Advantage CPs

Advantage CPs
Notes
The key to winning with these CPs is to simply have a better
understanding of the ideas behind these CPs than your
opponent. Reading a CP will shift the attention away from the
aff and to the CP, and if you can out-explain the CP than the
other team, and explain it in relation to the affs I/L chain. The
NBs to these CPs are intended to be topic generics (aka, NOT
politics). Also, I have a bad habit of overhighlighting so the
highlighting in this file might seem excessive. But as a general
note, you should definitely not highlight it to down to
Georgetown AM levels. If youre answering the CP, make sure
the answers dont contradict with your own aff
The way the files are meant to be done is creating multiplank

CPs that solve the aff via the advantages or solving some of
the advantages and impact turning the ones that you dont
solve.
This file doesnt have as many impacts as other camps, and if

you want to expand on this, then you do that. The part I didnt
research is the relation of these CPs to politics DAs, so if your
strat usually involves the politics DA, then you should do that.
But the more planks you involve, the more likely the plan
would be popular/unpopular in congress/with the public. If
youre really desperate, just straight turn the NB.
Anthony Wong
Lexington 17
Olivine CP
Notes
This CP is primarily intended to solve warming, and ocean
acidification. It takes a mineral called Olivine, and spreads it
on the beaches of the U.S. The theory is that olivine can react
with CO2 and form sand, so that the CO2 is sucked out of the
atmosphere. The Olivine is spread on the beach so that tidal
movements can naturally wear down the rocks into smaller and
smaller particles so that theres a greater surface area
exposed, and so more CO2 can be absorbed. The way the
chemical reaction works is (Ive attached it below) is that the
Olivine removes CO2 thats been dissolved in the water, and in
order to create equilibrium, CO2 goes from the atmosphere
into the ocean. However, this still resolves ocean acidification
because the theory is that the CO2 would be sucked up faster
than it needs can be naturally re-dissolved. (also its
pronounced ol-uh-veen)
Olivine reacts with CO2 to trap it from the atmosphere

decreases the greenhouse effect
Dummermuth and Grosfeld 13 [Angelika, researcher for the Alfred-Wegner Institute, Klaus,
researcher for the Alred-Wegner Institute, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE MARINE REALM, pg. 15, The Alfred-Wegner
Institute, https://epic.awi.de/33026/1/BzPM_0662_2013.pdf] AW
Over the last 250 years, the oceans have absorbed 530 billion tons of CO2, triggering a 30 percent increase in
ocean acidity. Before people started burning coal and oil, ocean pH had been relatively stable for the previous 20
million years, but now, ocean acidification is happening faster than it has in the last 300 million years. Researchers
predict that if carbon emissions continue at their current rate, ocean acidity will more than double by 2100. In
nature,ocean acidity is stabilised through the weathering of rocks, which react with
CO2 either in the atmosphere or the ocean and convert it to alkalinity which
restores ocean pH, allowing calcifying organisms to produce sediments again that
finally store the CO2 as solid rock again (equation 3). Many suggestions have been made to speed up
this process to prevent the increase in ocean acidification. A rather radical concept has been proposed by Schuilling
the mineral Olivine may be used to enhance the rate
& Krijgsman (2006). They postulate that
of weathering thereby trapping atmospheric CO2. Olivine is a greenish mineral
consisting of magnesium silicate (Mg2SiO4). It is the most common mineral on Earth
accounting for 90 per cent of the Earths crust (Fig. 13, left) and is abundant in many countries of
the world in mountain ranges. Olivine forms magnesium carbonate and silicon oxide when
reacting with CO2 in the atmosphere. The magnesium carbonate is washed into the
ocean and will form new sedimentary rocks at the seafloor. Silicon oxide is just sand
and therefore neutral in the natural environment. The concept is to crush olivine
rock, simply spread a thin layer over any available surface where it will react with
the CO2 in the atmosphere. Spreading it over beaches would even enhance the
effect, as the wave action would break down the rock into smaller pieces. This concept
is simply an accelerated natural process. It may prove to have far fewer side effects than other geo-engineering
options for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. However it remains to be seen if it would be feasible.
This biggest part about wining this CP and explaining it it
simply knowing the science ehind it. The ev is relatively old so
if you can find updates that would be good. Beating this CP
should just be poking holes in the logic chain, and identifying
why your I/L is the only way to resolve warming.
For those of you that are interested in the chemistry behind it.
(Mg, Fe)2SiO4 (olivine1 ) + 4 H2O ,2 (Mg, Fe)2+ + 4 OH +
H4SiO4 followed by 4 OH + 4 CO2 4 HCO 3 . CO2 is
consumed, and Mg2+ , Fe2+ , H4SiO4 and HCO 3 20 are
produced
The best way to beat this CP is through logical gut checks. How
much olivine do we really need? How would we get the olivine?
How do we monitor how effective it is? All of these things are
all hypotheticals, which havent really been tested because
geo-engineering for the purposes of preventing global
warming is a relatively new science. Pointing out those
discrepancies should help you beat the CP.
1NC
The United States federal government should fully fund and
implement coastal olivine treatments.
Olivine sucks CO2 out of the sea which then removes it from
the atmosphere to achieve equilibrium
Dummermuth and Grosfeld 13 [Angelika, researcher for the Alfred-Wegner Institute, Klaus,
researcher for the Alred-Wegner Institute, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE MARINE REALM, pg. 19, The Alfred-Wegner
Institute, https://epic.awi.de/33026/1/BzPM_0662_2013.pdf] AW
The relationship between atmospheric and seawater CO2 is closely correlated . As in

nature, the atmosphere and the sea act in equilibrium, any decrease in seawater CO2
concentrations, also decrease atmospheric CO2 concentrations . In the real world, this
means that by tackling ocean acidification with olivine, CO2 could diffuse out of the
atmosphere reducing atmospheric CO2 in turn reducing the effects of global
warming. As the reaction of olivine with carbon dioxide is exothermic, producing heat, it is clear from
temperature data that the fine crystal treatment allows the reaction to occur faster due to
the increased surface area to volume ratio of the fine crystals. When the reaction is
sped up, CO2 is converted faster in to CO2 containing solids . The pH data supports this,
showing that pH increased most in the fine powder treatment due to the decrease in CO2 dissolved in the seawater,
which dissociates with water into higher concentrations of carbonate and bicarbonate. The other chemical
fine crystal treatment caused a larger reduction of CO2 in the
parameters showed that the
atmosphere and corresponding increase of pH in the seawater than the treatments
with coarse crystals or a mix of both crystal sizes. The calculated saturation states of calcite and
aragonite were higher in the fine crystal treatment than in the other treatments. In nature, such higher saturation
states build favourable conditions for marine calcifying organisms such as corals, barnacles, and pteropods as they
When weathering occurs,
use calcite and aragonite to build their shells as protection against predation.
carbon dioxide is transformed to alkalinity (increased carbonate ion) which is subsequently
fixed by calcifying organisms that produce solid limestone that is taken out of the
system. Taking carbon dioxide, one of the main drivers of climate change, out of the system
could help to reduce the impacts of climate change, including ocean
acidification. This experiment was carried out to show that fine olivine crystals have the potential to increase
the weathering rate substantially. When distributed on beaches, abrasion through tidal
movement would allow for a natural way of making olivine sand that, through a larger
surface, would increase the weathering rate and therefore the amount of carbon
that is then stored in solids. By taking the help of tidal forces to grind the olivine, the olivine solution
becomes much cheaper than traditional carbon trade.
AT: Takes Long Time
Olivine is one of the fastest weathering mineralscostal
activity accelerates the process
Schuiling and Boer 11 [R.D., Professor of Earth Sciences at Utrecht University, Poppe, Professor of
Geosciences at Utrecht University, Rolling stones; fast weathering of olivine in shallow seas for cost-effective CO2
capture and mitigation of global warming and ocean acidification, pg 554, Earth System Dynamics, Dec 6 2011,
http://www.earth-syst-dynam-discuss.net/2/551/2011/esdd-2-551-2011.pdf]
Olivine weathers more rapidly than any other major rock-forming silicate mineral ...
so olivine does not usually survive to be part of the heavy-mineral fraction of most soils, sediments, or sedimentary
Areas with groundwater passing 5 through zones with a high
rocks (Velbel, 2009).
proportion of reactive minerals show lower tendencies to acidification than others,
and vegetation also has a positive effect on silicate weathering (Moulton et al., 2000), which
is obvious from the fact that olivine grains from nearby sources are not commonly found in soils (Wilson, 2004).
Biological activity can greatly accelerate the weathering of mafic silicates under the
uptake of CO2 (cf. Wilson, 10 2004; Needham et al., 2006; Taylor et al., 2009; Schuiling and de Boer, 2010;
Brantley et al., 2011). Carbon sequestration in ultramafic mining waste may be considerable (Pronost et al., 2011;
Experimental studies of ambient temperature olivine dissolution
Wilson et al., 2011).
kinetics suggest that olivine dissolution is interface-limited, with the rate-
determining step being the breakdown of a surface activated complex (Vel- 15 bel,
2009). The physical removal of surface complexes thus is expected to accelerate
olivine weathering.
AT: Expensive
Actually its notcoastal olivine cuts the cost of taking it to
the mill
Costs of mining and milling are of the order of 34 per ton olivine (OConnor et al., 2000)
(price level 2000). Thus, together with transport and spreading, the price per ton captured CO2 will
be less than 10.- , that is well below the current price of CO2 emission rights. Such
low cost can be achieved when the weathering process of 10 olivine and serpentine grains is
left entirely to nature, without using technologies like thermal activation , addition of
chemicals, mechanical activation, the use of autoclaves, subsurface injection of CO2 in peridotites and
other (ultra)mafic rocks, and milling to very fine grain sizes (cf. Lackner, 2002; Kelemen and Matter, 2008; Lal,
Large-
2008; Kohler et al., 2010; Haug et al., 2011; Krevor and Lackner, 2011; Zevenhoven et al., 2011). 15
scale experiments on the spreading of olivine grains along beaches and in shallow
seas, where grain collisions make these the cheapest ball mills available, are more
relevant than theoretical models and high-tech experiments which ignore important
natural factors.
AT: Impossible
Its not impossiblecheaper than other forms of geo-

engineering
The option to stimulate natural rock weathering by applying olivine (Schuiling and Krijgsman, 2006) has been
proposed not to be feasible because dissolution kinetics and passivating silica-rich surface-layer formation would
make the reaction far too slow (Bearat et al., 2006; Lal, 2008; K ohler et al., 2010) and also because the quantity
needed, 7 km3 olivine per year (that is 1 m3 /human) would be too great to be possi- 25 bly mined and
distributed (Hangx and Spiers, 2009). However, as demonstrated above, dissolution kinetics as defined
on the basis of theoretical calculations are much accelerated in nature by
mechanical and biological processes. The volume of 7 km3 (23 Gt; billion tons) olivine is
great, but less than the volume of hydrocarbons expressed in oil equivalent 10 km3 that
is annually retrieved, often from great depths and at distant locations. Olivine and
serpentine are readily available at the Earth surface on all continents (Kelemen and
Matter, 2008; Kohler et al., 2010; Zevenhoven et al., 2011), and past mining efforts show that such
volumes are exceeded by existing mines. E.g. the Bingham Canyon open pit mine in Utah has an
excavated volume of 25 km3 5 , and worldwide 6 Gt ores and industrial minerals and more than 20 Gt construction
minerals were mined in 2005 (Krausmann et al., 2009). The above volume is large indeed. E.g. in
Norway 1.33.6 million ton olivine was mined annually in the past 10 years (Geological-Survey-Norway, 2010).
Expansion 10 of olivine mining activities, possible on all continents, is a, though large-scale,
simple technical enterprise, much easier and much cheaper than CCS and other
expensive techniques for CO2 sequestration. Extrapolation of the 3.4 million tons of
olivine that were mined with 225 employees in Norway in 2004 (Geological-Survey-Norway,
2005) to the case in which all fossil fuel CO2 produced by mankind will be neutralized
by 15 the application of olivine, shows that then 1 to 1.5 million people (0.2 of
mankind) will be employed in open-pit olivine mining world-wide, considerably less
than in coal mining and oil industry. With 68 % of the Earth surface consisting of shelf seas, only
about 2 % of these shelf seas would be needed to accomplish such goal.
AT: Not Global
Only needs to be on 2% of the worlds sea shelfs
capture and mitigation of global warming and ocean acidification, Earth System Dynamics, Dec 6 2011,
Human CO2 emissions may drive the Earth into a next greenhouse state. They can be mitigated by accelerating
weathering of natural rock under the uptake of CO2. We disprove the paradigm that olivine weathering in nature
it is not needed to mill olivine to very fine, 10 m-size
would be a slow process, and show that
grains in order to arrive at a complete dissolution within 12 year. In high-energy
shallow marine environments olivine grains and reaction products on the grain
surfaces, that otherwise would greatly retard the reaction, are abraded so that the chemical
reaction is much accelerated. When kept in motion even large olivine grains rubbing and
bumping against each other quickly produce fine clay- and silt-sized olivine particles
that show a fast chemical reaction. Spreading of olivine in the world's 2% most
energetic shelf seas can compensate a year's global CO2 emissions and counteract
ocean acidification against a price well below that of carbon credits.
AT: Experiments Prove it Doesnt work
Their lab experiments dont assume real world ecosystems
Lenton and Vaughn 12 [Tim, Professor of Climate Change and Earth System Science at the
University of Exeter, Naomi, Senior Research Associate at the Tyndell Centre, Geoengineering Responses to
Climate Change, pg 156, Springer, 2012] AW
One may wonder why there is such a large discrepancy between laboratory experiments, showing low rates of
weathering, and the real world, where weathering rates are 100 times larger. The answer is
Higher plants live in symbiosis with mycorrhizal fungi in and around their
relatively simple.
root system. These fungi secrete low molecular organic acids like acetic acid, malic acid and
oxalic acid that rapidly attack mineral grains in the soil [26]. This liberates mineral
nutrients that are subsequently taken up by the higher plants . In turn, the higher plants
reward the fungi by providing them sugars. Lichens act in a similar way by secreting oxalic acid that eats the
In the laboratory, mycorrhizal fungi and lichens are absent, and this
underlying rock [27].
is the reason why the abiotic reaction rates that were found in the laboratory are
much lower than weathering rates in nature.
AT: Ocean Acidification DA
Actually decreases ocean acidificationincreases the alkalinity
of seawater
Climate Change, pg 161, Springer, 2012] AW
A larger application that can be used in the tropics as well as in temperate climates is to cover beaches that are
subject to erosion or tidal flats by olivine sand. Olivine is considerably heavier than quartz and will not be eroded
and transported away from the beach as easily as quartz sands. The tides will alternately wet the beach and drain
the pore water.During such a tidal cycle, the olivine will react with the seawater, thus
adding alkalinity to the sea, which makes it possible to store more CO2 as
bicarbonate in the seawater without acidifying it. The olivine grains bump into each other or
scratch each other when they are moved by the surf. They become rounded, and the tiny slivers that have
come off the grains will very rapidly weather [38]. If marine constructions (dams or artificial reefs)
are built with olivine blocks and sand, this will conceivably lead to well-cemented structures after some time.
Seawater is saturated with CaCO3. If the water between the olivine pieces is only
slowly replaced, it can react with the olivine for some time. This raises the pH of the
interstitial seawater, causing a shift in the carbonate equilibria. This leads to a
supersaturation of calcite which precipitates as a cement between the olivine. This process is similar to the
formation of beach rocks. Filling the solution holes left by underground solution mining of salt with olivine powder
serves two, possibly three purposes. After the cavity is filled with olivine, it is no longer necessary to keep the brine-
filled hole permanently pressurized to prevent it from collapsing because the olivine will support the cavity. By
injecting CO2 into the mixture of olivine and brine, one captures CO2 as bicarbonate. The heat of reaction of
carbonatation + hydratation may heat the water sufficiently to use it for warm thermal medicinal baths, or
swimming pools.
AT: Fossil Fuel Job DA
Doesnt cost jobs and is efficientcarbon credits and cheap
energy
Climate Change, pg 164-165, Springer, 2012] AW
The picture is complicated by the fact that the largest industrializing nations (such as China, India, Brazil, South
Africa, and Indonesia) all possess vast coal reserves and want to lift the standard of living of their people as quickly
as possible.One requirement to reach that goal is the unlimited access to cheap
energy. Reduction of emissions is, therefore, not necessarily a top priority. Enhanced
weathering ideas may be a way to break this deadlock by providing a means of
compensating their emissions by using olivine . All five industrializing nations mentioned also
possess vast reserves of olivine rocks. They can exploit these with their own
workforce for 10% of the cost of CCS for the same amount of CO2 sequestered, and
it will give them large employment opportunities. Moreover, if they produce more olivine than
required to meet their own agreed quota, they can sell surplus carbon credits to the other
countries for 15 Euros/t of CO2, and still make a profit. This will permit them to
continue to use their cheap energy based on coal, while still doing their part to
counteract climate change.
CCS KT Solve
CCS is the only way to phase out fossil fuels and avert
permanent disaster
Magil 14 [Bobby, Senior science writer for Climate Central, Carbon Capture Faces Hurdles of Will, Not
Technology, Climate Central, April 23 2014, http://www.climatecentral.org/news/carbon-capture-faces-hurdles-of-
will-not-technology-17321] AW
In order to keep the global average temperature from warming no more than 2C by
the year 2100 relative to the global temperature prior to 1900, the concentration of
carbon dioxide must be capped at 450 parts per million . (Global CO2 concentrations hit 400
ppm for the first time last year.) To do that, global greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 must be between 40 and 70
That would be a huge feat, and would require vast
percent lower than they were in in 2010.
decarbonization, according to the IPCC. That means a major rollout of renewable energy
technology that emits no carbon at all, a global emphasis on energy efficiency and, among other things,
capturing emissions from the burning of fossil fuels and burying them deep
underground or storing them elsewhere forever. In fact, all fossil fuel power
generation without CCS would need to be totally phased out . The total amount of carbon
that would need to be diverted from being emitted into the atmosphere is stunning: Current global atmospheric
CO2 emissions total roughly 30 gigatons, or 30 billion metric tons per year. That's about the equivalent of 1 billion
barrels of compressed CO2 per day, or more than 10 times the amount of oil transported around the globe on a
daily basis, Ruben Juanes, associate professor in energy studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an
expert in CCS, said. "Of course, we don't expect to take our current emissions to zero, or that one single technology
A viable technology to deal
will do it, but this does give a sense for the scale of the problem," he said.
with such a large amount of CO2 should need to divert 1 gigaton of CO2 per year
from the atmosphere, and there's only one technology capable of doing that CCS,
he said.
CCS KT Transition to Renewables
CCS is key to a transition to renewable energyIPCC and EPA
predictions
Carey and Fitzpatrick 15 [Melissa, policy specialist at the Environmentalist Defense Fund, Ryan,
Deputy Director of Clean Energy at Third Way, Let's Get Serious About CCS, Third Way, Aug 5 2015,
http://www.thirdway.org/report/lets-get-serious-about-ccs] AW
So heres the unfortunate truth that policymakers must address: were very unlikely to see a
renewables-only world in our lifetime. Dave Roberts, the columnist who coined the term climate
mitigation plans that rely too heavily on
hawk and is an outspoken climate advocate, describes
renewables as little more than thought exercises .4 DotEarth columnist Andrew Revkin says that
reports suggesting a 100% renewable future have a lot of that darned fine print. Of a recent Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, Revkin takes issue with language suggesting that existing renewable
technology can largely resolve climate concerns, saying, youd have to dig deep and long in the background
chapters to learn that many of these technologies exist today hides huge gaps, particularly at the scale that would
be needed to blunt emissions of greenhouse gases.5 These more realistic assessments echo the findings of some
Even after the Clean Power Plan is fully
of the most respected authorities on climate and energy.
implemented in 2030, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) believes that coal and
natural gas will still rule the grid, respectively accounting for 28% and 32% of
Americas electricity generation.6 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) also expects coal
and gas to continue providing over half of U.S. electricity, and projects an increasingly troubling reliance on fossil
fuels worldwide. EIA forecasts suggest that by 2040, global energy demand will grow by
56%, and fossil fuels will supply 80% of that demand .7 As Maria van der Hoeven, Executive
Director of the International Energy Agency (IEA) concluded, With coal and other fossil fuels
remaining dominant in the fuel mix, there is no climate friendly scenario in the long
run without CCS.8 U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz has made similar
statements and specifically highlighted the need for CCS on cleaner-burning natural gas,
saying "Eventually, if we're going to get really low carbon emissions , natural gas, just like
coal, would need to have carbon capture to be part of that. "9 Of course, energy projections
can (and often do) turn out to be incorrect. Predicting the speed of innovation and deployment for technologies like
wind and solar is tricky, and none of the aforementioned organizations is infallible.10 If the EIA, EPA, and IEA are
wrong and renewables displace the overwhelming majority of the worlds coal and natural gas within the next few
decades, well be well on our way to meeting our carbon reduction goals. Excellent news. But, what if the EIA, EPA,
and IEA projections are right? By the time we find out, itll be far too late to ask for a do-over. On this basis alone, it
makes sense to ensure that CCS is ready to assist in cutting emissions from fossil fuel consumption around the
According to the International Panel on Climate
worldbecause its the only technology that can do the job
Change (IPCC) and International Energy Agency (IEA),
CCS offers the most effective means of
drastically reducing emissions from fossil fuel-fired power plantsand the only
means of making deep cuts in some of the worlds most carbon-intensive industries
such as cement and steel production.11 Access to CCS technology will also be critical in
keeping mitigation costs from skyrocketing. The IPCC has found that without CCS, reaching
the aggressive mitigation goals suggested by the scientific community will be 138%
more expensive than if CCS were used. To put this into perspective, having limited penetration of
renewables on the grid would also increase mitigation costs, though by just 6%.12
AT: Olivine CP
No Solvency
Doesnt solve ocean acidificationlong term studies prove
Huack et al 16 [Judith, researcher of biosciences at the Alfred-Wegner Institute, Peter Khler, researcher
of geosciences at the Alfred-Wegner Institute, Dieter Wolf-Gladrow, Head of the bioscience department at the
Alfred-Wegner Institute, Christoph Vlker, researcher of biosciences at the Alfred-Wegner Institute, Iron fertilisation
and century-scale effects of open ocean dissolution of olivine in a simulated CO2 removal experiment, IOP Science,
Feb 09 2016, http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/2/024007#erlaa13c7s3] AW
The annual mean pH is 0.006 units higher than in CTRL at the end of the olivine dissolution simulation with 0.1% Fe-
the
availability. The effects of alkalinity (0.009) and silicic acid (0.001) lead to a larger pH restoration, however,
iron effect leads to an increase of pH initially, but to a decrease of pH after
approximately 50 years when the transport of remineralised carbon reaches the
surface and outweighs the current carbon draw-down by iron fertilisation (figure 1(b)). A
termination of the open ocean dissolution of olivine results in a lower pH relative to the unperturbed CTRL state only
The pH increase due to olivine dissolution is small compared
10 years after the termination.
to the pH decrease driven by anthropogenic carbon uptake from about 8.1 to $\lt $ 7.8 in
our simulations over the 21st century.
No long-term warming solvency

The largest effects of iron fertilisation by olivine dissolution occur within the first ten years of the simulations (figure
1). When terminating the continuous dissolution of olivine, the dominant part of the
benefit of the larger oceanic CO2 uptake is lost within a few years and a state
close to the control simulation without olivine addition is reached within
approximately one decade (figure 1). Terminating open ocean dissolution of olivine
dissolution leads to a lower pH relative to the CTRL simulation ten years after the termination (0.002 in the
last decade of the simulation) and to a loss of oceanic CO2 to the atmosphere relative to CTRL
25 years after the termination (0.2 PgC yr1 in the last decade of the simulation). However, the
cumulative sum of CO2 uptake is at every time higher in the SI+ALK+FE_1T simulation than in the CTRL, indicating
Net primary and export
that the release of the remineralised carbon to the atmosphere is rather slow.
production show a slower recovery to pre-olivine conditions and are still enhanced
relative to the CTRL simulation at the end of the simulations.
Err against the CPnot enough data has been collected to

ensure efficiency of olivine treatment
Wong 15 [Carrie, Geologist in Training at the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of
British Columbia, Olivine: The Environmentally Green Solution to Climate Change?, Geology for Investors, Jan 26
2015, http://www.geologyforinvestors.com/olivine-environmentally-green-solution-climate-change/]
The use of olivine in carbon capture has not been well-studied , but it remains an emerging
field of research. Scientists are uncertain how practical this approach would be since the
quantity of olivine needed to meaningfully sequester the CO2 emissions would be enormous. In
one study, it was estimated that it would take 5 gigatonnes of olivine on
beaches to offset 30% of the current CO2 emissions for merely one year . In
theory, one kilogram of olivine sequesters an equal amount of CO2 but this has not taken into account
the energy used to mine and distribute the olivine onto the beaches in the first
place. It is possible that the processes needed to grind and transport
olivine would emit as much CO2 as it could sequester. Furthermore, Olivine can
contain toxic metals such as nickel which could accumulate in the environment or
disrupt the local ecosystem by changing the pH of the water. All geo-engineering
approaches to climate-control or carbon sequestration carry risks, but it is possible to approach the problem of
it is impractical to mine olivine
anthropologic global warming with more than one tool. Perhaps
for the sole purpose of carbon sequestration, but olivine could be a byproduct of other
mining ventures. If olivine is a byproduct, then there is no increase in carbon emissions to take it out of the ground
and this could make it a viable solution, but this is still very speculative science.
Iron Fert DA
Olivine treatments lead to iron fertilization
Open ocean dissolution of olivine enhances marine CO2 uptake by increasing the alkalinity concentration in the
surface ocean and therefore the ocean's buffering capacity. In addition, marine primary and export production
The relative contributions to total CO2 uptake
benefit from the fertilisation effects of silicic acid and iron.
by olivine dissolution are 57% alkalinity, 37% iron and 6% silicic acid. The effects add up
linearly with small synergistic effects. Alkalinity and silicic acid effects scale linearly with the amount
of olivine, but the iron fertilisation runs into saturation, when the iron input reaches 2.3
Tg per year leading to a maximum iron-based carbon uptake rate of 113 PgC per
century (or ~1.1 PgC per year on average, decreasing with time).
Iron Fertilization damages the environmenttoxic by-product

Romm 13 [Joe, acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, Yet
Another Geoengineering Scheme, Ocean Iron Fertilization, Could Backfire, Climate Progress, July 10 2013,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2013/07/10/2150931/another-geoengineering-scheme-ocean-iron-fertilization-
could-backfire/] AW
The
The intended effect of ocean iron fertilization for geoengineering is to significantly disrupt marine ecosystems.
explicit goal is to stimulate blooms of relatively large phytoplankton that are usually
not abundant, because carbon produced by such species is more likely to sink
eventually to the deep ocean. This shift at the base of the food web would
propagate throughout the ocean ecosystem in unpredictable ways . Moreover, nutrients
such as nitrogen and phosphorus would sink along with the carbon, altering
biogeochemical and ecological relationships throughout the system. Some models
predict that ocean fertilization on a global scale would result in large regions of the
ocean being starved of oxygen, dramatically affecting marine organisms from
microbes to fish. Ecological disruption is the very mechanism by which iron fertilization would sequester
carbon. Argonnes study finds another problem ocean iron fertilization may have no positive climate impact and
might even make things worse: These blooms contain iron-eating microscopic phytoplankton that absorb C02 from
But one type of
the air through the process of photosynthesis and provide nutrients for marine life.
phytoplankton, a diatom, is using more iron that it needs for photosynthesis and
storing the extra in its silica skeletons and shells, according to an X-ray analysis of phytoplankton
conducted at the U.S. Department of Energys Argonne National Laboratory. This reduces the amount of
iron left over to support the carbon-eating plankton . Rather than feed the growth
of extra plankton, triggering algal blooms, the iron fertilization may instead
stimulate the gluttonous diatoms to take up even more iron to build larger shells .
When the shells get large enough, they sink to the ocean floor, sequestering the
iron and starving off the diatoms plankton peers.
Deterrence CP
Notes
This CP is pretty simple. It lifts the budget cap so that the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Missile_Defense_Agency)
has more money. The idea is that Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_Ballistic_Missile_Defense_System) is key to deter
other countries, and that traditional deterrence theory which
relies on the nuclear triad (ICBM missiles, bombers,
submarines) is incorrect. However, most experts within the
MDA say that having a consistent stream of funding so that
they can do R&D is key to perfect BMD tech. In Financial year
budget for 2015 (FY15) funding was cut so the R&D sector of
the MDA couldnt perform the R&D they need to.
Winning the CP requires winning that BMDs are actually

successful and that traditional deterrence theory is wrong, and
that BMDs really are important.
The aff answers are divided up into different scenarios. you

have to be especially careful that what you read doesnt take
out your aff.
In terms of updates, I would do more in-depth deterrence

theory true/false, and pay particular attention to the way that
BMDs change decision making calculus because theres
different competing theories.
1NC
The United States federal government should lift budget caps
for the Missile Defense Agency
Funding is key to maintain Ballistic Missile Defense and

increase R&D
Shalal 15 [Andrea, Reuters senior correspondent specializing in security policy, U.S. missile defense agency
warns of jeopardy from budget cuts, Reuters, March 19 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-military-
missiledefense-idUSL2N0WL25F20150319] AW
Further budget cuts would put the U.S. military's ability to protect the United States
in "serious jeopardy" at a time when Iran and North Korea are advancing their own missile programs, the
head of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said on Thursday. Vice Admiral James Syring told U.S. lawmakers that
failure to lift budget caps in fiscal 2016 would force him to delay urgently needed
steps aimed at improving the reliability of a system that top military leaders have already called
"unsustainable" given growing threats and budget pressures. Lawmakers estimate the agency could see
an 18 percent cut in its proposed funding of $8.1 billion for fiscal 2016 if the budget
caps are not lifted. Syring said he would safeguard plans to build 14 more ground-
based interceptors and missile defense projects underway in Europe. So any budget cuts
would delay efforts to redesign the kill vehicle used on ground-based interceptors
and a new long-range radar to help track enemy missiles. That would affect
Lockheed Martin Corp, Boeing Co and Raytheon Co. The three companies are working
jointly to redesign the kill vehicle, while Lockheed and Raytheon are competing for the new long-range
discriminating radar. Further cuts could also slow work on promising future technologies
such as lasers and a space-based system that promised to sharply lower costs in
the future, he said. Syring told the House Armed Services Committee's strategic forces subcommittee that he
saw some "opportunity" in a Nov. 5 memo from the top two officers in the Army and Navy, which urged a
reassessment of the overall U.S. missile defense strategy. In February, the Pentagon started a major review of
missile defense capabilities. Syring said new technologies were emerging to address missile threats in other ways.
The current system aims to destroy missiles after launch.
Deterrence theory has evolvedmissile defenses are now key

to stability
Gibilterra 15 [John, analyst at the Department of Defense, Conditional Deterrence and Missile Defense,
pg 70, Comparative Strategy, Feb 25 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2014.962976]
AW
proliferation of nuclear weapons has a

Policymakers seem to have an intuitive understanding that the
negative impact on international security, even though classical deterrence cannot
fully explain this behavior. The conditional deterrence approach (an advancement of power
parity theory) presented by Kang, Kugler, and Childs demonstrates the importance of the international
or regional status quo, relative power, and risk propensity. Conditional deterrence has
more explanatory power than the traditional classical deterrence
approach. Conditional deterrence suggests that as the development and deployment of
regional and global ballistic missile defense expands, the stability of deterrence is
strengthened in the short term. The long-term horizon is more tenuous. If a dissatisfied power develops missile
defenses, then deterrence stability might be reduced.42 The challenge for the dominant power in the international
system and its coalition is to guarantee that emerging nuclear weapons states are satisfied with the international
status quo.43
2NC: SolvencyDeterrence theory
Missile defenses discourage strikes and development of missile
forcescost benefit analysis
Gibilterra 15 [John, analyst at the Department of Defense, Conditional Deterrence and Missile Defense,
pg 66, Comparative Strategy, Feb 25 2015, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495933.2014.962976]
AW
Classical deterrence suggests that once MAD is achieved, the addition of missile defense systems is destabilizing
because the side without missile defenses loses the ability to deter. Conditional deterrence suggests
that nuclear preponderance by a satisfied power is far less dangerous than nuclear
parity. Credible defensive missile deployments can increase stability. A limited
missile shield decreases the risk of war initiation by a dissatisfied challenger . However,
if a dissatisfied challenger deploys defensive missiles, stability decreases.13 The deployment of such
defensive missile forces can buy time to employ diplomacy. Effective missile
defense may make proliferation less attractive by increasing the cost and difficulty
of the development of ballistic missiles and countermeasures to negate missile
defenses.14 Conditional deterrence suggests that small mobile defensive missile
forces enhance stability and may discourage continued development of missile
forces if accompanied by diplomatic efforts
Ballistic Middle Defense is effectivealters hostile cost-benefit

analysis
Rose 15 [Frank, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control Verification and Compliance, Missile Defense, Extended
Deterrence, and the Future of America's Alliances, U.S. Department of State, June 12 2015,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2015/243776.htm] AW
The BMDR also lays out the policy foundation for how missile defenses support our extended deterrence and
assurance goals. These goals include enhancing regional security architectures through the use of effective missile
defenses, counter-weapons of mass destruction capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and
The goal is to ensure
integrated command and control all underwritten by strong political commitments.
that if states attempt to attack U.S. forces or our allies and partners, their attacks will
be blunted and their aims denied by an enhanced set of capabilities. This deters
adversaries as they conclude that the benefits of threatening or carrying out an
attack will be dwarfed by its costs. Missile defenses support political and diplomatic
activities that enhance regional stability as well as assure leaders and populations under
threat that they have a defense against attack. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) also
complicates an adversarys calculus, denies them the certainty of a successful
attack, and signals determination to resist intimidation. In these ways, missile defenses
strengthen U.S. goals of deterrence , extended deterrence, and assurance. In so doing, they
also contribute to international peace and stability and reinforce the global nonproliferation regime.
AT: Funding high now
No its notFY17 had cuts which specifically impacted R&D
Karako 16 [Thomas, Senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, FY17 Budget
Squeezes MDAs Research and Development, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 18 2016,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/fy17-budget-squeezes-mda%E2%80%99s-research-and-development] AW
$7.5 billion FY17 budget request for the M issile Defense Agency
The recently released
(MDA) represents an $822 million reduction from last years enacted budget. These cuts are
essentially divided between procurement ($501 million) and research and development
($322 million) as compared to the $8.3 billion MDA budget enacted by Congress for FY16.
While cutbacks to procurement more obviously reduce capacity available to the war
fighter, the squeeze on research and development reflects a larger but insufficiently appreciated
trend that could impair the ability to outpace foreign missile threats . Some of the
reductions had been projected in the FY16 five-year outlay, which presupposed a FY17 request of $7.8
billion, down from $8.13 billion requested for FY16 . Another tranche of cuts, however, was
implemented by the November 2015 budget agreement. During his February 9 budget briefing, VADM James Syring,
MDA director, noted that MDAs share of the Department of Defense (DoD)wide $22 billion cut was
$300 million, which accounts for the projected $7.8 billion budget being shaved to
the $7.5 billion budget unveiled last month . The cuts to the overall DoD budget of $523.9 billion
represents a 4 percent reduction; by comparison, MDAs share represents a 3.8 percent reduction.
AT: Not International
This tech will can be deployed in a nuclear umbrella
internationally
Manea and Panayiotou 16 [Octavian, Romanian journalist focusing on foreign policy, Eleni,
writer for Defense Magazine, Ballistic Missile Defense and 21st Century Deterrence, Defense Matters, May 16
2016, http://defencematters.org/news/ballistic-missile-defense-21st-century-deterrence/859/] AW
Firstly this is the most advanced the most comprehensive possible missile defense system that we can have. It is
very sophisticated, it is very advanced and we havent seen anything like this in the world before. Secondly it is
Countries
developed because for a very long period of time we have seen the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
not so far from NATO are in the process of developing their ballistic missile systems
and also trying to acquire these kind of systems so therefore we are making a long-
term investment, facing a long term threat and this is really vital and its key and its really an answer in
the ability to defend NATO allies against all sorts of missile threats . In addition, U.S.
Deputy Secretary Defense Robert Work emphasized that the BMD system at Deveselu has the
ability to knock down the oncoming ballistic missiles onto the area: BMD is one of the
most technically challenging operations that you can imagine. Its like hitting a bullet with a bullet. The way we
determine the event through a serious of tests and demonstrations we develop this whole probability of kill, a single
shot. If the probability is too low, we will take two shots at the upcoming missile. We believe this is an extremely
effective system. Sometimes well take just one shot, other times two. We believe very strongly in its ability to
Inside NATO investing in BMD capabilities is no longer
knock down oncoming ballistic missiles.
just a U.S. focus, but a joint allied effort. Turkey is hosting an early warning radar, in
Germany there is a command and control HQ that tries to determine when and what type
of shots you should take against oncoming missiles, UK is developing a radar that looks
very far and helps cover the northern countries while Netherland and Denmark are
improving theirs. This larger perspective demonstrates that Deveselu is one of the nodes in a
multi-layered network. In short, as Robert Work pointed out during the Deveselu press conference this is
a system of systems that protects NATO and every time you add a new partner it
makes the whole system better and I would imagine that that would continue over
time.
Budget Key
Cuts in budget divert money from R&Dmakes it impossible to
maintain technological edge
Karako 16 [Thomas, Senior fellow at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, FY17 Budget
Squeezes MDAs Research and Development, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 18 2016,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/fy17-budget-squeezes-mda%E2%80%99s-research-and-development] AW
One of the larger systemic trends of MDAs budget , however, is the pressure on research
and development, especially within high technology. As missile defense has moved
from infancy to adolescence, an increased proportion of MDAs budget has been
diverted from research and development to procurement and operations. The intent had
been for MDA to develop the programs and then transfer procurement responsibility to the
services, but for the most part this has not taken place . Whereas MDA and its predecessor
organizations had previously been tasked almost exclusively with research and development, the actual
operational capability and the failure to transfer procurement to the services have
substantially increased MDAs set of missions. In short, MDA is being asked to do
new activitiesprocurement, operations and maintenance, and even foreign assistance of sorts in
addition to its primary task of research and development. These trends are accelerating. Whereas
MDA devoted 85 percent of its budget to Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) in 2011, it fell to 69 percent in 2015 and 72 percent in 2016. RDT&E accounts for about 77
percent of the 2017 budget, but this apparent rise may be overstated when taking into account expected future
foreign assistance and that some significant procurement-like activities have been relocated to the larger research
Without topline relief for MDA, both procurement and the
and development category.
research and development necessary to outpace future threats will continue to face
greater pressure. One example of how the RDT&E line is under more pressure than meets the eye is the
transfer of a procurement line for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Program. Whereas the FY16 budget
included $460 million for GMD procurement from 2017 to 2020 related to the Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV), that
line no longer remains in the 2017 request. These procurement-like dollars will presumably come from within
RDT&E. While there may be good reasons for this transfer, it is worth noting in order to appreciate the squeeze on
other research and development. While the 2017 budget request contained few surprises overall, it also
contains some unfortunate limits to both capacity and capability improvements. In his
budget briefing, VADM Syring explained that most of MDAs 2017 budget deal cuts come from
regional defense capacity: where we took risk was in interceptor procurement,
THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] and Aegis in particular. For 2017, the Aegis Ashore site in Poland
Standard Missile procurement absorbs $103 million of the budget
remains on track, but
deal reductions. Besides SM-3 interceptors, however, the budget also cuts Aegis hardware and
software. Future year projections furthermore appear not to include procurement for
Aegis Ashore Phase III or SM-3 IIA beyond 2018. While the budget thus supports the timeline for the
Poland site, this may underrepresent expected future demand for SM-3 IIA procurement outside of Europe. For
but there is
THAAD, current funding levels keep the completion of a seventh THAAD battery on track by 2018,
still no plan to meet the Armys stated requirement for nine batteries. Permanent
deployments in Guam and potentially in the Republic of Korea will likely further
strain THAAD supply in light of increasing combatant commander demand.
AT: Deterrence CP
2AC
Ballistic Missile Defense systems dont worktheyre based off
untested theories
Hruska 14 [Joel, IT journalist for extremetech, The United States missile defense system will never work
which is why were spending more money on it, Extreme Tech, May 10 2014,
http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/182175-the-united-states-missile-defense-system-will-never-work-which-is-
why-were-spending-more-money-on-it] AW
Iron Dome is an anti-missile system developed by Israel to defend against Grad and Qassam rockets fired by
insurgents and terrorist groups. These rockets have a typical velocity of about 675 meters per second, or
An ICBM, in contrast, has a velocity of 2.5 miles per second
approximately 0.4 miles per second.
in boost phase and a terminal-phase velocity of around 4.3 miles per second. Hitting
an ICBM with an anti-ICBM has been likened to hitting a bullet with a bullet. Considering
that the fastest bullets have a muzzle velocity of about 0.76 miles per second, one could argue that the Israeli Iron
Dome system does hit a bullet with a bullet. Trying to hit an ICBM with a GMD-fired missile is an order of magnitude
faster than that. There are three phases during which we could plausibly target an ICBM the boost phase (initial
rocket launch and climb), the midcourse phase (while the ICBM is in sub-orbital flight), and the reentry phase (which
is when the ICBM is driving back into the atmosphere towards its target). The boost phase is theoretically easy to
target, but requires close proximity, an extremely fast launch cycle, and an insane amount of acceleration
remember, youre trying to catch a good-sized rocket headed for Low Earth Orbit within 60-300 seconds. The re-
entry phase is a poor option because the missile is already on-target blowing up a nuclear or chemical rocket
might just drop the warhead slightly outside of town as opposed to on the city center. That leaves the midcourse
All available evidence, however, suggests that its
phase, which is the preferred target point.
extremely easy for the ICBM to launch countermeasures that would drastically
reduce the chances of the anti-ICBM missile from effectively locking on target . IO9 has
a rundown of the countermeasure options, and they arent pretty. The fundamental issue with any
anti-ICBM missile system is that its going to cost orders of magnitude more money
to develop an effective interception system than it does to throw more ICBMs at the
target. One of the reasons Israels Iron Dome system works is because the insurgents it defends against cant hurl
thousands of missiles into Israeli airspace in a matter of minutes. Even so, its more of a psychological protective
measure than an effective one.
Practical and empirical examples prove that BMDs dont work

North Korea doesnt care
Anderson, Larsen, and Holdrof 13 [Justin, Senior Editor of the DoD Law of War Manual,
Jeffery, Senior Scientist with Science Applications, Polly, National Security Analyst at the United States Airforce
Academy, Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy, pg
115-116, United States Air Force, http://www.usafa.edu/df/inss/OCP/OCP69.pdf] AW
contemporary U.S. and allied missile defenses

In the near-term, however, available evidence indicates that
do not appear to have affected the calculus of these potential adversaries in regards
to developing, testing, or fielding ballistic missiles. Despite ongoing U.S. government
efforts to improve U.S. and allied missile defenses in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, in the
years after the publication of the 2010 BMDR Iran and the DPRK continued to devote
extensive resources to expanding their current missile fleets and developing longerrange
missile platforms (including space launch vehicles). The U.S. intelligence community , for example,
reported in April 2013 that it assessed the DPRK as having taken initial steps
toward fielding a new road-mobile ICBM .259 The assessment followed shortly after the DPRK
publicly stated the reckless nuclear threat [of the United States] will be smashed by the cutting-edge smaller,
lighter and diversified nuclear strike means of the DPRK. Although it was not clear if this statement was referring to
DPRK nuclear-capable delivery systems and/or nuclear warheads (or it may have simply represented bellicose
propaganda attempting to inflate the countrys capabilities ),
the statement and U.S. intelligence
assessment both reflect Pyongyangs determination to pursue additional missile
capabilities despite international economic sanctions and U.S. efforts to develop
cooperative, theater, and national missile defenses geared to address the DPRK missile
threat.26
MDA is hella expensive and has a history of financial

mismanagement
Willman 15 [David, investigative journalist for the LA Times, The Pentagons $10-billion bet gone bad, LA
Times, April 5 2015, http://graphics.latimes.com/missile-defense/] AW
In reality, the giant floating radar has been a $2.2-billion flop , a Los Angeles Times
investigation found. Although it can powerfully magnify distant objects, its field of vision is so narrow that it would
be of little use against what experts consider the likeliest attack: a stream of missiles interspersed with decoys. SBX
was supposed to be operational by 2005. Instead, it spends most of the year mothballed at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.
The project not only wasted taxpayer money but left a hole in the nations defenses .
The money spent on it could have gone toward land-based radars with a greater capability to track long-range
missiles, according to experts who have studied the issue. Expensive missteps have become a
trademark of the Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon charged with protecting U.S. troops
and ships and the American homeland. Over the last decade, the agency has sunk nearly $10
billion into SBX and three other programs that had to be killed or sidelined after they proved
unworkable, The Times found. You can spend an awful lot of money and end up with
nothing, said Mike Corbett, a retired Air Force colonel who oversaw the agencys contracting for weapons
systems from 2006 to 2009. MDA spent billions and billions on these programs that didnt
lead anywhere. The four ill-fated programs were all intended to address a key
vulnerability in U.S. defenses: If an enemy launched decoys along with real missiles, U.S. radars could be
fooled, causing rocket-interceptors to be fired at the wrong objects and increasing the risk that actual warheads
would slip through. In addition to SBX, the programs were: The Airborne Laser, envisioned as a fleet of converted
Boeing 747s that would fire laser beams to destroy enemy missiles soon after launch, before they could release
decoys. It turned out that the lasers could not be fired over sufficient distances, so the planes would have to fly
within or near an enemys borders continuously. That would leave the 747s all but defenseless against antiaircraft
missiles. The program was canceled in 2012, after a decade of testing. The cost: $5.3 billion. The Kinetic Energy
Interceptor, a rocket designed to be fired from land or sea to destroy enemy missiles during their early stage of
flight. The interceptor was too long to fit on Navy ships, and on land, it would have to be positioned so close to its
target that it would be vulnerable to attack. The program was killed in 2009, after six years of development. The
cost: $1.7 billion. The Multiple Kill Vehicle, a cluster of miniature interceptors that would destroy enemy missiles
along with any decoys. In 2007 and 2008, the Missile Defense Agency trumpeted it as a transformational program
and a cost-effective force multiplier. After four years of development, the agencys contractors had not conducted
a single test flight, and the program was shelved. The cost: nearly $700 million. These expensive flops
stem in part from a climate of anxiety after Sept. 11 , 2001, heightened by warnings
from defense hawks that North Korea and Iran were close to developing long-range
missiles capable of reaching the United States. President George W. Bush, in 2002, ordered an urgent
effort to field a homeland missile defense system within two years. In their rush to make that deadline, Missile
Defense Agency officials latched onto exotic, unproven concepts without doing a rigorous
analysis of their cost and feasibility. Members of Congress whose states and districts benefited from
the spending tenaciously defended the programs, even after their deficiencies became evident. These
conclusions emerge from a review of thousands of pages of expert reports, congressional testimony
and other government records, along with interviews with dozens of aerospace and military affairs
specialists. The management of the organization is one of technologists in their hobby
shop, said L. David Montague, a former president of missile systems for Lockheed Corp. and co-chairman of a
National Academy of Sciences-sponsored review of the agency. They dont know the nitty-gritty of
what it takes to make something work. This leads, he said, to programs that defy the
limits of physics and economic logic. Of the SBX radar, Montague said: It should never have been
built. Retired Air Force Gen. Eugene E. Habiger, former head of the U.S. Strategic Command and a member of the
the agencys blunders reflected a failure to analyze
National Academy panel, said
alternatives or seek independent cost estimates.
BMDs dont solve hypersonic missile development which are an

alt-cause
Wellen 14 [Russ, editor of the Focal Points blog for the Institute of Policy Studies, Missile Defense Isnt the
Only Weapons System That Undermines Nuclear Deterrence, Foreign Policy In Focus, Sept 23 2014,
http://fpif.org/missile-defense-isnt-weapons-system-undermines-nuclear-deterrence/] AW
hypersonic missiles have been billed as a method for quickly delivering

In the US,
conventional warheads when time is of the essence; one example often given is attacking a
terrorist stronghold promptly when intelligence indicates the opportunity to kill a high-value target. Though, in fact,
the most successful attacks in counter-terrorism operations have been launched not from thousands of miles
hypersonic
away but from nearby, using ground forces, manned aircraft, or drones. More to the point,
missiles are viewed as a way of emulating a nuclear strike with conventional
weapons. As Gubrud writes Some proponents are more open in contending that hypersonic weapons should be
developed to provide a capability for attacking strategic military targets within the territory of a major military
power, including key radars and associated systems, command and control nodes, long-range surveillance
Proponents also claim that the use of hypersonic weapons
systems, and ships in port.
with conventional warheads (or pure kinetic energy) would permit such attacks to be
carried out on the home territory of a nuclear power without the risk of a nuclear
response. Why do they believe that? The vague reasoning is that the different flight profile
of these weapons would distinguish them from nuclear ballistic missiles, and the Chinese
(or Russians, in some other scenarios) would trust that American hypersonic missiles do not carry nuclear
warheads.In fact, though US non-nuclear hypersonic weapons could well be targeting
nuclear weapons and supporting facilities, possibly in preparation for a follow-on
nuclear strike. Furthermore, there is no physical reason why hypersonic missiles
could not deliver nuclear warheads. Thus Chinese and Russian officials have indicated
they fear that US hypersonic weapons could be used to lead a nuclear first strike,
and both those countries have begun hypersonic missile programs of their own,
suggesting that, absent controls, a full-scale hypersonic arms race is just around the
corner. The United States maintains that hypersonic missiles cant be mistaken for ballistic missiles (often armed
with nuclear weapons). However, Gubrud writes: The idea that they might be used to attack a nuclear power,
because they would be easily distinguished from ballistic missiles and the enemy would be willing to believe that no
it is a
hypersonic weapon carried a nuclear warhead, can hardly be considered stabilizing. Rather,
challenge to nuclear deterrence and a threat that potential adversaries
have to take seriously. They will respond by seeking countermeasures, including
symmetrical capabilities, as China and Russia are doing, via their own hypersonic missile
programs. The development of hypersonic missiles resembles the development of missile defense in that the United
States thinks other countries make too big a deal out of it and refuses to see how it might be a threat to other
states. But, Gubrud maintains To imagine that a strategic attack could be carried out on
military forces based in the homeland of a major nuclear power without the risk of a
nuclear response is a dangerous fantasy. But the race to develop and deploy
hypersonic weapons is serious. Gubrud calls for an international ban on hypersonic missiles and
proposes that the United States suspend testing for a while, to show good faith as it seeks agreement on an
Demonstrating leadership on nonproliferation by
international ban on hypersonic testing.
substantively disarming? That would constitute a dramatic about-face for the U nited
States, which seems intent on cracking the whip on a country such as Iran that has barely entertained the notion of
developing nuclear weapons while it modernizes its own nuclear stockpile to ensure its existence in perpetuity.
Doesnt Solve Russian Deterrence
BMDs fail to deter Russiaallies and international perceptions
Gramer 15 [Robbie, Assistant Director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council, Can
Missile Defense Counter Russias Nuclear Saber Rattling?, Atlantic Council, July 8 2015,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/can-missile-defense-counter-russia-s-nuclear-saber-rattling] AW
The first question is whether NATO's missile defense system can be directed toward
potential threats emanating from Russia. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), which
serves the backbone of NATO's missile defense architecture, is comprised of missile defense radars in Turkey, Aegis
missile defense ships in the Mediterranean, and forthcoming Aegis ashore sites in Poland and Romania, to be
the telemetry of NATO's focus has changed from Iran to Russia
completed in 2018. But while
since the Alliance first broke ground on its missile defense infrastructure in 2010 , "the
geography didn't change," according to Heather Conley, Director of the Center for Strategic and International
the EPAA was principally set up
Studies' Europe Program. Despite Russian claims to the contrary,
to deter against Iranian ballistic missile threats, not Russian threats,
making it difficult to recalibrate existing infrastructure to fully deal with a
threat from the East. Even if the missile defense systems could be fully repostured to face Russia, Rose
cautioned that "we need to be very realistic about the technical capabilities of our
missile defense systems." Additionally, Rose conceded that "there is no political consensus in
the Alliance" to enact such a change. And with an Iran nuclear deal still in flux, the
opportunity cost of focusing missile defense to the East could mean leaving NATO's
southern flank exposed. The second important question to answer is whether NATO's missile
defense system should be directed at threats from Russia. Proponents of such a move believe
it will deter Russia from further aggression and reassure nervous Eastern European allies. Ian Brzezinski, senior
fellow at the Atlantic Council, argued that "we need to rethink NATO's missile defense program to give it extra
punch against Russian capabilities" and that the EPAA needs to be adjust to "better address threats to the East" and
adapt to the new security environment NATO faces, which varies drastically from the environment it faced in 2010.
Russia's trend of using "rhetorical nuclear blackmail...is only going to ratchet up," according to Conley, making a
credible deterrent posture critically important to the Alliance. Missile defense has become one of the most prescient
issues in transatlantic security as Russia ups the nuclear ante, with NATO reticent to follow suit. On the nuclear
question, Conley said NATO "is a bit rusty...reluctant, and reactive." Nuclear deterrence has long been the elephant
in the room of meetings among NATO's leadership, but Russia's "nuclear saber rattling" has brought it back to the
fore. Nuclear weapons remain a "very controversial" issue in NATO, Conley believed, given the vestiges of anti-
nuclear sentiments in Europe going back to the Cold War. But NATO "needs a new look at its nuclear doctrine" no
matter how uncomfortable it is, Conley said. NATO should "not limit itself in its candid assessment" of its
conventional and nuclear capabilities as it determines how to counter Russian military activities in Europe. But
such a move could further alienate Russia from the
others think that
international community, exacerbate West-Russia tensions further, and diminish
chances of West-Russia cooperation on other security priorities. "We need Russia when we
deal with Iran, we need Russia when we deal with North Korea, and we need Russia when we deal with the Islamic
State," according to Mustafa Kibaroglu, Chair of the Political Science and International Relations Department at MEF
University in Istanbul. Missile defense has always been one of the most politically contentious issues in NATO-Russia
relations, andNATO's past rhetoric on missile defense may constrain its future
posturing. For decades, "we have been going around saying that our missile defenses
are not directed against Russia, " said Rose. If NATO were to suddenly change that line ,
Rose argued that it would "fundamentally give the Russians a political victory to say this
is about us, we have been telling you all along ." The consequences of such a move are not
relegated to Europe; the Chinese could worry that a similar situation would play out with
the US missile defense architecture directed at North Korea turn toward them . But the
question remains whether fears of an "I told you so" from Russia should command NATO's
missile defense posture a concern that will only grow in NATO's eastern members
if Russia's military aggression in Eastern Europe does not abate.
ICBMs Key
ICBMs, not BMDs are the fulcrum on which deterrence relies

strike capabilities and strategic benefits
Baroudos 16 [Constance, Vice President of the Lexington Institute, ICBMs: America's Nuclear 911 Force
Remains Crucial to Deterrence, The National Interest, April 14 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/icbms-americas-nuclear-911-force-remains-crucial-deterrence-15786] AW
The only defense the United States has against a Russian nuclear attack is the threat of
retaliation. To keep that threat credible, the military maintains a triad of land-based
missiles, sea-based missiles and bombers that would be nearly impossible to destroy in a
surprise attack. Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) stationed in the central U.S. that
make up part of the American nuclear deterrent remain critical to national security .
Eliminating ICBMs as some have proposed would weaken Americas nuclear deterrent that protects its homeland
and allies from a nuclear first strike. ICBMs are deployed in underground silos at three U.S. bases. Current weapons
were fielded in 1970 with a planned service life of 10 years, but have lasted over 40 years because they have been
refurbished many times. The U.S. cannot continue to sustain its Cold War ICBM force any longer because it is
antiquated and hard to maintain. Thus, the Air Force will develop a new missile as part of the ground-based
strategic deterrent program that will be deployed in the 2027 timeframe. The Air Forces initial proposal calls for
642 missiles of which 400 would be operationally deployed until the 2070s. But the ICBM force is facing controversy
because funding for its modernization will take place simultaneously with replacements of other legs of the Cold
ICBMs is not cheap, they are the least expensive component of the
War triad. While modernizing
nuclear deterrent, and they provide many benefits that the other legs do not . ICBMs
are on constant alert which shortens execution of a presidents decision to launch weapons in response to a surprise
attack. If ICBMs were eliminated,an enemy would only need to strike a small number of
targets to degrade the U.S. strategic posture since there are only three bases for nuclear-capable
bombers and two bases for ballistic-missile submarines. In contrast, each hardened ICBM silo would
have to be targeted separately. While nuclear submarines are undetectable in the ocean today, a
technological breakthrough could occur that would make the oceans less opaque. The sea-based leg might be
weakened and could be at risk of being destroyed by conventional forces. Thus, the land leg would increase in
significance. Eliminating ICBMs might motivate potential adversaries to try even harder to
develop the capability to locate nuclear submarines underwater. Consider what countries
are doing in other parts of the world today to understand the importance of ICBMs to security. Moscow is
modernizing its ICBM force to carry 10 nuclear warheads each. Beijing tested its newest
road-mobile ICBM twice last year road mobile ICBMs increase survivability because they do not have set locations
for an enemy to target. North Korea recently launched its sixth long-range rocket test that placed a satellite into
Deterrence
orbit (testing rockets through satellite launches provides invaluable data for potential future ICBMs).
is effective because it causes the enemy to fear a massive retaliatory response;
ICBMs in particular ensure an adversarys objectives are beyond reach
because they are on alert and cannot be destroyed by conventional forces .
A new ICBM is an expensive but essential investment that will prevent a potential aggressor from launching a
nuclear first strike and ensure these fearsome weapons are never used.
BMDs hurt Deterrence
They have it wrongBMDs weaken deterrencesecond strike

capabilities and posturing
Setff 16 [Rueben, Lecturer at Waikato University in the Political Science and Public Policy Programme,
Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project : From Truman to Obama pg. 117-119,
Routledge, April 2016] AW
Security dilemma theory posits that under the structural condition of anarchy the security of states is
interconnected. Self-defensive actions taken by one state to increase its security by arming itself engenders fear in
others, compelling them to respond and leading to a net loss in security for all. This reveals how conflict can occur
even when no state desires it. During the Cold War, the security dilemma was partly tamed by the ABM Treaty. By
encouraging joint management of the strategic balance it provided a measure of assured security for all the great
powers. Co-operation under the security dilemma is possible when offensive and
defensive weapons can be differentiated, and when defense has the advantage over
the offense. Under such circumstances, security seeking states can potentially differentiate themselves from
non-security seeking and revisionist power maximizing states. 1 But in a world where states have
secure second-strike capabilities, nuclear weapons become the ultimate defensive
technology. 2 The introduction of BMD disrupts this balance since a shield
can undermine mutual deterrence. Even if the intentions of a state when
constructing a shield are defensive, it will be interpreted, especially by other nuclear states,
as an offensive attempt to achieve nuclear superiority. Strategic calculations
are complicated and the security dilemma is exacerbated because other nuclear
powers view the shield as designed to negate their own deterrent , thus increasing the risk
of a surprise first strike. 3 In the post-Cold War era both Russia and China consider their nuclear deterrents to be
essential to their security, and countered that Americas official rationale for BMD was inexplicable because even if
they were not the initial target, intentions can change and future US presidents might reorient the system. After
being told that the system was directed at rogues, one Chinese government official stated, That doesnt matter.
The consequences are still terrible for us. 4 Russians Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also stated In matters of
defense, potential is what really counts, not good intentions and promises. 5 Finally, a Russian general said the
American argument was for the nave or the stupid This system will be directed against Russia and against
China. 6 Bush also initiated his freedom agenda which appeared to lay the groundwork for future great power
confrontation with other authoritarian great powers by considering the domestic regime of states as the
fundamental source of their foreign policy. 7 Bush seemed to confirm this when he invaded Iraq in 2003, and then in
his 2004 when he stated the US would shift the balance of power in favor of freedom, and that our aim is a
Moscow and Beijings concerns are magnified within a unipolar
democratic peace. 8
system as American power provides it with a wider latitude to pursue unilateral and
revisionist behavior in the present and future . 9 This is particularly the case when the
unipole embarks on qualitative improvements to its nuclear capabilities and
acquires BMD for nuclear primacy a capability that could destroy all foreign nuclear
arsenals in a preemptive first strike. 10 Indeed, David McDonough noted that the growing inventory of
high-yield warheads appeared most suitable for use against targets on Russian and Chinese territory. Also, China
and Russias fears were increased because they had memories of the unipolar state as a past predator during the
Cold War. 11Therefore, in the shadow of Americas immense power and ideological
commitment to spreading democracy, Russia and China concluded that America
was adopting an offensive posture and had become a power-hungry hegemon. This
led Russia and China to use worst-case analysis when judging BMD and
assume they were the intended targets their margin for error was simply too small to risk
otherwise. They used rhetoric suggesting they believed BMD would create a
new security dilemma (or stimulate a dormant one), resulting in a net decrease in
security for all. For example, in July 2000 China and Russia issued a joint statement declaring that NMD
would have the most grave adverse consequences not only for the security of Russia, China and other countries,
they issued another statement that
but also for the security of the United States . 12 In July 2000
said BMD was an attempt to gain unilateral military and security advantages, and
committed to strengthen their strategic partnership. 13 Lavrov also informed the Bush
administration that In questions of military-strategic stability, there are its own immutable laws: actions,
counteractions, defensive, offensive systems. He added: these laws operate regardless of how somebody would
like to see this or that situation. 14 The next section outlines their reactions.
Alt Causes
Structural issues prevent effective BMD deployment
Freedberg 16 [Sydney, deputy editor for Breaking Defense, Cyber, EW Are Secret Missile Defense
Weapons Too Secret To Use, Breaking Defense, Dec 05 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/cyber-ew-are-
secret-missile-defense-weapons-too-secret-to-use/] AW
The problem with secret weapons is that almost nobody knows about
WASHINGTON:
them including people on your own side who might really need to use them . Thats
the self-inflicted wound the Pentagon is struggling with as it tries to apply highly classified capabilities in cyber and
electronic warfare to the notoriously tough challenge of missile defense. Cutting-edge technologies hold the
potential to hack into an adversarys command-and-control network so his missiles never get the order to launch.
They could jam his radars and navigation systems so the missiles that do launch go harmlessly off target. Such
non-kinetic techniques expending no ammunition except electricity could reduce the number of incoming
missiles and thus the number of multi-million-dollar interceptors the US has to fire at them. No less a figure than
EW and cyber held more promise for
Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work has said bluntly that
missile defense than the traditional method of shooting down one missile with
another. It doesnt have to be a kinetic solution, Work said in March. Hell, I dont really want a
kinetic solution. Its got to be something else. So thats the promise but when Ive tried to get any specifics, I get
polite demurrals that the topic is too classified to talk about. But its not just reporters who have this problem.
People in the military who really need to know about these capabilities, as a matter of
potential life and death, arent always allowed to learn about them either. We need
to have enough people who understand what each of them is [and] a way to use
them when the time comes, said Rear Adm. Archer Macy, retired director of the Joint Integrated Air and
Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO). The fact that only very few people know what [some of
these capabilities] are make that very difficult. We need to have the conversation to figure
outhow do you most effectively bring all these pieces together, Macy told me after speaking on a panel of retired
missile defense commanders at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. On one level, Macy said, this is
not new. Weve been doing this in warfare going back to when we figured out, okay, do you use the archers first or
the knights on horses? But Henry V never had to coordinate so many different moving pieces .
He certainly never had to deal with half his nobles not being authorized to know what a longbow was. There
are
so many different technological means available , said Macy, at various levels of classification:
the black programs, the grey programs, the white programs. When a launch occurs or, better
yet, when you get intelligence a launch may happen which techniques do you
use, in what combination and what order, under what circumstances against which
adversaries? The tactical and technical complexities must be thought through , field-
tested, and practiced well in advance, Macy said, because theres no time to jury-rig
defenses once a missiles in the air. Do I use the photon torpedo first or do I use the light saber first?
Macy asked, obviously not naming actual classified technologies. The people who are going to need it
in the actual eventuality [of an attack], some of them are going to need to know about
it, and they need to know about it before the eventuality. The missile defenders dont
necessarily need to know the secret sauce, he said, but theyd better know at least enough to employ it
effectively. Youve got to deal with the classification questions, Macy said.
Youve got to deal with the command and control. Speaking on the CSIS panel
alongside Macy, recently retired Brig. Gen. Kenneth Todorov agreed on both the potential and the problems. There
is an appetite for it, people are working on it, said Todorov, who was deputy director of the Missile Defense Agency.
The Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence panel which is a group within the Department that looks at ways and
endorses methods of getting at this [missile defense] problem they are fully onboard with [exploring], What does
left of launch mean? What are some of the new capabilities?' That said, Todorov cautioned, we are a ways away
from the quote-unquote new stuff. The promise of electronic and cyber warfare for missile defenses is not a reason
to neglect traditional interceptors, he said: We need both. Theres general consensus that we need to pursue both
lethal and non-lethal. I dont think theres a tension there, I think its a complementary capability, said Lt. Gen.
Richard Formica, retired chief of the Army Space & Missile Defense Command. Theres recognition that well never
leave the type of physical defense that interceptors provide, and we need the full suite of those, from GMD to
Patriot and everything in between, [but] theres also the recognition that weve got to continue to develop those
other capabilities. Theres a realization among senior leaders of the need , agreed Rear Adm.
Joseph Horn, retired head of the Navys Aegis ballistic missile defense program. Theres direction to
accommodate that need at whatever classification level is [necessary]. The real
challenge is the synchronization and integration of those efforts . But that brings you back
to the basic questions. Who knows about it? And how do you employ it? Weve got
to get it out of the dark world, Todorov said. When it comes to coordinating missile
defense, Todorov added, its hard enough with white world assets. For example, during
Todorovs time at the US Northern Command, which runs homeland missile defense, he helped line up surveillance
ships and land-based radars both unclassified capabilities to monitor a potential North Korean missile test. The
problem was the assets NORTHCOM needed for its homeland mission all belonged to Pacific Command, and they
already had missions for PACOM for example, making sure the North Koreans werent about to hit them or
Americas Pacific allies.
People-to-People Exchange CP
Notes
The FG and the PRC have a forum called the U.S.China
Strategic and Economic Dialogue where they meet annually,
alternatively between Beijing and DC. The CP expands this
meeting so that it includes lower ranking officials/non-
governmental officials, and expands the topics of discussion
from bilateral issues, to include global issues. The solvency
evidence, in my opinion, is surprisingly good. Theres just
some vocab you would need to have to familiarize yourself
with the CP. Track II refers to people who operate outside the
government, so private citizens. Track 1.5 is a mix of
government, and non-government officials. For more technical
details of how the CP actually works, just read the 1NC
solvency advocate.
Perm do the CP and L to DAs is the best way to answer this CP.
The CP can function as a way in which the negotiations with
China in the context of the plan would happen. E.g. lifting
export controls in exchange for market access, the forum
would be the way in which the negotiations over market access
occur. Also this CP links the most to DAs as opposed to the
other CPs because this is the closest to engagement with
China.
1NC
The United States federal government should work
cooperatively with the Peoples Republic of China to create a
high level channel within the U.S.China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue framework to orchestrate people to people
exchange activities focused specifically on building
cooperation on global strategic issues
Encouraging discussion over global issues builds trust for bi-

lateral cooperation
Tanner and Zhao 16 [Travis, Director of the Kenneth B. and Anne H.H. Pyle Center for Northeast
Asian Studies, Minghao, research fellow at the Charhar Institute in Beijing, U.S.-China relations in strategic
domains, pg.99, The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2016] AW
use the CPE as a model to create a

This is not a proposal to replace the CPE but instead to
complementary mechanism within the S&ED to coordinate P2P activity around
strategic issues where scope for partnership exists . Building on the narrative that the United
States and China are global powers and that the degree to which they collaborate with one another to resolve
it is critical that both nations elevate the
global challenges carries worldwide implications,
management of P2P to achieve such strategic ends. We recommend that a new
presidentially mandated official senior-level working group (SLWG) be launched to
identify strategic global challenges on which P2P engagements could generate
progress and, by so doing, lead to opportunities to promote U.S.-China
collaboration. The SLWG would perform two functions. First, it would identify strategic issues of
critical concern on the horizon that present global risk (e.g., climate change, cybersecurity,
nonproliferation, energy security, collaboration in space, territorial disputes, and global health)issues that span
Second, it would oversee a series of specific P2P forums designed
beyond U.S.-China ties.
to address these global challenges. These forums would begin by addressing issues
where cooperation would be relatively straightforward to achieve as a means to
create a foundation for dialogue on increasingly difficult strategic issues over time.
By focusing on global strategic issues, the forum participants and discussions would avoid specific challenges
the consequence would be de facto increased
associated with the bilateral relationship. But
mutual understanding and common ground that would provide a foundation for
potentially resolving more difficult bilateral issues in the future. For example, the SLWG
could organize student exchanges utilizing project-learning models where American
and Chinese students would not simply study in one anothers country but also work side by side in
small Track 2 cohorts to develop solutions to global challenges. Other exchanges
would include scientists, journalists, business leaders, policy experts, and NGO
leaders and would focus on a wide range of security-related issues where the two sides
could potentially identify new modes of collaboration. The CPE would continue to coordinate exchanges in cultural
the SLWG would provide a platform for both nations to
areas. By fulfilling these objectives,
demonstrate their commitment to collaboration on solving global challenges through
the development of new ideas, approaches, public-private partnerships, and resources. In the process, these
collaborations would promote mutual trust and stronger bilateral ties and serve as a
counterweight to strategic rivalry.
AT: No Solvency
Person to Person solves a myriad of issuesexperts cooperate

over international issues
domains, pg.87-88, The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2016] AW
P2P activities have produced a wide range of short- and long-term benefits for the
bilateral relationship, some profound and others intangible. However, as the relationship matures,
dedicated and targeted P2P exchange is needed to address the strategic challenges
that the U.S.-China relationship faces. Tensions are rising over cybersecurity, maritime
disputes in the East and South China Seas, interactions in space, and obstacles impeding trade and
financial flows between the two countries. These frustrations, along with other friction points, have
heightened the level of strategic rivalry between the worlds two largest military
powers. While there does not appear to be a direct transition mechanism between the number or depth of P2P
exchange and the general health of the overall U.S.-China relationship, historically P2P exchange has
served as a ballast, allowing the U.S.-China relationship to weather difficult storms.
When tensions have been high, relationship managers have relied on human
relationships, unofficial communication channels, and a deep and personal
understanding of the other countrys interests to steady the boat and move the relationship
out of troubled waters. Strong relationships between citizens in both nations can also
mitigate the potential policy excesses that either side might otherwise be tempted to
pursuethe dont go there concept. Public participation and public opinion can weigh
heavily on the making of domestic and foreign policy. When government officials know
that private citizens are invested in policy outcomes and the general management of the
bilateral relationship, accountability is higher, providing an important variable for
consideration in the policymaking process. The public can also encourage public
officials to overcome short-term obstacles in order to achieve long-term objectives
the hang in there concept. Furthermore, educational exchange and other P2P activities lead to
increased mutual understanding. The more the future leaders and relationship
managers understand the perspectives, interests, considerations, and policy environments that
their counterparts face, the more successful they will be in steering the relationship
in a positive direction. Increased understanding helps build shared norms and
obviate misunderstandings and miscalculations.
Person to Person exchanges are critical to inform policy

innovation and familiarization
domains, pg.89-91, The National Bureau of Asian Research, April 2016] AW
As discussed above, the two governments convene regular discussions through the S&ED and other official
diplomatic talks to address topics related to national security, including nuclear weapons proliferation, space, and
cybersecurity. Many of these dialogues originated as Track 2 scholarly discussions that over time became critically
Track 2
important communication channels between academics and government officials on both sides.
interactions allow the United States and China to engage in a safe environment that
is conducive to more free and open dialogue about sensitive topics. Specifically, Track 2
discussions between experts from both countries provide a platform to educate a larger
number of interlocutors, identify areas of concern, define norms and vocabulary ,
identify negotiating positions, explore red lines, and provide sustained intellectual support to
government officials involved in Track 1 discussions. Furthermore, Track 2 talks provide
a less risky venue for airing controversial proposals and allow for negotiations
outside the domestic bureaucracies . In some cases, participants serve as de facto staff or advisers
who vet recommendations before passing them to officials.19 One expert on conflict resolution identified seven
Exploratory function. Help both sides learn more about each
specific benefits of Track 2 dialogue:20
other and understand the interests that inform official positions . Innovation function.
Create a forum to empower elites with additional credibility when proposing policy to
officials by granting them an opportunity to vet new ideas with the other side.
Legitimization effect. Help break taboos against negotiations , especially when
nonrecognition or a long period of hostility is the backdrop for talks. Accumulation effect.
Build a critical mass of elites on each side who have participated in informal
negotiations and can bolster the pro-negotiation camp within their national political
arena. Clarification effect. Help identify and discuss difficult details and sticking points.
Preparatory effect. Allow Track 1 officials to develop mutual familiarity before
official talks begin. Latency effect. Create equitable ideas that , while perhaps not
immediately actionable because of conditions on the ground, can be preserved in case a better
opportunity arises in the future. Commenting on the importance of dialogue in managing the U.S.-China
relationship, Vice Premier Wang Yang stated the following: There are different ways of resolving difference and
The establishment of the
frictions, and dialogue is certainly the most cost-effective means for doing so.
high-level, comprehensive dialogue serves the need for peace , development and
cooperation of our times and is a sign of the growing maturity of China-U.S. relations. Any
time or energy the two countries put into the dialogue is more than worthwhile
considering the enormous progress that results there for both sides. The convergence of
interests between our two countries has gone beyond many peoples imaginations. It is now such that
neither of us could afford non-cooperation or even all-out confrontation.21 P2P exchange between
countries has benefited many nations and improved even some of the most contested bilateral relationships. For
example, cricket diplomacy between India and Pakistan helped contribute to a better bilateral relationship in
201112.22 Israel and Palestine have likewise conducted a range of P2P activities, including Track 2 dialogues,
educational exchanges, visits by scholars to research centers, and civil society exchanges.23 Though difficult to
helped calm tensions and increased
ascertain the precise impact of these activities, they potentially
mutual understandingdevelopments that may have deterred violence and conflict. In both cases, P2P,
though not a panacea for the discord and tension between the nations involved, contributed to creating a
more conducive environment for managing the relationship in a positive way . Both
cases are of course quite different from the U.S.-China relationship.
CP KT create more cooperative policies
P2P exchange could play a constructive role in reducing tensions surrounding the
range of strategic issues facing the U.S.-China relationship. Coordinated Track 1.5 and 2
dialogues around emerging cyber, space, maritime, and nuclear issues would provide
sustained intellectual support for government officials and opportunities to educate and expand
the number of qualified interlocutors capable of discussing key issues in both countries. In certain strategic
domains, only a limited number of individuals can effectively engage with
counterparts in the other country. In order to ensure that a wide range of views , policy
options, and considerations are explored, a new and larger cohort of experts must be
cultivated and trained to manage critically important aspects of the relationship.
CP is a prereq to effective 1AC implementationbuilds trust

before entering negotations
Although U.S. and Chinese leaders often express a desire to cooperate more on key
strategic issues and major global challenges, a gap exists between this stated willingness and
actual practice. This essay proposes that an important way to bridge this gap is for senior
leadership in both countries to agree to expand P2P exchange and support more
Track 1.5 and 2 dialogues on sensitive strategic issues facing the relationship . This is
not an easy task, as the preceding discussion makes clear. Orchestrating P2P exchange to build
trust around the most sensitive issues will require long-term strategic vision by
leaders in both nations. Though this is no doubt a tall order, the risk of continuing along the current path of
high-level strategic mistrust is far too great. Actions must be taken today to ensure the future stability of the U.S.-
China relationship. Thus, we recommend the following steps to expand P2P exchange to strategic domains.
AT: Person-to-person Exchange
2AC
The CP doesnt solvedont involve enough sub-national
leaders
Tavenner and Watkins 16 [Carson, Executive Director of The Tai Initiative, Tom, member of
Schell Bray PLLC, China-U.S. Relations: Creating an Effective Relationship at the Subnational Level, China US
Focus, June 15 2016, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/china-us-relations-creating-an-effective-
relationship-at-the-subnational-level/] AW
We concur with Shens premise but believe it is only part of the puzzle that is sustaining relations during both good
times and bad. Citizens on both sides of the Pacific should be informed by the overlooked pieces: powerful
Chinese and American leaders hard at work below the national level. These connections
go beyond people-to-people exchanges. Birthed by U.S. President Eisenhower, the people-to-people concept
continues to play an important role in preventing national fear or contempt of foreigners that was found in the first
Nurturing a personal
half of the 20th century. But its influence at the national level is limited.
relationship with foreign counterparts through decades of mutual struggle and
achievement at the business, university, think tank, provincial and city level
creates time to marinate a lasting win-win relationship . National leaders responsibilities
compel them to spend no more than a few hours or days at most per year with a counterpart. The time they
spend is often scripted and each side must posture for the home audience as well.
Their staffs are the ones who manifest the communication. Therefore, little genuine relational
substance is generated in such environments. Clearly, we need these regular high-level meetings, but we need
to nurture effective relationships at the subnational level as well. Subnational
leadership includes governors, mayors, executives of businesses, universities, and
non-profits; thousands are filling the gap between people-to-people exchanges and
high-level diplomatic missions. In America and China, as former U.S. House Speaker Tip ONeill famously
observed, all politics is local.
Perm do the CPif they win China says yes to the plan, then
the most likely place where it would be proposed is the forum
for dialogue
The CP already existssquo systems are continually being

improved
Yandong 16 [Liu, Vice Premier of China, Liu Yandong Comments on Results of China-US High-Level
Consultation on People-to-People Exchange, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, June 07
2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1371466.shtml] AW
the CPE mechanism was

Liu Yandong said that with personal promotion of the two heads of state,
established in 2010 as the time required, and has been constantly improved since then. First, its
coverage has been constantly expanded from the initial four major areas to seven fields
today, namely education, science and technology, culture, sports, woman, youth and public health. And the
number of results of the consultation has increased from 13 to over 400. Second, the
scale of exchange has been continuously broadened. The number of Chinese
students studying in the US has been doubled from more than 300,000 to nearly 600,000,
and China remains to be the biggest source of international students in the US. The
number of Chinese tourists visiting the US has been quadrupled , rising from over 700,000
to nearly three million. Thanks to the policy of multi-entry business and tourist visas with the validity up to
10 years, the amount of Chinese tourists in the US grew by 53 percent in 2015. Having completed its 100,000
Strong Initiative ahead of schedule, the US has launched a more ambitious 1 Million Strong
Initiative, which sets the goal of bringing the number of US learners of Mandarin
Chinese to 1 million by 2020. As the second biggest source of foreign students in China, the US has about
22,000 students studying in China. Since 2015, more than 1340 US commercial performances
have been delivered in China. Third, the level of cooperation has been elevated
significantly. There are 399 programs and institutions of education collaboration between
the two sides. Joint research centers for clean energy, rail transportation and other fields
as well as cross-border innovation and entrepreneurship cooperation platforms
witness smooth operation. And dialogues between think-tanks are highly productive.
The two countries have joined efforts in fighting against Ebola in Africa, winning praise from
the international society. Fourth, social influence is becoming more extensive. More and more
local administrations, enterprises, schools, media and social organizations have taken part
in the exchange. The two countries have established 257 pairs of sister province-
state and cities with more than 27 million people participating in people-to-people
and cultural exchange activities. There are nearly 2,000 people signing up for almost 500
programs of the China-US Young Maker Competition, showing the vitality of innovation and entrepreneurship. It
is safe to say that the success of current bilateral people-to-people and cultural exchanges has gone beyond our
original anticipation, strongly proving the boundless charm and strong vitality of people-to-people and cultural
exchanges.
CTBT CP
Notes
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a
multilateral treaty which the vast majority of countries of
signed onto and ratified which bans nuclear testing of any
type, and creates an international system of observation
systems designed to detect nuclear testing.
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Nuclear-Test-Ban_Treaty). The U.S. is one of the
few nuclear countries which hasnt ratified the treaty. The last
time the U.S. tried to pass CTBT was in 2012. The idea is that
by knowing if countries were doing nuclear tests (a vital part
of making sure that the nuclear weapons which are created
actually work, and how destructive they are), the international
community would be able to put pressure on them to stop, and
also implement sanctions. A few of the other nuclear countries
which havent signed onto CTBT are conditioning their
ratification on the U.S. (e.g. China, Pakistan, India). By having
the U.S. join on, the CTBT would finally be able to have teeth,
and actually be completely implemented.
The reason why this treaty hasnt been passed is mostly GOP
fears that the U.S. would lose its nuclear edge since we
wouldnt be able to test our nukes, and that the treaty doesnt
actually do anything because it doesnt actually define what a
ban on nuclear testing means.
To beat this arg, I would pick one specific failure area of the
treaty in the 1AR, and just sit on the one that the block
undercovers. The 2AC ev lists out several reasons why CTBT
fails, so keeping a list of each reason helps the 1A stay
organized, and then pick a pivot.
1NC
The United States senate should ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty
CTBT expands the U.S. capability to detect and end rogue

nuclear proliferation
O'Leary and Kimball 11 [Hazel, seventh United States Secretary of Energy, Daryl, Executive
Director of the Arms Control Association, Ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Los Angeles Times, Sept 14
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/14/opinion/la-oe-oleary-nukeban-20110914] AW
The United States is one of just nine key nations that hasn't ratified the treaty. The U.S. Senate can change that
Its ratification and entry into force would immediately bolster the
and should do so now.
international community's efforts to stop rogue states from developing and potentially
proliferating nuclear weapons. In 1996, President Clinton was the first world leader to sign the treaty.
But the Senate in 1999, after only a brief consideration, rejected ratification of the measure and hasn't taken up the
issue since. The treaty is an essential tool for dealing with today's security threats. The
age of a superpower nuclear arms race is over. Instead, world leaders must focus on preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons to additional states, blocking advances in their nuclear
weapons technologies and not letting nuclear weapons slip into the hands of terrorists. Countries
with nuclear weapons, such as China, India and Pakistan, cannot create advanced nukes
without further nuclear test explosions . Without nuclear tests, Iran could not
confidently build warheads for delivery by ballistic missiles. By ratifying the treaty, the United
States would put pressure on these nations to shelve their nuclear programs and
engage more productively with the international community. To detect and deter nuclear
testing, the treaty empowers the U nited States and the international community with
strong inspections authority. The treaty provides for a global network of 337
monitoring stations, many of which are in sensitive locations like Russia and China to which the United
States doesn't have access. Once in force, the treaty would give inspectors the ability
to conduct short-notice, on-site investigations of any suspicious sites. That's an
ability the United States does not possess now. In 1999, opponents of the treaty expressed concern
that it would hamper America's ability to maintain a robust nuclear arsenal. Those worries are now moot. Thanks
to technological progress over the last decade, nuclear scientists can determine
with high confidence that warheads work without detonating them . Indeed, the United
States hasn't conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992. Research has shown that
plutonium, the key ingredient in nuclear weapons, is not affected by aging for 85 years or more. Scientific
advances have also allowed America's nuclear scientists to refurbish and modernize
existing warheads with "life extension programs ." A September 2009 study from the
JASON panel, a group of independent scientists, concluded that the "lifetimes of today's
nuclear warheads could be extended for decades " without explosive testing. Nuclear
experts have argued forcefully against testing. Earlier this year, the head of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, Thomas D'Agostino, said that the United States has "a safe and
secure and reliable stockpile" and that "there's no need to conduct underground
[nuclear] testing." Even some of those who opposed ratification of the treaty in 1999 have come out in favor
of the agreement. George Shultz, the secretary of State under President Reagan, has said that his fellow
Republicans "might have been right voting against [the treaty] some years ago" but they'd "be right voting for it
now." After all, the treaty does not hamstring America's efforts to maintain its nuclear
arsenal. President Obama has called for $85 billion over the next 10 years for our
nation's nuclear weapons laboratories a full 13% increase over the level of
spending during President George W. Bush's administration, and more than enough to get the job
done. By ratifying the treaty, the U nited States would gain the political and moral leverage to
end nuclear testing worldwide. And we'd help establish the kind of robust framework
needed by the international community to monitor and deter the nuclear activities of the
most dangerous countries.
Solvency: Generic
CTBT prevents weapons testing by detecting any nuclear tests
Kimball 13 [Daryl, executive director of the Arms Control Association, Past Time to Close the Door on
Nuclear Testing, Global Security Institute, Sept 27 2013, http://www.armscontrol.org/files/2013-NGO-CTBT-Art-XIV-
stmt-final-09-18.pdf] AW
The reasons are clear: nuclear testing is a dangerous and unnecessary vestige of the past.
By banning all nuclear weapon test explosions, the CTBT can help accomplish the
indisputable obligation under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons to cease the nuclear
arms race at an early date and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The established
nuclear weapons states would be barred from proof-testing new, more sophisticated nuclear
warhead designs. Without the option of nuclear explosive testing, newer testing
nations cannot perfect smaller, more easily deliverable warheads. The CTBT also serves to
reinforce the nonproliferation system by serving as a confidence-building measure
about a states nuclear intentions and, in this regard, it can help head off and de-
escalate regional tensions. And with the CTBT in force, global and national capabilities to
detect and deter possible clandestine nuclear testing by other states will be
significantly greater. In addition to these nonproliferation benefits of the CTBT it is worth noting that it
forms an essential part of the process of eliminating nuclear weapons . It is part of the
promise made to gain indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. If both the letter and spirit of the CTBT are adhered
it will help curtail improvements in existing arsenals and lower the prestige of
to, then
nuclear weapons programs. It strengthens the pursuit of international order based
on the rule of law.
Solvency: Barriers
The CTBT places barriers to proliferation and coordinates
international response
Gottemoeller 15 [Rose, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, CTBT:
Whats New And Whats Next?, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, March 23 2015,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/10-230315carnegieCTBT_-_formatted2.pdf] AW
However, none of them is absolute. None of them achieves it perfectly and I would say the same about the
comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When we look at a total ban on nuclear testing I think about
it as placing significant barriers in the way of proliferation . Significant barriers
particularly in the way of nuclear testing for states that may be aspirants but they
have not actually acquired any nuclear weapons . But are looking at acquiring some simple
primitive nuclear weapons. Of course, they can do so without nuclear testing but their confidence in
whether those weapons would ever work would be low or if they took the choice to
test against this norm that has now been established. Even as the comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not entered
into force, they would face international condemnation and international pressures and
some measures as we have seen in this intervening several decades. I think that for
those at the earlier stage and that want to acquire a simple capability there is a
significant barrier that a Test Ban places in their way . For states that are more
advanced that already have a nuclear weapons capability, perhaps have tested in the past but wish to acquire
more advanced nuclear weapons. The comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a ban on testing places also a
significant barrier in their way in just the same way they would never be confident
in the capability of boosted weapon for example that had not been tested.
Solvency: Norms
The treaty creates new international norms to prevent
proliferation
Engle 14 [John, Strategy Analyst at IntralinkGlobal, Its Time to Ratify the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,
Somewhat Reasonable, July 5 2014, http://blog.heartland.org/2014/07/its-time-to-ratify-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/]
AW
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons ever created and it is right that they should be limited;
An internationally ratified treaty
something that the test ban treaty will be a step towards.
comprehensively banning the testing of nuclear weapons would serve to hamper
attempts by countries currently not in possession of nuclear weapons from
acquiring them. This is particularly important in the cases of Iran and North Korea. Iran is getting closer and
closer to having a working weapon and North Korea already have simple nuclear weapons. These countries
possession of such weapons can only serve to diminish security in the world and the security of the United States.
Of course, a country could just develop a nuclear weapon without testing, butlittle faith can be put in a
weapon that is entirely untested; all countries that currently possess nuclear
weapons conducted tests. A comprehensive and internationally ratified treaty against testing
would serve as an important signaling device to countries considering developing
nuclear weapons. Just as a taboo has formed around the use of nuclear weapons due to international accords
denouncing their use, so too would a ban on testing generate a norm against it. Countries rely on their
reputations in international relations; states will fear loss of credibility should they be seen
flouting the ban, either by testing weapons themselves or by supplying materials to countries
seeking to perform tests. Some politicians and commentators say that rogue nations do not care at all about how
all countries rely to some extent on reputation to engage in
they are perceived. But
international affairs. Most states do not like being pariahs, especially when that
status carries with it heavy political and economic sanctions. The United States could
leverage international law in such a way as to further deter nuclear testing in
potentially hostile countries.
Solves China Prolif
Ratifying the CTBT resolves Chinese fearsleads to China
following onto the CTBT
ZuKang 14 [Sha, Chinese diplomat who was head of the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs from 2007 to 2012, Why US, China must ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, The BRICS Post, Sept 10
2014, http://thebricspost.com/why-us-china-must-ratify-the-nuclear-test-ban-treaty/#.V3LSNGgrLb0] AW
Naturally, the actions of the US triggered doubts among the international community, including China. Some have
asked me why the National Peoples Congress of China hesitates to ratify the CTBT. Personally I think it
is because of US behavior. I firmly believe that, were the US to ratify the treaty, China
would definitely follow. My conviction is rooted in Chinas consistent approach to international security
issues. As President Xi Jinping reiterated recently, China firmly pursues the path of
peaceful development, hegemony or militarism is simply not in the genes of the Chinese. For the sole
purpose of self-defense, China developed nuclear weapons under compulsion at a
certain point in history. Over the 50 years since it first possessed nuclear weapons, China has
consistently and continually advocated and promoted the complete prohibition and
thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Chinas nuclear policy is in harmony with
the goals and objectives of the CTBT, and its support for the CTBT will never
change. In fact, the efforts and contributions made by China in promoting the entry into force of the treaty are no
less than those of the ratified states. Coming back to the present and looking forward to the future, I believe that
the US holds the key that will open the door for the treaty entering into force. We
should, as a priority, encourage the US to open the door, instead of staying out of a legally binding instrument.
AT: CTBT Tech Insufficient
CTBT is constantly improving its technear universal coverage
Zerbo 15 [Lassina, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO, CTBT: Whats New And Whats Next?, Carnegie
Endowment for international Peace, March 23 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/10-230315carnegieCTBT_-
_formatted2.pdf] AW
Let me tell you that the CTBT was designed to compliment national technical means at the
beginning. When it was designed no one expected it to be at this level of sophistication if I could say that.
Sophistication meaning basically going far beyond what people have anticipated. The reason why I am saying this is
We have 90% of the station that are in place, we have as well more than
the following:
92% of the country that Ive said notably testing. And with 90% our detection
threshold and the level of the detection capability of our system. You take the four
technologies, are going far below what anyone could think of and on top of that we
are today working with scientific community more than nobody ever thinks. We have
our Science and Technology Conference that is coming. That is open to everybody. People were asking today, should
we be nominated by our country to come? No we have scientists from India, Pakistan who are a non-
signatory of the CTBT who are coming to the Science and Technology. The reason that Im saying this is that
we are developing ourselves continuously and today we are even better than what
was anticipated. So it means that the CTBT international monitoring system, its
verification regime can only go better and better. To compliment national technical
means. To finish let me tell you that today at this point in time there is very little chance that any
violator of this treaty will go undetected. At least anyone who is trying to build any relevant nuclear
weapon would go undetected.
CTBT tech is all encompassing of the Earthfunctionally no

loopholes
Deen 16 [Thalif, former UN Bureau Chief for Inter Press Service news agency, CTBTOs Verification System
Thwarts Nuclear Tests, Interpress Service, Feb 9 2016, http://www.ipsnews.net/2016/02/ctbtos-verification-system-
thwarts-nuclear-tests/] AW
The Organizations international monitoring and verification system has been

tracking all nuclear explosions - in the atmosphere, underwater and underground -
including all four nuclear tests by the Democratic Republic of Korea (DPRK) the only country in the world to test
The CTBTOs International Monitoring System has found
nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
a wider mission than its creators ever foresaw: monitoring an active and evolving
Earth, says Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of CTBTO, an Organization which also monitors earthquakes,
volcanic eruptions, large storms and drifting icebergs. He said some compare the system to a combined giant Earth
stethoscope and sniffer that looks, listens, feels and sniffs for planetary irregularities. Its the only global network
which detects atmospheric radioactivity and sound waves which humans cannot detect hear, said Dr. Zerbo. Asked
how effective the CTBTOs verification system is, Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Washington-based Arms
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature
Control Association told IPS since
20 years ago, national and international test ban monitoring and verification capabilities
have improved immensely and they now far exceeds original expectations. He said
there have been significant advances in the U.S. national monitoring and the
International Monitoring System capabilities across all of the key verification
technologies deployed worldwide to detect and deter nuclear test explosions,
including seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, radionuclide, and satellite monitoring,
as well as on-site inspections as demonstrated in the November 2014 integrated field exercise in
Jordan, which I observed directly. With the combined capabilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS),
national technical means (NTM), and civilian seismic networks, no potential CTBT violator could be
confident that a nuclear explosion of any military utility would escape detection. By
detecting and deterring clandestine nuclear-explosion testing, the CTBT and its
monitoring systems effectively inhibit the development of new types of nuclear
weapons, Kimball said. With the option of short-notice, on-site inspections , as allowed
under the treaty once it enters into force, we would have even greater confidence in
detecting evidence of a nuclear explosion, he added. According to CTBTO, the verification
regime is designed to detect any nuclear explosion conducted on Earth
underground, underwater or in the atmosphere, and the purpose of the verification
regime is to monitor countries compliance with the CTBT which bans all nuclear
explosions on the planet. Michael Schoeppner, Programme on Science and Global Security, Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, told IPS the verification system of
the CTBT relies on diplomatic and technical means. The technical verification aims
at the physical proof whether a nuclear explosion has occurred or not , he said. The
CTBTO has built an efficient and effective system to monitor the Earth around the
clock for underground, underwater and atmospheric nuclear explosions. It delivers
data to all member states and thus enables a sound decision-making of the
international community, he added. The CTBT and its verification regime establish an
international norm for countries to refrain from developing and testing new nuclear
weapon types, Schoeppner said. Alyn Ware, Global Coordinator for Parliamentarians for Nuclear
Nonproliferation and Disarmament, told IPS the effectiveness of the verification system provided by the CTBTO
demonstrates that similar real-time global verification required for nuclear
disarmament is indeed possible. He said the CTBTO and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which monitors nuclear reactors to ensure there is no diversion of fissile
materials into nuclear weapons programmes , could meet some of the verification tasks for nuclear
disarmament.
AT: Circumvention
Circumvention would be heavily punishedgives leverage to
ensure compliance
AW
Scanning and detection technology has become so advanced in recent years that it is
virtually impossible for a country to detonate a nuclear device without it being
detected. Compliance with the treaty can be monitored through the means of
seismology, hydroacoustics, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring. The technologies
are used to monitor the underground, the waters and the atmosphere for any sign of a nuclear explosion. The
monitoring network consists of 337 facilities located across the world. The system is
so sensitive that it was able to detect the disintegration of the space shuttle
Columbia. Furthermore, the treatys system of inspection will reveal any suspicious
activity regarding testing. Clearly, efficacy in terms of determining who might be testing weapons is not
an issue. When countries are found to be violating the CTBT, heavy political and economic
sanctions can be imposed that will serve to force countries back into compliance with
the treaty. A ratified CTBT gives a greater power to the worlds democratic powers, the United
States in particular, to take action against those states that would develop nuclear
weapons. Ratification would give a much greater moral justification to a decision to
take economic or political action against
AT: CTBT has no cred
Their argument doesnt assume the U.S. signing onthe U.S. is
uniquely key to ensure enforcement
AW
Some countries have been reticent to sign the CTBT for fear it would limit their ability
to either expand or to begin their nuclear arsenals. The United States stands as one of the only such non-
ratifiers, in the company of such countries as Iran, China, and North Korea. The United States fears the limiting of
in reality the United States will benefit
the ability for it to defend itself with nuclear armament. However,
politically and militarily by ratifying, and the world will be benefited by a greater
chance for peace without nuclear proliferation. American accession would benefit
the United States politically by increasing its credibility as a responsible international
player with a respect for international law. Often America is viewed by the rest of the world
as a cowboy pursuing its own aims and only paying lip service to the international communitys opinion. If
the United States were to show a degree of respect to international law , particularly
through signing CTBT, it will be more able to gain support from other countries for its
goals. If the Senate ratifies the treaty, it will encourage other states to sign, such as
China, which has said that its signature is contingent upon that of America .
American involvement in the CTBT, and the Chinese involvement expected to follow from it,
will give the treaty far greater weight, and will generate greater obedience to it , as
countries recognize that it is binding on all states, not just the weak.
AT: Deterrence DA
Testing wouldnt happen and we have sufficient info now

Pifer 12 [Steven, director of the Brookings Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, New Support for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Brookings, March 30 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2012/03/30-nuclear-pifer] AW
First, no onenot
even the staunchest CTBT opponenthas advocated that the United
States resume nuclear testing now. But would it even be possible politically? The last U.S.
underground nuclear explosion took place in 1992 at the Nevada test site, 40 miles northwest of Las Vegas. A lot
The population of Las Vegas numbers almost
has changed in Nevada over the past 20 years.
three times what it was then. The states politicians fought tooth and nail to block a
nuclear waste repository at the former test site. Does anyone think Nevada would
welcome resumed nuclear weapons testing? And if not there, is there another state
eager to host nuclear tests? Second, the CTBT would lock in a huge U.S. advantage in
knowing more about nuclear weapons and nuclear tests than anyone else. In the years
between 1945 and 1992, the United States conducted some 1030 nuclear testsas
many as all other nuclear weapons states combined. And U.S. scientists learned
more from tests. Twenty-four years ago, when serving at the American embassy in Moscow, I accompanied a
team of U.S. testing experts to the Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk. At one point, our Soviet hosts showed us a
three-foot diameter hole dropping hundreds of feet into the earth, ready to receive a nuclear device for an
upcoming test. One U.S. expert commented that the Russians sure will be surprised when they come to Nevada
we drill our vertical shafts ten feet in diameter. Why so large, when modern U.S. nuclear weapons are relatively
compact? Because the larger diameter of the hole gave U.S. testers a much greater
surface area on which to hang instruments to collect data from the blast in the instant
before the instruments themselves were vaporized. The CTBT would codify the current reality in
the United States: no plausible need to resume testing and no political possibility that
we could. Improved verification means very high confidence that someone elses
test would be detected. And the CTBT would lock in an important U.S. nuclear advantage. This should not
be a difficult question.
AT: No Spillover/U.S. Defunding
CTBT changes international political considerationsputs
pressure on non-signatories and violators
Asghar 14 [Rizwan, Visiting Fellow at Monterey Institute of International Studies, The future of the CTBT,
Daily Times, Jan 14 2014, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/opinion/14-Jan-2014/the-future-of-the-ctbt] AW
This approach will not only enable the consenting states to avoid unnecessary political
obstacles but will also strengthen nuclear test ban regimes. Without violating the
provisions of article XIV of the treaty, this approach is likely to increase pressure on
other countries to accelerate their ratification processes. The CTBT, after it is provisionally
applied by a large number of states, will have enhanced legal status, increasing the political
costs of violation. In this way, the treaty would provide a stronger legal basis for
collective UN action against the violator and there would be a glimmer of hope to
prevent failure of the test ban norm. According to article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, a treaty or part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if: (a) the treaty itself
The CTBT does not rule
so provides or if the negotiating states have in some other manner so agreed.
out the provisional application and even during the negotiations over entry-into-force requirements the
idea of provisional application was discussed by many states as a way to prevent a handful of other states from
Thus the CTBT can take legal effect for those who wish to abide by the
exercising a veto.
agreement. Though not binding on those who remain outside, the treaty in
provisional force would be more likely to act as a brake on further me too testing.
A major criticism levelled against the provisional application of the CTBT is based on the
apprehension that the US, which contributes a fifth of the overall costs of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty Organisation, may not like this step and limit its funding to the CTBTO. Such fears are
exaggerated because any such decision to cut down funding to the CTBTO would be
far more costly to Washington in terms of political influence against nuclear
proliferation. Also, the provisional application of the CTBT can be expected to tilt US
public opinion in favour of ratification and bring the US Senate under added
pressure to ratify the CTBT. And once the US ratifies the treaty, the remaining states
will rapidly follow suit due to the fear of being left out of influential posts. The
technological advances in the global nuclear test monitoring system have already
made it easier to detect underground nuclear tests with a yield of even less than one kiloton.
The entry-into-force of the CTBT will also make on-site inspections possible. Over the past
few years, the US and Russia are spending billions of dollars on modernising their nuclear forces. And there are very
the CTBT, after
genuine apprehensions that China is also planning to miniaturise its nuclear weapons. Thus
would be a major contribution to nonproliferation goals by
taking full legal effect,
restraining countries with nuclear weapons capability from further modernising their
nuclear forces.
The CP has a domino effect which pressures other countries to

sign on
Banerjee 15 [Amrita, Ph.D. Research Scholar at the US Studies Division of New Delhi, Why the US Should
Sign the CTBT, Prespective Americas, Jan 20 2015, http://www.perspectivesamericas.org/articles-research-
scholars/united-states/why-the-us-should-sign-the-ctbt/] AW
The United States ratification would surely have a Domino Effect on the other
non-signatories. For instance, if China ratifies one would hope that India would take
greater steps toward ratification. With Indian ratification, it might be easier to also
persuade Pakistan. Also, with a renewed emphasis on the Middle East and efforts to resolve
regional conflict there, it might be possible to start laying the conditions where Israel,
Egypt, and Iran could also be brought into the fold . North Korea, of course, is also a challenge,
but if they are brought back to the six-party talks, and also once China ratifies, it would have a
greater leverage to have the North Koreans join in this global demand or they would
risk further isolation. With more and more countries in CTBT camp, regional tensions
in the Middle East, South Asia and Korean peninsula will not blow out of hand and these volatile regions
could be stabilised. In this regard, being the sole superpower, the U.S. should and must ratify the
CTBT as it has a global and moral responsibility to do so in order to allow the world
to experience a future without nuclear tests and alleviate the nightmare of a Mutually Assured
Destruction (MAD).
AT: Signing is Sufficient
Nope, the treaty doesnt go into effect until its ratified.

Signing isnt enough.
Kimball 15 [Daryl, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, The Status of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty: Signatories and Ratifiers, Arms Control Association, March 15,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ctbtsig] AW
President George H. W. Bush signed into law the unilateral declaration to forego full-scale nuclear weapons testing
The United States signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996, the day it opened
October 2, 1992.
but the Senate dealt a severe blow to the near-term prospects for U.S.
for signature,
participation when it refused to provide its advice and consent October 13, 1999.
President Obama, however, stated in February 2009 that he intends to pursue Senate advice and consent to
ratification of the treaty "immediately and aggressively."The CTBT will formally enter into force
after 44 designated nuclear-capable states (as listed in Annex 2 of the treaty) have
deposited their instruments of ratification with the UN secretary-general . To date, 183
states have signed and 164 have ratified the treaty. Yet of the 44 specified countries, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea still have not signed, and only 36 have ratified the treaty.
AT: Other Treaties Solve
Only CTBT has the comprehensive technical expertise to detect
tests internationally
Wolverton 15 [Mark, science writer for MIT Technology Review, How International Monitors Spot Nukes
and Other Rumblings, MIT Technology Review, Sept 10 2015, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/541141/how-
international-monitors-spot-nukes-and-other-rumblings/] AW
But building a reliable operational weapon requires testing, and since the completion
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, a sophisticated global sensing network has come
online to ensure that no nuclear test anywhere in the world goes unnoticed. Known
as the International Monitoring System (IMS), it is the first alert system for nuclear
transgressions, employing four distinct and complementary techniques to detect and
pinpoint an atomic detonation anywhere on earth. Twenty-four hours a day, about 26
gigabytes of data from IMS stations in 89 countries pour into a control center in Vienna,
Austria, through satellite networks and secure ground links . It cost about $1 billion to build and
was funded by the nearly 200 member states of the 1996 treaty. One of the most crucial sensing
systems offers radionuclide detection. Eighty monitoring outposts and 16 laboratories in
IMS are equipped to pick up and analyze atmospheric traces of noble gases and
radioactive particles that provide a definite smoking gun sign of a clandestine
nuke blast, such as those from North Koreas nuclear tests. The IMS radionuclide network got an unexpected but
vital workout in March 2011, measuring and tracking the radioactive plume released by the damaged Fukushima
nuclear plant.A well-designed underground test might not release any detectable
nuclear residues into the atmosphere. Thats where the additional technologies of the network come
into play. With 50 primary and 120 auxiliary stations, the IMS seismic net identifies
about 130 events per day: earth tremors, mining explosions, or anything down to the
equivalent of a magnitude 3.0 quake, a nearly undetectable rumble. The seismic
stations are extremely sensitive, says Gerhard Graham, cordinator of the International Data Centre,
which is operated by an international group called the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
As the seismic net as a whole identifies those 130 events a day,
Ban Treaty Organization.
each individual station within the network is monitoring just about everything: A
seismometer can measure nanometers of ground motion , Graham says. For geologists, the
network provides an ever-deepening baseline of seismic data enabling more accurate assessments of hazards in
The capabilities of the seismic net are supplemented and extended
quake-prone regions.
by 11 stations listening for the acoustic underwater signature of a nuclear explosion .
Five of the stations are on shore, detecting sound waves that travel through water and then change to seismic
other six stations are hydrophonesunderwater
waves upon hitting the coastline. The
microphones moored about a kilometer beneath the surface in order to detect and
determine the direction of acoustic waveforms. Because sound travels so efficiently under water,
11 stations can cover the entire world, says George Haralabus, head of the IMS hydroacoustics
section. Completing the IMS network are infrasound sensors capable of detecting hearing sounds at extremely low
frequencies, well below the range of human capabilities hearing. The earth is never quiet in this acoustic realm,
with infrasound generated not merely by nuclear explosions but by the motions of the atmosphere and the earths
crust, volcanoes, human activities of all kinds, and even meteors and space junk penetrating the atmosphere.
Forty-eight infrasound stations are currently operational out of a planned 60,
featuring arrays of microbarometers. But the IMS network is also being used in ways its original
designers never imagined. One of the most important is as an early warning system for natural disasters. Since the
devastating Indian Ocean earthquake and resulting tsunami in December 2004, the IMS has linked its considerable
resources to tsunami warning stations worldwide. That arrangement paid off in March 2011, with IMS data providing
enough warning to Japanese authorities to move endangered residents to higher ground during the same
catastrophe that inundated Fukushima. The seismic stations can even pinpoint the crash sites of large aircraft on or
near land. Meanwhile, the other scientific possibilities of the IMS are only beginning to be fully appreciated, from the
monitoring of collapsing ice shelves at the poles and deep ocean temperatures for evidence of climate change, to
All the sensor
eavesdropping on whale songs for new insights into whale behavior and migration patterns.
data that comes into the center in Vienna is continuously processed, analyzed, and
passed along to all the member states of the 1996 test ban treaty. Assuming
anything suspicious turns up, the next step is an on-site inspection for evidence of
treaty violations. At least, that will be the next step when the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty actually goes into effect. Though the worlds declared nuclear powers
have observed a voluntary testing moratorium since 1991, several of the 183 signatories (including
the U.S.) are dragging their heels on ratification , mostly citing concerns about verification. But the
people who run the IMS say such concerns are moot now. Graham says the technologies in the system
make it all but impossible to escape detection.
AT: CTBT CP
This aff card slays
Litany of alt causes to solvencycheating, old weapons, and
structural enforcement issues
Bailey 16 [Kathleen, senior scholar at the National Institute for Public Policy, The CTBT Remains Fatally
Flawed, Real Clear Defense, Feb 24 2016,
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/02/24/the_ctbt_remains_fatally_flawed_109073.html] AW
Treaty proponents argue that if states are prohibited from conducting nuclear tests, non-nuclear powers will be
unable to develop new nuclear weapons and existing nuclear powers will be unable to improve their nuclear
Non-nuclear countries do not need nuclear testing
arsenals. Both points are demonstrably false.
to develop simple nuclear weapons or to produce nuclear weapons using designs
and materials obtained from the black market. And, despite their pledges not to test
nuclear weapons, Russia and China continue to significantly improve their nuclear
weapon capabilities and add new warheads without high-yield nuclear testing.
States can cheat in numerous ways with very low risk of detection. For example, a nuclear
explosion can be decoupled by conducting it in an underground cavity and/or in a special
container to reduce the seismic signal. Even CTBT proponents concede that militarily
significant nuclear tests may be undetectable. For example, the 2002 study by the National
Academy of Sciences on CTBT verification reported that Russia could develop and test new tactical
weapons in the range of 10 to 100 tons with little or no risk of detection . Indeed, Russia
could develop a 10-ton nuclear weapon using only hydronuclear tests in the kilogram-yield range, and be
reasonably confident of its performance.The treaty fails to define a nuclear test, the very
action it is supposed to prohibit. Consequently, states may decide for themselves what
constitutes a test. The US interprets the treaty as prohibiting tests that produce any nuclear yield . Russia
apparently has a different interpretation; it reportedly conducts hydronuclear tests
that produce some nuclear yield. Such tests can be highly useful in assuring the safety and reliability of
nuclear weapons, and in their modernization. The treaty also has weak verification and
enforcement measures. For example, on-site inspections under the treaty are governed by an Executive
Council of state membersessentially a mini-UN (without a guaranteed seat for the US). Authorization to
conduct an on-site inspection requires an affirmative vote of 30 of the 51 votes on
the Council. But even if the inspection authorization proceeded smoothly, getting a
team to a suspect site before any telltale emissions dissipate would be exceedingly
difficult. The US has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992. Yet, the US may need to return to
some level of testing for at least two reasons. First, history shows us that a problem with the
current stockpile could arise that requires testing to resolve . During the 1958-1961
U.S.-Soviet nuclear test moratorium serious problems in our stockpile went undetected
until the US resumed testing. The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), designed to prevent such
problems during the current moratorium, has had some successes, but important programs have been
scaled back and funding reduced. It is possible that stockpile problems could again
occur, requiring testing to resolve. Second, testing may be required to shape the
nuclear deterrent to better meet the challenges of the changed threat environment.
Recently there have been significant upgrades in the nuclear arsenals of both Russia and China along with troubling
changes in their nuclear doctrines. Russia has developed a new intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying
multiple warheads, a new ballistic missile submarine with an associated new missile and warhead, a new short-
range ballistic missile, and lowyield tactical nuclear weapons including an earth penetrator. China is diversifying its
nuclear missile force by fielding a new set of road-mobile missiles, a small force of strategic missile submarines,
Large-yield US nuclear weapons designed during the Cold
and is expanding its ICBM force.
War to destroy entire cities are less-thanoptimal weapons for many of todays threat
scenarios. It is possible that further weapons developments or doctrinal changes by
Russia and/or China will necessitate a reevaluation of whether the US should
develop new nuclear warheads to bolster the US deterrent . The US complies with arms
control treaties whereas others often dont. Russia has violated several arms agreements ,
including most recently the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and it has expanded its
arsenal under New Start. The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention have not deterred some parties from cheating nor inspired the
international community to confront those suspected of noncompliance.
2AC
Structural issues with CTBT make it ineffective
Spring 11 [Baker, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, U.S. Should Reject Ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Heritage, May 26 2011, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/us-
should-reject-ratification-of-the-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty] AW
According to Tauscher, Senate consent to the ratification of the CTBT may be justified on the basis that times have
changed. In reality, the substantive problems with the CTBT that led to its rejection in 1999 are still present. In
the problems regarding the maintenance of a safe, reliable, and militarily
fact,
effective nuclear arsenal have grown worse over the intervening years: The CTBT
does not define what it purports to ban . The text of the treaty remains identical to that which the
Senate rejected in 1999. Its central provision, as well as its object and purpose, is to ban explosive
nuclear testing. The treaty does not, however, define the term.[3] The U.S.
interpretation is that it means a zero-yield ban, but other states may not share
that interpretation. The U.S. nuclear weapons complex has grown weaker during the
intervening years. After considerable pressure from a number of Senators, chief among them Jon Kyl (RAZ),
about the alarming decline in the U.S.s nuclear weapons, the Obama Administration committed to invest more
money in the complex in order to pressure the Senate into granting consent to the badly flawed New START arms
control treaty with Russia. But this investment program is only just getting started, and its success is far from
guaranteed. A zero-yield ban on nuclear explosive tests remains unverifiable. If the U.S.
interpretation of the CTBT as a zero-yield ban is accurate, it was impossible to verify
the ban in 1999, and it remains so today. The International Monitoring System (IMS) being put in
place to detect violations depends largely on seismic evidence. The fact is that
extremely low-yield tests are not likely to be detected by the IMS. Even Tauscher
acknowledged that it is possible that a country might conduct a test so low [in yield] that it
would not be detected. At the same time, she dismissed this possibility as far-fetched. In reality, it is not
at all far-fetched. The Obama Administration has imposed self-defeating output limits on the nuclear weapons
modernization program. While the Obama Administration has pledged to increase the investment level in the
nuclear weapons complex and stockpile stewardship programs, it is also imposing limits on what the complex and
program may do. Specifically, the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report states: The United States will not
develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs will use only nuclear components based on previously
tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilities.[4] Nuclear
proliferation trends are pointing in the wrong direction. The Obama Administration sees its nuclear disarmament
agenda, of which CTBT ratification is a part, as necessary to giving the U.S. the moral standing to combat nuclear
The fact that countries such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are
proliferation.
continuing to pursue or expand their nuclear weapons capabilities suggests that the
Obama Administrations moral suasion argument is ineffective and that Iran and
North Korea view the U.S. commitment to nuclear disarmament as a sign of
weakness to be exploited.
CTBT doesnt solveno enforcement, structural issues,

circumvention, and hurts deterrence
Cotton and Lankford 16 [Tom, junior United States Senator from Arkansas, James, junior United
States Senator from Oklahoma, Sens. Cotton and Lankford: Why the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is still a bad
idea, Fox News, May 23 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/05/23/sens-cotton-and-lankford-why-
comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-is-still-bad-idea.html] AW
U.S. nuclear deterrent

Those issues aside, the CTBT is simply not in our national-security interests. First, the
is vital to our security. Its what prevents major powers, like Russia or China, or rogue regimes,
from attempting a nuclear strike against the U nited States and allies. But
like North Korea or Iran,
that deterrent is greatly diminishedand the prospect for nuclear war greatly increasedif there is
any doubt about the readiness of U.S. weapons . Our safety and security depends on the working
order of our nuclear forces and there is no room for error. This is especially true at a time when Russia is issuing
nuclear threats against NATO allies. Our nuclear forces are only a deterrent if they are
credible. Nuclear weapons do not improve with age. They are composed of
inherently unstable parts and materials whose nature changes over time. And while advances in
supercomputing and modeling, along with adequate funding for maintenance programs, provide a
degree of security in the aging of these weapons, they arent perfect. There may come a day when
weapons specialists will tell the President they cannot certify the viability of the U.S.
nuclear-weapons stockpile without taking a weapon off of the shelf and testing it. On
that day, the President should not be forced to decide between violating a legally binding treaty or putting the
security of the United States at risk. Second,the treaty doesn't define the activity that it
purports to ban: nuclear weapons-testing. The Clinton administration determined
that the United States would define the CTBT as prohibiting tests that produce any
nuclear yield. But other states, including Russia, have not agreed to that definition. A ban
that lets treaty signatories decide for themselves what constitutes a test is no ban at all. This means that under
the Clinton interpretation of the CTBT, Russia and other U.S. adversaries would have
the ability to conduct tests to improve the effectiveness and reliability of their nuclear
stockpiles, but the U.S. would not . For instance, Russia, which is modernizing its nuclear weapons,
could improve warheads designed for an autonomous underwater nuclear-delivery system and low-yield strikes in
Europe. Those who might claim that Russia would never violate the spirit of the CTBT should remember that Russia
signed the CTBT in 1996, but according to the 2009 report of the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Commission on
Americas Strategic Posture, "apparently Russia and possibly China are conducting low yield tests. In contrast, the
United States has not carried out a test producing any nuclear yield since President George H. W. Bush directed a
moratorium on testing in 1992. Third, compliance with the CTBT would be unverifiable . While
verification technologies have advanced in the last 17 years, so have the ways our enemies hide or mask illicit
tests. In some instances, underground tests of small tactical nuclear weapons could be
carried out with no abnormal seismic activity detected. And where seismic activity is
detectable, we cant be sure that current technology could confirm a test by
detecting radioactive traces. As the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General Vincent
Stewart, recently testified, no radionuclides have been detected from the North Korea
nuclear test that occurred over three months ago and they have a very robust
capability to deceive, contain, hide their full capability and capacity. The room for
cheating in the CTBT highlights a reoccurring problem with treaties: while the U.S.
honors its agreements, rogue nations and Russia do not. This has been the rule, not the
exception. Look no further than the INF Treaty, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Open Skies Treaty, Chemical
Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Convention to see examples of Russias tortured definition of
If the CTBT enters into force, the United States would be legally bound to
compliance.
its obligations. No reasonable person can say it would bind countries like Russia,
China, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran in this same way.
Russia proliferation
They dont solve Russian prolifRussia has empirically violated
arms control treaties
Heinrichs 15 [Rebeccah, Fellow at the Hudson Institute, The Senate Should Forever Reject the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Hudson Institute, Oct 28 2015, http://www.hudson.org/research/11852-
the-senate-should-forever-reject-the-comprehensive-nuclear-test-ban-treaty] AW
President Obama and Hillary Clinton really seem to believe that through arms control the United States could
in order for arms control to be
improve its frosty relationship with foes, in particular, Russia; only,
effective, among other criteria, there must be a means to verify compliance and a
willingness to enforce it. Now more than four years since the treatys ratification, Russia has ended
what is called the cooperative threat reduction that enabled the United States to aid
Russia in protecting its stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, has ramped up its nuclear
modernization program, and is still threatening to employ the kinds of nuclear weapons
that Russia refused to include in the New START Treaty. Additionally, Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range
If the world is safer now that the U.S.
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty without meaningful consequence.
has agreed via a treaty to shrink its nuclear force and, unlike what we can expect
from Russia, will scrupulously abide by the treaty, overwhelming evidence points to
the contrary.
Military Carrier CP
Notes
This CP replaces the Navy Ford class supercarriers with Queen
Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. Squo naval strategy is to have
three or four naval carrier strike groups deployed at any given
time. Currently, the U.S. has 10 aircraft carriers, 11 if you
consider the Ford carrier which wont be operational till around
2018. Over half of these aircraft carriers are currently in port
undergoing maintenance, with only two or three currently
deployed overseas (https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1sBGyGlr10FgCE3ODmS-
7GIgH7RI&hl=en_US). The idea is that having lots of carriers are a sign
of US naval power, allow us to bully other countries, and

reassure our allies. The CP overcomes the carrier gap by
purchasing carriers from Britain so that there is no longer a
shortage. To update this file, you should find some naval power
KT U.S. heg cards. If you want to be lazy, maybe the oceans
topic or college troop deployment files would be a good place
to look.
To beat this CP, you probably want to go for the arg that the
Elizabeth class carriers arent able to do as much as the Ford
class carriers. This is because the Elizabeth carriers are
smaller so the number of aircraft theyre able to hold is
smaller. The missions that are able to be carried out from the
respective carriers, are thus different, and the Ford class
carrier has mission capabilities that the Elizabeth doesnt.
1NC
The United States federal government should replace each of

its Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers with two Queen
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, well clarify.
Reconfiguring the navy is key to end carrier gap and maintain

effective power projections
Rogoway 15 [Tyler, Defense editor at Time Inc, America's "Carrier Gap" Crisis Highlights A Need For
Smaller Aircraft Carriers, FoxtrotAlpha, Nov 04 2015, http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/americas-carrier-gap-crisis-
highlights-a-need-for-sma-1740644946] AW
The US Navy is also unable to meet its commitment to field two carrier strike groups,
with another three able to surge and deploy should the need arise. Even if sequestration cuts are
reversed and full funding is restored , service leaders have said it would be at least 2018
before the Navy would be able to regain those operational readiness levels. Gaps in
carrier coverage threaten to undermine both the US ability to deter conflict and respond
to crises, Rep. Randy Forbes, R-Virginia and chairman of the House Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee,
said Tuesday during a hearing on the carrier situation. Members of the House Subcommittee on Readiness joined
with Seapower members in the hearing. And even as Sean Stackley, the Navys top acquisition official,
acknowledged that the carrier is at the very core of our maritime strategy, he and a panel of admirals provided
shortages will continue, and why the fleet will remain at 10 ships for
detailed testimony why
the time being, rather than the 11-ship fleet mandated by Congress. We require 11,
today we have 10, Stackley said. We have more in depot maintenance today than we
would normally have under a stable operational cycle. So we have a shortfall in our
ability to generate the forces we need. We discussed this very issue in-depth over a year ago in this
previous Foxtrot Alpha post, contemplating not just size, but also propulsion, as in nuclear versus fossil fuel, for
Americas super carrier size is hard to justify as
potential future carrier designs. The reality is that
the carrier air wings they host have shrunk over the last couple of decades. During the cold War,
close to 90 aircraft would call the decks of a Nimitz Class carrier home. Today that number is more like 60
to 65 aircraft, many of which have direct commonality with one another. The idea is
not to replace the super carrier entirely with more plentiful and less expensive
smaller carriers, but to replace a portion of the super carrier fleet as they retire. Just
the cost of building a super carrier has ballooned , with the price of the USS John F. Kennedy being
(CVN-79) at nearly $12 billion, that is after the billions of dollars in development costs that have already been sunk
into the first in class USS Gerald R. Ford, a ship that has been dogged by poor procurement strategy and technical
affording one-for-one replacements of the existing carrier fleet
difficulties. With this in mind,
could crush the Navys ship-building budget, especially with other uncertain fleet
priorities looming, like replacing the Ohio Class of nuclear ballistic missile submarines. For
less than the cost of one Ford Class super carrier, the U.S. Navy could
purchase two Queen Elizabeth Class carriers. Even with U.S. modifications,
including catapults and arresting gear, these ships could very well cost even less than what
they do today as the baseline research and development costs would have largely
been already paid for by the British Ministry of Defense. If we could replace every
other super carrier with two modified Queen Elizabeth class carriers, we could
drastically increase our carrier forces flexibility. In doing so, the Navy would have to think
differently about how it uses its carrier-borne personnel, escorts and air wings. Still, savings garnered by
building smaller carriers could be reallocated to adapting to such a new way of
doing business. Like so many other 100% solution, high-cost military vehicles, they may be perceived as very
effective in combat but they can only be in one place at one time, and often that place is in the shipyard or the
maintenance hangar. By building smaller carriers, and more of them, Navy commanders will be
able to better pair their available resources with the mission at hand . For instance, you
do not need a super carrier for simply creating a strong presence in a region , or to
support low-intensity warfare operations, or to train aircrews, or to execute good-will tours. In fact, smaller
carriers would provide everything a super carrier could , although at diminished
sortie rates. For missions where a super carriers capability is needed, and if none
are available, two smaller carriers can be deployed in ones place . A one-size-fits-all,
and that size being extra-large, approach to Americas carrier force will likely be
unsustainable in the coming decades. With Americas Navy having to be in more
places at one time than ever, breaking the old super-carrier or bust mold will be
essential for meeting the mission demands of the future. This is especially true as the U.S.
looks to pivot towards the pacific and to confront Chinas anti-access/area denial strategy, one where more
carriers will be far more useful than fewer super carriers.
Solvency
Carriers are able to convey all aspects of hegeconomic,
diplomatic, and military
Slattery 13 [Brian, research associate for Security Studies at The Heritage Foundation, U.S. Fleet Shrinks
as China and India Build New Aircraft Carriers, The Daily Signal, Aug 21 2013, http://dailysignal.com/2013/08/21/u-
s-fleet-shrinks-as-china-and-india-build-new-aircraft-carriers/] AW
Competition from foreign militaries is not the only reason the U.S. Navy should continue to sail a robust carrier fleet.
The air force on board one U.S. carrier matches that of most nations . The ability to
sail this power projection force to virtually anywhere in relatively little time has
proven effective both for security and political objectives . As former Defense Secretary William
Cohen explained, If you dont have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a
voice, less of an influence. Carriers also often serve in humanitarian aid missions, with
their capacity to supply hundreds of hospital beds, clean water, and auxiliary power in a crisis. U.S. carriers
performed these missions during the earthquake disasters in Japan and Haiti , to name
just two recent examples. If this fleet shrinks, it sends a signal to our adversaries that the
U.S. will not be able to respond to conflict in every corner of the world . Do we want near
peer-competitors such as China filling that void? The aircraft carrier provides capabilities
unparalleled in the fleet and serves the U.S. Navy longer than any other vessel. Its
combination of power projection, mobility, and versatility make it a critical element
of national security. Members of Congress should reject attempts to reduce this crucial fleet because they
have the constitutional responsibility to provide and maintain a Navy. Americas position as a global naval power
depends on it.
AT: Shorebasing
Carriers are key to maintain power projectionscomparatively
more effective than shore basing
Groothousen 16 [Michael, Rear Admiral of the United States Navy, The Enduring Relevance of
Americas Aircraft Carriers, The American Spectator, March 2 2016, http://spectator.org/65600_enduring-relevance-
americas-aircraft-carriers/] AW
While the carriers reputation is increasingly maligned in some circles, the carrier strike group remains
the fastest way to deploy American forces whether in a show of force or a real fight that
America has or is likely to develop. The only alternative is to build, arm, man, and maintain foreign
bases around the world forever at a cost that would probably be far higher than
what it costs to keep our CSGs on patrol. Carriers have been efficiently pumping
strike aircraft into U.S. war efforts and they have been the most used naval platform
in actual combat operations since WWII. Our nuclear carrier strike groups represent the
singular warfighting capability that distinguishes the U.S. Navy from all others. Carriers have
provided sustained peacetime presence and have been first-on-scene for nearly
every crisis over the past 75 years; where and when needed without the fiscal and political investment
required for shore basing. To have an honest discussion about the cost of carriers, critics should balance the
investment with the value, versatility, and combat capability they represent. Putting cost in context, over the past
50 years the cost of buying a new aircraft carrier has risen at about the same average annual escalation rate as a
Ford F-150 truck.The aircraft carrier is expensive, but its capabilities are numerous. The
platform is huge, dense with technology, and serves for 50 years. On a pound for pound cost
basis, carriers are one of the least expensive ships the Navy buys. In todays world
it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure shore basing rights in critical regions.
Our use of them has sometimes been denied by host countries during contingency operations. And where
predictions of which regions will be critical for future operations are often incorrect,
shore basing has not provided the capability to rapidly relocate carrier forces that
CSGs have. While the potential vulnerability of our mobile CSGs must be considered and those threats dealt
with it would be far more responsible to our national security and defense strategy to do
that rather than scrapping one of the most capable weapon systems weve ever had
without otherwise providing an equivalent capability with something else.
AT: Carriers not key
Their carrier irrelevant args dont applyno other groups is as
flexible or powerful as a carrier
Groothousen 16 [Michael, Rear Admiral of the United States Navy, The Enduring Relevance of
Americas Aircraft Carriers, The American Spectator, March 2 2016, http://spectator.org/65600_enduring-relevance-
americas-aircraft-carriers/] AW
Much of the recent carrier criticism arises from predictions that the Chinese DF-21 missiles long range will keep
high end warfare is
CSGs from the high-end fight (meaning anything goes except nuclear weapons). But
significantly more complex than simple range comparison, and Navy leadership has
made clear that tactics and technology are in hand and in development to deny
targeting of the battle group and to provide defensive weapons capable of
destroying or disabling the threat. Thats why our next carrier the USS Gerald Ford has a growth
margin built into it to absorb these future capabilities. Some think tanks suggest we should replace the strike
capacity provided by carriers with cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines. Cruise missiles from surface
ships and submarines are certainly a part of the strike warfare equation and when they are combined with carrier
the CSG
air wing ordnance that provides alternative capability and capacity not provided by cruise missiles,
provides unmatched capability and sustained operations at sea across a full range
of military operations. Additionally, the air wing better addresses the
implementation of complex and nuanced rules of engagement that are scenario
dependent. The value proposition of the CSG rests in its ability to provide a broad range of credible capabilities
to any theater. It is supported by a robust command and control complex that is key to
success in any conflict or natural disaster. It performs many important missions that simply cannot be accomplished
by other assets. It is not dependent upon extensive footprints ashore , it does not require
permission from others when in international waters and airspace , it is not as locatable as
fixed targets ashore, it is not an occupying force that stays it is a force that is flexible, sustainable,
and self-deployable. Current views of the demise of the carrier clearly do not consider all the facts and
perpetuate a dangerous fantasy that future conflicts will be prevented and wars won from a standoff sanctuary.
The value that the CSG provides in maintaining peace and fighting wars is an
investment that our country must be committed to continue if we wish to maintain
our role as a world leader. Killing the carrier without substituting a successor
weapon system that provides all its capabilities including speed of deployment
would be enormously dangerous to our nations defense.
AT: Antiship Missiles
Squo has sufficient antimissile capabilitiesChinas claims of
success are a farce
Ackerman 12 [Spencer, national security editor for the Guardian, How to Kill Chinas Carrier-Killer
Missile: Jam, Spoof and Shoot, Wired, March 16 2012, https://www.wired.com/2012/03/killing-chinas-carrier-killer/]
AW
First up: the missiles guidance systems. This is where Greenert wants the Navys investment in
jamming and electronic warfare generally to pay off. If whatever is launched has a seeker, can
you jam it? Greenert mused. Yes, no, maybe so? What would it take to jam it? For now, thats a job for the
flying, jamming Growlers which messed with Moammar Gadhafis anti-aircraft
systems in Libya last year. Later on, the Navy will have a next-generation jammer, also built
onto some of its jets, which it wants to use to infect enemy systems with malware .
Alternatively or in supplement, the strike group would go radio silent, to stop the missile
from homing in on its electronic emissions . Then comes the more popular part, Greenert said:
shooting the missile down. The Aegis missile-defense cruisers included in an aircraft
carrier strike group would be tasked with that over the next decade. Afterward, the Navy
wants to use giant shipboard lasers to burn through incoming missiles . But its by no
means clear the Navy really can clear all the technological obstacles to oceanic laser warfare by its mid-2020s
deadline. And shooting down this new missile isnt a guaranteed proposition. When do you have to engage it? On
the way up? Mid-course? Terminal? Greenert said. His answer: all of the above. We call it links of a chain,
Greenert said. We
want to break as many links as possible. Navy weapons have to be
ready to disable the DF-21D either through jamming it or shooting it during
all phases of its trajectory. Theres also something that Greenert didnt mention: he has time on his
side. The Navy conceded in December 2010 that the DF-21D had reached initial operating capability. But its
blowing up a carrier is still past Chinas means. Hitting a
intelligence chief quickly added that
moving object is difficult. Testing the thing at sea is too. Then China needs to
integrate the missile into its general surface warfare plans. And after all that come
the countermeasures Greenert outlined. Solving all that takes time.
AT: Enough Carriers Now
Now is keyAraba allies are already beginning to doubt our
projections and capabilities
Wong 15 [Kristina, defense reporter for The Hill, Experts alarmed at 'strains' on aircraft-carrier fleet, The
Hill, Nov 08 2015, http://thehill.com/policy/defense/navy/259447-experts-alarmed-at-strains-on-aircraft-carrier-fleet]
AW
The Navys 272-ship force is straining under todays security challenges, some experts say and one
glaring symptom is a shortage of aircraft carriers . For the first time in almost a decade, the Navy
does not currently have a single aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf area to execute the
war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or to keep Iran in check. There was also an
interruption to what is billed as a continuous carrier presence in the Asia-Pacific
region after the USS George Washington left in July and its replacement did not get
there until the fall. Earlier this week, senior Navy officials publicly acknowledged there will
be more gaps next year. The basic problem is simple: The Navy only has 10 aircraft
carriers, one short of what senior officers say is required. "We require 11 aircraft carriers to meet our
full range of military operational requirements, the Navys Assistant Secretary for Research, Development and
Acquisition, Sean Stackley, told the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee on
Wednesday. "Today we're at 10 and we're at 10 that are highly stressed because
they have been driven hard," Stackley said. An 11th aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford,
is slated to be commissioned in 2016, but won't be ready to deploy until 2021. This shortage
also comes at the same time U.S. leaders are attempting to reassure Gulf Arab allies
that they are willing and able to counter growing Iranian influence in the region. The
day after the USS Theodore Roosevelt left the Persian Gulf on Oct. 9, Iran fired off a ballistic
missile in violation of international law. Officials say the carrier shortage is due mainly to deferred
maintenance on the carriers, to accommodate repeated deployments in support of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.
The longer a carrier goes without being maintained, the longer maintenance will take when it's finally done. That
Currently, half of
backlog of maintenance was then exacerbated by steep defense cuts under sequestration.
the 10 carriers are in maintenance. With three carriers supporting every one carrier deployed, it is
impossible to have two continuously deployed in both the Middle East and the Asia Pacific at the same time. But its
not just carriers that are stretched thin, its the whole Navy fleet, according to naval expert Seth Cropsey, director
of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute. The Navy is strained because the number of ships is
down from where it was five, 10, 15 years ago, and the numbers of missions that it has, has increased from five, 10,
15 years ago, said Cropsey, who served as deputy undersecretary of the Navy for Republican Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush. The Navy itself has pushed back against the notion that it is strained. "We're
focused on being present where it matters, when it matters and ensuring the force is employed in a sustainable,
affordable way," said Navy spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Tim Hawkins. "But make no mistake, we are still meeting our global
commitments." Retired Marine Col. Mark Cancian disagrees. Cancian served as the chief of the Office of Budget and
Management division that works on the Pentagons budget from 2008 until April 2015. "There's no question that the
Navy is strained, said Cancian, who is now a senior adviser of the International Security Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Strained in the sense that the combatant commanders want more naval
The Navy is attempting to reach a goal of 303 ships by
presence than the Navy can give them.
2021. Cropsey argues the absolute minimum is somewhere around 325 ships . If we
are serious about the threat that's increasingly coming from states like China, Iran,
Russia and North Korea, specifically their efforts to deny access to the waters in
their area, we need closer to a 350-ship Navy . The requests actually made by the combatant
commanders are usually kept private. But Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), chairman of the House Armed Services
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, said during Wednesdays subcommittee hearing that
combatant commanders would hypothetically request 21 aircraft carriers. Forbes is a
consistent advocate of robust military spending whose district abuts cities, including Norfolk and Hampton, that are
heavily dependent upon the Navy. The answer is we need more , added Bryan McGrath, deputy director
of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute. McGrath noted that during World War II, the United
States had around 3,000 ships, including about 50 aircraft carriers. That number dropped down to 700 during the
Vietnam War. The numbers dropped further soon afterward, he said. Former President Ronald Reagan made it his
goal to build a 600-ship Navy getting to 594, including 15 aircraft carriers. After the Cold War, the numbers
plummeted further. Still, he said, a review during the Clinton administration called for 365 ships. And that was
during an era for little or no great-power tension I think we are beginning to enter an era of renewed great-power
tension. In my view, we have a Navy that is not appropriately sized for our part of the bargain, McGrath said. He
noted the argument by some that ships are only becoming more vulnerable as enemies improve their capabilities,
but he said that was true of every arsenal. It's not clear whether calls for more ships may be heeded. Fiscal hawks
and skeptics who believe the Pentagon has sought more funding than it actually needs have pushed back against
increased defense spending. Calling for more ships has become a popular Republican talking point. New House
Speaker Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) mentioned building more ships during a recent interview on the Hugh Hewitt Show. And
several Republican presidential candidates have sounded similar notes. But Cancian said it's not just a GOP talking
point. "The current strategy calls for a very forward engaged military , a lot of forward
presence, and our allies and partners expect that." he said. In the Middle East,
particularly now youd like to be reassuring your allies and partners . Cancian also argued
that ships provide a more forceful U.S. military presence than other forces. Flying a couple of airplanes
into an airbase just doesn't give the visibility that sailing a ship into a harbor does ,
he said. Theres nothing like sailing a carrier into someones harbor to make the point
that the United States is here.
Carriers create a unique signal which de-escalates conflicts

and encourages diplomatic connection
Blachford 13 [Kevin, Ph.D. candidate in International Relations at the University of Winchester, THE
CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS FOR THE U.S. NAVY, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs,
Aug 15 2013, http://journal.georgetown.edu/the-continuing-relevance-of-aircraft-carriers-for-the-u-s-navy-by-kevin-
blachford/
One of the primary benefits of a carrier is that it can work as a platform even when
the technologies for air-wings, missiles, and electronics have moved on. As one report in Foreign Policy
argues, unlike other classes of ships, the aircraft carrier does not need to be retired when its
primary weapons system becomes obsolete. Similarly, defensive systems are more
easily upgraded aboard an aircraft carrier than any other ship.[12] For example, fighters
launched from carriers act as defensive perimeters, and with the pace of drone technological developments, this
task could soon be done by unmanned drones, which can operate for far longer and without risk to pilots lives. This
suggests that far from reducing the navys reliance on carriers, there should be a broader re-assessment of the F-35
aircraft, which is intended to be the primary naval air-wing for the next few decades. As the most expensive
procurement project in Pentagon history,[13] the flaws of the F-35 program demonstrate that the biggest concern
should not be the role of a carrier, but the ability of its primary weapons to fulfil their mission at a reasonable cost.
Critics of carriers have advocated moving towards long-range intercontinental forces and long-
distance bombers, but relying purely on these options would limit the responses available to
policy makers in a crisis and potentially increase the chances of violence escalation.
The deployment of carriers, however, shows a willingness to use force without
escalating into an armed conflict. A British naval think tank acknowledges the deterrent ability of
carriers by pointing to the Iranian threat to close the straits of Hormuz. The report notes that the immediate
reaction of the United States Navy was to send a carrier battle group into the Arabian
Gulf and to position a second carrier battle group in the Gulf of Oman. The threat of force and the deterrent
ability of carriers persuaded the Iranian Government that their threat to blockade the
Hormuz Strait would not be tolerated and they rapidly suggested a return to the negotiating
table.[14] There will always be the need for rapidly deployable forces that can offer
flexibility and power projection, which only aircraft carriers can provide. According to
Robert D. Kaplan, while the twentieth century focused on the landscape of Europe, the twenty-first century
will focus on the seascape of East Asia .[15] Although it remains too early to contemplate a
struggle for hegemony in the Western Pacific, the rise of China and the shifting of power to the East will
require a U.S. commitment to engagement in the region, in which a visible naval
presence will play a key part. Strategists may seek alternatives to the carrier, but the simple fact
that other powers are desperately seeking carrier capabilities demonstrates that
they are still relevant tools for policy makers and military strategists. While anti-
access capabilities are a growing concern for U.S. strategists, they offer no use or purpose as a
diplomatic or political tool. Anti-carrier ballistic missiles will only sit and wait until they are ready to be
used, whereas a carrier may last a lifetime without being fired upon . Asymmetric technology poses a
challenge for carriers, but it is far from impossible to overcome these new threats.
Despite recent controversies over the relevance of carriers, there is no doubt that aircraft carriers can
continue to be at the heart of Americas naval presence. While there will always be
technological and fiscal challenges to their continued use, no other class of naval vessel is able to
offer the flexibility, deterrent ability, power projection, and capabilities of aircraft
carriers. It is for this reason, that aircraft carriers will remain a leading option for both strategists and policy
makers. Carriers have been at the heart of the U.S. navy for decades, and instead of dismissing the utility of
carriers, there needs to be a further development of defence technology and armaments, along with new strategic
The development of new carriers by potential rivals
planning for the use of carriers.
demonstrates the continuing relevance of aircraft carriers for major powers,
including the United States.
AT: Supercarriers key
Improving air tech and changing needs means small carriers

can do the same as supers
Rogoway 14 [Tyler, Defense editor at Time Inc, Why The US Navy Should Build Smaller Aircraft Carriers,
FoxtrotAlpha, July 09 2014, http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/americas-carrier-gap-crisis-highlights-a-need-for-sma-
1740644946] AW
If we were to move to a smaller fleet of supercarriers, dispersing these assets would

be logical, and reactivating Naval Station Mayport as a carrier base may be part of such a strategy. Mayport
would also be clearly useful if our carrier force is augmented, or partially replaced by conventionally powered
port would not have to be upgraded to handle
smaller carriers (more on this in a moment), as the
the complex and volatile nuclear powerplants found on all of America's active
supercarriers. Really, one has to marvel at a furious debate that makes little mention as to the scale of the
high-cost subjects in question. It is as if only 100,000+ ton displacement supercarriers can
operate Super Hornets or offer a valuable contribution during combat operations.
This is certainly not the case, and for decades large fighter aircraft operated off of
smaller conventionally powered aircraft carriers. It was only after Operation Desert Storm that the
sub-65,000-ton USS Midway was finally retired, with her sister ship, the USS Coral Sea, being retired in 1990. With
all this in mind, wouldn't it be prudent for the Navy to take a closer look at a Midway Class sized modern carrier,
something similar to or directly based on the UK's recently christened HMS Queen Elizabeth, albeit in a catapult and
America's
arresting gear configuration? Before the post-Cold War military draw-down of the 1990s,
supercarriers would deploy close to 90 aircraft when on cruise. Fast forward to the
present, and that number is somewhere usually between about 60 and 70. So how is it
that even though technology has shrunk many components classically installed on a naval ship, and the aircraft
operated from them are no bigger (and in some cases smaller than those they replaced, not to mention current
Carrier Air Wings are compromised of about 25-30% less aircraft with about half the types as their predecessors)
are we building the same sized aircraft carriers that we did decades ago? Good question. Some would say it's
because we can surge our all supercarrier fleet with more aircraft during a time of war. Seeing as there are far more
it
Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) than there are available carriers at any given time, this makes some sense. Yet
seems pretty arbitrary to say we need a carrier capable of operating 90 aircraft
even though we rarely plan on sailing with more than 70 or so, and in some cases
less than 60 aircraft. The cause behind the ever-shrinking Carrier Air Wing (CVW) is no mystery. The
ability for one aircraft to perform many roles including counter-air, strike, close air support,
reconnaissance and tanking means that we don't necessarily need as many aircraft as the
days where there were many types of combat aircraft on deck to do each individual
mission. For instance, a CVW in 1983 would have looked something like this: 2 fighter squadrons (VF) of 12 F-4s
or F-14s 2 attack squadrons (VA) of 12 A-7Es or 2 strike fighter squadrons of 12 F/A-18s 1 all-weather attack
squadron (VA) 10-12 A-6E (plus 4 KA-6D tankers) 1 early warning squadron (VAW) of 4-6 E-2Cs 1 tactical electronic
warfare squadron (VAQ) or Marine tactical electronic warfare squadron VMAQ) of 4 EA-6Bs 1 anti-submarine
squadron (VS) of 10 Lockheed S-3A Vikings 1 helicopter anti-submarine squadron (HS) of 6 SH-3H Sea Kings 1
detachment of EA-3B ELINT aircraft from a fleet air reconnaissance squadron (VQ) 1 detachment of C-2A Greyhound
aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) 1 detachment of RF-8Gs from a light photographic reconnaissance
squadron (VFP) or RF-4s from a Marine photographic reconnaissance squadron (VMFP) If one of the F-14 squadrons
Today
was Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pod Systems (TARPS)-capable, the RF-8 detachment would be deleted.
the Carrier Air Wing has been highly streamlined with F/A-18 Hornet multi-role
fighters doing the work that was previously done by multiple types and the S-3
Viking's fixed wing sea control mission has been deleted entirely: 1 strike fighter squadron
(VFA) of 12 F/A-18F Super Hornets 1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18E Super Hornets 2 strike fighter
squadrons (VFA) or Marine fighter attack squadrons (VMFA) of 12 F/A-18C Hornets 1 electronic warfare squadron
(VAQ) of 5 E/A-18G Growlers 1 early warning squadron (VAW) of 4 E-2Cs One Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC)
Squadron of 6 MH-60S Seahawks One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of 6 MH-60R Seahawks 1
Although a Carrier Air Wing's
detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD)
force structure has diminished in size, they have never been more deadly. The
introduction of precision guided munitions and fused sensor and communications
systems has allowed for Carriers Strike Groups to have a much larger punch than ever
before. This is not necessarily true when it comes to pounds of ordinance deliverable, but it is true in
terms of how many targets can be hit successfully on a given day. The days when a
whole Carrier Air Wing would launch the majority of its inventory in what is known as an "Alpha Strike"
just to go after one primary target such as an airfield, bridge or oil refinery are long gone. Now
a single Carrier Air Wing with the same amount of aircraft, or even less, can go after many
dozens of similar targets on a single mass launch and do so with a much higher
probability of success than ever before.
AT: Expensive
Sorry but the Queen Elizabeth design is just more strategic
economically and militarily
1740644946] AW
Although a drawback in America's naval force structure is inevitable, there may be an

opportunity to create a more flexible and efficient carrier force that is better suited for
the missions and challenges of tomorrow. It's time to learn to do more missions with less dollars. Taking a
good look at procuring smaller, 55,000-65,000 ton CATOBAR configured carriers may be
a great place to start. Partnering with our friends in UK on the new Queen Elizabeth
Class design and procuring them at a much lower cost (around half) than a $13B to $15B (depends on who you
ask) Ford Class supercarrier, while at the same time benefiting from economies of scale,
and even cross-crewing potential is an option. The Queen Elizebeth Class was
designed to accommodate both CATOBAR or short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL)
configurations, with the UK finally opting for the STOVL configuration. The French, who
were once partnered with the UK on their new carrier design, may have an even closer requirement for such a ship
coming down the acquisition line, and their carrier will be nuclear powered. France's only CATOBAR carrier, Charles
de Gaulle R91, is nearing the middle of its lifespan and France will need a platform to operate its fixed-wing
navalized air arm from when she is retired. Furthermore, France has always needed a second aircraft carrier in order
to even get close to meeting its requirement of having one ship available for operations at all times. A common
US/French design could save billions in research and development and operational costs, and it could also lead to
the possibility of cross-decking squadrons of US Super Hornets and French Rafales on one another's ships, not to
we could replace
mention shared crewing opportunities. As far as possible force structure changes go,
some of our Nimitz Class carriers with these smaller designs while still procuring
Ford Class supercarriers at a lower frequency. For instance, we could buy 1.5 smaller
carriers for every Nimitz Class that goes out of service while retaining five
supercarriers in the fleet persistently. This would leave a fleet of 9 smaller carriers
and 5 supercarriers. You can plug and play the force structure mix however you like, but assuming the
average supercarrier costs $13B over the next 10 retirement cycles and the smaller
carriers cost $6B, this would make for a savings of $16 billion while increasing the
overall fleet size by 3 carriers. This force structure would also offer much greater
deployability and surge capability than the current and operationally rigid supercarrier only
inventory. For many missions there is simply no need for a massive CVN . Lower intesity
conflicts such as those we have found ourselves in over the last two decades could be well served by smaller but
Not to mention, constant training requirements such as
more numerous aircraft carriers.
aircrew carrier qualifications that were once handled at least partially by the geriatric USS Lexington now
demand a 100,000 ton supercarrier. Does it make sense to deploy such an asset just to receive a dozen or so T-45
Goshawk trainers? Not really. Then there are the crew demands of a CVN versus a smaller carrier, and especially a
traditionally fueled one. The HMS Queen Elizabeth, which can carry up to 50 aircraft, will have a
permanent crew of around 700. It will balloon to close to double that number when the Air Wing is deployed. With
pales in comparison to the
an additional 250 troops embarked she can berth and feed 1600. This
demands of an American CVN, which even in with the Ford Class's reductions in
manpower the crew compliment will still be close to 5,000, or three times that of the
HMS Queen Elizabeth. A CATOBAR version of the Queen Elizabeth , or a similar sized
US carrier design would only sacrifice in the frequency of its Air Wing's sortie
capability, not its magnitude, as the same types aircraft could operate from it as its
larger CVN brethren. A theoretical Carrier Air Wing for such a carrier would look similar to the Midway's just
before her retirement when it comes to size, carrying about 50 aircraft: 1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18F
Super Hornets 1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F-35C Lightnings 1 strike fighter squadron (VFA) of 12 F/A-18C
Hornets or 12 Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) X-47, Sea Ghost, Avenger etc. 1 early warning squadron
(VAW) of 3 E-2Cs Hawkeyes 1 electronic warfare squadron (VAW) of 4 E/A-18G Growlers One Helicopter Sea Combat
(HSC) Squadron of 4 MH-60S Seahawks One Helicopter Maritime Strike (HSM) Squadron of 4 MH-60R Seahawks 1
detachment of C-2A Greyhound aircraft for Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) In the end, the Navy needs to ask itself:
do we really need a 100,000 ton nuclear supercarrier to fight pirates, take part in low-intensity conflicts, provide
seeing as a
Combat Air Patrols or to qualify pilots to land aboard a carrier? The answer is they do not, and
carrier can only be in one place at one time, and about 70% of that time is not
actively at sea projecting power, having a more numerous and flexible fleet is an
intriguing proposition. It is becoming clear that the DoD's current one-size-fits-all
procurement mentality is becoming increasingly unaffordable , especially when that
one size is GIGANTIC in both procurement and operational costs, as well as in
physical size. The truth is that America's aircraft carrier fleet does not have to shrink
at all, but the size of the aircraft carriers we buy and operate does.
Save money live betterat worse only of 1% of daily

government spending
Thompson 16 [Loren, Deputy Director of the Security Studies Progrsam at Georgetown University, Why
Complaints Over Cost Of New Class Of U.S. Aircraft Carriers Are Off The Mark, Forbes, March 24 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/03/24/aircraft-carriers-cost-less-than-1-of-the-federal-budget-a-lot-
less/2/#53f3d8846a48] AW
So lets think for a moment about how much the Navys aircraft carriers cost the government, starting with
the Navy only builds one carrier every five years,
construction costs. Keep in mind that
because they last so long. The Gerald R. Ford, lead ship in the new class, is expected to
cost $14.7 billion in 2015 dollars to complete. Im not counting about $5 billion in R&D costs, because those
will be spread across all the ships in the class (at least 10 will likely be bought). You could buy a lot of elementary
that price-tag only represents about 31 hours of federal
schools for $14.7 billion. However,
spending at the rate the government is expected to disburse money in the fiscal year
beginning October 1. The presidents proposed budget for the new fiscal year envisions spending $11.36 billion per
day, or $473 million an hour. And remember, the Navy only plans to construct six aircraft carriers between now and
2045. None of the follow-on carriers in the Ford class will cost anywhere near as much at
the lead ship; the first ship in a class always is more expensive, because everything
is new and workers at the Huntington Ingalls shipyard (a contributor to my think tank) have to figure
out how best to integrate a raft of new technologies. Outside analysts and the Navy are more or
less in agreement that the next ship in the class, the John F. Kennedy, will cost about $11 billion in
2015 dollars to build, or roughly 24 hours worth of federal spending. The cost of building aircraft carriers over the
last ten years has averaged about $2 billion annually. No doubt about it, thats big money. But in a typical year,
Americans spend $70 billion on lottery tickets, $80 billion on cigarettes, and nearly $100 billion on beer. No kidding:
Americans spend more on tattoos each year $2.3 billion than they do on building
aircraft carriers, and twice as much on Saint Patricks Day (the latter outlays presumably overlap with the beer
number). At this point, some expert will probably say, but what about the cost of actually operating the
carriers isnt that a lot more? Well yes, it is. But compared with the rest of the federal
budget, it isnt much. Retired Navy Captain Henry Hendrix of the Center for a New American Security
figured out three years ago that it costs about $6.5 million per day to operate a carrier strike
group, including its air wing and the various warships that escort it . To quote Hendrix,
Carrier strike groups are expensive to buy and operate. Factoring in the total life-cycle costs of an associated carrier
air wing, five surface combatants and one fast-attack submarine, plus the nearly 6,700 men and women to crew
the number of
them, it costs about $6.5 million per day to operate each strike group. Now, bear in mind that
personnel required will dip as the Ford class begins replacing Nimitz carriers, and that
the Navy would probably need more surface combatants and subs if there were no
carriers to execute strike operations. On the other hand, a fleet of ten (soon eleven)
carriers can sustain three or four strike groups at sea on a typical day , so Hendrixs
number needs to be multiplied. Lets say it is an especially active day and four carrier strike groups are under way.
Hendrix says fully loaded, that would cost the Navy $26 million per day. Bryan McGrath of the influential Information
Dissemination web-site pointed out in rebutting the Hendrix study thatat the specified price-tag, three
carrier strike groups would only cost about 1.4% of the defense budget . But lets look at
the bigger picture. Were talking about a government that spends $11.36 billion daily which means the cost
of operating four carrier strike groups is only about one-fourth of one percent of all
federal outlays.
Nah. Turns out the total price operational comes out to be even
less.
1740644946] AW
Considering thatsupercarriers spend much more time in port than at sea , maybe the cost
of traditional fuel does not supersede the high cost of building, maintaining, and refueling
complex nuclear powered aircraft carriers, large or small. At one time the Navy was building cruisers
and destroyers with nuclear powerplants, but those days are long gone. Today, just the US Navy's
submarine force and our carrier force run on nuclear power. This means that all of
the Carrier Strike Group's surface combatants run on traditional fuel , as does the
carrier's Air Wing. This fact negates some of the logistical advantages of being able
to run for long periods of time on nuclear power alone as all the other vessels in the
flotilla need bunker ships for replenishing their fuel (not to mention other supplies), as does
the nuclear carrier when it comes to its jet fuel stocks. Replenishment Oilers have long been
seen as an "Achilles Heel" of the US Navy, as even with a Destroyer or Frigate escort, they are prime targets during
protracted near-peer state combat against a serious naval power. But just because the carrier itself is immune to
the possibility that these ships may be sunk during hostilities, such an event still leaves the carrier dead in the
water as it relies on the rest of its escorts and Air Wing, all of which run on traditional fuel, for extended anti-
dependency on bunker ships may one day be a
submarine screening and area air defense. This
thing of the past, as new methods of turning seawater into fuel are being pioneered
and the technology does look promising. Such a method will use large amounts of electricity, which could be
If this technology comes to fruition, it would allow a
provided by a nuclear carrier's reactors.
Carrier Strike Group, with its traditionally fueled escorts, to have seemingly
unlimited range, and it would also allow them to rely far less on vulnerable bunker
ships as the carrier would produce its own fuel for its flotilla. In the end, there are positives
and negatives to both propulsion concepts, with the high up-front cost of nuclear power
weighed against the increased logistical needs and fluctuating costs of conventional
fuel. Yet, what may work well for a 100,000 ton supercarrier may present smaller
advantages for one of half its displacement, so a study into exactly which fuel scheme works best
for a smaller carrier would be highly beneficial (one for the CG(X) exists).
AT: Carrier CP
2AC
New anti-ship missiles were recently developed which bypass
any carrier defenses
RT 16 [Russia Today, Russian government-funded television network, US aircraft carriers may lose sea
dominance to Russia, China study, Russia Today, Feb 23 2016, https://www.rt.com/usa/333356-us-aircraft-
carriers-useless/] AW
These capabilities are likely to become more widespread in the years to come, the
military analysts say, placing greater constraints on US carrier operations than ever before. While
the study primarily focused on Chinas naval capabilities, it also says the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
utilizes a great deal of increasingly lethal Russian-made weaponry. Chinas four
Russian-built Sovremenny guided missile destroyers also operate an advanced anti-ship
cruise missile 3M80ME Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn in NATO classification) with each ship capable of
launching eight missiles. These missiles, according to the report, can evade the
sophisticated Aegis missile defense shield used by the US Navy and
devastate any large target at sea including an aircraft carrier at ranges of 120 to 240
kilometers (65 to 130 nautical miles) with its semi-armor piercing warhead. Approximately
40 batteries of Russian-built S-300 air defense systems are in use with the Chinese
military, the study added. It cites the Pentagons assessment of it as one of the largest forces of advanced long-
range surface-to-air systems in the world, that would make carrier-launched airstrikes
inefficient and dangerous. Russian upgraded S-400 systems can also extend any
users ability to strike incoming targets at ranges of 398 kilometers (215 miles) a range
large enough to cover the entirety of China's exclusive economic zone.
Carriers arent cost-effective and perceived benefits are

marginal
Hendrix 13 [Henry, active duty United States Navy Captain, At What Cost a Carrier?, pg 5-6, Disruptive
Defense Papers, March 2013] AW
Carrier strike groups are expensive to buy and to operate. Factoring in the total life-cycle costs of an
associated carrier air wing, five surface combatants and one fast-attack submarine, plus the nearly 6,700 men and
it costs about $6.5 million per day to operate each strike group. When
women to crew them,
considering the demands by presidents, allies and combatant commanders for forward-deployed naval
presence, wise spenders must question the cost and method of meeting these
demands. Given that the aircraft carrier is the benchmark for current naval presence missions, for the purposes
of discussion, assume it has a presence value of 1.00 on a sliding scale where a riverine detachment, on the low
the current acquisition cost of 1.00 presence is $13.5
end, has a value of 0.01. This means that
billion, which raises the question of whether an alternative combination can achieve
this level of presence at a lower cost. What is the presence value of a destroyer? Can one assign it a
0.2 presence value? Would spending $10 billion on have destroyers to create a 1.00 naval presence value at an
Does its
operating cost of $1.8 million per day be a better investment? What about a littoral combat ship?
presence, bearing the Stars and Stripes, not assert American interests near a 0.10 presence
score at a cost of $500 million apiece ? Would not a $5 billion investment in 10
littoral combat ships, at a combined operating cost of $1.4 million per day ships that could be
present in many places simultaneously not meet U.S. presence requirements more
economically? Proponents will counter that these platforms would fall short in their ability to transition to
power projection missions during wartime, when the ability of the carrier to sortie a large number of tactical aircraft
really comes into play. Nimitz-class carriers can generate approximately 120 sorties a day. Ford-class carriers, with
the new electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS), are projected to launch around 160 sorties per day, a 33
percent increase in launch capacity. This seems very impressive until one realizes that the USS George H.W. Bush,
In the end, the
the last Nimitz carrier, cost $7 billion and the USS Gerald R. Ford is coming in at $13.5 billion.
nation is paying nearly 94 percent more for a carrier that can only do 33 percent
more work.13 Even factoring in projected savings from reduced manning and lower
maintenance costs, this investment is still not a good use of U.S. taxpayer money ,
especially given what U.S. sortie requirements are and what they are projected to
be. After World War II, the Strategic Bombing Survey team calculated that it took 240 tons of bombs to drop one
bridge spanning a river. By 1965 in Vietnam that number had only come down to 200 tons, but shortly thereafter,
American investment in precision strike weapons really began to pay off. By 1999 only 4 tons of bombs were
needed to accomplish the mission, regardless of the weather at the target. Couple this fact with the observation by
Colin Powell former secretary of state, national security adviser and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of State that
modern warfare plays out under Pottery Barn rules (if you break it, you own it and you will pay to replace it).
Reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan has cost the American taxpayer more than $109 billion since 2002.14
Future wars should be characterized by smaller target lists that emphasize
discreetly interrupting capacities, not destroying them . Think power relay stations rather than
power generation plants, and you begin to get the picture. Arguments that the United States will need
to generate expanded sortie capacity above and beyond what it has now run
counter to current technological and political trends . Should the United States and itself
in a position where massive destructive power is necessary, the capabilities that
populate its ballistic submarine force will be waiting in the wings.
Carriers fail specifically in the context of China

White 16 [Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, United States aircraft
carriers are a costly gamble in the Asia-Pacific contest with China, The Age, March 29 2016,
http://www.theage.com.au/comment/united-states-aircraft-carriers-a-costly-gamble-in-asiapacific-contest-with-
china-20160327-gns0k8.html#ixzz4DHkgDvJh] AW
The most obvious reason to doubt the carriers' future is their vulnerability. China
has exploited new surveillance and guidance technologies to build forces that can much
more reliably find and sink US carriers anywhere within hundreds of kilometres of its
coast. If China's new systems work, a carrier sent to confront China somewhere such as the
South China Sea would be in real danger, to the point that any president would think twice before
sending it into such a confrontation. And a massive strike campaign to destroy China's forces
would escalate into a full-scale US-China war, even before the carriers could be
deployed. The decision to press ahead with another massive carrier-building program assumes that US
ingenuity will find a way to keep the carriers afloat against these new threats. But this has yet to be proved. And
there is another problem, less discussed but more fundamental .
Even if the carriers can survive
China's assault and bring their aircraft within striking range of China, what could
they achieve? Carriers made their name during the Second World War in epic battles such as the Coral Sea,
Midway and the Philippine Sea, where the US and Japan were trying to destroy one another's battle fleets. They
dominated because better than any other weapon, their aircraft could find and hit the enemy's ships, giving them
much cheaper ways
the most lethal anti-ship capability of their day. Since then, however, many other,
have been found to attack ships, and carriers have increasingly been regarded
primarily as platforms from which to launch air attacks on land targets . That's how we
have seen them in action in places such as the Persian Gulf. But how will that work in Asia? The problem
is that even a very big carrier can deploy only relatively few aircraft with relatively
small weapons loads. This doesn't matter when the target is as vulnerable and valuable as a major warship:
only two or three bombs or missiles can be enough to destroy a costly platform and
inflict hundreds or even thousands of casualties. But the sums come out differently when the targets are
land facilities such as factories, bridges or military bases. It takes many more aircraft and
weapons to achieve a strategically significant result, even when good intelligence
and precision guidance ensures that every kilogram of explosive goes where it is
intended. Carrier-based aircraft might make a useful contribution to operations against a relatively small and
vulnerable country such as Iraq, but it is a different matter when one is thinking of war with a huge power like
China.Sheer scale gives China immense resilience, and even the most intense
carrier-based air campaign could do little if anything to compel Beijing to bow to
Washington's wishes. Carriers simply do not pack enough punch to do serious
damage to a country the size of China.
Only Ford Carriers maintain power projectionsQueen

Elizabeths dont have the same effect
Manazir 15 [Michael, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR WARFARE SYSTEMS, Unmatched Value
How can we not afford to build the Ford Class Aircraft Carrier?, Navy Life, June 18 2015,
http://navylive.dodlive.mil/2015/06/18/unmatched-value-how-can-we-not-afford-to-build-the-ford-class-aircraft-
carrier/] AW
The nuclear powered aircraft carrier (CVN), with its embarked carrier air wing (CVW), is the only
maritime force capable of executing the full range of military operations necessary
to protect our national interests. From deterrence, to humanitarian assistance, to large-scale combat
operations, Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) stand ready to answer the call in all phases of conflict. Navies across the
globe aspire to extend their influence by building aircraft carriers and developing deployment models that mirror
what the United States has been doing for more than eighty years. Our innovative leadership in this arena must
continue to grow as the need for a modern aircraft carrier remains critically important to the continued freedom of
Geopolitics and global threats require that we maintain a
navigation on the high seas.
maneuverable and visibly persuasive force across the globe that can accomplish a
number of missions, over sea and land. The carrier is the only answer to this
requirement and the future USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) will soon be underway fulfilling this
critical need. The Ford is not a notional, larger than life project that may never see the light of day. Ford is alive and
pier-side in Newport News. Ninety percent of the actual ship is structurally complete, and multiple cutting edge
systems are coming online each month. She is nearly ready to go to sea and a community of sailors, shipbuilders,
engineers, and citizens cannot wait to take her to the front lines. Despite the significant costs of developing the
worlds newest aircraft carrier, the investment is absolutely critical to our national security over much of the next
Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and their embarked air wings enable the
century.
U.S. to operate without a permission slip for host nation basing . Ships like Ford will
generate the full range of effects necessary to deter potential adversaries with
minimal notice or diplomatic coordination. It is understandable that the cost of operating 100,000
tons of fast, highly-lethal combat power should come with a high price tag, but weve been committed to rigorous
oversight and management of cost and delivery deadlines. Looking at cost in a vacuum without considering how
unmatched warfighting power is extracted from each of those dollars would be shortsighted. Overall, the Ford class
brings improved warfighting capability, quality-of-life improvements, and reduced total ownership costs. Together,
these efforts will reduce manning by approximately 700 billets, reduce periodic
maintenance, improve operational availability and capability, and reduce total
ownership costs through its 50-year life by $4 billion for each ship over its Nimitz
class counterpart. With the exception of the hull, virtually everything has been redesigned; it is the first new
aircraft carrier design in more than 40 years.
The ships design includes sophisticated new
technologies that deliver capability now and will continue to grow with the
incorporation of future weapons systems. A new nuclear propulsion and electric
plant on the Ford class will generate almost three times the electrical power over
the Nimitz class, leading to higher aircraft sortie rates and excess power to
incorporate future technologies, such as the employment of directed energy weapons. From the
Advanced Arresting Gear to engineering efficiencies, the Ford class is cutting-edge.
Electronic Warfare
Notes
The CP is meant to solve heg. The plan passes the Electronic
Warfare Capabilities Enhancement Act which is designed to
streamline various electronic warfare technologies. The
evidence that Russia is ahead in electronic warfare is very
convincing since the U.S. has been mostly fighting against
terrorists whose most important technological advancements
are IEDs as opposed to a conventional force with more
sophisticated technology. Electronic warfare is important
because the U.S. military is dependent on having superior tech
to win its wars. The reason why our military is smaller
numerically than other is because the quality per unit is higher
than in other countries because of our tech. However, if Russia
were able to jam our communication networks, radar, etc, then
basically on the battlefield, individual units would not be able
to coordinate, or gain access to greater resources so they
would be picked off one by one.
1NC
The United States federal government should pass the
Electronic Warfare Capabilities Enhancement Act of 2016
The CP is key to shore of U.S. technical deficienciesno new

research in the past 25 years
Kredo 16 [Adam, senior writer for the Washington Free Beacon, Congress Moves to Boost Militarys
Electronic Warfare Capability, The Washington Free Beacon, Feb 1 2016, http://freebeacon.com/national-
security/congress-moves-to-boost-militarys-electronic-warfare-capability/] AW
As Army leaders work behind the scenes to beef up the forces electronic warfare
capability, which lags about 25 years behind most other modern countries,
Congress is readying a new piece of legislation to help military leaders procure the
funds necessary to catch up with the rest of the globe, according to a preview of a new bill viewed by the
Washington Free Beacon. Countries such as Russia, China, and Iran have made significant
gains in the electronic warfare arena in recent years, according to congressional and
military officials who spoke to the Free Beacon. Meanwhile, the United States has fallen far
behind on this front due to shrinking budgets and an acquisitions process for new
technologies that can take more than a decade to complete. The new bill seeks to cut
through this red tape by giving Pentagon leaders more flexibility on how funds are
spent within the electronic warfare umbrella. It is just the first step of many that will be required to
bring the United States into the modern age, officials say. It is critical our military dominate the
offensive and defensive ends of electronic warfare because our enemies know they
can harm our troops by targeting our electronic systems , Sen. Mark Kirk (R., Ill.), a leading
sponsor of the bill who recently met with military leaders to discuss the threat, told the Free Beacon. My
Electronic Warfare Enhancement Act will cut through the Pentagons bureaucracy in
order to put critical electronic warfare technology into the hands of our
servicepeoplemen and servicewomen as rapidly as possible, Kirk said. Col. Jeffrey Church, chief of
the Armys electronic warfare division, told the Free Beacon that he and others have been working behind the
scenes to convince Defense Department leaders of the necessity to catch up to other nations technological
capabilities. The [technology] is out there right now, Church said. We can go to industry. We can go to the
government, off the shelf. The technology is there. Often times, people forget, but I say, What do you think the
Russians are using? Make-believe technology? No, its there. We could have, the U.S. army, a world class
For more than a decade, the Army was out of the electronic
electronic warfare force.
warfare business, Church said. Other nations surpassed the United States during that time
in technology and its use in the field. Senior military leaders, for instance, have described Russias
capabilities on this front as eye-watering. From around 1995 to 2003, the Army had shuttered its electronic
warfare units. Operations informally ramped up again around 2005, when a large number of troops were being
killed and maimed by radio activated improvised explosive devices in Iraq. While the army shut its units down,
other military branches, such as the Air Force, continued to operate in the electronic warfare arena. At the time,
We didnt have any people. We didnt have any equipment. We didnt have any experience, Church said. All of
Multiple
that stuff had gone out of the inventory in the mid 1990s. So really the Army started building from zero.
Pentagon studies have concluded over the years that the army is 25 years behind,
Church said. The army needs to dedicate efforts to this resource . The army needs to rapidly get
back in to the electronic warfare capabilities. Every study concludes the same thing.
Solvency
Bill greatly improves electronic warfare capabilities

streamlined committees and new capabilities
Gould 16 [Joe, Staff reporter at Defense News, US Senators Offer Bill To Speed Electronic Warfare
Development, Defense News, Feb 8 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense-news/2016/02/08/us-
senators-offer-bill-speed-electronic-warfare-development/80020114/] AW
The bill, sponsored by Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., and Sen. Kristen Gillibrand, D-N.Y., is meant to speed up the
acquisition cycle for electronic warfare programs, which generally have to do with
using electromagnetic energy to jam, spoof or eavesdrop on enemy signals. It is
critical that the United States military dominates the offensive and defensive ends of electronic warfare, Kirk, a
former Navy Reserve intelligence officer, said in a statement. Thisbill will give DoD and industry
leaders the tools to quickly develop critical electronic warfare technology for the
warfighter, the importance of which I have seen firsthand. The bill, called the Electronic Warfare
Enhancement Act, comes a year after the Pentagon announced a group focused on
innovations and strategies in electronic warfare across the entire Defense
Department, called the Electronic Warfare Executive Committee. The bill would
require the committee to supply Congress with a strategic plan for enhancing its
electronic warfare capabilities, through cross-service cooperation, streamlining acquisitions, and
improving training and advancing offensive capabilities. The bills text warns of a deficiency in
electronic warfare that if left unfilled is likely to result in critical mission failure , the
loss of life, property destruction, or economic effects. Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the Army's
most senior commander in Europe, said last March that Russian-backed forces used jammers
to interfere with drones intended to monitor compliance of a cease-fire agreement,
and that Ukraine's ground defense systems are being jammed, creating what was
essentially a no-fly zone. "The quality and sophistication of their electronic warfare is eye watering,"
Hodges said at the time.
Fast-tracks new electronic warfare development

Davis 16 [Jeremy, Senior reporter for SC magazine, Draft bill seeks to improve U.S. military cyber warfare
capabilities, SC Magazine, Feb 08 2016, http://www.scmagazine.com/draft-bill-seeks-to-improve-us-military-cyber-
warfare-capabilities/article/471965/] AW
Draft legislation proposed by Sen. Mark Kirk (R-Ill.) seeks to improve the Pentagon's ability to
quickly develop and acquire process cyber warfare technologies. The Electronic
Warfare Enhancement Act (S. 2486), co-sponsored by Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), would
streamline the defense procurement process for cyber warfare technologies by
including electronic warfare technologies within the Secretary of Defense's Rapid
Acquisition Authority (RAA). The draft also proposes to create an exception to a requirement (Section 181,
Title 10) that the defense secretary review acquisition programs. The proposal comes as the U.S.
struggles to play catch-up to Russia's growing cyber capabilities. The U.S. military ,
for example, lags behind the electronic attack , jamming communications, radar and command-and-
control nets used by Russia in the Ukraine and Syria to jam drones and block battlefield communications.
According to National Defense, the US Army is working on stronger jamming systems, expected to be available in
2023. Last week, SCMagazineUK.com learned that Russia's Ministry of Defense is planning to spend $200 to $250
The proposed legislation would
million per year to further improve its cyber-offensive capabilities.
provide the U.S. military with more options in response to situations such as dealings with
Russia, wrote Robert Stasio, a Truman National Security Fellow and previously CEO of Ronin Analytics, LLC, in an
email to SACMagazine.com. The bill could also expand non-lethal options , he noted.
Solves Heg
Every U.S. military advantage is undermined by electronic

warfare
Cohen 16 [Josh, Former USAID project officer, Do not underestimate the Russian military, Intersection
Project, Jan 8 2016, http://intersectionproject.eu/article/security/do-not-underestimate-russian-military] AW
Russias use of electronic warfare in Ukraine represents just the tip of the iceberg: In
Syria, Russias Krasukha-4 - a jamming system mounted on a simple four axle military truck shields
Russian forces from NATO spying, and is reportedly able to neutralize the United
States low-Earth orbit (LEO) spy satellite. Russia's Richag-AV radar jamming system
fits on helicopters, ships and other military equipment and is reportedly capable of
jamming an adversarys advanced weapons systems as far as several hundred
kilometers away. Russia is also developing a new electronic warfare system which it
claims could disable American cruise missiles and other advanced precision guided
weaponry employed by the United States Military. Russias advanced electronic warfare
capabilities elucidates a broader point. The US Militarys superiority depends on advanced
communications and electronics, yet these expensive advanced systems are highly
susceptible to the Russian advanced jamming abilities. These systems are also much less
expensive to produce than many of the advanced weapons deployed by the United States. For example, a single
Richag-AV radar system costs only $10 million expensive in absolute terms but a cheap asymmetrical capability in
relative terms. While the commander of U.S. Army units in Europe, Lt. General Ben Hodges, calls Russias electronic
warfare capabilities eye-watering, Russias cyber warfare capabilities are the Kremlins
ultimate asymmetric tool. While Chinese hackers receive the majority of attention, the United States
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper believes Russias cyber threat exceeds the Chinese
one, using stealthier and more advanced cyberattack methods. The Russian military recently established a
dedicated cyber command in preparation for a future conflict, and reportedly hacked both the State Department
and the White House. Although the Russian cyber penetration explored only unclassified portions of the White
House network, the attackers were still able to gain access to the Presidents daily schedule. Moreover, this
represents just the tip of the iceberg. Far more worryingly, Russian hackers have also been actively exploring the
Russian
United States infrastructure vulnerabilities. In recent Congressional testimony, Clapper revealed that
hackers had successfully penetrated the industrial control systems which monitor
and access critical U.S. infrastructure such as water and energy systems. By remotely
accessing these systems, hackers could theoretically take down the United States power grid. This is not solely an
American problem. A 2014 report from leading cybersecurity firm Symantec reveals that European infrastructure
sits squarely in the crosshairs of Russian cyber hackers as well. The attackers, dubbed Dragonfly by Symantec
researchers, penetrated major energy firms in such sectors as electricity generation, pipeline operators and energy
industry industrial equipment providers. Only 24 percent of the attacks struck the United States, with the remainder
occurring largely in Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Poland and Romania. According to Symantec, if the
attackers had used the sabotage capabilities open to them, (they) could have caused damage or disruption to
energy supplies in affected countries. Translation the European grid is vulnerable as well. Those doubting the
serious threat posed by Russias cyberattack capabilities need only look at last months unprecedented attack that
took down Ukraine's Prykarpattyaoblenergo power grid for approximately six hours. Analysts from the American
cyber intelligence firm iSight Partners attributed the attack to the Russian hacking group Sandworm. While its
unclear whether Sandworm is working directly for the Russian government, iSight's director of espionage analysis,
John Hultquist, says at a minimum it is a Russian actor operating with alignment to the interest of the state." Aside
from the technical sophistication of these attacks, whats also troubling is that they cannot be easily traced back to
their exact origin. According to Admiral Michael Rogers, head of the United States National Security Agency, these
penetrations are not always executed by governments, and sophisticated Russian cyber gangs are used to
"obscure, if you will, their (nation-states) finger prints." The ability to obscure an attacks origin, in turn, raises
doubts about when there should be a government-to-government response perhaps even of a kinetic variety or
whether it should be treated as a civilian domestic issue. If this sounds suspiciously like the plausible deniability
approach behind Russias now widely discussed hybrid warfare, thats because it is. Needless to say, Russia is not
the only country with advanced cyber capabilities. The United States military also established its own cyber
command, and as the Stuxnet attack which disabled Iranian nuclear centrifuges demonstrated sophisticated
Western cyber attack capabilities exist as well. Likewise, in a real conflict, NATO would surely deploy electronic
counter counter measures (ECCM) against Russian electronic warfare systems such as the Khibin or Richag-AV. Most
importantly, none of this means the West should assume a war with Russia is inevitable. Its not and concerted
diplomacy must always seek to avert such a catastrophic scenario. Nevertheless, there are a number of things the
the United States
West should do immediately. First, when it comes to electronic warfare, NATO especially
remains horribly under-resourced, with a grand total of only 813 troops committed to this
mission. The United States can spend ten billion dollars on its next generation aircraft
carrier and 500 billion dollars on the flawed F-35 fighter, but if these weapons advanced
electronics risk being disabled by an opponents weapons systems at a fraction of
the cost, then Americans overall advantage in firepower is negated. As Colonel Jeffrey
Church, the U.S. Armys chief of electronic warfare noted, Russia has companies, they have battalions, they have
brigades that are dedicated to the electronic warfare mission. NATO should embark on a crash course to increase
its own electronic warfare capabilities.
Ineffective Electronic warfare undermines individual troops

deployments
Freedberg 16 [Sydney, investigative reporter at The E.W. Scripps Co, Army Electronic Warfare
Investment Lags Russian Threat, Breaking Defense, March 21 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/army-
electronic-warfare-investment-lags-rhetoric-russians/] AW *EW=Electronic Warfare
we are falling
There is a great disconnect in the Department of Defense. Leaders at the highest levels realize
behind or have already fallen behind Russia and China in electronic warfare, the invisible
battle of detecting and disrupting the radar and radio transmissions on which a
modern military depends. Even in the traditionally lower-tech world of land warfare ,
Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work told me EW was a pillar of the future Army, alongside
the new domain of cyber and the traditional arts of fire and maneuver. Yet the US
Army, the largest armed service, has few EW sensors, no long-range jammers, and no
funded plan to field them before 2023. While Army leaders now acknowledge the importance of EW, and
units are training harder on how to operate when the enemy is jamming them, the service is investing
very little in fighting back. Its true that Army modernization is squeezed tight. But even in a diminished
budget, Army EW investment is a rounding error. Out of $17.6 billion in procurement
requested for 2017, just 0.8 percent $142 million is listed under electronic
warfare, very broadly defined: $99.9 million of that $142 goes to specialized radars to detect incoming mortar
fire, which isnt really EW. Out of a $7.6 billion 2017 request for Research, Development, Testing, & Evaluation
(RDT&E), just 1.6 percent $118 million is EW-related. These numbers, small as they are, are actually up from
prior years. Not reflected in these figures is recent infusion of $50 million to accelerate the Army jammer program
by all of three months. So while the Armys 2017 budget request makes many much-needed investments
in other areas, said analyst Jim McAleese, it still shortchanges electronic warfare. I can see cyber
money. I can see Active Protection Systems money. I can see aircraft survivability money, McAleese said at last
weeks Association of the US Army conference in Huntsville, Ala. The only place that I would tell you, sir, that
theres probably a weakness in the budget that I can see the Army spends very, very little on EW. The lack of
investment has real-world consequences. Are we closing the gap between Russian EW
capability and US Army EW capability? Right now no, said Col. Jeffrey Church,head of electronic warfare on
the Armys Pentagon staff (section G-3/5/7). The EW wall locker is still bare. The maneuver
commander still does not have a tool at his disposal that he owns and controls on a
daily basis to conduct electronic warfare. Meanwhile, the Russian army has fully
equipped electronic warfare brigades, some of them at work in Ukraine with lethal effect. At the
tactical level, the small-unit level, the Russians and the Chinese have a distinct
advantage because they have deployed very capable electronic warfare tools , said
Gen. Paul Selva, speaking at the March 10 McAleese/Credit Suisse defense conference. Selva is Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a military futurist, and co-chairman of the Pentagons new Electronic Warfare Executive
Committee (EW EXCOM). That
will mean that we will very likely have to deploy fairly
elegant electronic warfare tools at the tactical level, which today we do not have .
AT: No adversaries
Russia has been developing electronic warfare for a while

more advanced than us
Majumdar 16 [Dave, Defense Editor of The National Interest, How Russia's Edge in Electronic Warfare
Could 'Ground' the U.S. Air Force, The National Interest, April 26 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/how-russias-edge-electronic-warfare-could-ground-the-us-air-15932] AW
Russian electronic-warfare powerhouse KRETConcern Radio-Electronic Technologieshas started

testing a powerful new ground-based jamming system that could cut the crucial data-
links that enable the United States military to conduct operations around the world . The
system is designed to be used in conjunction with advanced Russian-built air defense systems like the S-300V4 and
S-400 to disrupt air operations. According to a company sourcewho spoke to the Moscow-based TASS news
agency the system consists of multiple separate jamming modules that are capable
of attacking a command and control system at extended ranges using complex
digital signals. The system is also capable of attacking multiple types of systems
simultaneously. Multichannel stations that ensure simultaneous inhibition of various avionics systems have
been created, the Russian defense industry source told TASS. The new systemthe designation of which TASS did
not reportis designed to be seamlessly integrated with air defense systems. It conducts real-time automated
exchange of data on the actions of the aerospace grouping for purposes of centralized target assignment, the
source told TASS. The new Russian electronic warfare system is also designed to be
highly resilientfeaturing multiple dispersed nodes. Their energy, frequency and intellectual
resources are distributed in an optimal way. In addition, all the modules are equipped with
individual defense sets because they are the prime targets for enemys attack ,
KRETs first deputy director general Igor Nasenkov told TASS. The development is significant because
U.S. air power is highly dependent upon networking . The Pentagon uses a host of
networks including Link-16 to tie its forces together in real time . Moscow has watched
American warfighting capabilities since the first Persian Gulf War and has learned lessons from those conflicts.
Russiawhich retains a very robust defense industryhas invested heavily in countering
American advantages. Russia knows how we roll, U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, commander of U.S.
European Command told the House Armed Services Committee on February 25. They have invested a lot
in electronic warfare because they know we are a connected and precise force and
they need to disconnect us to make us imprecise . The United States will have to invest time and
money to rebuild its electronic warfare capabilities. During his testimony, Breedlove admitted that the
Pentagon had neglected electronic warfare during the past two decadeswhich has
allowed the Kremlin to gain an advantage. Thats especially true of the U.S. Air
Force, which divested most of its electronic warfare capability because of its single-minded devotion to stealth.
The U.S. Navy, however, upgraded its airborne electronic attack force with the Boeing EA-18G Growlerbut those
new aircraft will rely on antiquated ALQ-99 jamming pods until the new Raytheon Next Generation Jammer becomes
operational in 2021.
AT: Squo Solves
Nah. The U.S. military has gotten lazy and the equipment we
have is out-dated
Thompson 16 [Loren, Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University,
Electronic Warfare: How The U.S. Army Could Lose Its Next War, Forbes, March 15 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/03/15/electronic-warfare-how-the-u-s-army-could-lose-its-next-
war/#51c3814c2a28] AW
Theres only one problem: in future wars,the Army is likely to face enemies far better equipped
than it is to seize control of the electromagnetic spectrum and exploit it to tactical
advantage. Two decades of fighting rag-tag terrorist groups with scant resources has
dulled its edge in electronic warfare, while countries like Russia and China have
worked hard to maintain and expand their capabilities. To say the Army isnt ready for what lies
ahead is an understatement: if it got in a fight with Russian troops in Ukraine, Poland or the Baltic
states, the Army could quickly see all of its key targeting and communications
systems shut down by enemy jammers. It might even lose access to GPS signals,
which soldiers depend on to know where they and their allies are on the battlefield. GPS signals are not
hard to jam theyre relatively weak and the Russians know exactly how to do this. Basically, all they
would need to do is load up the relevant frequencies with enough interference so
receivers cant get a fix on where they are. At that point, the fog of war would close
in to a degree where soldiers would be cut off and isolated if their tactical
communications links were being jammed too. The Army is used to depending on
the electronic-warfare planes of other services to cope with such threats, but with Russian air
defenses extending over most of the Baltic region and Poland, that might not be an option in Eastern
Europe.
There arent enough electronic warfare capabilitiesresources

stretched too thin
Freedberg 16 [Sydney, investigative reporter at The E.W. Scripps Co, Army Electronic Warfare
Investment Lags Russian Threat, Breaking Defense, March 21 2016, http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/army-
electronic-warfare-investment-lags-rhetoric-russians/] AW *EW=Electronic Warfare
So why cant the Army just rely on the other services ? That was actually the plan in the 1990s
drawdown, when having multiple electronic warfare programs was seen as a redundant cost. There are just
three problems: high-priced, high-flying aircraft with high-power jammers are
inefficient against small targets on the ground; a modern adversary like Russia or China
could keep the air support away with long-range missiles ; and even when America does own
the air, the other services still may not show. We have lived real life experiences in Iraq and
Afghanistan where the Army has requested electronic attack , airborne electronic
attack, and it hasnt been there, said Col. Church: The limited number of Navy and Air
Force EW aircraft were often too distant or too busy with other missions to answer the
Armys call. By contrast, a Russian commander doesnt have to say, hey, I want to do EW,
ask the air force,' Church said. He owns the people and the resources to conduct
electronic warfare operations. That means Russian commanders can make EW a
central element of their battle plans. Indeed, in Ukraine, the first salvos of a Russian attack are often
not artillery shells or rockets but electrons: EW direction-finders trace Ukrainian transmissions and locate their
sources for bombardment, then jammers shut down Ukrainian radios so they cant call for help or coordinate a
The US Army isnt equipped, organized, or trained to conduct such
defense.
operations. Until I, as an Army maneuver commander, own and control electronic warfare soldiers with
electronic warfare equipment, and I train with them, its going to be an afterthought, its going to be an add-on, he
said, because the day I launch my attack I cant count on you being there.
AT: Electronic Warfare
2AC
F-35s patch up any gaps in electronic warfare nowNew tech
Tucker 16 [Patrick, technology editor for Defense One, This Is The Most Important Technology On the F-35,
Defense One, Jan 19 2016, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/most-important-technology-f-
35/125228/2] AW
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the most expensive weapons program ever, wont justify its price tag by
outmaneuvering other jets (it cant), flying particularly fast, or even by carrying munitions in a stealthy bomb bay.
Instead, the U.S. military is banking on an emerging technology called cognitive
electronic warfare to give the jet an almost-living ability to sniff out new hard-to-
detect air defenses and invent ways to foil them on the fly. While the specifics of the jets
electronic warfare, or EW, package remain opaque, scientists, program watchers and military leaders close to
the program say it will be key to the jets evolution and its survival against the futures
most advanced airplane-killing technology. In short, cognitive EW is the most
important feature on the worlds most sophisticated warplane. There are small
elements of cognitive EW right now on the F-35 , but what we are really looking toward is the
future, Lee Venturino, president and CEO of First Principles, a company that is analyzing the F-35 for the Pentagon,
said at a recent Association of Old Crows event in Washington, D.C.Think of it as a stair-stepper approach. The first
step is probably along the ESM [electronic support measures] side. How do I just identify the signals Ive never seen
before? To understand what cognitive warfare is, you have to know what it isnt. EW makes use of the invisible
waves of energy that propagate through free space from the movement of electrons, the electromagnetic spectrum.
Conventional radar systems generally use fixed waveforms, making them easy to spot, learn about, and develop
tactics against. But newer digitally programmable radars can generate never-before-seen waveforms, making them
A concern that U.S. EW was falling behind the challenges of todays
harder to defeat.
world prompted a 2013 Defense Science Board study that recommended that the
military develop agile and adaptive electronic warfare systems that could detect
and counter tricky new sensors. In the past, what would happen is youd send out your EA-18, the
militarys top-of-the-line EW aircraft, Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work said last month in an event at the Center
for New American Security. It would find a new waveform. There was no way for us to do anything about it. The
pilot would come back, they would talk about it, theyd replicate it, theyd emulate it. It would go into the
gonculator, goncu-goncu-goncu-gonculatoring, and then you would have something, and then maybe some time
down the road, you would have a response. That process is far too slow to be effective against
digitally programmable radars. The software [to defeat new waveforms] may take on the order of
months or years, but the effectiveness needs to programed within hours or seconds. If its an interaction with a
radar and a jammer, for example, sometime its a microsecond, said Robert Stein, who co-chaired the Defense
Science Board study. Read interaction in that context to mean the critical moment when
an adversary, perhaps a single lowly radar operator, detects a U.S. military aircraft on a covert
operation. That moment of detection is the sort of world-changing event that happens, literally, in the blink of
an eye. Just before the study came out, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or
DARPA, established the Adaptive Radar Countermeasures program to enable U.S.
airborne EW systems to automatically generate effective countermeasures against
new, unknown and adaptive radars in real-time in the field. The goal: EW software
that can perceive new waveforms and attacks as quickly and as clearly as a living
being can hear leaves rustle or see a predator crouching in the distance, then
respond creatively to the threat: can I outrun that? Can I fight it? Should I do anything at all? Its a
problem of artificial intelligence: creating a living intelligence in code.
New innovation in electronic warfare now
Osborn 14 [Kris, Information Liaison for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Army Testing
Improved Electronic Jamming Technology, Defense Tech, Dec 2 2014,
http://www.defensetech.org/2014/12/02/army-testing-improved-electronic-jamming-technology/] AW
The Army is testing a series of new electronic warfare technologies designed to

address a wider range of threat signals in the electromagnetic spectrum, service officials said.
Electronic warfare can be used for a wide range of combat functions to include jamming or thwarting an electronic
signal used to detonate an IED, identifying enemy communications or electronic signals, and attacking or disabling
The new EW technologies are being engineered to detect,
enemy electromagnetic signals.
respond to and operate in a wider range of frequencies to provide commanders with
more offensive and defensive options. They are being designed as upgradable hardware and software
that can accommodate new threat information as emerging signals are learned, Army officials said. The nature of
the electromagnetic spectrum is such that it is increasingly contested and increasingly congested. You must be able
to attack in the spectrum and defend in the spectrum and also ensure that you manage the spectrum. In order to
do all of these things, you must gain and maintain an advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum, said Col. Jim
The new EW systems will be configured to go on
Ekvall, electronic warfare division chief.
unmanned aircraft, helicopters and vehicles, among other platforms, Ekvall added. One
of the new technologies now in development is called Electronic Warfare Planning
and Management Tool, or EWPMT, which allows commanders to synchronize and
integrate a host of electronic warfare signals. EWPMT is slated to be ready by 2016 .
Another new system, scheduled to enter formal production in 2021, is an offensive system called
Multi-Function EW. This is an offensive oriented system consisting of airborne,
mobile vehicle, man-portable and fixed-site applications. All of these variants are
offensively oriented. In other words they are used to attack the enemys command and communications
and other things that use the electromagnetic spectrum, Ekvall said.
New tech is filling the gap nownew growler airplane

Barrie 16 [Allison, defense reporter for Fox News, Meet the military's new $1 billion jammer, Flash News,
April 21 2016, http://us.flash24.news/technology/meet-the-military-x27-s-new-x24-1-billion-jammer/] AW
One billion dollars of electronic warfare tech will be amping up the Growler fighter
jet. This week, the U.S. Navy awarded a $1 billion contract to Raytheon to build the Next Generation Jammer (NGJ).
Chosen to replace the legacy ALQ-99 systems used on the EA-18G Growler, the NGJ is a cutting-edge
electronic attack smart pod that will take the already-impressive Growler
capabilities to an unprecedented level. The NGJ will play a vital role in staying ahead of adversaries
capabilities. The tech will give the US military even greater power , further enhanced precision,
and a faster response time for electronic attack and electronic warfare counter-
measures. To help thwart adversaries from targeting them, US forces can deploy jammers,
making aircraft and troops invisible to enemy tech. Preventing detection enables
effective strikes and helps keep American fighters safe. Jammers can also even be used to
create phantom aircraft to mislead enemy forces into believing other aircraft are in the air. The NGJ will
enhance what is arguably the most advanced airborne electronic attack aircraft in
the world: the EA-18G Growler. The Growler regularly provides tactical jamming and
electronic protection to U.S. military forces and allies around the world. A variant of the F/A-18F
Super Hornet, the aircraft combines electronic attack with fighter aircraft speed and maneuverability. Typically
Ahead of
crewed with one pilot and one weapon systems officer, Growler can reach speeds of 1190 mph.
ground, maritime, and other aircraft teams, Growler can enter the fight first,
unleashing a devastating electronic attack . Using electronic attack tech, the aircraft
can suppress enemy air and ground defenses. By jamming enemy radar, the Growler helps both
air crews and ground strike teams to reach their target without being detected. In addition to jamming the
the ALQ-227 Communications
adversarys communications over a broad frequency range,
Countermeasures Set also allows the Growler to locate , record, and play back enemy
transmissions. US forces need to work in heavily jammed environments. The Growler can unleash
its Interference Cancellation System to defeat the jamming systems and ensure
uninterrupted radio communications for ground, maritime, and air forces. Equipped with AIM-
120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles, the Growler can protect itself as well as
attack enemy aircraft.
Funding is stable nowmost recent budget bill

Mchale 16 [John, editorial director of Military Embedded Systems, Funding for radar, electronic warfare,
C4ISR, steady in DoD FY 2017 budget request, Military Embedded Systems, Feb 28 2016, http://mil-
embedded.com/4894-funding-for-radar-electronic-warfare-c4isr-steady-in-dod-fy-2017-budget-request/] AW
The total FY 2017 budget request is $582.7 billion, up $2.4 billion from $580.3
billion enacted in FY 2016. The FY 2017 budget also complies with the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015,
giving the department both funding stability and protection from the damage of sequestration in FY 2016 and FY
2017, according to the DoD. The overall RDT&E budget for FY 2017 is $ 71.765 billion, and increase over the FY
2016 enacted total of $69.968 billion. However, funding dropped about slightly for the DoDs Science and
Designers of embedded
Technology (S&T) program from $13 billion in FY 2016 to $12.5 billion for FY 2017.
computing, signal processing, open architectures, and other commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) solutions should find a steady market as the DoDs missions continue
to rely more and more on cyber, C4ISR, radar, and EW systems to keep an edge on
battlefields and in peace time. Each of these applications has an insatiable need for bandwidth and
processing capability that is only fueled by embedded computing and open architecture designs. I believe there
will be continued focus to replace , or upgrade aging systems through data
conversion, emulation, virtualization, and the use of embedded, small form factor
computing devices, says Michael Carter, Chief Executive Officer of IXI Technologies in San Diego in this
months COTS Confidential, which dicusses the Navy market for COTS electronics. Technology exists today that can
translate data from one protocol to another, with the use of an electronic interface with software operating code.
Technology also exists that can use the same operating code, without the electronic interface running on an
embedded computer in a server true virtualization. Embedded computing, especially products with multiple
processors, interfaces and are small, light and consume little power will dominate. Below are key areas within the
budget that leverage embedded hardware and software. Cyber operations gets a nice increase in
the FY 2017 budget request, with a $900 million increase from FY 2016 enacted
levels to $6.7 billion. According to the budget documents the new cyber strategy focuses on
building cyber capabilities and organizations for DoDs three primary cyber
missions: to defend DoD networks, systems, and information; defend the Nation
against cyberattacks of significant consequence; and provide cyber support to
operational and contingency plans. For more on the DoD cyber strategy, click here. Total
electronic warfare funding in the FY 2017 RDT&E budget is $298 million, more than 100
million over the FY 2016 enacted total of $184 million. The Navy is receiving the bulk of the EW RDT&E
funding, with $183 million requested. The Army and Air Force are slated to receive $102.5
million and $12.5 million respectively. Procurement for the Navys AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare Suite
is down slightly from the FY 2016 enacted total of $296 million to about $275 million.
Signature Strikes
Notes
Gonna be honest, this is probably the weakest of the CPs that
are in this file. The CP eliminates the U.S. signature strike
policy which is currently used in the Middle East (specifically
Pakistan and Yemen) against suspected terrorists. Theres two
types of strikes:
These missile strikes are actually so screwed up

Heller 13 [Kevin, Associate Professor at the Melbourne Law School, One Hell of a Killing Machine Signature
Strikes and International Law, pg 90, Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2013] AW *modified for gendered
language
The attack at Zawhar Kili is the first known example of what has come to be called a signature strikea
drone attack that targets groups of [people] [ men] who bear certain signatures, or
defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities arent
known.2 The vast majority of drone strikes conducted by the CIA have been
signature strikes, not personality strikes those in which the CIA has a high degree
of confidence that it knows the precise identity of the target .3 In 2010, for example, Reuters
reported that of the 500 militants killed by drones between 2008 and 2010, only 8%
were the kind top-tier militant targets or mid-to-high-level organizers whose identities could have
been known prior to being killed.4 Similarly, in 2011, a US official revealed that the United States had
killed twice as many wanted terrorists in signature strikes than in personality strikes.5
The idea is that these strikes contribute to an anti-U.S.

sentiment abroad, and not only incentivize people to join
terrorist organizations, but also provide material for terrorists
to create propaganda. As Ian Miller pointed out, one of the
weakest parts of the CP is that the ev isnt quite reverse
causal. (strikes incentivize terrorism but stopping strikes
doesnt mean that people still arent incentivized to go join
terrorism).
1NC
The United States federal government should eliminate the

signature strikes policy
Signature strikes tank US credibility and fuel terrorism

Mencini 14 [Daniel, Researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Blast from the Past:
Using History to Shape Targeted Strikes Policy, Georgetown Security Studies Review, June 10 2014,
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/blast-from-the-past-using-history-to-shape-targeted-strikes-
policy/] AW
The White House should eliminate the signature strikes policy . Targeting individuals
by characteristics alone expands the concept of imminence too far, setting a
dangerous precedent. Technological innovation, as well as a public appetite for counterterrorism, have led
to targeting killing policies that widen the concept of imminence beyond recognition. By analyzing an individuals
past actions, it is possible to explain how he might pose an imminent threat to the United States. Post strike, it is
It is impossible, however, to assess an
also possible to convey that individuals misdeeds to the public.
individuals plots or operations when the state does not know an individuals
identity. This fact eliminates the opportunity to announce the proposed beneficial
ramifications of a strike to the public. Signature strikes also set a dangerous
precedent for the international community. If other nations decide to conduct lethal
operations to counter terrorism or other national security threats, the White Houses
targeted killings policy sets a better example than its signature strike policy. The
White House is significantly more transparent when it targets individuals than when
it targets militants based on their behavior. When a government specifically identifies the individual
it is targeting, it also makes it possible for scholars, reporters, international institutions, and the public to assess
whether that person poses an imminent threat and the merits of the governments justifications for the targeted
killing. It is impossible to do the same for signature strikes . The executive branch, based on its
past strikes, has a set of criteria for signature strikes which include handling explosives, traveling in an armed
convoy towards a conflict, or training in a known al Qaeda facility. Neither the Bush nor Obama administrations
another nations
have explicitly defined these scenarios; the criteria are only inferred through reports. Thus,
signature strike policy is open to their own governments interpretation, which is
especially disconcerting when considering some of the worlds more repressive
regimes. Signature strikes may be effective at eliminating threats by chance, yet the pros of signature
strikes do not outweigh the cons. Signature strikes may be more effective in active duty war zones
where there are troops on the ground supported by armed drones. Signature strikes in limited lethal
counterterrorism operations, however, are out of place. The chances of a signature
strike going awry and killing scores of civilians is much higher than a targeted
operation against a well-known individual . The scenarios for signature strikes are
open to the pilot or targeting analysts interpretation. In addition, if the President decides he or
she needs to continue to kill terrorists outside of active war zones in the future,
signature strikes run the risk of severely damaging relations with host nations . If the
CIA and military conduct too many unsuccessful or collateral damage-ridden signature strikes, the United States
runs the risk of nullifying the host nations agreement to allow American UAVs in
their airspace. Thus far, leaders from Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia have remained amenable to American UAVs
in their airspace. The recently reported negotiations between Pakistani leaders and American policymakers about
curbing low-value strikes, however, signal that foreign nations will use airspace as a diplomatic bargaining chip.[38]
Nullifying the agreement would eliminate the opportunity to target high-value individuals. If the reports are true
that the Obama administration agreed to scale back its strikes in Pakistan and only target high-value individuals, a
policy which would serve to eliminate all signature strikes, then American officials are already moving toward this
recommendation.[39] While the agreement between Pakistani and American officials is a step in the right direction,
the Obama administration has continued to authorize signature strikes in Yemen in 2014.[40]
AT: Strikes Effective
Signature Strikes are ineffectiveofficial statements prove

Shane 15 [Scott, U.S. intelligence reporter for the New York Times, Drone Strikes Reveal Uncomfortable
Truth: U.S. Is Often Unsure About Who Will Die, New York Times, April 23 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/drone-strikes-reveal-uncomfortable-truth-us-is-often-unsure-about-
who-will-die.html] AW
Every independent investigation of the strikes has found far more civilian casualties
than administration officials admit. Gradually, it has become clear that when operators in Nevada
fire missiles into remote tribal territories on the other side of the world, they often do not know who they
are killing, but are making an imperfect best guess. The presidents announcement on Thursday
that a January strike on Al Qaeda in Pakistan had killed two Western hostages, and that it took many weeks to
confirm their deaths, bolstered the assessments of the programs harshest outside critics. The dark picture was
compounded by the additional disclosure that two American members of Al Qaeda were killed in strikes that same
month, but neither had been identified in advance and deliberately targeted. In all, it was a devastating
acknowledgment for Mr. Obama, who had hoped to pioneer a new, more discriminating kind of warfare. Whether
the episode might bring a long-delayed public reckoning about targeted killings, long hidden by classification rules,
officials have expressed serious
remained uncertain. Even some former Obama administration security
doubts about the wisdom of the program, given the ire it has ignited overseas and
the terrorists who have said they plotted attacks because of drones . And outside experts
have long called for a candid accounting of the results of strikes. I hope this event allows us at last to have an
honest dialogue about the U.S. drone program, said Rachel Stohl, of the Stimson Center, a Washington research
institute. These are precise weapons. The failure is in the intelligence about who it is that we
are killing. Ms. Stohl noted that Mr. Obama and his top aides have repeatedly promised greater openness
about the drone program but have never really delivered on it. In a speech in 2013 about drones, Mr. Obama
declared that no strike was taken without near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured. He added
that nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties and
said those deaths will haunt us as long as we live. But over the Obama presidency, it has become harder
for journalists to obtain information from the government on the results of particular
strikes. And Mr. Obamas Justice Department has fought in court for years to keep secret the legal opinions
justifying strikes. Micah Zenko, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations and lead author of a 2013 study of
the presidents statement highlights what weve sort of known: that most
drones, said
individuals killed are not on a kill list, and the government does not know their
names.
Drone strikes are unsustainablebad targeting policies and

contradictory statements
Zenko 13 [Micah, Senior Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies,
pg. 10-11, Council Special Report No. 65, Jan 2013] AW
it remains unclear if drone strikes are successful or

From a strategic perspective, however,
sustainable. There is a clear disconnect between whom the Obama administration
claims to target with drones and who has actually been killed. According to U.S. officials,
individuals targeted by drones are limited to high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks; individuals
who are a threat to the United States; individuals involved in some sort of operational plot against the United
Of the estimated
States; and specific senior operational leaders of al-Qaeda and associated forces.20
three thousand people killed by drones, however, the vast majority were neither al-
Qaeda nor Taliban leaders. Instead, most were low-level, anonymous suspected
militants who were predominantly engaged in insurgent or terrorist operations against their
governments, rather than in active international terrorist plots.21 By targeting
individuals who are not terrorist leaders and who do not pose a direct threat to the
United States or its alliesbut are predominantly fighting insurgent operations the United States risks being
dragged further into internal armed struggles, because it is explicitly intervening on
behalf of the government. Some former and current U.S. officials maintain that the United States
relies too much on drone strikes at the expense of longer-term strategies to prevent
conditions that foster international terrorism.22 At best, targeted killings appear to
be a stalemate. By some accounts, however, drone strikes may be indirectly increasing
the number of militants. In Yemen, for example, in 2010 the Obama administration
described al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) as encompassing several hundred al-
Qaeda members; two years later, it increased to more than a thousand members. By July 2012,
AQAP had a few thousand members. 23 The evidence that U.S. drone strikes create
blowbackwhereby killing suspected militants or civilians leads to the marked
radicalization of local populations that join or sympathize with al-Qaeda or affiliated
organizationsvaries widely within the affected states, and it is difficult to determine motivations for joining
domestic insurgencies and groups dedicated primarily to international terrorism like AQAP, which has made several
attempts to attack the United States. Nevertheless, there appears to be a strong correlation in
Yemen between increased targeted killings since December 2009 and heightened
anger toward the United States and sympathy with or allegiance to AQAP.24 At the same time, some
drone strikes contradict stated nonmilitary foreign policy objectives . In February 2012, at a
press conference for the International Contact Group on Somalia, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked:
I know enough to say airstrikes would not be a good idea. And we have absolutely no reason
to believe anyonecertainly not the United Statesis considering that.25 Within hours, a convoy was
attacked in the Shabelle region of Somalia, killing between four and seven suspected Islamic militants.26 An
anonymous U.S. official confirmed that a JSOC drone killed the militants.27
Public Support
Eliminating signature strikes brings back public support for

U.S. foreign policy
Mencini 14 [Daniel, Researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Blast from the Past:
Using History to Shape Targeted Strikes Policy, Georgetown Security Studies Review, June 10 2014,
http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2014/06/10/blast-from-the-past-using-history-to-shape-targeted-strikes-
policy/] AW
The American public despised Bin Laden, and it is perhaps for this reason that the strike at Abbottabad offers an
example of successful executive transparency. Americans turned en masse to their televisions and computers when
news about Bin Ladens death began to leak. The Awlaki drone strike, by contrast, did not receive the same level of
public support, despite the fact that Alwaki was a high-value target. From an operational perspective, Awlakis
target value was high, but the Yemeni cleric did not earn the same public enmity as Bin Laden or Yamamoto.
Awlakis American citizenship also complicated public support for the strike. Although President Obama announced
the news was that the White House targeted an
Awlakis death the morning after it occurred,
American citizen and the debate quickly shifted to the issue of citizenship rather
than the value of the target.[35] Thus, two factors theoretically contribute to positive
American reaction to targeted killings as seen in Figure 1. The most positive public
support to targeted strikes will occur when target value and executive transparency
are both high. Using the same logic, negative reaction will occur when target value
and executive transparency are both low. The other example worth noting is the CIAs assassination
attempts during the Cold War, which resulted in negative public reaction. As noted earlier, assassinations are
different from targeted killings because the former are illegal. Nevertheless, the executive transparency was very
low and the CIA plotted the operations in secrecy against a range of targets during the Cold War. The most
notorious target of these proposed assassinations was Fidel Castro. While Castros target value was high, executive
transparency was low.[36] The Phoenix Program led to heightened cynicism directed towards the CIA, and signature
Public reaction where a low target value is
strikes continue to face considerable opposition.[37]
coupled with high executive transparency, and high target value is coupled with low
executive transparency are both noted as neutral; however the public will likely
respond more favorably to the death of a high-value target (thus neutral to positive), as it did
in the Yamamoto raid, even when transparency is low. There is also no real precedent for
announcing low-value strikes with high executive transparency because there are
not many scenarios where the public would be grateful that the president informed
them the military targeted low-level militants. The only possible scenario is if the president was
clarifying an operational mistake, which certainly would not result in positive public support. Figure 2 shows
observed public support to lethal targeted strikes. As noted, it would be bizarre for an executive administration to
have high transparency for a low-value target unless an egregious error occurred. Therefore, the quadrant for high
transparency and low target value highlights the rarity of such an event. The major implication of this argument is
high-value targets and executive transparency are the two most important
that
factors in determining positive American reaction to the use of targeted lethal force.
AT: Squo Solves
Nope, rise of ISIS has only increased the use of drones.

De Luce and Mcleary 16 [Dan, Foreign Policys chief national security correspondent, Paul, the
Pentagon reporter for Foreign Policy, Obamas Most Dangerous Drone Tactic Is Here to Stay, Foreign Policy, April
05 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/05/obamas-most-dangerous-drone-tactic-is-here-to-stay/] AW
Nearly three years later,

the administration has abandoned any pretense of reining in its
use of signature strikes. With the Islamic State expanding its reach, Washington is
doubling down on the tactic and dispatching drones to strike at targets in Yemen and Somalia. In
March, U.S. drones and other warplanes bombed an al-Shabab training camp in Somalia north of Mogadishu, killing
what the Pentagon later estimated were about 150 militants who had gathered for a graduation ceremony. And an
air raid a few weeks later on an Islamic State training camp in the mountains of Yemen killed dozens of suspected
U.S. officials privately acknowledged that they didnt know the
militants, the Pentagon said.
precise identities of who they killed. Signature strikes like the ones in Somalia and
Yemen form a key element in Obamas aggressive drone bombing campaign, one
that will be handed over to the next president 10 months from now. The signature
raids have been carried out in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia countries where the United
States is not engaged in a publicly declared war and, unlike targeted killings against specific
extremist leaders, do not require presidential approval.
AT: Reforms
Reforms dont solvevague language and structural barriers
to implementation of reforms
Zakira and Hosenball 13 [Tabassum, Senior Advisor at Bipartisan Policy Center, Mark, American
investigative correspondent at Reuters, U.S. drone guidelines could reduce 'signature strikes', Reuters, May 23
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-obama-speech-guidelines-idUSBRE94N03520130524] AW
Faced with criticism about civilian casualties, Obama said the United States would only use those drone strikes
when a threat was "continuing and imminent," a nuanced change from the previous policy of launching strikes
CIA analyst, said that was too vague. "It still
against a significant threat. Paul Pillar, a former
leaves questions and doubts. One piece of phraseology that should raise questions
is the somewhat oxymoronic 'continuing, imminent threat.' If a threat is continuing,
how can it be imminent, except maybe at one particular time before it is finally
executed? " he said. The new Obama drone policy also states a preference for having future strikes conducted
by the military. Until now, the CIA had been the main agency conducting drone strikes outside war zones in places
The administration made public few details about how the shift in control
like Pakistan.
of drone operations would be carried ou t. But government sources told Reuters earlier this week that
shifting operations to the Pentagon would be done in stages and that the CIA would
keep conducting strikes in Pakistan for the time being.
Solves: Legitimacy
U.S. legitimacy goes down with each missile strike

international condemnation
Abizaid and Brooks 14 [John, former U.S. Central Command commander, Rosa, law professor at
the Georgetown University Law Center, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON US DRONE
POLICY, Stimson, June 2014, http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1209482/task-force-report-final-web-
062414.pdf] AW
UAV strikes by the United States have also generated a backlash in countries not
directly affected by the strikes, in part due to the perception that such strikes cause
excessive civilian deaths, and in part due to concerns about sovereignty, transparency, accountability
and other human rights and rule of law issues. (These are discussed more fully below.) In February 2014, for
instance, the European Parliament voted 534- 49 for a resolution condemning US drone strikes, asserting that
thousands of civilians have reportedly been killed or seriously injured by drone strikes [but] these figures are
difficult to estimate, owing to lack of transparency and obstacles to effective investigation.82 T he
resolution
went on to call for EU member states to oppose and ban the practice of extrajudicial
targeted killings [and] ensure that the member states, in conformity with their legal obligations, do not
perpetrate unlawful targeted killings or facilitate such killings by other states.83 National officials,
parliamentarians and thought leaders in numerous allied countries and at the United
Nations have questioned or condemned US targeted strikes.84 While US officials may take the view
that such criticisms are based on erroneous information or an incorrect reading of the applicable law, the fact
when allies and partners do not support US policies, we pay a price. The
remains that
price may be direct allies may be unwilling to share intelligence data crucial to
targeting, for instance, for fear of incurring legal liability in their own courts or for fear of
domestic political consequences or it may be indirect anger at US targeted strikes
may translate into lower levels of co-operation with unrelated US diplomatic
initiatives. Either way, the risk of international backlash against US strikes needs to be
factored in as we evaluate the strategic value of targeted strikes.
Internationally, signature strikes are seen as contradictory

makes legitimacy vacuous
Kennedy 13 [Greg, Professor of Strategic Foreign Policy at the Defence Studies Department of Kings
College, Drones: Legitimacy and Anti-Americanism, The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters Winter-Spring
2013, 2013,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/winterspring_2013/3_article_kennedy.pdf] AW
The recent phenomena of using drones, to deliver lethality in situations of

unmanned vehicles, or
conflict is yet another instance in which a type of technology has proliferated before
considerations of its legitimacy have been agreed upon : The exponential rise in the use of
drone technology in a variety of military and non-military contexts represents a real challenge to the framework of
established international law and it is both right as a matter of principle, and inevitable as a matter of political
reality, that the international community should now be focusing attention on the standards applicable to this
technological development, particularly its deployment in counterterrorism and counter-insurgency initiatives, and
attempt to reach a consensus on the legality of its use, and the standards and safeguards which should apply to it.4
The current debate over the legitimacy of Americas use of drones to deliver deadly
force is taking place in both public and official domains in the United States and
many other countries.5 The four key features at the heart of the debate revolve around: who is controlling
the weapon system; does the system of control and oversight violate international law governing the use of force;
are the drone strikes proportionate acts that provide military effectiveness given the circumstances of the conflict
they are being used in; and does their use violate the sovereignty of other nations and allow the United States to
disregard formal national boundaries? Unless these four questions are dealt with in the near future the impact of
the unresolved legitimacy issues will have a number of repercussions for American foreign and military policies:
Without a new doctrine for the use of drones that is understandable to friends and
foes, the United States risks achieving near-term tactical benefits in killing terrorists
while incurring potentially significant longer-term costs to its alliances,
global public opinion, the war on terrorism and international stability. 6 This article
will address only the first three critical questions. The question of who controls the drones during their missions is
The use of drones by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to
attracting a great deal of attention.
conduct signature strikes is the most problematic factor in this matter .
Between 2004 and 2013, CIA drone attacks in Pakistan killed up to 3,461up to 891 of them civilians.7 Not only is
the use of drones by the CIA the issue, but subcontracting operational control of drones to other civilian agencies is
also causing great concern.8 Questions remain as to whether subcontractors were controlling drones during actual
the intense
strike missions, as opposed to surveillance and reconnaissance activities. Nevertheless,
questioning of John O. Brennan, President Obamas nominee for director of the CIA in February
2013, over drone usage, the secrecy of their controllers and orders, and the legality of
their missions confirmed the level of concern Americas elected officials have
regarding the legitimacy of drone use. Furthermore, perceptions and suspicions of
illegal clandestine intelligence agency operations, already a part of the public and official psyche
due to experiences from Vietnam, Iran-Contra, and Iraq II and the weapons of mass destruction debacle, have
been reinforced by CIA management of drone capability . Recent revelations about the use of
secret Saudi Arabian facilities for staging American drone strikes into Yemen did nothing to dissipate such
suspicions of the CIAs lack of legitimacy in its use of drones.9 The fact that the secret facility was the launching site
for drones used to kill American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and his son in September 2011, both classified by the CIA
as al-Qaedalinked threats to US security, only deepened such suspicions. Despite the fact that Gulf State observers
the existence of
and officials knew about American drones operating from the Arabian peninsula for years,
the CIA base was not openly admitted in case such knowledge should . . . damage
counter-terrorism collaboration with Saudi Arabia .10 The fallout from CIA involvement and
management of drone strikes prompted Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, to suggest the need for a court to oversee targeted killings. Such a body, she said, would replicate the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which oversees eavesdropping on American soil.11 Most importantly, such
oversight would go a long way towards allaying fears of the drone usage lacking true political accountability and
legitimacy. In addition, as with any use of force,drone strikes in overseas contingency operation s
can lead to increased attacks on already weak governments partnered with the
United States. They can lead to retaliatory attacks on local governments and may
contribute to local instability. Those actions occur as a result of desires for revenge
and frustrations caused by the strikes. Feelings of hostility are often visited on the
most immediate structures of authoritylocal government officials, government buildings, police,
and the military.12 It can thus be argued that, at the strategic level, drone strikes are fuelling anti-
American resentment among enemies and allies alike. Those reactions are often
based on questions regarding the legality , ethicality, and operational legitimacy of
those acts to deter opponents. Therefore, specifically related to the reaction of allies, the military legitimacy
question arises if the use of drones endangers vital strategic relationships.13 One of the strategic relationships
being affected by the drone legitimacy issue is that of the United States and the United Kingdom. Targeted killing,
by drone strike or otherwise, is not the sole preserve of the United States. Those actions, however, attract
more negative attention to the United States due to its prominence on the worlds
stage, its declarations of support for human rights and democratic freedoms, and rule-of-law
issues, all which appear violated by such strikes. This complexity and visibility make such targeted
killings important for Anglo-American strategic relations because of the closeness of that relationship and the
perception that Great Britain, therefore, condones such American activities. Because the intelligence used in such
operations is seen by other nations as a shared Anglo-American asset, the use of such intelligence to identify and
conduct such killings, in the opinion of many, makes Great Britain culpable in the illegality and immorality of those
operations.14 Finally,the apparent gap between stated core policies and values
and the ability to practice targeted killings appears to be a starkly
hypocritical and deceitful position internationally , a condition that once again makes
British policymakers uncomfortable with being tarred by such a brush.15 The divide between US policy
and action is exacerbated by drone technology, which makes the once covert
practice of targeted killing commonplace and undeniable. It may also cause deep-
rooted distrust due to a spectrum of legitimacy issues. Such questions will, therefore,
undermine the US desire to export liberal democratic principles . Indeed, it may be beneficial
for Western democracies to achieve adequate rather than decisive victories, thereby setting an example of restraint
for the international order.16 The United States must be willing to engage and deal with drone-legitimacy issues
across the entire spectrum of tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels to ensure its strategic aims are not
derailed by operational and tactical expediency.
Solves: Terror
Strikes allow people to become martyrs for terrorism and

justify anti-U.S. sentiment
Gonzalez 16 [Naiomi, representative in the Texas House of Representatives, Drone Strikes: An Ineffective
Tool in the War on Terror, Uisio, June 3 2016, http://www.uisio.com/drone-strikes-an-ineffective-tool-in-the-war-on-
terror/] AW
Terrorists groups, instead of being dissuaded by drone strikes, have used the strikes as
justification for their actions. In December 2009, Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi entered a CIA post in
Khost Afghanistan, blew himself up, killing seven CIA officers and a Jordanian intelligence officer. (27) Balawi, in a
video released after the attack, says, This attack will be the first of revenge operations against the Americans and
Some of those interviewed by the New York
their drone teams outside the Pakistani borders. (28)
University and Stanford demonstrated anger and bitterness towards losing loved ones
in drone strikes. One relative claimed, We wont forget. Our blood, for two hundred, two thousand, five
thousand yearswe will take ourrevenge for these drone attacks. (29) Another person who lost a family member
stated, Blood for blood. . . . All I want to say to them is . . . why are you killing innocent people like us that have no
concern with you? (30) Furthermore,even when drone strikes kill their intended target, the
target who dies may simply be framed as a martyr . Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in a drone strike in
2011, but the ideology he espoused continues to influence terrorists and would-be-terrorists years later. The
brothers responsible for the 2013 Boston marathon bombers were reportedly
influenced by al-Awlakis sermons, widely available online . (31) Chrif Kouachi, one of the
shooters responsible for the January 2015 attack at Charlie Hebdo referenced,Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki in his last
Data compiled by nonprofits, think tanks,
public words before being killed by police. (32)
academics, and journalists have raised significant doubts as to the governments
insistence that the drone program predominately kills terrorists, that the civilian
number is low, and that it deters terrorists. In fact, the limited available data suggests that
the use of drones is ineffective at deterring terrorists, as it instead increases
hostility against America that benefits the agenda of terrorist groups. The drone
strikes, in contrast to President Obama and his administrations reassurances that they are accurate, may in
fact be killing a substantial number of civilians, which in turn angers the local
population and can increase sympathy towards terrorists groups . But even if the
drone strikes kill the targeted individual, the individuals death can become a call to
martyrdom inspiring others to take up the fight against the West.
Signature strikes contribute to anti-U.S sentiment and drive up

terror recruiting
Greenfield 13 [Danya, leader of the Yemen policy group at The Atlantic, The Case Against Drone Strikes
on People Who Only 'Act' Like Terrorists, The Atlantic, Aug 19 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/08/the-case-against-drone-strikes-on-people-who-only-act-
like-terrorists/278744/] AW
As Mark Bowden discusses in this month's Atlantic cover story, there is great debate about whether drone strikes
should be a core component of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Of all the the arguments in favor, those those
The term "signature strike" is
emphasizing effectiveness of signature strikes are particularly dubious.
used to distinguish strikes conducted against individuals who "match a pre-
identified 'signature' of behavior that the U.S. links to militant activity," rather than
targeting a specific person. The United States should not allow signature strikes
because the cost of these attacks far outweighs the potential benefit. Leaving
aside significant concerns about the legality of such strikes, there are serious questions about the efficacy of this
signature strikes is that they open the
approach in undermining terrorist networks. The problem with
door to a much higher incidence of civilian casualties --and this is where the danger lies. If the
United States is choosing targets based on suspicious activity or proximity to other known-terrorists, this falls short
perpetuates a disastrous U.S.
of the threshold for drone strikes set by the Obama Administration,
image in Yemen, and serves to invigorate the ranks of those groups the U nited States
aims to dissolve disable. In response to increasing criticism, President Obama outlined his counterterrorism
policy in May 2013 with a speech at National Defense University. Obama noted that the U.S. will only act against
"terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other
governments capable of effectively addressing the threat." He did not, however, directly address the use of
signature strikes, leaving open the prospect that they could be used in the ongoing fight against terrorism. This
would be a mistake. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, extensive signature strikes sparked a
significant increase in anti-American sentiment . After years of drone strikes, 74
percent of Pakistanis considered the U.S. an enemy by 2012 (up from 64 percent in 2009)
according to a Pew Research Center poll. The White House authorized signature strikes for
Yemen, but U.S. officials insist that they have not employed this tactic to date. If
true, the incidence of civilian and non-combatant casualties in Yemen means that
faulty intelligence and targeting failures are to blame , which is perhaps even more worrisome.
In waging the drone campaign, the United States occasionally hits precisely the wrong
person. A U.S. strike in August 2012 supposedly killed three al-Qaeda militants in Yemen. Among the casualties,
however, was an anti-Qaeda imam and a policeman he had brought along for protection. The imam was working to
dismantle al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), making him precisely the sort of local ally the U.S. desperately
in
needs in a place like Yemen. Yemeni Nobel Prize laureate Tawakkul Karman warned that Yemeni tribal leaders
areas where civilians have been killed in drone strikes say that these attacks drive
more Yemenis to turn against Washington. During his testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Yemeni writer Farea al-Muslimi recounted an incident where the eldest son of a man killed by a drone
joined AQAP because he identifies the U.S. as his father's killer and wants revenge.
As the deaths and injuries mount, dangerous anti-American sentiment grows. When
drone strikes occur and non-combatants are killed, Yemenis lash out with protests
demanding justice and accountability from the United States--which has not been
forthcoming. In a place like Yemen, although the American drone program is
universally hated, many Yemenis will admit they would support targeted assassinations if there is clear
intelligence that an individual is a senior operative within AQAP and plotting a specific and imminent act of terror
signature strikes is that they do not meet this threshold--
against Americans. The problem with
not even remotely-- and they open the door for the U.S. to make grievous targeting
mistakes and be seen as taking sides in a domestic insurgency . Signature strikes
target low-level militants who might be nasty characters, but they are not necessarily
planning an imminent act of terror or hold a leadership position.
Drone strikes contribute to terrorist recruiting effortstop

generals agree
062414.pdf] AW
Civilian casualties, even if relatively few, can anger whole communities , increase
anti-US sentiment and become a potent recruiting tool for terrorist organizations .78
Even strikes that kill only terrorist operatives can cause great resentment , particularly
in contexts in which terrorist recruiting efforts rely on tribal loyalties or on an economically
desperate population. Friends, family and fellow tribe members of those attacked or harmed in
strikes may become hostile to the United States, and, over years, their hostility may cost
the United States in terms of foreign cooperation, hostility to US travelers and foreign business and
support for terrorism. UAV hunter-killer operations may also go against the larger counterterrorism and
counterinsurgency strategy of attempting to gain support of local populations to deter them from supporting al-
Even where strikes kill only legitimate targets , the
Qaida and associated forces.79
perceived insult to sovereignty in places such as Pakistan and Yemen and among fellow tribe
members of the dead sparks bitterness, feelings of nationalism or other forms of
identity politics violently hostile to US military operations or Americans.80 As retired Army
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, former International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander in Afghanistan, has
noted, The resentment created by American use of unmanned strikes ... is much
greater than the average American appreciates. They are hated on a visceral level,
even by people whove never seen one or seen the effects of one. The unmanned
strikes, McChrystal says, create a perception of American arrogance that says, Well we can fly
where we want, we can shoot where we want, because we can. 81
Solves: Reverse Causal
The link between drone strikes and terror attacks is directly

correlatedlong term-analysis
Gill 15 [Paul, lecturer at University College Londons in the department of Security and Crime Science, THE
IMPACT OF DRONE ATTACKS ON TERRORISM: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN, The Remote Control Project, June 2015,
http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Paul_Gill_drones_terrorism_Pakistan.pdf] AW
there is a positive linear relationship between drones

What is clear however, is that
and terrorism attacks at the monthly level. The nature of the drone strike does not
appear to matter (in terms of the numbers killed or who was killed), just the fact that they
occurred. The violent response by terrorist groups is disproportionately more likely
to target civilians (and hence also increase the fatality rate as they are softer targets). This finding regarding
civilians taking the likely brunt of the upswing in terrorism attacks has been found in studies of the Northern Ireland
The response also does not occur within a day or even a week, but has a longer term
conflict also.
implication as the terrorist group likely slows down its activities in the immediate
aftermath of a drone strike for basic security reasons. When they do re-emerge they
target softer targets that do not necessitate the lengthy planning that a high-value
target may warrant. The cumulative effect of these drone strikes on civilian
casualties has therefore been far greater in terms of their indirect victims
(e.g. those who died in the terrorist reprisals) than the victims directly killed in the drone strikes themselves. The
results displayed in this research report are of course purely correlational .
Future research may also disaggregate Pakistan into smaller geographical units and incorporate more variables for
a full regression to be carried out. These variables could control for aspects like the location of the drone strike,
population density, and socio-economic indicators. The work of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism in collecting
data on drone attacks is excellent but gaps in data still abound in terms of who the casualties are in drone strikes
(e.g. confirmed militants vs. ordinary citizens) and this may have implications for the results. Future research may
Other studies might
also account for the type of terrorist attack that occurs in response to drone attacks.
expect easily planned attacks (such as shootings) to be more likely than those attacks
requiring a great deal of coordination and planning (such as bombings).
AT: Signature Strikes
Strikes Solve Terror
Strikes are key to disrupt terror plotshamper communication

and alternative options are worse
Byman 13 [Daniel, director of research and a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings,
Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice, Brookings, Aug 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman]
AW
The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work .
According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S.
drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist
operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al
Qaeda and the Talibantop figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief
aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that
when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is the rise of lower leaders
who are not as experienced as the former leaders and who are prone to errors and
miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower
down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.
Drones have also undercut terrorists ability to communicate and to train new
recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to
avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers . A tip sheet found among
jihadists in Mali advised militants to maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts and avoid gathering in
Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and
open areas.
training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an
entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaedas command and training
structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders
and risking dead leaders. Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the
fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic . To be sure, in an ideal world,
militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful
information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than
lethal operations. That is why they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United
in war zones or unstable countries, such as
States enjoys the support of the host government. But
arresting militants is highly dangerous and , even if successful,
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia,
often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control
over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants
hiding out there. Worse yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants.
If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down
terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists , likely leading to
firefights, U.S. casualties, and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians. Of course, it was a Navy
SEAL team and not a drone strike that finally got bin Laden, but in many cases in which the United States needs to
capture or eliminate an enemy, raids are too risky and costly. And even if a raid results in a successful capture, it
begets another problem: what to do with the detainee. Prosecuting detainees in a federal or military court is difficult
because often the intelligence against terrorists is inadmissible or using it risks jeopardizing sources and methods.
And given the fact that the United States is trying to close, rather than expand, the detention facility at
Guantnamo Bay, Cuba, it has become much harder to justify holding suspects indefinitely. It has become more
a
politically palatable for the United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists. Furthermore, although
drone strike may violate the local states sovereignty , it does so to a lesser degree than
would putting U.S. boots on the ground or conducting a large-scale air campaign. And compared with
a 500-pound bomb dropped from an F-16, the grenadelike warheads carried by most drones create smaller, more
precise blast zones that decrease the risk of unexpected structural damage and casualties. Even more important,
drones, unlike traditional airplanes, can loiter above a target for hours, waiting for the ideal moment to strike and
using drones is also far less
thus reducing the odds that civilians will be caught in the kill zone. Finally,
bloody than asking allies to hunt down terrorists on the United States behalf. The
Pakistani and Yemeni militaries, for example, are known to regularly torture and execute
detainees, and they often indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant
groups. Some critics of the drone program, such as Ben Emmerson, the UNs special rapporteur on the promotion
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, have questioned the lethal
approach, arguing for more focus on the factors that might contribute to extremism and terrorism, such as poverty,
unemployment, and authoritarianism. Such a strategy is appealing in principle, but it is far from clear how
Individuals join anti-American terrorist groups for many
Washington could execute it.
reasons, ranging from outrage over U.S. support for Israel to anger at their own
governments cooperation with the United States. Some people simply join up
because their neighbors are doing so. Slashing unemployment in Yemen, bringing democracy to Saudi
Arabia, and building a functioning government in Somalia are laudable goals, but they are not politically or
financially possible for the United States, and even if achieved, they still might not reduce the allure of jihad.
AT: Pakistan and Yemen Support
Pakistan and Yemen government support strikesempirical

support
Byman 13 [Daniel, director of research and a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings,
Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice, Brookings, Aug 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2013/06/17-drones-obama-weapon-choice-us-counterterrorism-byman]
AW
It is also telling that drones have earned the backing, albeit secret, of foreign
governments. In order to maintain popular support, politicians in Pakistan and
Yemen routinely rail against the U.S. drone campaign. In reality, however, the
governments of both countries have supported it. During the Bush and Obama
administrations, Pakistan has even periodically hosted U.S. drone facilities and has been
told about strikes in advance. Pervez Musharraf, president of Pakistan until 2008, was not
worried about the drone programs negative publicity : In Pakistan, things fall out of the sky all
the time, he reportedly remarked. Yemens former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, also at times
allowed drone strikes in his country and even covered for them by telling the public
that they were conducted by the Yemeni air force . When the United States involvement was
leaked in 2002, however, relations between the two countries soured. Still, Saleh later let the drone
program resume in Yemen, and his replacement , Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has publicly
praised drones, saying that they pinpoint the target and have zero margin of error, if you know what target
youre aiming at. As officials in both Pakistan and Yemen realize, U.S. drone strikes help
their governments by targeting common enemies. A memo released by the antisecrecy website
WikiLeaks revealed that Pakistans army chief, Ashfaq Parvez kayani, privately asked U.S. military
leaders in 2008 for continuous Predator coverage over antigovernment militants, and the
journalist Mark Mazzetti has reported that the United States has conducted goodwill kills against
Pakistani militants who threatened Pakistan far more than the United States. Thus,
in private, Pakistan supports the drone program. As then Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told
Anne Patterson, then the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, in 2008, Well protest [against the drone program] in the
National Assembly and then ignore it.
UAV strikes are popular with foreign populationscitizens hate

terrorists more
Crilly 16 [Rob, Irish freelance journalist, Why many people in Pakistan support American drone strikes, The
Telegraph, May 19 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/19/why-many-people-in-pakistan-support-
american-drone-strikes/] AW
Since then the strikes have slowed. But to date there have been 423 strikes and as many as 3,999
people killed, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The civilian victims have been documented and
the strikes
used as evidence that the American programme was counterproductive. No, said the police officer,
were popular around his town. He explained patiently how Hussain, one of the Pakistan Taliban's
most feared commanders, had run training camps for children. Such was his reputation he
was known as Ustad-i-Fedayeen, teacher of suicide bombers, and kept DI Khan in a permanent state of anxiety.
Until he died, that is, in one of the CIA drone strike that occasionally lit up Pakistan's tribal areas.
No one is quite sure when he was killed. But the officer was convinced he had died in the months before our
meeting. That is when the suicide attacks stopped. It was not the first time I'd had a conversation like this. During
my four and a half years reporting from Pakistan I began to learn that the drone debate was skewed.
Speak to protesters in Lahore or Islamabad and you would hear how drone strikes were part of the problem,
creating blowback against the West. It was an easy connection to make. Finding out what was really happening, in a
region all but inaccessible to foreigners, was impossible. I asked campaigners for help checking the details, but their
researchers in the tribal regions were always mysteriously unreachable. To operate there meant toeing the
militants' line anyway. Andthe closer I got to the areas pockmarked by strikes, then the
more the population seemed to support the CIA drones . As the friendly policeman had
explained, these after all were people who had to live with the daily consequences of
terrorism. A new survey seems to bear out my anecdotal impressions. Aqil Shah, a professor at Oklahoma
University, conducted 147 interviews with people in South Waziristan and found a majority of people
believed the strikes had made a decisive contribution to breaking the back of the
Pakistan Taliban and generally avoided harming civilians . Broadly speaking, the
interview data do not support the blowback thesis, he wrote. More specifically, the
data contradict the presumed local radicalisation effects of drones. In fact, 79
percent of the respondents endorsed drones. While there were concerns about earlier signature
strikes when the CIA targeted, for example, groups of young men without really knowing who they were more
than two thirds of respondents said non-militant victims were known sympathisers
or collaborators.
AT: Kills Civilians
UAV strikes dont kill a disproportionate number of civilians
reforms and new tech
062414.pdf] AW
Lethal UAV strikes frequently have been criticized for their alleged tendency to cause excessive civilian casualties.
UAV technologies, in fact, enable greater
This criticism has little basis in fact. Contrary to popular belief,
precision in targeting than most other common means of warfare . UAVs are a platform for
tactical air-to-surface missiles, such as Hellfire II missiles, which themselves are very accurate munitions for tactical
In contrast to manned aircraft,
strikes, whether they are launched from manned or unmanned platforms.
however, UAVs enable persistent surveillance: they can spend hours, days, weeks or even months
monitoring a potential target. Equipped with imaging technologies that enable operators , who
may be thousands of miles away, to see details as fine as individual faces, modern UAV
technologies allow their operators to distinguish between civilians and
combatants far more effectively than most other weapons systems
including, most especially, manned aircraft. No weapons system is perfect, and targeting decisions whether for
UAV strikes or for any other weapons delivery system are only as good as the intelligence on which they are
the empirical
based. We do not doubt that some US UAV strikes have killed innocent civilians. Nonetheless,
evidence suggests that the number of civilians killed is small compared to the
civilian deaths typically associated with other weapons delivery systems (including
manned aircraft). The frequency and number of civilian casualties resulting from US
drone strikes also appear to have dropped sharply in recent years, as UAV
technologies have improved and targeting rules have been tightened.53
Dont Solve Terror
The CP falls shortlarger structural conditions fuel terrorism,

not strikes
Cottee 15 [Simon, senior lecturer in criminology at the University of Kent, What Motivates Terrorists?, The
Atlantic, June 09 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/terrorism-isis-motive/395351/] AW
One culturally prevalent answer to the why question is that terrorists are driven or pushed to do it, and that the
decisive driving or pushing agent is pathology. This answer has evolved in recent years in line with advances in
knowledge and moral sensibilities. In terrorism studies in the late 1960s, it was not uncommon for scholars to
conceive of pathology as a psychological abnormality or affliction rooted inside the individual. Since the 1980s, this
idea has fallen into disrepute, and the scholarly consensus now holds that the roots of terrorism lie not
in the individual, but in the wider circumstances in which terrorists live and act. This
reflects a broader consensus in the social sciences about violence: namely, that it is socially
determined, a product of deeper historical, economic, or cultural forces over and
above the individual. It is perhaps best summarized by the renowned social psychologist Albert Bandura.
Drawing on studies of violence from across the human sciences, Bandura concluded that it requires
conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious
deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do
extraordinarily cruel things. Social scientists argue about the nature and impact of the social
conditions in question, but few would question the essential point that violence, however personalized or
idiosyncratic its expression, is primarily rooted in historical structures or social
relationships, not individuals, still less their pathological mindsets. This
consensus is also reflected in much liberal-left commentary about terrorism, especially of the jihadist variant. For
example, in some quarters of the radical left it is asserted that the roots of jihadist terrorism lie not in Islam but in
the myriad historical crimes and injustices of Western, and specifically U.S.-driven, imperialismmost notably, in
the post-9/11 era, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Jihadist violence, from this perspective, is an inevitable
reaction fueled by Muslim anger and vengeance; and Westernized jihadists, far from
rejecting the civilized norms and ideals proclaimed by the West, are in fact alienated from a West that
excludes, demeans, and harasses Muslims. The scholarly consensus on violence has a lot going for
it. It humanizes the perpetrators of violence by insisting on their ordinariness and contextualizing their actions. It
obliges people to reflect on their own possible shortcomings and vulnerabilities, and how, in different
circumstances, they too could do monstrous deeds. And it compels people to recognize that they do not act in a
social vacuum, and that what they think, feel, and do is powerfully shaped by the broader historical circumstances
Westernized jihadists, as a recent report cogently
in which they are compelled to live and act. Moreover,
assuredly are alienated and feel that they do not belong in a secular world
suggested,
that often mocks and challenges their religion and identity as Muslims.

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The way the files are meant to be done is creating multiplank

This file doesnt have as many impacts as other camps, and if

Olivine reacts with CO2 to trap it from the atmosphere

The relationship between atmospheric and seawater CO2 is closely correlated . As in

Its not impossiblecheaper than other forms of geo-

No long-term warming solvency

Err against the CPnot enough data has been collected to

Iron Fertilization damages the environmenttoxic by-product

Winning the CP requires winning that BMDs are actually

The aff answers are divided up into different scenarios. you

In terms of updates, I would do more in-depth deterrence

Funding is key to maintain Ballistic Missile Defense and

Deterrence theory has evolvedmissile defenses are now key

proliferation of nuclear weapons has a

Ballistic Middle Defense is effectivealters hostile cost-benefit

Practical and empirical examples prove that BMDs dont work

contemporary U.S. and allied missile defenses

MDA is hella expensive and has a history of financial

BMDs dont solve hypersonic missile development which are an

hypersonic missiles have been billed as a method for quickly delivering

ICBMs, not BMDs are the fulcrum on which deterrence relies

They have it wrongBMDs weaken deterrencesecond strike

Encouraging discussion over global issues builds trust for bi-

use the CPE as a model to create a

Person to Person solves a myriad of issuesexperts cooperate

Person to Person exchanges are critical to inform policy

CP is a prereq to effective 1AC implementationbuilds trust

The CP already existssquo systems are continually being

the CPE mechanism was

CTBT expands the U.S. capability to detect and end rogue

CTBT tech is all encompassing of the Earthfunctionally no

The Organizations international monitoring and verification system has been

Testing wouldnt happen and we have sufficient info now

The CP has a domino effect which pressures other countries to

Nope, the treaty doesnt go into effect until its ratified.

CTBT doesnt solveno enforcement, structural issues,

U.S. nuclear deterrent

of US naval power, allow us to bully other countries, and

The United States federal government should replace each of

Reconfiguring the navy is key to end carrier gap and maintain

Carriers create a unique signal which de-escalates conflicts

Improving air tech and changing needs means small carriers

If we were to move to a smaller fleet of supercarriers, dispersing these assets would

Although a drawback in America's naval force structure is inevitable, there may be an

Save money live betterat worse only of 1% of daily

Carriers arent cost-effective and perceived benefits are

Carriers fail specifically in the context of China

Only Ford Carriers maintain power projectionsQueen

The CP is key to shore of U.S. technical deficienciesno new

Bill greatly improves electronic warfare capabilities

Fast-tracks new electronic warfare development

Every U.S. military advantage is undermined by electronic

Ineffective Electronic warfare undermines individual troops

Russia has been developing electronic warfare for a while

Russian electronic-warfare powerhouse KRETConcern Radio-Electronic Technologieshas started

There arent enough electronic warfare capabilitiesresources

The Army is testing a series of new electronic warfare technologies designed to

New tech is filling the gap nownew growler airplane

Funding is stable nowmost recent budget bill

These missile strikes are actually so screwed up

The idea is that these strikes contribute to an anti-U.S.

The United States federal government should eliminate the

Signature strikes tank US credibility and fuel terrorism