Lim v.

Lim
G.R. No. 163209, October 30, 2009
Nature
Who Must Pay Support
Ma. Cheryl married Edward in 1979. She then lived with him in his parents
Prudencio and Filomenas house in Forbes Park, where also lived Edwards
grandmother Chua Giak. Ma. Cheryl and Edward begot three children, Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Edward worked in the family business,
which provided him with a monthly income of P6,000.00.
In 1990, Ma. Cheryl and her children moved out of the house after she caught
Edward in a very compromising situation with Chua Giaks in-house midwife.
Ma. Cheryl then filed an action for support against Edward, the spouses Lim, and
Chua Giak. While ongoing trial, the court ordered Edward to provide P6,000.00
monthly support. After trial, the court ordered the defendants to provide P40.000.00
monthly support to Ma. Cheryl and her children, Edward shouldering P6,000.00 and
the others the balance of P34,000.00 Filomena and Prudencio asked for
reconsideration of the decision, holding out that as grandparents, they are not
required to support Ma. Cheryl and her children. The court denied the motion, hence
they filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, which also deemed their appeal,
unmeritorious.

Issue
Whether or not the Grandparents had the obligation to Support their
grandchildren directly if they have parents.

Held

Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe
constriction of the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the
governing text are the relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended,
on Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas
share a common ground in that parental authority encompasses the obligation to
provide legal support, they differ in other concerns including the duration of the
obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus, although
the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the
emancipation of the child, the same obligation arising from spousal and general
familial ties ideally lasts during the obligees lifetime.. Also, while parental authority
under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to
ascendants only upon its termination or suspension, the obligation to provide legal
support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in another case raising
the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give support in light of the fathers
sufficient means:

Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly
from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are
capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order of
support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.

xxx

Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide
sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed
that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is
insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the
ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal19
lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme
material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support
even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants

as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree.
As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice
Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive
support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their
marital bond.Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the
trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained
to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

TEOFISTO I. VERCELES v. MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, et al.

G.R. SP. 159785, 27 April 2007, Quisumbing, J. (Second Division)
It is not the caption but the facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading.
Courts are called upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. There is
nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a consenting adult who
begets a love child to damages.

Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, a young lass from the barrio of Pandan,
Catanduanes, met a close family friend, petitioner Teofisto Verceles, mayor of
Pandan.

He then offered Posada a job. Posada accepted Verceless offer and worked as a
casual employee in the mayors office. Along with some other employees, Posada
accompanied Vereceles to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning. One
day, Verceles started to make amorous advances on her. She panicked, and
hurriedly left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident to herself. She went
on as a casual employee. One of her tasks was following-up barangay road and
maintenance projects.

On orders of Verceles, Pasada went to Virac, Cantaduanes, to follow up funds for

barangay projects. She went to Cantanduanes Hotel on instructions of Vecerceles
who asked to be briefed on the progress of her mission. They met at the lobby and
heled her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
the upper floor. Instead, however, Verceles opened a hotel room door, led her in, and
suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would
divorce her anytime. He also claimed he could appoint her as a municipal
development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the
incident to herself. Posada missed her menstruation and wrote Verceles that she
feared she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter, Verceles told Posada that he
should have no regrets should she become pregnant even unexpectedly, and that
they shall both take care of the child.

Posada explained Verceles used an alias Ninoy and addressed her as Chris
probably because of their 25-year age gap. In court, Posada identified Verceless
penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office. On
September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada. The Posadas
filed a complaint for damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC,
Virac, Catanduanes against Verceles. The trial court issued a judgment in favour of
the Posadas. The CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, ordering VErceles to pay a
monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada from her birth, and to pay damages to Maria
Clarissa and her parents.

Issues

Whether or not paternity and filiation can be resolved for support pendent lite?

Held

The Court has held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required. Any authentic writing is treated as a voluntary recognition that does not
require a separate action for judicial approval.

The letters are private handwritten instruments of Verceles which establish Verna
Aizas filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. Thus, in addition to other
evidences, there is irrefutable evidence that Verna Aiza is, indeede, Verceless
illegitimate child. Verceles not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he himself
presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling.

Thus, he is obliged to pay support for his child.

MANGONON V. CA
G.R. No. 125041, June 30,1996

Nature

Who must pay support

FACTS

On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly

married by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time,
petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As
the marriage was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the New
Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.

25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the
assistance of her second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as
private respondents had totally abandoned them.

Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA)
where petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to
and finally settled in. Rica was admitted to the University of Massachusetts
(Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island University and Western New
England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rinawere,
however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the
following:

a)

The average annual cost for college education in the US is about US$22,000/year or
a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica and Rina

b)

Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the amount of
US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year.

c)

Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her 2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after
taxes which she can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much less their
required college educational support.

d)

Neither can petitioners present husband be compelled to share in the general

support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son with
petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to.

Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the
U.S. Department of Education.

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then
minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support,
with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati5)
Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters father,
Francisco,
for general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica
and Rina. The twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning
these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the latter being
generally known to be financially well-off.

ISSUE

Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her

granddaughters educational support

HELD:

ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The
spouse;(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;(3) The ascendants in the nearest
degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters.

There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico
are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily
charged to support their
childrens college educationbut being restricted by their financial income- respondent
Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support
to his granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been established that
respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters
education.

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the
family dwelling the person who hasa right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.

The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give
support. Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under
the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina,
respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should move here to the Philippines
to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may give the determined amount of
support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. This
option cannot be availed of in this case since there are circumstances, legal or
moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be considered. Respondent
Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica
and Rina as support pendent lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco
has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors,
thus the amount of support should be proportionate to the resources or means of the
giver and to the necessities of the recipient. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and
Regina
Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado ishereby held
liable for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court
pursuant to this Decision.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their
education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to
award support pendente lite
in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college untilthey had finished
their respective studies.

De Guzman v. Perez
G.R. No. 156013, July 25, 2006

Nature
Who must pay support

Facts

Petitioner Roberto P. De Guzman and private respondent Shirley F Aberde had a

child out of wedlock, Robby Aberde de Guzman, who was born in 1987. Petitioner
married another woman, while private respondent supported her child by herself,
with petitioner only sending money of his sons schooling twice and giving 7,000
when he was seriously ill in 1994. Private respondent worked in a factory in Taiwan,
but there reached a point where she just about spent all her savings to provide for
her and Robbys needs. The childs continued education thus became uncertain.

On the other hand, petitioner managed the de Guzman family corporations. He

apparently did well as he led a luxurious lifestyle. He owned at least five luxury cars,
lived in a palatial home in the exclusive enclave of Ayala Heights Subdivision,
Quezon City, built a bigger and more extravagant house in the same private
community, and sent his children (by his wife) to expensive schools in Metro Manila.
He also regularly traveled abroad with his family. Despite his fabulous wealth,
however, petitioner failed to provide support to Robby.

In 2000, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and neglect
of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603.

Petitioner claimed that Robby is not a neglected child. He has been given, albeit by
private respondent who is the financially capable parent, the requisite education he
is entitled to.

Issue

Whether the complaint should be dismissed.

The petition is without merit.

Petitioner is charged with neglect of child punishable under Article 59(4) of PD 603
which provides that:
Art. 59. Crimes. Criminal liability shall attach to any parent who:

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education which the familys station in
life and financial conditions permit.

xxx xxx xxx

The crime has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the child and
(4) the offenders station in life and financial condition permit him to give an
appropriate education to the child.

The argument that criminal liability for neglect of child under Article 59(4) of PD 603
attaches only if both parents are guilty of neglecting the childs education does not
hold water.

The law is clear. The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability for the crime
does not depend on whether the other parent is also guilty of neglect. The law
intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure
to give the child the education which the familys station in life and financial condition
permit. The irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of
his neglect by invoking the other parents faithful compliance with his or her own
parental duties.

Petitioners position goes against the intent of the law. To allow the neglectful parent
to shield himself from criminal liability defeats the prescription that in all questions
regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.

Ruiz v CA (Taxation)
Estate of Hilario Ruiz v CA G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996
FACTS:
Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his
three granddaughters,
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent
Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156,
Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will and for the
issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz
ISSUE:
whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of
the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from
the funds of the estate for the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the
release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all properties of
the estate to the executor of the will.
RULING:
1. No. Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the
funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and
children and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their
minority or incapacity.
2. No. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.

3. No. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management

of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be
exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration, He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents
properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of
all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and
estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity,
propriety and justness.

REYES vs. INES-LUCIANO G.R. No. L-48219 February 28, 1979 Facts:
Manuel Reyes attacked his wife twice with the intent to kill. A complaint was filed on
June 3, 1976: the first attempt on March was prevented by her father and the second
attempt, wherein she was already living separately from her husband, was stopped
only because of h
er drivers
intervention. She filed for legal separation on that ground and prayed for support
pendente lite for herself and her three children. The husband opposed the
application for support on the ground that the wife committed adultery with her
physician. The respondent Judge Ines-Luciano of the lower court granted the wife
pendente lite. The husband filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife
is not entitled to receive such support during the pendency of the case, and that
even if she is entitled to it, the amount awarded was excessive. The judge reduced
the amount from P5000 to P4000 monthly. Husband filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA to annul the order granting alimony. CA dismissed the petition which made
the husband appeal to the SC.
Issue
: Whether or not support can be administered during the pendency of an action.
Ruling:
Yes

provided that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will
not bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered
during the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not necessary to
go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits
or other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [The SC on July, 1978
ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from the period of June to February 1979,
after the trial, it was reverted to P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the
trial court that the husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it
wasnt excessive.
SILVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 114742 July 17, 1997 Facts:
Carlitos Silva and Suzanne Gonzales had a live-in relationship and they had two
children, namely, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Silva and Suzanne eventually
separated. Silva and Suzanne had an understanding that Silva would have the
children in his company on weekends. The legal conflict began when Silva claimed
that Suzanne broke that understanding on visitation rights. Silva filed a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court Branch 78 of
Quezon City. The petition was opposed by Gonzales who claimed that Silva often
engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and
social values of the children. The Quezon City RTC ruled in favor of Silva giving him
visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays. The court however
explicitly stated that in no case should Silva take the children out without
the written consent of Suzanne. Suzanne filed an appeal from the RTCs decision to
the Court of
Appeals. In the meantime, Suzanne had gotten married to a Dutch national. She
eventually immigrated to Holland with her children Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia.
The Court of Appeals overturned the ruling of the Quezon City RTC. The CA, stated
that as
alleged by Suzanne, Silvas womanizing would have a negative influenc
e on the children.
Issues:
a)

Whether or not Silva has visitation rights. b)

Whether or not the mother has parental authority over the children.
Ruling:
The High Court set aside the ruling of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the
Quezon City
RTCs decision favoring Silvas visitation rights on weekends with Suzannes written
permission.
The Supreme Court ruled that the biological father has visitorial right over his
illegitimate children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right
of parents over their children. The
Court clarified: Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to
care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best
interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the
parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are
estranged and their affection for each other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for
their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to
suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well-being of the child.
The mother has exclusive parental authority over her illegitimate child (Art. 176 of
the Family Code). The biological father has visitorial right over his illegitimate
children in view of the constitutionally protected inherent and natural right of parents
over their children. This right is personal to the father; no other person, like
grandparents, can exercise this right for him. Silva (the father) may have won with
the Supreme Courts upholding of his visitation rights, but this favorabledecision did
not prevent Suzanne (the mother) in the exercise of her parental authority from
immigrating to Holland with her two children. The right to visitation and the duty to
pay child support are distinct and separate. If the mother and the father of the
illegitimate child can agree on the terms and conditions of the visitation, then there
will be no problem. In case of disagreement however, the father must file a petition
asking the court to settle the terms and conditions.
TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122906 February 7, 2002 Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate
daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the
USA where she found a work as a registerednurse. Gardin was left in the care of her
father and paternal grandparents. Edgar filed a petition forguardianship over Gardin
in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the court granted the petition and
appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the judgment only on April 1,
1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her
opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In
1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court
issued a resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's
motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the
resolution. Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA
modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise
adjudged. Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to
the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin
Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate
minor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then,
attained the age of seven. Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that
Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship
proceeding?
Ruling:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and
well-being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an
informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority
of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that [n]o child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. It will be observed that in both provisions, a
strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is especially evident in Article 213
where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As
explained by the Code Commission: The general rule is recommended in order to
avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No
man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender
age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for compelling reasons for the
good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are
neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable
illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but
the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by
disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in
which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial
court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who
should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said
minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing
her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child
should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed
an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law.
We are not in the best position to assess the parties respective merits vis --vis their
opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age
of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a
fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent
should have the custody over her person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor
should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment
of the trial court.
VANCIL vs. BELMES G.R. No. 132223 June 19, 2001 Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died
on 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by
his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a favorable court
decision appointing her as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie and Vincent.
On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen followed
her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New
One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising
parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where
they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition was filed,
Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, the trial court rejected and denied Helens motion to remove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC. Since Valerie had reached
the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the issue
revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.
Issue:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his
guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the
preferential right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the
Family Code provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary. xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the
corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. "Of considerable importance is
the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported
by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by
the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacias
claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute
parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case
of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority
only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is
very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,
Bonifacia has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian, Helens
unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Bonifacia merely insists that Helen
is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped
Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of
this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of
Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty
of discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will
merely delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a
guardian.
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate,
etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators
and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding
that there is no statutory requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here