Legal Ethics Canon 1-7 Print

SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016
TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under
the Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is
reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez
(Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Teresita's version of the facts is as follows:
Around 2009, Teresita hired Atty. Alvarez to handle several cases filed against her before the Office of the Ombudsman. 1 Atty. Alvarez was then
working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health. 2 He asked for P1,400,000.00 as acceptance fee.3 However, Atty. Alvarez did not
enter his appearance before the Office of the Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings. 4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain
fee.5 Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to
have the cases against Teresita dismissed.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, just two (2) weeks after Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision recommending the
filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service, respectively.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave. 8 Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita;
however, he failed to fulfill this promise.9 Teresita sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed. 10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the other hand, Atty. Alvarez claims the following:
Atty. Alvarez is Legal Officer III of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health. 11 He has authority to engage in private
practice of the profession.12 He represented Teresita in several cases before the Office of the Ombudsman. 13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez and Teresita had an arrangement that Teresita would consult Atty. Alvarez whenever a case was filed against her.14 Atty. Alvarez would
then advise Teresita to send him a copy of the complaint and its attachments through courier.15 Afterwards, Atty. Alvarez would evaluate the case and
call Teresita to discuss his fees in accepting and handling the case. 16 A 50% downpayment would be deposited to Atty. Alvarez's or his secretary's bank
account.17 The balance would then be paid in installments.18 The success fee was voluntary on Teresita's part.19 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 10, 2009, Atty. Alvarez received a call from Teresita regarding a meeting at Shangri-La Mall to discuss the decision and resolution she received
from the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing her from service for dishonesty and indicting her for violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019,
respectively.20 Atty. Alvarez accepted the case and asked for P500,000.00 as acceptance fee. 21According to Atty. Alvarez, he arrived at the amount
after considering the difficulty of the case and the workload that would be involved, which would include appeals before the Court of Appeals and this
Court.22 However, the fee is exclusive of filing fees, appearance fees, and other miscellaneous fees such as costs for photocopying and mailing. 23 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez claimed that he prepared several pleadings in connection with Teresita's case:
(1) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the administrative case;
(2) motion for reconsideration filed on July 23, 2009 in connection with the criminal case;
(3) petition for injunction filed on October 15, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan City; and
(4) petition for preliminary injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order filed before the
Court of Appeals on November 18, 2009, and the amended petition on November 26, 2009. 24
Atty. Alvarez also said that he prepared several letters to different government officials and agencies. 25 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Alvarez alleged that Teresita made staggered payments for the amounts they agreed on. 26Teresita only paid the balance of the agreed
acceptance fee equivalent to P450,000.00 on February 11, 2010. 27 While Teresita paid P60,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses, she did not pay the
expenses for other legal work performed and advanced by Atty. Alvarez. 28 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the last day for filing of the petition for review of the Office of the Ombudsman's Decision, Teresita informed Atty. Alvarez that she was no longer
interested in retaining Atty. Alvarez's services as she had hired Atty. Tyrone Contado from Nueva Ecija, who was Atty. Alvarez's co-counsel in the cases
against Teresita.29
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On June 1, 2011, Teresita filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant a Verified Complaint praying for the disbarment of Atty. Alvarez. 30 This Court
required Atty. Alvarez to file his comment on the complaint within 10 days from notice. 31 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On December 7, 2011, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 32 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his Report and Recommendation33 dated November 12, 2012, Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamayor found Atty. Alvarez guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended Atty. Alvarez's suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.34 Atty. Alvarez
was also ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to Teresita with legal interest from the time of demand until its full payment. 35 The dispositive
portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation reads: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding Respondent guilty of committing unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts of the Canon of Professional Responsibility, [it] is
recommended that he be suspended for one (1) year in the practice of law and he be ordered to return the amount of P700,000.00 to the
Complainant within two (2) months from receipt of this order with legal interest from the time of demand, until fully paid, with a warning that
repetition of [a] similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.36 cralawre d
On the unauthorized practice of law, the Investigating Commissioner found that while Atty. Alvarez claimed that he was authorized by his superior to
privately practice law, the pleadings he allegedly prepared and filed did not bear his name and signature. 37 Hence, the Investigating Commissioner
stated that:
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The time that Respondent spent in following up the case of Complainant in the Office of the Ombudsman is a time lost to the government which could
have been used in the service of many taxpayers[.] 38 cralawred
In any case, granting that Atty. Alvarez was authorized by his superior to practice his profession, the Investigating Commissioner stated that Atty.
Alvarez was prohibited to handle cases involving malversation of funds by government officials such as a municipal treasurer.39 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner found that the attorney's fees Atty. Alvarez asked for were unreasonable: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
From all indication, Complainant was forced to give to the Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of Respondent that he has
friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who can help with a fee. That because of that guarantee, Complainant was obligated to shell out every now
and then money for the satisfaction of the allege[d] friend of the Respondent[.]
Complainant is an ordinary Municipal Treasurer of a 4th or 5th class municipality and the amount of attorney's fees demanded by the Respondent is
very much excessive. . . . The exorbitant amount that he demanded from complainant is too much for a lowly local government employee. What the
Respondent did is not only illegal, immoral and dishonest but also taking advantage of a defenseless victim.
....
While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees, no hard and fast rule may be set in the determination of what a reasonable fee is, or what
is not. That must be established from the facts of each case[.]
....
The fees claimed and received by the Respondent for the alleged cases he handled despite the fact that the records and evidence does not show that
he ever signed pleadings filed, the amount of P700,000.00 is reasonable, thus, fairness and equity dictate, he has to return the excess amount of
P700,000.00 to the complainant[.]40 cralawre d
In Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-77841 dated June 21, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that complaint [sic] is guilty of unlawful, immoral and deceitful acts, Atty.
Nicanor C. Alvarez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year with [a] Warning that repetition of the same acts shall be
dealt with more sever[ejly. Further, he is Ordered to Return the amount of P700,000.00 to complainant with legal interest from the time of
demand.42 (Emphasis in the original) cralawred
Atty. Alvarez moved for reconsideration of the Resolution, 43 but the Motion was denied by the Board of Governors in Notice of Resolution No. XXI-
2014-28644 dated May 3, 2014. The Resolution reads: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
resolution subject of the motion, it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
Resolution No. XX-2013-778 dated June 21, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED. 45 (Emphasis in the original) cralawre d
We resolve the following issues:
First, whether respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez, as a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the
Department of Health, is authorized to engage in the private practice of law; and
Second, whether the amount charged by respondent for attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.
The Investigating Commissioner did not make a categorical declaration that respondent is guilty of unauthorized practice of his profession. The
Investigating Commissioner merely alluded to respondent's unauthorized practice of law.
We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.
Respondent claims that he is authorized to practice his profession 46 as shown in the letter dated August 1, 2001 of National Center for Mental Health
Chief Bernardino A. Vicente.47 The letter reads: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ

Legal Officer III
This Center
Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of profession
This refers to your request for permission to engage in private practice of your profession.
In accordance with Administrative Order No. 21, s. 1999 of the Department of Health, which vested in the undersigned the authority to grant
permission for the exercise of profession or engage in the practice of profession, you are hereby authorized to teach or engage in the practice of your
profession provided it will not run in conflict with the interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole. In the exigency of the service
however, or when public interest so requires, this authority may be revoked anytime.
Please be guided accordingly.
[sgd.]
BERNARDINO A. VICENTE, MD, FFPPA, MHA, CESO IV
Medical Center Chief II48 (Emphasis supplied) cralawre d
Respondent practiced law even if he did not sign any pleading. In the context of this case, his surreptitious actuations reveal illicit intent. Not only did
he do unauthorized practice, his acts also show badges of offering to peddle influence in the Office of the Ombudsman.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,49 the modern concept of the term "practice of law" includes the more traditional concept of litigation or appearance before
courts:chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
"x x x for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts
for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for
that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law."cralawre d
....
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law
in even broader terms as advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute." cralawre d
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
....
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Arty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poorverily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirementthat he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. 50 (Emphasis supplied) cralawred
Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib: 51
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any
degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod, this court cited the deliberations of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission and agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal knowledge or
legal talent" is practice of law.52 (Citations omitted) cralawre d
By preparing the pleadings of and giving legal advice to complainant, respondent practiced law.
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
and Memorandum Circular No. 17, series of 1986,53government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their
profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to
conflict with the official functions of the government official or employee: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Republic Act No. 6713:
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution
and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:
....
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
....
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with their official functions[.]
....
Memorandum Circular No. 17:
The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency in accordance with Section 12,
Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
"Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no
permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any real or apparent conflict between his
private interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the
enterprise or become an officer or member of the board of directors", cralawred
subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the interest of the service, as expressed in
the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission. cralawred
In Abella v. Cruzabra, the respondent was a Deputy Register of Deeds of General Santos City. While serving as an incumbent government employee,
54
the respondent "filed a petition for commission as a notary public and was commissioned . . . without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of
the Department of Justice."55 According to the complainant, the respondent had notarized around 3,000 documents. 56 This Court found the respondent
guilty of engaging in notarial practice without written authority from the Secretary of Justice. Thus:
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the D[epartment] [of] J[ustice]. Respondent's superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he
is not the head of the Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any
proof of that written permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for
commission as a notary public after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986. 57 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, respondent was given written permission by the Head of the National Center for Mental Health, whose authority was designated under
Department of Health Administrative Order No. 21, series of 1999. 58 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
However, by assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against government in general, respondent put himself in a
situation of conflict of interest.
Respondent's practice of profession was expressly and impliedly conditioned on the requirement that his practice will not be "in conflict with the
interest of the Center and the Philippine government as a whole." 59 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In Javellana v. Department of Interior and Local Government,60 the petitioner was an incumbent City Councilor or member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Bago City. He was a lawyer by profession and had continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority from the
Regional Director of the Department of Local Government. 61 In 1989, the petitioner acted as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang and
filed a case for Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages against Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia, City Engineer of Bago City.62 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Engr. Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed an administrative case before the Department of Local Government for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act
No. 6713 and relevant Department of Local Government memorandum circulars on unauthorized practice of profession, as well as for oppression,
misconduct, and abuse of authority.63 While the case was pending before Department of Local Government, the petitioner was able to secure a written
authority to practice his profession from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, "provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with his official functions."64 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
This Court in Javellana observed that the petitioner practiced his profession in conflict with his functions as City Councilor and against the interests of
government: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
In the first place, complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed
with public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and
Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By serving
as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of R[epublic] A[ct] [No.] 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the
private practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests adverse to the government.
Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5
of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe
rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials
to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it.65
cralawred
There is basic conflict of interest here. Respondent is a public officer, an employee of government. The Office of the Ombudsman is part of
government. By appearing against the Office of the Ombudsman, respondent is going against the same employer he swore to serve.
In addition, the government has a serious interest in the prosecution of erring employees and their corrupt acts. Under the Constitution, "[p]ublic
office is a public trust."66 The Office of the Ombudsman, as "protectors of the [P]eople," 67 is mandated to "investigate and prosecute . . . any act or
omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 68 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, a conflict of interest exists when an incumbent government employee represents another government employee or public officer in a case
pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. The incumbent officer ultimately goes against government's mandate under the Constitution to
prosecute public officers or employees who have committed acts or omissions that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. 69 Furthermore,
this is consistent with the constitutional directive that "[p]ublic officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the [P]eople, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives." 70
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The objective in disciplinary cases is not to punish the erring officer or employee but to continue to uplift the People's trust in government and to
ensure excellent public service: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
[W]hen an officer or employee is disciplined, the object sought is not the punishment of that officer or employee, but the improvement of the public
service and the preservation of the public's faith and confidence in the government. . . . These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in
our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service. 71 cralawred
Having determined that respondent illicitly practiced law, we find that there is now no need to determine whether the fees he charged were
reasonable.
In disbarment or disciplinary cases pending before this Court, the complainant must prove his or her allegations through substantial
evidence.72 In Advincula v. Macabata,73 this Court dismissed a complaint for disbarment due to the lack of evidence in proving the complainant's
allegations:chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per
rerum naturam factum negantis probation nulla sit. In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof required of her.
A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 74 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted) cralawred
Moreover, lawyers should not be hastily disciplined or penalized unless it is shown that they committed a transgression of their oath or their duties,
which reflects on their fitness to enjoy continued status as a member of the bar: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for
the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the Bar. Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to such extent as to
clearly show the lawyer's unfltness to continue in the practice of law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced
the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
attended the commission of the offense should also be considered. 75 cralawred
Likewise, we find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very
least, made it appear to complainant that he knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant's case.
Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of their profession. 76 Respondent violated the oath he took when he
proposed to gain a favorable outcome for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was pending. 77 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 78prohibit lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.79 Respondent's act of ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with
officers or employees in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7 80 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers
to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."
In relation, Canon 1381 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client violates Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.82 This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and has no place in the legal profession: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judgeor a judge evincing a willingnessto discuss, in private, a matter related to a case
pending in that judge's sala cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a
mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his client's favor. This conduct is
not acceptable in the legal profession.83 cralawred
In Jimenez v. Verano, Jr.,84 we disciplined the respondent for preparing a release order for his clients using the letterhead of the Department of Justice
and the stationery of the Secretary: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and consideration from a government agency. This is
precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondent is duty-bound to actively avoid any act
that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people's faith in the judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice. To that end, their clients' success is wholly subordinate. The
conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.
....
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client's cause must always be within the bounds of the law. A self-respecting independence in the exercise of the
profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting
standards. Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as commensurate penalty for the offense. 85 cralawre d
Similar to the present case, in Bueno v. Raeses, we disbarred a lawyer who solicited bribe money from his client in violation of Canon 13 of the
86
Code of Professional Responsibility: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Raeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty. Raeses merits the ultimate administrative
penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should
not be, in a lawyer's relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent. It is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty.
Raeses in fact lost the case. It is fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these, he maligned the
judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on the merits, but through deceitful meansa decidedly black mark
against the Judiciary. Last but not the least, Atty. Raeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Raeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is
a member. The Court cannot and should not allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and allto all lawyers, their
clients and the general publicthat the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our
judicial system and the institutions composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided members of the
Bar.87(Emphasis supplied) cralawre d
In the interest of ridding itself of corrupt personnel who encourage influence peddling, and in the interest of maintaining the high ethical standards of
employees in the judiciary, this Court did not hesitate in dismissing its own employee from government service when she peddled influence in the
Court of Appeals:88
What brings our judicial system into disrepute are often the actuations of a few erring court personnel peddling influence to party-litigants, creating
the impression that decisions can be bought and sold, ultimately resulting in the disillusionment of the public. This Court has never wavered in its
vigilance in eradicating the so-called "bad eggs" in the judiciary. And whenever warranted by the gravity of the offense, the supreme penalty of
dismissal in an administrative case is meted to erring personnel. 89 cralawred
The Investigating Commissioner found that complainant was "forced to give . . . Respondent the amount of P1,400,000.00 because of the words of
Respondent that he ha[d] friends in the Office of the Ombudsman who c[ould] help with a fee." 90 It is because of respondent's assurances to
complainant that she sent him money over the course of several months. 91 These assurances are seen from the text messages that respondent sent
complainant: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>
SUBJECT:
Cnbi ko dun sa kontak dati na magbibigay tayo na pera sa allowance lang muna later na ang bayad pag labas ng reso at kaliwaan pero sbi nya mas
maganda kung isasabay na ang pera pagbgay ng letter mo sa omb.. Parang dun tayo nagkamali pero ang solusyon ay sana ibalik nila ang pera . . in d
meantime hindi dapat apektado ang kaso at kailangan an Appeal sa CA at may deadline yun
DATE: 31-05-2010
TIME: 5:24 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ...
DATE: 21-05-2010
TIME: 5:13 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Pnro sbi ng Dep Omb la png cnabi sa knya ng Omb. Ang CA Reso pnaiwan n Orly @ studyohn nya (txt kontal)
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 6:07 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....

SUBJECT:
Yung blessing pala ni gutierez ang hnhntay ng overall dep omb si orly at dun din siya subok kuha letter pero nasbhan na si gutierez ng dep omb for
Luzon sbi ko pwwde b nila gawin total alam na ni gutierez. . . Maya tawag ko sayo update
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 12:44 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Gud mrng Tess hindi na svmagot kahapon tnxt ko pero minsan hndi tlga sumasagot yun nag ttxt lang pagkatapos kaya lang d mo pala naiintindihan
ang txt nya bisaya "istudyahun" ibig sabihn kausapin pa so nasbi na nya sa omb yung letter at istudzahan pa
DATE: 31-03-2010
TIME: 8:25 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Ok panero update ko na lang client pero nag txt tlga kailangan daw nya letter habang wala pa omb reso., Txt mo lang ko panero, have a nice
holidays., (sagot ko yan tess)
DATE: 03-03-2010
TIME: 5:03 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....

SUBJECT:
Sa dep omb for Luzon na nya follow up ang MR at saka overall dep omb si orly dun nya kukunin letter
DATE: 30-03-2010
TIME: 5:00 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro. Ang Dep. Omb. My closd dor mtng pro pnkta s knya ang note q at sabi rw bumalik aq aftr Holy wk. C Orly nman ay ngsabi n es2dyuhn
p rw nya.
DATE: 30-03-2010
TIME: 4:52 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Binigay ko na pera kahapon at kinausap ko para sa letter magkikita pa kami marnaya las 2 at kukunin nya copy letter natin kay sales at CA reso
DATE: 15-04-2010
TIME: 12:32 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Tess ndpst mo na? Kakausapin ko kasi na qc na lang kami kita at malapit ako dun maya at hindi na sa crsng. Tnx
DATE: 14-04-2010
TIME: 1:29 pm
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Gud pm pnro. Ok ba ang 15k rep maya 6pm? Thnx (txt ng kontak tess kausapin ko mbuti sa letter)
DATE: 14-04-2010
TIME: 10:25 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Pnro ung rep alo n bngay mo 1st Mar 24 ay ok Ing pra s 2 falo-ups q Mar 25 @ Mar 30. As usual, magkita tau Apr 14 @ kunin q 20 th para sa falo-up
Apr 15 thnx
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 10:58 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Ok panero kailangan malinaw din ang presentation lp sa client panero at ang impression nya yun na ang hningi natin... so april 15 panero an balik mo
sa MR at yung letter form omb to dof bhala ka na sa diskarte panero pag nakakuha tayo nakahanda na 150k dun
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 10:56 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Pnero dapat maalala mo n ung purpose ng 400th hindi directly delivery ng Reso granting d MR pro ung delivery by the Dep Omb ng letr of appeal 2 d
Omb at pgpaliwang nya sa Omb. Re sa hnhngi ng rspondnt n modfcation ng Dcsion. Nung 1st mtng ntn Mar 24, ngin4m q sau n ngawa n i2 ng Dep
Omb pro kausapn p ng Omb c Orly. Itong huli ang nabtn p, pro yon ay dscrtion n ng Omb@ wing control d2 and Dep. Omb.
DATE: 08-04-2010
TIME: 10:55 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Tess gud mrng, wag mo kalimutan mgdpst 25k today 6pm mtng naming omb tnx.
DATE: 24-03-2010
TIME: 10:23 am
TYPE: Text Message
....
SUBJECT:
Gud pm uli pnro. Kung subukan q n lkrn ky Orly ung cnabi mong letr adrsd 2 DOF Sec @ synd n Orly ang letr, pktanong s rspndnt kung ok b s knya
nab yarn nya aq ng Atty's fee n 75thou upfront @ another 75thou upon receipt of a DOF ordr holdng n abyans implmntation of hr dsmsal due 2 Orly's
letr? thnx
DATE: 11-03-2010
TIME: 7:03 pm
TYPE: Text Message92 cralawred
In response to his alleged text messages, respondent claims that complainant must have confused him with her other contacts. 93 Respondent found it
"mesmerizing" that complainant was able to save all those alleged text messages from two (2) years ago. 94 Moreover, assuming these messages were
"true, still they [were] not legally admissible as they [were] covered by the lawyer-client privileged communication as those supposed texts '[had
been] made for the purpose and in the course of employment, [were] regarded as privileged and the rule of exclusion [was] strictly enforced.'" 95 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In cases involving influence peddling or bribery, "[t]he transaction is always done in secret and often only between the two parties
concerned."96 Nevertheless, as found by the Investigating Commissioner and as shown by the records, we rule that there is enough proof to hold
respondent guilty of influence peddling.
We agree with the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. We find respondent's acts of
influence peddling, coupled with unauthorized practice of law, merit the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
To be so bold as to peddle influence before the very institution that is tasked to prosecute corruption speaks much about respondent's
character and his attitude towards the courts and the bar.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators, judges, or Justices pervert the system,
weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even as they claim to be members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's
ability to have illicit access. Rather, it should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully
gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about attaining justice in a fair manner. Law
exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly
influencing people or public officials.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make a decision is an act worthy of the utmost
condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its members must live within its ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for
influence peddling.
While this Court is not a collection agency for faltering debtors, 97 this Court has ordered restitution of amounts to complainants due to the erroneous
actions of lawyers.98 Respondent is, therefore, required to return to complainant the amount of P500,000.00the amount that respondent allegedly
gave his friends connected with the Office of the Ombudsman.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Arty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return
the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant Teresita P. Fajardo.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Likewise,
copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013
VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyers oath, docketed as CBD Case No.
10-2631.
The Facts
Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction,
Corazon told Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP
250,000) from her (Victoria). Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed
the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo was introduced to her as her godmothers lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former.
Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP
250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check dated February 2, 2009
1
for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo
requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that she was still waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to
fund the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check
was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (PhP 50,000) representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria deposited the said
2
check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victorias repeated demands.
Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount
of PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds.
Victoria thereafter became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a
demand letter dated August 3, 2009. 3
When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office. 4
Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutors Office which she personally received and
continued to ignore Victorias demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan
obligation.
5
In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos
(PhP 275,000.). However, to Victorias chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo did not file
6
any counter-affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without
Atty. Espejos participation. Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010,
7
the CBD, through Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victorias
8
administrative complaint failing which would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On
May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a
mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her
right to participate in further proceedings. 9
At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared. 10
Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order noting Atty. Espejos failure to appear during the mandatory conference and her
11
failure to file an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified
position paper, which she filed on June 11, 2010. 12
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law
13
and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.
The CBD reasoned:

The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary
sanction.
Moreover, respondent[s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her
obligation and her disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges
against her for Estafa and Violation of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.
On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the
14
modification lowering Atty. Espejos suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the
amount of PhP 250,000 within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. The
Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents grave
misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to complainant
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned
from the time the demand was made.
On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the
records of this case. 15
The Courts Ruling
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part. Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse
allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts
and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. 16
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II,
We explained that the prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:
In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal
to pay. Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce.
Although he acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On
the contrary, he refused to recognize any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross
misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.
17
The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of
no moment. As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct
committed in his non- professional or private capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his
misconduct outside of the lawyers professional dealings is so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege
which his licenses and the law confer. 18
In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this
case, manifests a lawyers low regard for her commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyers
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her
unworthy of public confidence. The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful
to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the
oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem.
xxxx
In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was convicted in the criminal case filed
against him. In Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on
the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of
property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the complainant. 19
Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer
to the complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which
amounts to conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only for the courts,
but also for judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the
complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP
gave him another chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect
for authority. Indeed, he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote
respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and
other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys. 20
Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejos issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office and the IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provide:
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE
LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 A
LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST
ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the
circumstances. We, however, cannot sustain the IBPs recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from
Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar. Our only concern is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on
other judicial action which the parties may to choose me against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not
involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination
in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule
on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant. 22
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years affective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
PREBITERIO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012
GRACE M. ANACTA*, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDUARDO D. RESURRECCION, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to ensure the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and trustworthy men in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence." 1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment filed on August 22, 2007 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
complainant Grace M. Anacta (complainant) prays for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion (respondent) for "gross
misconduct, deceit and malpractice."3
Records show that on November 15, 2004, complainant engaged the services of respondent to file on her behalf a petition for annulment of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, for which she paid respondent P 42,000.00.4
In December 2004, respondent presented to the complainant a supposed copy of a Petition for Annulment of Marriage 5 which bore the
stamped receipt dated December 8, 2004 of the RTC, as well as its docket number, Civil Case No. 04-25141.
From then on, complainant did not hear from respondent or receive any notice from the trial court relative to the said petition. This prompted
her to make inquiries with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City (OCC-RTC). To her surprise and dismay, she
discovered that no petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141 was ever filed before the said court. 6 Thus, complainant
terminated the services of respondent "for loss of trust and confidence" 7 and requested the OCC-RTC to refuse any belated attempt on the
part of respondent to file a petition for annulment of marriage on her behalf. 8
On July 30, 2007, complainant, through her new counsel, wrote a letter 9 to the respondent demanding for an explanation as to how
respondent intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had suffered due to respondents deceitful acts. Respondent has not
replied thereto. Hence, complainant filed before the IBP a verified complaint praying that respondent be disbarred.
In an Order10 dated August 22, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, required the respondent to submit
his answer to the complaint within 15 days from notice. However, respondent did not heed said directive. Hence, complainant filed Motions
to Declare Respondent in Default and Hear the Case Ex-Parte. 11The Investigating Commissioner, Romualdo A. Din, Jr., held in abeyance
the resolution of the above motions and instead set the complaint for Mandatory Conference on October 6, 2008. 12 On the said date,
however, only the complainant and her counsel appeared. Accordingly, in an Order 13 dated October 6, 2008, the Investigating
Commissioner deemed respondent to have waived the filing of an answer; noted complainants motion to declare respondent in default;
and gave the complainant 10 days from notice within which to file her verified position paper, after which the case shall be deemed
submitted for resolution.
Complainant filed her verified Position Paper14 on October 15, 2008.
In his Report and Recommendation15 dated December 8, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner found clear and convincing evidence that
respondent is guilty of deceit and dishonesty when he misrepresented having filed the petition for annulment of marriage after receipt of
P42,000.00 when in fact no such petition was filed. He thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two years and to reimburse/return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00.
In a Resolution16 dated August 28, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner
but modified the recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law from two years to four years and ordered respondent to
return to the complainant the amount of P 42,000.00, otherwise his suspension will continue until he returns the sum involved.
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
In Narag v. Atty. Narag17 this Court held that "[t]he burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."
In this case, complainant submitted the following documents to prove her allegations: (1) the Service Agreement dated November 15, 2004
to prove the existence of attorney-client relationship between the parties; (2) the Petition for Annulment of Marriage 18 supposedly filed by
respondent on December 8, 2004 with the RTC of Quezon City and docketed as Civil Case No. 04-25141; (3) the Certification issued by
the Assistant Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City showing that "no Petition for Annulment of Marriage with Civil Case No. Q-04-25141
was filed on December 8, 2004"; (4) the letter dated March 6, 2005 of the complainant to the respondent informing the latter that she is
terminating his legal services effective immediately; (5) the letter of complainant to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon City wherein
she requested that "any belated attempt by my former lawyer Atty. Resurreccion to file any Petition for Annulment x x x be refused
acceptance"; and, (6) the letter dated July 30, 2007 of complainants new counsel demanding for an explanation as to how respondent
intended to indemnify the complainant for damages she had suffered by reason of respondents fraudulent misrepresentations. 19
In the face of such a serious charge, the respondent has chosen to remain silent.
Thus, we find the confluence of the evidence submitted by the complainant to have clearly, convincingly and satisfactorily shown that
indeed the respondent has authored this reprehensible act. Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by misrepresenting that he
had already filed a petition for annulment on behalf of the complainant and pocketing the amount of P42,000.00. He even went to the extent
of presenting to the complainant a supposed copy of the petition duly filed with the court. After he was found out, he made himself scarce.
He ignored all communications sent to him by the complainant. After the disbarment complaint was filed, he failed to file his answer despite
due notice. He totally disregarded the proceedings before the IBP despite receipt of summons. "The act of respondent in not filing his
answer and ignoring the hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal
proceedings."20
We thus agree with the observation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner that "such action of the respondent is patently deceitful and
dishonest, considering further that he received an amount of money from the complainant." 21
"The natural instinct of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It is totally against our human nature
to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Hence, silence in such cases is almost always construed as implied
admission of the truth thereof."22
As early as In Re: Sotto,23 this Court held that:
One of the qualifications required of a candidate for admission to the bar is the possession of good moral character, and, when one who
has already been admitted to the bar clearly shows, by a series of acts, that he does not follow such moral principles as should govern the
conduct of an upright person, and that, in his dealings with his clients and with the courts, he disregards the rule of professional ethics
required to be observed by every attorney, it is the duty of the court, as guardian of the interests of society, as well as of the preservation of
the ideal standard of professional conduct, to make use of its powers to deprive him of his professional attributes which he so unworthily
abused.
In addition, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." "The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes but also mandates the utmost degree of
fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship." 24
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, respondent may either be disbarred or suspended for committing deceitful and
dishonest acts. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. [Emphasis supplied.]
It is thus clear from the foregoing provision that in any of the following circumstances, to wit: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer's oath; (7) wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; or (8) corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so; the Court is vested with the authority and discretion to impose either the extreme penalty of disbarment or mere
suspension. Certainly, the Court is not placed in a straitjacket as regards the penalty to be imposed. There is no ironclad rule that
disbarment must immediately follow upon a finding of deceit or gross misconduct. The Court is not mandated to automatically impose the
extreme penalty of disbarment. It is allowed by law to exercise its discretion either to disbar or just suspend the erring lawyer based on its
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case.
We examined the records of the case and assessed the evidence presented by the complainant. After such examination and assessment,
we are convinced beyond doubt that respondent should only be meted the penalty of four-year suspension as properly recommended by
the IBP Board of Governors. In the exercise of our discretion, we are unquestionably certain that the four-year suspension suffices and
commensurable to the infractions he committed. As will be pointed out later, there have been cases with more or less the same factual
setting as in the instant case where the Court also imposed the penalty of suspension and not disbarment.
We have gone over jurisprudential rulings where the respondents were found guilty of grave misconduct and/or dishonesty and we observe
that the Court either disbars or suspends them based on its collective appreciation of attendant circumstances and in the exercise of its
sound discretion.
In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel,25 the Court found respondent therein to have committed dishonesty and abused the confidence 26 of his client for
failing to file the ejectment suit despite asking for and receiving from the complainant the money intended as filing fees. In his bid for
exoneration, therein respondent attempted to mislead the Court by claiming that he has not yet received the registry return card of the
notice to vacate hence his failure to file the ejectment suit. However, the records indubitably showed that he had already received the
same. Moreover, therein respondent likewise refused to return the monies he received from the complainant despite repeated
demands.27The Court thus concluded that therein respondent's actions constitute gross misconduct. Nevertheless, based on its
appreciation of the evidence, the Court refrained from imposing the penalty of disbarment. Instead, it imposed the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of six months, ratiocinating thus:
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However, we find that suspension from the practice of law is sufficient to discipline
respondent. The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent. Suspension, we may add, is not
primarily intended as punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the legal profession. 28
In Ceniza v. Rubia,29 respondent therein was alleged to have misrepresented having already filed in court the necessary complaint by
showing the copy of the complaint stamped "received" with a docket number thereon. 30However, upon verification with the appropriate
court, it was discovered that none was filed.31 It was also noted that respondent therein prompted the complainant to borrow money from a
third party just to be able to pay her attorney's fees. When the case reached this Court, it imposed the penalty of suspension and not
disbarment. In so doing, the Court lent more credence to the explanation of the respondent that the case was "withdrawn" after it had been
stamped "received" by the court.
In Roa v. Moreno,32 the Court found respondent therein guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. He issued a bogus Certificate of Land
Occupancy to the complainant33 and refused to return the amount paid by the complainant. 34 For said infractions, the Court meted him with
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.35
In Barcenas v. Alvero,36 respondent failed to deposit in court the amount of P 300,000.00 which he received from his client supposedly as
redemption price. He also failed to return the amount despite repeated demands. He was suspended for two years.
In Small v. Banares37 respondent received P80,000.00 from complainant for his legal services and as filing fees. He however failed to file
the necessary complaint and was never heard from again. He was thus suspended from the practice of law for two years.
In Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,38 therein respondent failed to promptly report that he received money on behalf of his client. However, for
lack of evidence of misappropriation, he was only suspended and not disbarred.
In Gonato v. Atty. Adaza,39 Atty. Adaza asked money from his client supposedly as filing fees when in fact no such filing fees are needed or
due. Worse, he issued a falsified "official receipt" as proof of payment. Finally, when he was discovered, he failed to heed his client's
demand to return the amount. For such infractions, Atty. Adaza was suspended for a period of six months.
In Aquino v. Atty. Barcelona,40 Atty. Barcelona deliberately misrepresented to his client that he was able to successfully facilitate the
restructuring of his clients loan with a bank through his "connection". On the basis of said false pretenses, he collected P 60,000.00 from
his client. His client eventually became aware of such misrepresentations when his property was foreclosed by the bank. Atty. Barcelona
was thus charged with misconduct and for which he was suspended by the Court for a period of six months.
The foregoing cases illustrate that the Court is not bound to impose the penalty of disbarment in cases of gross misconduct and/or
dishonesty, if in its appreciation of facts and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the penalty of suspension would be more
commensurate.41 "Disbarment, jurisprudence teaches, should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as reprimand,
suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic
life and honor of the erring person."42 In this case, we believe that the penalty of suspension of four years will provide Atty. Resurreccion
"with enough time to ponder on and cleanse himself of his misconduct."43 "While we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end."44 We note that there is no mention in the records of any previous or similar administrative case filed against
herein respondent.
Anent the issue of whether respondent should be directed to return the amount of P 42,000.00 he received from the complainant, we note
that the rulings of this Court in this matter have been diverse. On one hand, there are cases where this Court directed respondents to return
the money they received from the complainants. On the other hand, there are also cases where this Court refrained from venturing into this
matter on the ground that the same is not within the ambit of its disciplinary authority as the only issue in administrative cases is the fitness
of the lawyer to remain a member of the bar.
Now is the most opportune time to harmonize the Court's ruling on this matter. Thus, it is imperative to first determine whether the matter
falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter
involves violations of the lawyers oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Courts disciplinary authority. However, if the matter
arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the
matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Courts disciplinary authority. Thus,
we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the
legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the
Courts disciplinary authority.
In this case, respondent received the amount of P42,000.00 supposedly as payment for his legal services and as filing fees. Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
xxxx
Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x
In this case, it is thus clear that respondent violated his lawyers oath and code of conduct when he withheld the amount of P 42,000.00
despite his failure to render the necessary legal services and after complainant demanded its return. He must therefore be directed to
return the same.
Finally, we emphasize that "the object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by proceeding the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove from the
profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office has proved them unfit to continue discharging the trust respect in them as
members of the bar."45
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo D. Resurreccion is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for four years. He is
also DIRECTED to return to the complainant the amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30) days from the promulgation of this Decision.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and
guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this Decision to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate justice

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
ATTY. JOSABETH V. A.C. No. 8481

ALONSO andSHALIMAR P. [Formerly B.M. No. 1524]
LAZATIN,
Complainants, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO-MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 3, 2010
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR.,
Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Complaint[1] dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Ibaro B.
Relamida, Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines,
Incorporated for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines,
Incorporated (Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.
On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier.[2] It held that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from
Servier and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.
Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the NLRC-
Third Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.[3]
Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution [4] dated May
5, 2003.
Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 77968. In a Decision[5] dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the
NLRC that Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for
reconsideration, but was denied in a Resolution[6] dated April 30, 2004.
Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a Resolution[7] dated
August 4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a
motion for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution[8] dated October 11, 2004.
Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated
August 4, 2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion.[9]
Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
January 19, 2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted
without action Ebanens third motion for reconsideration.[10]
On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanens Motion for
Leave to Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of
judgment on February 17, 2005.[11]
On February 17, 2005, the Courts Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final and executory;
thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment[12] has been issued.
However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a second complaint
on August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier,
now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.
Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping
and res judicata.
Subsequently, in a Resolution[13] dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and Atty.
Relamida to comment on the letter-complaint against them.
On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments. [14] Both respondents admitted the filing of the
second complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void
for want of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital
documents filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not
amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed that
there was also no violation of the rule on forum shopping.[15]
On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[16]
On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res judicata and
forum shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively
dismissed.
On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to appear. Ebanen
manifested that she is not a lawyer.
Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.
Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio
(Atty. Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate
lawyer.
He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier. He
claimed that in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was
Atty. Lapulapu Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however,
that during the filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio.
[17]
He also admitted that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and
signed as counsel for Ebanen.[18]
Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent
the latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her
motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null
and void; thus, there was no res judicata.[19] He maintained that he did not violate the lawyers oath by serving the
interest of his client.
Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the rights of
Servier, since the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum
shopping for the same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend
themselves in a case that has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the
filing of the second complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that
Atty. Relamida be disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.
On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent Atty.
Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a
non-lawyer.
In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating the rules
on res judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts by
filing a complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to penalty the
report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.
On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.
We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.
All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they
take their oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold
the laws of the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according
to the lawyers oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."[20]
In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the rule on res
judicata. Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Servier. He ought to have
known that the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He
was aware of all the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated
in the preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally.[21] He knew that the decision
in the subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second
complaint, it involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of
nullity of the previous dismissal.
His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to protect the
rights of his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant
consideration. He should know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is
laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to
respect the courts verdict and to comply with it.[22]
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as
a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable
decision. An important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-
litigants by the filing of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Thus, the following requisites should concur:[23]
x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the action under consideration.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the courts processes and improper conduct that tends to
impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to
state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final
and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or
for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such
actions as appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor.[24]
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata,
runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort
and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent
also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."[25]
The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the
court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to
delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyers duty.[26] This we will not tolerate.
In cases of similar nature,[27] the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension from the
practice of law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6)
months from practice of law is proper.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found respondent
Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED.
Atty. Relaminda is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of
this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record
of Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V.

LABRADOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a Petition for disbarment against Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos for allegedly representing conflicting interests
[1]
and for using the title Judge despite having been found guilty of grave and serious misconduct in Zarate v. Judge
Romanillos.[2]
The facts are as follows:
In 1985, respondent represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. (SJHAI) before the Human Settlements
Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and Corp., Inc. (DCI) for violation of the Subdivision and
[3]
Condominium Buyers Protection Act (P.D. No. 957). SJHAI alleged that Lot No. 224 was designated as a school site in the
subdivision plan that DCI submitted to the Bureau of Lands in 1961 but was sold by DCI to spouses Ramon and Beatriz
Durano without disclosing it as a school site.
While still the counsel for SJHAI, respondent represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAIs
conformity to construct a school building on Lot No. 224 to be purchased from Durano.
When the request was denied, respondent applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) in behalf of Montealegre. Petitioners Board of Directors terminated respondents services as counsel and
engaged another lawyer to represent the association.
Respondent also acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez who substituted for DCI in Civil Case No. 18014
entitled San Jose Homeowners, Inc. v. Durano and Corp., Inc. filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134. Thus, SJHAI filed a disbarment case against respondent for representing conflicting interests, docketed as
Administrative Case No. 4783.
In her Report dated August 3, 1998, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar
[4]
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) made the following findings:
Respondent failed to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, knowing fully well
that the Montealegre case was adverse to the Complainant wherein he had previously been
not only an active board member but its corporate secretary having access to all its
documents confidential or otherwise and its counsel in handling the implementation of the writ
of execution against its developer and owner, Durano and Co. Inc.
Moreso, when Respondent acted as counsel for the substituted defendant Durano and Co. Inc.,
Lydia Durano-Rodriguez; the conflict of interest between the latter and the Complainant
became so revealing and yet Respondent proceeded to represent the former.
For his defense of good faith in doing so; inasmuch as the same wasnt controverted by the
Complainant which was his first offense; Respondent must be given the benefit of the doubt to
rectify his error subject to the condition that should he commit the same in the future; severe
penalty will be imposed upon him. [5]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended dismissal of the complaint with the admonition that respondent should
observe extra care and diligence in the practice of his profession to uphold its dignity and integrity beyond reproach.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, which we noted in a resolution dated March 8, 1999.
Notwithstanding the admonition, respondent continued representing Lydia Durano-Rodriguez before the Court of
Appeals and this Court and even moved for the execution of the decision.
[6] [7]
Thus, a second disbarment case was filed against respondent for violation of the March 8, 1999 Resolution in A.C.
No. 4783 and for his alleged deceitful conduct in using the title Judge although he was found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct.
Respondent used the title Judge in his office letterhead, correspondences and billboards which was erected in several
areas within the San Jose Subdivision sometime in October 2001.
In his Comment and Explanation, respondent claimed that he continued to represent Lydia Durano-Rodriguez
[8]
against petitioner despite the March 8, 1999 Resolution because it was still pending when the second disbarment case
was filed. He maintained that the instant petition is a rehash of the first disbarment case from which he was exonerated.
Concerning the title Judge, respondent stated that since the filing of the instant petition he had ceased to attach the title to
his name.
On July 7, 2003, the matter was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. [9]
Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. reported that respondent did not violate the admonition because it
referred to future cases only and not to cases subject of A.C. No. 4783. Besides, petitioner never questioned the propriety
of respondents continued representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez on appeal until the case was terminated.
The Investigating Commissioner, however, believed that respondent was deceitful when he used the title Judge, thus
creating a false impression that he was an incumbent.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended thus:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Commissioner respectfully recommends the

following penalty range to be deliberated upon by the Board for imposition on Respondent:
minimum penalty of reprimand to a maximum penalty of four (4) months suspension. It is
further recommended that in addition to the penalty to be imposed, a stern warning be given
to Respondent in that should he violate his undertaking/promise not to handle any case in the
future where the Complainant would be the adverse party and/or should he again use the title
of Judge which would create an impression that he is still connected to the judiciary, a more
severe penalty shall be imposed on him by the Commission.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
The IBP Board of Governors approved with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with

modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and considering Respondents violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Roberto Romanillos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six
(6) months with a WARNING that should he violate his undertaking/promise a more severe
penalty shall be imposed against him.
Undoubtedly, respondent represented the inconsistent interests of SJHAI, DCI as substituted by Lydia Durano-
Rodriguez and the Montealegres. Respondent was admonished yet he continued to represent Durano-Rodriguez against
SJHAI.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondents continued representation of Lydia
Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as the lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure. Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in
A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondents continued use of the title Judge violated Rules 1.01 and 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct and from using any misleading
statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring
to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in
his capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Respondent did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during the pendency of Zarate
v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious misconduct and would have been
dismissed from the service had he not resigned.
In that case, respondent was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. We ruled
thus:
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Roberto B. Romanillos is hereby found guilty of
grave and serious misconduct affecting his integrity and honesty. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal. However, respondent, in an obvious attempt to escape punishment for his
misdeeds, tendered his resignation during the pendency of this case. Consequently, we are
now precluded from dismissing respondent from the service. Nevertheless, the ruling in People
v. Valenzuela (135 SCRA 712 [1985]), wherein the respondent judge likewise resigned before
the case could be resolved, finds application in this case. Therein it was held that the rule that
the resignation or retirement of a respondent judge in an administrative case renders the case
moot and academic, is not a hard and fast rule.
ACCORDINGLY, in view of our aforestated finding that respondent Judge Romanillos is guilty of
grave and serious misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had
he not resigned during the pendency of this case, and it appearing that respondent has yet to
apply for his retirement benefits and other privileges if any; the Court, consistent with the
penalties imposed in Valenzuela (supra.), hereby orders the FORFEITURE of all leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which herein respondent Judge Romanillos may be
entitled WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or
corporations.
SO ORDERED. [10]
The penalty imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of
government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations. Certainly, the use of the title Judge is
one of such privileges.
We have previously declared that the use of titles such as Justice is reserved to incumbent and retired members of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may not be used by any other official of the
Republic, including those given the rank of Justice. By analogy, the title Judge should be reserved only to judges,
[11]
incumbent and retired, and not to those who were dishonorably discharged from the service. As correctly pointed out by
the Investigating Commissioner, the right to retain and use said title applies only to the aforementioned members of the
bench and no other, and certainly not to those who were removed or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals
[12]
who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport
[13]
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics faith in the legal
profession.[14]
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never
be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law,
it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have
no place in the legal profession.
[15]
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction. We are mindful that the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution, for only the most imperative reasons, and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
[16]
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. [17]
This is not respondents first infraction as an officer of the court and a member of the legal profession. He was stripped
of his retirement benefits and other privileges in Zarate v. Judge Romanillos. In A.C. No. 4783, he got off lightly with just
[18]
an admonition. Considering his previous infractions, respondent should have adhered to the tenets of his profession with
extra fervor and vigilance. He did not. On the contrary, he manifested undue disrespect to our mandate and exhibited a
propensity to violate the laws. He is thus unfit to discharge the duties of his office and unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed on him as an officer of the court. His disbarment is consequently warranted.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of
the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of
a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-
complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under the following
circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in his name agreed
that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of him
being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and undisturbed use of
the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier
had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national,
is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant
prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest
scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of
complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness
and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership
of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years and the
cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 8 of the Rules
of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of support for
his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case
as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and
obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary
action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that
virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for
one year for preparing a contract which declared the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract
separately subsequent marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963
DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI; and the instituted heirs, namely:
ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely: FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE
ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.

Romerico F. Flores for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and
to pass upon the question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.
The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the
settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9,
1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and
Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of
Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and
intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and
Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will,
adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was
alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to the executor's project of
partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for
hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues.
In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the
deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated
to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to
question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must
be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the
original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that
since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore
could not validly dispose of it in his will.
On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without
making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that,
considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during
the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728
in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects
of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal
properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing
the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of
the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to
the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for
new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.
The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special
jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.
In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or
intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in
which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.2 However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the
probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v.
Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters affecting property under
judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are
not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the
probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the
conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?
At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial
court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does
not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law
and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-
jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection
(that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the
procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary
action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the
jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate,
has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the
estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and
payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to
succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever
community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative
to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests
of third parties are affected.4
In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved whether they
belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which
necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his
heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have
been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to
the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is
one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the
petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.
Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the
determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is
undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset.
The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the
Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding.
Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it
for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In
other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife
to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties which is well within the competence of
the probate court and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from
the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who set the court in
motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them. 6
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the
widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased
husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that
to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting
estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. 7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the
deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa,
as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
A.C. No. 5179
DIONNIE RICAFORT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
Complainant Dionnie Ricafort filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Rene 0. Medina on December 10, 1999.
1 2
Complainant alleged that at about 7:30 a.m. on October 4, 1999, his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao
City. Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila
3
sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left. 4
Later, Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car. Complainant later learned that the
5
driver of the car was Atty. Rene 0. Medina, a provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.6
According to complainant, he felt "hurt, embarrassed[,] and humiliated." Respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of
7
office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct.
8
Attached to complainant's letter were his Affidavit, Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit, and a letter dated October 27, 1999 signed by Mayor
9 10 11
Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter. In her letter, Mayor Navarro stated that
respondent slapped complainant and caused him great humiliation. Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross
12
misconduct and abuse of authority:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
This is to bring to your attention an incident that occurred last October 4, 1999 in Surigao City, committed by Provincial Board Member
Rene O. Medina.
The said public official slapped in full public view a certain Donnie Ricafort, a tricycle driver, causing great humiliation on the person. We
believe that such conduct is very unbecoming of an elected official. Considering the nature and purpose of your Office, it is respectfully
submitted that appropriate action be taken on the matter as such uncalled for abuse consists of gross misconduct and abuse of authority.
Attached herewith is a copy of the affidavit of the victim and the petition of the Municipal Mayors League of Surigao del Norte.
Thank you very much for your attention and more power.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.)
Mayor ARLENCITA E. NAVARRO
Mayor's League President
Surigao del Norte Chapter 13
(Emphasis in the original)
Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del
Norte. In his Comment, respondent denied slapping complainant. He alleged that the incident happened while he was bringing his 10-
14 15
year-old son to school. He further alleged that complainant's reckless driving caused complainant's tricycle to bump the fender of
16
respondent's car. When respondent alighted from his car to check the damage, complainant approached him in an unfriendly
17
manner. Respondent pushed complainant on the chest to defend himself. Sensing, however, that complainant was not making a move
18 19
against his son and himself, respondent asked complainant if his tricycle suffered any damage and if they should wait for a traffic
officer. Both parties agreed that they were both too busy to wait for a traffic officer who would prepare a sketch. No traffic officer was
20 21
present during the incident. 22

Four or five days after the traffic incident, respondent became the subject of attacks on radio programs by the Provincial Governor's allies,
accusing him of slapping the tricycle driver. He alleged that complainant's Affidavit was caused to be prepared by the Provincial Governor
23
as it was prepared in the English language, which was unknown to complainant. Respondent was identified with those who politically
24
opposed the Provincial Governor. 25
According to respondent, the parties already settled whatever issue that might have arisen out of the incident during the conciliation
proceedings before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay Washington, Surigao City. During the proceedings, respondent
26
explained that he pushed complainant because of fear that complainant was carrying a weapon, as he assumed tricycle drivers did. On 27
the other hand, complainant explained that he went near respondent to check if there was damage to respondent's car. As part of the
28
settlement, respondent agreed to no longer demand any indemnity for the damage caused by the tricycle to his car. 29
Attached to respondent's Comment was the Certification dated October 27, 2006 of the Officer-in-Charge Punong Barangay stating that
30
the case had already been mediated by Punong Barangay Adriano F. Laxa and was amicably settled by the parties. 31
On December 5, 2006, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 32
Only respondent appeared in the Mandatory Conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 20, 2007.33 Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Commissioner De La Rama) noted the Certification from Barangay Washington,
Surigao City attesting that the case between the parties had already been settled. 34
Commissioner De La Rama supposed that this settlement "could be the reason why the complainant has not been appearing in this
case[.]" The Mandatory Conference was reset to September 21, 2007.
35 36
In the subsequent Mandatory Conference on September 21, 2007, only respondent appeared. Hence, the Commission proceeded with the
37
case exparte. 38
In his Report dated July 4, 2008, Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days
39
from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret to recommend for the suspension of Atty. Rene O. Medina from the practice of
law for a period of sixty ( 60) days from notice hereof due to misconduct and violation of Canon 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for behaving in an scandalous manner that tends to discredit the legal profession. (Emphasis in the original)
40
Commissioner De La Rama found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident. The slapping incident was
41
witnessed by one Manuel Cuizon, based on: (1) the photocopy of Manuel Cuizon's Affidavit attached to complainant's complaint; and (2)
42
the signatures on the League of Mayors' letter dated October 29, 1999 of the Surigao Mayors who believed that respondent was guilty of
gross misconduct and abuse of authority and should be held administratively liable. 43
On August 14, 2008, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution 44
adopting and approving with
modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A "; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent's
misconduct and violation of Canon 7. 03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for behaving in a scandalous manner, Atty. Rene O.
Medina is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for thirty (30) days. (Emphasis in the original)
45
Respondent moved for reconsideration of the Board of Governors' August 14, 2008 Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration was
46
denied by the Board of Governors in the Resolution dated March 22, 2014.
47
We resolve whether respondent Atty. Rene O. Medina should be held administratively liable.
There is sufficient proof to establish that respondent slapped complainant.
Respondent's defense consists of his denial that the slapping incident happened. He stresses complainant's seeming disinterest in and
48
lack of participation throughout the case and hints that this administrative case is politically motivated. 49
It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations.
This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established. A lawyer is presumed to
50
be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her
oath. Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim.
51 52
In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, 53
or evidence that is superior, more
convincing, or of "greater weight than the other."54
In this case, complainant discharged this burden.
During the fact-finding investigation, Commissioner De La Rama-as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors also
adoptedfound that the slapping incident actually occurred. 55
The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit; complainant's Affidavit was also
56
supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed
57
complainant of respondent's plate number. 58
In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent, Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of
59
Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded" because of respondent's act of slapping complainant. The
60 61
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding.
The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim
that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors'
signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's reaction to respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In
this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers.
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of
another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?"
1awp++i1
("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and
discrimination.
This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the
profession. As officers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission.
Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. This Court has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit
62
acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court. 63
This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. They are neither civil nor criminal in
64
nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to
determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. In Tiaya v. Gacott:
65
Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak
of a complainant or a prosecutor. 66
As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the
proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings. 67
Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of
administrative liability.
WHEREFORE, the findings of fact of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are ADOPTED and APPROVED. Respondent Atty. Rene O.
Medina is found to have violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three (3) months.
Let copies of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent as attorney, and be furnished to the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts throughout
the country. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013 - ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS,
REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR,
SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-
WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE,
ANTIQUE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty
of disbarment.
The Case
Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San Jose, Antique for
his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.
Antecedent
On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the
United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special
Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2
Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the
petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.
Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the
purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been
presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. 4
After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge
Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. 5
The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation
of the falsification.6
In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005, 7wherein he stated that it was the respondent who
had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley
Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8
The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side, 9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley
Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his sworn statement.
After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a
recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court
Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. 11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a
Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar Confidant. 12
Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit, 13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He
insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws
involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what
appeared to be a court decision;14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised
Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted
to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that
one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit
with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at
the instance of Dy Quioyo.15
Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty
of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special
Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and
in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the
petitioner;18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized her conclusions thusly: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof
thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision
was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the
names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain
silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere
afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely implicate him in this incident. 19
In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709 21denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and
affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule
139-B22 of the Rules of Court.
On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the
complainants reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment within 10
days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from notice.
Ruling
We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in
consideration of a sum of money.
The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that
the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to
resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.
However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos
categorical declaration on the respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome
by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence. 23 Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible
specifics and did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en
banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an
afterthought.
The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in
the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to
its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is
immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela
in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.
In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-
existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was
to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.
It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence
of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who
wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for them to:chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary
x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients x x x.
No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the
deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of
malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that
reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. 27 Verily, no lawyer is
immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct committed either in a
professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 29 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of
Attorneys.
This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the
country, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ.,
concur.
Del Castillo, J., on leave.
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, A.C. No. 6593
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and
MENDOZA, JJ.
ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Promulgated:
Respondents. ______________
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit [1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E.
Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline
charging them with gross immorality. The complaint-affidavit states:
1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila
which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel
Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters, Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later
part of 1987, an unknown caller talked with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere
joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the
Robinsons Department Store at Ermita, Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others that
the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong
sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial support to the prejudice of our children who
stopped schooling because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia
considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless
nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was
not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea
after he and Constancia parted ways. He further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she
married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close
to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial difficulties with his second
family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were
educated in private schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course. [4] Atty. Garrido alleged
that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third
marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer.
In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained that Maelotisea was not the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and
Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she
(Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party
to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had
no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings [6] in view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed
against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity [7] (of marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss [8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage
between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that
she had no personality to file her complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they
married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his admission to the bar. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6) children. [10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this
motion.[11]
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report and
Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors)
approved and adopted this recommendation with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part
states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that Atty.
Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is
hereby DISBARRED for gross immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution No. XVII-2007-
038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the circumstances, he did not commit
any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession; he is already in the twilight
of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable life notwithstanding his situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on
Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the
view that disbarment is very harsh considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by
filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has ever been
filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURTS RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido, and to reject its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of
offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for
membership in the Bar.[13] We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling. [14]First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the public. [15] The admission
qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to practice law.Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of
the standards for the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this
sense, the complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his or her own;
[16]
effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material in
considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member
of the legal profession. From this perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to
the practice of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a
lawyer.[18] Admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a lawyer; this
may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar. [19]
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the members of the Bar
to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this
constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that
he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is
more of a witness than a complainant in these proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented
her evidence; her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected by her desistance. We
cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase
of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.[22]
In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently used legal remedies to sever
them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up
to for the rearing of our children, for the development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the
strengthening of our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first wife was subsisting. We held
that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral
character required by the Rules of Court disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly contracted a second marriage with the
daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of contracting a
second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral
conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and
the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married to Constancia. [26] This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were in place and without taking into
consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second
marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married
Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy
to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual relations with two (2) women who at
one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-
Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to
escape liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar admission rules, of his
lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the Bar. [27] As a lawyer, he violated his
lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, [29] and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, [30] all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage
while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example in promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal
whims and desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding
the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. [31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. [32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized. [34]
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances
for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got married shall not afford them exemption
from sanctions, for good moral character is required as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether
the misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the claim that his marriage to complainant was
void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently
declared null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of morality required of them as members of
the Bar.[35]
Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. [36] To have good moral character, a person must have
the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a
person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public in the place where she is known. [37] The requirement of good moral character has
four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. [38] Each purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a
married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the
moral duty to give him proper advice; instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of
his two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage. These circumstances, to our
mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose
confidential advice was sought by another with respect to the latters family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a
romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains that he took a man away from a
woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in
fact a twice-married man with both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she
continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his relationship with Maelotisea and
their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a
third marriage with her. This scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt
free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary
to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only
after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong [39] leads us to
the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the
subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valenciaafterwards opted to retain and use
her surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with
her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband
with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to
approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions
were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a
romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could not but
be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she
helped the second family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his
second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to
live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership
in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve
to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great
caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an
officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The records show the parties pattern of
grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children with Maelotisea after their
separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic and serious flaw in her character,
which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration
of justice into question. She was not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle
whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

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SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9018, April 20, 2016

TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent.

We resolve the following issues:

We find that respondent committed unauthorized practice of his profession.

TO : ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ

Subject : Authority to engage in private practice of profession

Please be guided accordingly.

Cayetano was reiterated in Lingan v. Calubaquib: 51

Republic Act No. 6713:

Memorandum Circular No. 17:

Code of Professional Responsibility: chanRoble svirtualLawlibrary

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FROM: Atty. Alvarez <+639063630224>

Gud pm pnro, naLBC n b ang Reso? Kung Jan un pnrmahn ...

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A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,

VELASCO, JR., J.:

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared. 10

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

and as a member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.

The CBD reasoned:

The Courts Ruling

PREBITERIO J. VELASCO, JR.

Republic of the Philippines

A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

GRACE M. ANACTA*, Complainant,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Complainant filed her verified Position Paper14 on October 15, 2008.

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Republic of the Philippines

ATTY. JOSABETH V. A.C. No. 8481

Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.