WILLIAMSON MURRAY
Ambassador Anthony D. Marshall Professor
Marine Corps University
Professor Emeritus
The Ohio State University
H O OV E R I N S T I T U T I O N P R E S S
stanford university | stanford, california
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Preface ix
1 An End to War? 1
v
Dedication
To General Jim Mattis and the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen
who by their acuity, blood, sweat, and tears will protect this great
Republic over the coming century.
PREFACE
ix
x Preface
AN END TO WAR?
The hero becomes a thing dragged behind a chariot in the dust: . . . The
bitterness of such a spectacle is offered us absolutely undiluted. No comfort-
ing fiction intervenes; no consoling prospect of immortality; and on the
heros head no washed-out halo of patriotism descends.
Simone Weil
You suppose that this war has been a criminal blunder and an exceptional
horror; you imagine that before long reason will prevail, and all those
inferior people who govern the world will be swept aside, and your own party
will reform everything and remain always in office. You are mistaken. This
war has given you your first glimpse of the ancient, fundamental, normal
state of the world, your first taste of reality.
George Santayana
1
2 America And The Future Of War
where the real world is far from the minds and interests of those
responsible for preparing new generations of Americans to deal with
an unstable, uncertain, and fractious world, that is certainly not the
case. Not surprisingly, the saying falsely attributed to Trotsky that
you may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you
remains far from their thoughts.
The purpose of this short study is to suggest that Mars, the God
of War, is not yet dead and to examine the implications of that
reality. It is, of course, dangerous for an historian to comment on
the possible paths that the fates will unwind over coming decades.
But history can and does suggest how to think about the future at
least in preparing for its shocks. As the historian MacGregor Knox
noted in the early 1990s:
Simply put, if you do not know where you have been (the past),
then you do not know where you stand, and any road to the future
will do. Thus, a perceptive understanding of the present based on
historical knowledge is the first step to thinking about the future.
1. MacGregor Knox, What History Can Tell Us about the New Strategic
Environment, in Williamson Murray, ed., Brasseys Mershon American Defense
Annual, 19951996 (Washington, DC, 1996).
4 America And The Future Of War
2. The most recent Joint Operating Environment, produced by the Joint Staff in
the Pentagon, represents the worst kind of trend analysis. Its analysis is further
muddied by bureaucratic prose that says little in the maximum number of words.
3. Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(New York, 2011).
An End to War? 5
Why did Pitt get it so wrong? There are two possible explana-
tions: The first is that, while nearly one-third of the previous years
in the eighteenth century had involved wars between the major
European governments, those conflicts, as Clausewitz suggests, had
remained limited to cabinet wars. The forces involved had been
relatively small, while the combatants had never really aimed at the
complete overthrow of their opponents. The second factor was that
France, Britains great continental enemy during the previous cen-
tury, appeared to be in a state of collapse with the kings authority
in dispute and the nations military forces dissolving as the other
European powers watched. The explosion that followed after 1789,
which was as unexpected to contemporary observers as was the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, quite literally blew up the map
7. There was, of course, the American Civil War, but that occurred far from
Europes shores, while the appearance of its armies, which possessed none of the
spit and polish of European armies, misled most Europeans as to its warning. As
the chief of Prussias Great General Staff commented, there was nothing to be
learned from a war waged by militias. See chapter of this study for an examina-
tion of the American Civil Wars importance for understanding the course of
Western war.
10 America And The Future Of War
8. Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (New York, 1913), pp. xxi.
12 America And The Future Of War
what should have been done, political and military leaders are under
the enormous pressure of events so fast-moving that they have
almost no time for reflection or calculation. None of this makes war
any less likely. In his memoirs about the First World War, Winston
Churchill put the immediate events that resulted in the war in the
following terms:
One arises from the study of the causes of the Great War with a
prevailing sense of the defective control of individuals upon
world fortunes. It has been well said that There is always more
error than design in human affairs. The limited minds of the
ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion in
which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions to the
mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their compass,
so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspectsall this must
surely be considered. . . . Events . . . got onto certain lines and
no one could get them off again.10
12. The greatest of these memoirs of the war and the least wrapped up in
political bitterness is Frederic Mannings The Middle Parts of Fortune (London,
1929).
13. New Statesman, 22 August 1936.
An End to War? 15
Personally I just sit and pray for one thing, namely that Lord
Runciman will live up to the role of [an] impartial British states-
man. I cannot believe that he will allow himself to be influenced
by ancient history or even arguments about strategic frontiers
and economics in preference to high moral principles. The great
and courageous game which you and the Prime Minister are
playing [namely to surrender Czechoslovakia to the tender mer-
cies of Nazi Germany] will be lost in my humble opinion if
14. For the Third Reichs economic and strategic vulnerabilities, see particu-
larly Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 19381939;
The Path to Ruin (Princeton, NJ, 1984), ch. 1.
16 America And The Future Of War
[Runciman] does not come out on this side of the higher moral
principles for which in fact the British Empire really stands.15
In fact, the First World War had certainly not persuaded the
German elite, as well as the Nazis, of the notion that war was neces-
sarily a bad thing. The greatest German literary figure of the First
World War, Ernst Jnger, was anything but a pacifist. A veteran of
nearly four years on the Western Front, storm troop officer,
wounded a number of times, and winner of the pour le mrite (the
highest combat decoration in the German Army), Jnger believed
the war had been an ennobling experience, one that every genera-
tion should experience. The contrast between German literature
and British literature could have been more graphic. But the larger
problem lay deeper than simply a literary difference in the interpre-
tations of the war. Although none of the other major German war
memoirs came close to the quality of Jngers writings, they shared
with him a bloody-minded enthusiasm for the war. In every respect
Erich Maria Remarques All Quiet on the Western Front was an anomaly,
far more popular in Britain and the United States than Germany.
The German explanation for their military defeat in fall 1918 was
not that they had taken on the whole world and lost, which was the
sensible explanation in strategic terms. Instead, almost immediately
after the Germans had signed the armistice ending the war, the
national narrative became that the home front had stabbed the Ger-
man Army, unbroken and unbeaten on the Western Front, in the
back. It did not take long for those on the right to identify those
15. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 3rd. Ser., vol. 2, Doc 390, 6.8.38,
letter from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax.
An End to War? 17
Two years after the Munich crisis and immediately after the cata-
strophic fall of France in May 1940, the French philosopher and
activist Simone Weil wrote a dark and prophetic essay on Homers
Iliad, that ancient Greek epic poem on the war between the Greek
warrior tribes and the Trojans. Her essay was a bleak description of
what had just happened and what was soon to come. In her essay she
noted that
The true hero, the true subject, the center of the Iliad is force.
Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force before
which mans flesh shrinks away. . . . For those who considered
that force, thanks to progress, would soon be a thing of the past,
the Iliad could appear as a historical document; for others, whose
powers of recognition are more acute and who perceive force,
20. Quoted in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1, The Gather-
ing Storm (Boston, 1948), pp. 32728.
20 America And The Future Of War
21. Simone Weil, The Iliad, or the Poem of Force, Chicago Review, 18:2
(1965), p. 5.
An End to War? 21
tion envisaged the past and the present as in front of uswe can
see them. The future invisible is behind us. . . . Paradoxical though
it may sound to the modern ear, this image of our journey through
time may be truer to reality than the medieval and modern feeling
that we face the future as we make our way forward into it.22 That,
of course, suggests why the moderns have made such herculean
efforts in the social sciences in the hopeless task of trying to bring
clarity to thinking about the future, an effort that is inherently
unpredictable.
That fundamental difference underlines the vast gulf between the
great Greek historian Thucydides and his view of the world and that
of modern social scientists and too many historians. In his opening
paragraphs he made clear that it will be enough for me . . . if these
words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand
clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human
nature being what it is) will at some time or other and in much the
same ways, be repeated in the future.23 But there is nothing predic-
tive about Thucydidess account of the terrible events that trans-
pired in the three-decade-long Peloponnesian War. He fully lays out
only the nature of human behavior in the interplay of events that
provide his future readers some sense of how human beings will act
under similar circumstances.
At the heart of all human political actions, according to Thucydides,
lies his famous triptych: security, honor, and self-interest.24 In
22. Bernard Knox, Backing into the Future: The Classical Tradition and Its Renewal
(New York, 1994), pp. 1112.
23. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, translated by Rex Warner
(London, 1954), p. 48.
24. Ibid., p. 80.
22 America And The Future Of War
our own as well as that of others. It is to place our trust in the hope
that other nations and entities will act in what Americans view as a
reasonable fashion, a belief and assumption that too many have
placed their hopes in with disastrous results for themselves and
their allies.
In even blunter fashion than in their discussion with the Spartans,
the Athenians replied to the Melian negotiators who attempted to
deflect the formers demand that they join the Athenian empire with
reference to justice and the Gods:
For those then who look at the past with dispassion, there is
nothing in the history of the past 2,400 years, since Thucydides
wrote his history, to suggest that this dark and pessimistic view of
mans fate did not represent an accurate prediction of what was to
come. The basic problem is that, as Michael Howard has suggested,
war has been a constant companion of mankinds course, while to
27. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace & the Reinvention of War (London,
2002), p. 1.
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