Chinese Overseas
Chief Editor
Wang Gungwu
Subject Editors
Evelyn Hu-DeHart, David Der-wei Wang, Wong Siu-lun
Editorial Board
Ien Ang, Shirley Geok-lin Lim, Liu Hong, Frank Pieke,
Elizabeth Sinn, Jing Tsu
VOLUME 4
Chinese Indonesians and
Regime Change
Edited by
Marleen Dieleman, Juliette Koning, and Peter Post
LEIDEN BOSTON
2011
Cover Image: The Board of Directors of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, 1952.
This picture was taken on August 20, 1952, in the ballroom of Hotel des Indes
( Jakarta) during a cocktail party to celebrate Tan Tek Pengs 35th anniversary with
Kian Gwan Co. (Indonesia) Ltd. N.V.
Standing from left to right: Yap Kie Ling, Mrs. Oei Ing Swie, Oei Ing Swie, Mrs. L. Tan
Tek Peng-Souw, Tan Tek Peng, Mrs. M.L. Oei Tjong Tjay-Blanc, Oei Tjong Tjay,
Tjoa Soe Tjong.
Dieleman, Marleen.
Chinese Indonesians and regime change / by Marleen Dieleman, Juliette Koning,
and Peter Post.
p. cm. (Chinese overseas ; v. 4)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-19121-1 (hardback)
1. ChineseIndonesiaHistory. 2. ChineseIndonesiaPolitics and government.
3. IndonesiaPolitics and government20th century. 4. Regime changeIndonesia
History20th century. 5. IndonesiaEthnic relations. I. Koning, Juliette. II. Post,
Peter, 1953 III. Title. IV. Series.
DS632.3.C5D54 2010
959.8004951dc22
2010029370
ISSN 1876-3847
ISBN 978 90 04 19121 1
PART I
INTRODUCTION
PART II
PART III
Chapter Six The Loa Joe Djin-Case: A Trigger to Change ... 117
Patricia Tjiook-Liem
PART IV
Marleen Dieleman
Juliette Koning
Peter Post
ABBREVIATIONS
Pelindung protector
Pembauran assimilation
Peranakan person of mixed ancestry
Pers delict press offense
Pribumi native, indigenous, sons of the soil
ronda or siskamling communal neighborhood guard duty at night
Ronda guard control
Suku ethnic group
Tionghoa Hokkien term for Chinese
Totok full blooded
Wijkenstelsel zoning system
CONTRIBUTORS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Purdey 2006; Shiraishi 1997; Somers 1965; Twang 1998). This has
been the case with the overthrow of the Dutch colonial regime by the
Japanese military in 1942, the so-called Bersiap period during the first
year of the Indonesian Revolution of 194549, the coup that marked
the transition from the Sukarno to the Suharto regime in 1965, and in
May 1998 with the fall of Suharto. Themes of violence, discrimination
and oppression during the transitory periods from the Dutch, to the
Japanese, to the Sukarno and to the Suharto regimes have therefore
been prominent in the literature on Chinese Indonesians. This singu-
lar focus we believe needs correction. The Chinese in Indonesia were
not only by-standers or innocent victims of history, but were simul-
taneously active agents of change during periods of crises, war, and
revolution. The literature on the Chinese Indonesians that appeared
after May 1998 testifies to this. We can read for instance how Chinese
Indonesians started to revive Sino-Indonesian culture (Allen 2003),
became active in civil society groups (Giblin 2003), began to explore
their Chinese identity (Hoon 2006; Turner and Allen 2007) and set
out to reassess their position in Indonesian society (Coppel 2003; Her-
lijanto 2005; Lindsey 2005). This volume adheres to the new directions
that this growing body of literature offers and above all demonstrates
that there have been many other moments in Indonesian history dur-
ing which Chinese Indonesians were active agents of change, both in
their private lives, through their companies and in society at large.
Hence, this book shows how Chinese Indonesians played an active
role in shaping society during regime changes, and found creative and
constructive ways to deal with situations of adversity and crisis. The
chapters demonstrate that regime changes, throughout Indonesian his-
tory, did not only pose threats of violence, but also offered chances and
opportunities that induced agency on the part of Chinese Indone-
sians to shape their destinies and that of the country.
1
An important exception is the work of historian Charles Coppel, whose historical
embeddedness approach embraces not only many different themes (religion, culture,
education, violence, minority status), but also departs from the premise to always
understand Chinese Indonesians in their Indonesian context (Coppel 2002, 111).
6 marleen dieleman, juliette koning, and peter post
2
There have been lengthy debates on the appropriate terms to address Chinese
migrants. While we do not wish to review these debates here, it is interesting to note
that Wang Gungwu (1990, 1993) argues that with the growing number of people of
Chinese descent taking on the local nationalities of their place of residence, the term
overseas Chinese no longer holds. He instead prefers to use Chinese overseas
(Wang Gungwu 1993, 927). The terminology debate touches upon broader questions
of ethnic identity and whether or not ethnic Chinese population groups in Southeast
Asia were sojourners, would return to China, or could become a fifth column for
China (Reid 1996; Somers 1974; Suryadinata 1979).
8 marleen dieleman, juliette koning, and peter post
rule they achieved great business successes, but that their loyalty was
with the survival of their global business. In conditions of crisis and
adversity, which meant the destruction of property and jailing of lead-
ers and personnel, the family tried to adapt to new conditions as well
as they could and they aggressively moved into new opportunities that
the crisis situation posed, without aligning themselves to one single
national identity.
The coup that brought Suharto to power in 1965 is an example of
an internal force that set in motion a regime change that greatly affected
the Chinese population groups. While the precise details of this his-
torical event are still being revisited and investigated after the end of
the Suharto regime, it is clear that from a society that was character-
ized by a balance of power between the army and the communists,
held together by the charismatic Sukarno who favored a nationalistic
and state-led Indonesia, Suharto shifted the power balance toward
the army and helped crush the communist party (Cribb 1990, 2001;
Vatikiotis 1998). In this process, a massacre against real and imag-
ined communists occurred, the Chinese population groups being one
of the targets. Suhartos rise to power led to a set of policies for the
economy and civil society that impacted the lives of Chinese Indone-
sians profoundly. In the economy, Suharto opened the country for
international trade and investment, and he favored a selected group of
ethnic Chinese businessmen, whom he used to develop the economy,
showering them with incentives.
Indonesia witnessed a period of economic growth during the thirty-
two-year rule of Suharto, which saw the development of many of
todays major Chinese Indonesian family business groups. Dieleman
in this volume explores the strategy and networks of one such business
group, the Salim Group, in detail. The chapter shows how this firm,
whose group leaders were closely connected to Suharto, dealt with
the regime change, also the outcome of internal forces, that occurred
when the Suharto regime fell and was replaced. Dieleman argues that
the Salim Group had outgrown its traditional Chinese and political
networks, and drew from a much wider range of global partnerships,
which allowed it to survive the demise of Suharto. As such, the chapter
criticizes extant theories on ethnic Chinese business networks, which
focus mainly on how companies make use of ethnic or political net-
works, and it shows that large firms broaden their networks and use
them for survival in case of a regime change. It suggests a dynamic
and evolutionary approach to business networking, where family
chinese indonesians and regime change 11
related to the Asian Crisis and fall of Suharto, which proved to be both
constraining and enabling at the same time. The chapter presents per-
sonal stories of Chinese Indonesian businessmen, and these are placed
in a social and political context of post-crisis Indonesia, which on the
one hand gave more freedom of expression to Chinese identities, but
on the other also increased a perceived lack of safety. Using the lens of
religion, this chapter shows how these religious movements construct
a global culture modified to the local Indonesian setting. This global
religious culture taps into the need for recognition as a full member
of a community of belonging, whereas these religious movements
are also conducive to business ideas. The author argues that Chinese
Indonesians and global charismatic Christianity embraced each other
after the fall of the Suharto regime because there was a fit.
The general notion that change is embedded within the formal and
informal institutions that collectively structure social lifeand at the
same time that change is induced by active agencyhas found wide
acceptance throughout the social sciences, including in political theory,
sociology, institutional economics, and in organizational sciences (e.g.,
DiMaggio 1988; Krasner 1983; North 1990; Scott 1995). The notion
that actors also have the capability to change existing arrangements
and thereby induce change comes to the fore best in the chapter by
Yamamoto. His chapter shows convincingly how peranakan Chinese
journalists were actively contributing to the spreading of nationalist
ideas. This chapter deals with an aspect of the role of Chinese Indo-
nesians in the late colonial era that has hitherto hardly been inves-
tigated, namely the influence of journalists, and more generally the
media industry, on the nationalist movement. The chapter describes
the role of Chinese Indonesians in this industry, in particular journal-
ists working for newspapers in the 1910s1930s in colonial Indonesia.
Being part of a larger media culture, journalists, both indigenous and
Chinese, created an imagined community of ideas, often propa-
gating against the colonial regime. The tight and intimate networks
within this industry, the culture of citation, and the rotation of people
in high-level positions from one newspaper to the other led to a com-
mon journalist culture that cut across categories of ethnicity, language,
nation, and political orientation. The tight networks across boundaries
ensured that the Chinese Indonesian journalists were deeply embed-
ded in the nationalist political movement in the late colonial era. It
was this nationalist movement that later shaped the regime change
chinese indonesians and regime change 15
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PART II
Juliette Koning
Introduction
1
I will use the term Chinese Indonesians for those Indonesians with a Chinese
descent line in stead of ethnic Chinese as it does better justice to the dual affinities
most of them feel and express (see also Koning 2007). For a further discussion on this
terminology see Coppel (2003). The term ethnic Chinese is only used if I refer to
literature that uses this terminology.
24 juliette koning
2
There are indications that Evangelical Christianity is on the rise as well. See for
instance news reports in the International Herald Tribune of 20 September 2008,
and themalaysianinsider.com of September 5, 2008. Accurate numbers are, however,
not available.
3
The request for a permit to establish a house of worship needs to be sanctioned
by at least ninety worshippers and sixty people from other faiths residing in the area;
this requirement is in particular difficult to meet for religious minority groups (Decree
No. 1/2006, revision of joint ministerial Decree 1969).
business, belief, and belonging 25
Conversion in Context
4
It has to be remarked that the start of the New Order regime (196566) was also
a moment during which many ethnic Chinese (and others) converted to Christianity.
The new government had stipulated that all Indonesians needed proof (on their iden-
tity card) of adhering to a world religion. Confucianism was excluded from the list.
Not adhering to a religion at that time equaled being an atheist and hence a commu-
nist, a persona non grata after the recent killings of thousands of supposedly communist
party members. See Bertrand (2004, 74) and Coppel (2002a).
5
Chinese Indonesians are often divided into totok (China-born Chinese) and perana-
kan (descendents of mixed marriages between totok men and indigenous-Indonesian
28 juliette koning
women). This distinction is used to claim that the totok are more Chinese than the
peranakan who are supposedly more assimilated. Some scholars point out that this
distinction is no longer relevant and that many peranakan regard Chinese culture and
traditions as important as is supposed for the totok (Wijaya 2002, 1013).
6
For a detailed discussion see Coppel (2002b, 131149).
7
There is much more to be said about the ethnic Chinese during the colonial era
and the Old Order for which I refer to: Reid (1996), Hefner (2001), Coppel (2002a),
Chua (2008).
8
The theme of assimilation is discussed in great detail in the following two chapters
in this volume. Aizawa in the next chapter takes on the issue of assimilation depart-
ing from the perspective of the government (Ministry of Home Affairs) in order to
unravel the relationship between the Chinese Indonesian community and the Indo-
nesian nation-state, while the chapter by Susanto explores the different manners in
which assimilation was incorporated by Chinese Indonesian citizens.
business, belief, and belonging 29
citizens and might turn their back on Indonesia whenever they feel like
it (Freedman 2000), consisted of issuing more than sixty discriminat-
ing regulations (Winarta 2008, 62).
Most of the discriminatory regulations date from the early years of
the New Order when the assimilation policy was aimed at repudiating
Chineseness.9 Details of such regulations can be found in the chapter
by Susanto, but in short it can be said that it was in particular the
presidential instructions from 1967 that limited the scope of Chinese
traditions to the family worship house and required Indonesian ethnic
Chinese to change their Chinese names into Indonesian ones in order
that such citizens shall be assimilated as to avoid any racial exclusive-
ness and discrimination (Winarta 2004, 72). Around the same time
the use of Chinese language and characters in newspapers and shops
was prohibited and a much contested law was installed earlier regard-
ing citizenship, stating that Indonesian ethnic Chinese needed to have
a citizenship certificate, evidence of the change of their Chinese names
into Indonesian and Indonesian citizenship status (ibid.).10 The most
severe blow, however, came from the elimination of Chinese cultural
expressions such as Chinese media, Chinese organizations, and Chi-
nese schools (Suryadinata 2005, 78).
The end of the New Order regime in late May 1998 was preceded
by events that became a very black page in the history of Chinese
Indonesians. Discontent in the country over political and economic
affairs (economic crisis) led to student protests, upheavals in the bigger
cities, and finally culminated in outbursts of violence against Chinese
Indonesians in Jakarta, Medan, and Solo.11 This severe act of aggres-
sion against Chinese Indonesians made a number of Chinese Indo-
nesians leave Indonesia never to return, while others were left in an
even more severe state of insecurity than before (Susanto 2006). As
the personal story of the events and their aftermath by Zhou Fuyuan
(2003, 453) explicates, the number of people who managed to make
9
For an extensive overview of the discriminatory regulations before and after the
New Order regime, see Coppel (2002a), Lindsey (2005), and Winarta (2004, 2008).
10
This certificate is known as Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraaan Republik Indonesia,
SBKRI.
11
See Coppel (2002a) and in particular the special volume of Asian Ethnicity (vol. 4.
no. 3, 2003) discussing the variety of responses of Chinese Indonesians after the fall
of Suharto. A detailed discussion of these events and other ethnic Chinese violence
between 1996 and 1999 is to be found in the work of Purdey (2006).
30 juliette koning
their way to a foreign country was very small: far more had to stay
and resign themselves to the situation. For those who chose to stay,
anxiety was our constant companion; we became hypersensitive . . . we
were living in an environment so susceptible to calamity.
There were only ten days between these outbursts of violence and
the forced resignation of Suharto. The Reform Era that followed was
the start of the revocation of discrimination against Chinese Indone-
sians. Interim president Habibie (May 1998October 1999) approved
the formation of Chinese political parties and installed a Decree to
stop the official use of the terms pribumi (native; sons of the soil ) and
non-pribumi (non-native; immigrantsincluding Chinese Indonesians).
Abdurrahman Wahid (President from October 1999 until July 2001)
abolished the law on the manifestation of Chinese cultural and reli-
gious expression in 2000. Megawati Sukarnoputri (in office from July
2001 until October 2004) issued a Decree that made Chinese New
Year a national holiday. Notwithstanding these revocations, there are
still regulations related to citizenship and population affairs that lead to
discriminatory treatment of Chinese Indonesians (Winarta 2008, 65).
At the same time it is questioned whether there is enough political and
judicial confidence among Chinese Indonesians to reclaim their citi-
zenship and legal rights, as these still belong to a system controlled by
the state, a system that has proven to be unreliable (Lindsey 2005).
Notwithstanding such hesitations, two themes were discussed more
openly than before: the assimilation policy and racialism in Indone-
sian society at large (Herlijanto 2005, 75). This could also be noted
among the interviewees in 2004, and one remarked: we, alumni of
Chinese schools, we are thinking of starting a Chinese organization in
order to correct the wrongs being done to the Chinese, to get rid of
the discrimination against the Chinese. We want the same rights as
other Indonesians.
As pointed out by Herlijanto (2005), there was a double bend in the
position of Chinese Indonesians during the New Order era because the
government was not only the one discriminating against the Chinese
but also considered the best party that could secure their safety. How-
ever, this changed dramatically after May 1998. It is argued that the
May 1998 riots created a crisis of trust among Chinese Indonesians
who now believed neither the military nor the state could offer any
protection (Herlijanto 2005, 69). In fact, this crisis of trust created a
business, belief, and belonging 31
vacuum. Some groups filled the vacuum with initiatives such as form-
ing political parties and pressure groups, while others preferred to be
left alone doing what they have always done quietly and continue
to go about their business and hope and pray that their family will
survive this multiple crisis (Tan 2004, 35). Yet others perhaps went
looking for protection elsewhere, such as religion.
Converting to What?
Life-cum-Business Stories
was a very difficult time business-wise because of the crisis. Arief explains he
experienced a miracle in his business. Before the crisis I had ordered vari-
ous materials from the factory but the materials were not delivered, while at
the same time the prices were rising because of the crisis. My children said,
papa: do not just trust on your own strength but trust in Jesus. My children
took my wife and me to church and there I started to cry. I felt very embar-
rassed but I could not stop. At that point I was ready to give my worries into
the hands of Jesus and I raised my hands. I was the only one. I was called
to come to the fore and, although I was afraid, we went up and raised our
hands together. There I felt as if electricity went through my fingers, I wanted
to cry out, it was a very nice feeling.
In the meantime his order had not yet arrived and prices were rising con-
stantly. But I stayed very calm and knew Jesus would take care of it. By the
time the prices had risen to the highest point, finally my trucks with materials
arrived. The strangest thing is that notwithstanding the very high price we
had no problem at all in selling them.
One of the major changes in my business is that since I have met Jesus I
pray every morning before opening up the store; with my wife. This strength-
ens my faith and power. There is no clash between the Bible and business but
it is all about priority. Arief is quite critical of the charismatic movements in
Yogya. People go there as an experiment, just to feel fine, to find success,
they pray to have a better life, to get something. Many rich people became
Christians during the crisis: they mainly prayed for money. Business people
often follow Jesus to become successful. To be honest, for business people it
is not easy in Indonesia. For instance in my case: why can I not grow bigger?
Because most of the building projects are in the hands of the government
and, if you want to join these projects you need to give money, and that I
cannot do because of my religion. Join corruption and so on. This is some-
thing that is not possible. But others go along with the corruption anyway. If
we join in corruption this means we have no faith, if we have no faith we are
never going to be saved. I am very much at ease in my business now. That
is my faith. Indonesia needs to be converted.
fields. I was also a person with sins, you know. This company is a mission
company.
I wrote a book that teaches people how to pray. This book is more or less
my mission so that Indonesia will one day have 200 million people who pray,
who want to pray. Indonesia is full of problems, especially since the crisis,
but also because of all kinds of aggressive Islamic movements and terrorist
problems. The political system and the law system in Indonesia are terrible;
Indonesia is the third-largest corrupt country in the world. That is why pray-
ing is so important. Since we cannot join practical politics, we can only follow
the politics of the Lord.
Gono witnessed the growth of the charismatic movement in Yogyakarta.
The charismatic movement in Yogyakarta started in the 1980s. There
was quite some growth and there were quite some cases of healing. But the
charismatic movement has two faces; there is the entertainment: clapping
hands, singing, and testimonies that are blown up. And there is the learn-
ing how to know Jesus. This is teaching about the true mercy of God and
being blessed. Lets start from the fact that many threatening things happen
to Christian people, but also to business people in Indonesia. In the middle
of the threatening experiences Jesus opened their eyes. Business people only
know money; their focus is on making money. But then their stores were
burnt to the ground in Solo and Jakarta (Chinese problems 1998). This and
the crisis opened their eyes. They became aware that there is something
above them that is bigger. They started to put their hope in Jesus. Hence
business people meet many problems and dangers apart from the hatred of
the people. Then they started to see that there is Jesus; that Jesus wants to
help them. They wanted to become closer to God, learn how to pray, they
started to have meetings and get-togethers. After this, the Lord chose them
to spread the word and bring further the movement of God but without
having to leave their businesses. They can sponsor the needs of churches.
The churches also started to focus on businessmen and teach them the word
of God.
If we look at the facts, we can say that in the past the Chinese were intimi-
dated, they were kept low, they were afraid. This is exactly why they went
looking for justice, love, mercy, spirituality, protection, God. And, they began
to be blessed. However, as a result new feelings of jealousy arose. A new gap
arrived. People said, oh the Chinese easily get rich. But today it is time that
the Chinese start to carry out their identity that they start to get involved in
practical politics. It is the time. But we have to be careful, we should not be
too excessive, we should not blow it up too much. With identity I mean cul-
tural values; that we are people who matter. How I see it, the Chinese have
always been under pressure and people under pressure often come with up
with better results.
38 juliette koning
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that the group under study
is precariously situated in the Indonesian nation-state. This is related
to their long history of contested identities as ethnic Chinese and as
economic actors, and, paradoxically, it is also related to the fall of
Suharto. Although the regime change meant more space for expres-
sions of Chinese identity, it in fact increased their insecurity. In the
following section, based on the cases above, I shall discuss the religious
turn by exploring the interplay between the economic crisis, regime
change, business, and conversion.
12
The question of what it means to be Chinese Indonesian for various generations
is addressed by Koning and Susanto (2008).
42 juliette koning
Conclusion
character, the gifts of the spirit, and the dynamic and vibrant atmo-
sphere makes Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity very attractive. It
provides them a forum where they can share their insecurities and
their business problems with like-minded people. There is instant care
and relief; the get-togethers with fellow Christians and in most cases
co-ethnics bring both material and immaterial support.
The narratives also reveal a new vigor around issues of Chinese-
ness after the regime change in the late 1990s. The choice for Pente-
costal-charismatic Christianity can be interpreted in terms of a move
away of the nation-state that, although at times an important security
foundation, proved unreliable during that last regime change and in
particular during the severe riots of May 1998. Pentecostal-charismatic
Christianity is a global movement. Because of the linkages between the
local and the global, individual members may feel connected to believ-
ers all over the world, not only sharing the Gospel but also a social
position and common lifestyle. For converted Chinese Indonesians this
connectedness to a global community takes on a special meaning. It
reduces their insecurity and offers an escape from a depressing situation
in which their ethnic and economic status is constantly under pressure,
erasure, or even worse. Their membership of the Charismatic move-
ment, by providing them a global religious identity, enables them to
break away from the oppressive political system of and unfair treat-
ment by their own nation-state, while at the same time they will fall
under the protection of global Christianity.
The religious turn expresses the new hope and dream to be pro-
tected and accepted properly in their entire being, which is as Chinese
Indonesian, as entrepreneur or businessman, and as husband/wife and
father/mother. Global Pentecostal-charismatic Christianity seems to
offer that, in particular to true believers, and this is fate and faith they
have in their own hands.
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4539.
CHAPTER THREE
ASSIMILATION, DIFFERENTIATION,
AND DEPOLITICIZATION:
CHINESE INDONESIANS AND THE MINISTRY
OF HOME AFFAIRS IN SUHARTOS INDONESIA
Nobuhiro Aizawa
Introduction
1
See the article, Obituari Kristoforus Sindhunata Dimakamkan Hari Jumat (Kompas,
August 18, 2005). Harry Tjan Silalahi also wrote an obituary; he was a friend of
Sindhunata at the Law Faculty of the University of Indonesia, and a former colleague
at the Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia (PMKRI, Indonesian Catholic
Students Association). Sindhunata was vice-chairperson of PMKRI from 19571959
while Harry Tjan acted as chairperson from 19611962. See also the article: Obitu-
ari Mengantar Kepergian Almarhum Mayor Laut K. Sindhunata (Kompas, August 28, 2005).
Sindhunata is one of the Eminent Indonesian Chinese in Suryadinatas (1981) bio-
graphical sketches.
48 nobuhiro aizawa
that besides promoting assimilation also had the task to bridge the
communication gap between the central government and the Chinese
Indonesian community. Both organizations were government sup-
ported and were mainly concerned with Chinese Indonesian affairs.2
As a moderator of the assimilation policy for Chinese Indonesians,
Sindhunata became well known both among public officials as among
Chinese Indonesian political activists. However, at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, his name has as good as disappeared. The
issue is no longer whether the Chinese need to assimilate or not, but
rather how to restore and redress their rights, and how to acknowledge
their Chinese heritage, a heritage that had come under a lot of pres-
sure during the Suharto period with the banning of Chinese schools
and the public display of Chinese language signboards.3
Since the end of Suhartos presidency (1998), the socio-cultural con-
ditions of Chinese Indonesians have changed quite drastically. One of
the more crucial changes is the China boom which has taken place
in Indonesias major cities. The flow of Chinese goods to Indone-
sian cities is now widespread and visits to and from China have been
increasing. Chinese cultural and social activities are not only publicly
displayed; they are actually welcomed and encouraged. Imlek, the Chi-
nese New Year, and Cap Go Meh, the celebration of the fifteenth night
of the New Year festival, are now publicly celebrated. Festival favor-
ites like the Lion and Dragon Dance draw large crowds at shopping
centers and on the streets. Such celebrations not only attract Chinese
Indonesians but also so-called pribumi.4 It is now an expected part of
the annual holiday landscape to see shopping centers fully decorated
in red ribbons, lanterns, and other Chinese decorations during the
New Years celebration.
Another crucial change is the shift in the terminology used by the
government and mass media to refer to Chinese Indonesians. Tionghoa,
2
LPKB, with backup from the military, was established in March 1963 to coun-
teract the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) that supposedly
had connections with the Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (BAPERKI,
Body for Indonesian Citizenship). BAKOM PKB was established in 1977 with the
backup of the Ministry of Home Affairs to assist the communication between the
government and the Chinese community.
3
In 2000 under President Abdurrahman Wahid, Presidential Decree No. 6/2000
was issued to annul Presidential Decree No. 14/1967, which had restricted all public
activities of the Chinese related to religion, beliefs, and customs.
4
Pribumi is an Indonesian term for those who are regarded to be indigenous Indo-
nesians. Chinese Indonesians were often referred to as non-pri. Pri and non-pri became
words to differentiate between indigenous Indonesians and Chinese Indonesians.
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 49
which was used in the Sukarno era, has returned and has taken over
the derogative term Cina that was used during Suhartos regime.
Today, many Chinese Indonesian students study Mandarin and China
has become a favorite holiday destination for many Indonesians. A
process of re-sinicizationthat is, a reconnecting with Chinese cul-
tural heritagecan be witnessed. These political and cultural changes
seem to have made the idea of assimilation an outdated concept for
Chinese Indonesians.5
Since 1999, various non-governmental organizations and political
parties have been established to spearhead the issues of Chinese Indo-
nesians. The appeal of these groups to abolish assimilation policies
gained support and several crucial laws were successfully dismissed.
The governments that came to power after the fall of the New Order
regime have started to reconsider the assimilation laws because these
are now considered discriminatory, inhumane, and in violation of
basic human rights.6
In light of this changing position of Chinese Indonesians in
todays Indonesia, it becomes relevant to unravel what the assimila-
tion policies of the past encompassed, and under what circumstances,
by whom, and for what purposes these policies were implemented.
The aim of this chapter, therefore, is to describe what assimilation, as
implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs, entailed for the Suharto
regime, and to advance our general understanding of the relationship
between the Indonesian state and Chinese Indonesians, a dimension
often ignored.
In order to come to a better understanding of these assimilation
policies, many researchers turned to the political debate, better known
as the assimilation versus integration debate, among Chinese Indone-
sian activists and politicians in the 1950s and 1960s.7 The assimilation-
ists argued that Chinese Indonesians should abandon their Chinese
cultural background and exclusionary lifestylethat is, living sepa-
rately from other Indonesian ethnic groups. The integrationists, how-
ever, were of the opinion that in order to fully participate in national
5
Also Sindhunata visited China in the last days of his life, even though he was one
of the most cautious Chinese Indonesians regarding trips to China.
6
For an overview of discriminatory laws see Jusuf and Srivanto (2001), and Suryo-
menggolo (2003).
7
See Somers (1964), Coppel (1983), Setiono (2002), and Yayasan Tunas Bangsa
(1962).
50 nobuhiro aizawa
politics, Chinese Indonesians did not need to deny their cultural back-
ground. Interestingly enough, this frame of analysis is still surprisingly
influential in the post-Suharto period for studying both the new social
movements of Chinese Indonesians as well as for reviewing the history
of Chinese Indonesians.8
Although this assimilation versus integration framework does provide
a rich analysis of the dynamics within the Chinese Indonesian com-
munity, it does not address the political relationship between Chinese
Indonesians and the Indonesian nation-state. Therefore, to understand
the politics associated with the issue of Indonesias assimilation policy,
we need to go beyond the dynamics within the Chinese Indonesian
intellectual community, and investigate the intricacies of the relation-
ship between the Chinese Indonesian community and the state.
This chapter will describe how and why the now-condemned assim-
ilation policy was originally implemented and became a prominent
feature of the Suharto regime. Although Sindhunata was an important
figure, it is not appropriate to treat what Sindhunata and his assistants
advocated as if it was government policySindhunata, LPKB, and
BAKOM PKB were never in a position to issue a regulation or law.
Needless to say, it is the government that has the final decision on
what regulations and laws are issued. Thus, the need to investigate
the institution that drafted and made the final decisions on issuing
assimilation policies: the Ministry of Home Affairs.
By investigating the policies of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depar-
temen Dalam Negeri, hereafter referred to as DEPDAGRI), I examine
what assimilation actually meant to the government. It was the
DEPDAGRI that was in charge of issuing assimilation policies under
the Suharto regime. What the DEPDAGRI wanted to accomplish as
far as assimilation was concerned was not what Sindhunata advocat-
edto elevate the status of the Chinese Indonesians in the Indonesian
political scene. DEPDAGRIs goal was rather to depoliticize the Chi-
nese Indonesians under the guise of the same assimilation agenda. It
8
In compiling the political history of Chinese Indonesians, Setiono (2002) pays
extensive attention to the asimilasi vs integrasi debate. Purdey (2003) also uses this frame-
work to analyze the political and social activities of Chinese Indonesians during the
first years of the post-Suharto period. The magazine Sinergi is an important source that
condemned the assimilationists. Suryomenggolos (2003) sharp review of the Suharto
period frames the Suharto era as an era of assimilation.
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 51
9
BAPERKI was a social organization established in 1954, its membership con-
sisted mostly of Chinese Indonesians. The aim was is to gain equal rights for Chinese
Indonesians. BAPERKI had wide participation from Chinese Indonesian intellectuals,
including members from various political parties. Cf. Setiono (2002, 713732).
10
The debate developed in Star Weekly magazine. Regarding the rivalry between
the LPKB and BAPERKI, see Coppel (1983), Sadayoshi (1995), Setiono (2002).
52 nobuhiro aizawa
11
See Sukisman (1973). Taiwan was not acknowledged as a state and there-
fore its people were neither registered as Indonesian nor as foreign Chinese but as
stateless.
12
See Aizawa (2006).
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 53
13
This intra-governmental coordination was led by the National Committee of
Drafting the Policies Resolving the Cina Problem, and headed by Brigjen (Brigadir
Jenderal ) Sunarso, personal staff for the President of the Political section.
14
See Presidential Decree No. 240/1967. All the policies on masalah Cina by various
institutions were coordinated by a special staff for Cina affairs, (Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina,
SCUT) later succeeded by the National Coordination Body of Intelligence (Badan
Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, BAKIN) and the Coordination Agency of the Cina Problem
(Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina, BKMC).
54 nobuhiro aizawa
Dirjen SOSPOL
The name Dirjen SOSPOL was introduced in 1975 as a result of the
structural reform of DEPDAGRI that same year. From that year on,
Dirjen SOSPOL functioned as the axis of the Suharto regime, watch-
ing over the most crucial and sensitive SARA issues. Before 1975,
various other directorates with ever-changing names managed SARA
issues. Until 1970 SARA matters fell under the Biro Politik, and from
1970 to 1975, it was under the Dirjen Khusus. After a brief interlude of
belonging to the Dirjen Pemerintahan Umum, in 1975 the name Dirjen
SOSPOL was chosen and this lasted until 1999.
From the early days of his career, the most trusted advisers of
Suharto came from the military that were assigned double functions,
dwi-fungsi. This meant that they were not only active as military offi-
cers but also fulfilled roles in politics and the bureaucracy. One of the
practical outcomes of this dwi-fungsi doctrine was the appointment of
military generals into the DEPDAGRI. The most important civilian
15
Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 220 tahun, 1967. The efforts of Sindhunata
and the reaction of Ruslan Abdulgani and other high officials are best described in
Coppel (1983).
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 55
positions that members of the military took over were that of the Min-
ister of DEPDAGRI and the Chief of Dirjen SOSPOL. These two
posts became the backbone of repressing political opposition and pre-
venting social unrest.
The Minister of DEPDAGRI had great influence in selecting the
governor of each province, while the Chief of Dirjen SOSPOL had the
power to orchestre surveillance activities of civilian officers throughout
the archipelago. With its influence and importance, Dirjen SOSPOL
was truly a powerhouse. Erman Harrirustaman, a brigadier general
in the army, was the first director-general and was appointed by the
Minister of DEPDAGRI, Lieutenant-General Amirmachmud.16 Amir-
machmud had a reputation as The Bulldozer for his tough attitude
towards government oppositiona toughness that was, in practice,
carried out by Dirjen SOSPOL.
Different from other directorate-generals, an important character-
istic of Dirjen SOSPOL was that it not only had an office at DEP-
DAGRI but in every region, and the organization of each regional
office paralleled the organization of the central DEPDAGRI office.
In 1978, provincial, municipal, and county level DEPDAGRI offices
established SOSPOL divisions and each of these housed KESBANG
offices (Direktorat Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa, or the Directorate of Pro-
moting National Unity that took charge of the masalah Cina). By 1976,
central and regional offices charged with monitoring and executing the
policies toward Chinese Indonesians had been established throughout
the archipelago. To further complicate the chain of offices involved
in Chinese Indonesian affairs, institution building did not end with
this official SOSPOL network but was supplemented by the establish-
ment of the Communication Body of Organizing National Unity, or
BAKOM PKB.
BAKOM PKB
One of the most famous institutions that Chinese Indonesians had
access to during the Suharto period may have been the BAKOM
PKB. This organization is frequently referred to as the main instru-
ment in the assimilation policy during the Suharto era. BAKOM PKB
16
Before leading the Dirjen SOSPOL, Erman Harirustaman also chaired the Dirjen
Pemerintahan Umum.
56 nobuhiro aizawa
was known as the institution that brought together local Chinese Indo-
nesian leaders who were close to or who wanted to get closer to the
Suharto regime. Initially, to be a BAKOM PKB member was a rare
chance to gain an official channel to each provincial governors office
and to the central office of DEPDAGRI. BAKOM PKB started with
former LPKB leaders and was chaired by Sindhunata.
The establishment of BAKOM PKB took place in 1977. Prior to
this initiative, the mayor of Daerah Khusus Istimewah (DKI, Special Dis-
trict) Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, had already instigated a similar initiative.
In August 1974, Sadikin established Badan Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa
(BPKB, Body of Promoting National Unity), a group whose role it
was to collect information in the Kota area, the old downtown trading
center in the northwestern part of Jakarta densely populated with Chi-
nese Indonesians. Former LPKB members were appointed to open a
channel and facilitate communication between Sadikins office and the
Chinese Indonesian residents of the Kota. There was special interest
in this area because of the anti-Chinese riots of 1967.
Although ten years had passed since the restrictions on Chinese cul-
tural and social practices, there were still many people in this area who
kept their Chinese traditions and spoke Mandarin. Local officers who
were dispatched to conduct administrative work frequently faced com-
munication problems with residents, primarily due to language prob-
lems. In order to better deal with the Chinese Indonesian population,
Sadikin, a former military general and an ambitious mayor, recruited
former LPKB personnel to intervene. Subsequently, DEPDAGRI saw
the value of this action and applied it at the national level as well.
On July 1923, 1977, a preliminary meeting to discuss national
unity and the establishment of BAKOM PKB was convened with
Minister Amirmachmud, two Chinese Indonesian representatives and
one regional officer from each of the twenty-six provinces,17 along with
General Sudomo (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertibaan, Chief of
KOPKAMTIB), Major-General Sunarso (Badan Koordinasi Masalah
Cina, Chief of BKMC), and important staff from other major gov-
ernment branches. According to the proposals from this preliminary
meeting, on August 25, 1977, Amirmachmud ordered all governors to
establish institutions similar to the BAKOM PKB.
17
The twenty-six provinces at that time did not include East Timor.
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 57
18
Departemen Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia (1977a). Kawat Menteri Dalam Negeri 600/
KWT/SOSPOL/D2/VIII/1977.
19
The General Director of SOSPOL, Erman Harirustaman, and the Director of
Promoting National Unity, Suwarno, were also appointed as members of BAKOM
PKB.
20
August 26, 1978. Piagam Berdirinya Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa
(Charter on the establishing of the Communication Body of Organizing National
Unity).
21
On the establishment of BAKOM PKB, see Departmen Dalam Negeri Republik Indo-
nesia. 1978. Peresmian Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa (BAKOM PKB) Ting-
kat Nasional oleh Menteri Dalam Negeri, tgl. 31 Desember 1977. Jakarta: Departemen Dalam
Negeri Republik Indonesia.
58 nobuhiro aizawa
It was within this context that the Suharto regime gained its power
and it was during the Third Development Cabinet that the relevant
institutions were prepared that would implement the new policies for
Chinese Indonesians.22
22
The Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) under the Suharto
Presidency lasted from 1978 to 1982. Each cabinet had a term of five years.
23
The Neighborhood Improvement Program in the Assimilation process (Program
Peningkatan Peranan RT/RW Dalam Proses Pembauran) was conducted under the initiative
of the Dirjen SOSPOL.
The sixteen designated provinces were: North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, South
Sumatra, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, DI Jogjagkarta, East Java, West
Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi,
Bali, West Nusatengara.
24
According to the preliminary survey conducted by DEPDAGRI, these provinces
retained districts where the ratio of Chinese population was more than forty percent,
and thus were recognized as sites to conduct the assimilation program. (Cf. Laporan
Hasil Pengamatan Lokasi RT/RW Percontohan Dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Program Peningka-
tan Peranan RT/RW dalam Proses Pembauran. In the circulation letter of the Minister of
DEPDAGRI on SOSPOL No. 148/7622 (1980)).
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 59
It can thus be argued that from the late 1970s onwards a powerful and
massive assimilation system was established and coordinated under
Dirjen SOSPOL and DEPDAGRI. However, it did not produce
25
Departmen Dalam Negeri Republik Indonesia. 1980. Laporan Hasil Pengamatan Lokasi
RT/RW Percontohan Dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Program Peningkatan Peranan RT/RW dalam
Proses Pembauran. SOSPOL 148/7622.
26
In 1983, a new TV show was broadcasted on national television by TVRI
under the banner: people of different ethnicities living in good harmony. One show
revolved around a love story between a Javanese and Chinese Indonesian who initially
broke up because of their different ethnicities. However, with the help and under-
standing of their communities, they gradually and successfully resolve their problems
and live happily ever after. The message obviously being, no matter the ethnic differ-
ences, people in Indonesia can live in harmony.
60 nobuhiro aizawa
the expected results. There are two reasons why assimilation neither
worked nor caught on.
The first reason relates to a structural problem. The most important
mission of DEPDAGRI was to retain the political and social order.
To do this, the Ministry had the task to successfully carry out gen-
eral elections every five yearsmeaning that DEPDAGRI served the
President so that he would be assured of re-election. Whatever their
other activities were, DEPDAGRIs ultimate goal was to manage and
coordinate the political and social environment in such a way that the
general election would end the right way. As a result, the assimila-
tion activities of DEPDAGRI could not really veer from DEPDAGRIs
core business: maintaining political and social stability for the sake of a
successful election. Assimilation policies should therefore be under-
stood within this context of preventing the Chinese Indonesian issue
to become a destabilizing factor of the political and social order. As
a result, former members of the LPKBlike Sindhunata and those
Chinese Indonesian activists who were close to the Suharto regime
were also confronted with the difference between what they meant and
what DEPDAGRI meant by assimilation. For Sindhunata and other
LPKB members who aimed to enhance the living situation of Chi-
nese Indonesians, assimilation meant guaranteeing safe political access
and preventing social conflicts that would harm Chinese Indonesians.
However, for Dirjen SOSPOL and DEPDAGRI, assimilation was
intended to prevent possible sources of political opposition and, thus,
pave the way for the presidents re-election. Ultimately, DEPDAGRIs
political structure set the boundaries for the assimilation policy.
The second reason the assimilation policy was ineffective and lim-
ited relates to the coordination problem that occurred on December
10, 1977. In November 1977, Minister Amirmachmud authorized the
establishment of BAKOM PKB. At the same time he also, confiden-
tially, released the administrative guidelines for establishing the popu-
lation census. These guidelines were sent to government institutions
and the President.27 The guidelines were significantAmirmachmud
instructed that, in order to distinguish Indonesians of foreign descent,
mainly Chinese, a particular code would be put on their national iden-
tity cards. This would make it possible for anyone to identify whether
27
Departmen Dalam Negeri Repubik Indonesia 1977a. Kawat Menteri Dalam Negeri 600/
KWT/SOSPOL/D2/VIII/1977.
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 61
Concluding Remarks
28
Ibid.
29
Interview, Harry Tjan Silalahi, May 11, 2005.
62 nobuhiro aizawa
30
Cited from the Presidents remarks on Independence Day before the DPR,
August 16, 1967. Translated by the author, emphasis added.
assimilation, differentiation, and depoliticization 63
Bibliography
Aizawa, Nobuhiro. 2006. Defining Masalah Cina in Suhartos Indonesia. PhD diss.,
Kyoto University.
Coppel, Charles. 1983. Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press.
Jusuf, Esther, and Ferdi R. Srivanto. 2001. Rasisme: Dokumentasi Dokumen-dokumen Inter-
nasional Tentang Rasisme. Jakarta: Yayasan Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa.
Purdey, Jemma. 2003. Political Change Reopening the Asimilasi vs Integrasi Debate:
Ethnic Chinese Identity in Post-Suharto Indonesia. Asian Ethnicity 4 (3): 42137.
Sadayoshi, Yasushi 1995. Peranakan kajin no dokaronsou (1960nen)-indonesia sikou
no yukue (The assimilation debate among the Peranakan Chinesethe fate of
pro-Indonesian). Nanpo Bunka 20, 338.
Setiono, Benny G. 2002. Tionghoa dalam Pusaran Politik. Jakarta: Elkasa.
. 2005. Kegagalan Doktrin Asimilasi Indonesia Media Online: http://www.indone-
siamedia.com/2005/10/early/sejarah/kegagalan%20doktrinasi%20asimilasi.htm.
Somers, Mary F. 1964. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. PhD diss. Cornell
University.
Sukisman, W.D. 1975. Masalah Cina di Indonesia. Jakarta: Yayasan Penelitian Masalah
Asia.
Suryadinata, Leo. 1981. Eminent Indonesian Chinese: Biographical Sketches. Jakarta: Gunung
Agung.
Suryomenggolo, Jafar. 2003. Hukum sebagai alat Kekuasaan: Politik Asimilasi Orde Baru.
Yogyakarta: Galang Press.
Yayasan Tunas Bangsa. 1962. Lahirnya Konsepsi Asimilasi. Jakarta: Yayasan Tunas
Bangsa.
CHAPTER FOUR
DIVERSITY IN COMPLIANCE:
YOGYAKARTA CHINESE AND THE
NEW ORDER ASSIMILATION POLICY
Andreas Susanto
Introduction
1
Badan Koordinasi Inteligensi Nasional (Bakin, Coordinating Body for National Intel-
ligence), 1979.
2
See Jahja (1983, 1991). His books contain a collection of the indigenous percep-
tions toward the Chinese in Indonesia.
66 andreas susanto
3
Badan Komunikasi Penghayatan Kesatuan Bangsa, Bakom-PKB, was set up in every
province; see the previous chapter by Aizawa in this volume for more details.
diversity in compliance 67
4
On December 9, 1967, the government established the Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina
(SCUT, Special Staff for Chinese Affairs), whose purpose was to assist the government
to formulate policies regarding the Chinese, and to supervise the implementation of
these policies. See Coppel (1983, 131).
5
The most extensive published compilation can be found in the three volumes,
Pedoman Penyelesaian Masalah Cina di Indonesia (Guide to the Solution of the Chinese
Problem in Indonesia), published by the Coordinating Body for National Intelligence
(Bakin, 1979).
6
See Joint Decision of the Minister for Religion, Minister for Internal Affairs, and
the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 67, 111, and 224 of 1980,
translated in Coppel (2002), Appendix I.
70 andreas susanto
7
See Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No. 49 of 1967.
8
For a detailed account of Chinese language schools in Indonesia, see Suryadinata
(1978).
diversity in compliance 71
9
Pamrih is explored in Andersons The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture
(1972).
10
See Warnaen (2002) and Jaspar (1982).
72 andreas susanto
According to Wang Gungwu (1991, 198), the Chinese have never had
a concept of identity, only a concept of Chineseness, i.e., of being
Chinese and of becoming un-Chinese. This implies that one could be
more Chinese or less Chinese, but this does not lead to a concept
of identity.11 It can be said that this is an opinion the Chinese and
indigenous Indonesians share. It is the Chineseness that became the
target of eradication in the assimilation measures, so that the Chinese
in Indonesia would cease to be Chinese.
The Chinese in Yogyakarta come from various socio-economic back-
grounds and they live mainly in the city proper. The majority engages
in small and medium businesses, both as employees and employers.
However, many Yogyakarta Chinese have also become profession-
als, such as lecturers, doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, and
beauticians. Their sub-ethnic groups include Hokkien, Hakka, Can-
tonese, Hokchia, and Teochiu. Many Chinese are Christians, but
there are Buddhists and Muslims as well. Although the distinction has
been blurred, the peranakan and totok categories still prevail.12 Their
responses to the attempts to erase their Chineseness can be distin-
guished into four categories.
The first group can be referred to as the natural assimilationists. These
Chinese do not perceive assimilation to be a problem. On the con-
trary, they believe that it is natural for Chinese to gradually merge
into the local indigenous society. However, unlike the assimilationist
11
In their study of the Chinese and Chineseness, cultural studies theorists have
criticized the hegemonic formation in discussions of the Chinese. They point out that
the search by overseas Chinese for an authentic Chinese meaning is inherently flawed
and futile. They argue that the notion of Chinese and Chineseness are contingent,
often multiple and evolving (Wong 2003). See also Ang Ien (1994).
12
Peranakan Chinese are considered to be more acculturated and less affiliated
with Chinese culture. Totok are regarded to be pure Chinese because they are not
descendants of inter-marriages between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians, as many
peranakans are. Totok Chinese are considered to retain a strong affiliation with Chi-
nese culture.
diversity in compliance 73
13
Hardjono (1970, 44) called this group the silent majority, those who silently
integrate into the indigenous community.
74 andreas susanto
14
At this point, it is important to note that mutual negative stereotyping between
Chinese and indigenous people exist. Generally speaking, the Chinese perceive indig-
enous people to be sluggish, less hard-working, and unreliable.
15
They also keep up with the recent events in China. I could see enthusiasm in
their faces when we talked about the remarkable development of China. Apparently,
the fact that China is now growing as a prominent economic power in the world, to
some extent, influences their pride in being Chinese. See Koning and Susanto (2008).
16
A peranakan Chinese remarked that the stereotype of the hard-working Chinese
more appropriately applied to the earliest migrants and totok Chinese. He recalled
that until the early 1970s, most peranakan-owned shops on Malioboro closed between
2 and 5 p.m for an afternoon rest and reopened in the evening.
diversity in compliance 77
Since the Chinese traditions are foreign to them, they do not see the
absence of these traditions in their lives as a problem. They were not
raised under circumstances where Chinese or peranakan culture had
an effect on their lives. They know nothing about the assimilationist-
integrationist debates of the 1960s. Therefore, they do not feel any loss
of culture, nor do they have any desire to fight for its survival.
Their lifestyles are derived from the Indonesian modern, cosmo-
politan culture that does not belong to any local, traditional culture.
Their families may no longer celebrate Chinese New Year, but do
observe Christmas and the international New Year. Moreover, like
other Indonesians of the younger generation, they are more akin to
modern Indonesian or Western music and dance. According to some
young Yogyakarta Chinese, very few young Chinese in their social
circle own Mandarin song collections. Most of them are, however,
familiar with Indonesian and Western popular music and idols.17
Although these cosmopolitan assimilationists really consider them-
selves to be one hundred percent Indonesian, their convictions are
challenged repeatedly. In the face of covert discrimination and period-
ical anti-Chinese violence elsewhere, when some have begun to realize
that they are not fully accepted as Indonesians, they begin to distance
themselves from the indigenous majority. It is this group of Chinese
who sometimes experience identity crises. Generally, however, many
of them remain positive about their identities as Indonesians. They are
quite critical and open-minded in understanding the disadvantaged
position of the Chinese in Indonesia, in the sense that they do not see
it as an isolated Chinese problem, but as a result of the poor manage-
ment of the countrys political and economic health. Several educated
Yogyakarta Chinese are aware of the general injustice in Indonesia;
they do not view their situation as purely racial or ethnic based. Very
17
This was the general case until the end of the New Order. In 2002, a shift
occurred when a Taiwanese television series, Meteor Garden, became the most popular
drama serial in Indonesia. The actors, four members of a Taiwanese boy band known
as F4, suddenly rocketed to stardom. Their hairstyles became the fashion among many
urban Indonesian boys. According to Feny, a Yogyakarta Chinese girl, her infatua-
tion with F4 was similar to her previous fascination with other Western boy bands,
so her fondness for them had nothing to do with her ethnicity. F4 was later replaced
by a Korean movie star. Indonesian and American music pop stars continue to rank
among the favorite artists of young people.
78 andreas susanto
Residential Strategy
course, this may not happen, but they believe that there is a tendency
to see the Chinese as rich and as potential sources for financial aid. It
is difficult to be socially accepted if one refuses to be generous. In other
words, it is the desire to avoid treatment of the Chinese as a milking
cow that prevents them from living in indigenous kampungs.18 The
advice is usually: If you are not able to adjust to the indigenous com-
munity and participate in the kampung activities, it is better not to live
in their kampung!
The question of whether they must or are willing to make adjust-
ments while they still have other options is, of course, arguable. The
fact is that many Chinese prefer to live amidst their ethnic group,
although not necessarily in a Chinese compound. They realize that,
to some extent, they have different lifestyles from the indigenous com-
munity, and since it is not easy for both sides to accept the others as
they are, they avoid trouble by living within their own group. At this
point, it should be noted that the reasons behind their preference for
any particular location might differ; there is no collective reason. Pref-
erences of Chinese entrepreneurs are based on pragmatic reasons. On
Malioboro, the commercial center, where Chinese are predominant,
the communal activities fit in with the schedule of their businesses. In
fact, there are not many communal programs or social obligations.
Therefore, this is a suitable place for Chinese business people to live
and work. Moreover, many Chinese who lived in the old Chinese
quarter for a long time still believe that it would be more secure to
stay together. As one of them said: Who will help you if there are no
Chinese in your neighborhood?19 Many lower-middle class Chinese
said that they could not afford to buy new houses in other areas.
Today, many Chinese no longer view the old Chinese quarter in
the Malioboro neighborhood as a residential area. It has become
overcrowded. For the well-to-do Chinese and the younger generation
who are in a better economic position, the Chinese quarter was never
a fashionable neighborhood. They prefer to live in modern housing
estates in the nearby suburbs. Generally, the residents in these housing
18
Again, it should be noted that this is not always the case. There are kampungs
where Chinese and indigenous people live harmoniously together.
19
During the struggle for independence (194549) and in late 1965, many Chinese
who lived in indigenous kampungs outside the city took temporary shelter in their
relatives homes in town (Pecinan).
80 andreas susanto
estates in Yogyakarta, both for the middle or upper class, are from
ethnically mixed groups.
Nani, Wahyu, Junaedi, and Gunawan, who live in upper-middle
class housing estates, suggest that neighborhood life in these subdivi-
sions is comfortable, because Chinese and indigenous families who
live there share a similar social standing and background, which cre-
ates mutual understanding. For instance, since most of the home own-
ers are very busy entrepreneurs and professionals, they do not have
much time to socialize. They understand how people are preoccupied
with their activities outside their neighborhood, e.g., in their places of
employment, business or social associations, and sport clubs. There-
fore, they employ security guards to guard their complex and use a
cleaning-service agency to perform the tasks they do not do them-
selves.20 It is public knowledge that the people who live in the upper-
middle class housing estates tend to be individualistic. Their social
interaction is confined to whatever is deemed absolutely necessary.
Communal gathering and activities are minimized in order to spend
more time with their families or to work on their businesses. Sharing
this common lifestyle, the indigenous residents, in general, do not per-
ceive their Chinese neighbors behavior as unusual.
Religious Affinities
20
In many upper-middle class housing areas, the housing developers provide secu-
rity and cleaning services.
diversity in compliance 81
21
To explore the conversion to Christianity from a broader perspective, see Hefner
(1993).
22
For a detailed discussion on this issue, see The (1993, 5599; 1965, 6783); also
Jacobsen (2003).
82 andreas susanto
PITI said that they decided to become Muslims because they believed
that Islam is a good religion, not because it is the religion of the indig-
enous majority. Haji Kwik said: We must not forget that Chinese
in China became Muslim long before Islam came to Indonesia. And
even if we have the same religion as the indigenous people, our way
of thinking and lifestyles are not similar. Some Muslim Chinese also
feel uneasy that the indigenous Muslims often doubt their devotion to
Islam or suspect their motives in becoming Muslims (Legowo, 1986).
In response to this less-than-friendly attitude by indigenous Muslims,
the Chinese Muslims created separate associations. It is very rare that
Muslim Chinese join either Muhammadiyah or Nadhlatul Ulama, the
two main Islamic organizations in the country.
Some Muslim Chinese do acknowledge that there is an advantage
to being Muslim, in the sense that the indigenous people respect them
more or at least refrain from harassing them as they might other Chi-
nese. This is especially true if they have made the haj pilgrimage to
Mecca and become a haji. For example, although the Chinese in Yog-
yakarta are not entitled to own land, Haji Budi, the head of PITI,
received his certificate of land ownership by revealing that he was a
haji.23
It should be noted that many Muslim Chinese, in particular the
opportunistic assimilationists, retain membership in the Chinese asso-
ciations. Despite criticism regarding their conversion, they still belong
to the Chinese community. In fact, some prominent Muslim Chinese,
like Haji Budi, Haji Tun and Haji Kwik, have become middlemen
between the Chinese and the Muslim communities. They attempt to
prove that the negative stereotypes of Chinese are not the general rule.
Haji Kwik is frequently invited to indigenous Muslim gatherings and
through his preaching he emphasizes that the true Muslim should not
be racist or prejudiced against other ethnic groups.
In the Christian Chinese community in Yogyakarta, there are
more Protestants than Catholics. This is interesting since the Protes-
tant churches are less tolerant than the Catholic Church towards Chi-
nese traditional rituals, such as burning incense and praying for their
ancestors.
23
The situation for Muslim Chinese in Indonesia is diametrically opposed to the
situation of Muslim Chinese in Malaysia, where they are considered to be bumiputera,
or pribumi, and have indigenous status. See Lam (2004); Tan (1988).
diversity in compliance 83
Chinese Organizations
What did the Chinese do after the New Order government denied
them the right to organize groups based on ethnicity? In general, to
safeguard their interests, their social groups were broadened into gen-
eral associations that were open to everyone, not exclusively to Chi-
nese. Their basic principles and goals, as well as membership, were
general and not particularly Chinese. For example, the basic principle
for all social organizations was based on Pancasila, the state ideology,24
and the goal was to advance the welfare of its members. As the defi-
nition of a Chinese association or organization was not clearly stipu-
lated, it was interpreted to mean the obvious use of Chinese names
and themes. Symbolic assimilationists took this interpretation as a
loophole that provided an opportunity for them to organize a group
for Chinese. They had to be careful and clever enough to camouflage
their organizations in such a way that they did not attract suspicion.
24
The Suharto government imposed Pancasila as the sole principle for all social
and political organizations. See Vatikiotis (1993, Chapter 4).
84 andreas susanto
Concluding Remarks
The regime change that brought to power the New Order regime
(196698) meant the introduction of policies and institutions that
attempted to force the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia to assimilate into
the indigenous society. The New Order regime was in particular
focused on breaking the dominance of the Chinese in the economy,
and continued to practice legal segregation by referring to them as
non-indigenous. The Chinese became convenient targets of harass-
ment, extortion, and discrimination. Periodic anti-Chinese violence in
some form occurred in virtually every outbreak of social and political
unrest during Suhartos thirty-three years in power.
The main objective of this chapter was to understand how the
Chinese community in Yogyakarta responded to the pressures for
socio-cultural assimilation and to the negative stereotypes practiced
throughout the New Order period. There are at least four categories
diversity in compliance 87
Bibliography
Anderson, Benedict. 1972. The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture. In Culture and
Politics in Indonesia, ed. Claire Holt, 3843. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ang, Ien. 1994. On Not Speaking Chinese: Postmodern Ethnicity and the Political
Diaspora. New Formations 24: 118.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Brown, Iem. 1989. Religions of the Chinese in Indonesia. In The Ethnic Chinese in
the ASEAN States: Bibliographical Essays, ed. Leo Suryadinata, 97119. Singapore:
ISEAS.
Coppel, Charles. 1983. Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press.
. 2002. Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian
Studies.
Hardjono, R. 1970. Komuniti Tionghoa Jogjakarta: Sedjarah Minoritas Lokal dengan
Fokus Sosiologis. BA Thesis, IKIP Sanata Dharma, Yogyakarta.
Hefner, Robert. 1993. Conversion to Christianity: Historical and Anthropological Perspective on
a Great Transformation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Jacobsen, Michael. 2003. Chinese Muslim in Indonesia: Politics, Economy, Faith
and Expediency. SEARC Working Papers Series No.54. Southeast Asia Research
Centre, City University Hong Kong.
Jahja, Junus. 1983. Garis Rasial Garis Usang: Liku-Liku Pembauran. Jakarta: Bakom-PKB
Pusat.
. 1991. Nonpri di Mata Pribumi. Jakarta: Yayasan Tunas Bangsa.
Jaspar, J.M.F. and S. Warnaen. 1982. Intergroup Relations, Ethnic Identity and Self-
Evaluation in Indonesia. In Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, ed. Henri Tajfel,
33566. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Koning, Juliette and Andreas Susanto. 2008. Chinese Indonesians and the Rise of
China: From Business Opportunities to Questions of Identity. In China in the World:
Contemporary Issues and Perspectives, ed. Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh and Joanne Hoi-Lee
Loh, 16184. Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya.
Lam, Joy. 2004. Religious Conversion and Reconstruction of Identities: The Case of
Chinese Muslim Converts in Malaysia. Paper presented at the annual meeting of
the American Sociological Association, August 14, San Francisco.
Legowo, M. 1986. Pandangan Masyarakat Jawa terhadap Muslim Cina di Kotama-
dya Yogyakarta, Suatu Penelitian Awal tentang Masalah Pembauran. BA thesis,
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta.
Suryadinata, Leo. 1978. The Chinese Minority in Indonesia: Seven Papers. Singapore: Chop-
men.
Susanto, Andreas. 2008. Under the Umbrella of the Sultan. Accommodation of
the Chinese in Yogyakarta during Indonesias New Order. PhD diss., Nijmegen
University.
Tan Chee Beng. 1988. The Baba of Melaka: Culture and Identity of a Chinese Peranakan
Community in Malaysia. Selangor: Pelanduk Publication.
Tan, Mely. 1991. The Social and Cultural Dimensions of the Role of Ethnic Chinese
in Indonesian Society. Indonesia 51: 11351.
The Siauw Giap. 1993. Islam and Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia and Malaysia. In
Chinese Beliefs and Practices in Southeast Asia, ed. Cheu Hock Tong, 5999. Selangor:
Pelanduk Publication.
Vatikiotis, Michael. 1993. Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure
for Change. London: Routledge.
Wang Gungwu. 1991. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic
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diversity in compliance 89
Warnaen, Suwarsih. 2002. Streotip Etnis dalam Masyarakat Multietnis. Yogyakarta: Mata
Bangsa.
Wong, Loong. 2003. Belonging and Diaspora: The Chinese and the Internet. First
Monday, 8 (47). http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/
article/viewArticle/1045/966
PART III
Nobuto Yamamoto
The tragedy of the baba (peranakan) group is that they are too Chi-
nese to be indigenous Indonesians, but they are also too assimilated into
Indonesian to be 100% Chinese! (Kwee 1948, 26)
Introduction
1
On the disappearance of peranakan literature from Indonesian collective
memory, see Chandra (2006).
94 nobuto yamamoto
2
Shiraishi (1990) makes use of Andersons idea of imagined communities with
reading local newspapers and colonial documents in analyzing the development of
Indonesian nationalism in the 1910s and the 1920s. Attention to the development of
Indonesian press revived, too. See for instance, Said (1988), Adam (1995), Kompas
(2002), Maters (2003). As an example of novel reading of Malay literature and peri-
odicals in the Indies, see Siegel (1997).
3
Doenia pers, Sin Jit Po, 4 May 1926, Th. 3, No. 95, L22.
the chinese connection 95
legal authority with a mixture of modern and traditional rule was taken
over by a modern repressive administration; technological innovation
introduced electronic printing machines in the publishing industry;
and an information regime drew wider public attention through the
development of media industry and market activities. These changes
provided the circumstances for the social world of journalism and
nationalism to develop.
This contribution thus attempts to flesh out the unspoken link
between nationalists and journalists in the 1930s and serves two pur-
poses. One is to reveal the instrumental relation between newspapers
and political associations. I illustrate the changing circumstances in
politics and the media that gave rise to commercial journalism. I also
discuss the expansion of the Malay print market in the late 1920s
and the 1930s, with particular emphasis on the peranakan Chinese
who were dominant in newspaper business. The number of press
in Malay increased rapidly in that decade, which roughly coincided
with the time when local politics were cut off from politically oriented
newspapers.
The second purpose is to deconstruct the conventional categoriza-
tion of the Chinese. In general, this categorization is made to draw
broad outlines of the politically diverse Indies Chinese; but it has
become rather imposing in the sense that it obscures precisely the
multiplicity it tried to capture. My research finds the conventional
political categorization of the Chinese oversimplified, misleading, and
quite often even contradictory to the realities of the Chinese. It also
underscores that peranakan communities cannot be understood solely
on the basis of their political orientations or through organized poli-
tics. Class issues and cultural affiliation provided the basis for more
complex peranakan relationship and identification.
When the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy in 1900, it was believed
then that it was the moral duty of The Netherlands to promote
welfare and combat the causes of perpetual poverty in the Indies.
Efficiency, welfare, and autonomy were the practical goals (Fur-
nivall 1939, 225256). Western education inspired the young gen-
eration of the upper classes with new ideas. This was not limited to
the indigenous Indonesians, but also to Eurasians and the Chinese.
96 nobuto yamamoto
4
For instance, Sin Jit Po carried an advertisement of an electronic printing machine
shop in 1925. Electrische-Drukkery Kho Tjieng Bie & Co., Pintoe BesarBatavia,
Sin Jit Po, September 26, 1925, Th. 3, No. 68, L33.
the chinese connection 97
450
400
350
300
Number
250
200
150
100
50
0
25
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
daily weekly monthly and others
5
NA, Kol. na 1900, Vb. 20139F2, Mr. 988x/1938.
the chinese connection 99
It was in this mood of time that the Sino-Malay newspaper Sin Jit Po
was launched in Surabaya in 1923. It was to become a popular news-
paper in the 1920s, but would lose competition to Pewarta Soerabaja in
November 1929. Thereafter, it recommenced publication as Sin Tit
Po. Sin Jit Po had no political organization behind it. But, while the
market started to expand in the 1920s, the colonial authority kept a
close watch on local newspapers and from time to time applied disci-
plinary measures against them. Sin Jit Po was a liberal newspaper that
often challenged colonial authority. I take Sin Jit Po as an example to
present a journalistic practice that I call the culture of citation, but
more specifically to look at the persdelict (press offense) cases reported
in this newspaper. Persdelict cases reveal how the colonial authorities
harassed newspaper reporters and how the newspaper fought back.
In the early days of Sin Jit Po, Th. H. Phoa was editor-in-chief. Oei
Kie Hok and R.M. Bintarti served as editors in Surabaya and Ang
Hoay Lie in Samarinda. The director was Oei Ping Bie; its adminis-
trator, Njoo Khee Tjo. The newspaper had its own printing house, the
N.V. Handelsdrukkerij Sin Jit Po. Its distributing agents extended
from East Java (Madiun, Malang, Wonogiri), Central Java (Yogya-
karta, Bangil ), West Java (Sukabumi, Blitar), Sulawesi (Makasar,
Tulungagung, Gorontalo), Kalimantan (Samarinda), and even to The
Netherlands. It was among the more popular and well-known dailies
in the Sino-Malay language between the 1920s and the 1930s, not
100 nobuto yamamoto
only in Surabaya and East Java, but also in other parts of the Indies
archipelago.
Sin Jit Po, like other newspapers of the time, covered various kinds
of news and articles not only of Surabaya and the Indies, but also
from China and other parts of the world. The basic format of the
newspaper was as follows.
Section 1: Page 1: Kota Soerabaja (City of Surabaya), Feuilleton: Darah
Poetih atawa Kabaran jang tida berwates, ditjeritaken oleh Th. H.
Phoa (White Blood or News without limits, as told by Th. H. Phoa)
Page 2: Hoakiauw dan Tiongkok (Overseas Chinese and China), Kabar
Dagang (Commercial News)
Page 3: Kabar Kawat (Wired News), Hindia dan Laen Negri (Indies and
Other Countries)
Page 4: <Advertisements>
Section 2: Page 1: Kabar Sport (Sports News), Hindia dan Laen Negeri
(Indies and Other Countries)
Page 2: Hoakiauw dan Tiongkok (Overseas Chinese and China)
Pages 34: <Advertisements>
Section 3: Page 1: Hindia dan Laen Negri (Indies and Other Countries),
Tong See Han Yan Gie: Satoe tjerita Tionghoa jang bagoes rame,
banjak digoenaken daja oepaja dan menarik hati, oleh Nemo (Tong
See Han Yan Gie: A good Chinese story, meticulous and charming,
by Nemo)
Page 2: continued from Hindia dan Laen Negri of page 1
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These sections indicate that Sin Jit Po did not really emphasize one
particular segment because the same subtitles occur in all the sections.
Rather, they reflect a variety of contents, a compilation of news. To
carry such a news variety, it was necessary for newspapers to have
a network of news agents to obtain reports and to cite articles from
one another, as it was not possible to have its own correspondents all
over the Indies and abroad. This culture of citation had a long his-
tory in journalistic practice. The coverage of citations was extensive;
it encompassed Dutch, Chinese, and indigenous newspapers. And the
culture of citation provided the basis for local journalists to imagine a
kind of a journalistic community.
Sin Jit Po featured many political reports and news items alongside
articles on culture. It also carried many commercial advertisements
from Surabaya as well as other major cities in Java. Among the impor-
tant items Sin Jit Po liked to cover were the persdelict (press offense)
cases. The law on persdelict was introduced in the Indies in 1914
and became increasingly severe in 1917 when the colonial publishing
the chinese connection 101
house Balai Poestaka took over the role of press monitoring. As men-
tioned earlier, Balai Poestaka issued the weekly IPO, which was then
used as a manual to discipline journalists, to keep writers and editors
in jail for a period of time or to get them to pay a penalty. Over a
period of twelve years (December 1917 to January 1929), 101 cases
of persdelict were reported in IPO. Seventy-four cases occurred in the
first five years (1918 to 1922), and more than ten leaders of the nation-
alist movement and journalists were incarcerated (Yamamoto 1997a).
Journalists were the main target of the authorities due to their public
remarks in printed matters, newspapers, and magazines alike. In the
middle of the 1920s, due to tightening colonial control over the com-
munist movement, some radical leaders and followers were banned to
The Netherlands or deported to China.
The persdelict was a convenient penal code for offenses of various
forms. In a period of one year alone, from July 1925 to June 1926, Sin
Jit Po carried forty articles related to persdelict cases. One is tempted
to assume that the persdelict was applied solely to political writings,
the coverage of actual politics in the Indies, or to anti-government
articles. This, in fact, is the traditional perception of the persdelict
because researchers tend to overemphasize its politically oppressive
nature.6 However, a closer look reveals that the persdelict could actu-
ally be invoked for a variety of reasons. It could apply to newspaper
articles that seemed to incite racial hatred, to (offensive) writings on
influential families or on religion, to accounts based on hearsay or false
witness, to criticism of other imperialist countries in Asia, or for using
words (terms) unfamiliar to the authority. Additionally, any person,
not only the authority, could invoke a persdelict.
Take for instance the case involving local Chinese authority. The
daily Keng Po was hit with a persdelict because a former Capitan Cina
(a local Chinese official appointed by the colonial authority) in Cire-
bon filed a complaint. As cited in Sin Jit Po, Keng Po had carried an
article accusing the Chinese official of embezzlement. Toean Oeij
Thiam Tjoan gelapken f 3600poenja pakoempoelan Hoa Ho Siang
Kiok (Mr. Oeij Thiam Tjoan embezzled f 3600the money belongs
to the association of Hoa Ho Siang Kiok).7
6
This view is derived from the reading of colonial documents, especially IPO,
rather than from a close reading of local newspapers. For the conventional view of
persdelict, see Maters (2003, 21830).
7
Sin Jit Po, September 17, 1925, Th. 3, No. 60, L21.
102 nobuto yamamoto
8
Sin Jit Po, October 25, 1925, Th. 3, No. 90, L23.
9
Sin Jit Po, November 4, 1925, Th. 3, No. 98, also put the announcement of new
story of Hikajat Kakedjian (Story behind Brutality), which investigated the back-
ground of the same murder case.
10
Sin Jit Po, December 8, 1925, Th. 3, No. 127, L12.
11
Sin Jit Po, June 22, 1926, Th. 3, No. 134, L22.
12
Sin Jit Po, November 5, 1925 , Th. 3, No. 99, L12.
the chinese connection 103
the PID might have tried to control the press and other wild voices
in the society.
The persdelict also provided the opportunity for journalists to
establish (and perhaps demonstrate) a sense of journalistic gal-
lantry. Court hearings on persdelict issues gave them a chance to make
fun of the authorities13 not only for injustices, but also for their igno-
rance regarding local language and knowledge. Many persdelict cases
led to prison terms for journalists as most of them refused to pay the
fine, and chose instead to go to jail for a period of weeks, months, even
a year. On the other hand, journalists who chose to pay the fine in
order to avoid imprisonment were often derided by other newspapers
as cowards. Thus in spite of many persdelict cases against it, Sin
Jit Po and its personnel were proud of their tenacious attitude as a
sign of commitment against the colonial governments repression of
the press.
This tradition of anti-authority is also reflected in a number of arti-
cles on Boven Digoel the newspaper featured from early December
1926 onward. The first news of the communist movement (later it
was called communist uprising by the colonial authority) in West
Sumatra was reported in Sin Jit Po on December 3, 1926 with the title
Gerakan kaoem Communist in Sumatra Barat: Keadaan di Djawa
hendak ditjontoh (Communist movement in West Sumatra: Trying
to emulate Java), with a follow-up article Rahasia Communist di
Soematera Barat, terboeka: Pemboenoehan di Kamang (Secrets of
Communist in West Sumatra exposed: The murder in Kamang) on
December 24, 1926.
Unfortunately, the issues of Sin Jit Po from the year of 1927 were
missing from the Cornell University Kroch Library archive, so I could
not follow subsequent articles and news of the period. Yet in the article
Kota Digoel (Digul Town) of April 17, 1928, Sin Jit Po featured
information on the situation in Boven Digoel, which distinguished it
from other newspapers.
The cases of persdelict and related articles inform us about the cul-
ture of citation among newspapers. As I have discussed above, the
liberal-minded Sin Jit Po attracted the readers attention. Its articles
13
Making fun of authorities at courts was a common strategy by nationalistic lead-
ers since the late 1910s. On one of the first cases, see Semaoen (1919) and Yamamoto
(1997b).
104 nobuto yamamoto
14
Sin Jit Po, October 16, 1925, Th. 3, No. 82, L22.
15
Sin Jit Po, October 24, 1925, Th 3, No. 89, L31.
the chinese connection 105
16
The description of Liem Koen Hians career mainly relies on Tjamboek (2004)
and Suryadinata (1993, 5684).
106 nobuto yamamoto
17
For the classic categorization of peranakan political orientations, see Suryadinata
(1981).
the chinese connection 107
18
Sin Jit Po, May 28, 1926, Th. 3, No. 114, L12.
108 nobuto yamamoto
19
Kwee Hing Tjiat, Baba Dewasa [A Mature Baba], Mata Hari, August 1, 1934,
translated in Suryadinata (1979, 6263). Translation is modified by the author.
20
Djawa Tengah Review (August 1934), p. 611, cited in Suryadinata (1993, 25). Trans-
lation is modified by the author.
the chinese connection 109
21
American scholars produced many works on the Chinese in Indonesia in the
1950s and the 1960s. Special attention was paid to socio-cultural aspects of the Chi-
nese in order to grasp why the Chinese (both peranakan and totok) in Java did not
assimilate into the local society like their counterparts in Thailand. Among others,
William Skinners review article (Skinner 1961) remains influential. In it Skinner refers
to the peranakan as local-born Chinese who no longer speak their ancestors Chinese
dialect and who consider Java their permanent domicile, and to totok as culturally
pure Chinese (Skinner 1961, 3567).
110 nobuto yamamoto
attention to the language that they spoke at home. It goes that per-
anakan were Indonesia (Indies)-born and spoke one of the Indonesian
vernaculars or a variant of Bahasa Indonesia known as Bahasa Melajoe
Tionghoa (Chinese Malay or Batavian Malay). The totok, on the other
hand, were those who used Chinese as the medium of communica-
tion in the family, though they were Indonesia (Indies)-born (Suryadi-
nata 1981, xiv). These dichotomous categories presumably encompass
all Chinese in the Indies regardless of their education, social status
and income level.
But this peranakan-totok dichotomy does not seem to reflect the
social reality in the Indies. Even as early as 1930, Vandenbosch (1930)
had posed a question on this categorization. He uses instead legal
categorizations when writing about the Chinese in the Indies: singkeh
(totok) are Chinese subjects, while peranakan are Indies subjects. It is
quite natural to assume that at least until 1930 legal distinctions mat-
ter when Westerners dealt with the Chinese in the Indies. In his writ-
ing, Vandenbosch remarks that beginning in 1919 the Chinese were
subjected to European laws with exceptions in inheritance and family
laws. In this case what he referred to as the Chinese were actually
the singkeh, which did not include peranakan. But this distinction was
not quite accurate either because, Vandenbosch continues, the rela-
tion between the singkeh, or Chinese subjects, and the peranakan is so
close that if the government grants singkeh the right to be tried before
European courts it cannot withhold the same privilege from the per-
anakan (Vandenbosch 1930, 1013). His admission indicates that both
singkeh and peranakan were too closely intertwined to be subjected to
different sets of law. Even Leo Suryadinata, whose scholarly works are
credited with categorizations of the Chinese, admits that his finding
does not mean that there was a sharp separation between totok and
peranakan politics (Suryadinata 1981). In other words, it is difficult to
draw lines between totok and peranakan Chinese to distinguish them
in legal or political terms.
The other oft-cited categorization concerns the three political
streams among peranakan. As early as August 1932, Liem Koen Hian
gave a talk in Surabaya about the political streams (Suryadinata 1979,
5155). It suggests that there were the China-oriented Sin Po group,
the Netherlands Indies-oriented group (CHH), and the Indonesia-
oriented political party (PTI). Eventually, the three stream theory was
widely accepted among the Chinese. Dutch and foreign scholars also
adhered to the grouping. In their files from the 1930s, the Dutch secret
the chinese connection 111
22
NA, Vb. 11021933R2/MR nos. 211x/1935 and 255x/1936; and NA, Vb.
170219373 (Pluvier 1953, 88, 92).
112 nobuto yamamoto
23
Sin Jit Po, September 9, 1925, Th. 3, No. 53, L31.
114 nobuto yamamoto
Indonesian politics and were forced to stay within their own Chinese
circles. Even under these circumstances, journalists kept communicat-
ing with each other through their culture of citation, and through their
personal networks. It was not an organized political association that
stirred politics among the Indonesian population, but rather printed
words with a broad market reach. This was how journalists related to
the nationalist movement in the 1930s.
The political situation changed again a decade later. It was not until
around 1938 when the left-wing party Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Indone-
sian Peoples Movement, Gerindo) opened the door for Chinese to get
involved in politics (Suryadinata 1981, 164166). Gerindo leaders, like
Amir Syarifuddin and Muh. Yaminboth prominent journalists
had close connections with Liem Koen Hian through their journalistic
network. Once this door was opened, Liem Koen Hian immediately
abandoned PTI and joined Gerindo. Now journalists were back into
Indonesian party politics.
Conclusion
Bibliography
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1942. Clayton: Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No. 5.
Adam, Ahmad B. 1995. The Vernacular Press and the Emergence of Modern Indonesian Con-
sciousness (18551913). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism. London: Verso.
Chandra, Elizabeth. 2006. National Fictions: Chinese-Malay Literature and the Poli-
tics of Forgetting. PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley.
Furnivall, John S. 1939. The Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Harahap, Parada. 1924. Journalistiek: Pers-en Spreekdelictenboek. Weltevreden: Uitgevers
Maatschappij Bintang Hindia.
. 1926. Dari Pantai Kepantai: Perdjalanan Ke-Soematra OctoberDec. 1925 dan Maart
April 1926. Weltevreden: Uitgevers Maatschappij Bintang Hindia.
. 1941. Pers dan Journalistiek. Medan: Handel Mij. Indische Drukkerij.
Kahin, George McT. 1946. The Chinese in Indonesia. Far Eastern Survey 21 (October):
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Kompas. 2002. Beberapa Segi Perkembangan Sejarah Pers di Indonesia. Jakarta: Kompas.
Kwee Kek Beng. 1948. Doea Poeloe Lima Tahon Sebagi Wartawan. Batavia: Penerbit
Kuo-Batavia.
Lohanda, Mona. 1996. The Kapitan Cina of Batavia 18371942. Jakarta: Djambatan.
Maters, Mirjam. 2003. Dari Perintah Halus ke Tindakan Keras: Pers Zaman Kolonial antara
Kebebasan dan Pemberangusan 19061942. Jakarta: Hasta Mitra.
McVey, Ruth. 1963. The Rise of Indonesian Communism. Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press.
Mrazek, Rudolf. 2002. Engineers of Happy Land: Technology and Nationalism in a Colony.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Pluvier, J.M. 1953. Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesi in de
jaren 1930 tot 1942. s-Gravenhage, Bandung: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve.
Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 1985. Jejak Langkah. Jakarta: Hasta Mitra.
Said, Tribuana. 1988. Sejarah Pers Nasional dan Pembangunan Pers Pancasila. Jakarta: CV
Haji Masagung.
Semaoen. 1919. Persdelict Semaoen. Semarang: Sarikat-Islam Sekarang.
Shiraishi, Takashi. 1990. An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 19121926. Ithaca
and London: Cornell University Press.
Siegel, James T. 1997. Fetish, Recognition, Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Skinner, William. 1961. Javas Chinese Minority: Continuity and Change. The Journal
of Asian Studies 20 (3): 35362.
Suryadinata, Leo, ed. 1979. Political Thinking of the Indonesian Chinese 19001977: A
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. 1981. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 19171942. Singapore: Singapore Uni-
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. 1993. Peranakans Search for National Identity: Biographical Studies of Seven Indonesian
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Tjamboek Berdoeri. 2004. Indonesia dalem Api dan Bara. Malang: ELKASA.
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Williams, Lea E. 1960. Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Move-
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(March 1997): 4384.
. 1997b. Reading and Placing Semaoens Hikajat Kadiroen: A Thought on
Political Discourse and Institutional Politics in Early Indonesian Nationalism. Keio
Journal of Politics, 9: 4980.
CHAPTER SIX
Patricia Tjiook-Liem
Introduction
1
Equated to the Natives means having the same legal position as the Natives.
Equated to the Natives were Arabs, Moors, Chinese, and all Mohammedans and
heathens (art. 109 RR 1854). In colloquial speech these equated were also known as
Foreign Orientals.
118 patricia tjiook-liem
2
On May 1, 1848, the years of codification of the laws for the Netherlands East
Indies ended with the coming into force of these laws.
3
Art. 69 General Provisions of Legislation for the Netherlands Indies (Algemeene
bepalingen van wetgeving voor Nederlandsch-Indi ), Ind. Stb. 1847 no. 23.
4
Art. 109 Government Regulations (Regeeringsreglement), Ind. Stb. 1855 no. 2.
the loa joe djin-case 119
the principles of the codification of the laws for the Netherlands East
Indies in 1848, required the legal system for the Europeans to follow
that of the motherland as closely as possible. In that way it would
provide them with an administration of justice, which would meet the
same standards as in the homeland.
In criminal lawand with respect to the subject in this essay we will
deal only with the administration of justice regarding minor criminal
offencesEuropeans were brought before the residency-court, while
Natives and their equated had to appear before the police-court. The
main difference between these two kinds of administration of justice
was the presence, respectively absence of sufficient guarantees for a
fair administration of justice by respectively the residency-court and
the police-court.
5
Administrative head of a district or region.
6
Chairman codification committee to Minister of Colonies, 31-08-1845, National
Archives The Hague, Archives Scholten van Oud Haarlem, inv. 48. National Archives
The Hague hereafter as NA.
120 patricia tjiook-liem
7
Controleur: the lowest in rank in the colonial administration.
the loa joe djin-case 121
The turn of the nineteenth into the twentieth century marked the
beginning of a new episode in the history of the Chinese in the Neth-
erlands East Indies. It is impossible and with respect to the Loa Joe
Djin case it would go too far to deal extensively with all aspects and
122 patricia tjiook-liem
8
We follow Van Dales definition of emancipation as the liberation from legal,
social, political, or intellectual restrictions and limitations, as the assignment of equal
the loa joe djin-case 123
rights and as equation before the law (Van Dale Groot Woordenboek der Nederlandse
Taal, 1992).
124 patricia tjiook-liem
wish for equation, they were nevertheless equated with the Europeans
in art. 109 Government Regulations of 1899. It was considered to be
a political move, but all the same the Chinese felt it to be an insulting
discrimination.9
Sino-Malay newspapers started appearing in 1901 and they gave
voice to the ambitions of the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies.
They contributed to the development of a pan-Chinese movement
aimed at the unification of the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies
and at a cultural and political orientation on China (Suryadinata 1981,
6). Some of them, as for instance the Kabar Perniagaan and later the
China-oriented Sin Po became very influential. Also in that first decade
Chinese commercial organizations as the Siang Hwee and the Chi-
nese reading clubs Soe Po Sia were set up. The Siang Hwee func-
tioned as a Chamber of Commerce with direct contacts with China
and contributed to a closer connection with that country. The Soe
Po Sia, which initially focused on educational activities, became more
and more politically orientated (Govaars-Tjia 1999, 6973; Williams
1960, 95109).
The Indies government had not only to deal with these develop-
ments in the Netherlands East Indies itself, she had also to face a
growing interest from China for the Chinese. A connection of the
Chinese in Netherlands East India with the ancestral homeland was
established when the THHK schools needed teachers for the Chi-
nese language. These teachers were recruited from Singapore, Japan,
and China and the connection with China resulted in an active inter-
est from the Chinese government. The latter even set up a school in
Nanking to continue the THHK-education of these Chinese students
(Govaars-Tjia 1999, 6465). Starting in 1906 government officials and
others such as school-inspectors were sent by China to inspect the
Chinese schools, although such an inspection was also used as a pre-
text for other interests, commercial as well as political. At first visiting
officials from the Chinese government were received cordially by the
Indies government. But this soon changed when the frequency of these
visits increased and when these visitors arrived accompanied by navy
vessels and even warships. The positive and enthusiastic feelings of the
Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies for these visitors from China
were in profound contrast to their negative attitude to the Indies
9
See for the realization of this amendment, Tjiook-Liem (2005, 192208).
the loa joe djin-case 125
10
Dutch charg daffaires in Peking to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 14-07-1909
no.880/216, NA, Vb.15-10-1909, R.20/inv.114.
11
Minister of Colonies to Governor-General, 03-11-1905-46, NA, Vb.03-11-1905/
inv.342; Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, 09-08-1906-59/1 confidential,
NA, Vb. 15-10-1909, R.20/inv.114.
12
Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, 09-08-1906-59/1 confidential, NA,
Vb.15-10-1909, R.20/inv.114.
126 patricia tjiook-liem
13
Dent is used here for the Malay word somplak.
the loa joe djin-case 127
Even after a house search (which in the case of Chinese and other
non-European people could be done without a search warrant), box
and records did not surface, according to Mrs. Hoolboom because Loa
had sent his employee after her to spy on her when she was looking for
a telephone to warn husband and bailiff. (The employee, Tan Keng
Tjiang, admitted having gone to the pawnhouse, where Mrs. Hool-
boom went to telephone, but not by order of Loa). The bailiff gave
credit to Mrs. Hoolbooms testimony and concluded that Loa should
be brought before the police-court magistrate. He believed that Loa
liked to occupy himself with fencing (ia soeka djadi toekang tadah), buying
and selling stolen goods in close collaboration with his employee.
Against these two statements Loa testified that, when Mrs. Hool-
boom came to his shop to buy some gramophone records, he showed
her the records he had, and that when she decided not to buy, he did
not send his employee after her. When she returned he had shown the
bailiff the records Mrs. Hoolboom intended to buy. He denied having
other gramophone records in his possession or having hidden any.
The magistrate found Loa guilty of accessory to theft and subsequently
sentenced him to the maximum punishment of ninety days of hard
labor at the public works for food without pay.14
In his petition for mercy to the Governor-General, Loa persisted in
his innocence. He based his petition on the following grounds:
14
Statements of Mrs. Hoolboom, the bailiff of Tanah Abang Hekman and Loa
Joe Djin; sentence of the assistant-resident signed by the inspector of police Van der
Meer June 16, 1909, as noted in the Register of the Police-Court Batavia; assistant-
resident to resident of Batavia Jauary 29, 1909. The summary of Mrs. Hoolbooms
testimony by the assistant-resident W.J. Ketjen in his letter to the resident of Batavia
January 29, 1909, deviates in some respects from her statement, NA, Vb.02-10-1909,
X.19/inv.113.
128 patricia tjiook-liem
had been a decent taxpayer and his reputation had so far been
unblemished.15
15
Loas petition for mercy 29-01-1909, NA, Vb.02-10-1909, X.19/inv.113. Only
Loas most important arguments are used here.
16
About this statement see: assistant-resident to resident Batavia, NA, 29-01-1909
no.498/4, pp. 4, 7 and 8, NA, Vb.02-10-1909, X.19/inv.113.
17
The assistant-resident Ketjen denied the arguments which Loa put forward in
his petition for mercy. It is not clear whether Ketjen himself or the inspector of police
Van der Meer acted as magistrate.
18
Native prosecutor.
130 patricia tjiook-liem
June 1909
19
Assistant-resident to resident Batavia 29-01-1909 no.498/4; advices to the Gov-
ernor-General of the resident Batavia 08-02-1909 no.23442/4; Attorney-General at
the High Court 11-02-1909 no. 461; High Court 16-02-1909; Governments Decision
05-03-1909 no. 42, all in NA, Vb.02-10-1909, X.19/inv.113.
20
At that time a Dutch judge with ten years of service would enjoy a monthly
salary of 700 guilders. Council of the Netherlands East Indies to Governor-General
29-03-1910-XXXVII, p. 4, NA, Ministery of Colonies, file no. 934.
21
Articles in Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad March 6, 1909 and April 4, 1909; in the Loco-
motief April 6, 1909; in resident Batavia to Governor-General 22-06-1909-156 F, con-
fidential, NA, Vb.02-10-1909, X.19/inv.113.
the loa joe djin-case 131
and Malay newspapers picked up the item. In their comments they all
disapproved of the existing administration of justice, which, apart from
the question of guilt, was considered a mockery of justice.22
In June 1909 the local administrative officers brushed aside the news
about the Chinese Council with the remark that their meeting was of
no importance and the news coverage a matter of exaggerated and
distorted interpretation, possibly far from the truth.23 In its petition
the Chinese Council requested the Indies government to equate the
Chinese with the Europeans, as far as the criminal administration of
justice was concerned, or at least to be withdrawn from the adminis-
tration of justice before the police-court. Contrary to the local admin-
istration the request was taken seriously by the Director of Justice. The
government decided that for the moment a formal answer meant to
put oil in troubled waters and to bide some time for more concrete
plans, would do. The petition, so the government answered, would be
considered in the discussion around the already existing plans of the
government to reform the administration of justice, including that of
the police-court. At that moment there were no plans in Batavia, just
ideas how to cope best with the political pressure. Even so, realization
dawned in government circles that with the given answer the appear-
ance of having given in to pressure would not be taken away.24
In The Hague the Chinese ambassador Lou Tseng Tsiang, after
having received Loa Joe Djins telegram, lost no time. He requested
an investigation, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. de Marees
van Swinderen, passed on to his colleague, the Minister of Colonies,
A.W.F. Idenburg. To the last de Marees admitted that ambassador
Lous remark held some truth. Lou remarked that a small merchant
as the complainant would not go to such high costs by sending his
22
Newspaper cuttings June 1909 from the following newspapers: Bintang Soera-
baia, Pewarta Soerabaia, Pantjaran Warta, Pemberita Betawi, Soerabaiasch Handelsblad; in NA
Archives Ministery of Foreign Affairs concerning citizenship Netherlands East Indies-
Chinese 18921903, file no. 38.
23
Assistant-resident to resident Batavia 22-06-1909-4572/4; resident Batavia to
Governor-General 22-06-1909-156 F, NA, Vb.02-10-1909, X.19/inv.113.
24
Undated petition of the Chinese Council (probably submitted between June 22
and August 11, 1909); Director of Justice to Governor-General 07-06-1909-174, most
confidential; Director of Justice to Governor-General 11-08-1909-266 confidential;
Council of the Netherlands East Indies to Governor-General 27-08-1909-XXIII, Gov-
ernment Decision 05-09-1909-5, NA, Vb.10-10-1911, 91/inv.869.
132 patricia tjiook-liem
telegram, if he were not innocent and sure about his unjust conviction.25
But Idenburg, on the contrary, suspected that the ambassador again
was meddling improperly with Dutch internal affairs26 and that in that
case not much store should be set at the matter of the high costs.27 He
attached more importance to the question of Loas citizenship than to
the question of his guilt. Should Loa fulfill the requirements for Dutch
citizenship according to the draft of the Dutch Citizenship lawwhich
law was soon to beproclaimedthen Loa would fall under Dutch
authority, and Chinas request could be declined.
In Batavia the ministers request for full information forced the offi-
cials involved to render an account of the justice administered. The
Loa-case that until then had been an internal and normal affair in the
Netherlands East Indies had drawn the attention of the government
in The Hague and beyond.
In 1909 and 1910 the two main actors in the decision process regard-
ing the reform of the administration of justice before the police-court
were A.W.F. Idenburg, Minister of Colonies and subsequently Gover-
nor-General and I.A. Nederburgh, Director of Justice in Batavia. In
August 1909 Idenburg turned over his office of Minister of Colonies in
The Hague to his successor J.H. de Waal Malefijt, to become Gover-
nor-General for the Netherlands East Indies. There he took over office
from Governor-General J.B. van Heutsz on the December 18, 1909
(Wal, van der 1964, 694).
Both Idenburg and Nederburgh were very concerned about the
political situation. Although they were not in direct contact with each
other, they shared the same view regarding the political situation in
1909. However, they had a different solution in mind. Already in April
25
Minister of Foreign Affairs to Minister of Colonies 04-06-1909 no. 11362, enclos-
ing a translation of Loas telegram, NA, Vb.09-06-1909, P.2/inv.110.
26
The activities of the Chinese ambassador Lou Tseng Tsiang in 1908 and 1909
in matters regarding the legal position of the Chinese and their nationality were con-
sidered by the Minister of Colonies Idenburg to be improper meddling and most
irritable, Minister of Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 28-05-1909 no.W.11 in
Vb.28-05-1909, W.11/inv.110.
27
Minister of Colonies to Minister of Foreign Affairs 09-06-1909-P.12 no. 50 con-
fidential, NA, Vb.09-06-1909, P.12/inv.110.
the loa joe djin-case 133
28
Stb. 1855 no. 79.
29
Minister of Colonies Idenburg to State Committee, and Minister of Colonies
to Governor-General 08-04-1909 no. 35, NA, Archives Ministery of Colonies, file
no. 930.
30
Minister of Colonies to State Committee, and Minister of Colonies to Governor-
General 08-04-1909-35, NA, Archives Ministery of Colonies, file no. 930.
134 patricia tjiook-liem
A few months later, in July 1909, for Idenburg the political necessity
had become a political urgency, most probably on account of the Loa
Joe Djin-case. He urged the State-committee, to whom he had com-
missioned the working out of his ideas into drafts to speed up.31
For Nederburgh, at the other side of the world, in Batavia, the
developments in the Netherlands East Indies did not come unexpect-
edly. Already in 189832 he had expressed his views that sooner or
later a new situation with equal rights for Europeans and non-Euro-
peans would come and that it would be wise to be prepared. After
the amendment of the Government Regulations in 1899, by which the
Japanese were equated with the Europeans, he had pleaded for the
abolition of the racial distinction to reef the sails before the storm.33
In August 1909, facing the national and international turmoil caused
by the publication of the Loa Joe Djin-case, the petition of the Chi-
nese Council, and the request of the Minister of Colonies for a full
report, he expressed the following views to Governor-General J.B. van
Heutsz. Although in itself the publications in the press may not be of
great importance, as the local administration considered, it was a dif-
ferent matter put in connection with the growing resentment about the
existing situation of the Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies and in
China. Nederburgh believed that it would only be a matter of years
before the colonial policy and the connecting old-fashioned situa-
tion would come to an end. He characterized the situation at that
very moment as periculum in mora.34 Waiting any longer would
weaken the position of the Indies government against China and the
Indies Chinese. Now already the appearance of enforcement could
not be wholly avoided. Should the government be forced in the future
to acknowledge equal rights again and again, which she could have
acknowledged earlier in an honorable way and of her own accord,
then each time such enforcements would mean a blow in the face and
a slur on prestige and national honor. He did not expect the Chinese
to stop until the reason of their discontentment would have been taken
away and until they were given a fair place in the Netherlands Indies
31
Minister of Colonies to State Committee 14-07-1909-44, NA, Archives Ministery
of Colonies, file no. 930.
32
Nederburgh (18961898, 333, 335).
33
Nederburgh (1903, 54, 62).
34
Mortal danger.
the loa joe djin-case 135
35
Director of Justice Nederburgh to Governor-General Van Heutsz 07-06-1909
no.174, most confidential, NA, Vb.10-10-1911, 91/inv.869.
36
Governor-General to Minister of Colonies 23-04-1910-26/1 confidential, NA,
Archives Minister of Colonies file no. 934, Governor-General to Minister of Colonies
11-06-1910-37/1 confidential, NA, Archives Ministery of Colonies, file no. 932, Min-
ister of Colonies to Governor-General 19-01-1911-41, Minister of Colonies to State
Committee 25-07-1911-22, NA, Archives Ministery of Colonies, file no. 933.
136 patricia tjiook-liem
Concluding Remarks
Due to the timing and the ways Loa tried to get attention for his case,
its effects must be considered important. The timing was unintentional,
but the Loa-case occurred in the midst of a period of great discontent
about the legal position of the Chinese in general and the mentioned
grievances in particular. The time was ripethe case fell in fertile
grounds due to Loas resourcefulness in choosing the stages to present
his case. In such a situation it could function as a trigger, as it did.
37
Governor-General to Minister of Colonies 26-10-1910-68/1 confidential; Dutch
ambassador in Peking to Governor-General 27-10-1910 no. 1536/370, NA, Vb.20-
12-1910, 22/inv.789.
38
Governor-General to Ministery of Colonies 11-06-1910-37/1 confidential, NA,
Archives Minister of Colonies, file no. 932; Governor-General to Minister of Colonies
10-08-1911-1037/11, NA, Vb.10.10.1911-91/inv.869; Telegram Governor-General
to Ministery of Colonies 12-06-1911-444 and Telegram Minister of Colonies to Gov-
ernor-General 13-06-1911-42, NA, Vb.13-06-1911, 42/inv.834.
the loa joe djin-case 137
Bibliography
. 2005. Feiten en ficties bij het ontstaan van de Japannerwet. Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn
Themis 166 (4): 192208.
Wal, S.L. van der. 1964. De Volksraad en de staatkundige ontwikkeling van Nederlands-Indi.
Groningen: J.B. Wolters.
Williams, Lea. 1960. Overseas Chinese Nationalism, The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement
in Indonesia, 19001916. Illinois: Glencoe.
PART IV
Alexander Claver
Introduction
1
It therefore seems rather symbolic, that on June 28, 1931 the Dutch colonial
pavilion burned to the ground. The decision to rebuild was quickly made and in a
tour de force a new, though far less conspicuous, pavilion was constructed and offi-
cially opened on August 17.
142 alexander claver
In October 1929, the New York Stock Exchange on Wall Street col-
lapsed with devastating economic consequences. From 1929 till 1932,
Wall Streets industrial stock would lose about eighty-two percent of its
value, accompanied by a drop in Americas industrial output of no less
than fifty-four percent. ([Atlas] 1987 II, 145). The severity of the crash
shook peoples confidence in the real economy, which manifested itself
in declining orders and investment. The resulting economic contrac-
tion accelerated the existing decline in commodity prices. Since the
late 1920s a serious oversupply of primary commodities, such as rub-
ber and sugar, had started to affect world market prices long before
Wall Street tumbled. With no effective means of price restoration at
their disposal producers had sought to compensate for the resulting
loss of revenue by raising output. Though understandable, this strat-
egy merely served to exacerbate the existing fall in prices and when
world demand shrank due to the Wall Street crash the impact on
commodity prices proved disastrous.2
In the case of the Netherlands Indies, export prices fell by 7.1 per-
cent annually between 1920 and 1928 (See Tables 1 and 2). However,
export volumes rose by 7.7 percent over the same period, while the
2
The economic crisis of the 1930s and its impact on the economies of Southeast
Asia, including the Netherlands Indies, have been well documented. The following
publications provide an excellent introduction: Boomgaard (2000), Booth (1998, 3947,
10516, 15461, 20322), Dick et al. (2002, 15362), Taselaar (1998, 363422).
144 alexander claver
3
See Dick et al. (2002, 155), Van der Eng (1993, 202205), Khudori (2005, 21,
346), Lindblad (1988, 2789, 2869), Lindblad (2000, 132).
146 alexander claver
mainly due to the delayed reduction of the high production levels for
sugar and rubber.
Total import values, whether measured in current or real prices,
likewise dropped and did not bottom out until 1935 (See Table 3 and
Figure 1). When compared to the preceding decade, import prices
on average nearly halved during the 1930s (Korthals Altes 1994, 19)
(See Table 2). In 1934, for instance, the Batavia cost of living index
was only fifty-eight percent of its 1928 value, whereas the rural Java
food price index stood at forty-one percent (Booth 1998, 40; Dick et
al. 2002, 156). This remarkable price fall partly restored international
competitiveness and helped cushion the decline in income of the popu-
lation. The explanation given for the rapid deflation is the adherence
of the Dutch to the gold standard until 1936. According to Booth, a
sharp internal deflation was the only way to bring about the neces-
sary real depreciation of the guilder, when faced with deteriorating
terms of trade and a nominal appreciation in the exchange rate (Booth
1998, 40).4
4
More information concerning the adherence to the gold standard in The Neth-
erlands can be found in Griffiths (1987) and Korthals Altes (1979). The colonial
crisis management and creative adjustment 147
250
200
Index numbers
150
100
50
0
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
Years
Import Import (deflated) Export Export (deflated)
(1913=100)
stance regarding this issue is detailed by Taselaar in his study on the Dutch colonial
lobby (Taselaar 1998, 37180).
148 alexander claver
5
See Post (1991, Chapter 7 and 9) for the Japanese economic activity in the Neth-
erlands Indies during the 1930s. Of special interest are also the articles published by
Dick (1989) and Booth (1994). More information regarding the political implications
of the Japanese presence in the colony is provided by De Graaff (1997, 26070). Japa-
nese espionage activities are dealt with in Haslach (1985, especially 10733, 1512,
1745).
crisis management and creative adjustment 149
6
See Booth (1998, 21921), Dick (1989, 253), Dick et al. (2002, 1589), Fukuda
Shozo (1995, 13545), Panglaykim (1963, 812).
150 alexander claver
7
See Duynstee (1980, 14854), De Graaff (1997, 2678), Haslach (1985, 8490, 99,
1448, 1567, 1647), De Jong (1984 Vol. 11a, 6716), Post (1991, 2458), Taselaar
(1998, 41012).
8
A first-hand account of this confrontation can be found in a curious, yet very
interesting book entitled Indisch getij, Hollandsche bakens. Through an intriguing blend
of fiction and non-fiction the authorsA. Voortland and W.G.N. de Keizeroffer a
fascinating glimpse of the economic hardship people had to endure during the 1930s
and the bitter sacrifices they were obliged to make (Voortland and De Keizer 1944).
crisis management and creative adjustment 151
9
See Booth (1998, 156, 21819), Dick et al. (2002, 159), Hacco (1947, 1730,
14154, 21556), Sato (2004, 21), Taselaar (1998, 380400, 47283), Voortland and
De Keizer (1944, 8899).
152 alexander claver
(Bata). Other projects initiated in the late 1930s included the produc-
tion of consumer goods (light bulbs, bicycles, rubber sandals, metal
fittings, and soap).
The late colonial industrialization achieved some degree of import
substitution, but only in a narrow range of mainly consumer goods.10
It was only after the occupation of The Netherlands by the Germans
in 1940 that domestic demand was shifted to local heavy industry. For
two years, the metal, machinery, and chemical industries operated at
full capacity, because of government contracts in anticipation of war
with Japan. In addition, a crash program for the development of heavy
industry was announced, which aimed to free the Netherlands Indies
from dependence on foreign supplies of essential industrial inputs.
Unfortunately, many of the projects under consideration had barely
left the drawing board when the Pacific War broke out in 1942 and
none would ever be completed.
Margo-Redjo11
Since the crisis of the 1930s left companies little room to maneuver,
they had to formulate a survival strategy which explored all the lee-
way management could find. With the exception of companies like
Internatioone of the largest general trading houses in the colony
most entrepreneurs had little or no capital at their disposal and there-
fore could not afford the costly reorganization and investment strategy
chosen by their giant counterpart.12 They had to look for other, less
expensive options within their more limited range of possibilities.
The coffee firm Margo-Redjo in Semarang, Central Java, provides
an interesting example of how a smaller enterprise dealt with the
problems it encountered. (See Box 1) Margo-Redjo was owned by the
10
See Booth (1998, 1567), Dick et al. (2002, 15962), Keppy (2001, 3540),
Segers (1987, 2738).
11
The following section is based upon research of the private archive of Margo-
Redjo kept in Semarang for which permission was kindly granted by W.B. Dharmowi-
yono (Tan Tjoan Pie). More information was obtained during three interviews held
with W.B. Dharmowiyono on June 19, 1999, December 4 and December 13, 1999.
Additional information was provided by Tan Tjoan Ik in an interview conducted
on October 18, 2000 and W.W. Dharmowiyono (Tan Swie Ing) in a letter dated
November 11, 2005.
12
The survival strategy of Internatio during the 1930s can be found in detail in
Claver (2006, 37180) and Claver (2007, 30526).
crisis management and creative adjustment 153
13
This assertion is confirmed by two genealogies of the Tan family in possession of
the author, which were kindly provided by Tan Tjoan Ik and Kwee Hui Kian, respec-
tively. See also Tan Tjoan Iks personal account Op zoek naar Tan Bing (In search of
Tan Bing) written in 2002. His account can be found in the library of the Koninklijk
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV) in Leiden.
14
See Vleming (1926, 258) for the Chinese practice of giving enterprises and
brands a well-sounding name. The fact that Tan Tiong Ie selected a Javanese name
for his company appears to have been a deliberate choice. From a marketing point of
view, the name Margo-Redjo certainly served its purpose, since the company catered
predominantly to the Javanese population during the first years of its existence.
154 alexander claver
Box 1. Margo-Redjo.
Source: Private archive Margo-Redjo.
crisis management and creative adjustment 155
15
Naturally, the crisis also affected Margo-Redjo since another son of Tan Tiong
Ie was forced to leave the company and had to seek employment elsewhere during
the years 193035.
156 alexander claver
Orang-Matjoel, Koffie Sentoso, Koffie Mirama, and Koffie Sari-Roso (See Box 5
for an example). Second, Margo-Redjo stressed the fact that it custom-
ized the packaging size of its coffee. After all, the needs of wholesale
traders, retail traders, and individual customers strongly differed. This
proved a strong point since this strategy was not yet common practice.
Third, the distribution network of Margo-Redjo was well developed.
Not only did it reach as far as Singapore, Makasar, and Lampung, but
in Java especially it reached the smallest of places. This was seen as
an important factor in the companys success. Moreover, retail traders
received their order with special labels giving their names, so that each
package sold added to their reputation as well.
Finally, Margo-Redjo put much time and effort into advertising its
different products, placing ads in newspapers, participating in exhibi-
tions, etc. But more was required in order to build a relationship with
the customer in the street. Retail traders were therefore encouraged to
combine sales by promising customers a free item, such as milk, when
they bought one of Margo-Redjos brands. Another tactic was to hand
out a coupon whenever a customer bought a specific brand; five cou-
pons earned the customer a tea cup, seventy-five coupons a kebaja, 150
coupons obtained a kain batik aloes, or a very fine piece of dyed batik
cloth, and so on. At the Pasar Malam held in Semarang in 1930, a
contest was organized offering a price of one hundred guilders for the
person that had collected most labels of Tjap Orang-Matjoel.
By using these methods Margo-Redjo enhanced its reputation and
increased its turnover. Given the small margins on coffee, profitability
rested primarily upon a high sales level. Maintaining this was of the
utmost importance, and the marketing strategy aimed to do just that.
The more people knew about Margo-Redjos coffee and the more they
appreciated its quality, the more coffee would be sold. After all, many
purchases of relatively small amounts would boost sales and thereby
help achieve sufficient turnover. Though lacking the financial resources
of companies like Internatio, Margo-Redjos creativity thus paid off.
16
Bank Indonesia, Archive of De Javasche Bank, 3354 No. 28.
158 alexander claver
when they had run out. In addition, prices often needed to be negoti-
ated. By contrast, the Japanese shop looked neat and clean. Goods
were priced and usually displayed in windows and glass cases, allowing
the customer to walk around and get an idea of the available products.
Furthermore, most Japanese shopkeepers sold their merchandise at
fixed prices and, if possible, kept large stocks (Post 1991, 2523, 255;
Post 1993, 149; Post 1996, 3079).
These visible distinctions were very important, but Nater and Folk-
ers also stressed that the Japanese business mentality fitted the prevail-
ing economic conditions better than the Chinese. According to one of
their Japanese interviewees, Chinese shopkeepers were primarily inter-
ested in making a quick profit. When a potential client entered their
shops they would immediately ask themselves how much he or she
might be worth and whether or not he or she was aware of the prevail-
ing prices. The Japanese, on the other hand, followed a different tactic.
They focused on winning the trust of all their clients, including the
smallest ones.17 After all, a customer buying for only a cent could come
back another day with more than one cent in his pocket. The ambi-
ance of the shop (neat and clean with goods displayed attractively)
and the fact that prices were fixed were of crucial importance in earn-
ing this trust. As a result, Japanese shops attracted many customers,
mostly at the expense of the Chinese, at a time when every client was
highly valued in order to keep turnover high.
The fact that Japanese retailers did much better than their Chi-
nese counterparts was swiftly recognized, but initially their example
was hardly followed. Although complaining loudly, the Chinese busi-
ness community was slow to react. Many voiced the opinion that little
could be done against the Japanese since they were part of a giant
organization supported by the Japanese government.18 This conspiracy
theory fitted the growing general attitude in the Netherlands Indies
which considered every Japanese citizen a potential spy (Haslach
1985, 10733, especially 1256; Post 1991, 2434). In addition, at the
height of the crisis most Chinese businessmen were more concerned
17
As early as June 17, 1922, the Batavia newspaper Kabar Perniagaan criticized the
surliness and indifference with which the Chinese treated their customers contrary to
the Japanese who attracted much more consumersespecially from the indigenous
populationbecause of their friendliness (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia/Archive
Binnenlandsch Bestuur 656 Nr. V).
18
Ibid.
crisis management and creative adjustment 159
with surviving the economic slump than dealing with growing Japa-
nese competition.
Still, there were exceptions to this rule as the case of Margo-Redjo
clearly shows. Another example of a change in Chinese business per-
ception can be found in the publication of a new magazine in Batavia
by Liem Kha Tong in 1932: Maandblad Reclame & Efficiency Dagang,
or Monthly Magazine for Advertising & Efficiency in Trade. (See
Box 2)
In January 1933 the name and subtitle of the magazine were changed
into:
EFFICIENCY
Maandblad boeat orang-orang jang Actief.
Efficiency (batja: ef-fi-si-en-si) adalah Pengetahoean jang paling baroe, jang toedjoean-
nja: dengen tenaga atawa onkos jang paling ringan, dapetken hasil jang paling besar.
Efficiency perloe digoenaken dalem Pengidoepan dan Perdagangan boeat dapetken: Suc-
ces, Keoentoengan, Kemadjoean dan Kebroentoengan.
EFFICIENCY
A monthly magazine for Active people.
Efficiency (read: ef-fi-si-en-si) is the latest Knowledge with the purpose
of achieving the best result with the least energy and cost. Efficiency is
needed in Life and Trade in order to achieve: Success, Profit, Progress
and Luck.
19
Maandblad Efficiency, March 1935.
20
Ibid. October 1934.
21
Ibid. March 1935, April 1935 and May 1935.
crisis management and creative adjustment 161
22
Geo. Wehry & Co. Tsa Chih, I 1 ( January 1933).
23
Geo. Wehry & Co. Tsa Chih, I 1 and 2 ( January 1933); Geo. Wehry & Co. Tsa
Chih, I 12 ( June 1933).
24
See Willmott (1960) for the importance of the langganan system in establishing
trust relations. Willmott defines a langganan as a regular client/customer or his oppo-
site, the regular dealer/supplier. According to him the langganan businessman and his
client enter into an explicit or implicit agreement to trade exclusively with each other
in a certain field, as a result of which they develop a prolonged acquaintance, mutual
obligations, considerable trust and even friendship (Willmott 1960, 701). Confirma-
tion of the above can be found in Leiden at the oral history project of the Koninklijk
Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (KITLV) entitled Stichting Mondelinge
Geschiedenis Indonesi (SMGI). See for instance SMGI, Boer 1170.13.
162 alexander claver
of these men and women, each issue of Geo. Wehry & Co. Tsa Chih
printed a photograph of a client with whom the company had traded
for more than twenty years (See Box 4).
These wonderful portraits showed the proud owner of a shop with
the following text in Malay: Sobat2 dengen siapa kita soeda berdagang lebih
dari 20 taon (Friends with whom we have traded for more than 20
years). With some, Geo. Wehry & Co. had maintained business
relationships for over forty years. Djie Hong Swie, a trader in textiles
from Surabaya, held the record, having traded with Geo. Wehry &
Co. for forty-five years. According to the text under his picture, he was
a personal friend of the partners and highly respected by all.25
To what extent these and other endeavors mentioned above man-
aged to turn the tide remains unknown, but their contribution, how-
ever small, to the survival of trading business in general cannot be
denied. Margo-Redjos success during the height of the crisis testifies
to this. However, there were many other forces at play during the
1930s and some were of greater and more direct consequence. The
competition of Japanese traders, for instance, was successfully curbed
by the introduction of the Crisis Import Ordinance of 1933, which
reduced Japans share of imports from thirty-two percent to fifteen
percent in 1937. It would have been impossible for an invigorated
Chinese business mentality to achieve the same result in such a short
period of time.
Still, the importance of government measures was exceeded by the
worldwide improvement of economic conditions during the second
half of the 1930s. Once price levels started to climb, trading soon
recovered its profitability. This could not have been achieved by good
illumination, nice show cases, or courses on window dressing alone.
However, under the improved economic circumstances it seemed as if
the promise of these new initiatives could finally be fulfilled.
Unfortunately, the occupation of the Netherlands Indies by the Jap-
anese in 1942 prevented this. The relatively short period before the
war failed to see the successful implementation of the many new ideas
within the trading sector at large. More time was needed for people
to change the way they conducted their business. Margo-Redjos lead
over the competition could have served as an example, but with the
arrival of the Japanese any advantage the company had once enjoyed
immediately vanished.26
The disruption of its business was initiated in February 1942 when
the Dutch destroyed most of the firms machinery as part of a planned
scorched earth policy. Following the defeat of the Dutch, all goods in
storage were looted and never returned.27 Outstanding debts could
25
Geo. Wehry & Co. Tsa Chih, I 12 ( June 1933).
26
Private archive Margo-Redjo; Interview B. Dharmowiyono, December 4, 1999.
27
See for a general description of the chaotic events in Java and more specifically
Semarang during the Japanese attack Brugmans et al. (1960, 1023, 11928, 25383),
164 alexander claver
De Jong (1984 Vol. 11a, 64950, 97883) and Twang Peck Yang (1998, 704). A
graphic presentation of the Japanese conquest of the Netherlands Indies can be found
in Cribb (2000, 150).
crisis management and creative adjustment 165
Concluding Remarks
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stellingen 18801931. Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek.
Boomgaard, Peter. 2000. Surviving the Slump. Developments in Real Income during
the Depression of the 1930s in Indonesia, Particularly Java. In Weathering the Storm.
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Brown, 2352. Singapore and Leiden: ISEAS/KITLV Press.
Boomgaard, Peter and Ian Brown, ed. 2000. Weathering the Storm. The Economies of South-
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Booth, Anne. 1994. Japanese Import Penetration and Dutch Response. Some Aspects
of Economic Policy Making in Colonial Indonesia. In International Commercial Rivalry
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Missed Opportunities. Basingstoke/New York: MacMillan Press/St. Martins Press.
Brugmans, I.J. et al. 1960. Nederlandsch-Indi onder Japanse bezetting. Gegevens en documenten
over de jaren 19421945. Franeker: T. Wever.
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Commercial Relations between Europeans and Chinese, 1820s1942. PhD diss.,
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
. 2007. Crisis, Response and Survival. Internatio in the 1930s. Economics and
Finance in Indonesia (Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia) 55: 30526.
Cribb, Robert. 2000. Historical Atlas of Indonesia. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press.
Dick, Howard. 1989. Japans Economic Expansion in the Netherlands Indies between
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Dick, Howard et al. 2002. The Emergence of a National Economy. An Economic History of
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Duynstee, T.J.B.M. 1980. De reis van Hart naar Tokio in het licht van de economi-
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Fukuda Shozo. 1995. With Sweat and Abacus. Economic Roles of Southeast Asian Chinese on
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crisis management and creative adjustment 167
Peter Post
Introduction
1
The Kian Gwan trading firm, predecessor of the Oei Tiong Ham concern, was
established in Semarang by Oei Tjie Sien in 1863. Under the directorship of the leg-
endary Oei Tiong Ham (18661924), son of Oei Tjie Sien, the company grew into
a multinational corporation. After Oei Tiong Hams death, the company was first
directed by Oei Tjong Swan (18991944), son of Oei Tiong Hams third wife, from
1925 until 1930, and subsequently by Oei Tjong Hauw (19041950), eldest son of
Oei Tiong Hams fifth wife. The latter steered the corporation through the depression
years and the Japanese period. There are several articles and books on the develop-
ment of the Oei Tiong Ham Concern and more specifically on the achievements and
entrepreneurial cunning of Oei Tiong Ham. See for example, Liem (1979), Koo (1943
and 1975); Tjoa (1963); Panglaykim and Palmer (1970). Yoshihara (1989) brings sec-
tions of these books and articles together. In addition, Yoshihara added contributions
by Onghokham (on Chinese capitalism in Java) and Charles Coppel (on Liem Thian
Joes unpublished History of Kian Gwan) and included two extensive interviews with
Oei Tjong Tjay and Oei Tjong Ie. But as Coppel noticed in his contribution to the
Yoshihara volume, little is known about the Oei Tiong Ham Concern during the
central decades of the twentieth century.
the oei tiong ham concern 171
When Oei Tjong Hauw (190450) took full control of OTHC he was
only twenty-six years old. It is difficult to imagine what he must have
felt like taking over a multinational conglomerate with some 25,000
people in the Netherlands East Indies on its payroll, a bank, a steam-
ship company, sugar factories, an enormous wholesale business, and
a well-known international trading firm, as well as branch-offices in
Singapore and London, and over ten branches in the Indies. There
is little information about his early life, and although he entered the
HBS there is no evidence that he completed this higher education.
According to most written and oral sources, he received only little
training from his father. Until the age of seventeen he most probably
2
In writing this essay I greatly benefited from a large number of interviews con-
ducted with members and close associates of the extensive Oei Family. Unfortunately,
some of them have recently passed away. I am most grateful to Oei Tjong Ie ( Jack,
19182007), Oei Tjong Tjay (Benny, 1924), both sons of Oei Tiong Ham, and to Tan
Swan Bing (19082004) for sharing their thoughts and detailing their life-histories with
me. Also to Oei Ing Swie (Billy, 19242005), eldest son of Oei Tjong Hauw, who in
his e-mails was kind enough to share his views. Moreover, I would like to thank Ms Dr
Yve Boen San Tjiang and Ms Lieke Oei Tiang Han (daughters of Tan Tek Peng),
Oei Hwaij Liem and Oei Tiang Han, for kindly providing me with a rare 1959
manuscript on the History of Kian Gwan written by Tan Tek Peng, and for detailing
their personal experiences during the Japanese occupation and the Sukarno period.
In addition I have talked to many peranakan Chinese living in The Netherlands and
Singapore, who had married into the Oei family or who were otherwise connected to
them. I gained much insight into the complicated Oei family structure through a close
analysis of a number of private photo albums. I would like to thank Kwee Kiem Han,
Oei Tiang Han, and Khoe Liong Hoey for allowing me to use their family photo-
albums. I am moreover grateful to Ms Twie Marinkelle-Tan for introducing me to
the Oei Family and the late Mr Tan Swan Bing. I would like to emphasize that the
ideas expressed in this essay are mine only and do not necessarily reflect the thoughts
of the people interviewed.
172 peter post
led a life of leisure and pleasure befitting his status as one of the heirs
of OTHC. Most of his early education he apparently received from
his mother Ong Mie Hoa Nio. In 1921 his father took him into the
business and made him chief of the loan and mortgage department,
mockingly called the Bank Oei Tiong Ham (Tan 1959). At the age
of twenty he married Be Hien Nio, youngest daughter of the famous
major-titular of Solo, Be Kwat Koen.
Through this marriage Oei Tjong Hauw became member of a
highly influential and respectable peranakan family that had close ties
and intimate relations with the Central Javanese royalties and the
Thai royal family.3 Being at the helmet of OTHC at this young age,
he relied most heavily on the knowledge and business experience of
some of the concerns most talented professional managers.
First among these was Tan Tek Peng (18961969), who had joined
Kian Gwan in 1917 and served as its executive director from 1924 to
1952. Tan was born in Bandung and was a brilliant student in book-
keeping. He finished the Dutch high school (HBS-B, which until the
early 1970s was the major higher education for a business career in
The Netherlands) and became chief bookkeeper in 1920. After Oei
Tiong Ham moved to Singapore in 1924 he promoted Tan to execu-
tive director of the trading department of the conglomerate. Although
he himself was not directly related to the Oei family, a niece of Tan
Tek Peng was married to Oei Tjong Liam, half-brother of Tjong
Hauw.4 Under Tans leadership the trading interests of the company
greatly expanded. During the 1920s, when Oei Tjong Swans directed
the conglomerate, Tan opened branches in Calcutta (1925), Bombay
(1926), and Karachi (1928) to buy jute sacks for the packing of sugar,
and in the early thirties set up offices in Bangkok, Canton, Tsien-
tsin, and Amsterdam. The Bangkok office was mainly engaged in the
export of rice to Java, whereas the China branches dealt in a wide
range of goods. Tan Tek Peng became a well-known figure in Java-
nese business circles. He was small (1.60m.), good humored, and was
known as the Little Napoleon of OTHC. In the mid-thirties he was
3
Be Kwat Koen was a nephew of Be Biauw Tjoan and heir to the Be fortunes.
4
Interview Yve Boen, November 2004. Dutch archive sources mention that Tan
Tek Peng was an illegitimate son of Oei Tiong Ham, which according to these sources
was one of the reasons that Oei Tiong Ham favored the young boy so much. A close
associate of Tan Tek Peng, Mr Tan Swan Bing (19052004) saw no reason to deny
this rumor.
the oei tiong ham concern 173
close he was with the son of Raja Gula (Sugar King) Oei Tiong Ham.
Managing-directors like Tjoa and Tan Tek Peng hardly had any idea
what kind of deals Lie Hoo Soen actually made for the company. And
in a way they didnt care. When there was labor unrest or a large
debtor needed to come forward, they knew that Lie Hoo Soen would
successfully take care of it, but how he handled these cases, nobody
except for Oei Tjong Hauwknew.5
When in the 1930s the Depression hit the Indies hard and the
sugar industry in particular was affected, Tjong Hauw and his execu-
tive directors started to look for new investment possibilities and new
markets for Indies produce. In this they showed great creativity and
innovativeness.
In 1933 they moved into the rubber remilling industry in South
Sumatra by renting a rubber mill in Palembang owned by the Dutch
Rubber Union. Together with the Singapore based, Lee Rubber Com-
pany, which rented the rubber mill of Internatio, Kian Gwan came to
play a pioneering role in transforming South Sumatran rubber exports
from slabs to blankets, and by 1936 half of Palembangs rubber exports
were blankets. At this stage Kian Gwan decided to rubber sheet pro-
duction and set up collecting agencies in the interior. Since hand man-
gles were essential to the production of small holder sheet rubber, the
company also encouraged their import and distribution selling them
mainly to warung holders. Lee Rubber and also Nomura East Indies
(the largest pre-war Japanese investor in the Indies) did the same, and
in 1941 a total of 31,000 tons of sheet rubber (thirty-six percent of
exports) went out from Palembang. To create new markets for its rub-
ber Tan Tek Peng traveled to New York and would soon find important
clients. He negotiated a special arrangement with the Dutch shipping
line KPM whereupon Kian Gwan started to export blankets (and later
sheets) directly to the United States, thereby breaking the monopoly of
5
Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, who took over OTHC Indonesia in 1950, confided to
the author that Lie generally scared him and that he did not know how to deal with
him. He too avoided Lie as much as possible and just handed money whenever Lie
requested it; knowing too, that whatever Lie did, it was always in the interest of the
firm. Authors interview Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, November 4, 2004. Little is known
about Lie Hoo Soen. But he is most probably related to Lie Siong Hwie who headed
the Kian Gwan Surabaya branch after 1907 and had been involved in the company
for more than twenty years. Lie Siong Hwie was president of the Surabaya Chinese
Chamber of Commerce at the time. Wright (1909, 5478).
the oei tiong ham concern 175
6
In a personal interview Tjong Hauws half-brother, Oei Tjong Ie, insisted that
Tjong Hauws main motivation, however, was to bring his mistress to Shanghai and
that business motivations were only secondary. Post (2004, 14).
the oei tiong ham concern 177
7
See Alex Clavers contribution to this volume.
8
Since increasing sugar exports to Japan were part of the bilateral deal made
between the Japanese government and the Dutch colonial office in 193334 and
Dutch trading firms were not particularly equipped to handle huge amounts of sugar,
the pressure on the large Chinese trading firms to focus only on their traditional
export trade, rather than to step into the import trade from Japan, might have been
good policy from the Dutch colonial authorities point of view. But the powerful ethnic
Chinese business class thought otherwise. According to them they could have easily
developed both trades successfully. This, however, would have had an even more
negative impact on the role of Dutch trading firms and hence on the carefully struc-
tured social economy the Dutch colonial government wanted to protect.
178 peter post
9
The following is drawn from the private correspondence of Mangkunegoro VII
with Chinese from Central Java covering the period 191644. I am grateful to Madelon
Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis for making these sources available for the project.
10
The special relation between the Be Kwat Koen and Mangkunegoro VII is dealt
with in Post (2009).
11
In her recently published Vorst tussen twee werelden [Monarch between two worlds]
(Schoorl: Uitgeverij Conserve, 2006) Madelon Djajadiningrat-Nieuwenhuis looks spe-
cifically at the relations between Mangkunegoro VII and Dutch intellectuals. In this
illuminating study, which has been written in the form of a novel, Ms Djajadiningrat
makes extensive use of private letters and memoirs of MN VII and his intimate Dutch
intellectual friends.
the oei tiong ham concern 179
OTHC and Japans Pre-War Expansion into East and Southeast Asia
12
Interview Tan Swan Bing, January 2003.
13
The Matahari was to become the most profitable newspaper in the Netherlands
East Indies.
14
Authors interview with Tan Swan Bing, December 2004.
the oei tiong ham concern 181
15
Interview Tan Swan Bing and Benny Oei Tjong Tjay. December 2004. How-
ever, recently Ms. Yuko Kudo, a PhD graduate of Tokyo University, discovered that
at least in the second half of the 1920s, OTHC did make use of the financial services
of the YSB. To what extent this relation continued in the 1930s needs to be scruti-
nized further.
16
Tan Tek Peng, for example, forbade his daughters to go to school and learn
Japanese culture and language during the Japanese period in Indonesia. They were
forced to stay inside and keep out of sight. Interview Yve Boen and Lieke Oei, daugh-
ters of Tan Tek Peng, May 2007.
17
Interview Tan Swan Bing. The late Mr. Tan, voicing the opinions of others
in the company, was very clear and outspoken about this. He considered the anti-
Japanese actions by Tan Kah Keh and other prominent leaders of the wide-spread
National Salvation Movement as highly irrational and ineffective.
182 peter post
Corporate Structure
18
Interview Tan Swan Bing, December 2003.
19
Details in these sections come from Tan (1958).
20
As might be recalled this was the tea business Oei Tiong Ham Concern had
taken over in 1926 from the Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Society.
the oei tiong ham concern 183
The wide-spread interests and the vast staff and diverse labor force
demanded further attention to the personnel front to ensure commit-
ment, loyalty, and harmonious working relations throughout the con-
glomerate. To achieve this, the staff members, in consultation with the
directors, formed in 1939 the Sarpoci (Sarikat Pegawai Oei Tiong Ham
Concern Indonesia). The head-committee of the Sarpoci was located in
Semarang, whereas in the main branch-offices side-committees were
formed. In these committees directors and staff members regularly
got together to explain business decisions, to discuss salary scales and
old-age provisions, leave regulations, and staff housing problems.
The creation of Sarpoci contributed to feelings of belonging to
the concern, and it tended to alleviate feelings of competition and
antagonism between staff members of the industrial and commercial
departments.
In 1932 the Oei Tiong Ham Concern consisted of the following legal entities:21
21
The details in this section come mainly from the Handboek voor Cultuur- en Handel-
sondernemingen (Batavia: De Busy, 1930 and 1933). I would like to thank Drs. Herman
Kwak for thoroughly scrutinizing these materials.
184 peter post
On the organizational level we see that by the end of the 1930s the
OTHC operated a highly modern and well-structured multinational
business enterprise with tasks and responsibilities of the different depart-
ments and divisions clearly defined. Mainly due to this rationalization
the conglomerate had been able to overcome the pitfalls of the world
depression and successfully entered new lines of business in the Neth-
erlands East Indies and other parts of the world. Overall control in
the company rested firmly with Oei Tjong Hauw, who was respected
by everyone and had shown himself to be a capable successor to his
father. Since the OTHC was the only ethnic Chinese conglomerate
in pre-war Indonesia that operated on such a grand scale and was so
influential worldwide, the company was envied by many in the Chi-
nese business circles in Southeast Asia and in Java specifically.
The 3.5 years of Japanese military rule had a large impact on the Chi-
nese business communities in Indonesia. Many well-established large
peranakan firms that were closely integrated in the Dutch colonial
economy found themselves in disarray, and not being able to cope
with the changing business environment, lost much ground to singkeh
the oei tiong ham concern 185
Chinese firms.22 Soon after the Japanese troops landed popular unrest
loomed quickly and Chinese firms and shops were its main targets.
Within a couple of days many firms, shops, and factories all over Java
were plundered, its owners and personnel beaten and sometimes mur-
dered, leading to sizable damage to Chinese assets in the Indies. Once
the Japanese forces had established their military administration, it
took a firm stand towards plunderers and offered protection and shel-
ter for the Chinese population groups.
Damage to Chinese property was also caused by Dutch demolition
troops. As part of the scorched earth policies, Dutch military forces
destroyed strategic harbor facilities and the big oil refineries, along
with many Chinese-owned factories (Touwen-Bouwsma 2002, 57;
Twang 1998, 70). One of the sugar factories destroyed was the Ponen
factory in Semarang of the OTHC. In a similar way the Oei family
lost the Palembang rubber remilling factory. The Chinese losses in
Indonesia during the first weeks of the occupation, by both popular
violence and Dutch demolition forces, have been estimated at 100
million guilders (Twang 1998, 71).
Despite the fact that the premises of the Oei family and managing
personnel of the company were also attacked and its buildings, lands,
and factories partly plundered, the Oei Tiong Ham Concern and its
senior staff unlike most other large peranakan firms fared relatively
well under Japans military administration and did comparatively bet-
ter than many other ethnic Chinese firms during the period.
Prior to the arrival of Japanese troops on the north-coast of Central
Java, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng had been instructed by
Dutch authorities to leave Semarang and to move inland in order not
to fall into Japanese hands. Together with three of his brothers, Tjong
Hauw, Tan Tek Peng, and Tan Swan Bing (including their families)
took refuge in Tawang Mangu (a mountain resort near Solo owned
by Mangkunegoro VII where the Oei family had a villa). Before leav-
ing Semarang it was decided that Tjoa Soe Tong would stay behind
to defend the fortress and that Tan Swan Bing would go on to the
Yogya branch and from there keep an eye on the still active sugar
factories in Madiun and Malang. Jack Oei Tjong Ie, who together
22
This transformation has convincingly been described by Twang (1998).
186 peter post
with his mother Lucy Ho had lived in The Netherlands to study law
and had returned to Java in April 1940 ( just prior to Germanys occu-
pation of The Netherlands), was working at Kian Gwans Surabaya
branch at the time of the Japanese invasion.
In April 1942 Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng were summoned
by Yamamoto Moichiro, Head of the General Affairs Department, to
come to Batavia and were fetched for that purpose by two Japanese
officers to undergo the cumbersome journey from Tawang Manggu
to the capital. When after many difficulties they arrived in Batavia,
the Japanese authorities questioned them and called them all sorts of
names. They were primarily interested in Tjong Hauws ideas about
Japans mission in Asia. Tjong Hauw pointed out that in his house
he had two photographs hanging on the wall, one of Wang Ching
Wei (president of the Japanese puppet regime in Nanking), the other
of Sun Yat Sen, father of the Republic.23 This apparently convinced
the Japanese officers that he was not collaborating with the Chunking
regime of Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently Tjong Hauw and Tek
Peng were sent home without any directives.
In the meantime, all the warehouses of the company had been put
under seal and nothing could be done until, in June 1942, they got a
new summon and again proceeded to Batavia, now by their own means,
which meant the slow train that had started running again between
the most important cities of Java. In this meeting with Yamamoto an
ultimatum was submitted to Oei Tjong Hauw; either agree with the
conditions stipulated or the Kian Gwan concern would be closed and
all the assistant-managers, managers, and higher ranking officials in
the concern would be put into custody. The condition included the
acceptance of Japanese trusteeship and the voluntary offering of their
stocks of sugar and tapioca flour in the factories (more than 20,000
tons with a nominal value of about two million guilders). Having little
choice and being convinced that it was in the interest of the company
and its personnel, Oei Tjong Hauw accepted the terms and signed the
document. They were allowed to go home and the seals could be lifted
from the warehouses.
It took, however, some time before Kian Gwan could start work
again. Staff members were strayed in all directions and had to be
recalled and reorganized; the Netherlands East Indies banknotes had
23
Interview with Benny Oei Tjong Tjay, Amstelveen, December 2003.
the oei tiong ham concern 187
24
Interview Jack Oei Tjong Ie, Singapore, July 2004.
25
Economisch Weekblad voor Nederlandsch Indie (EWNI), April 20, 1946, 12e jrg. No. 6: 45.
26
Interviews Tan Swan Bing, Jack Oei Tjong Ie; Personal Memoir Tan Tek Peng.
On the so-called collaboration of OTHC and the reactions to it, see Twang (1998,
8691).
188 peter post
27
This didnt mean, however, that there were no personal hardships and tragedies.
On the contrary. Chinese elite members did not only suffer from the Japanese kenpetai
for political reasons, but also simply because they were rich and wealthy and belonged
to the upper layers of society. And not only the native population, but many in the
lower ranks of the Japanese military and the civilian administration, enjoyed hassling
them and making it physically clear that their life of luxury was over. Tan Tek Peng
spend three weeks in jail and was severely beaten by the kenpetai, Tan Swan Bing
was accused of anti-Japanese behavior and dangerous thoughts and was sent to
prison for eight months from mid-1942 until early 1943. Whereas Jack Oei Tjong Ie,
always a rebel and not afraid of the devil himself, hid Moluccan soldiers in his house
in Surabaya and secretly listened to the BBC radio, was sentenced to death in early
1943 and spend the occupation period in a kenpetai prison in Jakarta.
the oei tiong ham concern 189
Social-Political Roles
On the social and political level, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng
played important roles under Japans military rule. Both became cen-
tral figures in Japanese efforts to organize, seek cooperation from and
deal with the Chinese in Central and East Java. In December 1942,
under the energetic leadership of Toyoshima Ataru, a Preparatory
Committee for the Foundation of a General Association of Chinese
Immigrants was established for which Tjong Hauw and Tek Peng
were also invited.28 Six months later, all over Java local Chinese
Associations were formed, which oversaw and directed socio-politi-
cal and cultural developments within the Chinese communities. The
powerful Chinese Association (Kakyo Sokai) in Semarang was chaired
by Oei Tjong Hauw, whereas Tan Tek Peng acted as its vice-chair-
man. Other members of the Semarang Association were Oei Tjong
Ik and Oei Tjong Tjat, younger brothers of Tjong Hauw.29 Also, in
other Javanese cities members of the Oei family and staff members
of OTHC came to hold important positions in the Kakyo Sokai. His
brother-in-law Kwee Zwan Lwan for example was appointed chair-
man of the Kakyo Sokai in Cirebon. Holding these positions gave
28
Toyoshima Ataru came to Batavia in 1939 to head the Chinese Affairs Section at
the Japanese Consulate-General. In 1941 he was promoted to vice-consul. During this
period he was very active in gaining the cooperation and support of Chinese in Java
for Japans policies and established a wide-ranging network among prominent Chi-
nese leaders and influential Japanese in the Indies. See Didi Kwartanada An Expert
on Chinese Affairs or a Pacifier?: Toyoshima Ataru and the Campaign towards the
Chinese in Java, 19391945, paper presented at ICAS 4, Shanghai, August 2024,
2005.
29
NA, the Hague, Archive Procureur-General 2.10.17, inv. No. 411 Oei Tiong
Ham File.
190 peter post
people like Tjong Hauw, Tan Tek Peng, and Kwee Zwan Lwan much
negotiating power with the General Affairs Department of the Gun-
seikanbu (the most important department in the military administra-
tion) and made it possible not only to promote their own business and
private family interests, but also assist and help unfortunate members
of the Chinese community and the Dutch and Eurasian populations
that were interned. Tjong Hauws pre-war record as a secret and
silent business associate of the Nanking government and a friend of
Cheng Kung Po undoubtedly played a part in being accepted as a
trustworthy and reliable partner of the Japanese military.30 He was
also instrumental in setting up, under Japanese guidance and initiative,
a Committee on Overseas Chinese Voluntary Defense Army. The aim
of this defense army was twofold. One was to train and militarize
young Chinese in order to help the Japanese to defend Java in case
of an allied attack. Secondly, to set up a paramilitary Chinese self-
defense force that was undoubtedly necessary when popular unrest
might again turn against the Chinese. This committee was formed in
March 1944 and Tjong Hauw was appointed its chairman.31 Early
in 1945 this self -defense organization came into being and initially
counted around 2,000 members in Batavia alone.
In the meantime, Oei Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng c.s. were
also in close contact with Indonesian leaders like Hatta and Sukarno,
and prominent pribumi businessmen, discussing the future economic
development of an independent Indonesia. In October 1943 the Japa-
nese set up the Chuo Sangiin (Central Advisory Board), which became
the key institution for political participation and economic matters.32
Oei Tiong Hauw was one of the four Chinese members of this all-
embracing council. His important and influential position during this
central year of the Japanese occupation can be gauged from a photo-
graph taken of the official installation of the Chuo Sangiin in October
1943.
30
Dutch sources also mention that he good relations with several kenpetai officials;
but this might also be due to the fact that he successfully negotiated the ultimate
release of his brother Oei Tjong Ie, who was sentenced to death. Nobody in the Oei
Family knew exactly how Tjong Hauw had been able to keep Tjong Ie from not being
executed by the kenpeitai.
31
Ministery of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, NEFIS Archives, Inv. no. 2756
Chineesche Beweeging.
32
On the Chuo Sangiin see Sato (1994, 6471) and Post et al. (2010, 4823).
the oei tiong ham concern 191
Figure 2.
Source: Boekoe peringtanan Tyoo Sangi-in (s.l., Impressum, 1943).
In this picture we see Oei Tjong Hauw (white suite and black tie)
standing in the centre, third row, right behind Raden M.A.A. Kusumo
Utoyo (vice-chairman of the Chuo Sangiin) and next to Vice-Admiral
Maeda Tadashi. Sukarno (chairman of the Chuo Sangiin) is standing
in the centre, front row, whereas Lt.-Gen. Harada Kumakichi (Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Sixteenth Army) is standing in front.33
In April 1945 an Investigating Committee for the Peoples Economy
was established by the Japanese military. Indonesian pribumi business-
men dominated this committee, Tan Tek Peng being the only Chinese
representative, and when one month later the Investigation Body for
the Preparation of Indonesian Independence was inaugurated, Oei
Tjong Hauw gained a seat (Kanahele 1967, 100102, 1924; Twang
1998, 11819). In the discussions at these committees about the
future development of the Indonesian economy, it was made clear by
33
Maeda Tadashi (18981977) was head of the Naval Liaison Office in Jakarta and
played a decisive role in the final days of the Japanese occupation period when he
offered his residence to Sukarno and Hatta to prepare the Proclamation of Indepen-
dence. Harada Kumakichi (18881947) succeeded Imamura Hitoshi as C-in-C of the
Sixteenth Army (November 1942April 1945). Post et al. (2010, 499500; 5445).
192 peter post
The first priority after Indonesias independence was to find out the
state of the present assets of the firm. To that extent, Oei Tjong Yan
and Oei Tjong Ik (younger brothers of Oei Tjong Hauw) traveled the
interior of Java. In addition the overseas offices had to be checked. Oei
Tjong Ie, despite his experiences with the brutal kenpetai regime, went
to Japan, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, and Tan Tek Peng undertook a
trip to Singapore, Bangkok, and Calcutta. It turned out that only the
offices in Bangkok and Calcutta had done relatively well under Japans
Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. The administrations were
in order and office expenses were successfully met. Bangkok had even
made profits. Shanghai and Singapore were in a distressful situation
and the offices in Tokyo and Osaka had been abandoned. The Kian
Gwan office in London had been destroyed by German air raids dur-
ing the war in Europe and a new office building had to be found. In
Indonesia itself, fighting between Republican forces and Dutch troops
resulted once again in the destruction of sugar factories and planta-
tions; and after hostilities came to an end it was soon found that the
production capacity of 1.5 million tons of sugar was reduced to a half
million. It also became clear that the factory equipment of the Tang-
goel Angin sugar factory had been looted by Japanese military and
that the Krebet and Ponen factories were destroyed; also, the Krebet
flour factory was reduced to ashes. In Palembang, Kian Gwans rub-
ber factory including the stocks had gone into flames. Only the Redjo
Agoeng and Pakkis factories had remained intact and continued pro-
duction. Kian Gwans plantations in West Java as well as its real estate
and storing facilities in the province were also not affected by the war
and the fighting between Dutch and Indonesian troops.
Despite these heavy losses, Kian Gwan was soon able to rebuild
itself. In 194748 it expanded its foreign representations and erected
new branch-offices in Amsterdam, New York, and Rangoon (for the
import of rice). Having established a separate import department in
1931 bore fruit, especially in the period 194750, when the company
was able to get a big share of the importation of general commodities
194 peter post
In this reorganization process Tjong Hauw and Tan Tek Peng also
had other important and probably more pressing matters at hand. Until
that time tasks and responsibilities within the senior-management of
the conglomerate were clearly defined and accepted by everyone. But
since the outbreak of the war in Europe the four sons of Oei Tiong
Hams seventh wife Lucy Ho, all of them shareholders, had reached
maturity and now after the Japanese surrender started to claim their
rights.34 It was decided that the three elder brothers would be assigned
as managers of respectively the Singapore, Bangkok, and Hong Kong
offices, while the youngest one, Oei Tjong Tjay, would work in the
Jakarta office under the guidance of Tjong Hauw.
While he was in the middle of this reorganization, Oei Tjong Hauw
suddenly died of a heart attack in Jakarta on January 21, 1950. With
his death OTHC suddenly lost its one-man leadership and a most
capable and knowledgeable president-director, well-connected in fast
changing Indonesia and the rest of Asia.
Aftermath
Under the single directorship of Oei Tjong Hauw the rationale of the
conglomerates structure could still be considered business itself, but
after his death the rationale of the conglomerate became the compli-
cated family structure.35 The main division being the cleavage between
the, what was called, Hauw and the Ho groups. The Hauw group con-
sisted of the younger brothers of Oei Tjong Hauw, namely Oei Tjong
Tjiat, Oei Tjong Yan and Oei Tjong Ik, and included Oei Ing Swie,
eldest son of Tjong Hauw. The Ho group consisted of the four sons
of Ho Kiem Hoa Nio (Lucy Ho). Since neither allowed the other full-
control, it was decided to split the group into geographical divisions.
The American continent and Europe came under the directorship
of the members of the Hauw group, and the Asian division and its
34
These were Oei Tjong Ie (b. 1918), Oei Tjong Bo (b. 1922), Oei Tjong Hiong
(b. 1923) and Oei Tjong Tjay (b. 1924).
35
Many large family businesses, especially in countries and cultures were polygamy
is still practiced, currently face the same problems. See http://pabs.netfirms.com/
chapter8.htm Chapter 8 Polygamy and Family Squabbles submitted by the Phoenix
Group for the College of Management, University of Philippines. Accessed on July
1, 2008.
196 peter post
Concluding Remarks
and the interests of families that dependent upon the OTHC, nothing
more . . . and nothing less.
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CHAPTER NINE
Marleen Dieleman
Introduction
school, the same clan, the same surname, the same family, and so on.
As such, it is easier for Chinese people amongst themselves to develop
guanxi than for Chinese with people of other nationalities. Business
networks, in this perspective, are thought to be stable attributes of fam-
ily leaders, and provide a cushion to mitigate effects of external hard-
ships. To the extent that personal networks change, it is attributed to
internal factors, such as the size of the firm and the wealth of its leader.
Sociologist Fei (1992) argues that the more powerful the person, the
more extended are its networks, which is consistent with the idea that
larger and more powerful family conglomerates maintain an elaborate
web of ties with other Chinese businessmen.
A second body of literature focuses on another type of network: the
crony connection. It argues that ethnic Chinese businesses developed
corrupt relations with power-holders, who provided resources or pro-
tection, in exchange for money or shares (Robison 1986; Yoshihara
1988). Local political figures, particularly in Indonesia, were keen to
establish crony links with Chinese businessmen because they could
derive economic benefits from this alliance without the other partner
forming a threat to political power and because they could more easily
be kept at bay (Suryadinata 1997). The fact that a leader like Suharto
linked up with various ethnic Chinese businessmen is understood in
this manner (Elson 2001). The allocation of certain advantages due
to connections is usually seen as either rent-seeking (Yoshihara 1988),
corruption, or crony capitalism. Corruption involves bureaucratic
behavior that deviates from the norm and that results in private gains
by bureaucrats (Luo 2002). Cronyism is argued to be a special type of
corruption, based on repeated relationships. It can be defined as a
reciprocal exchange transaction where party A shows favor to party
B based on shared membership in a social network at the expense
of party Cs equal or superior claim to the valued resource (Khatri,
et al. 2006). Political economists working on Indonesian conglomer-
ates see crony relations with the regime as the key factor underpinning
ethnic Chinese business success (Chua 2007; Robison 1986). Most of
the literature on crony connections has stressed the beneficial effects
of maintaining such network ties for firms, as well as the fact that
such ties are inappropriate or undesirable from a macro-economic
development perspective. However, from the perspective of a business
leader, there are also profound risks associated with crony relation-
ships, namely that the carefully cultivated political connection might
fall from power (Fisman 2001; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006) or
the case of the salim group 205
uses his or her political leverage to acquire the firms resources (Fan,
Won and Zhang 2007). As such, an external shock such as a regime
change may profoundly affect the political ties themselves and also
have an impact on the composition of a family business network.
Third, networks are often analyzed using the concept of social capi-
tal, referring to the ability of company leaders to use networks as a
business resource. In situations of uncertainty and low levels of trust,
strong business networks reduce transaction costs if they create higher
levels of trust among their members. This can be the case of families
(Burkart et al. 2003), of communities (Lester and Cannella 2006), in
school or political networks (Keister 1999), in ethnic networks (Bon-
acich 1973; Rauch and Trindade 2002), or in the entire society (Fuku-
yama 1995). Together, personal connections of business owners that
are used for the benefit of the company can be referred to as social
capital. Given its broad scope, social capital applies to both categories
mentioned above as it encompasses all relations firm owners possess
that can translate into value for the firm. The concept of social capital
is also often used in the field of management to describe the advan-
tage companies can have as a result of their network ties (Adler and
Kwon 2002; Blyler and Coff 2003; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). It
is now common to distinguish between bonding and bridging capital,
where bonding is building connections within the own social group
and bridging refers to networking with people across social categories
(Adler and Kwon 2002). Following this classification, crony capitalism
can be seen as bridging capital whereas family and ethnic networks
would be seen as bonding capital.
A fourth body of literature which can be called the evolutionary
approach introduces the time aspect and considers network strategies
as a dynamic attribute of organizations (Blyler et al. 2003; Hite 2005).
Some authors have criticized the attribution of omnipotent powers to
ethnic Chinese business networking, and have argued that, as the busi-
ness grows and its environment develops, guanxi and networking with
political figures is not as important as in early stages (Chung 2006;
Peng and Zhou 2005). Institutional theorists see the networking behav-
ior as a reaction to an imperfect business environment. Once strong
economic institutions arise and a liberal market economy emerges,
these authors believe that ethnic Chinese companies will naturally
move from a relational model towards a rule-based model with weaker
network ties (Peng 2003; Peng and Zhou 2005). In doing this these
authors adhere to a stages model of economic development and expect
206 marleen dieleman
Methodology
(Dieleman 2007; Dieleman and Sachs 2006). All quotes used stem
from interviews with the author, unless otherwise attributed.
This trend, which started in the 1970s, would finally bring about a
third of the conglomerate activities outside Indonesia two decades
later, but did not change its embedding in the Indonesian domestic
context. Rather on the contrary, the Salim Group grew to be the most
dominant domestic player with (semi-)monopolistic positions in a range
of industries such as cement and flour and chemicals, usually enjoy-
ing some degree of government protection. Although Liem looked to
Japan for successful business examples, such as the sogo shosha, Anthony
Salim, who had been educated in the West, implemented several West-
ern business insights that were modern at the time. Under the second
generation leadership the Group professionalized its management and
organization structure. A divisional structure was introduced, and vari-
ous companies became listed on regional stock exchanges and man-
aged by professional CEOs. Anthony Salim also sought to become
less dependent on a benevolent dictator. By the 1990s the Group had
established relationships with major banks and with many major mul-
tinational companies.
In the period up to the Asian Crisis crony capitalism was even more
widespread in Indonesia, with protection and special favors very much
in the open, particularly when it came to the special business endeavors
of Tommy Suharto, one of Suhartos children. This national context
was increasingly inviting criticism from the IMF and the World Bank,
which promoted a liberal free trade model with low or no protection
of local industries and players. When the Asian Crisis came to Indone-
sia Suharto was eventually forced by the IMF to curb the protectionist
policies favoring friends and family members.
By the time the crisis reached its full scale Suhartos position came
under increasing pressure and he eventually resigned. The demise of
Suhartos order had severe consequences for the Salim Group. Having
been so closely associated with the Suharto regime, they were seen as
a symbol of it. The group became a target for public anger, and the
family houseas well as several branches of the Salim-owned Bank
Central Asiawas set to fire. BCA, the largest privately owned bank
in Indonesia, had two of Suhartos children on its supervisory board,
and was subsequently victim of a bank run that depleted its resources
and was nationalized. The fall of BCA marked a new period for the
Salim Group. A new government, espousing anti-corruption policies,
took over from Suharto and recapitalized the bank, demanding from
the Salim family full repayment as well as a fine for the violation of
the case of the salim group 213
certain banking laws. The total amount fixed by the government was
approximately USD 5 billion.
The Asian Crisis led to violence against ethnic Chinese, and the
Salim Group became a symbol of the old crony regime. It suffered
political as well as physical attacks and was partly nationalized as a
result of repayments to the government. Liem, said to be disappointed
by the anti-Chinese riots in which his portrait appeared as a symbol of
corruption and crony capitalism, never returned from exile in Singa-
pore and let his son Anthony Salim deal with the crisis in Indonesia,
while another son, Andree Halim, withdrew and focused on smaller
businesses in Singapore and China. The leadership of the Salim Group
was thus, as a side-effect of the regime change and economic crisis,
suddenly centralized in the person of Anthony Salim, who faced the
critical mission to disentangle the group from the previous regime and
prevent a complete collapse.
As economic conditions worsened, most Indonesian businesses were
considered insolvent, and the new post-Suharto government had to
consider ways to restore the entire financial sector and the economy.
It created an entity that had to deal with ailing banks, most of them
belonging to conglomerates, of which the Salim Group bank, BCA,
was the largest. Ethnic Chinese were seen as the culprits for the crisis,
and the Salim Group was clearly a symbol of dirty crony capital-
ism. The new government came under enormous public pressure to
dismantle the companies that were previously cronies of Suharto, as is
witnessed in the statement of one of their partners at the time.
With the crisis the problems started. The pressure on the Salim Group
became enormous, at the time they were afraid for their lives. When
they had some idea that a Chinese hunt would become reality, they tried
to move everything out of Indonesia. The government was not fond of
Salim, and forced them out of our joint venture. It wasnt even legal;
we were not supposed to own hundred percent of the venture. For some
time we were in a very odd situation. We did not want the Salim Group
to exit from our cooperation, we were unhappy with this development.
(Western Joint Venture partner of the Salim Group)
While some of the large conglomerate owners were arrested, this never
happened to Anthony Salim, who opted for a strategy of cooperative
negotiations with the government. He handed over (shares in) 107
companies to pay the government, which meant the nationalization
of a large part of the Salim Group. Given this attitude, which even
its staunch critics praised, the group could now become a symbol of a
214 marleen dieleman
new post-Suharto era. Part of his luck may have been that the Salim
Group was too large to fall, employing over 200,000 people, most
of them in Indonesia. For a couple of years following the crisis, the
Salim Group reshuffled companies and assets in order to rearrange
their portfolio. Even after the settlement of the USD 5 billion govern-
ment debt, the group still was a large business player. In the words of
Anthony Salim:
We talked to the new, emerging government and asked them several
questions. 1. Whether a company like Salim can still exist under the
new environment; and 2. Is this going to be a political or commercial,
economic solution. If this is a political solution you can do anything
you like, nationalize companies or put someone in jail. But we believe
it is commercial solution for the following reasons: The new emerging
country for economic policy heavily depends on IMF, World Bank and
bilateral support. We believe that has not been changed. So we believe
a commercial solution is one of the solutions for the economy. Secondly,
it is not only us. Its the total financial, monetary, corporate crisis. We
are one of the problems, no doubt a big one, but one of the many. (. . .)
Our approach is: ok, we open up. We dont believe that negotiation
will be hide and seek. This is the total wealth of the group. Some of the
assets are already pledged to the bank, some is free. Even my personal
assets I declared, like my house in Los Angeles, I just declare also. This
is our wealth; now lets negotiate how this is going to solve the problem.
(Anthony Salim)
Thus, the Salim Group experienced the most severe crisis in its history.
On the other hand, the crisis was also an opportunity to get rid of old
businesses and select the most profitable companies for continuation.
The Salim Group did this through extremely skilful negotiations with
the government and the banks. As Anthony Salim was now clearly the
central leader, and the crisis had contributed to a reorientation of the
conglomerate, the group was on its way to fully implement a more
market-oriented and less relationship-focused corporate strategy. The
institutional environment was chaotic during the crisis, but it was gen-
erally expected that a more liberal economic policy and a decrease in
crony capitalism would eventually take place.
After the crisis, the leaner Salim Group sought to diversify away
from Indonesia into Asia to mitigate its dependence on Indonesia.
It established new relations abroad with business partners and with
governments. After an initial period of recovery, the Salim Group
has started an ambitious growth strategy again since 2003. It invested
heavily in China and India, both growth markets, and also in other
the case of the salim group 215
14
12
10
Number of occurences
8 Ethnic Chinese
Political
6 Foreign
0
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Figure 1. Salim group partnerships.
Source: Authors database.
100%
Ethnic Chinese
75% Political
Foreign
50%
Linear
(Ethnic Chinese)
Linear (Foreign)
0%
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004
the number of business deals with this category of partners seems par-
ticularly modest.
Ethnic Chinese partners show a slight declining trend, which may
be consistent with the vision of the second generation business leader
who attaches no special importance to descent or identity when it
comes to selecting business partners. This seems consistent with our
proposition three, which argues that bonding ties will decrease over
time as the country modernizes and the firm matures, with looser
network ties taking their place. In particular, the trend seems to be
towards arms length relationships with multinationals, rather than
the more particularistic political and ethnic ties that dominated in the
past. This trend was visible before the crisis already, but the Asian
Crisis seems to have given even more prominence to partnerships
with foreign multinationals, because both ethnic Chinese and political
ties declined. Our results should be interpreted with care, because we
measure only occurrences, not importance, but with this caveat, we do
see a slight decline of ethnic and political ties before the crisis, and an
even sharper decline thereafter.
These figures do not tell us anything about the situation before 1984.
The interpretative analysis suggests that both political and ethnic Chi-
nese ties were important, with ethnic Chinese ties being predominant
in the period before 1965, and ties with Suharto and his family were
essential in the years 196584. For example, initial internationalization
took place with the help of regional Chinese networks, and many of
the early firms were started with support of the Suharto regime. While
this early situation matches our first and then second proposition (on
the predominance of ethnic and political ties, respectively), our quan-
titative analysis shows that these propositions cease to be applicable in
the period starting in 1984.
Discussion
Single case studies are not designed to lead to conclusions that apply
to an entire population. The Salim Group was chosen for its size and
importance, and most likely this very fact influences the nature and
composition of the network ties with other firms. We take this into
account when interpreting the results. Nevertheless, good case research
can formulate new insights and unearth new patterns that may apply
to a broader group of entities. In order to achieve this, we abstract
the case of the salim group 219
International
Politicians bonding
Global Banks
Foreign
Local
Army Investors
Politicians
Officers Time
The results also show how the network size and composition is
related to institutional factors, such as economic growth, crisis, political
changes and institutional modernization, and how it changes substan-
tially over time, displaying both gradual and sudden changes. This
study supports the proposition informed by institutional scholars that
ethnic network ties and corrupt alliances with politicians will decrease
over time as economies modernize and become open market democ-
racies, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. Institutional
improvement decreases the extra benefits of a strong ethnic network.
With regard to the effects of the crisis, we see an overall decline in
new partnerships, and of those remaining new network ties virtually all
are with foreign multinationals. Political ties in particular are affected
by political changes. Contrary to proposition two, the Salim Group
did not build close connections with subsequent political leaders, even
if some other Indonesian business groups (e.g., Bakrie Group) have
continued to benefit from a politically connected strategy beyond the
Suharto period, suggesting that such a crony model continued to be
an option for business leaders. With regard to ethnic Chinese ties and
the Asian Crisis, our data suggest that the regime change strength-
ened the ongoing decline in the relative importance of ethnic Chinese
network ties. In addition, our study also points at the importance of
internal factors. The second generation leader of a family business is
more likely educated with Western management ideas, and may have
different views on building business relations than the previous genera-
tions, which are more strongly rooted in Chinese culture. Our results
also imply that the Salim Group, by virtue of foreign firms being its
most important type of partners, will likely have adapted to the way
of working of Western and Japanese firms, and thereby will have built
competencies to operate in ways similar to modern multinationals.
Perhaps the era in which ethnic Chinese business groups could be
envisioned as unique species is over.
Conclusion
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INDEX
Hatta, Mohammad 190, 191 n. 33, Java 12, 35, 81, 97100, 103, 109
192, 194 n. 21, 133, 146, 15153, 15557,
Heidelberg Cement Group 217 165, 17273, 17680, 18490, 193,
High Court 120 197
Ho, Lucy 186, 195 Journalism 95, 107, 114, 229
Hoakiauw dan Tiongkok 100 Journalist 1415, 67, 73, 9395,
Hong Kong 83, 173, 176, 179, 193, 9895, 100109, 111, 113114
195, 211
Kabar Perniagaan 124, 130, 158 n. 17
Idenburg, A.W.F. 13136 Kalimantan 61, 99, 105
Identity 34, 67, 10, 13, 1516, 27 Kan Hok Hoei (H.H. Kan) 112, 178
n. 4, 28, 3738, 51, 4043, 60, 63, Keng Po 101, 104
6566, 72, 7475, 77, 8081, 218 Khoe Boen Sioe 104
Import 142, 144, 146, 14952, 174, Kian Gwan 170 n. 1, 17275, 177,
177 n. 8, 182, 187, 193, 210 17980, 182, 18687, 189, 193, 196
India 151, 214 Kong Hoa Po 106
Indies Chinese community 93 Krebet 175, 187, 193
Indies government 96, 111, 117, Kudus 209
12225, 131, 134 Kuomintang (KMT) 113
Indonesia 36, 814, 2329, 3133, Kwee Hing Tjiat 106108
3537, 42, 47, 49, 5253, 6566, Kwee Kek Beng 9394, 104, 107
70, 72, 74, 77, 8182, 8586, 93, Kwee Thiam Tjing 111
107108, 109 n. 21, 1011, 113, 115, Kwee Zwan Lwan 18990
16971, 174 n. 5, 181 n. 16, 18485, Kwik Hoo Tong Trading Co. 177
190, 19297, 202, 204, 20715, 217
Indonesian Landrechter 117, 136
Bethel Church 32 Law on Dutch Citizenship (Wet op het
Revolution 4 Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap) 122
Internatio 152, 156, 160, 174, 194 Lee Rubber Company 174
International Colonial Exhibition 141 Lie Hoo Soen 17374
International trade 10, 142, 151, 210 Liem Kha Tong 15960
Interrater reliability 208 Liem Koen Hian 94, 104107,
Investigating Committee for the Peoples 110111, 113114
Economy 191 Liem Sioe Liong 209, 219
Investigation Body for the Preparation Life-cum-business stories 2627, 32, 41
of Independence 192 Ling Ying Ching 104
IPO 9698, 101 Loa Joe Djin 11718, 121, 12526,
131, 134
Jakarta 26, 29, 37, 47, 56, 63, 73, Lou Tseng Tsiang 125, 131, 132 n. 26
186, 188 n. 27, 191 n. 33, 19496, LPKB 47, 48 n. 2, 5051, 5354,
210 5657, 60, 63
Japans economic expansion 149
Japanese Maandblad Reclame & Efficiency
business 14243, 14849, 15758, Dagang 159
170, 17980, 208 Makasar 99, 156, 179, 182
military 45, 9, 16970, 184, 188 Malay
n. 27, 19091, 19394 magazines 9798
multinationals 217, 220 periodicals 9698
occupation 9, 171 n. 2, 173, 184, print market 9596, 99
187, 190, 191 n. 33, 192, 209 Mangkunegoro VII 17879, 185
threat 148 Margo-Redjo 12, 14243, 15253,
trade 148, 163 15556, 159, 16365
Japanese-Chinese economic Masalah Cina 5, 5253, 55, 58, 6162
networks 149 Matahari 180
230 index