Extended Cognition (Lecture 1)

Andrea Polonioli

University of Edinburgh
a.polonioli@sms.ed.ac.uk

November 10, 2014

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Our question for today and Thursday:

Where is the mind?

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Intuitive answer
In the head, of course!

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Where does cognition take place?

Prevailing explanations of cognitive behavior appeal to:

Internal mechanisms

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Where does cognition take place?

Popular explanations of cognitive behavior also appeal to:

brain region activation patterns

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Today and this Thursday well consider a different perspective on mind

and cognition:

Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC)

Mental states and cognitive processes in humans extend outside their
heads to include external resources

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

The hypothesis was put forth by Clark and Chalmers in the 1998 paper
published in Analysis

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Consider a more familiar idea: the extended body

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

According to HEC, technology might get incorporated into our minds

But you dont have to look like this to incorporate technology in your
mind!

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

There is a more ordinary kind of cognitive extension

Consider that some functions of our brains have been taken over by
smart-phones

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

In the words of David Chalmers:

The iPhone [...] has replaced part of my memory, storing phone

numbers and addresses that I once would have taxed my brain with.
It harbors my desires: I call up a memo with the names of my favorite
dishes when I need to order at a local restaurant. I use it to calculate,
when I need to figure out bills and tips. It is a tremendous resource in
an argument, with Google ever present to help settle disputes. I make
plans with it, using its calendar to help determine what I can and cant
do in the coming months. I even daydream on the iPhone, idly calling
up words and images when my concentration slips.

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Is this just a big metaphor?

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

No, a genuine philosophical hypothesis

Cognitive processes realized by your computer, calendar, notebook, etc.

just as they are by your neural resources

Mental processes and states...

Actually extend outside our head, not just could
Often extend, not rarely
Extend, but not cosciousness
Extend, but this does not mean that external objects have
independent mental lives

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 Extended Cognition: An Introduction

Some authors claim that there are in fact two different theses here (e.g.
Poyhonen 2014, 737)

Extended mind hypothesis: mental states such as beliefs can be

partly constituted by the environment
Extended cognition hypothesis: cognitive processes can span the
brain, body and external world
Here we take our version of HEC to refer to both mental states and
cognitive processes

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 Plan of lectures

1 Today
Introduce the functionalist argument for HEC
2 Thursday
Should we look for other / better justifications of HEC?

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 Plan for today

CCs arguments for HEC

Problems for HEC: Rupert, Adams and Aizawas objections
A reply to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa

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 Plan for today

CCs arguments for HEC

Problems for HEC: Rupert, Adams and Aizawas objections
A reply to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa

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 CCs arguments for HEC

Clark and Chalmerss (1998) case for HEC is supported by two thought
experiments:
Case 1: Tetris
Case 2: Otto and Inga

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 Case 1: Tetris

Consider 3 ways to play Tetris

T1 - Mentally rotating ones image of blocks to see if they will fit
T2 - Pressing physical button to rotate blocks on-screen to see if they
will fit
T3 - Neural implant: Using a neural implant that rotates ones
mental image on demand

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 Case 1: Tetris

The argument:
Premise 1: T1 is a cognitive process
Premise 2: T3 is a cognitive process
Premise 3: T2 and T3 have an equal claim to cognitive status
Conclusion: T2 is a cognitive process

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 Case 2: Otto and Inga

Inga:

Inga is a normal human subject

Inga hears of exhibition at MoMA
Inga recalls that MoMA is on 53rd Street, and sets off

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 Case 2: Otto and Inga

Otto:

Otto has mild form of Alzheimers and always writes down useful info
in his notebook
Otto hears of exhibition at MoMA
Otto retrieves its address from his notebook, and sets off

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 Case 2: Otto and Inga

Clark and Chalmers observe that Ottos notebook (N) and Ingas
biological memory (B) play the same functional role:

N interacts with Ottos desires and beliefs in the same way as B

interacts with Ingas desires and beliefs
New information causes Otto to revise N, just as new information
causes Inga to revise B
N causes Otto to stop at 53rd Street, just as B causes Inga to stop at
53rd Street
The functional role of the stored information is the same in both cases

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 Case 2: Otto and Inga

Only difference is that Ingas B lies inside her skin, and Ottos N lies
outside his skin

Can we object on these grounds?

N and B are otherwise relevantly alike

Therefore, N and B have equal claim to mentality

Conclusion: Just as Inga has a belief that MoMA is on 53rd St., so Otto
has a belief with the same content that extends partially into the
environment

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 The parity principle

Parity Principle (PP)

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in
recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is
(so we claim) part of the cognitive process

Guarantees equal treatment between internal and extended cases

We should not be prejudiced against extended processes
If two processes are similar in all relevant ways (except for one being
extended and the other being purely internal), then both have equal
claim to be cognitive

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 CCs arguments for HEC

The argument for HEC based on PP

Parity Principle: If two processes extended and internal are just like
one another, then they have an equal claim to be cognitive
Premise 2: Extended processes actually exist that are just like some
internal cognitive processes
HEC: Extended cognitive processes actually exist

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 CCs arguments for HEC

So, PP looks like a broadly functionalist principle

Functionalism: what makes something a mental state is that it has a

certain pattern of causes and effects

Pre-history - physicalism: what makes something a mental state is what it

is made out of (neurons)

Problem with physicalism: chauvinist about mental life

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 CCs arguments for HEC

Functionalism
Each mental state has a unique signature
Reproduce the signature, and one reproduces the state
For instance, pain = state with X, Y, Z causes and A, B, C effects

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 CCs arguments for HEC

Functionalism as an embattled doctrine

It has proliferated several versions

But functionalism is orthodoxy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science

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 Plan for today

CCs arguments for HEC

Problems for HEC: Rupert, Adams and Aizawas objections
A reply to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa

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 Challenging the functionalist argument for HEC

Different moves available to resist the conclusion

A popular move is to accept the Parity Principle and question Premise 2:

Extended processes actually exist that are just like some internal
cognitive processes

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 Challenging the functionalist argument for HEC

Rupert, Adams and Aizawa claim that Premise 2 is false

Once one looks at the fine-grained detail of the Tetris and Otto/Inga
cases, can see they are not relevantly like any internal cognitive process:

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 Challenging the functionalist argument for HEC

Rupert: negative transfer absent in the extended processes

Adams and Aizawa: functional and causal structures of T1 and T2 are

different

Moreover, the functional role of N in Ottos life is not the same as that of
B in Ingas

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 Challenging the functionalist argument for HEC

So, extended processes are not just like some internal cognitive processes!

We should deny premise 2

The argument for HEC is not sound

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 Plan for today

CCs arguments for HEC

Problems for HEC: Rupert, Adams and Aizawas objections
A reply to Rupert, Adams and Aizawa

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 A problem with the objection: the Martian intuition

There is a problem with the objection, though

Consider that functionalism might come in different varieties:

Fine-grained vs. coarse-grained functionalism

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 A problem with the objection: the Martian intuition

Functionalist theories have a grain parameter: how much detail to

specify the causal role of a mental state

Rupert, Adams and Aizawas objections make fine-grained features of

internal cognition essential

But this makes us chauvinists about the mental!

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 A problem with the objection: the Martian intuition

We want to say that a creature could have mental states even if it had a
different biological makeup from ourselves:
It does not matter if it has green slime instead of neurons
It is possible for a creature to have a different fine-grained psychology
Learning profiles, reaction times and cognitive architecture may differ

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 A problem with the objection: the Martian intuition

For instance, we can think of a Martian with internal memory store of

ink-marks instead of neurons

The Martian may have genuine beliefs, even if his cognitive architecture is
different from ours

If fine-grained features are necessary for mentality, then we are committed

to chauvinism

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