GR 206612 TOYOTA ALABANG VS.

GAMES with the rule, because there must first be an

accompanying assignment of the employer's bank
deposit.

On the merits, the NLRC dismissed the case on the

Remaining at bench is the Motion for
basis of the rule that no appeal may be taken from an
Reconsideration1 of petitioner Toyota Alabang, Inc. We
order of execution of a final judgment. 8 For the NLRC,
had unanimously denied2 its Petition for Review on
petitioner's failure to appeal the LA Decision already
Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive
made the ruling final and executory.
Relief,3which sought the nullity of the Court of Appeals
(CA) Decision and Resolution. 4 The CA affirmed the
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Resolutions5 of the National Labor Relations
Certiorari, but the action was dismissed. Firstly, the CA
Commission (NLRC) dismissing petitioner's appeal for
ruled that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion
non-perfection and for lack of merit. In effect, the
in denying the appeal, given that petitioner had failed
NLRC sustained the ruling 6 of the labor arbiter (LA)
to comply faithfully with the bond requirement.
finding that petitioner had illegally dismissed
Secondly, it echoed the ruling of the NLRC that a final
respondent Edwin Games (Games).
judgment is no longer appealable. Thirdly, the CA
found that petitioner's own negligence had caused it to
In gist, the antecedent facts are as
lose its right to appeal.
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Games, who worked as a foreman for petitioner,
Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Injunctive Relief
allegedly stole its vehicle lubricants. Subsequently, it
before this Court. It disputed the finding that it did not
charged him with qualified theft before the trial court.
show proof of its security deposit for the appeal bond.
Two years thereafter, or on 24 August 2007, Games
It also insisted that its counsel's gross negligence
filed a Complainant for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of
justified the reopening of the proceedings below.
benefits, and damages against petitioner. The latter,
through counsel, failed to file its Position Paper on the
By way of a minute Resolution, this Court denied the
date set on 15 November 2007.
petition considering that the allegations, issues and
arguments raised by petitioner failed to sufficiently
Several resettings of the hearings ensued. During the
show that the CA had committed any reversible error
21 December 2007 hearing, petitioner manifested that
in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant
it had failed to file its Position Paper because its
the exercise of this Court's discretionary appellate
handling lawyer was no longer connected with the
jurisdiction. Hence, the instant Motion for
company. Then, in the hearing of 11 January 2008,
Reconsideration.
petitioner failed to appear and even reneged on
submitting its pleading. Accordingly, on 25 January
The determinative issues in this case remain the same.
2008, the case was declared submitted for decision.
This Court is tasked to review, on reconsideration,
whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in
On 5 February 2008, the LA ruled against petitioner
refusing to reopen the proceedings below.
and ordered the latter to pay Games P535,553.07 for
his separation pay, back wages, service incentive leave
RULING OF THE COURT
pay and attorney's fees resulting from his illegal
dismissal. Petitioner no longer filed a motion for
To recall, the LA's decision finding that petitioner
reconsideration. As a result, the LA's ruling became
illegally dismissed respondent was already final and
final and executory.
executory because of petitioner's failure to file a timely
appeal. Therefore, the labor dispute between the
The LA issued a Writ of Execution, which petitioner
parties should have been considered a closed case by
sought to quash. It prayed that the proceedings be
then, and no longer subject to appeal. At that point,
reopened, explaining that it had failed to present
Games should have already reaped the benefits of a
evidence because of its counsel's negligence in filing
favorable judgment. Still, petitioner sought the
the appropriate pleadings. The LA denied the claims of
reopening of the case, which the tribunals a
petitioner. Aggrieved, the latter appealed before the
quo denied.
NLRC.
This Court maintains that the CA correctly refused to
The appeal of petitioner was denied due course
reopen the proceedings below. The reopening of a case
because it had failed to show proof of its security
is an extraordinary remedy,9 which, if abused, can
deposit for the appeal bond under Section 6, Rule VI of
make a complete farce of a duly promulgated decision
the 2005 NLRC Rules of Procedure. According to the
that has long become final and executory. Hence, there
NLRC, the bonding company's mere declaration in the
must be good cause on the movant's part before it can
Certification of Security Deposit that the bond was fully
be granted.
secured7 was not tantamount to a faithful compliance

1
In this case, petitioner itself was negligent in
advancing its case. As found by the appellate court,
petitioner was present during the mandatory
conference hearing in which the latter was informed by
the LA of the need to file a Position Paper on 15
November 2007. However, petitioner not only reneged
on the submission of its Position Paper, but even failed
to move for the filing of the pleading at any point
before the LA resolved the case on 5 February 2008.
Moreover, petitioner had failed to exhibit diligence
when it did not attend the hearing on 11 January
2008, or any of the proceedings thereafter, despite its
manifestation that it no longer had any legal
representative. Given the instances of negligence by
petitioner itself, the Court finds that the CA justly
refused to reopen the case in the former's favor.
Definitely, petitioner cannot now be allowed to claim
denial of due process when it was petitioner who was
less than vigilant of its rights.10redarclaw
At this stage of appellate review, Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin dissents and votes to remand the case to the
LA for the reception of petitioner's evidence. He posits
three reasons as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First, he states that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in requiring petitioner to post an appeal
bond, because this requirement does not cover an
appeal from a decision of the LA denying a motion to
quash a writ of execution.
Second, he writes that in any event, the NLRC erred in
requiring petitioner to accompany the appeal bond with
proof of a security deposit or collateral securing the
bond. He bases this point on the fact that the bonding
company has already issued a Certificate of Security
Deposit declaring that the appeal bond was fully
secured by a security deposit equivalent to the
judgment award.
Third, he advances the opinion that there may be merit
in the Rule 45 petition filed by petitioner. He cites that
it had a just cause to dismiss respondent after he had
allegedly stolen its vehicle lubricants.
Before discussing these points, it is apropos to
elucidate that this Court must be faithful to the
framework of resolving labor cases on appellate review
before this Court. Universal Robina Sugar Milling
Corporation v. Acibo aptly explains:11redarclaw
This Court's power of review in a Rule 45 pet1t1on is
limited to resolving matters pertaining to any
perceived legal errors, which the CA may have
committed in issuing the assailed decision. In
reviewing the legal correctness of the CA's Rule 65
decision in a labor case, we examine the CA
decision in the context that it determined, i.e.,
the presence or absence of grave abuse of
discretion in the NLRC decision before it and not
on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the
2
merits of the case was correct. In other words, we
have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule
65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC
decision challenged before it. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the task at hand involves a
determination of whether or not the CA gravely erred
in finding that the NLRC did not exceed its jurisdiction
in refusing to grant petitioner's entreaty to reopen the
case. In other words, as long as the exercise of
discretion below is based on well founded factual and
legal bases,12 no abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction can be imputed, and we
are then justified to deny due course both to the Rule
45 petition and the concomitant Motion for
Reconsideration.
The tribunals below gave overwhelming justifications
for their rulings. In contrast, the first point espoused in
the dissenting opinion has no basis. The paraphrased
proposition that "an appeal bond is not required in
appeals from decisions of the LA denying a motion to
quash a writ of execution" lacks any citation sourced
from a statute or case law. Article 223 of the Labor
Code and Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, uniformly state thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the
Regional Director involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a bond, which shall either be in the form
of cash deposit or surety bond equivalent in amount to
the monetary award, exclusive of damages and
attorney's fees. (Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the above rules do not limit the appeal bond
requirement only to certain kinds of rulings of the LA.
Rather, these rules generally state that in case the
ruling of the LA involves a monetary award, an
employer's appeal may be perfected only upon the
posting of a bond. Therefore, absent any qualifying
terms,13 so long as the decision of the LA involves a
monetary award, as in this case,14 that ruling can only
be appealed after the employer posts a bond.
Clearly, this construction is but proper considering the
avowed purpose of appeal bonds demanded by the law
from employers in labor cases. This matter was
discussed by the Court in Computer Innovations
Center v. NLRC,15 to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
As earlier stated, the underlying purpose of the appeal
bond is to ensure that the employee has
properties on which he or she can execute upon
in the event of a final, providential award. The
non payment or woefully insufficient payment of the
appeal bond by the employer frustrates these ends.
Respondent Cario alleges in his Comment before this
Court that petitioner Quilos and his wife have since
gone abroad, and wonders aloud whether he still would
be able to collect his monetary award considering the
circumstances. Petitioners,
their Reply and Memorandum, do not aver otherwise.
Indeed, such eventuality appears plausible considering
that Quilos himself did not personally verify the
petition, and had in fact executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of his counsel, Atty. Bernabe B.
Alabastro, authorizing the filing of cases in his name. ft
does not necessarily follow that the absence of Quilos
from this country precludes the execution of the award
due Cario. However, if the absence of Quilos from this
country proves to render impossible the execution of
judgment in favor of Cario, then the latter's victory
may sadly be rendered pyrrhic. The appeal bond
requirement precisely aims to prevent empty or
inconsequential victories by the laborer, and it is hoped
that herein petitioners' refusal to post the appropriate
legal appeal bond does not frustrate the ends of justice
in this case. (Emphasis supplied)
If we are to construe otherwise, then an aggrieved
party may simply seek the quashal of a writ of
execution, instead of going through the normal modes
of appeal, to altogether avoid paying for an appeal
bond. This ruse will then circumvent the requirement
of both labor rules and jurisprudence16to post an
appeal bond before contesting the LA's grant of
monetary award. Hence, the first point is not only
incorrect, but also dangerous.
The second point likewise fails to justify the grant of
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. This point
refers to the proper construction of Section 6, Rule VI
of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, which demands
that an appeal bond must be accompanied by a "proof
of security deposit or collateral securing the bond."
According to the NLRC and the CA, the bonding
company's mere declaration in the Certification of
Security Deposit that the bond is fully secured17 is not
tantamount to a faithful compliance with the rule,
because there must first be an accompanying
assignment of the employer's bank deposit. On the
other hand, the dissent sees this declaration as an act
that satisfies Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure. For this reason, he opines that the
NLRC should have entertained the appeal of petitioner.
Notwithstanding this issue, the NLRC has given a well-
founded reason for refusing to entertain petitioner's
appeal, namely, no appeal may be taken from an
order of execution of a final and executory
judgment.
An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere
statutory privilege. It may be availed of only in the
manner provided by law and the rules.18 Thus, a party
who seeks to elevate an action must comply with the
requirements of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure as
regards the period, grounds, venue, fees, bonds, and
other requisites for a proper appeal before the NLRC;
and in Section 6, Rule VI, the aforesaid rules prohibit
appeals from final and executory decisions of the Labor
Arbiter.
in
In this case, petitioner elevated to the NLRC an already
final and executory decision of the LA. To recall, after
petitioner learned of its former counsel's negligence in
filing a Position Paper before the LA, it nonetheless
failed to file a motion reconsideration to question the
ruling of the LA that it illegally dismissed Games. At
that point, the Decision was already final and
executory, so the LA dutifully issued a Writ of
Execution. Petitioner sought the quashal of the writ of
execution and the reopening of its case only at that
stage; and only after it was rebuffed by the LA did
petitioner appeal before the NLRC. Based on the
timeline, therefore, the LA's adverse Decision had
become final and executory even prior to petitioner's
appeal before the NLRC contesting the denial of the
Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution. Consequently,
the NLRC dismissed the appeal based on its clear
prohibition under Section 5, Rule V of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure.19redarclaw
The NLRC's reasoning that no appeal may be taken
from an order of execution of a final and executory
judgment is also rooted in case law. Jurisprudence
dictates that a final and executory decision of the LA
can no longer be reversed or modified.20 After all, just
as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within
the prescribed period, so does the winning party have
the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case.21 On this basis, theCA did not
grievously err when it concluded that the ruling of the
NLRC denying petitioner's appeal was not baseless,
arbitrary, whimsical, or despotic.22redarclaw
Finally, as regards the third point pertaining to the
advancement of the merits23 of the case, it may no
longer be properly considered by this Court. To
adjudicate on the merits of the instant appeal would
require the reopening of the whole case, a step that all
the tribunals below - the LA, the NLRC, and the CA-
have already refused to take.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the reopening of a case
is, by default, not allowed merely on the ground that
the counsel has been negligent in taking the required
steps to protect the interest of the client, such as
timely filing a pleading, appearing during hearings, and
perfecting appeals.24 An exception arises only when
there is good cause and excusable negligence on the
client's part.25redarclaw
Both the explanation of the CA and the records
undeniably show no good cause or excusable
negligence on the part of the client - petitioner Toyota
Alabang, Inc. given the totality of the instances of the
latter's own negligence in these proceedings, viz: (1)
despite being informed, during the mandatory
conference hearing, of the necessity to file a Position
Paper, petitioner reneged on its duty to timely submit
its Position Paper to the LA on 15 November 2007; (2)
after manifesting that it no longer had a counsel,
petitioner was still absent on 11 January 2008, the
date when it could still have submitted its belated
3
Position Paper; (3) thereafter, it altogether absented
itself from all the proceedings before the LA; (4) at no
point before the LA's resolution of the case on 5
February 2008 did petitioner file a Position Paper; and
(5) after allowing the LA Decision to attain finality as a
result of its non-submission of an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration, petitioner belatedly sought the
quasha1 of the execution of the LA Decision granting
compensation to respondent.
Despite the overwhelming lapses mentioned above, the
dissent maintains that petitioner cannot be considered
negligent by any measure. According to the dissent,
petitioner could not be faulted for failing to file a
position paper because the filing of pleadings has been
entrusted to its counsel. For the dissent, "given the
nature and extent of its business and operations, the
petitioner could not be expected to supervise and
monitor all the cases it had entrusted to its lawyer."
But, this stance is baseless as can be seen by the lack
of legal citation in the dissent.
More importantly, this Court cannot give special
treatment to petitioner. In our past cases, this Court
already held that the failure of the counsel to file the
required position papers before the LA is not a ground
to declare that petitioner had been deprived of due
process; and is not a cause to conclude that the
proceedings a quo had been null and void.26 In Building
Care Corporation v. Macaraeg,27 this Court thoroughly
explained that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
It is, however, an oft-repeated ruling that the
negligence and mistakes of counsel bind the client. A
departure from this rule would bring about never-
ending suits, so long as lawyers could allege their own
fault or negligence to support the client's case and
obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the
operation of law. The only exception would be, where
the lawyer's gross negligence would result in the grave
injustice of depriving his client of the due process of
law. In this case, there was no such deprivation of due
process. Respondent was able to fully present and
argue her case before the Labor Arbiter. She was
accorded the opportunity to be heard.
We have consistently held that the requirements of due
process are satisfied when the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are
supposed to attach all the documents that would prove
their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should
be conducted or was necessary.28 Here, petitioner,
despite being given several chances to pass its position
paper, did not at all comply. Worse, petitioner also had
other instances of negligence. Consequently, this Court
cannot redo the whole proceedings of the Labor Arbiter
who had already afforded due process to the former.
Given the foregoing reasons, juxtaposed with the high
threshold for resolving appellate reviews in labor cases
4
before this Court, we rule for the denial of petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review with Urgent
Prayer for Injunctive Relief filed by Toyota Alabang,
Inc. is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings
shall be entertained in this case. Let an Entry of
Judgment be issued in due course.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Bersamin, J., I dissent.
METROGUARDS SECURITY AGENCY
CORPORATION (FORMERLY KNOWN AS
BEEGUARDS CORPORATION) AND MS. MILAGROS
T. CHAN, Petitioners, v. ALBERTO N.
HILONGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated
July 22, 2014 and Resolution2 dated November 18,
2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
134501.
The facts follow:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In his Decision3 dated April 30, 2010 in NLRC NCR-10-
14411-09, entitled Alberto Hilongo v. Bee Guards
Corp./Milagros Chan, the Labor Arbiter ruled that
herein respondent Alberto N. Hilongo was illegally
dismissed, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
rendered finding the dismissal of complainant
[Hilongo] as illegal and ordering the respondents
[herein petitioners] to pay complainant [Hilongo] his
backwages from the date of dismissal to the date of
this decision and separation pay of one month pay per
year of service, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees as
all hereunder computed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Backwages:
A. Basic Salary
9/5/09 4/30/09
(sic) = 7.83
P382 x 26 x 7.83 P77,767.56
B. 13th Month Pay
P77,767.56/12 6,480.63
C. Service Incentive Leave 1,246.27 P85,494.46

II. Separation Pay
10/25/01 4/30/10
P 69,524.00
= 7 yrs.
P382 x 26 x 7 years P155,018.46
III. 10% Attorneys fees 15,501.85
P170,520.31
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter in its
Decision5 dated September 30, 2010 and Resolution
dated November 23, 2010.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Aggrieved, Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari before
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 117891.7In its
Decision8 dated September 7, 2012, the CA reversed
the NLRC decision and reinstated the Labor Arbiters
Decision dated April 30, 2010.9 Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution10 dated March 26, 2013. Petitioners no
longer appealed to this
Court.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hilongo then filed a motion for entry of judgment and
a motion for clarification of Decision/Resolution praying
that the CAs March 26, 2013 Resolution be clarified
and interpreted to include the amount of the award as
stated in the Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30,
2010 and additional award computed from May 1,
2010 to March 26, 2013, or the date the CA denied
petitioners motion for
reconsideration.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its Resolution13 dated June 11, 2013, the CA granted
the motion for entry of judgment and noted Hilongos
motion for clarification of Decision/Resolution. The CA
held that when an appellate court affirms the Labor
Arbiters ruling, it is understood that awards due to the
illegally dismissed employee shall be recomputed in
order to account for the period of time that has lapsed
from the rendition of the Labor Arbiters decision up to
its finality. The CA quoted this Courts ruling in Session
Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v. Court of
Appeals,14 and Gonzales v. Solid Cement
Corporation15:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Consistent with what we discussed above, we hold that
under the terms of the decision under execution, no
essential change is made by a re-computation as this
step is a necessary consequence that flows from the
nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that
decision. A re-computation (or an original computation,
if no previous computation has been made) is a part of
the law specifically, Article 279 of the Labor Code
and the established jurisprudence on this provision
that is read into the decision. By the nature of an
illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on
until full satisfaction, as expressed under Article 279 of
the Labor Code. The re-computation of the
consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented.
5
The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of this
dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the
principle of immutability of final judgments.16
After the corresponding entry of judgment was issued
on June 11, 2013, the case was remanded to the Labor
Arbiter. On July 9, 2013, respondent Hilongo filed a
motion for issuance of writ of execution alleging that
the June 11, 2013 CA Resolution had confirmed that
the amount of P170,520.31 awarded by the Labor
Arbiter is not sufficient, and that there is a need to
compute additional monetary awards reckoned from
May 1, 2010 up to April 26, 2013 or the date Hilongo
presumed as the date of finality of the
decision.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In an Order18 dated October 29, 2013, the Labor
Arbiter directed the issuance of a writ of execution and
ruled that the award of P170,520.31 as stated in the
Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010 prevails.
Hilongo filed a petition for extraordinary remedy before
the NLRC which dismissed the petition in its
Decision19 dated November 29, 2013. The NLRC also
denied Hilongos motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution20 dated January 16, 2014.
Hence, Hilongo filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA.
In the assailed Decision dated July 22, 2014, the CA
granted Hilongos petition and set aside the NLRC
Decision dated November 29, 2013 and Resolution
dated January 16, 2014. The CA ordered the Labor
Arbiter to re-compute Hilongos monetary awards, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2013
and Resolution dated January 16, 2014 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
Second Division, in NLRC LER N[o]. 11-322-13/NLRC
LAC N[o]. 07-001-485-10 (NLRC NCR-10-14411-09)
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter
for the RE-COMPUTATION of the total monetary
benefits due to petitioner [Hilongo]. The Labor Arbiter
is further DIRECTED to incorporate the following in
the re-computation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Additional backwages and separation pay from May
1, 2010 to June 11, 2013, or the date when the April
30, 2010 Decision of Labor Arbiter Macam became final
and executory;chanrobleslaw
(2) Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the
total monetary awards, computed from June 11, 2013
to June 30, 2013 and six percent x x x (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.21
The CA held that it is already settled that the
computation of the monetary awards due to the
illegally dismissed employee must continue to run until
the final termination of the case on appeal. The CA
ruled that the Labor Arbiter should have been guided
by the CA Resolution dated June 11, 2013 which had
clarified that a re-computation of Hilongos award is
necessary.22 The CA also ruled that the re-computation
of the monetary awards is a necessary consequence
that flows from the nature of the illegality of Hilongos
dismissal. The CA further noted that since the Labor
Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010 had ordered the
payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement,
the finality of said decision on June 11, 2013
effectively declares that Hilongos employment
relationship with petitioners has ended on said date.
Hence, separation pay and back wages must be
computed up to that point to account for the time the
illegally dismissed employee should have been paid his
salary and benefit
entitlements.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, this petition.
The issue for our consideration is whether the CA erred
in ordering the re-computation of Hilongos monetary
awards.
We rule in the negative.
The issue is not novel. In Nacar v. Gallery
Frames,24 we have held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x no essential change is made by a recomputation
as this step is a necessary consequence that flows
from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared
by the Labor Arbiter in that decision. A recomputation
(or an original computation, if no previous computation
has been made) is a part of the law specifically,
Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established
jurisprudence on this provision that is read into the
decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the
reliefs continue to add up until full satisfaction, as
expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. The
recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal
upon execution of the decision does not constitute an
alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only
the computation of monetary consequences of this
dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the
principle of immutability of final judgments.cralawred
Nacar reiterated the Courts ruling in the earlier cases
of Session Delights and Gonzales.
We thus cannot agree with petitioners contention that
a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable.25 The re-computation of
the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of
the decision does not constitute an alteration or
amendment of the final decision being implemented.
The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of monetary consequences of this
dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the
principle of immutability of final judgments.
6
Likewise without merit is petitioners contention that
[i]t may very well be argued that the NLRCs final
decision reversing the Labor Arbiter is in fact the final
decision that effectively declared the employment
relationship between Hilongo and [petitioners] as
ended on which date the computation of the separation
pay and backwages awarded by the Labor Arbiter
ultimately ceased.26 We note that the CA, in its
Decision dated September 7, 2012, had reversed the
NLRC Decision dated September 30, 2010 and
Resolution dated November 23, 2010, and reinstated
the Labor Arbiters Decision dated April 30, 2010.
Thus, petitioners cannot claim that the NLRC decision
which was set aside with finality is the NLRCs final
decision and the final decision that effectively
declared the employment relationship between the
parties as ended.
Said CA Decision dated September 7, 2012 became
final and executory on April 26, 2013.27 Thus, the
April 30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter which
ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, effectively ended the employment
relationship of the parties on April 26, 2013, the date
the CA decision became final. Since the Labor Arbiters
computation of Hilongos monetary award was up to
the date of his April 30, 2010 Decision only, the CA
properly decreed the computation of additional back
wages and separation pay.
However, the CA incorrectly concluded that the April
30, 2010 Decision of the Labor Arbiter became final on
June 11, 2013,28 contrary to its own finding that it
became final and executory on April 26, 2013.29 This
led to its erroneous computation of the additional back
wages and separation pay of Hilongo, as well as
reckoning the date of the 12% legal interest. Following
the teaching of Nacar v. Gallery Frames30 that the
computation of the monetary consequences (back
wages and separation pay) of the illegal dismissal
decision should be reckoned from its finality, the
additional back wages and separation pay of Hilongo
should be computed from May 1, 2010 to April 26,
2013. Further, the payment of legal interest of 12%
per annum should also be from April 26, 2013 up to
June 30, 2013. Thereafter, in accordance with Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Boards Circular No.
799,31 series of 2013, the legal interest computed from
July 1, 2013 until the monetary awards were fully
satisfied will be 6% per annum.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition
and AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the Decision
dated July 22, 2014 and Resolution dated November
18, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
134501. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated
July 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 134501 shall read as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 29, 2013
and Resolution dated January 16, 2014 of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission,
Second Division, in NLRC LER N[o]. 11-322-13/NLRC
LAC N[o]. 07-001-485-10 (NLRC NCR-10-14411-09)
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter
for the RE-COMPUTATION of the total monetary
benefits due to petitioner [Hilongo]. The Labor Arbiter
is further DIRECTED to incorporate the following in
the re-computation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Additional backwages and separation pay from May
1, 2010 to April 26, 2013, or the date when the April
30, 2010 Decision of Labor Arbiter Macam became final
and executory;chanrobleslaw
(2) Interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the
total monetary awards, computed from April 26,
2013 to June 30, 2013 and six percent x x x (6%) per
annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
So ordered.
G.R. No. 209383, March 11, 2015
SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC.,
ROLANDO B. MAGCALE, AND SEALION SHIPPING
LIMITED UNITED
KINGDOM, Petitioners, v. MAURICIO G. PICAR,
JR., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assailing the May 2, 2013 Decision1and the
September 9, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 124763, which dismissed, for
being moot and academic, the petition
for certiorari filed under Rule 65 questioning the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), in a case for disability
benefits.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Antecedents
Respondent Mauricio Picar, Jr. (Picar) was employed by
petitioner Sealion Shipping Limited United Kingdom
through its local manning agent Seacrest Maritime
Management, Inc. (petitioners), as Chief Cook
continuously for several contracts from April 2005 until
his last employment contract in 2010, on board the
vessel, MV Toisa Paladin. The last contract was for a
fixed duration of three (3) months which commenced
on September 5, 2010 with a basic salary of
US$630.00 exclusive of overtime pay and other
7
benefits.3cralawred
On September 24, 2010, Picar experienced high fever,
chilling, lumbar back pain, and difficulty in urinating
accompanied with blood. He was referred for medical
treatment to the Maritime Medical Center PTE, Ltd in
Singapore (MMC). He was diagnosed with Urinary
Tract Infection (UTI) and Renal Calculus. After his
check-up, he was required to go back to the vessel and
take a rest. On September 28, 2010, he was brought
back to MMC where he was confined until October 1,
2010. On October 2, 2010, he was
repatriated.4cralawred
Upon his arrival in Manila, Picar was referred to Dr.
Natalio G. Alegre (Dr. Alegre) at St. Lukes Medical
Center (SLMC). On October 21, 2010, he underwent
sonography of his kidneys and urinary bladder, which
showed renal cyst on his right kidney; calyceal
lithiasis, right; and normal urinary bladder; slightly
enlarged prostate gland was noted. Dr. Alegre
repeatedly recommended that he undergo
extracorporeal shockwave lithotripsy for the dissolution
of his right kidney stone.5cralawred
On February 23, 2011, Picar consulted Dr. Efren R.
Vicaldo (Dr. Vicaldo) who also diagnosed him to be
suffering from Right Renal Calculus, Essential
Hypertension. Dr. Vicaldo considered his illness as
work aggravated/related and declared him unfit to
resume work as a seafarer in any capacity.6cralawred
Picar then filed a complaint for permanent disability
compensation, balance of sick wages, reimbursement
of medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages,
and attorneys fees.
On June 22, 2011, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered
judgment7 in favor of Picar. The LA found that his
illness was work-related and that the nature of his
work as a chief cook contributed to the aggravation of
his condition. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering respondents to pay jointly and
severally the complainant his permanent disability
compensation in the sum of US$60,000.00, balance of
sick wages in the sum of US$1,890.00, moral damages
in the sum of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the
sum of P200,000.00, and ten percent (10%) of the
judgment award as attorneys fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.8cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of
the LA.9 The NLRC ruled that Picars disability was
permanent as he was totally unable to perform his job
for more than 120 days from his repatriation. In
support of its ruling, it cited the case of Remigio v.
NLRC10 where it was held that if an employee was
unable to perform his customary job for more than 120
days and did not come within the coverage of Rule X of
the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability
(which, in more detailed manner, describes what
constitutes temporary total disability), then the said
employee undoubtedly suffered from permanent total
disability regardless of whether or not he lost the use
of any part of his body.
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the CA.
In the meantime, Picar moved for the execution of the
LA decision. On July 3, 2012, the LA issued a Writ of
Execution for the enforcement and full satisfaction of
its decision. Consequently, petitioners paid the
judgment award as evidenced by the Satisfaction of
Judgment pursuant to a Writ of Execution with
Acknowledgment Receipt executed by the NLRC-NCR
Sheriff on August 13, 2012.11cralawred
In its assailed Decision, dated May 2, 2013, the CA
dismissed the petition. Citing the case of Career
Philippines Ship Management, Inc. v. Madjus,12 the CA
ruled that the payment by petitioners of the judgment
award constituted an amicable settlement that had
rendered the petition moot and academic. The
dispositive portion of the decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations,
the instant petition is DISMISSED for having become
MOOT AND ACADEMIC.13cralawlawlibrary
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said decision, but it was denied in the CA Resolution,
dated September 9, 2013.
Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Issues and Arguments
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the CA
committed reversible error in dismissing the petition
for having become moot and academic.
Petitioners contend that the settlement of the
judgment award was by virtue of a writ of execution
duly issued and was effected specifically without
prejudice to further recourse before the CA. There was
nothing voluntary about the satisfaction of the
judgment award made in strict and compulsory
compliance with Rule XI, Section 8 of the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure. The terms of the settlement were
fair to both the employer and the employee. Hence,
the ruling in Career Philippines, relied upon by the CA,
was inapplicable.
On April 14, 2014, Picar filed his Comment14 wherein
he stresses that the CA committed no error in
dismissing the petition. He asserts that the voluntary
satisfaction by petitioners of the full judgment award
rendered the said petition moot and was a clear
8
indication that petitioners believed on the merits and
judiciousness of the award for disability compensation.
Petitioners fault the CA for dismissing outright the
petition for being moot and academic instead of
resolving the same on its merits.
The Courts Ruling
As correctly argued by petitioners, the petition
for certiorari before the CA was not rendered moot and
academic by their satisfaction of the judgment award
in compliance with the writ of execution issued by the
LA The CA cited Career Philippines, but it finds no
application here. Career Philippines was resolved on
equitable considerations. In the said case, while
petitioner employer had the luxury of having other
remedies available to it such as its petition
for certiorari pending before the CA and an eventual
appeal to this Court, respondent seafarer could no
longer pursue other claims, including for interests that
may accrue during the pendency of the case. Thus, it
was held that the LA and the CA could not be faulted
for interpreting petitioners "conditional settlement" to
be tantamount to an amicable settlement of the case
resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari.
In this case, no such document was executed between
the parties. The payment of the judgment award
without prejudice by petitioners required no obligations
whatsoever on the part of Picar.
The case of Leonis Navigation v. Villamater(Leonis
Navigation)15 is more in point, where the Court
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioners never moved for a reconsideration of this
Order regarding the voluntariness of their payment to
Sonia, as well as the dismissal with prejudice and the
concomitant termination of the case.
However, petitioners argued that the finality of the
case did not render the petition
for certiorari before the CA moot and academic.
On this point, we agree with petitioners.
In the landmark case of St. Martin Funeral Home v.
NLRC,16 we ruled that judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC is sought via a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, and the petition should be
filed before the CA, following the strict observance of
the hierarchy of courts. Under Rule 65, Section
4,17 petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice
of the assailed order or resolution within which to file
the petition. Thus, although the petition was not filed
within the 10-day period, petitioners seasonably filed
their petition for certiorari before the CA within the 60-
day reglementary period under Rule 65.
Further, a petition for certiorari does not normally
include an inquiry into the correctness of its evaluation
of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished
from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the province
of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely
confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. It is, thus, incumbent upon petitioners to
satisfactorily establish that the NLRC acted capriciously
and whimsically in order that the extraordinary writ
of certiorari will lie. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it
must be shown that the discretion was exercised
arbitrarily or despotically.18 (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Adhering to the pronouncement in Leonis Navigation,
the Court, in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v.
Legaspi (Transmarine),19 held that the satisfaction of
the monetary award by the employer did not render
the petition for certiorari moot before the CA.
In Transmarine, pursuant to a writ of execution issued,
the employer ship-owner/manning agency and the
complaining seafarer agreed to a settlement of the
judgment award. It was, however, stipulated that the
settlement shall be without prejudice to the pending
petition for certiorari filed by the employer before the
CA. It was further agreed that, in the event that the
petition would be granted and the judgment award
would be eventually reversed, whether in full or
partially, the seafarer shall return all amounts in
excess of what he would be entitled to and the
employer shall be allowed to file the necessary motion
for the return or restitution of the amount unjustly
paid. The parties covenants, as well as the
acknowledgment by the seafarer of receipt in full of
the judgment award, were embodied in a receipt of the
judgment award with undertaking. The CA, upon
being informed of the settlement, dismissed the
petition for certiorari for being moot and academic. In
support of the dismissal, the CA also relied on Career
Philippines. In reversing and setting aside the order of
dismissal issued by the CA, the Court
in Transmarine wrote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of
the LA Decision was imminent after its petition for
injunctive relief was denied, the employer filed before
the LA a pleading embodying a conditional satisfaction
of judgment before the CA and, accordingly, paid the
employee the monetary award in the LA decision. In
the said pleading, the employer stated that the
conditional satisfaction of the judgment award was
without prejudice to its pending appeal before the CA
and that it was being made only to prevent the
imminent execution.
The CA later dismissed the employers petition for
being moot and academic, noting that the decision of
the LA had attained finality with the satisfaction of the
judgment award. This Court affirmed the ruling of the
CA, interpreting the "conditional settlement" to be
tantamount to an amicable settlement of the case
resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari,
considering (i) that the employee could no longer
pursue other claims, and (ii) that the employer could
not have been compelled to immediately pay because
9
it had filed an appeal bond to ensure payment to the
employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the
employer because the conditional satisfaction of
judgment signed by the parties was highly prejudicial
to the employee. The agreement stated that the
payment of the monetary award was without prejudice
to the right of the employer to file a petition
for certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed
that she would no longer file any complaint or
prosecute any suit of action against the employer after
receiving the payment.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
In the present case, the Receipt of the Judgment
Award with Undertaking was fair to both the employer
and the employee. As in Leonis Navigation, the said
agreement stipulated that respondent should return
the amount to petitioner if the petition
for certiorari would be granted but without prejudice to
respondents right to appeal. The agreement, thus,
provided available remedies to both parties.
It is clear that petitioner paid respondent subject to
the terms and conditions stated in the Receipt of the
Judgment Award with Undertaking. Both parties signed
the agreement. Respondent neither refuted the
agreement nor claimed that he was forced to sign it
against his will. Therefore, the petition
for certiorari was not rendered moot despite
petitioners satisfaction of the judgment award, as the
respondent had obliged himself to return the payment
if the petition would be granted.20cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
Verily in this case, petitioners satisfied the judgment
award in strict compliance with a duly issued writ of
execution and pursuant to terms fair to both parties.
Thus, the equitable ruling in Career Philippines would
certainly be unfair to petitioners in this case as they
still have a remedy under the rules. The CA, therefore,
was in error in dismissing the petition for being moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 2,
2013 Decision and the September 9, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124763
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
ordered REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for
decision on the merits.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Leonen,
JJ., concur.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., NAPOLEON L.
NAZARENO, and RICARDO P. ISLA,* Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. Petitioners Smart Communications, Inc.
(Smart), Napoleon L. Nazareno and Ricardo P. Isla (Isla)
challenge the Court of Appeals' 3 July 2012 Amended
Decision2 and 23 November 2012 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 115794, affirming the National Labor Relations
Commission's (NLRC) 30 July 2010 Resolution.4
The Facts
On 26 April 2004, Smart hired respondent Jose Leni Z.
Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head for Smart Buddy
Activation. Smart Buddy Activation is under the Product
Marketing Group which is headed by Isla. On 21 September
2005, Islagave Solidum a memorandum5 informing him of
alleged acts of dishonesty, directing him to explain why his
employment should not be terminated, and placing him under
preventive suspension without pay for 30 days. On 28
September 2005, Solidum submitted his written explanation6 in
response to the 21 September 2005 notice.
On 22 October 2005, Isla gave Solidum a memorandum7 dated
21 October 2005 informing him of a modified set of alleged
acts of dishonesty, directing him to explain why his
employment should not be terminated, extending his
preventive suspension by 10 days, and inviting him to the
administrative investigation scheduled on 26 October 2005.
On 11 November 2005, Isla gave Solidum a
memorandum8 dated 9 November 2005 terminating his
employment "for fraud or willful breach of trust, falsification,
misrepresentation, conflict of interest, serious misconduct and
dishonesty-related offenses."9
Solidum filed against Smart a complaint10 for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
In his 3 July 2006 Decision,11 the Labor Arbiter found that
Solidums preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal
and that he was entitled to full back wages, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. The dispositive
portion of the Decision stated:
10
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of complainant and against respondents, as
follows:
1. Declaring the 20-day extended preventive
suspension of complainant from October 22, 2005 to
November 10, 2005 illegal and tantamount to
constructive dismissal, and ordering respondents to
jointly and severally pay complainant his
corresponding salaries, benefits, privileges,
allowances and other incentives/bonuses during the
period from October 22 to November 10, 2005, in the
amount of P236,061.94;
2. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
the complainants unpaid salaries, benefits, privileges,
allowances, and other benefits/bonuses during the
30-day preventive suspension, in the amount
of P365,896.00;
3. Declaring the dismissal of complainant effective
November 11, 2005 as illegal, and ordering
respondents to reinstate the complainant to his former
position, immediately upon receipt of this decision,
either physically or in the payroll, at the option of the
former, and failure to exercise their option within ten
(10) days hereof, shall place the complainant on
payroll reinstatement, with payment of accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits/incentives and
bonuses;
4. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant his full backwages, inclusive of all
benefits bonuses, privileges, incentives, allowances
or their money equivalents, from date of dismissal on
November 11, 2005 until actual reinstatement,
partially computed as follows:
a. Backwages and benefits - P2,903,561.79
b. Quarterly performance bonus
- P935,640.00
c. Monthly Gas allowance - P90,693.00
d. Monthly Rice allowance - P9,000.00
e. Monthly drivers allowance - P68,175.00
f. 13th month pay (pro-rata) - P265,569.68
g. Unpaid accumulated leaves 2004 & 2005
- P472,123.87
h. Smart incentive entitlement
- P7,370,250.00[;]
 5. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant for the foregone opportunity of pursuing
studies in the United Kingdom under the British
Chevening Scholarship Award, in the sum of
20,189.00 British pounds or Peso 1,982,727.37[; and]
6. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant moral damages in the amount of P2
million, exemplary damages in the amount of P2
million, and attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the
judgment award.
SO ORDERED.12
On 25 July 2006, Smart appealed to the NLRC. On 13
November 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution
ordering the sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93,
representing Solidums accrued salaries, allowances, benefits,
incentives and bonuses from 21 July to 20 October 2006. On
15 August and 25 October 2007, 11 February, 28 April, 23 July
and 11 November2008, and 22 January 2009, the Labor
Arbiter issued seven other alias writs of execution ordering the
sheriff to collect from petitioners Solidums accrued salaries,
allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses.
In its 26 January 2009 Resolution,13 the NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiters 3 July 2006 Decision and dismissed for lack of
merit Solidums complaint. Solidum filed a motion14 for
reconsideration dated 9 February 2009.
On 4 May 2009, Solidum filed with the Labor Arbiter an ex-
parte Motion15 praying that an alias writ of execution be issued
directing the sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93,
representing Solidums accrued salaries, allowances, benefits,
incentives and bonuses from 21 January to 20 April 2009.
In its 29 May 2009 Decision,16 the NLRC denied for lack of
merit Solidums 9 February 2009 motion for reconsideration.
The Labor Arbiters Ruling
In his 29 July 2009 Order,17 the Labor Arbiter denied for lack of
merit Solidums ex-parte motion praying that an alias writ of
execution be issued directing the sheriff to collect from
petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidums accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21
January to 20April 2009. The Labor Arbiter held that:
In the instant case, the NLRC promulgated its Decision dated
January 26, 2009 reversing this Offices Decision dated July
03, 2006. Also, the NLRC in its Decision dated May 29, 2009
denied the complainants motion for reconsideration of its
Decision dated January 26, 2009. This Office is mindful of the
fact that the NLRC is tasked with the review of decisions
promulgated by this Office, as such, it is a higher tribunal as
contemplated by law.
11
Verily, the recent decision of the NLRC reversing the Decision
of this Office prevents any future issuance of any writ of
execution on the reinstatement aspect in line with Gracia, et al.
vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. and International Container Terminal
Services vs. NLRC.18
Solidum appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRCs Ruling
In its 31 May 2010 Decision,19 the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiters 29 July 2009 Order. The NLRC held that:
In the case at bar, records show that respondents appealed
from the Labor Arbiters Decision to the Commission on July
25, 2006. The Commission resolved respondents appeal on
January 26, 2009, reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated July 3, 2006. Notably, there is no showing in the records
that respondents reinstated complainant to his former position.
Hence, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as
amended, relative to the reinstatement aspect of the Labor
Arbiters Decision, respondents are obligated to pay
complainants salaries and benefits, computed from July 13,
2006, when respondents received a copy of the Labor Arbiters
Decision which, among others, ordered the reinstatement of
complainant, up to the date of finality of the Commissions
resolution reversing the Labor Arbiters Decision, which, for this
purpose, is reckoned on May 29, 2009, when the Commission
denied complainants Motion for Reconsideration.
Indeed, common sense dictates that complainants entitlement
to reinstatement salaries/wages and benefits, emanating from
the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement, presupposes that
said order of reinstatement is still enforceable. Here, the Labor
Arbiters order of reinstatement dated July 3, 2006 was no
longer enforceable as of May 29, 2009 when the Commissions
resolution reversing the Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement
is deemed to have become final as hereinabove discussed.
Patently then, complainant is no longer entitled to
reinstatement salaries/wages and benefits after May 29, 2009.
Significantly, the Order of the Labor Arbiter being appealed
from by complainant, denied the latters motion for issuance of
alias writ of execution for the collection of his reinstatement
salaries and benefits for the period covering January 21, 2009
to April 20, 2009. The Labor Arbiter thus committed serious
error in denying complainants motion with respect to his
reinstatement salaries and benefits as he is entitled to the
same for the period starting July 13, 2006 to May 29, 2009.20
Solidum filed a motion21 for partial reconsideration. Petitioners
filed a motion22 for reconsideration. In its 30July 2010
Resolution, the NLRC granted Solidums motion for partial
reconsideration and denied for lack of merit petitioners motion
for reconsideration. The NLRC held that:
Our Entry of Judgment dated June 01, 2010 clearly states that
the Decision promulgated by this Commission on May 29,
2009 had become final and executory on August 10, 2009.
Thus, We so hold that the date of finality of Our Decision
reversing the Labor Arbiters Decision dated July 3, 2006 is
August 10, 2009, and the computation of complainants
reinstatement or accrued salaries/wages and other benefits
should be up to August 10, 2009.
Anent respondents Motion for Reconsideration, We find the
same unmeritorious.23
Petitoners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In his alias writ24 of execution dated 22 October 2010, the
Labor Arbiter ordered the sheriff to collect from
petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidums accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21
January to 20 April 2009.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its 25 January 2011 Decision,25 the Court of Appeals granted
petitioners petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order and set aside the NLRCs
31 May 2010 Decision and 30 July 2010 Resolution. The Court
of Appeals held that:
The order of the Labor Arbiter denying Private Respondents
ex-parte motion for issuance of Alias Writ of Execution is not a
final order as there was something else to be done, namely,
the resolution of his Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
Petitioners on the merits. The subject Order of the Labor
Arbiter did not put an end to the issues of illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal, and, thus, partakes the nature of an
interlocutory order. It is jurisprudential that an interlocutory
order is not appealable until after the rendition of the judgment
on the merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration
of justice and unduly burden the courts. Being interlocutory in
nature, the subject Order could not have been validly
appealed.
Moreover, as correctly argued by the Petitioners, an appeal
from an interlocutory order is a prohibited pleading under
Section 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC. Consequently, the Labor Arbiters order being
interlocutory and unappealable, Public Respondent NLRC has
no jurisdiction to rule on the appeal except to dismiss the
same. The assailed Decision and the Resolution, rendered in
excess of the Public Respondent NLRCs jurisdiction, are
therefore null.
Besides and more importantly, records show that the Decision,
dated May 29, 2009, of the NLRC in the Illegal Dismissal Case
which effectively denied Private Respondents Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal against Petitioners already attained finality on
12
June 1, 2010. Indeed, an Entry of Judgment was accordingly
made. Clearly, Private Respondent can neither pray nor cause
this Court to grant his Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution to reinstate him since his dismissal by Petitioners
was finally ruled to be legal; hence, the denial of his complaint
for lack of merit. Ruling on Private Respondents Ex-parte
motion shall also have an effect of reviewing a final judgment
which the law and the court abhor. It bears to stress that when
a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable.26
Solidum filed a motion27 for reconsideration.
In his alias writ28 of execution dated 18 May 2011, the Labor
Arbiter ordered the sheriff to collect from
petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidums accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21
April to 20 July 2009. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
a motion29 to order Solidum to return P2,881,335.86,
representing the total amount under the 22 October 2010 and
18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.
In its 3 July 2012 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals
partly granted Solidums motion for reconsideration and denied
petitioners motion to order the return of P2,881,335.86. The
Court of Appeals held that:
[T]here was a wrong appreciation of fact relative to the date of
finality of judgment. The true date when the May 29, 2009
NLRC decision became final and executory was on August10,
2009 and not on June 1, 2010. (Rollo, page 1895)
Conformably with the foregoing, the involved portion of our
ruling which is the subject of the discussion at hand is hereby
modified by changing the stated date therein from June 1,
2010 to August 10, 2009.
xxxx
On the last issue for consideration refund of monetary
award, We find necessary to quote the following
pronouncement of the High Court:
xxxx
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the
order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate
and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. (Juanito A.
Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 164856, January
20, 2009)
In view thereof, no refund will thus be permitted by this Court.30
Petitioners filed a motion31 for partial reconsideration with
motion to order the return of P2,881,335.86. In its 23
November 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals held that:
The move to reconsider the January 26, 2009 decision of the
NLRC was denied on May 29, 2009. Thereafter, an Entry of
Judgment was issued which provides in particular the
following: "this is to certify that on May 29, 2009, a DECISION
was rendered x x x and that the same has, pursuant to Rules
of the Commission, became [sic] final and executory on Aug.
10, 2009". (Rollo, p. 1895) It appears therefore that the
situation contemplated in the last paragraph of the Section 14
had been the case here. In view of this, We find no cogent
reason to reverse our earlier ruling that August 10, 2009 is the
true date of finality of subject decision.
xxxx
In the light, however, of our earlier discussion on the true date
of finality of judgment, we cannot order the return of the
amounts released by way of the 8th and 9th Alias Writ of
Execution. The wages, allowances, incentives/benefits and
bonuses received through the said writs covered the period
from January21, 2009 to July 20, 2009, thus, the latter is not
required to reimburse the same due to the fact that one is
entitled to such amounts until the day that the reinstatement
order was reversed with finality (which in this case falls on
August 10, 2009). (See Juanito A. Garcia vs. Philippine
Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009)32
Hence, the present petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raised as issues that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that (1) the NLRCs 29 May 2009 Decision became final
and executory on 10 August 2009, and (2) Solidum was
entitled to P2,881,335.86, representing the total amount under
the 22 October 2010 and 18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
The NLRCs 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009 as shown on the entry of
judgment.33 The entry of judgment states:
This is to certify that on May 29, 2009, a DECISION was
rendered in the above-entitled case, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
"WHERFORE, premises considered, complainants motion for
reconsideration, as well as respondents motion for injunction
are hereby both DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Our
January 26,2009 Resolution is hereby REITERATED.
13
SO ORDERED."
and that the same has pursuant to the Rules of the
Commission, become final and executory on Aug. 10, 2009and
is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Quezon City, Philippines, June 01, 2010.34 (Boldfacing
supplied)
Moreover, the certification35 issued by the NLRC states that the
NLRCs 29 May 2009 Decision becamefinal and executory on
10 August 2009:
This is to certify that the Decision in NLRC Case No. 00-11-
09564-05/NLRC CA No. 049875-06, entitled: Jose Leni Z.
Solidum vs. Smart Communications, Inc., Napoleon
L.Nazareno, and/or Ricky P. Isla, was promulgated on 29 May
2009; the same was mailed on 11 June 2009 and in the
absence of return cards, the decision had become final and
executory on 10 August 2009, (after sixty (60) calendar days
from the date of mailing), and had been recorded in the Book
of Entries of Judgment, pursuant to Rule VII Section 14 of the
2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides:
"The Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider
the decision, resolution or order as final and executory after
sixty (60) calendar days from date of mailing in the absence of
return cards, certifications from the post office, or other proof of
service to parties.36 (Boldfacing supplied)
Since the NLRCs 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009, Solidum is entitled
to P2,881,335.86, representing his accrued salaries,
allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses for the period 21
January to 20 July 2009.
In Bago v. NLRC,37 the Court held that employees are entitled
to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and
bonuses until the NLRCs reversal of the labor arbiters order of
reinstatement becomes final and executory, as shown on the
entry of judgment. The Court held that:
Finally, on Arlyns claim that respondents "unilaterally withheld
her payroll reinstatement" after the NLRC reversed on
September 27, 2004 the Labor Arbiters decision, Article 223,
paragraph 6 of the Labor Code provides that the decision of
the NLRC on appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter "shall
become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof by the parties." The 2002 New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC provided:
RULE VII
xxxx
SECTION 14. FINALITY OF DECISION OF THE
COMMISSION AND ENTRY OF JUDGMENT. (a) Finality of
the Decisions, Resolutions or Orders of the Commission.
Except as provided in Rule XI, Section 9, the decisions,
resolutions or orders of the Commission/Division shall become
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
same.
(b) Entry of Judgment. Upon the expiration of the
ten (10) calendar day period provided in paragraph
(a) of this section, the decision/resolution/order shall,
as far as practicable, be entered in a book of entries
of judgment.
(c) Allowance for Delay of Mail in the Issuance of
Entries of Judgment. In issuing entries of
judgment, the Executive Clerk of Court or the Deputy
Executive Clerk, in the absence of a return card or
certification from the post office concerned, shall
determine the finality of the decision by making
allowance for delay of mail, computed sixty (60)
calendar days from the date of mailing of the decision,
resolution or order.
That the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of and resolve
a petition for certiorari for the nullification of the decisions of
the NLRC on jurisdictional and due process considerations
does not affect the statutory finality of the NLRC Decision. The
2002 New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC so provided:
RULE VIII
xxxx
SECTION 6. EFFECT OF FILING OF PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON EXECUTION. - A petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a temporary
restraining order is issued by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court.
14
In the case at bar, Arlyn received the September 27, 2004
NLRC decision on October 25, 2004, and the January 31, 2005
NLRC Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration on
February 23, 2005. There is no showing that the Court of
Appeals issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
execution of the NLRC decision, as affirmed by its Resolution
of January 31, 2005. If above-quoted paragraph (a) of Section
14 of Rule VII of the 2002 NLRC New Rules of Procedure were
followed, the decision of the NLRC would have become final
and executory on March 7, 2005, ten (10) calendar days from
February 25, 2005. The NLRC, however, issued on June 16,
2005 a Notice of Entry of Judgment stating that the NLRC
Resolution of January 31, 2005 became final and executory on
April 16, 2005, apparently following the above-quoted last
paragraph of Section 14 of Rule VII. No objection having been
raised by any of the parties to the declaration in the Notice of
Entry of Judgment of the date of finality of the NLRC January
31, 2005 Resolution, Arlyn's payroll reinstatement ended on
April 16, 2005. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED and the questioned decision of the court
a quo is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that respondent
Standard Insurance, Co., Inc. is ordered to pay the salaries
due petitioner, Arlyn Bago, from the time her payroll
reinstatement was withheld after the promulgation on
September 27, 2004 of the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission until April 16, 2005 when it became final
and executory.38 (Boldfacing supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' 3
July 2012 Amended Decision and 23 November 2012
Resolution in CAG.R. SP No. 115794 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 205575, July 22, 2015
VISAYAN ELECTRIC COMPANY EMPLOYEES
UNION-ALU-TUCP AND CASMERO
MAHILUM, Petitioners, v. VISAYAN ELECTRIC
COMPANY, INC. (VECO), Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Resolutions dated September 25, 20122 and December
19, 20123 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR. SP
No. 06329, which dismissed the certiorari petition filed
by petitioners Visayan Electric Company Employees
Union-ALU-TUCP (the Union) and Casmero Mahilum
(Mahilum; collectively petitioners) against the
Decision4 dated June 30, 2011 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CC(V)-12-
000003-10 (NCMB-RBVII-NS-10-12-10) for failure of
their new counsel to show cause why
their certiorari petition should not be dismissed for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period.
The Facts
Respondent Visayan Electric Company, Inc. (VECO) is a
corporation engaged in the supply and distribution of
electricity in Cebu City and its neighboring cities,
municipalities, and barangays.5 The Union is the
exclusive bargaining agent of VECO's rank-and-file
employees, and Mahilum was the Union's president
from October 2007 until his termination from
employment on October 28, 2010.6redarclaw
It was claimed that, before Mahilum was elected as
union officer, he was transferred from VECO's Public
Relations Section to its Administrative Services Section
without any specific work. When he was elected as
union secretary, he was transferred to the Line
Services Department as its Customer Service
Representative.7 At the time of his election as union
president, VECO management allegedly: (a)
terminated active union members without going
through the grievance machinery procedure prescribed
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement8 (CBA); (b)
refused to implement the profit-sharing scheme
provided under the same CBA9; (c) took back the
motorbikes issued to active union members; and (d)
revised the electricity privilege10 granted to VECO's
employees.11redarclaw
Thus, on May 1, 2009, union members marched on the
streets of Cebu City to protest VECO's refusal to
comply with the political and economic provisions of
the CBA. Mahilum and other union officers were
interviewed by the media, and they handed out a
document12 containing their grievances against VECO,
the gist of which came out in local
newspapers.13 Following said incident, Mahilum was
allegedly demoted as warehouse staff to isolate him
and restrict his movements. Other union officers were
transferred to positions that will keep them away from
the general union membership.14redarclaw
On May 8, 2009, Mahilum was issued a Notice to
Explain15 why he should not be terminated from service
due to loss of trust and confidence, as well as in
violating the Company Code of Discipline, for causing
the publication of what VECO deemed as a libelous
article. The other union officers likewise received
similar notices16 for them to explain their actions,
which they justified17 as merely an expression of their
collective sentiments against the treatment of VECO's
management towards them.18redarclaw
On May 20, 2009, the union officers were notified19 of
the administrative investigation to be conducted
relative to the charges against them. During the
scheduled investigation, the Union's counsel initially
raised its objection to the proceedings and insisted
that the investigation should be conducted through the
15
grievance machinery procedure, as provided in the
CBA.20 However, upon the agreement to proceed with
the investigation of the Union Vice President, Renato
Gregorio M. Gimenez (Gimenez), through his own
counsel, Mahilum and the other union officers likewise
agreed to proceed with the aforesaid investigation,
with Gimenez's counsel representing the
Union.21redarclaw
Prior to the said investigation, the Union filed on May
18, 2009, a Notice of Strike22 with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) against
VECO, which facilitated a series of conferences that
yielded a Memorandum of Agreement23 (MOA) signed
by the parties on August 7, 2009.24 The parties
likewise put to rest the critical issue of electricity
privilege and agreed before the NCMB on a conversion
rate of said privilege to basic pay. Moreover, the
administrative investigation on the alleged libelous
publication was deferred until after the CBA
renegotiation.25redarclaw
However, even before the conclusion of the CBA
renegotiation26 on June 28, 2010, several complaints
for libel were filed against Mahilum and the other union
officers by VECO's Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer Jaime Jose Y. Aboitiz.27 The
administrative hearing on the charges against Mahilum
resumed with due notice to the latter, but he protested
the same, referring to it as "moro-moro" or "kangaroo"
and insisting that the investigation should follow the
grievance machinery procedure under the
CBA.28 Nonetheless, VECO's management carried on
with its investigation and, on the basis of the findings
thereof, issued a notice29 terminating Mahilum from
employment on October 28, 2010.30redarclaw
On even date, the Union filed another Notice of
Strike31 with the NCMB against VECO on the grounds of
unfair labor practice, specifically union busting for the
dismissal and/or suspension of its union president and
officers, refusal to bargain collectively, as well as non-
observance of the grievance procedure in their
CBA.32 To avert any work stoppage that will prejudice
VECO's power distribution activity, the Secretary of
Labor intervened and issued an Order33 dated
November 10, 2010 certifying the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.34 Consequently, the
strike was enjoined; Mahilum was ordered reinstated in
the payroll; and the parties were directed to refrain
from committing any act that would exacerbate the
situation.35redarclaw
The NLRC Ruling
After submission of the respective position papers 36 of
both parties, the NLRC Seventh Division rendered
Decision37 on June 30, 2011 dismissing the charge of
unfair labor practice against VECO for lack of merit,
and declaring Mahilum's dismissal from employment as
legal.
The NLRC found VECO to have acted within the bounds
of law when it administratively investigated the
suspended or terminated employees and union
officers/members, instead of subjecting their
respective cases to the grievance machinery procedure
provided in the CBA.38 In resolving apparently
conflicting provisions in the CBA, the NLRC applied
the specific provision found in Section 13 of Article
XIV that disciplinary actions shall be governed by the
rules and regulations promulgated by the company.
Since the administrative investigations conducted by
VECO were found to have complied with procedural
due process requirements, there was no unfair labor
practice to speak of.39redarclaw
On the matter of Mahilum's dismissal and the filing of
criminal cases against the union officers, the NLRC
found no substantial evidence to prove the imputation
of union busting. Similarly unsubstantiated were the
allegations of fraud and deceit in hiring and contracting
out services for functions performed by union
members, and declaring certain positions confidential
and transferring union members to other positions
without prior discussions, thereby allegedly interfering
with their right to self-organization and reducing union
membership.40redarclaw
The issue on VECO's alleged modification of the
electricity privilege, which the Union claimed as
violative of the CBA, was declared mooted by the MOA
entered into between the parties, with the assistance
of the NCMB, providing for, inter alia, electricity
privilege conversion to basic pay. This was
subsequently incorporated in the Renegotiated CBA
dated June 28, 2010.41redarclaw
Finally, the NLRC ruled that Mahilum was terminated
for a just and valid cause under Article 282 (c) of the
Labor Code, i.e., fraud or willful breach of trust by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer
or duly authorized representative, when he, together
with some other union officers, caused the publication
of a document which was deemed to have dishonored
and blackened the memory of former corporate officer
Luis Alfonso Y. Aboitiz, besmirched VECO's name and
reputation, and exposed the latter to public hatred,
9ontempt, and ridicule.42redarclaw
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration43 from the foregoing NLRC Decision,
which was denied in a Resolution44 dated July 29,
2011. They received said Resolution on August 18,
2011.45redarclaw
On October 18, 2011, petitioners elevated their case to
the CA on certiorari petition,46 docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 06329, imputing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the NLRC.
On February 29, 2012, the CA issued a
Resolution47 directing petitioners to show cause why
the certiorari petition should not be dismissed for
having been filed "one day behind the reglementary
16
period."48redarclaw
On March 13, 2012, Atty. Jonas V. Asis (Atty. Asis)
from the Seno Mendoza & Associates Law Offices filed
in behalf of petitioners a
Manifestation/Explanation49 claiming that "there was
unintended error/mistake in the computation of the
period,"50 and that there was no prejudice caused to
VECO by the "unintended one-day late filing of the
petition."51redarclaw
The CA Ruling
On September 25, 2012, the CA issued the assailed
September 25, 2012 Resolution52 pointing out that on
March 7, 2012, petitioners had filed a
Manifestation53 that they had terminated the services
of Atty. Asis and the Seno Mendoza & Associates as
their counsel in this case, and have contracted the
services of Atty. Remigio D. Saladero, Jr. (Atty.
Saladero) as their new counsel. Consequently, the CA
deemed as not filed the Manifestation/Explanation filed
by Atty. Asis, and dismissed the certiorari petition for
failure of Atty. Saladero to comply with the Resolution
dated February 29, 2012.
The motion for reconsideration54 filed by Atty. Saladero
imploring the CA to consider the
Manifestation/Explanation filed by Atty. Asis despite
the fact that he was no longer petitioners' counsel of
record was denied in a Resolution55 dated December
19, 2012 for lack of merit.
The Issue
Undeterred, petitioners are now before the Court
maintaining that the CA erred in dismissing
the certiorari petition on account of the one-day delay
in its filing despite the serious errors committed by the
NLRC in absolving VECO from the charge of unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal of Mahilum.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, certiorari should be filed "not later than
sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution" sought to be assailed. The provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable
as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and
are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. The timeliness of filing a pleading is a
jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle
with.56redarclaw
The Union admittedly57 received on August 18, 2011
the NLRC's July 29, 2011 Resolution, which denied
their motion for reconsideration of the NLRC's June 30,
2011 Decision. Therefore, the 60-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari ended on October
17, 2011. But the certiorari petition was filed one day
after, or on October 18, 2011. Thus, petitioners' failure
to file said petition within the required 60-day period
rendered the NLRC's Decision and Resolution
impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari, and no court can exercise jurisdiction to
review the same.58redarclaw
Petitioners adamantly insist, however, that the "one-
day delay occasioned by an honest mistake in the
computation of dates should have been overlooked by
the CA in favor of substantial justice."59Their former
counsel, Atty. Asis, allegedly thought in good faith that
the month of August has thirty (30) days, and that
sixty (60) days from August 18, 2011 is October 18,
2011.60redarclaw
The Court is not convinced.
First. The fact that the delay in the filing of the petition
for certiorari was only one day is not a legal
justification for non-compliance with the rule requiring
that it be filed not later than sixty (60) days from
notice of the assailed judgment, order or resolution.
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory that the ends
of justice would be better subserved by allowing a
petition for certiorari filed only one-day late. When the
law fixes sixty (60) days, it cannot be taken to mean
also sixty-one (61) days, as the Court had previously
declared in this wise:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
[W]hen the law fixes thirty days [or sixty days as in
the present case], we cannot take it to mean also
thirty-one days. If that deadline could be stretched to
thirty-one days in one case, what would prevent its
being further stretched to thirty-two days in another
case, and so on, step by step, until the original line is
forgotten or buried in the growing confusion resulting
from the alterations? That is intolerable. We cannot fix
a period with the solemnity of a statute and disregard
it like a joke. If law is founded on reason, whim and
fancy should play no part in its application.61
Second. While it is always in the power of the Court to
suspend its own rules, or to except a particular case
from its operation,62 the liberality with which equity
jurisdiction is exercised must always be anchored on
the basic consideration that the same must be
warranted by the circumstances obtaining in the
case.63 However, there is no showing herein of any
exceptional circumstance that may rationalize a
digression from the rule on timeliness of petitions.
Moreover, petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that
the refusal of VECO to follow the grievance machinery
procedure under Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA in
the suspension and termination from employment of
the other union officers and members constituted
unfair labor practice.
True, it is a fundamental doctrine in labor law that the
CBA is the law between the parties and they are
obliged to comply with its provisions. If the provisions
of the CBA seem clear and unambiguous, the literal
meaning of their stipulations shall control. However, as
17
in this case, when general and specific provisions of
the CBA are inconsistent, the specific provision shall
be paramount to and govern the general
provision.64redarclaw
Section 4, Article XVII of the CBA states that "(a)ny
difference of opinion, controversy, dispute problem or
complaint arising from CompanyUnion or Company-
Worker relations concerning the interpretation or
application of this Agreement or regarding any matter
affecting Company Union or Company-Worker relations
shall be considered a grievance."65 On the other hand,
under Section 13, Article XIV, "(t)he Company agrees
that henceforth there shall be a fair and uniform
application of its rules and regulations. It is understood
that disciplinary actions imposed on employee or
laborer shall be governed by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Company as well as those
provided for by existing laws on the
matter."66redarclaw
The Court is in accord with the ratiocination of the
NLRC that the sweeping statement "any matter
affecting Company-Union or Company Worker relations
shall be considered a grievance" under Section 4,
Article XVII is general, as opposed to Section 13,
Article XIV of the CBA, which is specific, as it precisely
refers to "what governs employee disciplinary
actions."67 Thus, the NLRC correctly ruled that VECO
acted within the bounds of law when it proceeded with
its administrative investigation of the charges against
other union officers and members.
This is consistent with jurisprudential rulings
supporting an employer's free reign and "wide latitude
of discretion to regulate all aspects of employment,
including the prerogative to instill discipline in its
employees and to impose penalties, including
dismissal, upon erring employees. This is
management prerogative, where the free will of
management to conduct its own affairs to achieve its
purpose takes form. The only criterion to guide the
exercise of its management prerogative is that the
policies, rules[,] and regulations on work-related
activities of the employees must always be fair and
reasonable[,] and the corresponding penalties, when
prescribed, are commensurate to the offense involved
and to the degree of the infraction."68 The Labor Code
does not excuse employees from complying with valid
company policies and reasonable regulations for their
governance and guidance.69redarclaw
Delving now into the merits of Mahilum's dismissal, the
Court holds that the two requisites for a valid dismissal
from employment have been met, namely: (1) it must
be for a just or authorized cause; and (2) the
employee must be afforded due process.70redarclaw
VECO anchored its termination of Mahilum on Article
282 (c) of the Labor Code and Articles 5.1 and 4.4 71 of
VECO's Company Code of Discipline, which read as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Article 282 (c) of tile Labor Code:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 282. Termination By Employer. - An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
(c) fraud or willful breach of trust by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;
Company Code of Discipline:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Art. 5.1 Every employee shall uphold company trust
and confidence as well as the trust relationship
between the company and its customers/suppliers.
Art. 4.4 Every employee shall willfully respect the
honor or person of his immediate superior and/or
department head or company officers.
VECO found the following "Press Release",72 which
Mahilum, together with other union officers, caused to
be published, as libelous for dishonoring and
blackening the memory of then corporate officer Luis
Alfonso Y. Aboitiz, as well as for maliciously impeaching
and besmirching the company's name and
reputation:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
VECEU-ALU President, Casmero A. Mahilum, said that
since 2004 up to present the new VECO Management
under the administration of the Aboitizes unceasingly
attack the local Union by continuously limit (sic) its
membership and diminish (sic) and/or abolish (sic)
worker's benefits and privileges stipulated in the CBA.
x x x. Through clever use of psychological warfare,
intimidation, deception, divide and rule tactic and
taking great advantage of the weakness of the Union
especially of the leadership during that time, the [new]
Management under the late Alfonso Y. Aboitiz was able
to secure a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed
by the Union and Management representatives and
ratified by the General Membership that gave
Management more flexibility in dealing with labor. x x
x.
xxxx
The [l]ocal Union wrote a letter to Mr. Aboitiz
expressing full support of his campaign for energy
conservation x x x. But Mr. Aboitiz was too hard and
too arrogant to deal with. x x x.
x x x. We, therefore, ask the general public to
understand our plight and support our actions. We also
urge everyone to oppose any electricity rate increase
filed by VECO and NAPOCOR at the Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC). Any rate increase in the electricity
will only worsen the already burdened public and
further increase profits for the Aboitizes. The entire
Union membership are one with you in condemning
such increase and brazen connivance of VECO and
NAPOCOR to justify increases in electricity rate.
18
x x x x73
The Court has consistently held that "x x x loss of trust
and confidence must be based on willful breach of the
trust reposed in the employee by his employer. Such
breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly,
and purposely, without justifiable excuse, as
distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Moreover, it
must be based on substantial evidence and not on the
employer's whims or caprices or suspicions[,]
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the
mercy of the employer. x x x. And, in order to
constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and show that the
employee concerned is unfit to continue working for
the employer. In addition, loss of confidence x x x is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned
holds a position of responsibility, trust, and confidence
or that the employee concerned is entrusted with
confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as
handling or care and protection of the property and
assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized."74redarclaw
Mahilum's attempt to rationalize his act as part of his
"moral, legal or social duty x x x to make known his
legitimate perception"75 against VECO does not, in any
way, detract from the indubitable fact that he
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely caused the
aforequoted "disparaging publication." Neither can he
hide behind the claim that the press release was
simply "an expression of a valid grievance."76 As the
NLRC aptly pointed out, "(i)nstead of him and the rest
of the union officers bringing their sentiments and/or
grievances against the management to the proper
forum, they intentionally, knowingly and purposefully
breached their employer's trust, by issuing x x x
derogatory statements and causing their publication,
apparently, to incite public condemnation against the
latter."77 It bears noting that, while petitioners harp on
the refusal of VECO to follow the grievance machinery
procedure under the CBA, they conveniently forgot
that they themselves shunned the very procedure to
which they now hang by a thread.
Moreover, the Court is unmoved by Mahilum's
insistence that there was nothing in his position which
called for management's trust and confidence in
him.78 The NLRC, whose findings of facts and
conclusions are generally accorded not only great
weight and respect but even with finality, correctly held
that, as Customer Service Representative, Mahilum
occupied a position of responsibility especially in
dealing with VECO's clients.79 His duties and
responsibilities included: (1) accepting pertinent
documents and processing electrical service
applications; (2) verifying authenticity of documents
submitted; (3) interviewing customer-applicant on
applications, complaints, and requests; (4) preparing
job assignment of service inspectors; (5) filing all
service orders of inspectors; (6) assessing and
accepting bill deposits; (7) preparing and facilitating
signing of Metered Service Contract; (8) issuing
service order for meter-related activities; (9) verifying
existing account of customer-applicant and approving
account clearances; (10) accepting payment of bills
from customer-applicant for account clearances; and
(11) processing payment arrangements of
customers.80 His performance was measured according
to how he: (1) handled customers' transactions; (2)
made decisions in processing customers' applications
and payment arrangements; and (3) maintained
posture at all times in handling customers' transactions
even wi.th angry customers.81redarclaw
It is clear from the foregoing that Mahilum was not an
ordinary rank and-file employee. His job entailed the
observance of proper company procedures relating to
processing and determination of electrical service
applications culminating in the signing of service
contracts, which constitutes the very lifeblood of
VECO's existence. He was further entrusted with
handling the accounts of customers and accepting
payments from them. Not only that, it was his duty to
address customer complaints and requests. Being a
frontliner of VECO, with the most consistent and direct
interaction with customers, Mahilum's job involved a
high degree of responsibility requiring a substantial
amount of trust and confidence on the part of his
employer, i.e., VECO.
However, with the derogatory statements issued by
Mahilum that were intended to incite, not just public
condemnation of VECO, but antagonism and
obstruction against rate increases in electricity that it
may be allowed, by law, to fix, there can be no dispute
that VECO, indeed, had lost its trust and confidence in
Mahilum and his ability to perform his tasks with
utmost efficiency and loyalty expected of an employee
entrusted to handle customers and funds. Settled is
the rule that an employer cannot be compelled to
retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the
19
interests of the employer. A company has the right to
dismiss its employee if only as a measure of self-
protection.82redarclaw
Thus, Mahilum was terminated for a just and valid
cause. Moreover, as declared by the NLRC, VECO
complied with the procedural due process
requirements of furnishing Mahilum with two written
notices before the termination of employment can be
effected. On May 8, 2009,83 Mahilum was apprised of
the particular acts for which his termination was
sought; and, after due investigation, he was given a
Notice of Decision84 on October 28, 2010 informing him
of his dismissal from service.
The fact that Mahilum served the company for a
considerable period of time will not help his cause. It is
well to emphasize that the longer an employee stays in
the service of the company, the greater is his
responsibility for knowledge and compliance with the
norms of conduct and the code of discipline in the
company.85redarclaw
As a final word, while it is the state's responsibility to
afford protection to labor, this policy should not be
used as an instrument to oppress management and
capital. In resolving disputes between labor and
capital, fairness and justice should always prevail.
Social justice does not mandate that every dispute
should be automatically decided in favor of labor.
Justice is to be granted to the deserving and dispensed
in the light of the established facts and the applicable
law and doctrine.86redarclaw
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Peralta,* Bersamin,** (Acting Chairpers