reverse
side of page 5, Exhibits "F"). Redentor, according to
Pagtakhan, is called for (sic) his nickname "Redy". That
name appears on Exhibit F (see pages 2, 3, 4, and 5,
thereof). The Court finds and so holds that Exhibit F contains
conclusive proof of Redentor's unlawful business of selling
shabu and marijuana to customers which includes
Pagtakhan and Bayani Salamat. . . .. Furthermore, there is a
considerable quantity of shabu and marijuana taken by the
Narcom agents from the residence of Redentor which
strongly indicates an intention of the part of Redentor to
sell, distribute and deliver said dangerous and regulated
drugs without being authorized by law (People vs. Toledo,
140 SCRA 259). 32
We find, however, that the conclusions drawn from Exhibit "F" are merely
conjectural. For one, the prosecution did not attempt, and thus failed, to
prove that the handwritten entries therein were made by the appellant. It
could have easily done so by presenting, in accordance with the Rules,
either a handwriting expert or an ordinary witness familiar with the
handwriting of the appellant. 33 There is, as well, no competent proof that
the said entries refer to transactions regarding shabu or marijuana and
that the figures appearing therein pertain to prices of dangerous drugs.
The facts in the instant case do not warrant the application of People vs.
Toledo, 34 which the trial court and the appellee cited as authority. While in
that case, this Court stated that the possession of a considerable amount
of a prohibited drug (three (3) plastic bags of marijuana) coupled with the
fact that the accused was not a user of the prohibited drug, indicate
nothing except the intention to sell and distribute it, the conviction
of Toledo for violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended, was not based on that ground alone, but on the accused's
extrajudicial confession, held to be valid and admissible, wherein he
disclose the details of his transactions of buying and selling marijuana by
narrating how and from whom he bought the three (3) plastic bags of
marijuana found in his possession, to whom he would sell it, and for how
long he had been engaged in pushing prohibited drugs. In the instant
case, appellant disclaims ownership of Exhibit "F" and avers that the
names Redentor and Sonia Dichoso written on several pages thereof were
actually written by prosecution witness CIC Orlando Bisenio. 35 Other than
exhibit "F," there is no evidence of sale, delivery, distribution or
transportation of prohibited drugs by the appellant.
The other case cited by the appellee, People vs. Claudio, 36 is of no help to
the prosecution. In that case, the accused was convicted of the violation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425 for her act of transporting marijuana and not of
selling or delivering the same, thus:
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no
recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be
convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the
subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which is
penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and
transportation of prohibited drugs. Claudio was caught
transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did
not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4. 37
In a prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, what is material is the proof
that the selling transaction transpired coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence, 38 and that to sustain a conviction
for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and unmistakably
established. 39
In the case at bar, not a single witness of the prosecution, not even Sgt.
Evangelista, claims to have seen the appellant sell or deliver shabu or
marijuana to anybody. Although Sgt. Evangelista testified that he was sold
by his civilian informer or agent that the latter was able to buy shabu from
and was offered marijuana by the appellant, the said civilian informer, who
was presented by the NARCOM when it applied for a search warrant, was
not presented in court during the trial of the cases below.
The unlawful sale of shabu or marijuana must be established by
unequivocal and positive evidence. 40
There is no doubt, however, that the appellant is guilty of unlawful
possession of shabu under Section 16, Article III and unlawful possession
of marijuana under Section 8, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, in Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Criminal Case
No. 6712-SP (91), respectively. The crime of unlawful possession of shabu,
a regulated drug, under Section 16 is necessarily included in the crime of of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, in
unlawful sale thereof under Section 15. Similarly, the crime of unlawful Criminal Case No. 6711-SP (91) and Section 8 of Article II of the said Act in
possession of marijuana under Section 8 is necessarily included in the Criminal Case No. 6712-SP (91). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
crime of unlawful sale of marijuana under Section 4 of the Act. 41 Law, he is hereby sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years as minimum to twelve (12)
The appellant cannot evade liability for illegal possession of dangerous years as maximum, and to pay a fine of Twelve Thousand Pesos
drugs by his admission that he sometimes uses shabu. Section 30 of R.A. (P12,000.00).
No. 6425, which provides that a drug dependent who voluntarily submits
himself for confinement, treatment and rehabilitation in a center, shall not Costs against the accused-appellant.
be criminally liable for any violation of Section 8 and Section 16 of the law,
does not apply to the appellant because occasional "use" of a dangerous SO ORDERED.
drug is not the same as "drug dependence" which is defined as "a state of
psychic or physical dependence, or both, on a dangerous drug, arising in a
person following administration or use of that drug on a periodic or
continuous basis." 42 Throughout the trial of the case below, the appellant,
whose petition for bail due to health reasons was denied, he has not been
shown to be a drug dependent and even if he was, indeed, a drug
dependent, he did not voluntarily submit himself for rehabilitation as
required by the law.

On the contrary, appellant's admission during the trial that he used shabu
"once in a while" 43 only helps ensure his conviction for violation of Section
16 of the Dangerous Drugs Act because the unauthorized use of a
regulated drug like shabu is one of the acts punishable under the said
section.

The penalty for illegal possession of regulated drugs like shabu is

"imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos." 44 The same
penalty is provided for illegal possession of marijuana, a prohibited
drug. 45 The Indeterminate Sentence Law 46 should, however, be applied. It
provides that in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by a
law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the minimum term of which shall
not be less than the minimum fixed by law and the maximum of which
shall not exceed the maximum term prescribed by the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision of the

Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, dated 11 June 1991, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6711-SP (91) and 6712-SP (91) is hereby modified. As
modified, accused-appellant REDENTOR DICHOSO y DAGDAG is hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III
[G.R. No. 132371. April 9, 2003] case. Inside the case were three (3) pieces of small transparent plastic
sachets containing suspected shabu (Exhibit B-2), some sniffing
paraphernalias such as improvised burner, tooter (Exhibit B-6), scissors
(Exhibit B-8), eight (8) strips of aluminum foil (Exhibit B-5), plastic sachets
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANILO SIMBAHON y with residue (Exhibit B-3), and empty plastic sachets (Exhibit B-4). After
QUIATZON, appellant. the search, an inventory receipt (Exhibit G) of the items seized from the
house of the suspects was prepared and, together with an affidavit of
DECISION orderly search (Exhibit H), was signed by Danilo Simbahon; that the three
accused were then arrested and brought to the precinct for
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: investigation. The ammunitions recovered were sent to the Firearms and
Explosive Unit, Camp Crame, Quezon City, to determine their identities
On April 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 23, and on September 22, 1995 and August 6, 1996, certifications were issued
issued Search Warrant No. 95-100,[1] commanding the search in the by said office to the effect that accused Maricar Morgia and Danilo
premises of 771 Roxas Street, Sampaloc, Manila, owned by appellant Simbahon were not licensed/registered firearm/ammunitions holders of
Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. any kind and caliber. The other evidence recovered were brought to the
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, National Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination and were
and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession of found to be positive for shabu and marijuana as evidenced by Exhibit E.
firearms.
For his part, Danilo Simbahon denied the allegations against him and gave
The search led to the prosecution and conviction of appellant for his version of the incident as follows:
violation of Section 8, Article III of RA 6425 by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 95-142514.
That in the early morning of April 23, 1995, he was sleeping, together with
The facts as narrated by the trial court are as follows: his wife and children, in one of the rooms in their house located at No. 771
Roxas Street, Sampaloc, Manila, when some male persons who introduced
Stripped of their immaterialities, the prosecutions evidence tends to themselves as police officers but were not in uniform forcibly pushed open
establish that about 3:00 oclock in the early morning of April 23, 1995, the door of their house and just barged in; that all of them were herded by
police operatives, together with the chairman of the barangay which had the police officers to the sala from their room but he and his wife, Charito,
jurisdiction over the place, and a member of media, served Search were not aware if something was indeed taken from the other rooms; that
Warrant No. 95-100, Exhibit F, issued by Hon. Judge William Bayhon on thereafter they were all brought, together with another female companion,
April 22, 1995, upon Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito to the headquarters and he (Simbahon) was investigated but despite his
Mangulabnan at their residence at No. 771 Roxas Street, Sampaloc, request, the investigation was not reduced into writing. Simbahon denied
Manila, that although at first they were met with slight resistance, the that a leather bag containing the evidence marked as Exhibits B-1 to B-11
team nevertheless gained entry into the house and, rounding up all the and a belt bag with six (6) live ammunitions were found under their bed
occupants found therein, herded them to the sala. Thereafter, they began claiming that they have no bed in their room as they were sleeping only
conducting a search of all the rooms in accordance with the search on the floor. He admitted, however, that they were shown a document or
warrant; that in the room occupied by live-in partners Danilo Simbahon paper by the police officers but the same was never handed to him inspite
and Charito Mangulabnan, the police officers found under the bed a brick of his request and that one of the policemen also showed them a taped
of dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana, weighing 856.8 grams, package saying that it was recovered from the room of Maricar Morgia but
wrapped in a newspaper and placed inside a plastic (Exhibit C) and a black the contents of the taped package were never shown to them despite
bullet pouch containing six (6) live ammunitions, while in the room demands. He likewise stated that the only reason he was charged by the
occupied by Maricar Morgia, the operative recovered a green plastic pencil police was he refused to accede to their demand of P20,000.00 in
case containing nine (9) pieces of small transparent sachets with white exchange for his release.
[2]

crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (Exhibit B-1) and five (5)

pieces of .38 caliber live ammunitions. When lastly the living room was Separate informations were filed against Danilo Simbahon, Charito
searched, the policemen found therein a red and black synthetic Mangulabnan, and Maricar Morgia for violation of RA 6425, as amended,
and PD 1866, as amended, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEARCH
Branch 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 95-142512 to 95-142515. WARRANT NO. 95-100 WAS VALID.
The three accused were arraigned on June 2, 1995 and respectively
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, upon motion of the prosecution, the III
charges against Charito Mangulabnan were dismissed on the ground that
she had no participation in the crimes charged against her. [3] The cases WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
were then consolidated and jointly tried against Danilo Simbahon and DISCRETION IN FAILING TO SUSPEND THE APPELLANTS ARRAIGNMENT
Maricar Morgia. After trial, the court a quo rendered a decision, the AFTER GRANTING A REINVESTIGATION.
dispositive portion of which states:
IV
WHEREFORE, for the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused Maricar Morgia y Mangulabnan on evidence beyond reasonable WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN
doubt, both in Criminal Case No. 95-142512 and in Criminal Case No. 95- FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH CONDUCTED PRIOR
142513, she is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges against her in the above TO THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE APPELLANT.
mentioned criminal cases. The warrant of arrest issued against her dated
November 15, 1995 is hereby ordered recalled. Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he was
caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the brick of marijuana
Likewise, for failure also of the prosecution to prove the guilt of accused flowering tops. He cites the testimony of SPO2 Nelson Estuaria that he
Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon beyond reasonable doubt, said accused is never admitted ownership or possession of the seized items, particularly
hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him in Criminal Case No. 95- the marijuana, and that the same could belong to any one of the
142515. occupants of the house that was searched.[5]
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the positive
However, the Court is convinced that there is proof beyond reasonable testimony of SPO2 Nelson Estuaria that marijuana was found inside the
doubt that accused Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon committed the crime room of accused-appellant prevails over his mere denial.[6]
charged against him in Criminal Case No. 95-142514 thereby finding him
guilty thereof and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion In all prosecutions for violation of The Dangerous Drugs Act, the
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) existence of the dangerous drug is condition sine qua non for
and to pay the cost. conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime.[7]
We find that the prosecutions evidence on the identification of the
xxxxxxxxx
marijuana allegedly seized from appellant is demonstrably weak,
unreliable and unconvincing. The prosecution failed to identify that the
SO ORDERED.[4] marijuana presented in court was the very same marijuana allegedly
seized from appellant.[8] Such failure to identify the corpus delicti of the
In view of the imposition of the penalty of reclusion crime charged against the appellant or to establish the chain of custody
perpetua, appellant interposed this direct appeal raising the following cannot but inure to the detriment of the prosecutions case. [9] SPO2 Nelson
issues: Estuaria testified in this wise:
I FISCAL SULIDUM:
Q What happened after you have searched the room of Danilo
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
Simbahon?
PROSECUTION PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 8 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 Witness
(1972).
A I found several specimens, maam.
II FISCAL SULIDUM:
 Q I am showing to you a brick of flowering tops dried leaves of
marijuana, will you please tell this Honorable Court what is
the relation of this brick of marijuana to the marijuana which
you recovered from the room of Danilo Simbahon?
Witness
A This is the same brick of marijuana, maam.
FISCAL SULIDUM:
Q How do you know that this marijuana was recovered from the
room of Danilo Simbahon?
Witness
A It was marked by the investigator, maam.
COURT:
Q How about you, did you put your own marking in order to
identify that this was recovered from the room of Danilo
Simbahon?
Witness
A None, Your Honor. I did not put my marking.
COURT:
Q Where is the marking that were marked by the investigator?
Witness
A I could not find the marking, Your Honor.[10]
The prosecutions failure to explain why the markings were no longer
on the bricks of marijuana leaves is certainly damaging to its case. The
prosecution must ensure that the item presented in court is the very same
item seized from an accused in order to discourage tampering with the
evidence. Its failure to do so, therefore, raised serious doubt as to
appellants guilt.
Considering that in criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is days from today.
necessary to establish the guilt of an accused, similarly, unwavering
exactitude in the identification of the corpus delicti is necessary. Every fact GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT, this 20 th day of April,
necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond 1995 in Manila, Philippines.
reasonable doubt.[11]
More importantly, this case should be dismissed on the ground of
manifest violations of the constitutional right of the accused against illegal
search and seizure. While appellant may be deemed to have waived his
right to question the legality of the search warrant and the admissibility of
the evidence seized for failure to raise his objections at the opportune
time,[12] however, the record shows serious defects in the search warrant
itself which render the same null and void.[13]
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court are entitled to
respect absent any indication that it overlooked certain facts or
circumstances of weight and influence which, if considered, would alter
the result of the case.[14] In this case, we find that the trial court
overlooked defects in Search Warrant No. 95-100, to wit: [15]
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under
oath SPO1 Bayani Corpuz Agulan and his witness, that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of Section 15 and 16, Article
III of RA 6425, as amended, and violation of PD 1866 has been committed
or is about to be committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to
believe that DANILO SIMBAJON @ Danny Pilay, CHARITO MANGULABNAN @
Chato and MARICAR MORGIA @ Caycay has in his possession the
following: (Emphasis provided)
Undetermined amount of methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu,
regulated drugs;
Packaging/sniffing paraphernalia such as weighing scale, plastic
sachet/bags, tooters, aluminum foils, burner, scissor and knife;
.38 caliber revolver unlicensed firearm
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the
day or night of the premises including the ground floor, the second floor
and in all floors and rooms therein above-mentioned and forthwith seize
and take possession of the above-mentioned properties subject of the
offense and bring to this Court said properties and persons to be dealt
with as the law direct. You are further directed to submit return with in (10)
(sgd.) WILLIAM M. BAYHON
Executive Judge
 The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant No. 95-100 show Costs de oficio.
that it was issued for more than one offense for violation of RA 6425 and
for violation of PD 1866. In Tambasen v. People, et al., it was held: SO ORDERED.

On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more
than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects
the violation of two special laws: P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of
firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-
Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a scatter-shot
warrant and totally null and void.[16]

Likewise, the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with

sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of a place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. [17] The constitutional
requirement is a description which particularly points to a definitely
ascertainable place, so as to exclude all others. In the case at bar, only the
application for search warrant[18] contained the address of the place to be
searched. The search warrant issued by the court merely referred to
appellants residence as premises, without specifying its address. The
Constitution and the Rules of Court limit the place to be searched only to
those described in the warrant.[19] The absence of a particular description
in the search warrant renders the same void.
Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant
issued for the search of appellants house. The seizure by the police
officers conducting the search of articles not described in the search
warrant was beyond the parameters of their authority under the search
warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires that a
search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.
[20]
Neither can the admissibility of such seized items be justified under the
plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were found not
inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous
search under the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a plastic
bag. In People v. Musa,[21] the marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents was
declared inadmissible because the said drugs were contained in a plastic
bag which bore no indication of its contents.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged against him. He is ordered immediately
released unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause.
G.R. No. 156413. April 14, 2004] 03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer transactions without
the corresponding payment of Documentary Stamps and Capital
ARIEL C. VALLEJO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Gains Tax.
Former SPECIAL FIFTEENTH DIVISION, JUDGE ISAAC R. DE
ALBAN, Regional trial Court, Ilagan, Isabela, Branch 16, and all of which documents are being used or intended to be used in the
FRANKLIN M. JAVIER, NBI Head Agent, Cagayan Valley commission of a felony that is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under
Regional Office II, Ilagan, Isabela, respondents. Article 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-
Graft) and are hidden or being kept in the said office.
DECISION
This application is founded on a confidential information received by the
CALLEJO SR., J.: undersigned, a peace officer, on information which I have personally
investigated and founded as follows: The Office of the Registry (sic) of
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Deeds of Isabela is keeping and hiding Fake Land Titles, and embezzling or
Rules of Court, as amended, to review and reverse the Resolution [1] of the stealing from the government thru non-payment of Capital Gains Tax and
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 24265 dismissing the petitioners petition Documentary Stamps.
as well as its Resolution dated November 28, 2002 denying the motion to
admit petition for certiorari. That upon the facts above-stated, I have caused to believe and verily
believe that the said Office of the Registry (sic) of Deeds located at the
Factual Antecedents Provincial Capital, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela and/or in the said Office of the
Registry (sic) of Deeds the above-described documents are hidden and
The petitioner is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the province of kept.
[2]

Isabela. On February 16, 2000, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)

Agent, Franklin M. Javier, filed a sworn application for search warrant On the same date, Presiding Judge Isaac R. de Alban issued Search
before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan, Isabela, Branch 16, worded as Warrant No. 2000-03 against the petitioner, thusly worded:
follows:
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
COMES NOW the undersigned HEAD AGENT of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Cagayan Valley Regional Office Ilagan, Isabela hereby GREETINGS:
requests that a Search Warrant be issued on the Office of the Registry (sic)
of Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the purpose of seizing the It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under
following documents, to wit: oath NBI Head Agent Franklin M. Javier and his witness that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that Falsification of Land Titles under Art.
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES, Official Receipts 171, Revised Penal Code, Article 213, RPC and R.A 3019 (Anti-Graft) has
in the Cashiers Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Our Primary been committed or is about to be committed and that there are good and
Entry Book under no. 496 and other pertinent documents related sufficient reasons to believe that the Registry (sic) of Deeds, Provincial
therewith; Capitol, Alibagu, Ilagan, Isabela has in its possession and control the
following:
02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every
table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds; 1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in
the Cashiers Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry
Book under No. 496 and other pertinent documents related Respondent Franklin M. Javier, for and in behalf of the NBI, filed his
therewith; comment on the petition where he alleged his version of the facts as
follows:
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every
table of employees of the Registry (sic) of Deeds; 4.1 On 08 December 1999, the undersigned received a tip-off (i.e. from
the respondent himself, ATTY. ARIEL VALLEJO) about the presence of fixers
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without who were allegedly submitting to him fake titles;
the corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of
documentary Stamps. 4.2 The undersigned together with other operatives of the Cagayan Valley
Regional Office (CAVRO) NBI, Isabela, Ilagan, conducted surveillance and
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the entrapment operations to confirm the veracity of reported, (sic) As a result
day or night of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize and thereof, the fixer was later apprehended in flagrante delicto and was
take possession of the above mentioned documents/subject of the offense subjected to investigation together with other employees of the Register
and bring to this court said documents and persons to be dealt with as the of Deeds of Ilagan, Isabela;
law may direct. You are further directed to submit return within 10 days
from today.[3] 4.3 Thereafter a certain, MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, a clerk assigned at the
Register of Deeds of Isabela, volunteered to provide CAVRO operatives
On February 17, 2000, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the vital information and later on turned witness considering her knowledge of
search warrant, which the trial court denied in its Order dated February 29, the scheme being used by corrupt employees assigned at the said office;
2000. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order on
the ground that the questioned search warrant was in the form of a 4.4. On 16 February 2000, after confirming information relayed to us by
general warrant for failure to describe the persons or things to be seized witness MS. REMEDIOS BIRI, the undersigned applied for a search warrant
and was violative of the Constitution; hence, null and void. The motion against the Office of the Register of Deeds, Ilagan, Isabela for Falsification
was, likewise, denied for lack of merit. of Public Document under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The
respondent presiding Judge HON. ISAAC DE ALBAN of the Regional Trial
On May 4, 2000, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and prayed that Court, Branch 16, Isabela, Ilagan finding the existence of probable cause
the entire record of the case be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The case issued Search Warrant No. 2000-03;
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 24265.
4.5 On 16 February 2000, operatives of CAVRO headed by the undersigned
In a Resolution dated September 6, 2000, the appellate court served aforecited search warrant. Found and seized inside the premises of
dismissed the petitioners appeal as follows: the Register of Deeds if Ilagan, Isabela were several fake titles/documents;
On 2 March 2000, a Return of the search warrant was made informing the
The appealed order denying a motion to quash the search warrant is respondent presiding judge of its positive findings;
[5]

interlocutory and not appealable. Accordingly, the appeal is

hereby DISMISSED. (Rule 41, Sec. 1 (c); Rule 50, Sec. 1 (i) and Sec. Respondent Javier asserted that contrary to the position of the
2, 2nd paragraph, in relation to Rule 124, Sec. 18, Revised Rules of petitioner, the things to be seized were particularly described in the
Court). questioned warrant. Furthermore, considering the volume of the
documents to be seized, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to provide
SO ORDERED.[4] the court with the technical descriptions of all the official receipts and the
titles, including the reference number or mark of the documents. To
The petitioner filed a motion to admit petition for certiorari on August require such task is to render the application of the search warrant nil, as
29, 2000 before the Court of Appeals. no such search warrant could be granted. According to respondent Javier,
there was no way that the court could determine with precision the exact Hence, the instant petition.
details of the things to be seized. The law does not require that the things
to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as to leave The Petitioners Arguments
no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. [6] Respondent
Javier also posited that the article Judicial Form No. 39 known as the The petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed grave
Primary Entry Book could not or would not have been mistaken for any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
other documents; similarly the Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the committing the following:
drawer of every table of employees of the Register of Deeds clearly
indicates the documents to be seized.[7] A. DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON
THE RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT HON. COURT OF
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion in its Resolution APPEALS DISMISSING PETITIONERS APPEAL ON THE
dated November 28, 2002 on the following grounds: RESPONDENTS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS ORDER DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO QUASH SEARCH WARRANT;
First. We earlier dismissed movants appeal because it was a wrong choice
of remedy to assail an order denying a motion to quash the search B. DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO ADMIT PETITION FOR
warrant. Movant himself has conceded that: CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, SEEKING TO CORRECT THE ERROR OF JURISDICTION
the relief that was resorted to by your appellant from the denial of his COMMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS
motion to quash search warrant subject of the case was under the imports THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
of an ordinary appeal and that it was not the proper remedy under the AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING
premises. PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO
Second. Movants petition for certiorari under rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of QUASH SEARCH WARRANT;
Civil Procedure purportedly to cure the procedural defect he incurred
cannot be countenanced. He admitted that his petition was filed beyond C. FAILING TO APPRECIATE AND CONSIDER SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
the reglementary period. The correct dismissal of an appeal becomes a ON PETITIONERS APPEAL OR CASE, AND BY REASON OF THIS
final judgment of the appellate court after the lapse of 15 days from FAILURE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS SERIOUSLY INJURED AND
service of a copy thereof upon the accused or his counsel. MADE SUBSERVIENT TO THE TECHNICALITY OF THE RULES;

Third. Movant cannot simultaneously or alternately resort to a petition for D. FAILING TO ACT UPON PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
review under Rule 45 (ordinary appeal) and/or petition for certiorari under AND MAKE A RULING ON THE MATTER OF THE PATENT NULLITY
Rule 65 (special civil action). They are mutually exclusive remedies having OF THE SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT
different legal grounds for their availment. Thus, the dismissed appeal REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT IN ITS EXECUTION EXTREME
cannot be incorporated with movants petition for certiorari which should PREJUDICE RESULTED AND THAT BY REASON FOR WHICH
have been first resorted to upon denial of his motion to quash and RELIEF IS EXTREMELY URGENT;[9]
docketed as a special civil action (SP).
According to the petitioner, by its failure to consider the petition on
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for reconsideration and the motion to admit the merits, the Court of Appeals allowed technicality rather than
petition for certiorari are DENIED for lack of merit. substantial justice to prevail, considering that the issue involved is a
constitutional right, no less than the right of one to be secure against
SO ORDERED.[8] unreasonable searches and seizures.
 The petitioner claims that in the implementation of the questioned The petitioner concludes that the search warrant in question, being in
search warrant, damages of far reaching implications were sustained not the nature of a general warrant, violated the constitutional as well as the
only in the functional operations of the Office of the Register of Deeds, but statutory requirements for its issuance, and as such, is null and void.
also in the business transactions involving lands in the province of
Isabela. According to the petitioner, millions of documents of various The Position of the Office of the Solicitor General [10]
nature were seized and hauled out of the premises of the office by the
respondent Javier, which continue to be in the latters custody. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, agrees with the
petitioner and opines that the strict application of the rules of procedure
The petitioner further asserts that the search warrant issued by the should be relaxed in this case.
RTC is in the nature of a general warrant. There was no particularity as to
what documents were to be searched and seized.While the warrant made The OSG also asserts that it cannot sustain the questioned CA
mention of fake land titles, there was no mention of which titles were Resolutions of September 6, 2000 and November 28, 2002 for the reason
spurious. The petitioner points out that the Register of Deeds is the that the subject search warrant is a patent nullity. It submitted the
repository of all land titles within the territorial jurisdiction of the province following reasons for such conclusion:
of Isabela, and millions of such titles are kept thereat. The phrase
undetermined number of land transfer transactions without the First. The subject search warrant issued by the RTC was not just for
corresponding payment of capital gains tax and payment of documentary one offense, but for at least three offenses, namely: violation of a) Article
stamps is, likewise, a dangerous supposition, as there are millions of 171 of the Revised Penal Code (Falsification by public officer, employee or
documents on various land transactions kept in the registry. Anent the notary or ecclesiastical minister); b) Article 213 of the same Code (Frauds
phrase blank forms of land titles kept inside the drawers of every table of against the public treasury and similar offenses); and, c) Rep. Act No. 3019
employees of the Register of Deeds, the petitioner asserts that no (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
conceivable wrong could have been committed therein, as it was the
normal practice for employees to have such blank forms in hand, in Second. The things to be seized were not particularly described in the
preparation for their issuance after thorough examination of the propriety search warrant, leaving the officer of the law with limitless discretion in its
of documents submitted in support thereof. However, the petitioner implementation on what articles to seize.
asserts that not every employee can take hold of such blank forms but
only those designated as examiners. There was no mention in the warrant Third. From the contents of the search warrant itself, the raiding team
of the names of the employees who purportedly kept the blank forms. could not have distinguished which of the land titles kept in the custody of
the Register of Deeds in Iligan, Isabela were fake, and which of them were
According to the petitioner, the warrant was a wanton, sweeping genuine. The warrant did not define the parameters upon which the fake
authority for the NBI agents who raided the Registry Offices and land titles could be gauged with sufficient clarity and definiteness, such as
confiscated and seized every document in sight. It was a fishing distinguishing marks.
expedition for the raiding party to obtain any kind of conceivable evidence
to support the offense for which it was applied. Fourth. The issue regarding the validity of a Torrens title is a judicial
question.
The petitioner also contends that the warrant is patently objectionable
for having been issued despite the fact that the application therefor Thus, the OSG prays that the instant petition be granted.
contained more than one offense, in violation of Article III, Section 2, of the
1987 Constitution. The Courts Ruling
 The issues in this case are as follows: a) whether or not the technical gravely abused its discretion. Indeed, the court has discretion to dismiss or
rules of procedure may be relaxed in the case at bar; and, if so b) whether not to dismiss an appeal, but such discretion must be a sound one, to be
or not the warrant issued by the RTC was valid. exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in
mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.[14]
A Relaxation of Technical Rules
The consequence of our ruling would be for the Court to direct the
Is Warranted in this Case Court of Appeals to resolve on its merits CA-G.R. No. 24265 by delving into
and resolving the issue raised therein on whether or not Judge de Alban of
According to the OSG, the petitioners motion to admit petition the RTC of Isabela, Branch 16, committed grave abuse of discretion in
for certiorari was filed beyond the sixty-day reglementary period. The issuing Search Warrant No. 2000-03. However, such step would unduly
petitioner received a copy of the trial courts Order dated February 29, prolong the resolution of the case. We shall act on the petition, considering
2000 denying the motion to quash search warrant on March 6, 2000. Thus, that the lone issue raised is one of law, and an invocation of a
he had only until May 5, 2000 within which to file a petition for constitutional right at that. It is an accepted rule that the Court may
certiorari. Realizing that the appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court he resolve the dispute and serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the
earlier filed with the Court of Appeals was not the proper remedy, the case to the lower court for further proceedings, if, based on the records,
petitioner filed his motion to admit petition for certiorari only on August pleadings, and other evidence, the matter can readily be ruled upon. We
[15]

29, 2000, way beyond the reglementary period. However, considering that take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of
the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just the constitutional issues raised.
[16]

determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the
stringent application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to The Search Warrant in Question
considerations of substantial justice.
is Constitutionally Infirm; Void
We agree. The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the for Lack of Particularity
principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
substantial justice must always be avoided.[11] It is a far better and more
prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and Sec 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no such
parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. [12] to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
The issue involved in this case is no less than the legality of the particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
issuance of a warrant of arrest.[13] It behooved the Court of Appeals to look to be seized.
past rules of technicality and to resolve the case on its merits, considering
that the petitioner therein was invoking a constitutional right. The Furthermore, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
appellate court should have, thus, considered the petitioners appeal under provides the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant, viz.:
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the said Rules. Thus, in dismissing the petitioners appeal, and, Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not
thereafter, the motion to admit petition for certiorari, the appellate court issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or 4. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and Cashiers Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be No. 496 and other pertinent documents related therewith;
seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
5. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before table of employees of the Registry of Deeds;
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the 6. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach corresponding payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of Documentary
to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits Stamps.[23]
submitted.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with expressly used in the warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious
the foregoing constitutional and statutory requirements; failure to comply intent of subjecting all the records pertaining to all the transactions of the
therewith constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[17] petitioners office at the Register of Deeds to search and seizure. Such
tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the explicit command of the
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical Constitution that there be a particular description of the things to be
precision of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be seized.[24] The executing officers sole function is to apply the description to
reasonable particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to its subject matter, which function may frequently involve the exercise of
be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving limited discretion in identifying the property described. A description of
commission.[18] Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be such generality, however, as to lodge in the executing officer virtually
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room unlimited discretion as to what property shall be seized, is repugnant to
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it the Constitution.[25] As we held in the early case of People v. Veloso:[26]
would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they
would not know exactly what kind of things to look for. [19] Any description A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making the constitutional and statutory provisions under which it was issued.
search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient. Otherwise, it is void. The proceedings upon search warrants, it has rightly
[20]
been held, must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of
process known to law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
However, the requirement that search warrants shall particularly citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrant will
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant always be construed strictly without, however, going into the full length of
describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be
discretion of the officer executing the warrant. [21] Thus, the specific invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.
property to be searched for should be so particularly described as to [27]
preclude any possibility of seizing any other property. [22]
The Search Warrant Must
A perusal of the tenor of the search warrant in question readily shows
that it failed to pass this test of particularity. The questioned warrant Be Issued for One Specific
directed the peace officers to search and seize the following in the
petitioners office at the Register of Deeds of Isabela: Offense
 The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant [28] for
having been issued for more than one offense - Falsification of Land Titles
under Article 171 and Article 213 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation
of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense.[29] In fact, a careful perusal of the
application for the warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any
specific act performed by the petitioner constituting a violation of any of
the aforementioned offenses..

Thus, the questioned warrant must be struck down for having been
issued in contravention of the 1987 Constitution, the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and existing jurisprudence. As the Court, through Justice
Concepcion held in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno:[30]

To uphold the validity of the warrant in question would be to wipe out

completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our
Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice,
or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be
remedied by the constitutional provision above-quoted to outlaw the so-
called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in
times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means. [31]

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated

September 6, 2000 and November 28, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED. The respondent National Bureau of Investigation is hereby
ORDERED to return to the petitioner all items seized from the subject
premises.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga
Plant, petitioner,
vs.
QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA,
a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA", respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as unfair
competition under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act
No. 8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant
against the hoarder? This is the issue we grapple with in this petition for
review on certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink giants;
petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola
Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of hoarding
empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage
its operation in Bicolandia.
BACKGROUND
The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for
hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga
City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code.
Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their
illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents. 1 In support of
the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three
witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he was
informed that one of their plant security guards had gained access into the
Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant security
officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was
hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security
guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed by the security guard
that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin
Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw
empty Coke bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases.2
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City,
after taking the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant
No. 2001-013 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty
Coke bottles at Pepsi's Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code.4 The local police seized and brought to the MTC's custody 2,464
Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells
for Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces) empty
Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga
a complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in
relation to Section 170 of the IP Code.5The named respondents, also the
respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E.
Galicia (Galicia) and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez,
Jr. (Gomez).
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles
came from various Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in
their return to make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles; they had no
way of ascertaining beforehand the return of empty Coke bottles as they
simply received what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles in
their yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and Regaspi's
statements are hearsay as they had no personal knowledge of the alleged
crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of
empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal
nature, must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their
favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. Miral and Rene Acebuche executed
a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook, Lirio did not visit or enter
the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to
quash the search warrant. They contended that no probable cause existed
to justify the issuance of the search warrant; the facts charged do not
constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in urgent need of the
shells.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of
the crime, arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It
insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable cause for
unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the respondents violated
R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes,
and other similar containers.
THE MTC RULINGS
On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order6 denying
the twin motions. It explained there was an exhaustive examination of the
applicant and its witnesses through searching questions and that the Pepsi
shells are prima facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the
respondents.
In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the
quashal of the warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and
exhaustive examination; the applicant and its witnesses had no personal
knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court failed to order the
return of the "borrowed" shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant
was issued based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure of the shells was
illegal because they were not included in the warrant.
On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in
the second assailed order,7 explaining that the issue of whether there was
unfair competition can only be resolved during trial.
The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga
City on the ground that the subject search warrant was issued without
probable cause and that the empty shells were neither mentioned in the
warrant nor the objects of the perceived crime.
THE RTC RULINGS
On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause
and the non-commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it
implied that other laws may have been violated by the respondents. The
RTC, though, found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing
MTC judge.8 Thus,
Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by
the Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge
of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City dated September 19, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed
to return to the Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.
SO ORDERED.9
In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the
petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was contradictory because
it absolved Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
search warrant, but at the same time nullified the issued warrant. The MTC
should have dismissed the petition when it found out that Judge Ocampo
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
reverse the decision of the RTC. Essentially, the petition raises questions
against the RTC's nullification of the warrant when it found no grave abuse
of discretion committed by the issuing judge.
THE PETITION and
THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the
respondents' petition for certiorari because it found no grave abuse of
discretion by the MTC in issuing the search warrant. The petitioner further
argues that the IP Code was enacted into law to remedy various forms of
unfair competition accompanying globalization as well as to replace the
inutile provision of unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. Section 168.3(c) of the IP Code does not limit the scope of
protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of
unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another." The
inherent element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that
hoarding of large quantities of a competitor's empty bottles is necessarily
characterized by bad faith. It claims that its Bicol bottling operation was
prejudiced by the respondents' hoarding and destruction of its empty
bottles.
The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was
improper because it complied with all the essential requisites of a valid
warrant. The empty bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to prevent
discovery while they were systematically being destroyed to hamper the
petitioner's bottling operation and to undermine the capability of its
bottling operations in Bicol.
The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted
his own examination, he gravely erred and abused his discretion when he
ignored the rule on the need of sufficient evidence to establish probable
cause; satisfactory and convincing evidence is essential to hold them
guilty of unfair competition; the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not
cause actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the
general public; the alleged criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at
deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles or
pass them off as the respondents' goods.
The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle
hoarding, as the acts penalized must always involve fraud and deceit. The
hoarding does not make them liable for unfair competition as there was no
deception or fraud on the end-users.
THE ISSUE
Based on the parties' positions, the basic issue submitted to us for
resolution is whether the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant
No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from Pepsi's yard for
probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This basic issue
involves two sub-issues, namely, the substantive issue of whether the
application for search warrant effectively charged an offense, i.e., a
violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code; and the procedural issue of
whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court
in the issuance of search warrants.
OUR RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our
agreement is more in the result than in the reasons that supported it. The
decision is correct in nullifying the search warrant because it was issued
on an invalid substantive basis - the acts imputed on the respondents do
not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the
present petition.
The issuance of a search warrant10 against a personal property11 is
governed by Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant
sections state:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under
oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their
sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. - If the judge is
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is
based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form
prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis supplied]
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is
probable cause in connection with a specific offense alleged in an
application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and his or
her witnesses. This is the substantive requirement in the issuance of a
search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a
personal task of the judge before whom the application for search warrant
is filed, as he has to examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and
his or her witnesses in the form of "searching questions and answers" in
writing and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive
and procedural aspects. Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of
the requirements and, hence, treated them separately; it approved of the
way the MTC handled the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search
warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect wanting. It
therefore resolved to nullify the warrant, without however expressly
declaring that the MTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the
warrant applied for. The RTC's error, however, is in the form rather than
the substance of the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for
the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave
abuse of discretion was committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions
below will show.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the
issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and
circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action
and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable
cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the
objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.12 Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an underlying
offense must, in the first place, exist. In other words, the acts alleged,
taken together, must constitute an offense and that these acts are
imputable to an offender in relation with whom a search warrant is applied
for.
In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged
- alleged to be hoarding of empty Coke bottles - constitutes an offense
under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. Section 168 in its entirety states:
SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and
Remedies. -
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the
goods he manufactures or deals in, his business or services from
those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has
a property right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or
services so identified, which will be protected in the same manner
as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means
contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods
manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or
who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall
be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action
therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of
protection against unfair competition, the following shall be
deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the
general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or
dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping
of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices
or words thereon, or in any other feature of their
appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers
to believe that the goods offered are those of a
manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer
or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such
appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such
goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such
goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who
employs any other means calculated to induce the false
belief that such person is offering the services of another
who has identified such services in the mind of the public;
or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the
course of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary
to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall
apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a)
The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of
protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of
unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to good faith of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another."
Allegedly, the respondents' hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is one
such act.
We do not agree with the petitioner's expansive interpretation of Section
168.3 (c).
"Unfair competition," previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in
relation with R.A. No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code, is now covered by Section 168 of the IP Code as this Code has
expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and
general rule on the definition of unfair competition. The law does not
thereby cover every unfair act committed in the course of business; it
covers only acts characterized by "deception or any other means contrary
to good faith" in the passing off of goods and services as those of another
who has established goodwill in relation with these goods or services, or
any other act calculated to produce the same result.
What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3
when it provides specifics of what unfair competition is "without in any
way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition." Part of
these particulars is provided under Section 168.3(c) which provides the
general "catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a
person shall be guilty of unfair competition "who shall commit any other
act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another."
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off
(or palming off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or
business of one person as the goods or business of another with the end
and probable effect of deceiving the public. It formulated the "true test" of
unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are
calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the
ordinary conditions which prevail in the particular trade to which the
controversy relates.13 One of the essential requisites in an action to
restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be
shown before the right to recover can exist.14 The advent of the IP Code
has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with
what Section 168 of the Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing
off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements that must be
present for unfair competition to exist.
The act alleged to violate the petitioner's rights under Section 168.3 (c) is
hoarding which we gather to be the collection of the petitioner's empty
bottles so that they can be withdrawn from circulation and thus impede
the circulation of the petitioner's bottled products. This, according to the
petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith - a conclusion that, if true, is
indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The critical question,
however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is
critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as
charged, "is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or
services" of the petitioner.
We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an
act within the contemplation of the IP Code.
The petitioner's cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that
refer to a very specific subject - intellectual property. Aside from the IP
Code's actual substantive contents (which relate specifically to patents,
licensing, trademarks, trade names, service marks, copyrights, and the
protection and infringement of the intellectual properties that these
protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the Code is
expressly reflected in its "Declaration of State Policy" which states:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The State recognizes that an
effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the
development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer
of technology, attracts foreign investments, and ensures market
access for our products. It shall protect and secure the exclusive
rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to
their intellectual property and creations, particularly when
beneficial to the people, for such periods as provided in this Act.
The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end,
the State shall promote the diffusion of knowledge and information
for the promotion of national development and progress and the
common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative
procedures of registering patents, trademarks and copyright, to
liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology, and to
enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
Philippines. (n)
"Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been defined under Section
4 of the Code to consist of: a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks
and Service Marks; c) Geographic Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e)
Patents; f) Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and
g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.
Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that should be made when a
question arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it
refers to an intellectual property as defined in the Code. If it does not, then
coverage by the Code may be negated.
A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an
intellectual property right as defined above, is whether it falls under the
general "unfair competition" concept and definition under Sections 168.1
and 168.2 of the Code. The question then is whether there is "deception"
or any other similar act in "passing off" of goods or services to be those of
another who enjoys established goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory
construction giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP
Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in particular. Under the
principle of "noscitur a sociis," when a particular word or phrase is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. 15
As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section
168.1 speaks of a person who has earned goodwill with respect to his
goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the Code, with
or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously discussed,
refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on
the other hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair competition,
with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the appearance of
the goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that his
or her goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill;
while the disputed Section 168.3 being a "catch all" clause whose
coverage the parties now dispute.
Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" - as
defined and charged by the petitioner - does not fall within the coverage
of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any
patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the respondents have
invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the
petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently "passing off"
their products or services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are
not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or
misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the
petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the
petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it
embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged, hoarding inflicts
unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the
bottles it can use for these sales.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another
law - R.A. No. 623 - covers, to wit:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the
manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated
waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles,
boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers, with
their names or the names of their principals or products, or other
marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with
the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used
by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made
applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written
consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully
registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the
provisions of the next preceding section, to fill such bottles,
boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked
or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of,
buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether
filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or
glasses or for any other purpose than that registered by
the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section
shall be punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or
imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.
As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a
measure that may overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II of the
IP Code on "The Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade Names."
What is certain is that the IP Code has not expressly repealed this Act. The
Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a special type of registrants
- the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water, mineral or aerated
waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes,
casks, kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers - who are given
special protection with respect to the containers they use. In this sense, it
is in fact a law of specific coverage and application, compared with the
general terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it
speaks specifically of unlawful use of containers and even of the
unlawfulness of their wanton destruction - a matter that escapes the IP
Code's generalities unless linked with the concepts of "deception" and
"passing off" as discussed above.
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs against the
that the parties did not consider at all in the search warrant application. petitioner.
The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its search warrant
application since the "one specific offense" that the law allows and which SO ORDERED.
the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in
our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the
present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the
petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support
the disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent.

Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense,
the ruling of this Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly
instructive:

In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a

finding of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent
requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The
nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues
raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for
Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void,
all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to
petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.16

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the
petitioner's search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioner's
failure to show that the acts imputed to the respondents do not violate the
cited offense. There could not have been any probable cause to support
the issuance of a search warrant because no crime in the first place was
effectively charged. This conclusion renders unnecessary any further
discussion on whether the search warrant application properly alleged that
the imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a "hoarding" in bad
faith aimed to prejudice the petitioner's operations, or whether the MTC
duly complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a
search warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly,

we confirm that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial
 [G.R. No. 129651. October 20, 2000] (5) Payments made by these tax evading
establishments are made by checks drawn payable
to cash and delivered to Uy Chin Ho; These payments
are also not receipted (sic);
FRANK UY and UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
(6) Uy Chin Ho will then pay UNIFISH for the quantity of
BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HON. MERCEDES
sardines he had withdrawn from the corporation;
GOZO-DADOLE, respondents.

3. Another fraudulent practice perpetrated by UNIFISH through Uy Chin

DECISION
Hos direction is the sale of imported oil locally to different customers. This
KAPUNAN, J.: is a case of smuggling in the sense that UNIFISH, being an export
company registered with the Board of Investments, is enjoying certain
Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of exemptions in their importation of oil as one of the raw materials in its
the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray for the return of processing of canned tuna for export. These tax exemptions are granted
the items seized by virtue thereof. by the government on the condition that the oil is to be used only in the
processing of tuna for export and that it is not to be sold unprocessed as is
On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau to local customers.
of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing Corporation and
Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting 4. Another fraudulent practice involves the sales of unused cans; UNIFISH
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code. Abos, who claimed to be also enjoys tax exemptions in its purchases of tin cans subject to the
a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit[1] stating: condition that these are to be used as containers for its processed tuna for
export. These cans are never intended to be sold locally to other food
1. He has personal knowledge that UNIFISH PACKING CORPORATION processing companies.
(hereinafter referred to as UNIFISH), a canning factory located at Hernan
Cortes Street, under the active management of UY CHIN HO alias Frank Uy 5. Prior to 1990, that is from 1980 to 1990, the factory of the UNIFISH
[,] is selling by the thousands of [sic] cartons of canned sardines without PACKING CORPORATION was then run by the PREMIER INDUSTRIAL &
issuing receipt. This is in violation of Sections 253 and 263 of the Internal DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (hereinafter referred to as PREMIER) [,]
Revenue Code. which corporation was being controlled by the same majority stockholders
as those now running and controlling UNIFISH; [a]t that time, PREMIER was
2. This grand scale tax fraud is perpetrated through the following scheme: also committing the same fraudulent acts as what is being perpetrated by
UNIFISH at present.
(1) Uy Chin Ho a director of UNIFISH buys in bulk from
the company; 6. The records containing entries of actual volume of production and sales,
of both UNIFISH AND PREMIER, are found in the office of the corporation at
(2) Being a director, Uy Chin Ho has a lot of clout in the its factory site at H. Cortes Street, Mandaue City. The particular place or
distribution of the canned sardines processed by spot where these records [official receipts, sales invoices, delivery
UNIFISH; receipts, sales records or sales books, stock cards, accounting records
(3) Uy Chin Ho dictates the value of canned sardines (such as ledgers, journals, cash receipts books, and check disbursements
that he orders and buys from UNIFISH without any books)] are kept and may be found is best described in the herein
receipt of his purchases; attached sketch of the arrangement of the offices furniture and fixture of
the corporation which is made an integral part hereof and marked as
(4) The moment he has the quantity he wants, UNIFISH Annex A,
through Uy Chin Ho delivers to the different
supermarkets such as White Gold, Gaisano, etc.;
7. He is executing this affidavit to attest under oath the veracity of the
foregoing allegations and he is reserving his right to claim for reward
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2338.
On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special
Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for search warrants from Branch
28 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. The application sought permission
to search the premises of Unifish.
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,
Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or
Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

After hearing the depositions of Labaria and Abos, Judge Mercedes 5. Sales Records, Job Order;
Gozo-Dadole issued the disputed search warrants. The first[2] is docketed 6. Corporate Financial Records; and
as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 FOR:VIOLATION OF SECTION 253
("Search Warrant A-1"), and consists of two pages. A verbatim 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
reproduction of Search Warrant A-1 appears below:
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other
7th Judicial Region
properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
Branch 28
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.

Plaintiff,
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79 Judge
FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
The second warrant[3]is similarly docketed as SEARCH WARRANT 93-
UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, 10-79 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253 ("Search Warrant A-2"). Search
Unifish Packing Corporation Warrant A-2, reproduced below, is almost identical in content to Search
Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City Warrant A-1, save for the portions indicated in bold print. It consisted of
x-------------------------/ only one page.
(with sketch) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CEBU
SEARCH WARRANT 7th Judicial Region
Branch 28
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER: Mandaue City

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G R E E T I N G S:
Plaintiff,

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination - versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 93-10-79
underoath (sic), Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 253
Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a (sic) probable cause
to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or UY CHIN HO alias FRANK UY, and
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason Unifish Packing Corporation
to believe that Uy Chin Ho c/o Unifish Packing Corporation, Hernan Cortes Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City
St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care and control, the following: x-------------------------/
(with sketch)
 SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
G R E E T I N G S:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examination
underoath [sic], Nestor N. Labaria, Asst. Chief, Special Investigation
Branch, BIR and witness Rodrigo Abos that there is a [sic] probable cause
to believe that the crime of violation of Section 253 - attempt to evade or
defeat the tax has been committed and there is good and sufficient reason
to believe that Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy and Unifish Packing
Corporation, Hernan Cortes St., Mandaue City has in his possession, care
and control, the following:
1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals,
Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or
Records; Provisional & Official Receipts;
2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;
3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;
5. Sales Records, Job Order;
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of
day or night of said premises and its immediate vicinity and to forthwith
seize and take possession of the articles above-mentioned and other
properties relative to such violation and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
WITNESS MY HAND this 1st day of October, 1993.
(sgd.)
MERCEDES GOZO-DADOLE
Judge
Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a third warrant, [4] which was docketed as
SEARCH WARRANT 93-10-80 FOR: VIOLATION OF SEC. 238 in relation to
SEC. 263 (hereinafter, "Search Warrant B").Except for the docket number
and the designation of the crime in the body of the warrant (Section 238 in
relation to Sec. 263 - non-issuance of sales invoice and use and possession
of unregistered delivery receipts and/or sales invoices), Search Warrant B
is a verbatim reproduction of Search Warrant A-2.
On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by
members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993, searched
the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation.They seized, among other
things, the records and documents of petitioner corporation. A return of
said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu ,
Branch 28.
On 8 February 1995, the BIR filed against petitioners a case before the
Department of Justice. The records, however, do not reveal the nature of
this case.
On 31 March 1995, petitioners filed motions to quash the subject
search warrants with Branch 28 of the Cebu RTC.
The RTC, however, denied petitioners' motions to quash as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioners to file a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA).The CA dismissed
their petition, holding that petitioners failed to comply with Section 2(a),
Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA), which
states:
a. What Should be Filed. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible
copies and a copy thereof shall be served on each of the respondents, and
must be accompanied by a certified true copy of the decision or order
complained of and true copies of the pleadings and other pertinent
documents and papers. (As amended by S.Ct. Res., dated November 24,
1992).
The CA found that petitioners did not submit certified true copies of (1) the
Motions to Quash, (2) the Motion for Reconsideration, and (3) the Affidavit
of Rodrigo Abos.
The CA also held that certiorari was not the proper remedy to question
the resolution denying the motion to quash.
In this case now before us, the available remedies to the petitioners,
assuming that the Department of Justice will eventually file the case, are:
a petition for reinvestigation; the right to post bail; a Motion to Quash the
Information; and in case of denial, an appeal, after judgment on the
merits, or after the case shall have been tried. This brings us to the case
of Lai vs. Intermediate 220 SCRA 149 and the pronouncement, thus:
Criminal Procedure: Certiorari: Certiorari should not be allowed where
petitioner has other remedies available. -- Anent the remedy resorted to
by petitioners (referring to the petition for certiorari) from the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Oriental presided by Judge Diez, the same should not
have been granted. Petitioners were not without plain, speedy and
adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law against Judge Lomeda's
order for their arrest. These remedies are as enumerated by respondent
appellate court in its decision: "1. they can post bail for their provisional RTC. Third, in a similar case, [6] we held that the submission of a document
release; 2. They can ask the Provincial Fiscal for a reinvestigation of the together with the motion for reconsideration constitutes substantial
charge against them. If unsatisfied with the fiscal's resolution they can ask compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, requiring the
for a review by the Minister of Justice; (Sec. 1(), RA 5180 as amended by submission of a certified true copy of material portions of the record as are
P.D. referred to [in the petition], and other documents relevant or pertinent
911); 3. if their petition for review does not prosper, they can filea motion thereto along with the petition. So should it be in this case, especially
to quash the information in the trial court. (Rule 117, Rules of considering that it involves an alleged violation of a constitutionally
Court). 4. If the motion is denied, they can appeal the judgment of the cou guaranteed right. The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rt after the case shall have been tried on the merits. rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help secure
substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is
x x x Where motion to quash is denied, remedy is not certiorari, but to go made, their aim could be defeated.[7]
to trial.-- Moreover, in the case of Acharon vs. Purisima, this Court held The CA likewise erred in holding that petitioners cannot avail
that when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, the remedy is notc of certiorari to question the resolution denying their motions to quash the
ertiorari but to go to trial without prejudice to reiterating the special defen subject search warrants. We note that the case of Lai vs. Intermediate,
ses involved in said Motion. In the event that an adverse decision is cited by the appellate court as authority for its ruling does not appear in
rendered after trial on the merits, an appeal therefrom should be the next 220 SCRA 149. The excerpt of the syllabus quoted by the court, as
legal step. observed by petitioners,[8] appears to have been taken from the case
of Yap vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 220 SCRA 245 (1993). Yap,
xxx however, is inapplicable since that case involved a motion to quash
a complaint for qualified theft, not a motion to quash a search warrant.
In this case now before Us, there is no pretention [sic] that the Court
issued the Search Warrants without jurisdiction. On the contrary, it had The applicable case is Marcelo vs. De Guzman,[9] where we held that
jurisdiction. The argument therefore that the Court committed an error in the issuing judges disregard of the requirements for the issuance of a
not describing the persons or things to be searched; that the Search search warrant constitutes grave abuse of discretion, which may be
Warrants did not describe with particularity the things to be seized/taken; remedied by certiorari:
the absence of probable cause; and for having allegedly condoned the
discriminating manner in which the properties were taken, to us, are Expressly announced in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
merely errors in the Court's finding, certainly not correctible by certiorari, general rule that certiorari is available where a tribunal or officer
but instead thru an appeal.[5] exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor
In any event, the CA ruled, no grave abuse of discretion amounting to any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
lack of jurisdiction was committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
warrants. In the light of the findings of the lower court, herein above quoted, it is
indisputable that Judge de Guzman gravely abused his discretion in issuing
As petitioners' motion for reconsideration proved futile, petitioners the said search warrant. Indeed, he acted whimsically and capriciously
filed the instant petition for review. when he ignored the explicit mandate of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules
Petitioners claim that they did submit to the CA certified true copies of of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
the pleadings and documents listed above along with their Petition, as well connection with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or
as in their Motion for Reconsideration. An examination of the CA Rollo, city judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
however, reveals that petitioners first submitted the same in their Reply, and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
after respondents, in their Comment, pointed out petitioners failure to to be searched and the persons or things to be seized; and that no search
attach them to the Petition. warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

Nevertheless, the CA should not have dismissed the petition on this The utter disregard by Judge de Guzman of the requirements laid down by
ground although, to its credit, it did touch upon the merits of the the said rule renders the warrant in question absolutely null and void. It
case. First, it appears that the case could have been decided without these has been held that where the order complained of is a patent nullity, a
pleadings and documents. Second, even if the CA deemed them essential
to the resolution of the case, it could have asked for the records from the
petition for certiorari and mandamus may properly be entertained despite
the existence of the remedy of appeal.
Moreover, an appeal from the order of Judge de Guzman would neither be
an adequate nor speedy remedy to relieve appellee of the injurious effects
of the warrant. The seizure of her personal property had resulted in the
total paralization of the articles and documents which had been
improperly seized. Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate
and expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to
prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party.
This Court had occasion to reiterate the above pronouncement issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions
in Silva vs. Presiding Judge, RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. XXXIII,[10] which and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any
also involved a special civil action for certiorari:[11]
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the
constitutional requirement that he must determine the existence of
probable cause by examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form
of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this
requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared in Marcelo
vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, the
capricious disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements
before issuance of search warrants constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, petitioners alleged in their petition before the CA that the
issuing judge violated the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court in issuing the disputed search warrants, which, if true,
would have constituted grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners also alleged
that the enforcers of the warrants seized almost all the records and
documents of the corporation thus resulting in the paralysis of its
business. Appeal, therefore, would not be an adequate remedy that would
afford petitioners expeditious relief.
We now proceed to the merits of the case.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the
people against unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
In relation to the above provision, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. - A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach
to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits
submitted.
A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions. These requirements, in
outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself
and not by the applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be
searched and persons or things to be seized.[12]
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright
nullification of the search warrants.[13] The proceedings upon search
warrants must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process
citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will
always be construed strictly without, however, going the full length of
requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be
invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it.
[14]
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject
warrants that command their nullification. They point out inconsistencies
in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as
well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. That two search warrants (Search
Warrants A-1 and A-2) were issued for the same crime, for the same place,
at a single occasion is cited as another irregularity. Petitioners also dispute the other hand, was directed against UY CHIN HO alias FRANK
the existence of probable cause that would justify the issuance of the UY, and Unifish Packing Corporation.
warrants.Finally, they claim that the things to be seized were not
described with particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render These discrepancies are hardly relevant.
the objects seized inadmissible in evidence. [15]
In Miller v. Sigler,[21] it was held that the Fourth Amendment of the
Inconsistencies United States Constitution, from which Section 2, Article III of our own
in the Constitution is historically derived, does not require the warrant to name
description of the person who occupies the described premises. Where the search
the place to be warrant is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and
searched not for the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant
of such property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the
Petitioners observe that the caption of Search Warrant A-1 indicates warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be
the address of Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy as Hernan Cortes St., Cebu City searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal
while the body of the same warrant states the address as Hernan Cortes defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise
St., Mandaue City. Parenthetically, Search Warrants A-2 and B correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to
consistently state the address of petitioner as Hernan Cortes the place to be searched.[22]
St., Mandaue City.
Since, in the case at bar, the warrant was issued not for search of the
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that persons owning or occupying the premises, but only a search of the
there be a particular description of the place to be searched and the premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or
persons of things to be seized.[16] The rule is that a description of a place in violation of the constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the
to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with premises, because of inconsistencies in stating their names. [23]
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended [17]and
distinguish it from other places in the community. [18] Any designation or Two warrants
description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion issued at one
of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the time for one
constitutional requirement.[19] Thus, in Castro vs. Pabalan,[20] where the crime and
search warrant mistakenly identified the residence of the petitioners one place
therein as Barrio Padasil instead of the adjoining Barrio MariaCristina, In any event, Search Warrant A-1 should be deemed superseded by
this Court "admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient Search Warrant A-2.
gravity to call for its invalidation."
Two warrants, Search Warrants A-1 and A-2, were actually issued by
In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan the trial court for the same crime (violation of SEC. 253 of the National
Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the Internal Revenue Code). It appears, however, that Search Warrant A-2 was
enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of petitioner issued merely to correct the inconsistencies in the address in Search
corporation. That Search Warrant A-1, therefore, inconsistently identified Warrant A-1, as well as to include Unifish Packing Corporation as a party
the city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell against whom the warrant was issued. Search Warrant A-2 was evidently
the warrants invalidation in this case. an attempt by the issuing judge to be more precise in the names of the
Inconsistencies persons against whom the warrant was issued and in the description of
in the the place to be searched. Indeed, it would be absurd for the judge to issue
description of on a single occasion two warrants authorizing the search of a single place
the persons for a single offense. Inasmuch as the apparent intent in issuing Search
named in the Warrant A-2 was to supersede Search Warrant A-1, the latter should be
two warrants deemed revoked by the former.

Petitioners also find fault in the description of the names of the The alleged
persons in Search Warrants A-1 and A-2. Search Warrant A-1 was absence of
issued solely against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy. Search Warrant A-2, on probable cause
 Petitioners claim there was no probable cause for Judge Gozo-Dadole The above portion of the transcript shows that Labarias knowledge of
to issue the subject search warrants. the alleged illegal activities of petitioners was acquired not through his
own perception but was merely supplied by Abos.Therefore, the deposition
Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances which of Labaria, which is based on hearsay, standing alone, cannot justify the
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an issuance of the search warrants.[30]
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [24] The application for the warrants, however, is not based solely on
Labarias deposition but is supported by that of Abos, whose knowledge of
In the determination of probable cause, the Constitution and the Rules petitioners alleged illegal practices was apparently obtained during his
of Court require an examination of the witnesses under oath. The employment with Unifish. In his deposition, Abos detailed the schemes
examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routine or pro employed by Frank Uy and Unifish to evade the payment of taxes, and
forma. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of described the place where the documents supposedly evidencing these
the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification schemes were located:
of the application.[25] Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an
application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general Q Do you know Frank Uy?
manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search
warrant.[26] A Yes.

The witnesses, in turn, must testify under oath to facts of their own Q Why do you know him?
personal knowledge. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the
individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of
the existence of probable cause.[27] Search warrants are not issued on
loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere suspicion or belief. [28]
It may be recalled that before issuing the warrants, the judge deposed
two witnesses, namely, Nestor Labaria of the BIR, and Rodrigo Abos, who
claimed to be an old employee of Unifish.Petitioners claim that the
testimonies of Labaria and Abos are hearsay. We agree with this
contention, but only as to the testimony of Labaria, who stated during the
examination:
A Because I were (sic) an employee of his from 1980 until August of
1993.
Q Where is this Unifish Packing Corporation located?
A Hernan Cortes St.
Q What is it being engaged of?
A It is engaged in canning of fish.
Q You have executed an affidavit here to the effect that it seems that in
his business dealings that he is actually doing something that
perpetrated tax evasion. Is that correct?

Q. Do you know of a certain Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy? A Yes.

A. No. Q How is it done?

Q. Do you know his establishment known as Unifish Packing A As an officer, he is an active member of the corporation who is at the
Corporation? same time making his authority as appointing himself as the
distributor of the company's products. He sells these products thru
A. I have only heard of that thru the affidavit of our informer, Mr. Abos. supermarkets in Visayas and Mindanao, in fact, the whole
Philippines. He makes it appear that it is the company which is
Q. Why are you applying for search warrant in the premises of Unifish
selling when actually it is him selling the goods and he does not
Packing Corporation?
issue any invoices.
A. Because of that information we received that they are using only
Q Since he does not issue any invoices, how is it done?
delivery receipts instead of the legal sales invoices. It is highly
indicative of fraud. A Thru delivery receipts.
Q. From where did you get that information? Q Is the delivery receipt official?
A. From our informer, the former employee of that establishment. [29]
A No. It is unregistered.
Q For how long has this been going on?
A As far as I know, it is still in 1986 since we started producing the
sardines.
Q When was the last time that you observed that that is what he is
doing?
A August, 1993, last month.
Q How did you happen to know about this last month?
A Because he delivered to certain supermarkets and the payments of
that supermarket did not go directly to the company. It went to him
and he is the one who paid the company for the goods that he sold.
Q Can you tell this Court the name of that certain supermarkets?
A White Gold and Gaisano.
Q How did you know this fact?
A As a manager of the company I have access to all the records of that
company for the last three years. I was the Operating Chief.
Q Until now?
A No. I was separated already.
Q When?
A August, 1993.
Q How does he do this manipulation?
A He sells the goods to the supermarkets afterwhich the company,
Unifish will deliver to his customers, then his customers will pay
directly to him and in turn, he pays to the company.
Q And these transactions, were they reflected in their books of account
or ledger or whatever?
A It is written but it is supposed to be a secret transaction. It is not for
the public, not for the BIR but it is only for the purpose of keeping
the transactions between the company and him. It is not made to
be shown to the BIR.
Q In that books of account, is it reflected that they have made some
deliveries to certain supermarkets?
A Yes.
Q For the consumption of the BIR what are the papers that they show?
A It is the private accounting firm that prepares everything.
Q Based on what?
A Based on some fictitious records just as they wish to declare.
Q In your affidavit you stated that there are sales invoices, official
receipts, delivery receipts, sales records, etc. These documents are
records that you have stated, in your affidavit, which are only for
the consumption of the company?
A Yes, not for the BIR.
Q Where are they kept now?
A They are kept on the table which I have drawn in the sketch. This is
the bird's eyeview (sic) of the whole office. When you enter thru
the door this Gina Tan is the one recording all the confidential
transactions of the company. In this table you can find all the
ledgers and notebooks.
Q This sketch is a blow-up of this portion, Exh. "A"?
A Yes. Exh. "B" is the blow-up of Exh. "A" inside the office.
In this blow-up there are four personnel plus one new personnel. Gina
Tan collects all the records from this girl and this girl makes the
statements. This first girl delivers the receipts. The second girl
prepares the bill of lading. The third girl keeps the inventory of all
the stocks.
This sketch here is the bodega where the records are kept. The records
from these people are stored in this place which is marked as "C".
Q So what you want to impress on that now is that only current records
are kept by Gina because according to you the whole records are
already placed in the bodega?
A Yes.
Q But how can you enter the bodega?
A Here, from the main entrance there is a door which will lead to this
part here. If you go straight there is a bodega there and there is
also a guard from this exit right after opening the door.
Q The problem is that, when actually in August have you seen the
current records kept by Gina?
A I cannot exactly recall but I have the xerox copies of the records.
Q Where are they now?
A They are in my possession (witness handling [sic] to the Court a
bunch of records).
Q The transactions that are reflected in these xerox copies that you
have given me, especially this one which seems to be pages of a
ledger, they show that these are for the months of January,
 February, March, April and May. Are these transactions reflected in Q Do you have proof to that effect?
these xerox copies which appear in the ledger being shown to the
BIR? A No, but we can get it there.

A As far as I know, it did not appear. Q Will that fact be shown in any listed articles in the application for
search warrant since according to you, you have seen this
Q What about this one which says Columnar Book Cash Receipt for the manipulation reflected on the books of account kept by Gina? Are
month of January, what does it show? you sure that these documents are still there?
A It shows that Frank Uy is the one purchasing from the company and A Yes. I have received information.
these are his customers.
COURT: Alright.[31]
Q Do these entries appear in the columnar books which are the basis
for the report to the BIR? Abos stated that, as former Operating Chief of Unifish, he had access
to the company records, and even showed the issuing judge photocopies
A As far as I know, it does not reflect. thereof. Thus, we reject the contention that this witness did not have
personal knowledge of the facts to which he testified. The contents of the
Q What are these xerox copies of checks? deposition clearly demonstrate otherwise.
A I think we cannot trace it up. These ones are the memos received by The deposition also shows that, contrary to petitioners submission,
Unifish for payment of sardines. This is the statement of the the inquiries made by the judge were far from leading or being a rehash of
company given to Uy Chin Ho for collection. the witness affidavit. We find such inquiries to be sufficiently probing.
Q It is also stated in your affidavit that the company imported soya Alleged lack
oil. How is it done? of
A The company imports soya oil to be used as a component in the particularity
processing of canned tuna for export. The company enjoys certain in the
BOI privilege and so it is tax free. As far as I know, they profit more description
to dispose the product locally. Whatever excess of this soya oil are of the things
sold to another company. seized

Q Is that fact reflected in the xerox copies? Petitioners note the similarities in the description of the things to be
seized in the subject warrants and those in Stonehill vs. Diokno,[32] Bache
A No. I have the actual delivery receipt. & Co. (Phil.), Inc. vs. Ruiz,[33] and Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs.
Herrera.[34]
Q In other words, the company imports soya oil supposedly to be used
as a raw material but instead they are selling it locally? In Stonehill, the effects to be searched and seized were described as:
A Yes. ([W]itness showing DR No. 3053 dated November 13, 1991.) This
delivery receipt was the delivery receipt to Celebes Canning Corp. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals correspondence,
of the 90 grams soya oil. receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
Q In other words, this soya oil should have to be used by Unifish but disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss
instead they are seeling (sic) it? statements.
A Yes, at a profit.
This Court found that the foregoing description failed to conform to
Q You also said that there is tax evasion in the selling of cans. What do the requirements set forth by the Constitution since:
you mean by this?
A There is another privileged [sic] by the BOI for a special price given to x x x the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records
packaging materials. When you export the product there is a 50% pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
price difference. Now, taking that advantage of that exemption, whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
they sold it to certain company here, again to Virginia Farms. seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicitexpresses a conclusion of fact - not of law - by which the warrant officer
command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be seized may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad
be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
object: the elimination of general warrants. direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2,
Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant does not
In Bache & Co., this Court struck down a warrant containing a similar conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized
description as those in Stonehill: have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must
necessarily have some evidence, other than those articles, to prove the
The documents, papers, and effects sought to be seized are described in said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner: handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least,
the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the
Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
receipts and disbursements books, customers' ledgers); receipts for promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks,
payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business others, enumerated in the warrant.
communications; accounting and business records; checks and check
stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970. In Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera, the description of
the things to be seized, i.e., Fire Registers, Loss, Bordereau, Adjusters'
Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers,
The description does not meet the requirement in Art. III, Sec. 1, of the Book of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general
Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that ledger, etc. was held to be an omnibus description and, therefore, invalid:
the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
x x x Because of this all embracing description which includes all
xxx conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which if seized x x x, could
paralyze its business, petitioner in several motions filed for early
In Uy Kheytin, et al. vs. Villareal, etc., et al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO carloads of
had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement that the warrant their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not
should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be only the company, its workers, agents, employees but also of its numerous
seized, to wit: insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the government
itself, and of the general public. And correlating the same to the charges
x x x Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 68 (sec. 97) for which the warrant was issued, We have before Us the infamous general
specifically require that a search warrant should particularly describe the warrants of old.
place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident purpose and
intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and In the case at bar, the things to be seized were described in the
only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to leave the following manner:
officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be 1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar
made, - that abuses may not be committed. That is the correct Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records;
interpretation of this constitutional provision borne out by the American Provisional & Official Receipts;
authorities. 2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated 3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;
under the search warrant issued in this case.
4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be 5. Sales Records, Job Order;
seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will
6. Corporate Financial Records; and
ordinarily allow (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil, 384); or when the description
 7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks than suppress everything seized, the court chose to sever the defective
portions of the warrant and suppress only those items that were not
We agree that most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the particularly described.
test of particularity, especially since witness Abos had furnished the judge
photocopies of the documents sought to be seized.The issuing judge could
have formed a more specific description of these documents from said Although the warrant was defective x x x it does not follow that it was
photocopies instead of merely employing a generic description invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of
thereof. The use of a generic term or a general description in a warrant is certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately, must be
acceptable only when a more specific description of the things to be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with respect to
seized is unavailable. The failure to employ the specificity available will other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from the
invalidate a general description in a warrant. [35] The use by the issuing authorization relating to the named books x x x. The search for and
judge of the terms multiple sets of books of accounts, ledgers, journals, seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the
columnar books, cash register books, sales books or records, provisional & defects concerning other articles.
official receipts, production record books/inventory lists, stock cards, sales
records, job order, corporate financial records, and bank xxx
statements/cancelled checks is therefore unacceptable considering the
circumstances of this case. x x x We agree with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California and
the majority of state courts that have considered this question and hold
As regards the terms unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered that in the usual case the district judge should sever the infirm portion of
purchase & sales invoices, however, we hold otherwise. The Solicitor the search warrant as passes constitutional muster. See United States v.
General correctly argues that the serial markings of these documents Giresi, 488 F.Supp. 445, 459-60 (D.N.J.1980). Items that were not
need not be specified as it is not possible to do so precisely because they described with the requisite particularity in the warrant should be
are unregistered.[36] Where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their suppressed, but suppression of all of the fruits of the search is hardly
description must be rather general, it is not required that a technical consistent with the purposes underlying exclusion. Suppression of only the
description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could items improperly described prohibits the Government from profiting from
issue. Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is its own wrong and removes the court from considering illegally obtained
clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could have evidence. Moreover, suppression of only those items that were not
been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular particularly described serves as an effective deterrent to those in the
description of the contents thereof. [37] Although it appears that Government who would be tempted to secure a warrant without the
photocopies of these unregistered documents were among those handed necessary description. As the leading commentator has observed, it would
by Abos to the issuing judge, it would be impractical to require the latter be harsh medicine indeed if a warrant which was issued on probable cause
to specify each and every receipt and invoice, and the contents thereof, to and which did particularly describe certain items were to be invalidated in
the minutest detail. toto merely because the affiant and the magistrate erred in seeking and
The general description of most of the documents listed in the permitting a search for other items as well. 2 W. LaFave, Search and
warrants does not render the entire warrant void. Insofar as the warrants Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4.6(f) (1978).
authorize the search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and
unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid. The Accordingly, the items not particularly described in the warrants ought to
search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described be returned to petitioners.
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. In United States v.
Petitioners allege that the following articles, though not listed in the
Cook,[38] the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) made the
warrants, were also taken by the enforcing officers:
following pronouncement:

1. One (1) composition notebook containing Chinese characters,

x x x. The leading decision is Aday v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 789, 362
P.2d 47, 13 Cal.Rptr. 415 (1961). In Aday, a warrant was issued authorizing
the seizure of two particularly described books and myriad other generally 2. Two (2) pages writing with Chinese characters,
described items. On appeal, the California Supreme Court held that only
the books were particularly described in the warrant and lawfully 3. Two (2) pages Chinese character writing,
seized. The court acknowledged that the warrant was flawed, but rather
4. Two (2) packs of chemicals, criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the
Constitution itself abhors.
5. One (1) bound gate pass,
The seizure of the items not specified in the warrants cannot be
6. Surety Agreement.[39] justified by the directive in the penultimate paragraph thereof to "seize
and take possession of other properties relative to such violation," which
In addition, the searching party also seized items belonging to the Premier in no way can be characterized as a particular description of the things to
Industrial and Development Corporation (PIDC), which shares an office be seized.
with petitioner Unifish. As regards the articles supposedly belonging to PIDC, we cannot order
The things belonging to petitioner not specifically mentioned in the their return in the present proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be
warrants, like those not particularly described, must be ordered returned contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
to petitioners. In order to comply with the constitutional provisions the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
regulating the issuance of search warrants, the property to be seized cannot be availed of by third parties.[42]
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals dated
property can be taken thereunder. [40] In Tambasen vs. People,[41] it was 27 June 1996 and 14 May 1987, affirming the Order of the Regional Trial
held: Court dated 17 July 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED insofar as said Resolutions
upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants authorizing the seizure
Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales
the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority under the invoices, but REVERSED with respect to the rest of the articles subject of
search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that said warrants. The respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue is hereby
a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The ordered to return to petitioners all items seized from the subject premises
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be and belonging to petitioners, except the unregistered delivery receipts and
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search unregistered purchase and sales invoices.
warrant, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and SO ORDERED.
seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed (Corro
v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, 547 [1985]); Bache & Co. [Phil.], Inc. v. Ruiz, 37
SCRA 823 [1971]; Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 [1920]). The same
constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in
person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity of the home,
and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v.
Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 [1992] citing Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, 646
[1946]).

Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the search warrant,
had been illegally seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the
police team were doing their task of pursuing subversives is not a valid
excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in
the performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail against the
constitutionally protected right of an individual (People v. Cruz, 231 SCRA
759 [1994]; People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, 176 [1925]). Although public
welfare is the foundation of the power to search and seize, such power
must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens (People v. Damaso, supra, citing
Rodriguez v. Evangelista, 65 Phil. 230, 235 [1937]). As the Court aptly puts
it in Bagahilog v. Fernandez, 198 SCRA 614 (1991), [z]eal in the pursuit of
 [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001] When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty,[4] whereupon he was tried.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
SALANGUIT y KO, accused-appellant. Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S.
Ludovico, forensic chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the
DECISION Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City, and PO3
MENDOZA, J.: Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field
operative. The prosecution evidence established the following:
This is an appeal from the decision, [1] dated January 27, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer imprisonment ranging of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches,
from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years andQuezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same
of shabu from accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-
law and sentencing him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P700,000.00. appellants room, and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by accused-
appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
were filed on December 28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the
information alleged: At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10
policemen, along with one civilian informer, went to the residence of
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of Methamphetamine The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but
Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license nobody opened it. They heard people inside the house, apparently
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law. panicking. The police operatives then forced the door open and entered
the house.[7]
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged: Cortes and his group started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small
heat-sealed transparent plastic bags containing a white crystalline
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance,
Philippines, the said accused not being authorized by law to possess or and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in
use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. [10] A
knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant
grams of Marijuana, a prohibited drug. refused to sign it.[11]

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with
them to Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items
they had seized.[12]
 PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence with a
evidence.[13] The white crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 minimum of six (6) months of arresto mayor and a maximum of four (4)
grams and those contained in a small box with a total weight of 8.37 years and two (2) months of prision correccional; and,
grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On
the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams 2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act
and the other 850 grams, were found to be marijuana. [14] No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
testimony was corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano. P700,000.00.

Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995,
as they were about to leave their house, they heard a commotion at the
gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian
attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.[15]
When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a pursuant to law.
piece of paper inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper was withdrawn and SO ORDERED.[20]
he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of
the house while the policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening
cabinets and taking his bag containing money, a licensed .45 caliber
firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and,
after putting handcuffs on accused-appellant, took him with them to the
NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where accused-appellant was detained. [18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his
testimony. Arcano testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate
their food, and took away canned goods and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and he is hereby
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams
of marijuana bricks are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition
according to law. The evidence custodian of this Court is hereby directed
to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of Investigation
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that -
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH
WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE
(SHABU)
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2)
BRICKS OF MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN
USED EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First,
the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used in obtaining it
was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the marijuana
allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the
doctrine. Third, the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the day/night of the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take
execution of the warrant. possession of the above-stated properties and bring said properties to the
undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure[21] provides that a search warrant shall not issue except upon GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite,
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined Philippines.
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly (SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may
be anywhere in the Philippines. Judge

In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the
requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No
presumption of regularity can be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds:
(1) that there was no probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2)
that the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense; and
(3) that the place to be searched was not described with sufficient
particularity.

In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant Existence of Probable Cause

reads:
The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160 and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause
of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-
For: Violation of RA 6425 appellant contends, however, that the search warrant issued is void
because no evidence was presented showing the existence of drug
SEARCH WARRANT paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by
the trial court.[23]
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the
GREETINGS: intelligence officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the
proceedings for the issuance of a search warrant on anything about drug
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under paraphernalia. He stated:
oath SR. INSP. RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND
M. BADUA, PNP that there is probable cause to believe that ROBERT Q - Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU,
SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his premises Binhagan St., NARCOM, do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring
San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit: or surveillance work?

UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA A - Yes, sir.

which should be seized and brought to the undersigned. Q - Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for
monitoring or surveillance?
A - Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.
Q - Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?
A - Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - Are you familiar with that place?
A - Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the
area and established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert
through my friend who introduced me to the former.
Q - In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias
Robert?
A - When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug
pusher of shabu, sir.
Q - Were you able to buy at that time?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - How much if you can still remember the amount involved?
A - I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the
amount of Two Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos,
sir.
Q - Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do
you know where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?
A - Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.
Q - How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?
A - When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done
inside his room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside
his cabinet.
Q - Do you know who is in control of the premises?
A - Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.
Q - How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT
SALANGUIT @ Robert is genuine shabu?
A - After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded
back to our office and reported the progress of my mission to our
Chief and presented to him the 2.12 grams of shabu I bought from
the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally requested the
Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical
Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug
as shown in the attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-
95 dated 19 Dec. 95.
Q - Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?
A - Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that
anything I wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to
transact to me on cash basis at his price of One Thousand Seven
Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.
Q - Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?
A - Yes, sir.[24]
However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the
application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the
conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only
if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none
was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the
search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable
cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior Court,[25] the warrant
properly described two obscene books but improperly described other
articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not
follow that it was invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that
the seizure of certain articles, even though proper if viewed separately,
must be condemned merely because the warrant was defective with
respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable
from the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the
principal basis of the charge of obscenity. The search for and seizure of
these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered illegal by the defects
concerning other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest
that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all
circumstances. We recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained
which are essentially general in character but as to minor items meet the
requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be made
under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be
upheld as to the property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant
procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on
probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized on the
basis thereof, is to be invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not supported by the evidence.
[26]
Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant,
authorizing the search of accused-appellants house for an undetermined
quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the second part, with respect to
the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more
than one specific offense because possession or use of methamphetamine
hydrochloride and possession of drug paraphernalia are punished under
two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425.[27] It will suffice to quote what this
Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in
connection with Violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the text thereof that There is
probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias Baby of
No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session
and control and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes
and other regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations which is
the subject of the offense stated above. Although the specific section of
the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of
the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the
finding of probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the description to be
made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for
Violation of R.A. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were
violated, and it authorized the search and seizure of dried marijuana
leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the
warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for
more than (1) offense, hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different
articles and sections of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search
warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short, following
this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search warrants,
one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of
marijuana and the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law
that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are subsumed into
prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for
the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For
Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity
of the warrant was questioned on the ground that it was issued without
reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which punished
several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of
firearms is penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under 3 thereof, the decree is a codification of the
various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions, and
explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus,
only one warrant was necessary to cover the violations under the various
provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place
 Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. seized.

This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San
Jose, Quezon City, the trial court took note of the fact that the records of
Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained several documents which
identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for search
warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in
between No. 7 and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the
deposition of witness which described the premises as a house without a
number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City; and 3) the pencil
sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police
officers who raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior
Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector
Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in Binhagan where appellant
lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not marijuana. However,
seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground that the drug was
seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view
of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. [35] For this doctrine
to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of
the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before
the police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with
by the authorities in seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably

appellants house and it was really appellant who was the target. The Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and
raiding team even first ascertained through their informant that appellant thus known to the police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the
was inside his residence before they actually started their operation. [32] police found the packets of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine can no longer
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As
the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and has been explained:
identify the place intended to be searched. [33] For example, a search
warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at 83 What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in
Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of
five apartments in the basement and six apartments on both the ground which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
and top floors and that there was an Apartment Number 3 on each accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether
floor. However, the description was made determinate by a reference to it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
the accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass. [34] In this with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless
case, the location of accused-appellants house being indicated by the seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
place to be searched with sufficient particularity. evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend
a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from incriminating at last emerges.[37]
accused-appellants residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly
issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is
determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness the conduct of a search pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for
possession of shabu. However, a search incident to a lawful arrest is
limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as
immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were
prevent the person arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the
or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance
with the plain view doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug
was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, must be upheld.
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on accused-
appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery, Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force
therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had was employed by the searching party in effecting the raid.
been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his
depostion, was invalid. Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure [42] provides:

Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window
apparent illegality to justify their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the marijuana recovered by warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic bag unlawfully detained therein.
which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one roof of his house to gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the
corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask process is unsupported by reliable and competent proof. No affidavit or
the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay officials or
respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth
where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the NARCOM of his claim.
agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the
contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force
that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag in order to gain entry cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house,
because it was within their plain view, what may be said to be the object especially accused-appellant, refused to open the door despite the fact
in their plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The that the searching party knocked on the door several times. Furthermore,
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object. It cannot be house. These circumstances justified the searching partys forcible entry
claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its into the house, founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of
distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents their mission would be frustrated unless they do so.
are obvious to an observer.[40]
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant
the process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A.
secured by the Constitution. [41] In this case, the marijuana allegedly found No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, and
in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents of arresto mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and ordering the confiscation of
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride is AFFIRMED.

In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court

finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of
prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the
1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the 11.14 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the
trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO, G.R. No. 166061
During arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
Petitioner,
Present: merits ensued.

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, Witnesses[5] for the prosecution testified as to the following set of
CARPIO, facts:
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VELASCO, JR., JJ. On 27 August 1996, a team from the Police Assistance and
Respondent.
Promulgated: Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) of the Department of Interior and Local
July 6, 2007 Government (DILG), composed of Chief Inspector Carlos Acosta, SPO4
Isagani Ilas, SPO2 Manubay, SPO2 Sanggalang, SPO2 Teodoro Sinag, SPO2
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Mario Magno, SPO2 de Leon, SPO2 Cecil Fajardo, SPO3 Marcelo Alcancia,
SPO3 Dennis Zarcal, and PO1 Eraldo Lectura, [6] was formed to implement a
DECISION
search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila on 26 August 1996.[7]
TINGA, J.:

At around 3:00 p.m., the team proceeded to the

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 dated 12 November 2004,
affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138,
Makati City, in Criminal Case No. 96-1498, that found Andy Quelnan y
Quino[3] (petitioner) guilty of violating Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.
The accusatory portion of the Information against petitioner reads:
That on or about the 27th day of August, [sic] 1996,
in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control 27.7458 grams of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.[4]
Cityland Condominium in South Superhighway, Makati. Upon arrival, they
went directly to the Security Office of said building to seek assistance in
serving the warrant. Security Officer Celedonio Punsaran (Punsaran)
accompanied the group and they proceeded to Unit 615.
At their knocking, a male person naked from the waist up opened
the door.[8] He was later identified as petitioner. SPO2 Sinag presented the
search warrant to petitioner.[9] Upon entry, the police operatives searched
the unit, which was composed of a small room with a plywood divider
separating the sala from the bedroom.[10] In the presence of petitioner and
Punsaran, the group started searching the place and eventually found on
top of the bedroom table three (3) pieces of transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substances later confirmed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) forensic chemist as shabu, plastic tubings,
weighing scales, an improvised burner, and empty transparent plastic
sachets.[11]Thereafter, the group prepared a receipt of the properties
seized and an Affidavit of Orderly Search allegedly signed by petitioner in
their presence and that of Punsaran.[12]
 Meanwhile, the group also went to Unit 418 of the same building to In behalf of petitioner, Luis Alvarez, the administrator of Cityland
serve the warrant and search the place. The police operatives did not find Condominium, testified that Lee was the actual occupant of Unit 615 at
any occupant in the room. the time petitioner was arrested. [17] Celso Fiesta, petitioners driver, also
stated in court that petitioner resides at Legaspi Tower. On 27 August
Petitioner was then brought to the PARAC office for 1996, he dropped petitioner off at Cityland Condominium
investigation. The pieces of evidence gathered by the police operatives between 1:00 and 2:00 p.m.Two and a half hours later, he went back to
were brought to the NBI for examination. That same day, NBI Forensic pick him up. As he was about to park the car, somebody poked a gun at
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo issued a certification stating that upon him and introduced himself as PARAC. Fiesta was ordered to get out of the
examination, the specimen submitted yielded positive for car and the PARAC team searched the vehicle. They found a gun and
methamphetamine hydrochloride. [13]
The following day, the Arrest Report brought Fiesta to the DILG. He was released the following day.[18]
and Joint Affidavit of Apprehension were executed by the police operatives
leading to the arrest and charging of petitioner for violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. No. 6425.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to
In his defense, petitioner testified that he is a resident of 150 suffer imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
Legaspi Tower 300, 2600 Roxas Boulevard, Manila.[14] He also happens to of prision correccional as minimum to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
be the registered owner of Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum.[19] In convicting
in Makati City, which he leased to Sung Kok Lee (Lee) beginning May 1996. petitioner, the trial court relied heavily on the clear, straightforward, and
[15]
On 27 August 1996, at around 3:00 p.m., petitioner went to Unit 615 to candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses:
collect payment of rental from Lee. Upon knocking at the door, petitioner
They were all present when the search warrant was
was greeted by the maid. The maid told him to wait for Lee inside the implemented at Unit 615 Cityland Condominium. No
room while she went out to infirmity or flaw affecting their credibility exists. Further, the
Court considered that they are public officers and there was
buy some refreshments. After a while, petitioner heard somebody no showing that they were motivated by ill-will testimonies
knocking at the door and he opened it. He saw around 15 to 20 armed or bad faith to falsely testify against the accused. There was
no evidence of intent to harass the accused. The
men who suddenly barged into the room. The officer in charge asked for a presumption of regularity in the performance of their
certain Bernard Kim and petitioner introduced himself as the owner of the functions can be fairly applied.[20]
condominium unit. The police operatives then proceeded to search the On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling,
house for the next half hour while petitioner was waiting in the modifying however the penalty to be imposed on petitioner in that he shall
sala. Petitioner was also forced to sign some documents at suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
gunpoint. Petitioner was then handcuffed and brought to the PARAC office. minimum to three (3) years and six (6) months of prision correccional as
Two days later, he was brought to the Makati Prosecutors Office for inquest maximum.
[21]

and a case was subsequently filed against him.[16]

 Petitioner now seeks the reversal of said judgment. His conviction
or acquittal rests on the validity of the warrantless arrest. The prosecution
proffers that petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto in possession of the
You are commanded to make an immediate search
subject shabu justifying his warrantless arrest. Another crucial issue anytime of the day or night of the premises
arises, that of the validity of the enforcement of the search warrant as abovementioned and forthwith seize and take possession of
the abovementioned MET[H]AMPHETAMINE
basis for the presence of the police operatives in the Cityland HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) subject of the offense and bring
Condominium unit. Therefore, these matters may be summarized into two to this Court said drugs and persons to be dealt with as the
law may direct. You are further directed to submit return
issues for our resolution: whether the search warrant was properly within ten (10) days from today.
enforced and whether petitioner was validly arrested without warrant.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF THIS COURT,
this 26[th] day of August 1996 in Manila, Philippines.
The issue as to whether the search warrant was validly
HON. WILLIAM M. BAYHON
implemented necessitates a review of the tenor of the search warrant,
Executive Judge, RTC
vis--vis the conduct of the police operatives enforcing such warrant. Branch XXIII, Manila
Search Warrant No. 96-585 reads:
NOTE: This Search Warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES from date of issue.[23]
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT Petitioner assails the improper enforcement of the search warrant
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
in that despite the knowledge that petitioner was not the subject of such
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, warrant, the police operatives proceeded anyway with the search and his
Plaintiff
resulting arrest. According to him, the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
- versus - SEARCH WARRANT NO. 96-585
FOR: VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425 that where a search warrant is issued for the search of specifically
BERNARD LIM[22] (Dangerous Drug Act 1972) described premises and not of a person, the omission of the name of the
Room 615 Cityland Condominium
South Superhighway, Makati City owner or occupant of such property in the warrant does not invalidate the
Respondent. same. Petitioner contends that this doctrine applies only if the search

SEARCH WARRANT warrant does not indicate with all certainty the owner or occupant of the
premises sought to be searched; on the contrary, the subject search
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS: warrant indicated with absolute clarity that the person subject thereof is
Kim.
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned
under examining under oath PNP SPO4 ISAGANI J. ILAS and
his witness, that there are [sic] reasonable ground to believe
that VIOLATION OF R.A. [No.] 6425 has been committed or is
about to be committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that still undetermined Quantity of This argument is misplaced. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Met[h]amphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) has [sic] in his Criminal Procedure provides for the requisites for the issuance of search
possession and control.
warrant, to wit:
 SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the
search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is found
personally by the judge after examination under oath or in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that
searched and the things to be seized which may be the said drug is a regulated drug.[25]
anywhere in the Philippines.

More importantly, the prosecution must prove that the accused had

Nowhere in said rule or any other provision in the Revised Rules of the intent to possess the drug. Possession, under the law, includes not
Criminal Procedure is it required that the search warrant must name the only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
person who occupies the described premises. In Uy v. Bureau of Internal possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession

Revenue,[24] the Court has definitively ruled that where the search warrant or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
is issued for the search of specifically described premises only and not for exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or
the search of a person, the failure to name the owner or occupant of such when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
property in the affidavit and search warrant does not invalidate the where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The fact
warrant; and where the name of the owner of the premises sought to be of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any
searched is incorrectly inserted in the search warrant, it is not a fatal reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must
defect if the legal description of the premises to be searched is otherwise prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of
correct so that no discretion is left to the officer making the search as to the drug in the place under his control and dominion, as well as the
the place to be searched. character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence
and character of the drug in the place where he exercises dominion and

A cursory reading of the search warrant reveals that the police control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
officers were ordered to make an immediate search of the premises the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has
mentioned and to seize and take possession of shabu. Furthermore, they control or dominion, or within such premises in the absence of any
were directed to bring persons to be dealt with as the law may direct. satisfactory explanation.
[26]

While petitioner may not be the person subject of the search, the fact that
he was caught in flagrante delicto necessitated his valid warrantless For the trial court, the fact of possession was clearly and

arrest. Therefore, the fact that petitioners name was not indicated in the convincingly established by the prosecution, to wit:
search warrant is immaterial.
Prosecution has presented in Court the three (3)
plastic sachet[s] containing 27.7458 grams of
Turning to the second issue, petitioner insists that his apprehension methamphetamine hydrochloride as well as all
paraphernalia seized from the accused consisting of an
cannot be considered in flagrante delicto because he was not in improvised burner, two (2) pieces of weighing scale, plastic
possession of the forbidden drug. tubing, aluminum foil, empty transparent plastic sachets,
 Icom radio, Calculator, Cellular phone, disposable lighters,
and dominion over the same. First, the shabu was found on top of a table
and two (2) pieces [of] blank cartridge. SPO4 Ilas and SPO2
Sinag clearly testified that they were found on top of a table in Unit 615 of Cityland Condominium when and where only petitioner was
in a room of [sic] Unit 615 in the afternoon of August 27, present inside the premises. Second, petitioner introduced himself as the
1996 at a time when only the accused was inside the
premises. Thus, the fact of possession was clearly and owner of the condominium. Third, petitioner admitted that he was at the
convincingly established.[27] subject premises allegedly to collect rentals from the lessee. Fourth,
petitioner was found naked from the waist up by the police operatives
The Court of Appeals pointed out that possession necessary for upon entering Unit 615. The Solicitor General stresses that petitioners
conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances may be actuation of being naked from the waist up while opening the door to
actual or constructive: greet visitors is natural only to someone who owns the premises. [30] Fifth,
Unit 615 is a studio unit with a divider and a sala. There was no room with
a door to be closed and locked which can prevent petitioner from having
free access to the shabu found on the table.

Although the shabu was not found by the searching

team on his person but in the bedroom of the subject
premises, appellant is deemed in possession thereof since
he was the only person in said premises. Moreover, at the
time of entry of the searching team in the subject premises,
appellant was half-naked from the waist up which, as the
trial court correctly concluded, only indicates extreme
familiarity and gives the impression of he being at home in
the premises, of which he was the registered owner.[28]
This Court is convinced that petitioners control and dominion over
the shabu found on top of the table were sufficiently established by his
questionable presence in Unit 615. Petitioners explanation that he went to
Lees unit to collect rentals and was left by the maid to fend for himself
while the latter went out to buy refreshments is highly suspicious. The
maid never came back. The maids testimony would have corroborated
that of petitioners.

Petitioner counters that he was in all his right to be in the leased

Despite the presentation of the testimonies of Cityland
premises because he had to collect the rentals due him from his
Condominium Administrator Luis Alvarez and other witnesses tending to
tenant. He further argues that the shabu was allegedly found on top of the
prove that petitioner is the owner and lessor of Unit 615 and his actual
table inside the bedroom and not within the immediate location where he
place of residence is in Legaspi Tower, such pieces of evidence do not
was positioned. When he was found half-naked by police operatives in
necessarily prove that petitioner did not have access and control over the
another persons house, petitioner defends his act by invoking his long
subject premises. In fact, petitioners overt act of getting half-naked while
bond of friendship with Lee which made the former treat Lees home like
opening the door establishes intimate familiarity with and over his
his own.[29]
surroundings. Petitioner seeks to justify such act by invoking his long bond
of friendship with Lee. This was, however, belied by the testimony of the
In support of the appellate courts ruling, the Solicitor General
building administrator which showed that Lee was a mere walk-in
maintained that petitioner was in constructive possession of the
applicant and he began renting Unit 615 only on 1 May 1996, barely three
subject shabu by citing several circumstances showing petitioners control
(3) months before petitioner was apprehended.[31]
 Equally doubtful is the existence of the lease contract allegedly executed
between petitioner and Lee which purportedly validates the presence of
Petitioner, in fact, affirmed this fact in his earlier testimony that he allowed
the former in Unit 615, which was to collect rentals from the latter. As the
Lee, whom he barely knew, to occupy the unit with only one month rental
Solicitor General correctly observed, the lease agreement is undated and
deposit:
unnotarized.[33] During cross-examination, the building administrator who
Q: Is it your practice to go personally to that unit to receive presented a copy of the lease agreement could not even remember when
the rental? the contract was executed.[34] Petitioner also testified that the rentals are
A: Yes, sir.
payable at the second week of each month. [35] His statement is
Q: Thats your practice? inconsistent with his avowed effort to collect payment in the last week of
A: Yes, sir.
the month, particularly on 27 August 1996.
Q: How much is the lease price?
A: P6,500.00.
We further find the Solicitor Generals conclusion that petitioner was
Q: Payable monthly? privy to the existence of the shabu on top of the table credible because
A: At the second week of the month.
the unit was a small room with a piece of plywood dividing the sala and
Q: For what month was that rental where [sic] you were the bedroom. With petitioner seemingly comfortable in moving about the
suppose to collect?
unit, the shabu and other paraphernalia could not have escaped his vision.
A: June and July[,] your Honor.

Q: Is it not a practice[,] Mr. Witness[,] that now lessee

should pay the deposit and a few months in
advance?
A: Yes, but he promise he does not have any money and to
produce later on.[sic]

Q: Which rental he is going to pay? Even more telling are the testimonies of the police operatives who
A: The deposit and the monthly rental.
conducted the search and subsequent arrest of petitioner. Inspector
Q: What you are saying [sic] when he entered the premises Acosta testified that his team conducted a search on Unit 615 and found
of this property he does not paid [sic] anything?
petitioner inside the room alone and that the search resulted in the
A: He just paid for the month of May.
discovery of the shabu, to wit:
Q: What you are saying you entered into a lease contract
with a person you do not know during the said
Q: In connection with your duties then as the member of the
month, that he entered the unit he was not able to
PARAC[,] do you recall if there was any occasion if
pay you even the deposit [sic]?
you meet a certain person whose name [was] Andy
A: He paid me just one month.
Quelman?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you agreed?
A: Yes, sir. [H]e promised to pay later on.[32]
Q: During what occasion did you meet this person?
A: During [sic] when we conducted the search of the
Cityland Condominium[,] South Q: And what happened next?
Superhighway[,] Makati City. A: Somebody opened the door.
Q: If this person Andy Quelman is present in this
Courtroom[,] can you point him out in the Court? Q: And after the door was opened[,] what did you and your
team do next?
COURT: A: We presented our search warrant.

Will you step down on the witness stand and tap on Q: To whom?
his shoulder?
COURT:
A: Yes, your Honor.
Would you know who open[ed] the door?
COURT:
A: Yes, sir.
Make of record that the witness stepped down on the
witness stand and tapped the shoulder of a person PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:
seated on the gallery who when asked of his name
answered his name as Andy Quelman. Q: Who?
A: Andy Quelman.
Q: You said that you conducted a search, when was this?
A: August 27, 1996. PROSECUTOR GARVIDA:

Q: What time? Q: Can you describe[,] Mr. Witness[,] the appearance of Mr.
A: 3:00 oclock in the afternoon. Andy Quelman when he opened the door?
A: He is half[-]naked wearing pants.
Q: Where did you conduct the search?
A: At room 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Q: What about the upper body?
Superhighway[,] Makati City. A: Naked.

xxxx

Q: By what authority did you conduct your search at room or

[U]nit 615 Cityland Condominium[,] South Q: Upon presenting the search warrant[,] what did you do
Superhighway[,] Makati City. next?
A: We are armed with [a] search warrant. A: We proceeded to the room to conduct the search.

Q: Issued by whom? xxxx

A: The RTC Judge Hon. Bayhon, City of Manila.
xxxx
Q: So upon arriving at the 6th floor what did you do, or what
did you do?
A: We knocked at the door of [R]oom 615.
Q: You said you proceeded to conduct the search. [W]hat
was Mr. Quelman doing while you are conducting the
search?
A: He was sitting at the table inside the room.
xxxx
 the recognized exceptions[39] to the conclusiveness of the findings of fact
Q: Now can you describe to this Court how you conducted
the search[,] Mr. Witness? of the trial and appellate courts.
A: First we proceeded to his room and I saw Mr. Quelman
sitting at his table. Later on we found at his table all
the paraphernalia. In sum, petitioners unlawful possession, as exhibited by his control and
dominion over the shabu found on top of the table, was duly established
Q: Can you enumerate to this Court what[,] if any[,] did you
find [sic] during the search? by the following evidence: his presence in Unit 615 at the time of his
A: We found 3 transparent plastic containing white arrest;[40] his representation to the police that he was the owner of the
crystalline substance.
unit;[41] his half-naked state when he opened the door, strongly implying
Q: Where did you find [sic]? that he had stayed in the house longer than he claimed to be; and finally,
A: Atop the table.
the fact that the shabu was found on top of a table beside the bed which
xxxx appears to be within sight of petitioner as there was a mere divider
between the sala and bedroom.[42]
Q: What did you do with Mr. Quelman after you found these
items which you [have] just enumerated?
A: We bring [sic] Andy Quelman to our office.[36] Having caught petitioner in flagrante delicto, the police operatives
are obligated to apprehend him even without a warrant of arrest.
The foregoing testimony was substantially corroborated by SPO4
Isagani Ilas and SPO1 Teodoro Sinag who were both part of the arresting We shall now determine the imposable penalty. Both the lower
team. These witnesses positively identified petitioner as the occupant of courts erred as to the respective penalties they imposed. Section 16,
Unit 615 at the time the search was conducted and that he was caught in Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, provides that if the quantity of the
flagrante delicto when the shabu was found in his constructive possession. regulated drug involved, in this case, shabu, is less than 200 grams, the
The trial court placed great weight on the testimonies of these police penalty to be imposed shall range from prision
officers and accorded them the presumption of regularity in the correccional to reclusionperpetua. Since petitioner was charged
performance of their functions.[37] The prosecution of drug cases largely
depends on the credibility of the police officers. The factual findings of the
trial court especially those which revolve on matters of credibility of
witnesses deserve to be respected when no glaring errors bordering on a with the possession of 27.7458 grams of shabu, the imposable penalty
gross misapprehension of the facts or no speculative, arbitrary, and is prision correccional.[43] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
unsupported conclusions can be gleaned from such findings. The petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional in its medium period as
the witnesses' deportment, demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling maximum.
examination.[38] In this case, the RTC was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner has not convinced this Court of the existence of any of
 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Court
of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 22001 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that petitioner ANDY QUELNAN y QUINO is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day of arresto mayor in its medium period as
minimum to Three (3) Years of prision correccional in its medium period as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial
Prosecutor FAUSTINO T. CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR
HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED, MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD
ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal
at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision promulgated
on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
[1]
Said judgment dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari to invalidate
(i) the order of Judge Caesar A Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial
Court dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28, 1996
denying the Peoples motion for reconsideration. [3] Those orders were
handed down in Criminal Case No. 43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of
explosives after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:
1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge
Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at
Quezon City on December 15, 1995,[4]
2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under
the warrant, and
3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the
Court within five (5) days to be released thereafter in favor of the
lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in
the Search Warrant."
The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are
hereunder set out.
1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for
search warrant before Branch 261, RTC of Quezon City against Mr.
Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and
explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay
Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte Bulacan.
2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068
(95) against Mr. Hussain was issued not at Abigail Variety Store but
at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store
resulting in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the
seizure of their personal belongings, papers and effects such as
wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts,
sunglasses and travelling bags including cash amounting to
$3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted)
which were never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00
was however returned to the respondents upon order of the court
on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece
of dynamite stick; two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one
(1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items described in the
search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four
(4) gmm pistol; (c) blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical
ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg and
ammunitions.
3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served,
a return was made without mentioning the personal belongings,
papers and effects including cash belonging to the private
respondents. There was no showing that lawful occupants were
made to witness the search.
4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment,
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged; ** and on the same date,
submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant
and to Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15,
1996;
5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading
(consolidated comment on petition for certiorari **): On January 29,
1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted
by respondent Judge and the following facts had been established
as contained in the order dated January 30, 1996** to wit:
 1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment
No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigails Variety Store;
2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the
building as it is correspondingly called only Apartment No.
1, 2, 3, and 4;
3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails
Variety Store;
4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from
Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No. 1;
5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have
its own respective doors used for ingress and egress.
That there being no objection on the said observation of
the Court, let the same be reduced on the records.
SO ORDERED.
6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly
granting the motion to quash search warrant **;[5]
7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the
concomitant motion to dismiss **;
8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan
filed a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion on the
order quashing the search warrant**;
9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent
filed opposition/comment and supplemental opposition/comment
on the motion for reconsideration **:
10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying
the motion for reconsideration **; (and on) June 11, 1996, private
respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.
Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996
above referred to, the Solicitor General forthwith commenced a special
civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did not prosper,
however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate
Tribunal promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the
case for lack of merit.
The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit: [6]
1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the
place described in the search warrant. This fact was ascertained
by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings
wherein, not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order
dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in which the accused
(herein petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is
a place other than and separate from, and in no way connected
with, albeit and adjacent to, Abigails Variety Store, the place
stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to
Judge Bacalla relative to the application for a search warrant,
actually depicted the particular place to be searched -- was
effectively confuted by Judge Casanova who pointed out that said
SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and
not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable
Judge (Bacalla, who) instead ** directed them to search Abigail
Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December
15, 1995 -- this, too, being the address given in the Application for
Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by P/SR INSP.
Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader. The untenability of the
claim is made more patent by the Peoples admission, during the
hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that
said sketch was in truth not attached to the application for search
warrant ** (but) merely attached to the motion for
reconsideration.[7]
Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following
observations of Judge Casanova contained in his Order of May 28,
1996, viz.:[8]
(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different
from the place mentioned in the Search Warrant, that is
the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes,
SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4 Cesar D. Santiago, who were
all EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of
 being RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN
were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH to say in
TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search
Warrant the words KATABI, or KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG
ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin or if they
happen to be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they
were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the
ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT
to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE, the place they are going to
raid.**.
3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful
occupants of the place (herein private respondents) or any
member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and
immobilized in the living room at the time. The search was thus
done in violation of the law.[9]
4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48
hours as required by the warrant itself; (i)n fact the return was
done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section
11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.[10]
5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to
quash search warrant, pursuant to the doctrinal tenets laid down
in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous
ruling of the Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA
295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a search warrant
has been issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal
case is initiated in another court or branch thereof as a result of
the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure.The
criminal case is more substantial than the search warrant
proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the
right to rule on the search warrant and to exclude evidence
unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).
6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent
Judge, in light of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and Rule
126 of the Rules of Court.
7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal,
not the special civil aciton of certiorari.
The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict
ascribing to the Court of Appeals the following errors, to wit:
1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the
proceedings before the issuing Court and overturning the latters
determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to
be searched;
2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not
attached to the application for warrant despite the clear evidence
** to the contrary;
3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:
4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be
diminished by the tardiness by which the return is made;
5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made
a substitute for appeal although the circumstances attending the
case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and
6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to
prove the validity of the warrant when the petition before it was
abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof.
The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a
search warrant was validly issued as regards the apartment in which
private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly,
whether or not that particular apartment had been specifically described
in the warrant.
The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the
Quezon City RTC for the search warrant had direct, personal knowledge of
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.It claims tha tone of
said officers, infact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be
searched prior to the search: this being the first of four (4) separate
apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same
police officers who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus
had personal knowledge of the place to be searched and had the
competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects
should be taken therefrom; and they had presented evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place
they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant
the rear of Abigail Variety Store -- was not what the Judge who issued the is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the
warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described place to be searched, look to the affidavit in the official court file.
in the search warrant.
Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants
The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty which, upon perusal, immediately disclosed an obvious typographical
depiction of the premises to be searched. For in their application and in error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive material
the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place allegedly concealed in two places: one at No. 19. Road 3, Project 6,
to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C & D. RMS Building, Quezon
warrant: premises located at Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-
Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And 82 [b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at
the scope of the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City because both
-- by the Judges admonition in the warrant that the search be limited only search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
to the premises herein described. Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive
material was hidden. This was error, of course but, as this Court there
Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose
least five (5) distinct places in the area involved: the store known as that the Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one
Abigails Variety Store, and four (4) separate and independent residential place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the search warrants
apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units
contiguous to each other although there are no connecting doors through C&D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening
which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that evidently, this
others. Each of the five (5) places is independent of the others, and may was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the
be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the police second warrant (No. 20-82 [b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by
officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one of the the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the warrant could
residential units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store: that immediately consult the records in the official court file.[12]
next to the store (Number 1).
The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an
However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the obvious typographical erro involving ambiguous descriptions of the place
physical configuration of the store and the apartments behind the store, to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that
the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos,
pinpoint Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the the inconsistency calling for clarification was immediately perceptible on
warrant -- which directs that the search be limited only to the premises the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no
herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument,
the apartment units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the place to be
correct said description. They seem to have simply assumed that their searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the
own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated, same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the judge
according to them, in the sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers
Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient particularization of had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit
the general identification of the place in the search warrant. to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched -- although not that
The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they
by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, [11] allegedly to the effect that the applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in which
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their the private respondents were then residing.
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution,
the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails providing that:[14]
Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
amplified or modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, to be serched, and the things to be seized.,
even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door
to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be
warrant that discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from based on probable cause, personally determined by the judge after
them. The particularization of the description of the place to be searched examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the
may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it witnesses he may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention being that the search
search. be confined strictly to the place so described.

The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a
review of Judge Bacallas finding of probable cause, as if he were an
appellate court. A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge
Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge
Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and the warrant itself, as regards the
identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla. [13] In Judge
Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record,
put in doubt the sufficiency of the determination of the facts on which the
search warrant was founded.
The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily
established probable cause before Judge Bacalla for the issuance of a
search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that
the place described in the search warrant -- which, of course, is the only
place that may be legitimately searched in virtue thereof -- was not that
which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the
result that what they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations
was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine, while there was
a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigails Variety
Store, there was none for Apartment No. 1 -- the first of the four (4)
There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional
requirement that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be
searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter
alia of the search-and-seizure provision) shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[16]
In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such
other points sought to be made by the Office of the Solicitor General as
whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the
residential apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly
marked -- was in fact attached to the application for the search warrant; or
(2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search
warrant was diminished by the tardiness by which the return was made, or
(4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which
** (the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the
trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special civil action of certiorari in the
Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these
issues would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search
and seizure proceedings are void because the place set forth in the search 3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in
speciousness of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression
precisely what they had described to the Judge, and originally and at all as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if
times had in mind. the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate
courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to supress
opines that where a search warrant has been issued by the evidence are alternative and not cummulative remedies. In order
court other than the one trying the main criminal case, the proper to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently
recourse of persons wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however, that
issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case involving the objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings
subject of the warrant is afterwards filed. [17] In support, it cites the second for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
of five (5) policy guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to
Appeals[18] concerning possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in the
accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is appopriate higher court.
pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for
the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by,
criminal case. Said second guideline reads: [19] Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City, and the return was
made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection
2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try with the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the
the main criminal case) issues the search warrant, a motion to Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this situation, a motion to quash the
quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not
court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate otherwise contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC
higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after the criminal action
issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to
known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings suppress evidence was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within
for the quashal of the warrant, other they shall be deemed waived. guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the latter court
must be deemed to have acted within its competence.
The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is
issued by one court and the criminal action based on the results of the WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a Appeals of September 11, 1996 -- which dismissed the Peoples petition
motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the
be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a motion may be filed for the Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in the
first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the reasons set out in the foregoing
criminal action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the motion does so to the
exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the SO ORDERED.
Omnibus Motion Rule and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly
stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what properly applies
to the case at bar, to wit:
 [G.R. No. 129035. August 22, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANNABELLE
FRANCISCO y DAVID, @ ANNABELLE TABLAN, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, accused-appellant Annabelle
Francisco, were placed under surveillance after the police confirmed,
through a test-buy operation, that they were engaged in selling shabu or
methamphetamine hydrochloride. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San
Juan of OADDI-WPDC, U.N. Avenue, Manila applied for a search warrant
before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to authorize them to
search the premises at 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report [1] of
SPO2 Teneros. It stated that Dante Baradilla, of 1726 Lallana St., corner
Sta. Catalina St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed to be one of Federico Veronas
runners in the illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of
SPO2 Teneros for the arrest of Verona. [2] The search warrant[3] was
subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing the search of shabu and
paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months
pregnant, was resting inside the second floor masters bedroom of their
two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City, when she
heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly opened the front
door. Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a
search for about an hour.Accused-appellant inquired about their identities
but they refused to answer. It was only at the police station where she
found out that the team of searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police
team, along with Barangay Chairwoman Miguelita Limpo and Kagawad
Bernie de Jesus, both of Barangay 64, Zone-6, District 2, Caloocan City,
enforced the warrant and seized the following: [4]
1. One (1) Salad Set marked Pyrex wrapped in a plastic containing
white crysthalline (sic) substance or methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu with markings by the undersigned
inside the house of subjects residence weighing (230) two
hundred thirty (sic) grams of methampetamine hydrochloride
or shabu by Aida Abear-Pascual of NBI Forensic Chemist;
2. Several plastics in different sizes;
3. Two (2) roll of strip aluminum foil;
4. Five (5) tooter water pipe and improvised and two burner
improvised;
5. Two (2) pantakal or measuring weight in shabu;
6. Two (2) cellular phone motorola with markings;
7. One (1) monitoring device with cord and with markings;
8. Several pcs. with strip aluminum foil;
9. Two (2) masking tip (sic) with markings;
10. Twentee (sic) two thousand nine hundred ninetee (sic) pesos.
The police team also allegedly seized the amount of P180,000.00, a
Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys, an ATM card, bank books and car documents.
Consequently, accused-appellant was charged with violation of
Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in an information[5] which reads:
That about 10:30 oclock in the morning of 30 March 1996 at No. 122 SCL
M. Hizon St., Kalookan City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
court, the above-named accused grouping herself together with some
other persons whose liabilities are still being determined in a preliminary
investigation, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession, custody and/or control, methamphetamine hydrochloride
popularly known as shabu, a regulated drug, with a total weight of 230
grams, without the corresponding license and/or prescription to possess,
have custody and/or control over the aforesaid regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF
THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF SHABU;
Accused-appellant filed a motion to quash the search
warrant[6] asserting that she and her live-in partner Federico Verona II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE
had been leasing an apartment unit at No. 120 M. Hizon Street, AGAINST THE ACCUSED;
District 2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the
present as certified by the owner of the apartment unit. III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED WAS ILLEGAL AND VIOLATIVE OF ACCUSEDS
On arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, [7] after which, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS;
trial on the merits ensued.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED
The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of AFTER FINDING THAT THE SEARCH WAS INDEED CONDUCTED
the search warrant. It rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty AT A PLACE DIFFERENT FROM THAT DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH
as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads: WARRANT.

WHEREFORE premises considered, and the prosecution having established
beyond an iota of doubt the guilt of the Accused for Violation of Sec. 16,
Art. III, RA 6425 as amended by RA 7659 and considering that the total net
weight of subject drugs consists of 230 grams, this Court in the absence of
any modifying circumstance hereby imposes upon the Accused the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P1,000,000.00 pesos, and to
pay the costs.
The appeal is impressed with merit.
Plainly, the basic issue submitted for resolution is the reasonableness
of the search conducted by the police officers at accused-appellants
residence.
The trial court, in upholding the validity of the search, stated that: [10]

The period of Accuseds preventive imprisonment shall be credited in full in Re 3rd argument - the fact that the search warrant in question was served
the service of her sentence pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. at apartment No. 120 and not at the specific address stated therein which
is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not by itself render as illegal the
Subject drugs and paraphernalia are hereby declared confiscated and search and seizure of subject stuff seized by the operatives pursuant
forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with thereto. While it is true that the rationale behind the constitutional and
law. procedural requirements that the search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched is to the end that no unreasonable
The return to the Accused of the two (2) cellular phones, (Motorola Micro search warrant and seizure may not be made (sic) and abuses may not be
Fac) (sic) Nos. S-2968A and S-3123A, which were turned over by the committed, however, this requirement is not without exception. It is the
Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Manila RTC, Br. 3 to her counterpart in this prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a description of the place to be
sala (Exh. 30) as well as the deposit of cash money in the amount of searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable
P22,990.00 with the Manila RTC Clerk of Court JESUS MANINGAS as effort ascertain and identify the place intended (People vs. Veloso, G.R. No.
evidenced by acknowledgment receipt dated 21 May 1996, are hereby L-23051, Oct. 20, 1925).
ordered.
Significantly in the case at bar the implementing officer SPO2 Teneros was
SO ORDERED.[8] principally the concerned official who conducted an active surveillance on
the Accused and subject house (Surveillance Report, Exh. 9) and pursued
On appeal, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of this case by filing the corresponding application for the issuance of a
errors:[9] search warrant. Perforce, SPO2 TENEROS was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to have prior and personal knowledge of particular house The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright
intended in the warrant which definitely refer to no other than the very nullification of the search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants
place where the same was accordingly served. must be absolutely legal, for there is not a description of process known to
the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, maintains that the search was there is none which excites such intense feeling in consequence of its
grossly infirm as the subject search warrant authorized the police humiliating and degrading effect.The warrants will always be construed
authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. However, strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical
the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. accuracy. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.[13]
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a
person, his home and his possessions against unreasonable intrusions of The application for search warrant filed by SPO2 Teneros requested for
the State is articulated in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which authority to search specifically the premises of No. 122 M. Hizon St.,
reads: Caloocan City. The application was accompanied by a sketch [14] of the area
which bears two parallel lines indicated as 10th Avenue drawn vertically
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, on the left-hand side of the paper. Intersecting these lines are two other
PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND parallel lines drawn horizontally and indicated as M. Hizon. Above and on
SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE the left-hand side of the upper parallel line of the lines identified as M.
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL Hizon, is a square marked as Basketball Court. A similar drawing placed
ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY near the right-hand side of the upper parallel line is another square
BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE marked as PNR Compound. Beneath the lower parallel line of the lines
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND marked as M. Hizon and right at the center is also a square enclosing an X
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE sign marked as 122, presumably No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
During the hearing for the application of the search warrant, police
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that asset Dante Baradilla described the house to be searched as:
there be a particular description of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. The rule is that a description of a place to Bale dalawang palapag po, semi concrete, color cream na ang mga
be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with bintana ay may rehas na bakal at sliding at sa harap ay may terrace at
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and may sasakyan sila na ginagamit sa pagdeliver ng shabu. [15]
distinguish it from other places in the community. Any designation or
description known to the locality that leads the officer unerringly to it The trial court then conducted an ocular inspection of the area. It
satisfies the constitutional requirement.[11] turned out that No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was a concrete two-
storey residential building with steel-barred windows and a terrace. It was
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant owned by a certain Mr. Joseph Ching. The house, however, bore no house
are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined number. The house marked No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City was
personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she actually two houses away from accused-appellants house at No. 120 M.
may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under Hizon St.
oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the On the other hand, No. 120 Hizon St. was a compound consisting of
place to be searched and the things to be seized.[12] three apartments enclosed by only one gate marked on the outside as No.
120. The different units within No. 120 Hizon St. were not numbered
separately. Accused-appellant rented the third unit from the entrance
which was supposedly the subject of the search. The entire compound had SPO2 Teneros attempted to explain the error by saying that
an area of approximately ninety (90) square meters. The second unit was he thought the house to be searched bore the address 122 M. Hizon St.,
located at the back of the first unit and the third unit was at the rear end Caloocan City instead of No. 120 M. Hizon St. [22] But as this Court ruled
of the compound. Hence, access to the third unit from M. Hizon Street was in Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion,[23] thus:
only through the first two units and the common gate indicated as No.
120. The occupants of the premises stated that they commonly use No. The police had no authority to search the apartment behind the store,
120 to designate their residence. which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended
it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched
In People v. Veloso, this Court declared that even a description of the cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended. [16] The x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
description of the building in the application for a search warrant ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
in Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself refer to the building No. meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands which was applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
considered sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. [17] done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in
the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to
from those in Veloso. At first glance, the description of the place to be allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
searched in the warrant seems to be sufficient.However, from the warrant on the claim that the place actually searchedalthough not that
application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the specified in the warrant[was] exactly what they had in view when they
police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
and identify the place intended precisely because it was wrongly described evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
as No. 122, although it may have been located on the same street as No. place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
120. Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
that house located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St. issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of
the facts of the case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
search warrants to avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of
discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in refusing to nullify the actions of The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or
the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their alleged knowledge modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the
of the place. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.Such
indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police. [18] a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the
search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as
It may well be that the police officer identified No. 120 M. Hizon St. as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the
the subject of the actual search. However, as indicated in the witness power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be delineated in
affidavit[19] in support of the application for a search warrant, [20] No. 122 M. the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
Hizon St. was unmistakably indicated. Inexplicably, a few days after the and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
search warrant was issued by the court and served at No. 120 M. Hizon Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
St., SPO2 Teneros informed Judge Bayhon in the return of search description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the
warrant[21] that the warrant was properly served at 122 M. Hizon St., Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of
Caloocan City, Metro Manila as indicated in the search warrant itself. the police officers conducting the search.
 All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit: Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I
VIOLATION OF THIS OR THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government
FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING. should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to
violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are Constitution itself.
[27]

prohibited from being used in evidence. Absent these items presented by

the prosecution, the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional
loses its basis. Trial Court, Branch 127, Caloocan City, convicting accused-appellant of
violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing
As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of
seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the P1,000,000.00 as well as the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
seizures. Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this Annabelle Francisco y David @ Annabelle Tablan is ACQUITTED and is
exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement, unless she is lawfully
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish held in custody for another cause.
means of coercing evidence.[24]
SO ORDERED.
On another note, we find disturbing the variety of the items seized by
the searching team in this case. In the return of search warrant, they
admitted the seizure of cellular phones, money and television/monitoring
device items that are not within the palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia,
which were the only items authorized to be seized. What is more
disturbing is the suggestion that some items seized were not reported in
the return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks, and money. In
an attempt to justify the presence of the car in the police station, SPO2
Teneros had to concoct a most incredible story that the accused-appellant,
whose pregnancy was already in the third trimester, drove her car to the
police station after the intrusion at her house even if the police officers
had with them several cars.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding

party to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.[25]

It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to

the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character
and therefore must be strictly complied with. To quote from the landmark
American decision of Boyd v. United States: It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon.Their motto should be obsta principiis.[26]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. Nos. 164368-69
Petitioner, x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

DECISION

Present:
BRION, J.:

PUNO, C.J.,
The People of the Philippines (the People) filed this Petition for
QUISUMBING, Review on Certiorari[1] to seek the reversal of the Sandiganbayans Joint
- versus -
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Resolution dated July 12, 2004, granting respondent Joseph Ejercito

CARPIO, Estradas (Estrada) demurrer to evidence in Crim. Case No. 26565.[2]

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
THE FACTS
CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES, On April 4, 2001, an Information for plunder (docketed as Crim.

Case No. 26558) was filed with the Sandiganbayan against respondent
TINGA,
Estrada, among other accused. A separate Information for illegal use of
CHICO-NAZARIO, alias, docketed as Crim. Case No. 26565, was likewise filed against
Estrada. The Amended Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 reads:
VELASCO, JR.,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
NACHURA,
That on or about 04 February 2000, or sometime
and THE HONORABLE SPECIAL
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines
DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
BRION, and above-named accused, being then President of the Republic
Respondents.
of the Philippines, without having been duly authorized,
PERALTA, JJ.
judicially or administratively, taking advantage of his
position and committing the offense in relation to office, i.e.,
in order to CONCEAL THE ill-gotten wealth HE ACQUIRED
Promulgated: during his tenure and his true identity as THE President of
the Republic of the Philippines, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE
VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ
April 2, 2009
the SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered
 name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents documents; both Ocampo and Curato also testified that Aprodicio
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Lacquian and Fernando Chua were present on that occasion;

CONTRARY TO LAW. B. (1) The testimony of PCIB-Greenhills Branch Manager Teresa

Barcelan, who declared that a certain Baby Ortaliza (Ortaliza)
transacted several times with her; that Ortaliza deposited several
checks in PCIB Savings Account No. 0160-62502-5 under the
account name Jose Velarde on the following dates (as evidenced by
Crim. Case Nos. 26565 and 26558 were subsequently consolidated deposit receipts duly marked in evidence):
for joint trial. Still another Information, this time for perjury and docketed
as Crim. Case No. 26905, was filed with the Sandiganbayan against a. 20 October 1999 (Exh. MMMMM)
Estrada. This was later consolidated, too, with Crim. Cases No. 26558 and
b. 8 November 1999 (Exh. LLLLL)
26565.
c. 22 November 1999 (Exh. NNNNN)

Estrada was subsequently arrested on the basis of a warrant of d. 24 November 1999 (Exh. OOOOO)
arrest that the Sandiganbayan issued.
e. 25 November 1999 (Exh. PPPPP)

f. 20 December 1999 (Exh. QQQQQ)

On January 11, 2005, we ordered the creation of a Special Division
g. 21 December 1999 (Exh. RRRRR)
in the Sandiganbayan to try, hear, and decide the charges of plunder and
related cases (illegal use of alias and perjury) against respondent Estrada. h. 29 December 1999 (Exh. SSSSS)
[3]

i. 4 January 2000 (Exh. TTTTT)

j. 10 May 2000 (Exh. UUUUU)

At the trial, the People presented testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove the allegations of the Informations for plunder, illegal k. 6 June 2000 (Exh. VVVVV)
use of alias, and perjury. The Peoplesevidence for the illegal alias
l. 25 July 2000 (Exh. WWWWW)
charge, as summarized by the Sandiganbayan, consisted of:

(2) Documents duly identified by witnesses showing that Lucena

A. The testimonies of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
Ortaliza was employed in the Office of the Vice President and, later
(PCIB) officers Clarissa G. Ocampo (Ocampo) and Atty. Manuel
on, in the Office of the President when Estrada occupied these
Curato (Curato) who commonly declared that on February 4, 2000,
positions and when deposits were made to the Jose Velarde Savings
Estrada opened a numbered trust account (Trust Account C-163)
Account No. 0160-62502-5.
with PCIB and signed as Jose Velarde in the account opening

The People filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits in the consolidated
cases, which the Sandiganbayan admitted into evidence in a Resolution
dated October 13, 2003.[4] The accused separately moved to reconsider
the Sandiganbayan Resolution;[5] the People, on the other hand, filed its
Consolidated Comment/Opposition to the motions.[6] The Sandiganbayan
denied the motions in its Resolution dated November 17, 2003.[7]
3. There is no proof of public and habitual use of alias as
the documents offered by the prosecution are banking
documents which, by their nature, are confidential and
cannot be revealed without following proper procedures;
and
4. The use of alias is absorbed in plunder.

After the People rested in all three cases, the defense moved to be
allowed to file a demurrer to evidence in these cases. [8] In its Joint
Resolution dated March 10, 2004,[9] the Sandiganbayan only granted the
defense leave to file demurrers in Crim. Case Nos. 26565 (illegal use of
alias) and 26905 (perjury). The People opposed the demurrers through a Consolidated
Opposition that presented the following arguments:[12]

Estrada filed separate Demurrers to Evidence for Crim. Case Nos.

1. That the use of fictitious names in bank transaction
26565 and 26905.[10] His demurrer to evidence for Crim. Case No. 26565
was not expressly prohibited until BSP No. 302 is of no
(illegal use of alias) was anchored on the following grounds [11]:
moment considering that as early as Commonwealth
Act No. 142, the use of alias was already
prohibited. Movant is being prosecuted for violation of
1. Of the thirty-five (35) witnesses presented by the C.A. No. 142 and not BSP Circular No. 302;
prosecution, only two (2) witnesses, Ms. Clarissa
Ocampo and Atty. Manuel Curato, testified that on one
occasion (4 February 2000), they saw movant use the
2. Movants reliance on Ursua vs. Court of Appeals (256
name Jose Velarde;
SCRA 147 [1996]) is misplaced;

2. The use of numbered accounts and the like was legal

3. Assuming arguendo that C.A. No. 142, as amended,
and was prohibited only in late 2001 as can be gleaned
requires publication of the alias and the habitual use
from Bangko Sentral Circular No. 302, series of 2001,
thereof, the prosecution has presented more than
dated 11 October 2001;
sufficient evidence in this regard to convict movant for
illegal use of alias; and

4. Contrary to the submission of movant, the instant

case of illegal use of alias is not absorbed in plunder.

Estrada replied to the Consolidated Opposition through
Consolidated Reply Opposition.
THE ASSAILED SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
The Sandiganbayan issued on July 12, 2004 the Resolution now
assailed in this petition. The salient points of the assailed resolution are:
First the coverage of Estradas indictment. The Sandiganbayan
found that the only relevant evidence for the indictment are those relating
to what is described in the Information i.e., the testimonies and
documents on the opening of Trust Account C-163 on February 4,
2000. The Sandiganbayan reasoned out that the use of the
disjunctive or between on or about 04 February 2000 and sometime
prior or subsequent thereto means that the act/s allegedly committed
on February 4, 2000 could have actually taken place prior to or
subsequent thereto; the use of the conjunctive was simply the
prosecutions procedural tool to guard against any variance between the
date stated in the Information and that proved during the trial in a
situation in which time was not a material ingredient of the offense; it
does not mean and cannot be read as a roving commission that includes
acts and/or events separate and distinct from those that took place on
the single date on or about 04 February 2000 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the use of the
disjunctive or prevented it from interpreting the Information any other
way.
Second the Peoples failure to present evidence that proved
Estradas commission of the offense. The Sandiganbayan found that the
People failed to present evidence that Estrada committed the crime
punished under Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6085 (CA 142), as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ursua v.
Court of Appeals.[13] It ruled that there is an illegal use of alias within the
context of CA 142 only if the use of the alias is public and habitual. In
a Estradas case, the Sandiganbayan noted, the application of the principles
was not as simple because of the complications resulting from the nature
of the transaction involved the alias was used in connection with the
opening of a numbered trust account made during the effectivity
of R.A. No. 1405, as amended,[14] and prior to the enactment of
Republic R.A. No. 9160.[15]
Estrada did not publicly use the alias Jose Velarde:
a. Estradas use of the alias Jose Velarde in his dealings
with Dichavez and Ortaliza after February 4, 2000 is not relevant in light of
the conclusion that the acts imputed to Estrada under the Information
were the act/s committed on February 4, 2000 only. Additionally, the
phrase, Estrada did represent himself as Jose Velarde in several
transactions, standing alone, violates Estradas right to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation, because it is very general and
vague. This phrase is qualified and explained by the succeeding phrase
and use and employ the said alias Jose Velarde which is neither his
registered name at birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents
with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. Thus, Estradas
representations before persons other than those mentioned in the
Information are immaterial; Ortaliza and Dichavez do not fall within the
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities specified in the
Information. Estradas representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez are not
therefore covered by the indictment.
b. The Sandiganbayan rejected the application of the
principle in the law of libel that mere communication to a third person is
publicity; it reasoned out that that the definition of publicity is not limited
to the way it is defined under the law on libel; additionally, the application
of the libel law definition is onerous to the accused and is precluded by the
ruling in Ursua that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be construed
strictly against the State and favorably for the accused. It ruled that the
definition under the law on libel, even if it applies, considers a the use of anonymous accounts, accounts under fictitious names, and all
communication to a third person covered by the privileged communication other similar accounts, is a legislative acknowledgment that a gaping hole
rule to be non-actionable. Estradas use of the alias in front of Ocampo and previously existed in our laws that allowed depositors to hide their true
Curato is one such privileged communication under R.A. No. 1405, as identities.The Sandiganbayan noted that the prohibition was lifted from
amended. The Sandiganbayan said: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Circular No. 251 dated July 7,
2000 another confirmation that the opening of a numbered trust account
was perfectly legal when it was opened on February 4, 2000.
Movants act of signing Jose Velarde in bank
documents being absolutely confidential, the witnessing
thereof by bank officers who were likewise sworn to secrecy The Sandiganbayan ruled that the provisions of CA No. 142, as
by the same law cannot be considered as public as to fall interpreted in Ursua, must necessarily be harmonized with the provisions
within the ambit of CA 142 as amended. On account of the
of R.A. No.1405 and R.A. No. 9160 under the principle that every statute
absolute confidentiality of the transaction, it cannot be said
should be construed in a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. A
that movant intended to be known by this name in addition
reasonable scrutiny, the Sandiganbayan said, of all these laws in relation
to his real name. Confidentiality and secrecy negate
to the present case, led it to conclude that the use of an alias within the
publicity. Ursua instructs:
context of a bank transaction (specifically, the opening of a numbered
account made before bank officers) is protected by the secrecy provisions
of R.A. No. 1405, and is thus outside the coverage of CA No. 142 until the
Hence, the use of a fictitious name or passage into law of R.A. No. 9160.
a different name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or
indication that the user intends to be
known by this name in addition to his real
name from that day forth does not fall within
THE PETITION
the prohibition in C.A. No. 142 as amended.

c. The Sandiganbayan further found that the intention

not to be publicly known by the name Jose Velarde is shown by the nature
of a numbered account a perfectly valid banking transaction at the
time Trust Account C-163 was opened. The opening, too, of a numbered The People filed this petition raising the following issues:
trust account, the Sandiganbayan further ruled, did not impose on Estrada
the obligation to disclose his real identity the obligation R.A. No. 6713
imposes is to file under oath a statement of assets and liabilities. 1. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
[16]
Reading CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405 and R.A. No. 6713 together, Estrada discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
had the absolute obligation to disclose his assets including the amount of holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his
his bank deposits, but he was under no obligation at all to disclose the alias Jose Velarde was not public despite the presence of
other particulars of the bank account (such as the name he used to open Messrs. Aprodicio Laquian and Fernando Chua on 4
it). February 2000;

Third the effect of the enactment of R.A. No. 9160.[17] The

Sandiganbayan said that the absolute prohibition in R.A. No. 9160 against
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in
holding that the use by respondent Joseph Estrada of his The Law on Illegal Use of Alias and the Ursua Ruling
alias Jose Velarde was allowable under banking rules,
despite the clear prohibition under Commonwealth Act
No. 142; Sections 1 and 2 of CA No. 142, as amended, read:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary,

cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes

3. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in dismissing Crim. Case No. 26565 and in and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a
applying R.A. No. 1405 as an exception to the illegal use
of alias punishable under Commonwealth Act No. 142; normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name

different from the one with which he was registered at birth

4. Whether the alleged harmonization and application
made by the court a quo of R.A. No.1405 and
Commonwealth Act No. 142 were proper;
in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien, with which
he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry;

or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a

5. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to the use of the
alias Jose Velarde by respondent Joseph Estrada on not been registered in any local civil registry and who have
February 4, 2000;
not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this

act within which to register their names in the civil registry

6. Whether the court a quo gravely erred and abused its
discretion in departing from its earlier final finding on of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic
the non-applicability of Ursua v. Court of Appeals and
name and one or two surnames.
forcing its application to the instant case.

Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall

apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally

THE COURTS RULING
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name

and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial

The petition has no merit. authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
 shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and
the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his
immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has
such names other than his original or real name, specifying
the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial
authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the
alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local
civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names
other than his original or real name unless the same is or
are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
How this law is violated has been answered by
the Ursua definition of an alias a name or names used by a person or
intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in
business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is
registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority. There must be, in the words
of Ursua, a sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this
name (the alias) in addition to his real name from that day forth [for
the use of alias to] fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142
as amended.[18]
Ursua further relates the historical background and rationale
that led to the enactment of CA No. 142, as follows:
The enactment of C.A. No. 142 was made primarily
to curb the common practice among the Chinese of
adopting scores of different names and aliases which
created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a
practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious
names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully
maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly,
claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A.
No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name,
unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial
proceedings and recorded in the civil register. [19]
Following the doctrine of stare decisis,[20] we are guided by
the Ursua ruling on how the crime punished under CA No. 142 may be
committed. Close adherence to this ruling, in other words, is
unavoidable in the application of and the determination of criminal
liability under CA No. 142.
Among the many grounds the People invokes to avoid the
application of the Ursua ruling proceeds from Estradas position in the
government; at the time of the commission of the offense, he was the
President of the Republic who is required by law to disclose his true
name. We do not find this argument sufficient to justify a distinction
between a man on the street, on one hand, and the President of the
Republic, on the other, for purposes of applying CA No. 142. In the first
place, the law does not make any distinction, expressly or impliedly,
that would justify a differential treatment. CA No. 142 as applied to
Estrada, in fact allows him to use his cinema or screen name of Joseph
Estrada, which name he has used even when he was already the
President of the Philippines. Even the petitioner has acquiesced to the
use of the screen name of the accused, as shown by the title of the
present petition. Additionally, any distinction we make based on the
Peoples claim unduly prejudices Estrada; this is proscribed by
the Ursua dictum that CA No. 142, as a penal statute, should be
construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. [21] The
mode of violating CA No. 142 is therefore the same whoever the
accused may be.
 The People also calls our attention to an earlier Sandiganbayan
ruling (Resolution dated February 6, 2002) denying Estradas motion to
quash the Information. This earlier Resolution effectively rejected the
application of Ursua under the following tenor:
The use of the term alias in the Amended Information
in itself serves to bring this case outside the ambit of the
ruling in the case of Ursua v. Court of Appeals (256 SCRA
147 [1996]), on which the accused heavily relies in his
motion to quash. The term alias means otherwise known as
(Webster Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p.
53). The charge of using an alias logically implies that
another name has been used publicly and
habitually. Otherwise, he will not be known by such name. In
any case, the amended information adverts to several
transactions and signing of documents with the Equitable
PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities where the above-
mentioned alias was allegedly employed by the accused.
The facts alleged in the information are distinctly
different from facts established in the Ursua case where
another name was used by the accused in a single instance
without any sign or indication that that [sic] he intended to
be known from that day by this name in addition to his real
name.[22]
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in applying Ursua notwithstanding this earlier final ruling on
its non-applicability a ruling that binds the parties in the present
case. The People thus claims that the Sandiganbayan erred to the
point of gravely abusing its discretion when it resurrected the
application of Ursua, resulting in the reversal of its earlier final ruling.
We find no merit in this argument for two reasons. First, the cited
Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order a ruling
denying a motion to quash [23] that cannot be given the attributes of
finality and immutability that are generally accorded to judgments or
orders that finally dispose of the whole, of or particular matters in, a
case.[24] The Sandiganbayan resolution is a mere interlocutory order
because its effects would only be provisional in character, and would
still require the issuing court to undertake substantial proceedings in
order to put the controversy to rest.[25] It is basic remedial law that an
interlocutory order is always under the control of the court and may be
modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time
before final judgment.[26] Perez v. Court of Appeals, [27] albeit a civil
case, instructively teaches that an interlocutory order carries no res
adjudicata effects. Says Perez:
The Decision in CA-G.R. No. 10415 having resolved
only an interlocutory matter, the principle of res
judicata cannot be applied in this case. There can be
no res judicata where the previous order in question
was not an order or judgment determinative of an
issue of fact pending before the court but was only
an interlocutory order because it required the parties
to perform certain acts for final adjudication. In this
case, the lifting of the restraining order paved the way for
the possession of the fishpond on the part of petitioners
and/or their representatives pending the resolution of the
main action for injunction. In other words, the main issue of
whether or not private respondent may be considered a
sublessee or a transferee of the lease entitled to possess
the fishpond under the circumstances of the case had yet to
be resolved when the restraining order was lifted. [28]
Second, in the earlier motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan solely
looked at the allegations of the Information to determine the
sufficiency of these allegations and did not consider any
evidence aliunde. This is far different from the present demurrer to
evidence where the Sandiganbayan had a fuller view of the
prosecutions case, and was faced with the issue of whether the
prosecutions evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of the
Information. Under these differing views, the Sandiganbayan may
arrive at a different conclusion on the application of Ursua, the leading
case in the application of CA 142, and the change in ruling is not per
se indicative of grave abuse of discretion. That there is no error of law
is strengthened by our consideration of the Sandiganbayan ruling on
the application of Ursua.
In an exercise of caution given Ursuas jurisprudential binding
effect, the People also argues in its petition that Estradas case is
different from Ursuas for the following reasons: (1) respondent Estrada
used and intended to continually use the alias Jose Velarde in addition
to the name Joseph Estrada; (2) Estradas use of the alias was not
isolated or limited to a single transaction; and (3) the use of the alias
Jose Velarde was designed to cause and did cause confusion and fraud
in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related
statutes seek to prevent. The People also argues that the evidence it
presented more than satisfied the requirements of CA No. 142, as
amended, and Ursua, as it was also shown or established that Estradas
use of the alias was public.
In light of our above conclusions and based on the parties expressed
positions, we shall now examine within the Ursua framework the
assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution granting the demurrer to evidence.
The prosecution has the burden of proof to show that the evidence it
presented with the Sandiganbayan satisfied the Ursua requirements,
particularly on the matter of publicity and habituality in the use of an
alias.
What is the coverage of the indictment?
The People argues that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred and
abused its discretion in limiting the coverage of the amended
Information in Crim. Case No. 26565 to Estradas use of the alias Jose
Velarde on February 4, 2000. It posits that there was a main
transaction one that took place on February 4, 2000 but there were
other transactions covered by the phrase prior to or subsequent
thereto; the Information specifically referred to several
transactions with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities. To
the People, the restrictive finding that the phrase prior to or
subsequent thereto is absorbed by the phrase on or about 04 February
2000 drastically amends the succeeding main allegations on the
constitutive criminal acts by removing the plurality of both the
transactions involved and the documents signed with various entities;
there is the undeniable essential relationship between the allegations
of the multiplicity of transactions, on one hand, and the additional
antecedent of prior to or subsequent thereto, on the other. It argues
that the Sandiganbayan reduced the phrase prior to or subsequent
thereto into a useless appendage, providing Estrada with a convenient
and totally unwarranted escape route.
The People further argues that the allegation of time is the least
exacting in satisfying the constitutional requirement that the accused
has to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 6 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an allegation of the
approximate date of the commission of the offense will suffice, while
Section 11 of the same Rule provides that it is not necessary to state in
the complaint or information the precise date the offense was
committed except when it is a material ingredient of the crime. This
liberality allegedly shaped the time-tested rule that when the time
given in the complaint is not of the essence of the offense, the time of
the commission of the offense does not need to be proven as alleged,
and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of
limitations and before the commencement of the action (citing People
v. Bugayong [299 SCRA 528, 537] that in turn cited US v. Smith [3 Phil.
20, 22]). Since allegations of date of the commission of an offense are
liberally interpreted, the People posits that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding the additional clause prior to or
subsequent thereto; under the liberality principle, the allegations of
the acts constitutive of the offense finally determine the sufficiency of
the allegations of time. The People thus claims that no surprise could
have taken place that would prevent Estrada from properly defending
himself; the information fully notified him that he was being accused of
using the alias Jose Velarde in more than just one instance.
We see no merit in these arguments.
At its core, the issue is constitutional in nature the right of
Estrada to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Under the provisions of the Rules of Court implementing
this constitutional right, a complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense in the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.[29] As to the cause of accusation, the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute, but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know the offense charged and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances, and for the court to
pronounce judgment.[30] The date of the commission of the offense
need not be precisely stated in the complaint or information except
when the precise date is a material ingredient of the offense. The
offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as
possible to the actual date of its commission.[31]
The information must at all times embody the essential
elements of the crime charged by setting forth the facts and
circumstances that bear on the culpability and liability of the accused
so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.[32] In
short, the allegations in the complaint or information, as written, must
fully inform or acquaint the accused the primary reader of and the
party directly affected by the complaint or information of the charge/s
laid.
The heretofore cited Information states that on or about 04
February 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [did] willfully,
unlawfully and criminally REPRESENT HIMSELF AS JOSE
VELARDE IN SEVERAL TRANSACTIONS AND use and employ the
SAID alias Jose Velarde which IS neither his registered name at
birth nor his baptismal name, in signing documents with
Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate entities.
We fully agree with the disputed Sandiganbayans reading of the
Information, as this was how the accused might have similarly read
and understood the allegations in the Information and, on this basis,
prepared his defense. Broken down into its component parts, the
allegation of time in the Information plainly states
that (1) ON February 4, 2000; (2) OR before February 4, 2000;
(3) OR sometime prior or subsequent to February 4, 2000, in the City
of Manila, Estrada represented himself as Jose Velarde in several
transactions in signing documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or
other corporate entities.
Under this analysis, the several transactions involving the
signing of documents with Equitable PCI Bank and/or other corporate
entities all had their reference to February 4, 2000; they were all
made on or about or prior or subsequent to that date, thus plainly
implying that all these transactions took place only on February 4,
2000 or on another single date sometime before or after February 4,
2000. To be sure, the Information could have simply said on or
about February 4, 2000 to capture all the alternative approximate
dates, so that the phrase sometime prior or subsequent thereto would
effectively be a surplusage that has no meaning separately from the
on or about already expressed. This consequent uselessness of the
prior or subsequent thereto phrase cannot be denied, but it is a direct
and necessary consequence of the use of the OR between the two
phrases and the THERETO that referred back to February 4, 2000 in
the second phrase. Of course, the reading would have been very
different (and would have been clearly in accord with the Peoples
present interpretation) had the Information simply used AND instead
of OR to separate the phrases; the intent to refer to various
transactions occurring on various dates and occasions all proximate
to February 4, 2000 could not be disputed. Unfortunately for the
People, the imprecision in the use of OR is the reality the case has to
live with. To act contrary to this reality would violate Estradas right to
be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; the
multiple transactions on several separate days that the People claims
would result in surprise and denial of an opportunity to prepare for
Estrada, who has a right to rely on the single day mentioned in the
Information.
Separately from the constitutional dimension of the allegation
of time in the Information, another issue that the allegation of time and
our above conclusion raise relates to what act or acts, constituting a
violation of the offense charged, were actually alleged in the
Information.
The conclusion we arrived at necessarily impacts on the Peoples
case, as it deals a fatal blow on the Peoples claim that
Estrada habitually used the Jose Velarde alias. For, to our mind, the
repeated use of an alias within a single day cannot be deemed
habitual, as it does not amount to a customary practice or use. This
reason alone dictates the dismissal of the petition under CA No. 142
and the terms of Ursua.
The issues of publicity, numbered accounts, and
the application of CA No. 142, R.A. No. 1405,
and R.A. No. 9160.
We shall jointly discuss these interrelated issues.
The People claims that even on the assumption that Ocampo
and Curato are bank officers sworn to secrecy under the law, the
presence of two other persons who are not bank officers Aprodicio
Laquian and Fernando Chua when Estradas signed the bank
documents as Jose Velarde amounted to a public use of an alias that
violates CA No. 142.
On the issue of numbered accounts, the People argues that to
premise the validity of Estradas prosecution for violation of CA No. 142
on a mere banking practice is gravely erroneous, improper, and
constitutes grave abuse of discretion; no banking law provision
allowing the use of aliases in the opening of bank accounts existed; at
most, it was allowed by mere convention or industry practice, but not
by a statute enacted by the legislature. Additionally, that Estradas
prosecution was supposedly based on BSP Circular No. 302 dated
October 11, 2001 is wrong and misleading, as Estrada stands charged
with violation of CA No. 142, penalized since 1936, and not with a
violation of a mere BSP Circular. That the use of alias in bank
transactions prior to BSP Circular No. 302 is allowed is inconsequential
because as early as CA No. 142, the use of an alias (except for certain
purposes which do not include banking) was already
prohibited. Nothing in CA No. 142 exempted the use of aliases in
banking transactions, since the law did not distinguish or limit its
application; it was therefore grave error for the Sandiganbayan to have
done so. Lastly on this point, bank regulations being mere issuances
cannot amend, modify or prevail over the effective, subsisting and
enforceable provision of CA No. 142.
On the issue of the applicability of R.A. No. 1405 and its
relationship with CA No. 142, that since nothing in CA No. 142 excuses
the use of an alias, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it ruled that R.A. No. 1405 is an exception to CA No. 142s
coverage. Harmonization of laws, the People posits, is allowed only if
the laws intended to be harmonized refer to the same subject matter,
or are at least related with one another. The three laws which the
Sandiganbayan tried to harmonize are not remotely related to one
another; they each deal with a different subject matter, prohibits a
different act, governs a different conduct, and covers a different class
of persons,[33] and there was no need to force their application to one
another. Harmonization of laws, the People adds, presupposes the
existence of conflict or incongruence between or among the provisions
of various laws, a situation not obtaining in the present case.
 The People posits, too, that R.A. No. 1405 does not apply to
trust transactions, such as Trust Account No. C-163, as it applies only
to traditional deposits (simple loans). A trust account, according to the
People, may not be considered a deposit because it does not create
the juridical relation of creditor and debtor; trust and deposit
operations are treated separately and are different in legal
contemplation; trust operation is separate and distinct from banking
and requires a grant of separate authority, and trust funds are not
covered by deposit insurance under the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation law (R.A. No. 3591, as amended).
The People further argues that the Sandiganbayans conclusion
that the transaction or communication was privileged in nature was
erroneous a congruent interpretation of CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405
shows that a person who signs in a public or private transaction a
name or alias, other than his original name or the alias he is authorized
to use, shall be held liable for violation of CA No. 142, while the bank
employees are bound by the confidentiality of bank transactions
except in the circumstances enumerated in R.A. No. 1405. At most, the
People argues, the prohibition in R.A. No. 1405 covers bank employees
and officers only, and not Estrada; the law does not prohibit Estrada
from disclosing and making public his use of an alias to other people,
including Ocampo and Curato, as he did when he made a public exhibit
and use of the alias before Messrs. Lacquian and Chua.
Finally, the People argues that the Sandiganbayan ruling that
the use of an alias before bank officers does not violate CA No. 142
effectively encourages the commission of wrongdoing and the
concealment of ill-gotten wealth under pseudonyms; it sustains an
anomalous and prejudicial policy that uses the law to silence bank
officials and employees from reporting the commission of crimes. The
People contends that the law R.A. No. 1405 was not intended by the
Legislature to be used as a subterfuge or camouflage for the
commission of crimes and cannot be so interpreted; the law can only
be interpreted, understood and applied so that right and justice would
prevail.
We see no merit in these arguments.
We agree, albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan
position that the rule in the law of libel that mere communication to a
third person is publicity does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our
close reading of Ursua particularly, the requirement that there be
intention by the user to be culpable and the historical reasons we cited
above tells us that the required publicity in the use of alias is more
than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to be
considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or
place, or to cause it to become generally known. In order to be held
liable for a violation of CA No. 142, the user of the alias must have held
himself out as a person who shall publicly be known under that other
name. In other words, the intent to publicly use the alias must be
manifest.
To our mind, the presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada
signed as Jose Velarde and opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not
necessarily indicate his intention to be publicly known henceforth as
Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua were not part of
the public who had no access to Estradas privacy and to the
confidential matters that transpired in Malacaan where he sat as
President; Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared
matters of the highest and strictest confidence, while Chua was a
lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and ties of friendship to keep
and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus, Estrada could
not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for public
consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also
inside the room at that time. The same holds true for Estradas alleged
representations with Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for
these representations to be admissible. All of Estradas representations
to these people were made in privacy and in secrecy, with no iota of
intention of publicity.
The nature, too, of the transaction on which the indictment
rests, affords Estrada a reasonable expectation of privacy, as the
alleged criminal act related to the opening of a trust account a
transaction that R.A. No. 1405 considers absolutely confidential in
nature.[34] We previously rejected, in Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan,[35] the
Peoples nitpicking argument on the alleged dichotomy between bank
deposits and trust transactions, when we said:

The contention that trust accounts are not covered
by the term deposits, as used in R.A. 1405, by the mere fact
that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship
between the trustor and the bank, does not lie. An
examination of the law shows that the term deposits used
therein is to be understood broadly and not limited only to
accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank.
The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:
SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the Government to give encouragement to the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions
and to discourage private hoarding so that the same
may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans
to assist in the economic development of the
country. (Underscoring supplied)
If the money deposited under an account may be
used by bank for authorized loans to third persons, then
such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-
debtor relationship between the depositor and the bank,
falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely
seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic
development of the country.
Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such
account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner and Urban
Bank provides that the trust account covers deposit,
placement or investment of funds by Urban Bank for and in
behalf of petitioner. The money deposited under Trust
Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to
remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere. To
hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405
would encourage private hoarding of funds that could
otherwise be invested by bank in other ventures, contrary to
the policy behind the law.
Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly
shows that the term deposits was intended to be
understood broadly:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with
bank or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the
Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and
may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order
of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction
of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The phrase of whatever nature proscribes any
restrictive interpretation of deposits. Moreover, it is clear
from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the
law applies not only to money which is deposited but also to
those which are invested. This further shows that the law
was not intended to apply only to deposits in the strict
sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no
need to add the phrase or invested.
 actual frontal clash between CA No. 142 and R.A. No. 1405 that
requires harmonization. Each operates within its own sphere, but must
Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to
necessarily be read together when these spheres interface with one
cover Trust Account No. 858.[36]
another. Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation to
the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an influencing
factor in his indictment.

We have consistently ruled that bank deposits under R.A. No.
1405 (the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) are statutorily protected or
recognized zones of privacy.[37] Given the private nature of Estradas act
of signing the documents as Jose Velarde related to the opening of the
trust account, the People cannot claim that there was already a public
use of alias when Ocampo and Curato witnessed the signing. We need
not even consider here the impact of the obligations imposed by R.A.
No.1405 on the bank officers; what is essentially significant is the
privacy situation that is necessarily implied in these kinds of
transactions. This statutorily guaranteed privacy and secrecy
effectively negate a conclusion that the transaction was done publicly
or with the intent to use the alias publicly.
In finding the absence of the requisite publicity, we simply
looked at the totality of the circumstances obtaining in Estradas use of
the alias Jose Velarde vis--vis the Ursua requisites. We do not decide
here whether Estradas use of an alias when he occupied the highest
executive position in the land was valid and legal; we simply
determined, as the Sandiganbayan did, whether he may be made
liable for the offense charged based on the evidence the People
presented. As with any other accused, his guilt must be based on the
evidence and proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding of criminal
liability requires. If the People fails to discharge this burden, as they
did fail in this case, the rule of law requires that we so declare. We do
so now in this review and accordingly find no reversible error of law in
the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

The enactment of R.A. No.9160, on the other hand, is a

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack
significant development only because it clearly manifests that prior to
of merit.
its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts were
permitted banking transactions, whether they be allowed by law or by
a mere banking regulation. To be sure, an indictment against Estrada
using this relatively recent law cannot be maintained without violating SO ORDERED.
the constitutional
prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.[38]

We hasten to add that this holistic application and

interpretation of these various laws is not an attempt to harmonize
these laws. A finding of commission of the offense punished under CA
No. 142 must necessarily rest on the evidence of the requisites for
culpability, as amplified in Ursua. The application of R.A. No. 1405 is
significant only because Estradas use of the alias was pursuant to a
transaction that the law considers private or, at the very least, where
the law guarantees a reasonable expectation of privacy to the parties
to the transactions; it is at this point that R.A. No. 1405 tangentially
interfaces with an indictment under CA 142. In this light, there is no
 [G.R. No. 122092. May 19, 1999]
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO
M. NARVAEZ JR., RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A.
DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA, NICEFORO V. AVILA,
FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B.
CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S.
LEGACION, ALBINO T. LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and
HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners, vs. JUDGE MAXIMIANO
C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA
III; and the SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OF THE PNP TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT COMMAND, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
due course to the Petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.
In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General,
the Court, in its February 5, 1997 Resolution, [7] required State Prosecutor
Leo B. Dacera to prepare the memorandum for the public
respondents.After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June 23, 1997,
[8]
the Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-
extendible period ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the
required memorandum. In view of Daceras manifestation that he was only
a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the case
from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the
Special Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to
file its memorandum within thirty days from notice; otherwise, the petition
will be deemed submitted for decision. [9] Even after the expiration of the
said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOUs refusal/failure to
submit its memorandum as a waiver of its privilege to do so.

To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against The Facts

unreasonable searches and seizures, the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be followed strictly. Where the judge fails
to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latters On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua
witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own applied for a search warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating: [10]
personal knowledge, the search warrant must be struck down.
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,
located at PICOP compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur,
The Case
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession
or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives,
which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in
the nullification of Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated the premises herein described.
March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City;[2] and (2) the issuance of a temporary
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law
restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B.
to take possession and bring to this Honorable Court the following
Dacera III, ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
described properties:
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, [3] this Court issued the TRO prayed
for and required the respondents to comment on the said Petition. On 'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2)
December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic Management Command filed AK-47 rifle[s], two (2) UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade
its 31-page Opposition[4] to the Petition, together with 90 pages of Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s], ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s],
annexes.[5] On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for said
its Comment[6] agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'
granted. After petitioners filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave
 Attached to the application[11] were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero
07 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171337 Elisco
S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito,[12] as well as a summary of the 08 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171114 Elisco
information and the supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe 09 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171114 (Tampered) Elisco
Moreno. 10 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171167 (Tampered) Elisco
11 M16 Rifle 5.56 170881 (Tampered) Elisco
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. 12 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP170897 Elisco
Asuncion issued the contested search warrant, [13] the pertinent portion of 13 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171509 Elisco
which reads: (With pending
case-Casaway Case)
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under 14 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171754 Elisco
oath, SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that 15 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP170881 (Tampered) Elisco
the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, 16 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174637 Elisco
located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, 17 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171366 Elisco
represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its 18 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174637 (Tampered) Elisco
possession or control the following: 19 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174610 Elisco
20 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP171367 (Tampered) Elisco
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles 01 M14Rifle 7.62 1499694 Elisco
Two (2) AK-47 rifle[s] 02 M14Rifle 7.62 889163 Elisco
Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm. 01 BAR Cal. 30 865975 Royal
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s] 01 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 384181 US Carbin
Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s] 02 Carbine M1 Cal. 30 998201 US Carbin
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s] 01 Garand M1 Cal. 30 1194008 Springfield
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms 02 Garand M1 Cal. 30 3123784 Springfield
Ten (10) handgrenades 01 Shotgun 12 Gauge H359704 Omega
02 Shotgun 12 Gauge 9211 Homemade
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, (Paltik)
Ammunition and Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought
before this Court. MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.

NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate 01 M16 (long) 29 pcs.
search daytime between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned 02 M16 (short) 48 pcs.
premises and to seize and bring the articles above-described and make an 03 Carbine M1 171 pcs.
immediate return there[of][14] 04 BAR 19 pcs.

On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.
PICOP compound and seized the following: [15]
01 M16 2,023 rounds
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND 03 Carbine M1 276 rounds
04 M-60 Cal. 7.62 1,800 rounds
01 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 Elisco 05 M1 Garand 1,278 rounds
02 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 175636 (Tampered) Elisco 06 Rifle Grenade 11 rounds
03 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171702 Elisco 07 Hand Grenade 4 pcs.
04 M16 Rifle 5.56 Defaced Elisco
05 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP174253 (Tampered) Elisco AMMO DAM POST NO. 24
06 M16 Rifle 5.56 RP173627 (Tampered) Elisco
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND 06. 9MM 30 rounds

01. M16 Rifle 5.56 171425 (Tampered) Gyno Corp. NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16
02. Machine Pistol .22 651 (Tampered) Landmann
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
01. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359910 Armscor
01. M16 (short) 3 pcs. 02. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359716 Armscor
02. M16 (long) 1 pc. 03. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359706 Armscor
03. M14 8 pcs. 04. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359707 Armscor
04. Clip M1 Garand 3 pcs. 05. Shotgun 12 Gauge 1036847 Armscor
05. Mag Assy. Cal .22 1 pc. 06. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359702 Armscor
07. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359732 Armscor
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY. 08. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359728 Armscor
09. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359708 Armscor
01. M16 73 rounds 10. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359711 Armscor
02. M14 160 rounds 11. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359723 Armscor
03. M1 Garand Cal .30 30 rounds 12. Shotgun 12 Gauge A359713 Armscor
04. Rifle Grenade 1 round 13. Shotgun 12 Gauge 1031271 Armscor
14. Shotgun 12 Gauge A262338 SB
15. Shotgun 12 Gauge A261619 SB
MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT 16. Shotgun 12 Gauge Defaced Not Indicated

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER SERIAL NUMBER BRAND LIVE AMMUNITION QTY.

01. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 171725 Elisco 01. 12 GAUGE shotgun 306 rds.
02. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco 02. M16 2,349 rds.
03. M16 Rifle 5.56 RP 132320 Elisco
04. Machine 9 MM 54887 Intratec
Pistol MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY.
05. Three (3) 12 Gauge Surit-Surit (H)
Shotguns 01. Carbine (defective) 76 pcs.
02. Cal. 22 -do- 16 pcs.
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY QTY. 03. M16 (long-defective) 2 pcs.
04. M16 (short-defective) 2 pcs.
05. Thompson (defective) 8 pcs.
01. M16 (long) 3 pcs. 06. Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective) 17 pcs.
02. M16 (short) 4 pcs. 07. BAR (defective) 2 pcs.
03. Intratec 1 pc.
04. US Carbine (defective) 2 pcs.
Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable,
the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash [16] before the trial
LIVE AMMUNITION QTY. court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental Pleading to the Motion
to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.[17]
01. M16 147 rds.
02. Cal. 30 5 rounds On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which
03. 12 gauge Shotgun 7 rounds denied petitioners motions.[18] On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered
04. Carbine 5 rounds its second contested Order[19] denying petitioners Motion for
05. Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds Reconsideration. [20]
 Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts.
support of their cause:[21]
I findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave
abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash
Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause [has] not xxx been
sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general
warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave
abuse of discretion or has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash
Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground that it was unlawfully served or
implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with
grave abuse of discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with
the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As
a preliminary matter, we shall also discuss respondents argument that the
Petition should be dismissed for raising factual questions.
This Courts Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions
In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be
dismissed for raising questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain that the Petition merely assails
the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the regularity of its
implementation.[22]
This argument is not convincing. It is settled that there is a question of
[23]
In the present case, petitioners do not question the truth of the facts as
found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which those
the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises
only questions of law, which may be resolved in the present case.
Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant
The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the basic conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down
in Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, [24] detail the requisites for the issuance of
a valid search warrant as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before
issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits Swear the witness.
submitted.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the
probable cause is present; (2) such presence is determined personally by whole truth and nothing but the truth before this Court?
the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce
are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or WITNESS:
affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally Yes Maam.
known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. [25] In the present case, the search STENOGRAPHER:
warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to examine personally
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other
the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
personal circumstances.
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had
no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the WITNESS:
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity. SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp
Crame, Quezon City, SOU, TMC.
xxxxxxxxx
No Personal Examination of the Witnesses
Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing
more. In fact, he failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his
In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the statement, the trial judge failed to propound questions, let alone probing
search warrant was valid, stating that before issuing the subject warrant, questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod (whose
the court propounded searching questions to the applicant and the testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor
witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable cause x x x. relied mainly on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in
[26]
(Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the this language:
Motion to Quash, which argued that it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that
the Honorable Court did not propound searching questions upon applicant Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the witnesses he produced. [27] The sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
records, however, proclaim otherwise. complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the
record.Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable
warrant was supported by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later
Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a summary of information and (3) that his declarations are false.
supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno. Except for
Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and
xxxxxxxxx
policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicants
participation in the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant
consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:[28] It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not
merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
COURT: established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the
contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant? justification of the application.[29]
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor. Bacolods Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him

COURT:
 Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined Q What did you f[i]nd xxxt?
by the judge. But his testimony showed that he did not have personal
knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of PD 1866, were not licensed A I found xxx several high-powered firearms being kept in the
to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition, he compound of PICOP.
stated: Q Where are those located?
Q How do you know that said properties were subject of the offense? A Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.
A Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for Q Inside the compound?
several days, we gathered informations from reliable sources that
subject properties [which] are in their possession and control [are] A Located inside the compound.
the herein described properties subject of the offense. (Summary of
Q Then what?
Information dtd Oct 94, SSs of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno both
dtd 30 Nov 94 are hereto attached).[30] A Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.
When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he Q You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own
believed that the PICOP security guards had no license to possess the security guards?
subject firearms. This, however, does not meet the requirement that a
witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared: A Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Q You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?
Corporation located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, A Yes, sir.
Surigao del Sur. How come that you have knowledge that there are
illegal firearms in that place? Q So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are
illegally obtained?
A At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to
investigate the alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante. A I believe they have no license to possess high-powered
firearms. As far as the verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is
Q In the course of your investigation, what happened? concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis supplied.)
A We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination Q Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?
plot are employees of PICOP.
A I conducted the inquiry.
Q Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you
do? Q What did you find out?
A We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of A They are using firearms owned by PICOP.
PICOP in Tabon.
Q Using firearms owned by PICOP?
Q What did you find xxx?
A Yes, sir.
A I found xxx several high-powered firearms.
Q You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no
Q How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP? firearms of their own?
A I exerted effort to enter the said compound. A No high-powered firearms.
Q By what means? Q By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside
the compound of PICOP?
A By pretending to have some official business with the company.
A There are M-16 armalite rifles.
Q So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of
PICOP? Q What else?
A Yes, sir.
 A AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries
revolvers, .45 caliber pistols, several handgrenades and ammos. Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay
[31]
(Emphasis supplied) Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is made
up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3
Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and
inside the PICOP compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some
the security agency and its guards were not licensed. He also said that one hundred fifty-five hectares.[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the police
some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no statement officers unbridled and thus illegal authority to search all the structures
before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no found inside the PICOP compound.[37]
license to possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses
inexplicably failed to attach to the application a copy of the In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the
aforementioned no license certification from the Firearms and Explosives constitutional requirement, because they submitted sketches of the
Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such premises to be searched when they applied for the warrant. They add that
certification could have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because they
was located in Camp Crame where the unit of Bacolod was also were not among those identified during the hearing.[38]
based. In People v. Judge Estrada,[32] the Court held:
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly
submitted by the police were not made integral parts of the search
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the fact that the raiding
best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP
introduction of such evidence is necessary in cases where the issue is the Compound housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, particulars of the place to be searched. [39] Otherwise, confusion would
the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place indicated in the
evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled
easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at for mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers.
the time of the application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason
therefor during the examination by the judge. Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court ruled that the police
had no authority to search the apartment behind the store, which was the
place indicated in the warrant, even if they really intended it to be the
Particularity of the Place to Be Searched subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched cannot
be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The
against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a
place to be searched only to those described in the warrant. [33] Thus, this meeting of the minds as to the place to be searched between the
Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in
and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in their
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy mind. This should not have been done. It [was] neither fair nor licit to
must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that
only under stringent procedural safeguards.[34] Additionally, the requisite of
particularity is related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least specified in the warrant [was] exactly what they had in view when they
under some circumstances, the lack of a more specific description will applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting
make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing to the evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place. place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
[35]
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court
issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigail's
place with particularity. It simply authorizes a search of the Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
aforementioned premises, but it did not specify such premises. The
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is
modified by the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the based on the firearms and other materials seized pursuant to Search
evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant. Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are
Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings before State Prosecutor
the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police
officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality
that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the and to maintain peace and order in the country; however, it reminds the
search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that law enforcement authorities that they must do so only upon strict
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our
particularization of the description of the place to be searched may people. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time
properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it for the right reason.[45]
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is
search. (Emphasis supplied.) hereby GRANTED and Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly
declared NULL and VOID. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No
Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search
Warrant No. 799 (95) issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with
the Department of Justice a complaint docketed as IS No. 95-167 against
herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State Prosecutor
Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary
investigation, issued a subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-
affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the
suspension of the preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their
motion to quash the search warrant. They argued, as they do now, that
the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis of the criminal
Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration met the same fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition, petitioners assert that State Prosecutor Dacera cannot
have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-
167.[41]
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms, explosives and other
materials seized were inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
[42]
As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized
evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.[43] Verily, they are
the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the
constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence xxx.[44]
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. G.R. No. 168306 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM
C. YAO JR., and ROGER C. YAO,
Petitioners,

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of

-versus Present:
Court, petitioners William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William
C. Yao, Jr., and Roger C. Yao pray for the reversal of the Decision dated 30
THE PEOPLE OF THE
YNARES-SANTIAGO, September 2004,[2] and Resolution dated 1 June 2005, of the Court of
PHILIPPINES, PETRON
CORPORATION and PILIPINAS Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 79256, [3] affirming the two Orders, both dated 5
Chairperson,
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., and June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City,
its Principal, SHELL INTL
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, relative to Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. [4] In the said
PETROLEUM CO. LTD.,
Respondents. Orders, the RTC denied the petitioners Motion to Quash Search
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
Warrant [5]
and Motion for the Return of the Motor Compressor
NACHURA, JJ.
and Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) Refilling Machine.[6]

The following are the facts:

Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS

CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and
distribution of LPG products. Private respondents Petron Corporation
(Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) are two
Promulgated: of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their
LPG products are sold under the marks GASUL and SHELLANE,
respectively. Petron is the registered owner in the Philippines of the
June 19, 2007
trademarks GASUL and GASUL cylinders used for its LPG products. It is the
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x sole entity in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and distributors to
refill, use, sell, and distribute GASUL LPG containers, products and its
trademarks. Pilipinas Shell, on the other hand, is the authorized user in
the Philippines of the tradename, trademarks, symbols, or designs of its
DECISION principal, Shell International Petroleum Company Limited (Shell
International), including the marks SHELLANE and SHELL device in
connection with the production, sale and distribution of SHELLANE LPGs. It
is the only corporation in the Philippines authorized to allow refillers and
distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute SHELLANE LPG containers and 2. [That] on the basis of the letter-
products. [7] complaint, I, together with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was
assigned as the NBI agent on the case.

On 3 April 2003, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) 3. [That] prior to conducting the
agent Ritche N. Oblanca (Oblanca) filed two applications for search investigation on the reported illegal activities, he reviewed
warrant with the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, against petitioners and other the certificates of trademark registrations issued in favor
of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International as well as other
occupants of the MASAGANA compound located at Governors
documents and other evidence obtained by the
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City, for alleged violation investigative agency authorized by [PETRON], PSPC and
of Section 155, in relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293, Shell International to investigate and cause the
otherwise known as The Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines. [8] The investigation of persons and establishments violating the
rights of [PETRON], PSPC and Shell International,
two applications for search warrant uniformly alleged that per information,
represented by Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. Certified copies of
belief, and personal verification of Oblanca, the petitioners are actually the foregoing trademark registrations are attached hereto
producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG products using as Annexes A to :E.
steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and
devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of
4. [That] among the establishments
the rights of the said entities.
alleged to be unlawfully refilling and unlawfully selling and
distributing [Gasul LPG and] Shellane products
is Masagana Gas Corporation (MASAGANA). Based on
Securities and Exchange Commission Records, MASAGANA
In his two separate affidavits[9] attached to the two applications for
has its principal office address
search warrant, Oblanca alleged: at 9775 Kamagong Street, San
Antonio Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The incorporators
1. [That] on 11 February 2003, the
and directors of MASAGANA are William C. Yao, Sr., Luisa
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received a letter-
C. Yao, Richard C. Yao, William C. Yao, Jr., and Roger
complaint from Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera Jr.
C. Yao. x x x.
of Villaraza and Angangco, on behalf of among others,
[Petron Corporation (PETRON)] and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC), the authorized representative of Shell
International Petroleum Company Limited (Shell 5. I confirmed that MASAGANA is not
International), requesting assistance in the investigation authorized to use [PETRON and] Shellane LPG cylinders
and, if warranted, apprehension and prosecution of certain and its trademarks and tradenames or to be refillers or
persons and/or establishments suspected of violating the distributors of [PETRON and] Shellane LPGs.
intellectual property rights [of PETRON] and of PSPC and
Shell International.
 6. I went to MASAGANAs refilling station
located at Governors
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires City (sic), Cavite
to investigate its activities. I confirmed that MASAGANA is
indeed engaged in the unauthorized refilling, sale and/or
distribution of [Gasul and] Shellane LPG cylinders. I found
out that MASAGANA delivery trucks with Plate Nos. UMN-
971, PEZ-612, WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603 coming in
and out of the refilling plant located at the
aforementioned address contained multi-brand LPG
cylinders including [Gasul and] Shellane. x x x.
7. [That] on 13 February 2003, I
conducted a test-buy accompanied by
Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. After asking the purpose of our
visit, MASAGANAs guard allowed us to enter the
MASAGANA refilling plant to purchase GASUL and
SHELLANE LPGs. x x x. We were issued an order slip which
we presented to the cashiers office located near the
refilling station. After paying the amount x x x covering
the cost of the cylinders and their contents, they were
issued Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated February 13,
2003. We were, thereafter, assisted by the plant attendant
in choosing empty GASUL and SHELLANE 11 kg. cylinders,
x x x were brought to the refilling station [and filled in
their presence.] I noticed that no valve seals were placed
on the cylinders.
[That] while inside the refilling plant doing the test-buy, I
noticed that stockpiles of multi-branded cylinders
including GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders were stored
near the refilling station. I also noticed that the total land
area of the refilling plant is about 7,000 to 10,000 square
meters. At the corner right side of the compound
immediately upon entering the gate is a covered area
where the maintenance of the cylinders is taking
place. Located at the back right corner of the compound
are two storage tanks while at the left side also at the
corner portion is another storage tank. Several meters
and fronting the said storage tank is where the refilling
station and the office are located. It is also in this storage
tank where the elevated blue water tank depicting
MASAGANA CORP. is located. About eleven (11) refilling
pumps and stock piles of multi-branded cylinders
including Shellane and GASUL are stored in the refilling
station. At the left side of the entrance gate is the guard
house with small door for the pedestrians and at the right
is a blue steel gate used for incoming and outgoing
vehicles.
8. [That] on 27 February 2003, I
conducted another test-buy accompanied by
Mr. Bernabe C. Alajar. x x x After choosing the cylinders,
we were issued an order slip which we presented to the
cashier. Upon payment, Cash Invoice No. 56398 was
issued covering the cost of both GASUL and SHELLANE
LPG cylinders and their contents. x x x Both cylinders
were refilled in our presence and no valve seals were
placed on the cylinders.
Copies of the photographs of the delivery trucks, LPG cylinders and
registration papers were also attached to the aforementioned affidavits. [10]
Bernabe C. Alajar (Alajar), owner of Able Research and Consulting
Services Inc., was hired by Petron and Pilipinas Shell to assist them in
carrying out their Brand Protection
Program. Alajar accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance of and test-
buys at the refilling plant of MASAGANA. He also executed two separate
affidavits corroborating the statements of Oblanca. These were annexed
to the two applications for search warrant. [11]
 6. LPG weighing scales; and
After conducting the preliminary examination
on Oblanca and Alajar, and upon reviewing their sworn affidavits and 7. Seals simulating the shell trademark.
other attached documents, Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang (Judge Sadang),
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 17, Cavite City, found probable cause receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
and correspondingly issued Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003. accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to
[12]
The search warrants commanded any peace officer to make an the production, sale and/or distribution of the
aforesaid goods/products.
immediate search of the MASAGANA compound and to seize the following
items:

Under Search Warrant No. 2-2003: d. Delivery truck bearing Plate Nos. WTE-527,
XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other
delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being
used or intended to be used for the purpose of
a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers,
selling and/or distributing the above-mentioned
bearing the tradename SHELLANE, SHELL (Device)
counterfeit products.
of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and the
trademarks and other devices owned by Shell
International Petroleum Company, Ltd.;
Under Search Warrant No. 3-2003:

b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or

intended to be used for the purpose of illegally a. Empty/filled LPG cylinder tanks/containers,
refilling LPG cylinders belonging to Pilipinas Shell bearing Petron Corporations (Petron) tradename and
Petroleum Corporation bearing the its tradename GASUL and other devices owned
latters tradenameas well as the marks belonging to and/or used exclusively by Petron;
Shell International Petroleum Company, Ltd.,
enumerated hereunder:

b. Machinery and/or equipment being used or

intended to be used for the purpose of illegally
1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks; refilling LPG cylinders belonging
to Petron enumerated hereunder;
2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic refilling
system);

3. LPG hydraulic pump/s; 1. Bulk/Bullet LPG storage tanks;

4. LPG refilling heads/hoses and 2. Compressor/s (for pneumatic filling

appurtenances or LPG filling assembly; system);

5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve 3. LPG hydraulic pump/s;

and handles and levers;
 4. LPG filling heads/hoses
appurtenances or LPG filling assembly;
5. LPG pipeline gate valve or ball valve
and handles levers;
6. LPG weighing scales; and
7. Seals bearing the Petron mark;
c. Sales invoices, ledgers, journals, official
receipts, purchase orders, and all other books of
accounts, inventories and documents pertaining to
the production, sale and/or distribution of the
aforesaid goods/products; and
d. Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos. UMN-971,
PEZ-612 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other
delivery trucks or vehicles or conveyances being
used for the purpose of selling and/or distributing the
above-mentioned counterfeit products.
Upon the issuance of the said search warrants, Oblanca and
several NBI operatives immediately proceeded to the MASAGANA
compound and served the search warrants on petitioners. [13] After
searching the premises of MASAGANA, the following articles described in
Search Warrant No. 2-2003 were seized:
and a. Thirty-eight (38) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders,
bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices
owned by Shell International Petroleum Company,
Ltd.;
b. Thirty-nine (39) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders,
bearing the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices
owned by Shell International Petroleum Company,
Ltd.;
c. Eight (8) filled 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing
the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices
owned by Shell International Petroleum Company,
Ltd.;
d. Three (3) empty 50 kg. LPG cylinders, bearing
the tradename of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation and the trademarks and other devices
owned by Shell International Petroleum Company,
Ltd.;
e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling
system.
Pursuant to Search Warrant No. 3-2003, the following articles
were also seized:
 a. Six (6) filled 11 kg. LPG cylinders without seal, 1. There is no probable cause for the
bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL issuance of the search warrant and the
and other devices owned and/or used exclusively conditions for the issuance of a search
by Petron; warrant were not complied with;

b. Sixty-three (63) empty 11 kg. LPG cylinders, 2. Applicant NBI Agent Ritchie
bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL N. Oblanca and his
and other devices owned and/or used exclusively witness Bernabe C. Alajar do not have any
by Petron; authority to apply for a search warrant.
Furthermore, they committed perjury when
they alleged in their sworn statements that
they conducted a test-buy on two
c. Seven (7) tampered 11 kg. LPG cylinders,
occasions;
bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL
and other devices owned and/or used exclusively
by Petron;
3. The place to be searched was not
specified in the Search Warrant as the place
has an area of 10,000 square meters (one
d. Five (5) tampered 50 kg. LPG cylinders,
hectare) more or less, for which reason the
bearing Petrons tradename and its trademark GASUL
place to be searched must be indicated with
and other devices owned and/or used exclusively
particularity;
by Petron with tampered GASUL logo;

4. The search warrant is characterized

e. One (1) set of motor compressor for filling
as a general warrant as the items to be
system; and
seized as mentioned in the search warrant
are being used in the conduct of the lawful
business of respondents and the same are
f. One (1) set of LPG refilling machine. not being used in
refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs.

On 22 April 2003, petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion to Quash

Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003[14] on the following grounds:
On 30 April 2003, MASAGANA, as third party claimant, filed with
the RTC a Motion for the Return of Motor Compressor and LPG Refilling
Machine.[15] It claimed that it is the owner of the said motor compressor
and LPG refilling machine; that these items were used in the operation
of its legitimate business; and that their seizure will jeopardize its
business interests.
As regards the Order denying the motion of MASAGANA for the
return of its motor compressor and LPG refilling machine, the RTC
resolved that MASAGANA cannot be considered a third party claimant
On 5 June 2003, the RTC issued two Orders, one of which denied
whose rights were violated as a result of the seizure since the evidence
the petitioners Motion to Quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-
disclosed that petitioners are stockholders of MASAGANA and that they
2003, and the other one also denied the Motion for the Return of Motor
conduct their business through the same juridical entity. It maintained
Compressor and LPG Refilling Machine of MASAGANA, for lack of merit.
that to rule otherwise would result in the misapplication and
[16]
debasement of the veil of corporate fiction. It also stated that the veil of
corporate fiction cannot be used as a refuge from liability.

With respect to the Order denying the petitioners motion to

quash Search Warrants No. 2-2003 and No. 3-2003, the RTC held that
Further, the RTC ratiocinated that ownership by another person or
based on the testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar, as well as the
entity of the seized items is not a ground to order its return; that in
documentary evidence consisting of receipts, photographs, intellectual
seizures pursuant to a search warrant, what is important is that the
property and corporate registration papers, there is probable cause to
seized items were used or intended to be used as means of committing
believe that petitioners are engaged in the business of refilling or using
the offense complained of; that by its very nature, the properties sought
cylinders which bear the trademarks or devices
to be returned in the instant case appear to be related to and intended
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell in the place sought to be searched and that
for the illegal activity for which the search warrants were applied for;
such activity is probably in violation of Section 155 in relation to Section
and that the items seized are instruments of an offense.
170 of Republic Act No. 8293.

Petitioners filed Motions for Reconsideration of the assailed

It also ruled that Oblanca and Alajar had personal knowledge of
Orders,[17] but these were denied by the RTC in its Order dated 21 July
the acts complained of since they were the ones who monitored the
2003 for lack of compelling reasons.[18]
activities of and conducted test-buys on MASAGANA; that the search
warrants in question are not general warrants because the compound
searched are solely used and occupied by MASAGANA, and as such,
Subsequently, petitioners appealed the two Orders of the RTC to
there was no need to particularize the areas within the compound that
the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
would be searched; and that the items to be seized in the subject search
of the Rules of Court.[19] On 30 September 2004, the Court of Appeals
warrants were sufficiently described with particularity as the same was
promulgated its Decision affirming the Orders of the RTC. [20] It adopted in
limited to cylinder tanks bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE.

essence the bases and reasons of the RTC in its two Orders.
The decretal portion thereof reads:
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reason to
disturb the assailed Orders of the respondent judge. Grave
abuse of discretion has not been proven to exist in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The assailed orders both dated June 5,
2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration [21] of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, but this was denied in its Resolution dated 1 June
2005 for lack of merit.[22]
Petitioners filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC CAVITE CITY HAD
SUFFICIENT BASIS IN DECLARING THE EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT NBI AGENT (RITCHIE OBLANCA) CAN APPLY FOR THE
SEARCH WARRANTS NOTHWITHSTANDING HIS LACK OF
AUTHORITY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF GIVING A PARTICULAR
DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED WAS
COMPLIED WITH;
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE APPLICATIONS AND THE SEARCH WARRANTS
THEMSELVES SHOW NO AMBIGUITY OF THE ITEMS TO BE
SEIZED;
V.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE COMPLAINT IS DIRECTED AGAINST MASAGANA
GAS CORPORATION, ACTING THROUGH ITS OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS, HENCE MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION MAY
NOT BE CONSIDERED AS THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT WHOSE
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE SEIZURE.[23]
 Apropos the first issue, petitioners allege These contentions are devoid of merit.
that Oblanca and Alajar had no personal knowledge of the matters on
which they testified; that Oblanca and Alajar lied to Judge Sadangwhen
they stated under oath that they were the ones who conducted the test-
Article III, Section 2, of the present Constitution states the
buys on two different occasions; that the truth of the matter is
requirements before a search warrant may be validly issued, to wit:
that Oblanca and Alajar never made the purchases personally; that the
transactions were undertaken by other persons namely, Nikko Javier and
G. Villanueva as shown in the Entry/Exit Slips of MASAGANA; and that Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in
even if it were true that Oblanca and Alajar asked Nikko Javier and G. their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
Villanueva to conduct the test-buys, the information relayed by the latter unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
two to the former was mere hearsay.[24]
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may
Petitioners also contend that if Oblanca and Alajar had indeed used
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
different names in purchasing the LPG cylinders, they should have searched and the persons or things to be seized.
mentioned it in their applications for search warrants and in their (emphasis supplied).
testimonies during the preliminary examination; that it was only after the
petitioners had submitted to the RTC the entry/exit slips showing different
personalities who made the purchases that Oblanca and Alajar explained
that they had to use different names in order to avoid detection;
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
that Alajar is not connected with either of the private respondents;
provides with more particularity the requisites in issuing a search
that Alajar was not in a position to inform the RTC as to the distinguishing
warrant, viz:
trademarks of SHELLANE and GASUL; that Oblanca was not also
competent to testify on the marks allegedly infringed by petitioners; that
Judge Sadang failed to ask probing questions on the distinguishing marks
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A
of SHELLANE and GASUL; that the findings of the Brand Protection search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
Committee of Pilipinas Shell were not submitted nor presented to the RTC; in connection with one specific offense to be determined
that although Judge Sadang examined Oblanca and Alajar, the former did personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
not ask exhaustive questions; and that the questions Judge Sadang asked
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
were merely rehash of the contents of the affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar. searched and the things to be seized which may be
[25]
anywhere in the Philippines.

According to the foregoing provisions, a search warrant can be
issued only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for search
warrant means such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place to be searched.[26]
The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts,
data or information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses
he may present.[27] The applicant or his witnesses must have personal
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense being complained of. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in writing the
complainant and his witnesses.[28]
Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the
constituting trademark infringement, thus:
SEC. 155. Remedies; Infringement. Any person who
shall, without the consent of the owner of the registered
mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark
or the same container or a dominant feature thereof in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution,
advertising of any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the sale of any
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;
or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy
or colorably imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be
used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or
services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be
liable in a civil action for infringement by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That the
infringement takes place at the moment any of the acts
stated in Subsection 155.1 or this subsection are committed
regardless of whether there is actual sale of goods or
services using the infringing material.
As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of a
acts
container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale,
distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause
confusion, mistake or deception among the buyers/consumers can be
considered as trademark infringement.
In his sworn affidavits,[29] Oblanca stated that before conducting an
investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed
the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine
Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell; that he
confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not
authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
cylinder containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of
 4. Certified true copy of the Certificate of
MASAGANA in its refilling plant station located within its compound at
Registration No. R-2813 for SHELL in the name of
Governors Drive, Barangay Lapidario, Trece Martires, Cavite City; that, Shell International;
using different names, they conducted two test-buys therein where they
purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE;
that the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their 5. Certified true copy of the Certificate of
presence by the MASAGANA employees; that while they were inside the Registration No. 31443 for SHELLANE in the name of
Shell International;
MASAGANA compound, he noticed stock piles of multi-branded cylinders
including GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they observed
delivery trucks loaded with GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in
6. Certified true copy of the Certificate of
and out of the MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to various Registration No. 57945 for the mark GASUL in the
retail outlets. These allegations were corroborated by Alajar in his name of Petron;
separate affidavits.

7. Certified true copy of the Certificate of

Registration No. C-147 for GASUL CYLINDER
In support of the foregoing statements, Oblanca also submitted the CONTAINING LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS in the
following documentary and object evidence: name of Petron;

1. Certified true copy of the Certificate of 8. Certified true copy of the Certificate of
Registration No. 44046 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the Registration No. 61920 for the mark GASUL AND
name of Shell International; DEVICE in the name of Petron;

2. Certified true copy of the Certificate of 9. Certified true copy of the Articles of
Registration No. 41789 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the Incorporation of Masagana;
name of Shell International;

10. Certified true copy of the By-laws of Masagana;

3. Certified true copy of the Certificate of
Registration No. 37525 for SHELL (DEVICE) in the
name of Shell International; 11. Certified true copy of the latest General
Information Sheet of Masagana on file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission;
 12. Pictures of delivery trucks coming in and out
suspicion, they used different names during the test-buys. They also
of Masagana while it
delivered Gasul and Shellane LPG; personally witnessed the refilling of LPG cylinders bearing the marks
GASUL and SHELLANE inside the MASAGANA refilling plant station and the
deliveries of these refilled containers to some outlets using mini-trucks.
13. Cash Invoice No. 56210 dated 13 February
2003 issued by Masagana for
the Gasul and Shellane LPG purchased by
Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; Indeed, the aforesaid facts and circumstances are sufficient to
establish probable cause. It should be borne in mind that the
determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the
14. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after
by Cash Invoice No. 56210 purchased trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with
from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar;
probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The standards of
judgment are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting

15. Cash Invoice No. 56398 dated 27 February 2003 calibrations of a judge after a full blown trial.[31]
issued by Masagana for the Gasul and Shellane LPG
purchased by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar; and

The fact that Oblanca and Alajar used different names in the
purchase receipts do not negate personal knowledge on their part. It is a
16. Pictures of the Shellane and Gasul LPGs covered
by Cash Invoice No. 56398 purchased common practice of the law enforcers such as NBI agents during covert
from Masagana by Agent Oblanca and witness Alajar. investigations to use different names in order to conceal their true
[30]
identities. This is reasonable and understandable so as not to endanger
the life of the undercover agents and to facilitate the lawful arrest or
apprehension of suspected violators of the law.

Extant from the foregoing testimonial, documentary and object

evidence is that Oblanca and Alajar have personal knowledge of the fact Petitioners contention that Oblanca and Alajar should have

that petitioners, through MASAGANA, have been using the LPG cylinders mentioned the fact that they used different names in their respective
bearing the marks GASUL and SHELLANE without permission affidavits and during the preliminary examination is puerile. The argument
from Petron and Pilipinas Shell, a probable cause for trademark is too vacuous to merit serious consideration. There is nothing in the
infringement. Both Oblanca and Alajar were clear and insistent that they provisions of law concerning the issuance of a search warrant which
were the very same persons who monitored the activities of MASAGANA; directly or indirectly mandates that the applicant of the search warrant or
that they conducted test-buys thereon; and that in order to avoid his witnesses should state in their affidavits the fact that they used
different names while conducting undercover investigations, or to divulge
such fact during the preliminary examination. In the light of other more
material facts which needed to be established for a finding of probable
cause, it is not difficult to believe that Oblanca and Alajar failed to mention
that they used aliases in entering the MASAGANA compound due to mere
oversight.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record.- The
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to
the record their sworn statements, together with the
affidavits submitted.

It cannot be gainfully said that Oblanca and Alajar are not

competent to testify on the trademarks infringed by the petitioners. As
earlier discussed, Oblanca declared under oath that before conducting an The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the
investigation on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge. Although there is
the certificates of trademark registrations issued by the Philippine no hard-andfast rule governing how a judge should conduct his
Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. These investigation, it is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
certifications of trademark registrations were attached by Oblanca in his exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro
applications for the search warrants. Alajar, on the other hand, works as a forma. The judge must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but
private investigator and, in fact, owns a private investigation and must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
research/consultation firm. His firm was hired and authorized, pursuant to application.
[34]

the Brand Protection Program of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, to verify reports
that MASAGANA is involved in the illegal sale and refill of GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders.[32] As part of the job, he studied and familiarized After perusing the Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the
himself with the registered trademarks of GASUL and SHELLANE, and the preliminary examination, we found the questions of Judge Sadang to be
distinct features of the LPG cylinders bearing the same trademarks before sufficiently probing, not at all superficial and perfunctory. [35] The
conducting surveillance and test-buys on MASAGANA. [33] He also submitted testimonies of Oblanca and Alajar were consistent with each other and
to Oblanca several copies of the same registered trademark registrations their narration of facts was credible. As correctly found by the Court of
and accompanied Oblanca during the surveillance and test-buys. Appeals:

As to whether the form and manner of questioning made by
Judge Sadang complies with the requirements of law, Section 5 of Rule 126
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,prescribes the rules in the
examination of the complainant and his witnesses when applying for
search warrant, to wit:
This Court is likewise not convinced that respondent
Judge failed to ask probing questions in his determination of
the existence of probable cause. This Court has thoroughly
examined the Transcript of Stenographic Notes taken during
the investigation conducted by the respondent Judge and
found that respondent Judge lengthily inquired into the
circumstances of the case. For instance, he required the NBI
 agent to confirm the contents of his affidavit, inquired as to
the alleged letter-complaint which is material and relevant to the
where the test-buys were conducted and by whom, verified
whether PSPC and PETRON have registered trademarks determination of the existence of probable cause; and
or tradenames, required the NBI witness to explain how the that Petron and Pilipinas Shell, being two different corporations, should
test-buys were conducted and to describe the LPG cylinders have issued a board resolution authorizing
purchased from Masagana Gas Corporation, inquired why
the Villaraza and Angangco Law Office to apply for search warrant in their
the applications for Search Warrant were filed in Cavite City
considering that Masagana Gas Corporation was located behalf.[38]
in Trece Martires, Cavite, inquired whether the NBI Agent
has a sketch of the place and if there was any distinguishing
sign to identify the place to be searched, and inquired about
their alleged tailing and monitoring of the delivery We reject these protestations.
trucks. x x x.[36]

The authority of Oblanca to apply for the search warrants in

question is clearly discussed and explained in his affidavit, viz:

Since probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and

findings of the judge who conducted the examination and who had the
opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, the findings of the
judge deserves great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or
ignored the clear dictates of reason.[37] We find no compelling reason to
disturb Judge Sadangs findings herein.
Anent the second issue, petitioners argue that Judge Sadang failed
to require Oblanca to show his authority to apply for search warrants;
that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime and not that of the
Intellectual Property Division of the NBI; that all complaints
infringement should be investigated by the Intellectual Property Division of
the NBI; that it is highly irregular that an agent not assigned to the
Intellectual Property Division would apply for a search warrant and without
authority from the NBI Director; that the alleged letter-complaint of
Atty. Bienvenido Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco Law Office was not
produced in court; that Judge Sadang did not require Oblanca to produce
[That] on 11 February 2003, the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) received a letter-complaint from
Atty. Bienvenido I. Somera, Jr. of Villaraza and Angangco, on
behalf of among others, Petron Corporation (PETRON)
[and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC), the
authorized representative of Shell International Petroleum
Company Limited (SHELL INTERNATIONAL)] requesting
assistance in the investigation and, if warranted,
apprehension and prosecution of certain persons and/or
establishments suspected of violating the intellectual
property rights of PETRON [and of PSPC and Shell
International.]
for
11. [That] on the basis of the letter-complaint, I, together
with Agent Angelo Zarzoso, was assigned as the NBI agent
on the case.[39]
 The fact that Oblanca is a member of the Anti-Organized Crime 10,000.00 square meters with several structures erected on the lot, the
Division and not that of the Intellectual Property Division does not search warrants should have defined the areas to be searched.
abrogate his authority to apply for search warrant. As aptly stated by the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the provisions on search
warrant under Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be
specifically commands that the applicant law enforcer must be a member searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable
of a division that is assigned or related to the subject crime or offense effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from
before the application for search warrant may be acted upon. The other places in the community. Any designation or description known to
petitioners did not also cite any law, rule or regulation mandating such the locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all others, and on
requirement. At most, petitioners may only be referring to the inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
administrative organization and/or internal rule or practice of the NBI. requirement.[41]
However, not only did petitioners failed to establish the existence thereof,
but they also did not prove that such administrative organization and/or
internal rule or practice are inviolable.
Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant
describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has
been held that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place
Neither is the presentation of the letter-complaint
of intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true
Atty. Somera and board resolutions from Petron and Pilipinas Shell required where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant
or necessary in determining probable cause. As heretofore discussed, the had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
affidavits of Oblanca and Alajar, coupled with the object and documentary warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit. [42]
evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish probable cause. It can
also be presumed that Oblanca, as an NBI agent, is a public officer who
had regularly performed his official duty. [40] He would not have initiated an
The search warrants in question commanded any peace officer to
investigation on MASAGANA without a proper complaint. Furthermore,
make an immediate search on MASAGANA compound located at Governors
Atty. Somera did not step up to deny his letter-complaint.
Drive, Barangay Lapidario, TreceMartires, Cavite City. It appears that the
raiding team had ascertained and reached MASAGANA compound without
difficulty since MASAGANA does not have any other offices/plants
Regarding the third issue, petitioners posit that the applications for in Trece Martires, Cavite City. Moreover, Oblanca, who was with the raiding
search warrants of Oblanca did not specify the particular area to be team, was already familiar with the MASAGANA compound as he
searched, hence, giving the raiding team wide latitude in determining and Alajar had monitored and conducted test-buys thereat.
what areas they can search. They aver that the search warrants were
general warrants, and are therefore violative of the Constitution.
Petitioners also assert that since the MASAGANA compound is about
 Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA otherwise it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
compound, there was no need to particularize the areas to be searched search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they
because, as correctly stated by Petron and Pilipinas Shell, these structures are looking for. Once described, however, the articles subject of the search
constitute the essential and necessary components of the petitioners and seizure need not be so invariant as to require absolute concordance,
business and cannot be treated separately as they form part of one entire in our view, between those seized and those described in the warrant.
compound. The compound is owned and used solely by MASAGANA. What Substantial similarity of those articles described as a class or specie would
the case law merely requires is that, the place to be searched can be suffice.[44]
distinguished in relation to the other places in the community. Indubitably,
this requisite was complied with in the instant case.

Measured against this standard, we find that the items to be seized

under the search warrants in question were sufficiently described with
As to the fourth issue, petitioners asseverate that the search particularity. The articles to be confiscated were restricted to the
warrants did not indicate with particularity the items to be seized since the following: (1) LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE;
search warrants merely described the items to be seized as LPG cylinders (2) Machines and equipments used or intended to be used in the illegal
bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE without specifying their refilling of GASUL and SHELLANE cylinders. These machines were also
sizes. specifically enumerated and listed in the search warrants; (3) Documents
which pertain only to the production, sale and distribution of the GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and (4) Delivery trucks bearing Plate Nos.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to WTE-527, XAM-970 and WFC-603, hauling trucks, and/or other delivery
be seized when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances trucks or vehicles or conveyances being used or intended to be used for
will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact the purpose of selling and/or distributing GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the cylinders.
[45]

search and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those
which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued.[43] Additionally, since the described items are clearly limited only to
those which bear direct relation to the offense, i.e., violation of section 155
of Republic Act No. 8293, for which the warrant was issued, the

While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must requirement of particularity of description is satisfied.
be particularly described therein and no other property can be
taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so
far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. The law does not require that Given the foregoing, the indication of the accurate sizes of the
the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute details as GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders or tanks would be unnecessary.
to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities;
 Consequently, MASAGANAs third party claim serves no refuge for
petitioners.
Finally, petitioners claim that MASAGANA has the right to intervene
and to move for the return of the seized items; that the items seized by
the raiding team were being used in the legitimate business of
Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA
MASAGANA; that the raiding team had no right to seize them under the
from that of the petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not
guise that the same were being used in refilling GASUL and SHELLANE LPG
require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
cylinders; and that there being no action for infringement filed against
against whom the search warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of
them and/or MASAGANA from the seizure of the items up to the present, it
no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the
is only fair that the seized articles be returned to the lawful owner in
warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be
accordance with Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC.
seized.[48] Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the properties seized
belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant to the
search warrants is still valid.
It is an elementary and fundamental principle of corporation law
that a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders,
directors or officers. However, when the notion of legal entity is used to
Further, it is apparent that the motor compressor, LPG refilling
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
machine and the GASUL and SHELL LPG cylinders seized were
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in the
the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, or the evidence of
case of two corporations merge them into one. [46] In other words, the law
the commission of trademark infringement. These were the very
will not recognize the separate corporate existence if the corporation is
instruments used or intended to be used by the petitioners in trademark
being used pursuant to the foregoing unlawful objectives. This non-
infringement. It is possible that, if returned to MASAGANA, these items will
recognition is sometimes referred to as the doctrine of piercing the veil of
be used again in violating the intellectual property rights
corporate entity or disregarding the fiction of corporate entity. Where the
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. [49]
Thus, the RTC was justified in denying the
separate corporate entity is disregarded, the corporation will be treated
petitioners motion for their return so as to prevent the petitioners and/or
merely as an association of persons and the stockholders or members will
MASAGANA from using them again in trademark infringement.
be considered as the corporation, that is, liability will attach personally or
directly to the officers and stockholders.[47]

Petitioners reliance on Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-1-06-SC,[50] is not

tenable. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, A.M. 02-1-06-SC is
As we now find, the petitioners, as directors/officers of MASAGANA,
not applicable in the present case because it governs only searches and
are utilizing the latter in violating the intellectual property rights
seizures in civil actions for infringement of intellectual property rights.
of Petron and Pilipinas Shell. Thus, petitioners collectively and MASAGANA
[51]
The offense complained of herein is for criminal violation of Section 155
should be considered as one and the same person for liability purposes.
in relation to Section 170[52] of Republic Act No. 8293.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
SO ORDERED.
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79256, dated 30 September
2004 and 1 June 2005, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.