Tipología de La Retaliación

JOURNAL
10.1177/0022427803262058
Jacobs
ARTICLE/ STREET
OF RESEARCH
CRIMINALINRETALIATION
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
A TYPOLOGY OF
STREET CRIMINAL RETALIATION
BRUCE A. JACOBS
Criminologists have long recognized that retaliatory violence diffuses outward from
discrete conflicts, often in contagion-like fashion. No understanding of the source of
this spread is possible without first documenting the modalities that fuel it. Retalia-
tion has variation, and it is important to catalog that variation if the concept of crime
as social control is to be more effectively understood. Drawing from in-depth inter-
views with 33 street offenders, and using qualitative techniques of analytic induction,
constant comparison, and domain analysis, this article offers a typology of retaliation
to refine understanding of a process that at present, remains only loosely developed.
Keywords: retaliation; violence; social control
Retaliation is a potent regulator of offender conduct, arguably the most

potent form of social control. Formal sanctions typically carry little deterrent
value, but the prospect of being wronged for a wrong you yourself committed
is far more certain, and its consequences more severe. Retaliation is a power-
ful testament to the norm of reciprocitya norm that holds every action
should yield an equal and opposite reaction (Gouldner 1960). Such reactions
may be extralegal, but rough justice (Baron, Forde, and Kennedy 2001) is
more effective precisely because grievants, not external actors or institutions,
are responsible for righting perceived wrongs.
The street criminal underworld is a context where law is unavailable as a
matter of course. Criminals lose legal protections when violated and must
retaliate to restore balance. The importance of self-help is amplified by the
code of the street, a set of normative concerns that prescribes appropriate
conduct in the face of conflict (Anderson 1999). At the core of the code is
respectgetting it, maintaining it, and enhancing it. This can be accom-
plished in a number of ways, but how one reacts to an affront is determinative.
I would like to thank Eric Baumer, Bob Bursik, Ted Chiricos, Jennifer Jacobs, Rick
Rosenfeld, Gordon Waldo, Richard Wright, and several anonymous reviewers for their helpful
comments and criticisms. I also would like to acknowledge the support of Noah and Grant
Jacobs. Please address correspondence to Bruce Jacobs, School of Social Sciences, University of
Texas-Dallas, Richardson, TX 75083-0688.
JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, Vol. 41 No. 3, August 2004 295-323
DOI: 10.1177/0022427803262058
2004 Sage Publications
295
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296 JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
To let a transgression slide, even one that is trivial, more often than not sig-
nals weakness. It demonstrates that you are soft, that you can be exploited
with impunity. Adversaries must be faced down and put in their proper place,
lest you be labeled a chump (Anderson 1999; Horowitz 1983; Wolfgang
and Ferracuti 1967).
Alerting the authorities is not a realistic option even if it were a desired
one. Calling the police conveys the impression that you cannot take care of
business yourself. It also labels you a snitch, and in street culture, there are
few worse statuses (Rosenfeld, Jacobs, and Wright 2003). The police are
widely thought to be ineffective anyway. They rarely are around when dis-
putes erupt. They take too long to respond. Their response makes little dif-
ference in the trajectory of a dispute. More troubling, the police often are
perceivedat least by street offendersto be hostile to real justice. They
reportedly detain people for little reason, hassle suspects in their charge,
plant evidence, use excessive force, and fail to give breaks when they could
(Rosenfeld et al. 2003; see also Anderson 1999; Miller 1996). Such per-
ceptions foment disrespect for the rule of law, promoting an atmosphere
that strengthens the oppositional culture and its reliance on self-help (see
Anderson 1999).
Despite the preeminence of self-help in settings beyond the law, the man-
ner in which criminal-grievants express their retaliatory impulses remains
poorly specified. No understanding of retaliations role in the spread of urban
violence is possible without first cataloging its variation and possible reasons
for it. A typology would help to accomplish this goal. The present article
offers one with this in mind.
The Retaliation Literature
The criminological literature on retaliation is surprisingly scant

surprising insofar as most social control is informal and many crimes are
moralistic (Black 1983; Katz 1988). Retaliation represents the obvious inter-
section between informal social control and moralism. It is, to use Blacks
(1983) elegant phrase, crime as social control. Extant studies are largely
descriptive and examine reprisal tangentially to other dynamics relevant to
offender groups and settings (see, e.g., Cromwell et al. 1991; Decker and Van
Winkle 1996; Jacobs 2000; Luckenbill 1977; Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco
2001). These studies do not explore retaliations essential variation, nor do
they attempt to organize it in any systematic way. When retaliation is exam-
ined in its own right, its situated composition is less important than the factors
that mediate the availability of law (Black 1983; Horwitz 1990). Retaliation
is represented more broadly in studies of formal organizations (Rothschild
and Miethe 1999), gender (Schnake et al. 1997), children (Herzberger and

Jacobs / STREET CRIMINAL RETALIATION 297
Hall 1993), domestic violence (Marleau and Hamilton 1999), racism (Craig
1999), terrorism (Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare 1994), and experimen-
tal psychology (see, e.g., DeRidder et al. 1999; Kim et al. 1998). But its struc-
ture, process, and contingent forms remain poorly understood.
Retaliation as an act of social control may be conceptually generic, but
particular retributive modalities unfold in particular circumstances. In the
abstract, reprisal by street criminals will always be immediate. Cowering in
the moment is not an option, and no amount of retrospective interpretation
deflects the stigma from an unjustified surrender. Reflexivity becomes even
more important when an audience is presentthird parties are the final arbi-
ters of status (Wilkinson and Fagan 2001:174)and when violators are
prone to talk. Word on the street travels fast, and the reputational damage can
be serious and long-lasting.
But the abstract and reality are not always consonant, and delays separat-
ing the response from the affront are a significant possibility. The affront may
not involve face-to-face contact. The affront may involve contact, but the vio-
lator may be able to escape. The violation may not involve contact, and the
violator may be unknown to the grievant. Information about the violators
identity or whereabouts might not emerge until well after the affront, if at all.
Information might emerge, but the grievant may be unable to catch the viola-
tor in a sufficiently compromising position to make retaliation possible. The
grievant might be unable to generate sufficient coercive power relative to
the violator or find him/herself in a setting unsuitable for retaliation. The
grievant may desire to retaliate but face costs and risks (e.g., foregone crimi-
nal wages, chance of arrest) that are too high to justify a strike at the moment
it is contemplated.
Violators take specific actions to amplify the prospect of deferment. Not
infrequently, they target people who do not know them, they wear disguises
to thwart the possibility of being tracked down, they alternatively lay low and
exercise mobility to make detection more difficult, and they maintain a high
degree of vigilance and defensibility to head off a retaliatory strike if and
when it comes (see Jacobs, Topalli, and Wright 2000). Desiring to retaliate
and consummating the act are two different things, so despite the discourse
about immediacy, situational factors can make it more talk than real.
Delays and uncertainty are significant because affronts attack identity
rather than some economic or political utility (Gabriel 1998; Greenberg
1993; Miller 2001). It is because injustice threatens identity that grievants
experience it as so disturbing: When maintaining or re-establishing justice,
[grievants are] actually maintain[ing] or re-establish[ing their] identities
(Wenzel 2001:331). This is especially true in street culture, where minor
affronts assume major prominence. Strikes that are delayed or that do not
involve face-to-face contact threaten reputational damage in excess of that

created by the violation itself. How grievants effect retaliatory modalities

with this dilemma in mind is of interest.
Drawing from in-depth interviews with 33 street offenders, and using
qualitative techniques of analytic induction, constant comparison, and
domain analysis (Spradley 1980; Strauss 1987), this article offers a descrip-
tive typology of retaliation that specifies reprisals various forms against a
backdrop of relevant constraints. Retaliation has variation, and it is important
to catalog this variation if the concept of crime as social control is to be more
effectively understood. Criminologists have long recognized that retaliatory
violence diffuses outward from discrete conflicts, often in contagion-like
fashion (Loftin 1985). No understanding of the source of this spread is possi-
ble without first documenting the modalities that fuel it.
Conceptual Context
Retaliation is a type of coercive action (Tedeschi and Felson 1994). As

such, it evolves in three distinct stages: naming, claiming, and aggression
(Luckenbill and Doyle 1989). Naming occurs when there is a perception
or recognition of harm from anothers behavior. Claiming transforms the
perceived injurious experience into a dispute (Baron, Forde, and Kennedy
2001:663), typically by demanding reparation from the wrongdoer. Aggres-
sion results when the aggrieved party decides to use force to resolve the dis-
pute (Luckenbill and Doyle 1989). In settings where normative support of
violence is strong, claiming may be bypassed in favor of outright aggression
(see Luckenbill and Doyle 1989 on the notion of disputatiousness).
Retaliation is an informal sanction that involves both punishment and
deterrencepunishment in the sense of payback for a past wrong, deter-
rence in the sense of inhibiting future transgressions by the violator or other
potential violators. Like any social control device, retaliation represents a
response to deviance (Goode 1997). Social control is penal, compensatory,
conciliatory, or therapeutic (Black 1993), but the end goal is always the same:
to respond to behavior in ways that maximize social order.
Informal social control has long occupied a central place in deterrence
theory. Analysts argue that would-be offenders contemplate the social costs
of rule-breaking (shame, guilt, embarrassment, loss of social standing) and
decide it is in their best interest not to offend. Bishop (1984:405) concludes
that informal sanctions may be the real deterrent and that formal punish-
ment is important only insofar as it triggers [them] (see also Zimring and
Hawkins 1973; for a nice overview, also see Brown, Esbensen, and Geis
1996).
As an informal sanction, retaliation is distinct from more traditional emo-
tive forces like shame, guilt, and embarrassment. The latter requires a cogni-

tive presence in the mind of the would-be offender. Retaliation is actual pun-
ishment, a physical act experienced only after it is delivered (Jacobs, Topalli,
and Wright 2000). Though the fear of retaliation does introduce the possibil-
ity of a cognitive deterrent to wrongdoing, this fear is less salient among
street criminals relative to other offenders because violence is routine, and
fatalism reduces worry: The threat of retaliation is assumed. It is part of the
game. Its risk can be managed. If the risk becomes unmanageable, offenders
simply cease to think about it. Fatalism is liberating by taking at least some of
the power away from fear (on fatalism and its role in releasing worry, see
Jacobs 2000; Miller 1958).
Retaliation may more closely resemble a formal sanction than certain
informal ones by virtue of its external sourcing and threats of physical inca-
pacitation or material deprivation (Jacobs, Topalli, and Wright 2000). The
harm accruing from retaliatory acts can rival or exceed even the most severe
forms of official punishment. Formal systems of criminal justice arose, in
part, because vigilantism was disproportionate to the affronts that incited
street justice.
Retaliation occurs in the service of justice but is guided by the principle of
revenge. Justice and revenge can be at odds when identity-defense anchors
the retributive process. Strikes in defense of identity tend to be excessive,
which is understandable in settings where affronts are considered blows to
character. But revenge has its own moral imperative and in seeking it,
grievants believe they are doing justice (Bies and Tripp 1996:258; see also
Bies and Tripp 2001). The objective of justice-seeking, however, is to get
even, and the objective of identity-defense is to win (Tedeschi and Felson
1994). Winning requires that grievants exact severe harm against violators.
In an irrational, Nietzschean way . . . [grievants seek] to humiliate and oblit-
erate [the violator] . . . , as if their own vitality derives from the . . . humilia-
tions . . . they inflict . . . (Gabriel 1998:1349). The point is that retaliation
may be grounded objectively in the norm of reciprocity, but reciprocity has
a subjective dimension when it occurs within the confines of punitive social
control. Exploring the nexus between punishment, identity-defense, and
social control permits our understanding of this understudied informal
sanction to be refined.
METHOD
Data for this study were drawn from in-depth qualitative interviews with
33 active offenders recruited from the streets of St. Louis, Missouri. Inter-
views took place in summer 2001 and summer 2002. The mean age of
respondents was 26.6 (the median was 25.5). A total of 25 respondents were

male, 8 were female; respondents, on average, had completed 11.6 years of

formal education; 17 of the 33 respondents claimed to work in some capac-
ity; 25 respondents reported having children, 8 did not; 2 of the 33 respon-
dents were married. All respondents were African American.
Respondents were recruited with the help of a specially trained, and com-
pensated, project fieldworker. This person, an active offender himself (also
interviewed as part of the 33), assisted the author in several previous projects
over the course of three years, demonstrating his reliability each time. The
fieldworker recruited individuals whom he knew to be involved in street cul-
ture and crime (friends, associates, acquaintances) and asked them to partici-
pate in an interview. There were no formal eligibility criteria beyond this. The
type of activities in which respondents participated ranged widely, from
assault to property crime to (episodic) drug use and/or dealing. The author
chose not to reveal the specific study protocol or interview questionnaire to
the fieldworker prior to initiating recruitment for fear it would give inter-
viewees the opportunity to craft their responses to meet the needs of the
study.1 All the respondents, however, had in fact experience with retaliation,
some of it quite extensive and recent. These experiences comprised the focus
of the interviews.
Interviews were tape-recorded, transcribed verbatim, and semistructured,
but allowed for considerable probing. The intention was for interviews to
flow much like a conversation, to elicit the thick description necessary for a
study of this nature. Some respondents were a bit apprehensive at first, but
most quickly relaxed and became quite conversational. Promises of anonym-
ity and confidentiality undoubtedly helped, as did the word of the field-
worker that everything was cool. In criminological field research, the gate-
keepers importance should not be underestimated (Walker and Lidz 1977).
The fieldworker had a solid reputation and an established track record of
working successfully with the author. The author himself is well-regarded
in the circles of offenders from which the fieldworker recruits. Respon-
dents knew they would not be burned by speaking with me, and this
seemed to put them at ease. A modest sum of $50 was provided to encourage
participation.
A number of specific measures were used to enhance the datas internal
validity. The author never asked for respondents real names, only street
names, which are sufficiently generic not to identify anyone in particular.
The author assured interviewees that their transcripts would be held in strict
confidence. The author emphasized (to respondents who appeared to be
especially wary) the importance of being sincere; their comments could end
up in a book or article, so it was critical to get it right. Past experience work-
ing with offenders suggested this to be an effective strategy. The author moni-

tored the veracity of responses by probing for inconsistent answers, and by

asking respondents to clarify ambiguous statements.
Internal validity is always problematic in the absence of watching offend-
ers do what it is they report, but this is not possible for obvious legal, ethical,
and practical reasons. The validity and reliability of offender self-reports,
however, have been examined by a number of scholars, all of whom suggest
that in-depth interviews are an excellent method for generating valuable data
(see e.g., Elliott and Ageton 1980; Erickson and Empey 1963; Nye and Short
1956). This is not to say that offenders never misrepresent what they do, but
rather that deception is far less rampant than many analysts might presume
(see Fleisher 1995).
As for external validity, the representativeness of a purposively drawn
sample of offenders cannot be determined conclusively because the parame-
ters of the population are unknown (Glassner and Carpenter 1985; Wright
and Decker 1994). Though all of these respondents were recruited by the
same fieldworker, offenders in this research setting tend to be quite mobile,
which enhances the likelihood that any purposively drawn sample will tap the
diversity of multiple networks. Criminal networks vary in structure, density,
and breadth, so this is important for improving generalizability within this
research setting and perhaps beyond it as well.
Though it would be unreasonable to claim that any fieldworker could
achieve theoretical saturation with a sample of 33, there is no cause to believe
that these respondents are unique or different from offenders examined in
other studies of street crime (see Hochstetler [2001] on this point). Re-
sponses did become repetitious, suggesting sufficient thematic coverage,
though it is conceivable that repetition was an artifact of the research design
itself. I have made reasonable effort to present quotes from a variety of
respondents, but selectivity is an unavoidable part of research of this kind
(Wright and Decker 1997). This is especially true because not all respondents
were asked the exact same questions or in the exact same order, because inter-
views became shorter and questions fewer as the research progressed (owing
to my desire to focus more systematically on issues raised earlier in the pro-
cess, such as the role of timing and contact in strikes), and because some
respondents inevitably are more candid or articulate than others. Necessarily,
this research must be considered exploratory in nature.
A Typology of Criminal Retaliation
Qualitative techniques of analytic induction, constant comparison, and

domain analysis (Spradley 1980; Strauss 1987) revealed the importance of
two axial factors around which retaliatory strikes can best be understood:
Whether such strikes occur immediately after the affront, and whether the

Affront
Retaliation
With face-to-face contact Without face-to-face contact
Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed
Delay Delay Delay Delay

desired undesired desired undesired
Reflexive Calculated Deferred Reflexively Sneaky Imperfect

displaced
Non
retaliation
Figure 1
strikes involve face-to-face contact with the person responsible for the
affront. Immediate reprisal that involves face-to-face contact will be called
reflexive retaliation. Immediate reprisal that involves no face-to-face contact
will be called reflexively displaced retaliation.2 When retaliation is delayed,
an added contingency is introducedwhether or not the delay is desired by
the retaliating party. This permits four additional possibilities. Face-to-face
retaliation where the delay is desired is called calculated retaliation. Face-to-
face retaliation where the delay is not desired is called deferred retaliation.
Retaliation without face-to-face contact where the delay is desired is called
sneaky retaliation. Retaliation without face-to-face contact with the violator
where the delay is undesired by the retaliating party is called imperfect retali-
ation. For the sake of clarity, these different types are presented as distinct
entities, but this is not meant to impose an artificial degree of clarity on cate-
gories that can fade into one another over time. The various branches of
this decision-tree and its assorted pathways are depicted schematically in
Figure 1.
Reflexive Retaliation
Reflexive retaliation is face-to-face retribution that occurs immediately

after an affront takes place. It is a knee-jerk response, in the moment. Of all

types, this one best fits the commonsense understanding of what street justice
is all about. Somebody wrongs you and you wrong them right back, immedi-
ately, without hesitation. In the words of Wilkinson and Fagan (2001:190),
cognition moves rapidly from cold to hot, and decision flows directly
into action. Reflexive strikes generally assume that the affront itself involves
face-to-face contact. Without such contact, the aggrieved party might not
know who the violator is or how she or he can be found. Both would create a
delay.
Reflexive retaliation is an outgrowth of the imperatives of street culture,
imperatives that emphasize spontaneous action and instant gratification to
the exclusion of almost everything else (see Shover 1996). Waiting also
makes you look afraid, and fear is not something you ever want to show.
Lashing out is much better. Intolerance gets you respect and makes you look
strong. Strength is protective.
Chewy thus beat a man into submission after the man chastised Chewy for
engaging a woman in street conversationostensibly for the purpose of
picking her up. The man claimed the woman was his wife, but she was not.
This claim in itself did not appear sufficient to trigger Chewys ire, but the
violators tenor and language was:
He started talking noise . . . calling me a punk and stuff . . . weak . . . I just upped
on him . . . I hit him a couple of times and then I grabbed him, threw him on the
ground and was on top of his hand. I busted it up. Then I started hitting him in
his chest, you know, punking him.
When the affront involves physical abuse, quick and forceful reactions
become even more important. Black was struck from behind by an associate
after making disparaging sexual remarks about the associates sister. The
blow was unexpected, occurred in front of an audience, was violent where
Blacks violation was verbal, and because it occurred from behind, was, in
Blacks words, cowardly shit. Black responded with a punch. A fight
ensued, but Black reportedly was unable to deliver the punishment he felt
was justified. He struck again two days later, this time in calculated fashion
(detailed shortly). Though Black obviously committed the violation that trig-
gered the affront that in turn led him to retaliate, disputes often escalate. Con-
flicts build sequentially and retaliation tends to breed counter-retaliation
(see, e.g., Luckenbill 1977; Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 2001; Wolfgang
1958).
Disputes escalate, but they also have a tendency to draw others in. Even
otherwise neutral parties might be required to respond through self-help to
a beef that was not theirs but that became theirs as events unfolded. Such
was the case with Lafonz, who found himself embroiled in conflict during a

neighborhood basketball game. A man called a foul on one of Lafonzs asso-

ciates (one of the mans opponents in the game). The associate claimed the
call was picky. An angry exchange of words followed, drawing in a second
associate as well as a friend of the man who made the call. A fight erupted.
Short of stature and slight of build, the associates were sorely outmatched,
and Lafonz reportedly felt it necessary to intervene on their behalf. Lafonzs
altruistic act, however, was very much rooted in self-interest. If he failed to
provide backup, word would have gotten back to the neighborhood that he
had pulled a bitch move, thereby sullying his reputation:
Because we all friends, you know what Im saying? Its like I cant let you get
beat up and just sit there and watch it . . . Itd just be . . . thatd be a bitch move . . .
itd have made me look bad . . . we from the same neighborhood and if I sit there
and let these two grown-ass men beat these two little dudes ass thats gonna
look bad on me.
Given their presupposed importance to the enactment of street justice,

more vital than explaining why reflexive strikes occurred is why they did not.
The data suggest that either the opportunity to strike reflexively was not pres-
ent, the situational context made it illogical, or grievants wanted to wait for
strategic reasons. One such reason was to cultivate the element of surprise.
Calculated strikes illustrate this strategy best.
Calculated Retaliation
Calculated retaliation is face-to-face retribution that is delayed where the

delay is desired by the retaliating party. Typically, delays are an outgrowth of
the grievants attempt to secure a competitive advantage over the violator.
The grievant wants the violator to believe as if the affront has been forgiven,
that he or she wants to move on. This is done to cultivate the element of sur-
prise. The data suggest that grievants generally know who the violator is and
have a pretty good idea of how to find him or her, so the strategy comes down
to waiting to attack until the moment is right.
Getting an opponent to lower his or her guard is perhaps the best strategy
for seizing the upper hand in a predatory encounterretaliatory or other-
wise. Stalking the violator openly, or letting him or her know that you are still
mad and out to get him or her, tips your hand and permits him or her to pre-
vent the retaliatory strike, or to mount a preemptive strike of his or her own.
Waiting and then acting by surprise later also permits the grievant to erase
any competitive advantage the violator might have at the moment the affront
occurs, an advantage that may have prevented the grievant from retaliating

reflexively in the first place. Waiting, finally, permits you to retaliate in a

form and at a level of your choosing.
Recall Blacks dissatisfaction with his initial reflexive strike against the
associate who punched him from behind. I didnt get no solid lick of his ass
[that night],3 he complained. I didnt get mine back. Biding his time for a
couple of days, to make the violator believe that everything was cool, Black
struck with full force when he felt the moment was opportune. What is
important is that he waited for an audience to be present, perhaps to show
up the associate in the same way he, Black, had been shown up. Black also
appeared to use the audience as a lure to bring the violator out and make him
feel comfortable, as is evident below:
He walked down the steps . . . in front of his house . . . just standing there. You
know, we in a group, we down the street. We just talking. I figure that as he walk
down the steps. I just didnt approach him then. He started coming down where
the crowd was . . . it was cool . . . when he got down there that was it . . . I just did
to him what he did to me . . . I hit his motherfucking ass . . . I just hauled off and
stole his ass . . . [Then] I kicked him and kicked him . . . he was gone.
Robbed while selling drugs, Sugar managed to remove the scarf that con-
cealed the perpetrators face. Recognizing the violator (it was another female
drug dealer, apparently jealous of Sugars success), Sugar decided to wait a
week and let it die down a minute . . . [to] let [that] whore . . . think [she] got
me. Sugar also indicated that had she retaliated more quickly, the violator
would have been waiting for her with something powerful thatd fuck you
up. Driving down the street one evening, Sugar and an accomplice spotted
the violator at a bus stop. They followed the bus after the woman embarked,
and snuck up on her as she got off and began walking home. Sugar and the
accomplice administered a terrible beating and managed to recoup far more
than the $350 cash and quarter pound of marijuana lost in the initial robbery:
My partner had a big stick. She was hitting her like in her ribs . . . I was just hit-
ting her in her face . . . stomping her ass . . . whipping her ass . . . big old cut . . .
right back here by her ear . . . face all fucked up . . . and then I got like directly in
front of her and I kind of like stomped her down in a sack . . . You taking my
motherfucker shit. You aint gonna do that shit no more. I aint the bitch to play
with . . . [We took a] thousand dollars . . . two quarter pounds [of marijuana] . . .
big [diamond rings] . . . nice little chain . . . earrings . . . We took every mother-
fucking thing.
Grievants need not wait an extensive amount of time to exact revenge.

Indeed, it behooved them not to wait too long lest they make it appear as if

they had accepted the violation (nor did they want to wait that long, owing to
anger). The length of time a grievant waited was less important than how she
or he used time relative to space to cultivate the element of surprise. Robbed
at gunpoint of $600 cash, his car, and a ring he had purchased for his infant
son, Crazy Jay could not discern the perpetrators identity (the robber wore a
mask). He did, however, recognize the robbers voice and also the work boots
he wore during the robbery, which had distinctive paint stains. The man was a
crack user who resided upstairs to Crazy Jay; both men lived at an extended-
stay motel and Jay, a dealer, had sold drugs to him there numerous times. Set-
ting his alarm for 7 a.m. the following morningCrazy Jay . . . wanted him
to think he got me [and that] I didnt know who he wasJay and an asso-
ciate burst into the violators apartment and shocked his ass, beating him
senseless:
Started hitting him with the gun . . . 30 or 40 times . . . on top of his head, on his
back, on his face . . . You bitch-ass nigger, you motherfucking dope head, . . .
you puss-ass nigger . . . he was as bloody as a motherfucker . . . after I hit him
so many times I was starting to lose my breath so I stood back . . . I cocked my
gun and I was like, Now Im gonna kill you cause you not only taking from
me, you taking from my kids so now you got to die.
Crazy Jay stopped the beating only after learning the whereabouts of his
car (in a nearby parking lot). He then picked up a large bowl and smashed the
TV, ensuring that the violator would have to check out of his room that day
(he obviously did not want him living upstairs). Able to recoup $200 and his
car (minus the radio), Crazy Jay never recovered his sons ring. This clearly
incensed him, particularly because he had reportedly given the violator spe-
cial treatment as a customer (i.e., delivery sales, credit). You bite the hand
that feeds you[,] . . . you need to be disciplined, Crazy Jay explained. Deter-
rence also was on his mind. If you ever, ever, ever, decide to do that shit
again, he described his thinking, [remember] this first cause it gonna be
even more severe.
Mad Dog let two days elapse before he returned to even a score against a
neighborhood rival who had approached him menacingly with a gun (Mad
Dog was in his car on a date at the time and was forced to speed off). Just to
let it cool down some, he explained. So they [the violator and his associ-
ates] wouldnt be paranoid or nothing. Tripping off who coming down the
street [if I were to come that same night]. Mad Dog secured a .45 revolver
and borrowed a car from a drug user. He chose not to drive his own car for fear
it would be recognized as he approached, which would have permitted his
targets to flee or mount a preemptive strike of their own. Mad Dog picks up
the story:

I pulled around the corner I saw them out standing next to the car, so I pulled up
like it wasnt no problem, like I was just driving through. Pulled up, stopped
next to them, went on and looked out of the car. He [the violator] saw my face.
[He] started to turn like he was going by to get something, like he was about to
run or something, [then I] pulled the gun up. I started shooting . . . I was just
shooting. I wasnt even aiming . . . because the way they was standing there I
figured there aint no way I could miss . . . I shot about six times.
The cases of Sugar, Crazy Jay, and Mad Dog suggest a critical lack of
coercive power at the moment the violation occurred, making reflexive retali-
ation inappropriate. Grievants want respect but they do not want to get killed,
and generally will submit when placed in a position of extreme vulnerability
(see Luckenbill [1981] on the dynamics of compliance generation). This is
not weakness, it is smart and helps you survive. Blacks initial reflexive strike
was, as readers recall, unsatisfactory, requiring him to strike a second time.
Calculation was his preferred mode of attack. Though any or all of these
respondents may have attacked by surprise to cover the fact that they were
afraid, there is no real way of knowing. What calculated strikes lack in celer-
ity, however, they can make up for in certainty and severity, and perhaps this
is what makes them so attractive. Sneaking up on a violator at a time and
place of ones choosing virtually guarantees punishment. Because the viola-
tor is likely to have reduced defensibility at the time of the attack, resistance is
improbable. This may allow the punishment to go on longer and to be more
severe than if the punishment was administered reflexively. In so doing,
grievants reputations not only are salvaged, they arguably are enhanced.
Deferred Retaliation
Face-to-face retaliation that is delayed where the delay is not desired by

the retaliating party is called deferred retaliation. Delays may be caused by a
number of factors. The initial affront may not involve face-to-face contact.
The affront may involve face-to-face contact but reflexive action may not be
possible due to setting, circumstance, or some strategy used by the violator.
The aggrieved party may be under a false impression about what is occurring
at the time the affront occurs (e.g., valuables that are lent but never returned
become stolen, but at the time they are loaned, this is not apparent). The ag-
grieved party may not know the identity of the violator. The aggrieved party
may know the violator but have trouble locating him or her. The aggrieved
party may want to retaliate but be compelled to wait due to the presence of
formal or informal social control (e.g., police, natural surveillance).
Deferred retaliation typically undergoes a period of incubation first. How
long the incubation period lasts depends on how long it takes to ascertain the

identity and/or whereabouts of the violator, how long it takes to realize that a
loan actually is a theft, or how long it takes to get the violator in a suffi-
ciently vulnerable position to make retaliation possible. These things are sit-
uational, so whether and when deferred retaliation occurs relative to the
affront cannot be predicted with certainty. Retaliation that keeps getting
deferred will persist in a state of incubation. Eventually, it will move either to
nonretaliation or, possibly, what Jacobs, Topalli, and Wright (2000) call
imperfect retaliationretribution committed against a third party innocent
of the affront. As Bottcher (2001:925) illustrates, even in cases in which vic-
tims are not personally responsible for affronts or harm, some crimes can best
be understood as practices of collective liabilityvictims stand in, so to
speak, for wrongs committed by someone else (see also Black 1983). More
on this possibility shortly.
Black engaged in deferred retaliation after some of his marijuana was
stolen from a dwelling in which he and some associates had been partying
(Black left the party and when he returned, his marijuana was missing).
Stolen is placed in quotation marks because, according to Black, the
motherfucker [who took it, an associate with whom he had been partying]
left money. In Blacks mind, this was irrelevant. My shit wasnt for sale, he
explained. It was just a simple principle. Somebody went in my shit [and
they shouldnt have] . . . I aint no bitch . . . I aint no punk. Learning the next
day (from another associate) precisely who took the $10 bag, he beat the vio-
lator with a metal pipe. I hit him up side his motherfucking head and split it
there and put a big old pussy in his head.
D-boy also was burglarized, though his loss was considerably larger: The
rims off his car, a car stereo, two televisions, and a DVD player (also from his
car). He obtained a description of the burglar from a neighbor, which he
matched to other clues to make a positive identification. D-boy encountered
the thief on the street one afternoon, and dialogue quickly gave way to vio-
lence. The thief apparently struck first, but D-boy reportedly got the better of
him. He swung on me first, D-boy recalled, but he missed and when he
missed I hit him one time and dropped him and he held his eye and moved his
hand and it looked like his eye could talk. D-boy clearly remained concerned
about counter-retaliation, however, even though he felt his action was justi-
fied. The man lived close by, knew where to find him, and would undoubtedly
be embarrassed after waking up with a fat-assed purple and red and bur-
gundy eye . . . revenge, revenge, revenge, D-Boy ruminated. Thats all
thats on his mind.
Three days after his car windows were smashed, his tires punctured, and
his vehicles exterior dented, Biddle ascertained the identity of the vandal. It
was the boyfriend of the girl Biddle had been having sex with, behind the
boyfriends back (one of Biddles crack-using customersBiddle was a

dealertold him).4 Retaliation did not come for another two weeks. Biddle
needed additional time to piece together information to confirm the vandals
identity. When reprisal came, it came opportunistically:
I popped over [to the girls house one day]. He [the vandal] was on the front . . .
[I] rolled past [and parked in the back] . . . get my bat out the trunk . . . Louisville
Slugger. His name [the bat] Johnny [and I came through the house to the front
porch] . . . and Im like Whats up, player? . . . He tried to break out and just
run cause he knew he was guilty . . . I swung the bat. Hit him in the back. He
fell. Boom . . . [Then I] broke two of his legs . . . neighbors came out . . . [and]
grabbed me [and stopped the beating].
Jay was forced to wait somewhere between two and three months before
retaliating against his bitch ass aunt, who had stolen $350 from a cookie jar
in his home. She seen me put my money up there [after a drug sale], Jay
recalled, when I left [the house, she came back and took it]. Jay claimed he
wasnt that hot at first, but after it became clear that his aunt was dodging
him, he decided to visit his grandmother, knowing the aunt would pop up
sooner or later. She did and Jay caught that bitch just the way I wanted to,
grabbing her by the back of her head and punching and kicking her. Though
the aunt subsequently called the police on Jay, for which he served several
hours in jail, he reportedly felt a sense of relief like the money [she] stole
was wiped [her] ass with.
Sneaky Retaliation
Retaliation that is delayed where the delay is desired by the retaliatory

party but where face-to-face contact with the violator is lacking is called
sneaky retaliation. Because the delay is desired, it implies a certain degree of
strategizing on the part of the grievant. That is, the grievant wants to get the
violator in a particular way, there are particular reasons for this, and acting
too quickly may undermine these reasons. Because the strike does not
involve face-to-face contact, it also would seem that the grievant wants to
keep his or her identity secretpossibly to minimize the risk of detection and
arrest or of suffering a counter-retaliatory strike. If it is the case that the
grievant wants to victimize the violator in the same way she or he was victim-
ized, the violation itself may not have involved contactassuming the
grievant wants to match the response with the affront (which is not always the
case).
Consider the case of Block, a street-level drug dealer who stashed $600
worth of crack in a vacant building before leaving the area. Someone had
apparently been watching him, however, and seized the stash after he left.

Returning to find his drugs missing, Block was fucking mad but did not
know who stole the cache for about a month. Discovery came when the thief
revealed the heist to his girlfriend, who (unknowingly to him) was friends
with Blocks girlfriend. A subsequent phone conversation between Block
and his girlfriend exposed the violator:
He told his gal and his gal cool with my gal . . . [but] he didnt know they was
cool . . . they just gossiping on the phone . . . he was bragging to his gal about it
and she running her mouth . . . and [then it got back to me].
Waiting an additional two weeks, Block enlisted a friend to set up a drug

deal to lure the violator out of his house. Block and a third associate then bur-
glarized the dwelling, netting two ounces of powder cocaine, one ounce of
crack, a drug scale, and over $300 in cash. This bounty represented consider-
ably more than what Block lost. Asked why he chose burglary as opposed to
violent reprisal, Block responded that he was playing his [the violators]
game . . . Im playing him the same way [he played me].
In a subsequent interview with one of Blocks co-offenders (the one
involved in the burglary), it was revealed that the burglary actually turned
into a robbery. The co-offender reported that he and Block waited in a dark-
ened hallway inside the violators house, and attacked when the violator
returned. Block, however, apparently did not take part in the robbery beyond
simply being there; the co-offender reportedly did the talking, threatening,
and striking. Both men, however, were masked, preserving the offenses
sneaky nature: There was contact, but it was not face-to-face.
Clearly, it pleased Block that the violator was uncertain about who victim-
ized him. Knowing that youve been exploited but not knowing who did it can
be agonizing. No amount of searching will turn up the needed information so
long as the perpetrators (in this case, Block and his associates) remain silent.
Frustration may not necessarily subside, or subside significantly, over time,
and Blocks strategy was intended to make the violator boil. A subsequent
run-in with the antagonist revealed the success of his strategy:
Block: . . . we see him every day . . . Hes pissed . . . he riding around mad . . .
Author: Do you think he knows that you did it?
Block: If he does he might have an idea because he knows he got me. He probably
like that nigger Block probably got me. But Im watching him though. See
what Im saying? Im watching him.
Just because a strike was sneaky did not preclude it from involving exces-
sive violence. The issue is whether the grievants identity is known to the vio-
lator as the strike occurs, not whether there is contact (or even how much).

Accidentally bumping into another man at a tavern one evening, Red spilled
his glass of cognac on him. Irate, the man (who was on a date with a female
companion), knocked the shit out of Red, giving him no opportunity to
apologize first. Other patrons inside the bar witnessed the assault, as did the
female companion, whom Red vaguely knew. Embarrassed and enraged,
Red left the bar and went to his vehicle, where he retrieved his pistol and sat
waiting for four hours. When the violator exiteddrunk and oblivious to
Reds presenceRed attacked, maximizing the shock value by sneaking up
and shooting him numerous times from behind. Though Red could have
responded immediately, this would have prevented him from using the level
of coercive force he desired. Attacking by surprise, later in the parking lot,
also reduced the chances that somebody would witness the strike. The rage
he felt that night was palpable in the interview room months after the incident
occurred:
A man dont never put his hand on another man . . . aint never in my life had a
motherfucker smack me before. Beside my mom and my dad. Them are the
only one I ever had in my life smack me . . . Im 43 years old . . . Im stone cold,
thats the bottom line, the dude should never had put his hands on me. He
should have never smacked me . . . [I was] straight up angry.
After someone had slapped his sister, Smoke Dog opted to have proxies
do the retributive work for him. One of the most ruthless members of the sam-
ple, Smoke Dog clearly was not afraid to do it himself. Rather, he reported
being at a point in his life where discretion was more valuable. Im trying to
be a G [a wise street criminal] about it now . . . if its too hard for me and I
cant handle it then I go hire my little homies . . . they just love to shoot.
Retributive proxies were the choice for Paris as well, though for more press-
ing reasons. The police stumbled into him right after being beaten, robbed,
and carjacked; any retributive act would almost have certainly incriminated
him first:
Why didnt I do it? Cause I didnt want to take the blame. Cause the police al-
ready had my name or what ever, you know cause they picked me up from the
ambulance or what ever and I know they just gonna be like, Maybe this guy
did it or whatever.
Retaliation by proxy is sneaky because the violator is unable to link the

strike to the hiring party. Though it is conceivable for the grievant to instruct
the hit party to tell the violator for whom the strike was being performed, this
strategy did not appear to be widely adopted.5 Grievants with sufficiently
fierce street reputations need not fear looking like a punk by having some-

one else do their dirty work. What mattered was retribution, not who per-
formed it. As long as its taken care of, Moon illustrates, it dont matter [if
I do it or I have somebody do it for me]. Not all offenders can stake this
claim, nor do they want to when, for example, an affront is particularly seri-
ous or hits especially close to home. Such circumstances require self-help in
the literal sense of the word.
Imperfect Retaliation
Retaliation that is delayed where the delay is not desired by the retaliating
party and where face-to-face contact with the violator is lacking is called
imperfect retaliation. Imperfect retaliation occurs when grievants reprise
someone other than the person who committed the violation. Typically, it is
an option of last resort, not first, after grievants have been unable to identify,
locate, and punish the wrongdoer in question. Displaced reactions typically
accomplish one of three objectives: message-sending, loss recovery, and
anger release. These objectives need not be mutually exclusive.
Kimmy, a female stripper, lost several hundred dollars to a fellow dancer
during a private motel sex party. Kimmy had apparently gone into the bath-
room to perform sexual acts on one of the partygoers and asked the other
stripper to watch her purse. She reportedly took it instead. Enraged, Kimmy
had yet to locate the woman at the time of our interview, about three weeks
after the theft. A week after the theft, Kimmys cousin spotted an associate of
the violator at a local 7-11 store. The cousin phoned Kimmy, Kimmy jumped
into her badly damaged car (it had a broken axle and was barely drivable),
and rammed it into the associates parked vehicle. Kimmy then grabbed a
metal pole from her car, ran into the store, and attacked the woman. Kimmy
explains why she did what she did, why it was better to strike imperfectly
than not at all, and also why she ultimately did not obtain closure with this
imperfect strike:
Beat her partners ass . . . fuck her cause thats her [the violators] friend and
she knows some shit about [the stolen money]. . . . When she seen my face she
know what the hell Im up there for . . . [But I want the violator to] see [by beat-
ing her friend] that Im not playing . . . even if it stops right there I know I did
something . . . thats the closest thing I could [do] . . . [But] Im gonna kill this
bitch [the violator]. . . . Anybody fuck with my money . . . [is] fucking with my
daughter cause thats where my money go . . . Even if I get my $900 back Im
gonna beat her ass anyway . . . I could be . . . on my deathbed. I swear I get my
ass up and try to beat this bitchs ass. I swear I will.
Goldie recounted a similar story after failing to locate any of the four per-
petrators who robbed him of his necklace at a bus stop one evening. Three

months after the robbery, Goldie spoke with a man who claimed to have
knowledge of the whereabouts of at least one of the offenders. This person
reportedly possessed the necklace or at minimum knew where it was. He
operated from a neighborhood close to Goldies, just four blocks away.
Goldie went there, where he spotted the mans younger brother and con-
firmed that he was one of the perpetrators. Goldie picks up the story:
I saw his little brother and I went up to him, I didnt have my burner [gun] on me
at the time so Im just like, Wheres your brother at? I dont know where he
is, I dont know where he is. Im like, Well, tell him Goldie, hes gonna holler
at him about something. Instantly he already knew, I could see that in his face,
that he already knew. So youre Goldie? OK, well Ill tell him, Ill tell him. . . .
So I come back. His brothers still in the same damn spot but this time I got a
burner with me. Im looking for trouble, cause I know hes somewhere around
here, cause his little brothers still around . . . at the same time Im seeing him
rumbling with a little pack that he had, I guess it was some crack or what ever.
So Im like, Well, you just give me that right there, thatll pay for it. . . . OK, I
aint doing anything, he did it. So now hes telling on his brother. So where is
he? . . . Oh, I cant tell you where . . . So Im like, Well, you can take for it
then . . . [I got] about $400, $1,300 of dope . . . [told] him to go back and tell his
brother.
Imperfect reprisal is best considered an interim procedure as opposed to a

replacement for direct retribution. Generally speaking, there is no substitute
for symmetrical vengeance. The violator who commits the wrong must ulti-
mately be punished lest she or he think that she or he has gotten away with
it and be inspired to commit another offense. It may be true, however, that
some imperfect strikes are less imperfect than others. Strikes committed
against someone close to the violator may help to flush him or her out,
which makes direct reprisal easier to accomplish. If material losses are recov-
ered as part of the attack, the original violation may sting less, and few mea-
sures are better at communicating the message that grievants are mad, look-
ing, poised to attack, and nearby than an attack of the kind performed by
Kimmy and Goldie. Absent a direct strike, this is the most would-be retali-
ators can hope to accomplish.
DISCUSSION
Using qualitative techniques of analytic induction, constant comparison,

and domain analysis, this article has offered a typology of criminal retalia-
tion organized around two axial factors: Whether reprisal occurs immedi-
ately after the affront and whether face-to-face contact with the violator is

involved. Immediate reprisal with face-to-face contact was called reflexive

retaliation. Immediate reprisal without face-to-face contact was called re-
flexively displaced retaliation (though there were no reported cases). When
retaliation is delayed, an added contingency was introducedwhether the
delay is desired by the grievant. This permits four additional possibilities.
Face-to-face retaliation where the delay is desired was called calculated
retaliation. Face-to-face retaliation where the delay is not desired was called
deferred retaliation. Retaliation without face-to-face contact where the delay
is desired was called sneaky retaliation. Retaliation without face-to-face con-
tact where the delay is not desired was called imperfect retaliation.
The data clearly underscore the importance of direct confrontation in
retaliatory strikes. Retaliation without face-to-face contact with the violator
may, in fact, deliver harm but not the kind of harm that cuts to the core of
street values. An essential part of payback is for the violator to know unequiv-
ocally that he or she has been put in his or her place by the specific person he
or she has wronged. Without this knowledge, the violator may be led to
believe that the victim has accepted the affront and is soft. The absence of
reported cases of reflexively displaced retaliation most powerfully highlights
the import of contact. The streets are a hypermasculine world (Maher and
Daly 1996), so attacking someone or something of value to the violator rather
than the violator him- or herself, even when the violator is right there (the
essence of reflexively displaced retaliation) makes you look weak. In street
culture, this is sometimes called a bitch move; it can be worse than not
striking at all. This is not to suggest that strikes without contact are entirely
or inevitably unacceptable, however. Sneaky retaliation may well be the
work of veteran criminals with juice and be understood as such by relevant
parties, and imperfect reprisal can communicate that direct retaliation is
imminentcircumstances simply have not yet allowed it to happen. In nei-
ther case do grievants necessarily sacrifice status, though it probably remains
true that a direct strike is better at minimizing this possibility.
The importance of punitive excess is equally clear. Ironically, its relevance
may be most apparent when retaliation is delayedironic in that delay intro-
duces separation between the aversive stimulus (i.e., the violation) and
reprisal, which should unbound rationality and moderate the attack rather
than intensify it. But anger seems to boil, not cool. Delays give grievants the
opportunity to mull over what has happened and to become more incensed
rather than less. Shock gives way to indignation and then outrage as the
magnitude of the violation sinks in (Rather 2001). This rumination pro-
cess, as Bies and Tripp (1996) refer to it, allows grievants to revisit the viola-
tion mnemonically, digging up new facts and evidence overlooked in the
initial processing of the violation . . . [and] to discover more personalistic
causes of the violation, which enhances the transgressors blame (Bies and

Tripp 1996:254). Anger may be especially intense if there is mounting frus-

tration about the identity and/or whereabouts of the violator. If so, the reprisal
that follows is intended not only to make back what grievants lost, but to
compensate them for the cognitive burden carried since the affront.6 A
number of the calculated and deferred strikes explored in this article attest to
this escalation of anger and its role in producing punitive excess.
The forms in which street criminals express their retaliatory impulses are
of significant interest, but perhaps more intriguing are the reasons grievants
choose one option over another when several are realistically available. Why,
for example, sneaky reprisal as opposed to reflexive, calculated as opposed to
deferred, or sneaky as opposed to calculated when circumstances permit any
or all three? Given that timing and contact are the critical orienting dimen-
sions, and both mediate behavior, at least in a volitional sense, only when
delays are desired, risk sensitivity would seem to be the relevant explanation.
This is obvious and also somewhat tautological. Any tactic that reduces a
grievants chances of encountering resistance, counter-retaliation, or arrest
betrays sensitivity to risk; delays and striking without contact do all three.
More instructive, perhaps, are the factors that condition risk sensitivity by
influencing dispreferences for contact and preferences for delay. Vertical dis-
tances between disputants (Black 1983) and the presence or absence of third
parties (Cooney 1998) bear consideration in this regard.
Violators in the present study were strangers, loose acquaintances, friends,
and in at least one instance, family members, of varying though roughly
equivalent statuses, and the preference for direct contact was reasonably uni-
form. As status differences intensify, this picture may changea pattern that
would seem to hold for both upward and downward revenge. Thus, low status
parties who reprise others they shouldnt will face severe consequences,
which they know and may opt against (see, e.g., Homans 1961). Reprisal is
better performed sneakily, or redirected against parties perceived to be less
formidable and/or those having little or nothing to do with the violation in
question. Though it is conceivable for low-status grievants to want bold,
face-to-face strikes as a way of enhancing their stature, or because their
already-inferior reputation does not permit anything less, the likely costs are
sufficiently high to render such attacks unwise. High-status grievants would
seem to prefer face-to-face strikes against lower-status violators for precisely
the opposite reasonstriking without contact permits someone lower than
you to take your respect, which brings you down to that persons level and
fully announces to others that you are letting this happenbut perhaps the
status imbalance is so great that direct reprisal ceases to be meaningful or
necessary. For grievants like Smoke Dog, for example, violations become
petty and not worth their time, making sneak attacks not only reasonable
but preferred. Or, perhaps, imperfect retaliation is the only available way to

send a message to the person really being sought; without sending this mes-
sage, status might be presumed to be lower than it really is (as the stories of
Goldie and Kimmy seem to suggest).
Third parties are relevant for issues of timing. Assuming their presence
does not generate coercive power imbalances for either disputant or intro-
duce levels of natural surveillance sufficient to deter contemplated behavior,
audiences generally increase the importance of celerity. Reputations are on
the line when violations are committed, but this is especially true when oth-
ers are around to witness (or hear quickly, secondhand about) their occur-
rence. The dilemma for many grievants is that situational circumstances fre-
quently do not permit the level of punishment they desire at the moment a
violation occurs, and perhaps for some time thereafter. Trading celerity for
severity is difficult, but logical when the content of the lesson is more
important than the rapidity with which it is delivered.7
Waiting, at least in part, is a function of the desire to avoid sanctions one-
self, but if such concerns exceeded or even rivaled concerns for punishment,
retaliation would always be delayed. It also would rarely involve face-to-face
contact or be excessive. Excess is especially noteworthy irrespective of tim-
ing, or even contact, because disproportionate strikes tend to be perceived as
affronts that inspire countergrievances, and then reprisal, as a way of restor-
ing reciprocity (see Tedeschi and Felson 1994:245). Conflict spirals occur
because of the different arithmetics of punishment that grievants have in
relation to violators. Such different arithmetics . . . occur because of an ego-
centric bias in the experience of pain . . . and/or because some harms are hard
to quantify, as when the principle of the thing is at stake (Bies and Tripp
1996:259). In other words, violators may perceive an initial attack to be not
that bad, but grievants do, and impose a level of harm far greater than the
violation itself. Violators, feeling they have been wronged by an excessive
strike, now become grievants, attacking excessively in return. Paradoxically,
each side believes their actions are defensive (see Bies and Tripp 2001:203).
The street criminal underworld is one of the few settings in which strong
bilateral retaliatory capacities result in mutual escalation rather than mutual
deterrence (see Ohbuchi and Saito 1986 on power imbalance in aggression).
Though defiance in the face of punishment, as opposed to deterrence, is by no
means unique to street offenders (Blau 1964; Homans 1961; Molm 1994;
Sherman 1993), the sensitivity of identity to affronts makes it especially
likely in this context. Lacking traditional sources of respectoccupational
and familial roles cannibalized by persistent poverty and high rates of fam-
ily disruption (Anderson 1999; Rosenfeld et al. 2003; Wilson 1996)
reputation depends almost exclusively on how actors display and handle
themselves in interaction. Disadvantage and marginalization, moreover,
reduces the threshold at which some action is considered offensive, resulting

in paranoid attributions of hostile intent (see, e.g., Dodge et al. 1990). Be-
cause such hostility derives ultimately from structural sources over which
individuals have little perceived control, excessive responses emerge as com-
pensation and catharsis (on violence as catharsis, see Tedeschi and Felson
1994). This explains why a relatively small effort targeted at the appropriate
point can produce [a] disproportionate effect (Gabriel 1998:1341).
It may be true, however, that different retaliatory modalities have different
deterrent capacities net of punishment severity. Though strikes involving
face-to-face contact (reflexive, calculated, and deferred) carry the highest
potential for specific deterrencethe lesson is directed at the particular per-
son who committed the wrongthey carry the highest risk of defiance for
the reasons just described. Strikes that lack face-to-face contact reduce the
chance of defiance, assuming violators remain unaware of the motive and
source of the strike, but sacrifice specific deterrence in the process. Sneaky
retaliation seems especially vulnerable to this problem: Strikes performed by
someone other than the person wronged or performed too long after the vio-
lation occurs, can signal weakness, especially if the violator never realizes
that the harm she or he suffered was retaliatory in nature (which may be the
case with at least some sneaky attacks). Sneaky strikes may succeed in get-
ting payback, but if the reason for the strike and identity of the attacker
remain unknown to the violator, the strike simply looks a random act of anti-
social behaviorleaving the violator undeterred from committing subse-
quent affronts and perhaps even more motivated to do so because now, they
too have lost something. Also, general deterrence, obviously, is not possible
unless grievants brag about the strike, which undermines the very reason for
performing it sneakily.
Whether the presence of defiance is worse than the absence of specific
deterrence is unclear. Perhaps defiance and deterrence obtain at the same
time: Violators may be enraged about suffering what they perceive to be
excessive punishmentattacking the grievant in returnbut this punish-
ment may well inhibit them from violating others in a similar manner later
on. General deterrence obtains when other would-be violators hear about
prior acts of retribution committed against others and refrain from commit-
ting violations themselves. The more tightly coupled the criminal network,
the faster this vicarious message will tend to travel, and the more substan-
tial this general deterrent effect will be (see Paternoster and Piquero 1995).
Theoretically, a net gain in systemic stability could result from excessive but
discrete strikeseven counting the potential for conflict spirals within and
among particular disputants.
Imperfect retaliation offers the exception. Grievants violate someone
other than the person explicitly responsible for the violation, which creates a
fresh (and additional dispute). The strike is inherently unjustified, so a defi-

ance effect is built into it. If the strike is excessively injurious (beyond its
inherent lack of justification), defiance will be especially intense. The target
of the imperfect attack may subsequently wish to retaliate against the original
violator for causing him or her to be singled out (assuming the target and
violator know each other). The imperfect target and original violator may
then team up to reprise the original grievant. If an extensive period of time
has elapsed between the initial violation and the imperfect strike, the original
violator may be emboldened to commit yet more reprisable offenses, against
the violator or unrelated others (see Paternoster and Piquero 1995 on the role
of punishment avoidance effects in producing future criminality). The lon-
ger a violator goes without being punished, the more severe that punish-
ment must be when administered to compensate for the discounting caused
by time (Nagin and Pogarsky 2001) which, of course, facilitates counter-
retaliation.
The wide range of retaliatory options available suggests that the rational-
ity of street offenders may not be as bounded as some analysts presume.
Whereas street criminals typically weigh a few aspects of a few alternatives
and ignore the rest (Johnson and Payne 1986:173), the data offered in the
present article suggest that more contemplative procedures may be at work.
Such procedures need not be lengthy or extensive to be contemplative. Time
pressure, threat, and uncertainty have a powerful tendency to increase focus,
resulting in sharper analytic clarity and more efficient decision making (see.
e.g., Arkes and Ayton 1999; Khatri and Ng 2000). Situational constraints
may ironically advance this process; ironic in that bounding rationality may
actually force choice to expand in the offending moment. The need for reci-
procity is too important not to consider multiple options, and reprisal might
otherwise be insufficiently retributive or pedagogical if performed without
adequate consideration to contextual cues. This seeming expansion is strik-
ing only insofar as it occurs against a backdrop of intense anger, and rational
choice itself is thought to break down in angers presence (Exum 2002). An-
ger, when inspired by moralistic concerns, may permit alternative retaliatory
scripts to emergescripts fueled by a hedonistic calculus that is less re-
strictive but more sensitive to communicating the desired punitive message.
Fruitful directions for further inquiry lie squarely in the realm of choice
and retaliations implications for it. The extent to which retaliatory prefer-
ences are stable or dynamic over time is noteworthy. Grievants may simulta-
neously ponder multiple retaliatory targets, all at different stages of incuba-
tion, which can affect strategies used both within incidents and across them.
The unexpected emergence of one target while searching for another may
well alter the nature and intensity of both strikes. Retributive choices can also
mature over time, with grievants graduating from one modality to another.
The nature, speed, and trajectory of this possible evolution warrant more pre-

cise specification. In this regard, perhaps grievants who strike sneakily over
time as opposed to reflexively may be quicker to forgive offenses they may
previously have reprised. The difference between sneaky and nonretaliation
is much smaller than the difference between reflexive and calculated retalia-
tion. Explaining why reprisal does not occur given cultural imperatives pro-
scribing pacifism is as important as why it does. Nonretaliation may often be
by defaultbecause the violator cannot be identified or foundbut not
always, and the reasons surrounding this choice deserve more systematic
attention.
NOTES
1. Though space limitations preclude me reproducing the complete interview guide here,
examples of questions asked of respondents include the following: Has somebody done some-
thing to you recently for which you have retaliated? What did the person do? How did you
respond? What specifically did you do? Why did you respond that way? Have you encountered
the offender since the attack? What happened? My interviewing style tends to be conversational,
so readers should not infer a degree of formality or organization in the interview guide that does
not exist. Depending on the cadence and flow of each interview, different inquiries might be used
to explore the same general topics. Readers interested in obtaining more information about the
interview guide are asked to contact the author.
2. There were no reported cases of reflexively displaced retaliation, so this category neces-
sarily is residual. The reasons for its absence will be explored in greater detail later.
3. Throughout the article, bracketed words indicate an attempt on my part to explain, clarify,
or amplify something a respondent said.
4. As is evident from anecdotes like this one, grievants and violators are often difficult to
distinguish.
5. There were no mentions of it in the transcripts, though in all candor, I did not specifically
ask respondents whether they made such instructions.
6. This is probably true only for a finite period, due to basic psychophysological processes of
anger. But this period may be longer in street culture than in comparable settings where law is
unavailable, owing to the importance and fragility of respect.
7. I recognize the obvious benefits of identifying particular contextual circumstances that
produce one type of retaliatory response over another (given the possible occurrence of multi-
ple types), but the data did not seem to permit it. After analyzing the nature of the violation (vio-
lent/nonviolent), the context in which it occurred (public/private), the apparent risk of sanction
threats at the time the violation occurred (both formal and informal), apparent status differences
between grievants and violators at the time of the offense, and apparent relational distances
between grievants and violators (apparent because it had to be intuited from the transcripts), I
could discern no particular reason or reasons why one modality emerged over anotherwith a
single exception and possibly one more: Reflexive strikes, relative to the other types, seemed to
involve less physically threatening violations and an opportunity to strike spontaneously,
whereas sneaky strikes often seemed to involve affronts without contact and violators who were
known to the grievant at the time of the affront or shortly thereafter. I initially thought that
deferred strikes involved violations without contact and that calculated strikes required grievants
to have a deficit of coercive power when the violation occurred, but these criteria were not

necessarily distinguishing. Variation seemed to be more a function of choice in context than

context by itself.
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JOURNAL

Keywords: retaliation; violence; social control

Retaliation is a potent regulator of offender conduct, arguably the most

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The Retaliation Literature

The criminological literature on retaliation is surprisingly scant

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created by the violation itself. How grievants effect retaliatory modalities

Retaliation is a type of coercive action (Tedeschi and Felson 1994). As

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male, 8 were female; respondents, on average, had completed 11.6 years of

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tored the veracity of responses by probing for inconsistent answers, and by

A Typology of Criminal Retaliation

Qualitative techniques of analytic induction, constant comparison, and

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With face-to-face contact Without face-to-face contact

Immediate Delayed Immediate Delayed

Delay Delay Delay Delay

Reflexive Calculated Deferred Reflexively Sneaky Imperfect

Reflexive retaliation is face-to-face retribution that occurs immediately

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neighborhood basketball game. A man called a foul on one of Lafonzs asso-

Given their presupposed importance to the enactment of street justice,

Calculated retaliation is face-to-face retribution that is delayed where the

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reflexively in the first place. Waiting, finally, permits you to retaliate in a

Grievants need not wait an extensive amount of time to exact revenge.

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Face-to-face retaliation that is delayed where the delay is not desired by

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Retaliation that is delayed where the delay is desired by the retaliatory

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Waiting an additional two weeks, Block enlisted a friend to set up a drug

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Retaliation by proxy is sneaky because the violator is unable to link the

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Imperfect reprisal is best considered an interim procedure as opposed to a

Using qualitative techniques of analytic induction, constant comparison,

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involved. Immediate reprisal with face-to-face contact was called reflexive

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Tripp 1996:254). Anger may be especially intense if there is mounting frus-

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necessarily distinguishing. Variation seemed to be more a function of choice in context than

Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street. New York: Norton.

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Wolfgang, Marvin. 1958. Patterns in Criminal Homicide. Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-

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