SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 94-8729
TINA B. BENNIS, PETITIONER v. MICHIGAN
on writ of certiorari to the supreme court of Michigan

[March 4, 1996]
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner was a joint owner, with her husband, of an automobile in which her husband engaged
in sexual activity with a prostitute. A Michigan court ordered the automobile forfeited as a public
nuisance, with no offset for her interest, notwithstanding her lack of knowledge of her husbands
activity. We hold that the Michigan court order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Detroit police arrested John Bennis after observing him engaged in a sexual act with a prostitute
in the automobile while it was parked on a Detroit city street. Bennis was convicted of gross
indecency. [n.1] The State then sued both Bennis and his wife, petitioner Tina B. Bennis, to have
the car declared a public nuisance and abated as such under 600.3801 [n.2] and 600.3825
[n.3] of Michigans Compiled Laws.
Petitioner defended against the abatement of her interest in the car on the ground that, when she
entrusted her husband to use the car, she did not know that he would use it to violate Michigans
indecency law. The Wayne County Circuit Court rejected this argument, declared the car a
public nuisance, and ordered the cars abatement. In reaching this disposition, the trial court
judge recognized the remedial discretion he had under Michigans case law. App. 21. He took
into account the couples ownership of another automobile, so they would not be left without
transportation. Id., at 25. He also mentioned his authority to order the payment of one half of
the sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs, to the innocent co title holder. Id., at 21. He
declined to order such a division of sale proceeds in this case because of the age and value of the
car (an 11 year old Pontiac sedan recently purchased by John and Tina Bennis for $600); he
commented in this regard: [T]heres practically nothing left minus costs in a situation such as
this. Id., at 25.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that regardless of the language of Michigan
Compiled Law 600.3815(2), [n.4] Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting this section
prevented the State from abating petitioners interest absent proof that she knew to what end the
car would be used. Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court ruled that the conduct in
question did not qualify as a public nuisance because only one occurrence was shown and there
was no evidence of payment for the sexual act. 200 Mich. App. 670, 504 N. W. 2d 731 (1993).
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the abatement in its
entirety. 447 Mich. 719, 527 N. W. 2d 483 (1994). It concluded as a matter of state law that the
episode in the Bennis vehicle was an abatable nuisance. Rejecting the Court of Appeals
interpretation of 600.3815(2), the court then announced that, in order to abate an owners
interest in a vehicle, Michigan does not need to prove that the owner knew or agreed that her
vehicle would be used in a manner proscribed by 600.3801 when she entrusted it to another
user. Id., at 737, 527 N. W. 2d, at 492. The court next addressed petitioners federal
constitutional challenges to the States abatement scheme: The court assumed that petitioner did
not know of or consent to the misuse of the Bennis car, and concluded in light of our decisions in
Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465(1926), and Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416
U.S. 663 (1974), that Michigans failure to provide an innocent owner defense was without
constitutional consequence. 447 Mich., at 740-741, 527 N. W. 2d, at 493-494. The Michigan
Supreme Court specifically noted that, in its view, an owners interest may not be abated when
a vehicle is used without the owners consent. Id., at 742, n. 36, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495, n. 36.
Furthermore, the court confirmed the trial courts description of the nuisance abatement
proceeding as an equitable action, and considered it critical that the trial judge so
comprehended the statute. Id., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.
We granted certiorari in order to determine whether Michigans abatement scheme has deprived
petitioner of her interest in the forfeited car without due process, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, or has taken her interest for public use without compensation, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. 515 U. S. ___ (1995). We
affirm.
The gravamen of petitioners due process claim is not that she was denied notice or an
opportunity to contest the abatement of her car; she was accorded both. Compare United States
v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U. S. ___ (1993). Rather, she claims she was entitled to
contest the abatement by showing she did not know her husband would use it to violate
Michigans indecency law. But a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owners interest in
property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even though the
owner did not know that it was to be put to such use.
Our earliest opinion to this effect is Justice Storys opinion for the Court in The Palmyra, 12
Wheat. 1 (1827). The Palmyra, which had been commissioned as a privateer by the King of
Spain and had attacked a United States vessel, was captured by a United States war ship and
brought into Charleston, South Carolina, for adjudication. Id., at 8. On the Governments
appeal from the Circuit Courts acquittal of the vessel, it was contended by the owner that the
vessel could not be forfeited until he was convicted for the privateering. The Court rejected this
contention, explaining: The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offence is attached primarily to the thing. Id., at 14. In another admiralty forfeiture decision 17
years later, Justice Story wrote for the Court that in in rem admiralty proceedings the acts of the
master and crew . . . bind the interest of the owner of the ship, whether he be innocent or guilty;
and he impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to the ship by
reason of their unlawful or wanton wrongs. Harmony v. United States, 2 How. 210, 234 (1844)
(emphasis added).
In Dobbinss Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1878), this Court upheld the forfeiture
of property used by a lessee in fraudulently avoiding federal alcohol taxes, observing: Cases
often arise where the property of the owner is forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or
misconduct of those intrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even when the owner is
otherwise without fault . . . and it has always been held . . . that the acts of [the possessors] bind
the interest of the owner . . . whether he be innocent or guilty.
In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), this Court upheld the forfeiture of a purchasers
interest in a car misused by the seller. Van Oster purchased an automobile from a dealer but
agreed that the dealer might retain possession for use in its business. The dealer allowed an
associate to use the automobile, and the associate used it for the illegal transportation of
intoxicating liquor. Id., at 465-466. The State brought a forfeiture action pursuant to a Kansas
statute, and Van Oster defended on the ground that the transportation of the liquor in the car
was without her knowledge or authority. This Court rejected Van Osters claim:
It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of property the
unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to whom he has entrusted it. Much of
the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of the statute and common law of liens as enables a mere
bailee to subject the bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in possession to
sell and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples. . . . They suggest that certain uses
of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril. .
..
It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or
lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id., at 467-468.
The Van Oster Court relied on J. W. Goldsmith, Jr. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505
(1921), in which the Court upheld the forfeiture of a sellers interest in a car misused by the
purchaser. The automobile was forfeited after the purchaser transported bootleg distilled spirits
in it, and the selling dealership lost the title retained as security for unpaid purchase money. Id.,
at 508-509. The Court discussed the arguments for and against allowing the forfeiture of the
interest of an owner who was without guilt, id., at 510, and concluded that whether the
reason for [the challenged forfeiture scheme] be artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed in the
punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now displaced, id., at 511. [n.5]
In Calero Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974), the most recent decision
on point, the Court reviewed the same cases discussed above, and concluded that the innocence
of the owner of property subject to forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense.
Id., at 683. Petitioner is in the same position as the various owners involved in the forfeiture cases
beginning with The Palmyra in 1827. She did not know that her car would be used in an illegal
activity that would subject it to forfeiture. But under these cases the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not protect her interest against forfeiture by the government.
Petitioner relies on a passage from Calero Toledo, that it would be difficult to reject the
constitutional claim of . . . an owner who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware
of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to
prevent the proscribed use of his property. 416 U. S., at 689. But she concedes that this
comment was obiter dictum, and [i]t is to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that
we must attend. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U. S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip
op., at 4). And the holding of Calero Toledo on this point was that the interest of a yacht rental
company in one of its leased yachts could be forfeited because of its use for transportation of
controlled substances, even though the company was in no way . . . involved in the criminal
enterprise carried on by [the] lessee and had no knowledge that its property was being used in
connection with or in violation of [Puerto Rican Law]. 416 U. S., at 668. Petitioner has made
no showing beyond that here.
The dissent argues that our cases treat contraband differently from instrumentalities used to
convey contraband, like cars: Objects in the former class are forfeitable however blameless or
unknowing their owners may be, post, at 2, but with respect to an instrumentality in the latter
class, an owners innocence is no defense only to the principal use being made of that property,
id., at 4. However, this Courts precedent has never made the due process inquiry depend on
whether the use for which the instrumentality was forfeited was the principal use. If it had,
perhaps cases like Calero Toledo, in which Justice Douglas noted in dissent that there was no
showing that the yacht had been notoriously used in smuggling drugs . . . and so far as we know
only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht, 416 U. S., at 693 (opinion dissenting in
part), might have been decided differently.
The dissent also suggests that The Palmyra line of cases would justify the confiscation of an
ocean liner just because one of its passengers sinned while on board. Post, at 5. None of our
cases have held that an ocean liner may be confiscated because of the activities of one passenger.
We said in Goldsmith Grant, and we repeat here, that [w]hen such application shall be made it
will be time enough to pronounce upon it. 254 U. S., at 512.
Notwithstanding this well established authority rejecting the innocent owner defense, petitioner
argues that we should in effect overrule it by importing a culpability requirement from cases
having at best a tangential relation to the innocent owner doctrine in forfeiture cases. She cites
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), for the proposition that a criminal defendant may not
be punished for a crime if he is found to be not guilty. She also argues that our holding in Austin
v. United States, 509 U. S. ___ (1993), that the Excessive Fines Clause [n.6] limits the scope of
civil forfeiture judgments, would be difficult to reconcile with any rule allowing truly innocent
persons to be punished by civil forfeiture. Brief for Petitioner 18-19, n. 12.
In Foucha the Court held that a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity in a criminal
trial could not be thereafter confined indefinitely by the State without a showing that he was
either dangerous or mentally ill. Petitioner argues that our statement that in those circumstances
a State has no punitive interest which would justify continued detention, 504 U. S., at 80,
requires that Michigan demonstrate a punitive interest in depriving her of her interest in the
forfeited car. But, putting aside the extent to which a forfeiture proceeding is punishment in
the first place, Foucha did not purport to discuss, let alone overrule, The Palmyra line of cases.
In Austin, the Court held that because forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner,
forfeiture proceedings are subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendments prohibition
against excessive fines. 509 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 15). There was no occasion in that case to
deal with the validity of the innocent owner defense, other than to point out that if a forfeiture
statute allows such a defense, the defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is punitive
in motive. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14-15). In this case, however, Michigans Supreme Court
emphasized with respect to the forfeiture proceeding at issue: It is not contested that this is an
equitable action, in which the trial judge has discretion to consider alternatives [to] abating the
entire interest in the vehicle. 447 Mich., at 742, 527 N. W. 2d, at 495.
In any event, for the reasons pointed out in Calero Toledo and Van Oster, forfeiture also serves a
deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose. Forfeiture of property prevents illegal uses
both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by imposing an economic penalty,
thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. Calero Toledo, supra, at 687. This deterrent
mechanism is hardly unique to forfeiture. For instance, because Michigan also deters dangerous
driving by making a motor vehicle owner liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a
driver who had the owners consent to use it, petitioner was also potentially liable for her
husbands use of the car in violation of Michigan negligence law. Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann.
257.401 (1990). The law thus builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion between the
wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner. Van Oster, 272 U. S., at 467-468.
Petitioner also claims that the forfeiture in this case was a taking of private property for public use
in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But if the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was transferred by virtue of that
proceeding from petitioner to the State. The government may not be required to compensate an
owner for property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental
authority other than the power of eminent domain. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492
(1973); see United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 125 (1967).
At bottom, petitioners claims depend on an argument that the Michigan forfeiture statute is
unfair because it relieves prosecutors from the burden of separating co owners who are complicit
in the wrongful use of property from innocent co owners. This argument, in the abstract, has
considerable appeal, as we acknowledged in Goldsmith Grant, 254 U. S., at 510. Its force is
reduced in the instant case, however, by the Michigan Supreme Courts confirmation of the trial
courts remedial discretion, see supra, at 4, and petitioners recognition that Michigan may forfeit
her and her husbands car whether or not she is entitled to an offset for her interest in it, Tr. of
Oral Arg. 7, 9.
We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago, that the cases authorizing actions of the kind
at issue are too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced. Goldsmith Grant, supra, at 511. The State here sought to deter illegal activity that
contributes to neighborhood deterioration and unsafe streets. The Bennis automobile, it is
conceded, facilitated and was used in criminal activity. Both the trial court and the Michigan
Supreme Court followed our longstanding practice, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Michigan is therefore
Affirmed.