TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003, 407 SCRA 10, Main
opinion of J. A. Carpio and C. J. R.S. Puno concurring/separate opinion

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division)

and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.

Under Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution, an order of sequestration may only issue
upon a showing "of a prima facie case" that the properties are ill-gotten wealth under
Executive Orders 1 and 2. When a court nullifies an order of sequestration for having been
issued without a prima facie case, the Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
PCGG but simply applies the law. The Republics supposed evidence does not show how
the Marcoses acquired the sequestered property, what makes it "ill-gotten wealth," and how
former President Marcos intervened in its acquisition. Taking the foregoing view, the
resolution of the issue surrounding the character of the property sequestered whether or not
it could prima facie be considered ill-gotten should be necessary. Although the two PCGG
lawyers issued the sequestration order in this case on March 18, 1986, before the passage of
Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules, such consideration is immaterial following the above ruling.
Finally, Mrs. Marcos is not estopped from questioning the order because a void order
produces no effect and cannot be validated under the doctrine of estoppel.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997, 267 SCRA 408
(1997)

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos.

10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision and does
not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect. Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is
couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws
to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing
nature of constitutional provisions. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one
part and non-self-executing in another.

The controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a
nation. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the
Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but
also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

GSIS is included in the term State, hence, it is mandated to implement 10, paragraph 2,
Article XII of the Constitution. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct
from the government are considered state action covered by the Constitution (1) when the
activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when the government is so significantly
involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and,
(3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and
third categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although entered
into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to the
constitutional command.
GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of the controlling shares of the
Manila Hotel Corporation. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows
preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder, in choosing the awardee respondents
are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are
presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Kilosbayan Inc., et al., v. Manuel L. Morato, G.R. No. 118910, November 16, 1995,
246 SCRA 540 (1995)

The ELA is valid as a lease contract under the Civil Code and is not contrary to the charter of
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
That under 1(A) of its charter (R.A. 1169), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office has
authority to enter into a contract for the holding of an on-line lottery, whether alone or in
association, collaboration or joint venture with another party, so long as it itselfholds or
conducts such lottery; and
That the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) in question did not have to be submitted to
public bidding as a condition for its validity.
E.O. No. 301, 1 applies only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment. It does not refer to contracts of lease of equipment like the ELA. The provisions
on lease are found in 6 and 7 but they refer to the lease of privately-owned buildings or
spaces for government use or of government-owned buildings or spaces for private use, and
these provisions do not require public bidding. It is thus difficult to see how E.O. No. 301 can
be applied to the ELA when the only feature of the ELA that may be thought of as close to a
contract of purchase and sale is the option to buy given to the PCSO. An option to buy is not
of course a contract of purchase and sale. Indeed the question is not whether compared with
the former joint venture agreement the present lease contract is more advantageous to the
government. The question is whether under the circumstances, the ELA is the most
advantageous contract that could be obtained compared with similar lease agreements
which the PCSO could have made with other parties. Petitioners have not shown that more
favorable terms could have been obtained by the PCSO or that at any rate the ELA, which
the PCSO concluded with the PGMC, is disadvantageous to the government.

TOPIC: POLICE POWER

ARTICLE II SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
In the 1935 and 1973 Constitution Section 4 spoke of defense of the State being the primary
duty of the government. The present version places emphasis on service to and protection
of the people.

ARTICLE II SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Democracy:
1. Peace and Order
2. Protection of Life, Liberty and Property
3. General Welfare

ARTICLE II SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.

State:
1. Protect Right to Health
2. Promote Right to Healthcare
3. Instill Health Consciousness

Jesus P. Morfe vs. Amelito R. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424 (1968)

The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)

Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office and
within the month of January of every year thereafter, as well as upon termination of his
position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts
and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.

Police power is an inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society (Justice Malcolm). It is the power
of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice
Taney). Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process
is observed. The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not
outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. It would be to dwell in the
realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with
its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary
and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file
such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon
assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power.

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. Mayor of the City of
Manila ,G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849 (1967)

Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due
process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the power
must not be unreasonable or violative of due process. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to
prove the ordinances nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co-Case was in the scope of police power. As
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this
character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in
the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of
facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and prostitution.
Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
income of the city government."

Rubiet al. (manguianes) vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919, 39
Phil Reports 660 , (1919)

Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows: Establishment of non-
Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of the
Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants
are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial board.

In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as
to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
objection can be made. Discretion may be committed by the Legislature to an executive
department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. The growing tendency in the decision is to give prominence to the
"necessity" of the case.

In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred
upon the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department
Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the
protection of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions
most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward
state. Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation
of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department
head.

Ortigas and Co., Limited Partnership vs. FEATI Bank & Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670,
December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 533 (1979)

Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the
municipality should be liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local
government in promoting economic conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the
community. This is found in the General Welfare Clause of the said act. Although non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not absolute since it has to be
reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to promote health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace
and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive
residential area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the
surrounding industrial and commercial establishments.

Lao H. Ichong vs. Jaime Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1156
(1957)

A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no
conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in
conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of
the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through
the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market
stalls in the Pasay city market.

Walter Lutz v. J. Antonio Araneta, G.R. No. L-7795, December 22, 1955, 98 Phil 149
(1955)

It was competent for the legislature to find that the general welfare demanded that the
sugar industry be stabilized in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making
body could provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes that it had to
sustain. The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other words, the act is
primarily a valid exercise of police power.

Valentin Tio v. Video G.R.am Regulatory Board (VRB), G.R. No. 75697, June 18,
1987, 151 SCRA 208 ( 1987)

There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to
legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance
in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited
period with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of
the [VRB].

Virgilio Gaston et al., v. Republic Planters Bank, et al., G.R. No. 77194, Mar. 15,
1988, 158 SCRA 626 (1988)

The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as
state funds, even though held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special
purpose, the revenues are treated as a special fund, administered in trust for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance will be transferred
to the general funds of govt.

It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in PNB, not in the National Treasury.

The sugar planters are not beneficial owners. The money is collected from them only
because they it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of funds derived
from it. The investing of the funds in RPB is not alien to the purpose since the Bank is a
commodity bank for sugar, conceived for the sugar industry growth and development.

Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used purely for private purposes or for the exclusive
benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the
industry, and all its components, stabilization of domestic and foreign markets, since the
sugar industry is of vital importance to the countrys economy and national interest.

Assn. of Small Landowners v. Hon. Philip Ella Juico, as Secretary of AG.R.arian

Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989, 175 SCRA343 (1989)

No. Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional
distinction between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property
condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the
compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the
taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner of the property expropriated.

Phil. National Bank (PNB) v. Office of the President, HLURB et al., G.R. No. 104528,
January 18, 1996, 252 SCRA 5 (1996)

Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the
contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages
executed prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent
purchasers from swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision
developers. The court ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not
reflect the intent and purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the
protection of human rights. It would also be illogical if PD 957 which seeks to oust the
fraudulent practices would not be applied to existing mortgage contract due to some a
technicality.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005,
452 SCRA 174 (2005)

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty
so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with
due deference to rights. A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more
careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the
subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal
located outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their
existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena.

The Court is not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting
the establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support from the private
sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc.
The weight of popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.
Miners Association of the Philippines v. Hon. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., Sec. of
Environment &Natural Resources, et al.,.G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995, 240
SCRA 100 (1995)

AO No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after
the effectivity of the 1987 Consti pursuant to EO No. 211. It bears to mention that under the
text of EO 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the
terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity
of the present constitution shall be subject to any and all modification or alterations which
the Congress may adopt. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause do
not apply to the aforesaid mining leased or agreements after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution.
The State in the exercise of police power may not be precluded by the constitutional
restriction on non-impairment of contracts. Police power being co-extensive with the
necessities of the case and the demands of public interest.

Carlos Superdrug Corporation et al., v.Dept. of Social Welfare and Development

(DSWC), et al., G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 130 (2007)

Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu et al., G.R. No. L-49112, February 2,
1979, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

The passed LOIs by Marcos is constitutional as it can be considered as proper practice of

police power.

Police power is the states authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Persons and property could be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health and prosperity of state.

The purpose of the LOI 229 & 479 is to enforce the protection of motorists from vehicular
accidents by having early warning devices on disabled, stalled and parked motor vehicles
even if motorists need to spend 72 pesos to buy these devices.

In this case, promoting safe transit and avoiding obstruction on roads and streets is a valid
governmental interest. Hence, this is a proper practice of police power by the State

White Light Corporation, et al., v. City of Manila et. al. G.R. No. 122846, January
20, 2009, 576 SCRA 416 (2009)

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely
wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and
varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered
establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves,
are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet
the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights.The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in
fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may
fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is
a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting
the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash
rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.

Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila Inc., et al., v.The Board of Transportation et al.,
G.R. No. L-59234, September 30, 1982, 119SCRA 597 (1982)

A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly, fairly and justly.
The span of 6 yearsw supplies that reaonable standard. By the time taxis have fully
depreciated, theircost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. Thyey are also
generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public.

The State in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the safety
and general welfare of the people. In addition, there is no infringement of the equal
protection clause because it is common knowledge that taxicabs in Manila are subjected to
heavier traffic pressure and more constant use, creating a substantial distinction from
taxicabs of other places.

Teresita Tablarin et al., v. The Honorable Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez, et al., G.R.
No. 78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730 (1987)

Petitioners arguments relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement
but constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority and such questions
should be addressed to the political departments of the government and not in the courts.

The legislative and administrative provisions questioned by the petitioners constitutes a

valid exercise of the police power of the state. Police power is the pervasive and non-
waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote the important
interests and needs (public order) of the general community
Health and physical safety and well-being of the population is an important component of
public order and which is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation.
Hence, the implementation of NMAT is a way of promoting the important needs of the
general community by raising the standards of prospective medical students and future
doctors. It is a valid exercise of police power.

Didipio Earth Savers Muti-Purpose Assn. Inc. et al., v. Elisea Gozunet al., G.R. No.
157882, March 30, 2006485 SCRA 586(2006)

Eminent Domain was properly applied by the courts in this case.

The court provides that the requisites of eminent domain are the ff:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is not w/o
just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107
of the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner,
occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly
compensated as may be provided for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to
the property of the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a
consequence of the mining operations or as a result of the construction or installation
of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to
exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.

Romeo P. Gerochi, et al., v. Department of Energy(DOE), et al.,G.R. No. 159796,

July 17, 2007, 527 SCRA 696 (2007)

The Universal Charge imposed under Section 34 of the EPIRA is a proper practice of police
power. Police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property.

Regulation is the primary purpose and the revenue is incidental, then it does not make the
imposition of tax but it is an exercise of police power. It can be gleaned that the Universal
Charge is an exercise of police power, which is to ensure the viability of the countrys
electric power industry. regulation is the primary purpose and the revenue is incidental, then
it does not make the imposition of tax. Hence, this is a proper practice of police power.

Compaia General de Tabacos v. City of Manila et al., G.R. No. L-16619, June 29,
1963,8 SCRA 367

Ordinance 3358 is a valid exercise of police power by regulatory enactment for sale of
intoxicating liquors. It clearly prescribes municipal licesnse fees for the privilege to engage
in the business of selling liquor as enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila pursuant to it
charter powers to fix license fees for regulatory purposes. The sale of intoxicating liquor is
harmful to public health and morals and must be subject to supervision or regulation by the
state, cities authorized to act in the premises. Hence, said ordinance is a valid exercise of
police power.

Physical Therapy Organization of the Phils. v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No.
L-10448, August 30, 1957, 101 Phil. 1142 ( 1957)

The purpose of the Ordinance is not to regulate the practice of massage, much less to
restrict the practice of licensed and qualified massagists of therapeutic massage in the
Philippines. The end sought to be attained in the Ordinance is to prevent the commission of
immorality and the practice of prostitution in an establishment masquerading as a massage
clinic where the operators thereof offer to massage or manipulate superficial parts of the
bodies of customers for hygienic and aesthetic purposes. This intention can readily be
understood by the building requirements in Section 3 of the Ordinance, requiring that there
be separate rooms for male and female customers; that instead of said rooms being
separated by permanent partitions and swinging doors, there should only be sliding curtains
between them; that there should be "no private rooms or separated compartments, except
those assigned for toilet, lavatories, dressing room, office or kitchen"; that every massage
clinic should be provided with only one entrance and shall have no direct or indirect
communication whatsoever with any dwelling place, house or building; and that no operator,
massagists, attendant or helper will be allowed "to use or allow the use of a massage clinic
as a place of assignation or permit the commission therein of any immoral or incident act",
and in fixing the operating hours of such clinic between 8:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m. This
intention of the Ordinance was correctly ascertained by Judge Hermogenes Concepcion,
presiding in the trial court, in his order of dismissal where he said: "What the Ordinance tries
to avoid is that the massage clinic run by an operator who may not be a masseur or
massagista may be used as cover for the running or maintaining a house of prostitution.

Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Taitv. James Rafferty, Collector of Internal

Revenue, 32 Phil. 580, December 21, 1915, G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915,
(1915)

: Those courts being of the opinion that statutes which are prompted and inspired by
esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and gratification
of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public safety, the public
peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to constitutional
provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property. Or, in other words, the police
power cannot interfere with private property rights for purely esthetic purposes. The courts,
taking this view, rest their decisions upon the proposition that the esthetic sense is
disassociated entirely from any relation to the public health, morals, comfort, or general
welfare and is, therefore, beyond the police power of the state. But we are of the opinion, as
above indicated, that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or billboards which are
offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general welfare of the public. This is
not establishing a new principle, but carrying a well recognized principle to further
application. (Fruend on Police Power, p. 166.) For the foregoing reasons the judgment
appealed from is hereby reversed and the action dismissed upon the merits, with costs. So
ordered.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association,

Inc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000 328 SCRA 836(2000)

A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by

law and has substantial control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one
endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers
the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or
municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise
of the [LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.

There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924
that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a
political unit of government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with
legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an elective official, but is merely appointed by
the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is
the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution
ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Dante Garin, G.R. No.

130230, April 15, 2005, 456 SCRA 176(2005)

TOPIC: EMINENT DOMAIN

ARTICLE III SECTION 9 (LIMITS OF EMINENT DOMAIN)

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent Domain is the power of the state to take private property for public use upon
payment of just compensation
The power of eminent domain resides in the State and is exercised by the national
government
For an LGU to exercise eminent domain, there must be an ordinance authorizing
such. Subject to the limitations specified by law.
Congress has plenary power of eminent domain
Elements of Eminent Domain
 o There is taking of private property
Expropriator must enter the private property
The entrance must be permanent
The entry is under a warrant or legal authority
The property must be for public use
The owner will be deprived of all benefits enjoyed of the property
o The taking must be needed for public use
o There must be just compensation
Police power regulates or destroys private property but there is no transfer of
ownership and just compensation, while eminent domain has
When municipal property is taken by the State there is compensable taking if it is a
patrimonial property
The State may not waive its right to exercise an inherent power

PUBLIC USE
Public Use means use by the public
If condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose, property
reverts to the owner in fee simple

JUST COMPENSATION
Just Compensation means the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the
owner of a thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. Payment
that matches market value
o The value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint for
expropriation and time of entry
Includes determination of amount to be paid and payment within a reasonable time
Entry before just compensation is allowed provided that 15% deposit with the
property court has been made unless the expropriate is for public works
Trial by commissioners for determining just compensation is a substantive right
Need not to be money, it must be in some form that embodies certainty of value and
of payment such as government bonds

JUDICIAL REVIEW
Adequacy of compensation
The necessity of the taking
The public use character of the purpose of the taking
Not applicable when eminent domain is exercised directly by Congress

ARTICLE XII SECTION 18 (PUBLIC UTILITIES)

The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital
industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.

Nationalization or State Ownership of Public Utilities and Industries

The State may compel a public utility to render server in the public interest with just
compensation

Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 4 (LAND REFORM)

The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural
lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may
prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and
subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for
voluntary land-sharing.

Goals of Agrarian Reform

o Efficient production
o Equitable distribution of land which recognizes the right of farmers and regular
farm workers who are landless to own the land they till
o A just share of other or seasonal farm workers in the fruits of the land
Agricultural Lands are only those arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands
Does not include land devoted to livestock, poultry and swine raising
Landowners have no qualification as to under what title the land is held or what
rights to the land the landowner may exercise
The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the
farmer/grantee ownership of the land described. It merely evidences the
governments recognization of the grantee as party qualified to avail
Redistribution?
o Voluntary Sale
o Expropriation
o Resale
Just Compensation?
o Yes. Following the computation in eminent domain. Farmers would only pay
what they can afford. Hence, government subsidy is needed for proper
compensation
o Money or financial instruments or Land Bank notes
There is a retention limit for small land owners
This eminent domain for the expropriation is for public use. It is revolutionary
because it affects all private agricultural lands wherever found and of whatever kind
as long as they are in excess of the maximum of the retention limits allowed their
owners

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5 The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers, and
landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers organizations to
participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide
support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial,
production, marketing, and other support services.

The State must ensure that redistributed land will be effectively productive and
effectively beneficial for all concerned

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession
suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the
rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates
which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law.
ARTICLE XIII SECTION 7. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities, to the preferential use of local marine and fishing resources,
both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate
technology and research, adequate financial, production, and marketing assistance, and
other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign
intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine
and fishing resources.

This extends to other natural resources even including the use and enjoyment of
communal marine and fishing resources and offshore fishing grounds

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 8. The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the
proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote industrialization, employment creation,
and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for
their lands shall be honored as equity in enterprises of their choice.

Industrialization and Agrarian Reform must be a mutually beneficial relationship.

Agrarian Reform should unlock idle wealth hidden in land for investment in
Industrialization and Industrialization should be able to absorb farm workers released
from farms because of mechanization. Enhancement of Human Dignity. Assured
financial instruments should enable landowners to channel their wealth into non-
agricultural production ventures.

Urban Land Reform and Housing

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 9. The State shall, by law, and for the common good, undertake, in
cooperation with the public sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing
which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlements areas. It shall also
promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the implementation of such
program the State shall respect the rights of small property owners.

Reform is proper urban land and righting of inequitable land distribution. It includes
the authorization to use expropriation for redistribution of urban land.

ARTICLE XIII SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their
dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.
No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate
consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated.

Eviction must be done in accordance with law, that is, with due process or
administrative manner. It must be just and humane.
The person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the
allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is
unlawful or against the will of the land owner; that should the illegal or unlawful
occupation be proven, the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or
demolition is done and there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss
of or damage to properties

1973 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE II Section 6. The State shall promote social justice
to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people. Towards this end, the State
shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment, and disposition of private
property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits.
1973 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ARTICLE XIV Section 13. The National Assembly may
authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of public lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

Jesus is Lord Christian School v. Municipality of Pasig, G.R. No. 152230. August 9,
2005, 466SCRA 235 (2005)

Failure to prove compliance with the mandatory requirement of a valid and definite offer will
result in the dismissal of the complaint. The purpose of the mandatory requirement to be
first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property
needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court of action.

Santiago Eslaban Jr. v. Clarita Vda. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146052, June 28, 2001, 360
SCRA 230 (2001)

PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the government the
easement of a public highway, way, private way established by law, or any government
canal where the certificate of title does not state that the boundaries thereof have been pre-
determined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was constructed on Oct 1981 after the
property had been registered in May of 1976. In this case, prior expropriation proceedings
must be filed and just compensation shall be paid to the owner before the land could be
taken for public use.

In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be paid but the
reasonable time for the Government to pay the owner. The CA erred in this point by stating
that the market value (just compensation) of the land is determined in the filing of the
complaint in 1991.The determination of such value should be from the time of its taking by
the NIA in 1981.

National Power Corporation (NPC) v. Sps. Misericordia Gutierrez et al., G.R. No. L-
60077, January 18, 1991, 193 SCRA 1

The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives Respondents of
their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed below the transmission
lines. Because of high tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to
life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the property is entitled to just
compensation.

Carmen Ayala de Roxas and Pedro P. Roxas v.The City of Manila and Robert G.
Dieck, G.R. No. L-3144, November 19, 1907; 9 Phil 215

While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic
may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the
PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.

The People of the Philippines v. Juan F. Fajardo et al.,G.R. No. L-12172, August 29,
1958, 104 Phil 44
The ordinance is not merely lacking in providing standards to guide and/or control the
discretion vested by the ordinance. STANDARDS ARE ENTIRELY LACKING IN THIS CASE.
Ordinance grants mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant/deny construction/repair
permits

IN THIS CASE: Structures regardless of their own beauty and regardless of the fact that they
are built on private land are condemned by the ordinance. Appellants would be constrained
to leave their land to idle without receiving just compensation for the virtual confiscation of
their private land. Municipal government justified the ordinance under Revised
Administrative Code Sec. 2243 C that municipal council shall have authority to exercise
discretionary powers regarding establishing fire limits in populous centers and empowers
municipal government to require construction/repair permits, to charge fees for such
permits. There were no fire limits or safety regulations that the municipal council
promulgated in order to set a standard in the type of building that can be safely constructed
in the public plaza.

The City of Manila v. Chinese Community of the City of Manila et al., G.R. No.
14355, October 31, 1919; (1919)

The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land.

The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon
municipal corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the
right of eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.

The conflict in the authorities upon the question whether the necessity for the exercise of
the right of eminent domain is purely legislative and not judicial, arises generally in the
wisdom and propriety of the legislature in authorizing the exercise of the right of eminent
domain instead of in the question of the right to exercise it in a particular case. (Creston
Waterworks Co. vs. McGrath, 89 Iowa, 502.)
By the weight of authorities, the courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent
domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by
the law. (Fairchild vs. City of St. Paul. 48 Minn., 540.)

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. Inc. (TELEBAP )v. The
Commission on Elections (Comelec), G.R. No. 132922, April 21, 1998, 289 SCRA
337 (1998)

Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television

stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and
television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and
frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely
given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public
service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and
television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising
them.

The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free
air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation
for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To
require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for
what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is
taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.

Republic of the Philippines v. Salem Investment Corp., et al., G.R.No. 137569, June
23, 2000, 334SCRA 320 (2000)

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose declared in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint"xxx.

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissionersxxx

It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been
completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just compensation that title over the
property passes to the government. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been
completed and terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with
the registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights pertaining to an owner,
including the right to dispose of his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately to
acquire it through expropriation.

Just compensation should be paid to the buyer. Determination of this issue hinges on
whether the original owner had already been divested of title and therefore without
authority to dispose of the land when it entered into a contract with buyer. The SC held that
since just compensation has not yet been paid, title remained with original owner, vesting
him with power to exercise acts of ownership. Hence, original owner validly transferred title
to buyer which makes the buyer the rightful recipient of just compensation.

Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Phil. Export Processing Zone (PEZA), G.R. No. 137285,
January 16, 2001, 349 SCRA 240(2001)

Expropriation proceedings involve two (2) phases. The first phase ends either with an order
of expropriation (where the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public purpose to which
they are to be devoted are upheld) or an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one
since it finally disposes of the case. The second phase concerns the determination of just
compensation to be ascertained by three (3) commissioners. Itends with an order fixing the
amount to be paid to the defendant. Inasmuch as it leaves nothing more to be done, this
order finally disposes of the second stage. To both orders the remedy therefrom is an
appeal.In the case at bar, the first phase was terminated when the July 11,1991 order of
expropriation became final and the parties subsequentlyentered into a compromise
agreement regarding the mode of payment of just compensation. When respondent failed
to abide by the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner filed an action to partially
rescind the same. Obviously, the trial court could only validly order the rescission of the
compromise agreement anent the payment of just compensation inasmuch as that was the
subject of the compromise. It is crystal clear from the contents of the agreement that the
parties limited the compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to
petitioner.Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the issue of payment such
that failure to pay by respondent will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No
statement to this effect was mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Hence, the "original demand"
referred to means the fixing of just compensation. When PEZA failed to fulfill its obligation to
deliver Lot 434, petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of the
expropriated Lot 1406-B.