7.
Alvarez vs CFI other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit
GR. No. 45358
Facts: The chief of the secret service of the
Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice,
presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an
affidavit alleging that according to reliable
information, the petitioner kept in his house in
Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-
lender charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law. In his oath at the end of
the affidavit, the chief of the secret service
stated that his answers to the questions were
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
He did not swear to the truth of his statements
upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable
person. Upon the affidavit in question the
Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is
the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioners house at any time of
the day or night, the seizure of the books and
documents above-mentioned and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be
disposed of in accordance with the law.
With said warrant, several agents of the
Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioners store
and residence at seven oclock on the night
and seized and took possession of the following
articles: internal revenue licenses for the years
1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two
cashbooks, nine order books, four notebooks,
four checks stubs, two memorandums, three
bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs, forty-
eight stubs of purchases of copra, two
inventories, two bundles of bills of lading, one
bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs
of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to
Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices
and other papers many documents and loan
contracts with security and promissory notes,
504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of used
checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation.
As the articles had not been brought
immediately to the judge who issued the
search warrant, the petitioner filed a motion
praying that the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any
all the seized articles in the office of the clerk
of court and that said agent be declared guilty
of contempt for having disobeyed the order of
the court. Motion granted. Attorney Arsenio
Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board,
filed a motion praying that the order be set
aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be
authorized to retain the articles seized for a
period of thirty (30) days for the necessary
investigation.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the affidavit is valid for
purposes in issuing a search warrant
2. Whether or not affidavit of witnesses is
needed
3. Whether or not the constitutional mandate
that the thing to be seized is particularly
described is violated
4. Whether or not fishing evidence is valid
Ruling:
1. The provisions of the constitution require
that there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an
application supported by oath of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking
the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of
an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a
manner that perjury could be charged thereon
and affiant be held liable for damages caused
it appears that the affidavit, which served as
the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, it is hereby held that the search
warrant in question and the subsequent seizure
of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the
deprivation to which the petitioner was
subjected.
2. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution provides that no warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce.
It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach
the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted
that the judge who issued the search warrant
in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Mariano G. Almeda
and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the
Constitution nor General Orders. No. 58
provides that it is of imperative necessity to
take the deposition of the witnesses to be
presented by the applicant or complainant in
addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of
probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge
may dispense with that of other witnesses.
Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this
case was insufficient because his knowledge of
the facts was not personal but merely hearsay,
it is the duty of the judge to require the
affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause to warrant the issuance of the
search warrant.
3. These provisions of the constitution are
mandatory and must be strictly complied with
but where, by the nature of the goods to be
seized, their description must be rather
generally, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean that
no warrant could issue. The only description of
the articles given in the affidavit presented to
the judge was as follows: that there are being
kept in said premises books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by
him in connection with his activities as money-
lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in
violation of the law. Taking into consideration
the nature of the article so described, it is clear
that no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular
description of the contents thereof. The
description so made substantially complies
with the legal provisions because the officer of
the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabling him to identify the
articles, which he did.
4. At the hearing of the incidents of the case
raised before the court it clearly appeared that
the books and documents had really been
seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to
conduct an investigation and later use all or
some of the articles in question as evidence
against the petitioner in the criminal cases that
may be filed against him. The seizure of books
and documents by means of a search warrant,
for the purpose of using them as evidence in a
criminal case against the person in whose
possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable,
and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against
himself
Other notes:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH
WARRANT; SERVICE AT NIGHT. Section
101 of General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that
the search be made at night when it is
positively asserted in the affidavit that the
property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched. As we have declared
the affidavit insufficient and the warrant issued
exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that
the contention is equally well founded and that
the search could not legally be made at night.
ID.; ID.; WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES. The Anti- Usury Board
insinuates in its answer that the petitioner
cannot now question the validity of the search
warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to
the issuance thereof, because he has waived
his constitutional rights in proposing a
compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine
of P200 for the purpose of evading the criminal
proceeding or proceedings. We are of the
opinion that there was no such waiver, first,
because the petitioner has emphatically denied
the offer of compromise and, second, because
if there was a compromise it referred not to the
search warrant and the incidents thereof but to
the institution of criminal proceedings for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. The waiver
would have been a good defense for the
respondents had the petitioner voluntarily
consented to the search and seizure of the
articles in question, but such was not the case
because the petitioner protested from the
beginning and stated his protest in writing in
the insufficient inventory furnished him by the
agents.
8. Mata v. Bayona
G.R. No. 50720
Facts: The validity of the search warrant
issued by respondent Judge (not reappointed)
is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure
to comply with the requisites of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search
warrant issued by respondent Judge was based
merely on the application for search warrant
and a joint affidavit of private respondents
which were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed,
and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of
respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was
allegedly a failure on the part of respondent
Judge to attach the necessary papers pertinent
to the issuance of the search warrant to the
records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein
petitioner is accused under PD 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against
him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took
and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
"selling illegal tickets known as 'Masiao tickets'
without any authority from the Philippine Jai
Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned."
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the
case, he discovered that nowhere from the
records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that
he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent
Judge replied, "it is with the court". The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and
annul the search warrant and for the return of
the articles seized, citing and invoking, among
others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The motion was denied by
respondent Judge on March 1, 1979, stating
that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of
Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote,
members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd
PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the
court made a certification to that effect; and
that the fact that documents relating to the
search warrant were not attached immediately
to the record of the criminal case is of no
moment, considering that the rule does not
specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. 2 Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order
having been denied, he came to this Court,
with the instant petition, praying, among
others, that this Court declare the search
warrant to be invalid and all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible
as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings
on the matter.
Issues: Whether or not the search warrant is
valid.
Held: No, it is tainted with illegality for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce". More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional
injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses
he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions
in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach
them to the record. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be
able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be
found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is
tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge
to conform with the essential requisites of
taking the depositions in writing and attaching
them to the record, rendering the search
warrant invalid
Could it be that the certification was
made belatedly to cure the defect of the
warrant?
Two points must be made clear. The term
"depositions" is sometimes used in a broad
sense to describe any written statement
verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is
limited to written testimony of a witness given
in the course of a judicial proceeding in
advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. The searching questions
propounded to the applicants of the search
warrant and his witnesses must depend to a
large extent upon the discretion of the Judge
just as long as the answers establish a
reasonable ground to believe the commission
of a specific offense and that the applicant is
one authorized by law, and said answers
particularly describe with certainty the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. The examination or investigation which
must be under oath may not be in public. It
may even be held in the secrecy of his
chambers. Far more important is that the
examination or investigation is not merely
routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the
required information. To repeat, it must be
under oath and must be in writing.
9. People v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 109633
Facts: Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo
Untiveros of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
of Cavite City, Regional Trial Court Judge Arturo
de Guia issued in the morning of September 4,
1991 a search warrant (Exh. T, p. 50, Rec.
Crim. Case No. 237-91) authorizing the search
and seizure of an "undetermined quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride commonly
known as shabu and its paraphernalias" in the
premises of appellant's house located at 828 R.
Basa St., San Roque, Cavite City. However, the
search warrant was not implemented
immediately due to the lack of police personnel
to form the raiding team
In the final briefing of the raiding team at the
police station, it was agreed upon that PO1
Venerando Luna will buy shabu from appellant
and after his return from appellant's house, the
raiding team will implement the search
warrant. A marked money consisting of a P100
bill was given by the Station Commander to
PO1 Luna and entered in the police logbook.
PO1 Luna with a companion proceeded to
appellant's house to implement the search
warrant. Barangay Capt. Maigue, Norma del
Rosario and appellant witnessed the search at
appellant's house. SPO3 de la Cruz and PO3
Francisco found a black canister containing
shabu, an aluminum foil, plastik .22 caliber
atop the TV set, three used ammunition in a
cup and three wallets. SPO1 Novero found
inside a show box aluminum foils, napkins and
a burner SPO3 de la Cruz turned over the
wallet containing the marked money to PO3
Onrubio (p. 8, tsn., Jan. 7, 1992).
At police station, the seized items were taped
and initialed by SPO3 de la Cruz (p. 33, tsn.,
Jan. 7, 1992). The next day, SPO4 Pilapil,
through PO1 Barbuco, forwarded to NBI
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas for
laboratory analysis the aluminum
foilContaining suspected shabu bought by PO1
Luna from appellant in the buy-bus operation
as well as the aluminum foils containing
suspected marijuana which were confiscated
by virtue of the search warrant.
The findings of NBI Forensic Chemist Aranas
disclosed that all the specimen submitted to
her for laboratory analysis by SPO1 Pilapil, thru
PO1 Barbuco, gave positive results for
Methamphetamine Hydrocholoride
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the
firearms was proper.
Held: No. The search warrant implemented by
the raiding party authorized only the search
and seizure of ".. the described quantity of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly
known as shabu and its paraphernalia" (Exh. O,
p. 50, original record). Thus, the raiding party
was authorized to seize only shabu and
paraphernalia for the use thereof and no other.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority
empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any
and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to
a crime. The Constitution itself (Section 2,
Article III) and the Rules of Court (Section 3,
Rule 126) specifically mandate that the search
warrant must particularly describe the things to
be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no
authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned, much less
described with particularly, in the search
warrant. Neither may it be maintained that the
gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for
as earlier observed, accused-appellant's arrest
was far from regular and legal. Said firearm,
having been illegally seized, the same is not
admissible in evidence (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20
SCRA 383 [1967]). The Constitution expressly
ordains the exclusion in evidence of illegally
seized articles. Any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.(Section 3 [2], Article III,
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines).With the exclusion in evidence of
the illegally seized firearm, there is, therefore,
a total absence of evidence to support the
charge of illegal possession of firearm, against
accused-appellant. The same way may be said
of the charge of illegal possession of
ammunition.
(CASE 10) G.R. No. 81567 October 3,
1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents
were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a
confidential information which was received by
their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said
hospital with a gunshot wound. That the
wounded man in the said hospital was among
the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two
(2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or
on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City.
The wounded man's name was listed by the
hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,"
twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4,
South City Homes, Bian, Laguna however it
was disclosed later that the true name of the
wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of
this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred
to the Regional Medical Servicesof the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Was Rolando was lawfully arrested?
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a
member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest without warrant is justified
as it can be said that he was committing as
offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
in furtherance therefore in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the
state and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.
2 CONDITIONS FOR VALID ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT
*NOTE: Viewed from another but related
perspective, it may also be said, under the
facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural
falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2)
conditions for a valid arrest without warrant:
first, that the person to be arrested has just
committed an offense, and second, that the
arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested is the one who
committed the offense.
Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers
to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting
officer or private person.It has been ruled that
"personal knowledge of facts," in arrests
without warrant must be based upon
PROBABLE CAUSE, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.
These requisites were complied with in the
Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must
also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court
notes that the peace officers who arrested
Dural are deemed to have conducted the same
in good faith, considering that law enforcers
are presumed to regularly perform their official
duties. The records show that the arresting
officers did not appear to have been ill-
motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore
clear that the arrest, without warrant, of Dural
was made in compliance with the requirements
of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule
113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here
that a few days after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double
murder with assault against agents of persons
in authority was filed against Dural in the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal
Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly
placed under judicial custody (as distinguished
from custody of the arresting officers). On 31
August 1988, he was convicted of the crime
charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetual.
(CASE 11) G.R. No. 93239 March
18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados
house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of
Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported
to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters
away from Regalados house. Sucro was
monitored to have talked and exchanged
things three times. These activities are
reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third
buyer was transacting with appellant and was
reported and later identified as Ronnie
Macabante.
From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to
the area. While the police officers were at the
Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt.
Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was
intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in
front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw
the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on
the ground. Macabante admitted buying the
marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team intercepted and arrested
SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and
Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4
teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the
chapel and another teabag from Macabante.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is
lawful.
(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is
admissible.
Held:
1. Yes. Search and seizures supported by a
valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule.
Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything, which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. (People v. Castiller)
The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their
knowledge required from the surveillance was
insufficient to fulfill requirements for its
issuance. However, warrantless search and
seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE
existed. The police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime from the surveillance of the activities of
the accused. As police officers were the ones
conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that
they are regularly in performance of their
duties.
An offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest
without a warrant, when the officer sees the
offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at
once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza)
2. YES. The act of Macabante, throwing of the
marijuana and the admission, constitute that
he just committed an illegal act which the
police officer had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitors Sucros
nefarious activity. Police officers have personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted
surveillance activities. Evidence admissible
because the arrest is valid. (People vs Bati)
*NOTE: It is well-settled that mere denials
cannot prevail against the positive
identification of the appellant. (People v. Khan)
In this case identified Sucro was identified by
Macabante.
(CASE 12) G.R. No. 95902 February 4,
1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
Facts: Narcotics Command (NARCOM) agents
staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining
information that there was an ongoing illegal
traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The
participating agents were given money treated
with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went
to said location, asked for a certain Don.
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with
him and a certain object wrapped in a plastic
later identified as marijuana was given in
exchange for P200 for 100 grams.
The agent went back to headquarters and
made a report, based on which, a team was
subsequently organized and a raid was
conducted in the house of the father of the
accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents
were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves
and aplastic syringe among others. There was
no authorization by any search warrant. The
accused was found positive of ultraviolet
powder. The lower court, considering the
evidences obtained and testimonies from the
prosecution, found him guilty of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced
him to reclusion perpetual.
Issue: Whether or not evidence obtained
without a valid search warrant may be used to
prosecute the accused.
Held: No. 1. The court held that a buy bust
operation is a form of entrapment employed by
peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in
flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar,
the term in flagrante delicto requires that the
suspected drug dealer must be caught red-
handed in the act of selling marijuana or any
prohibited drug to a person acting or posing as
a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure
adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
this qualification. Based on the very evidence
of the prosecution, after the alleged
consummation of the sale of dried marijuana
leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and
taking him into his custody if the sale of
marijuana did take place. It is decidedly
contrary to the natural course of things and
inconsistent with the afforested purpose of a
buy-bust operation.
2. The Narcom agents should have secured a
valid search warrant prior the raid since they
have already been conducting surveillance
against the accused for quite some time
already and the urgency of their cause of
action cannot be justified in court. Hence the
accused was acquitted.
*NOTE: Motive of the NARCOM agents in
prosecuting the accused was also revealed
during the trial of the case. Rebuttal witnesses
Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and
Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia,
testified that Sgt. Molinawe, who has since
been reportedly dismissed from the service,
asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in
exchange for the liberty of the accused. This
was never refuted in court.
19. Papa v. Mago
FACTS: The Manila Police Department seized
the goods owned by Mago which were inside
the truck hired by Mago to Lanopa for
transportation. It was seized because Alagao,
the head of counter-intelligence unit, received
a reliable information that a certain shipment
of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following
day from the customs zone of the port of
Manila and loaded on two trucks. They
conducted a surveillance at the gate and when
the trucks left they went after the trucks and
intercepted them and seized 9 bales of goods
without a search warrant. Also the owner
argues that the goods were illegally examined
because they requested for it to not be
examined. And even assuming them to have
been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not
subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the
Tariff and Customs Code because Mago had
bought them from another person without
knowledge that they were imported illegally.
After some time, a restraining order was issued
by Judge Jarencio from opening the 9 bales of
goods, however, at the time it was received,
some of the bales were already opend by the
examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police
Department, an assistant city fiscal and a
representative of Mago.
ISSUE: Was the search conducted by the Bureu
of Customs for the goods valid?
HELD: Yes, they had authority to effect the
seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code
does not require said warrant in this case. The
Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or
any person on board, or to stop and search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person
suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable
or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning
the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code
provides that said "dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued
by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is
our considered view, therefor, that except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house,
persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
In, Carroll vs US, it was made lawful for
customs officers not only to board and search
vessels within their own and adjoining districts,
but also to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person on which or whom
they should suspect there was merchandise
which was subject to duty, or had been
introduced into the United States in any
manner contrary to law, whether by the person
in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise,
and if they should find any goods, wares, or
merchandise thereon, which they had probably
cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure
the same, and the vehicle or beast as well, for
trial and forfeiture.
20. Espano v. CA
ANTECEDENT FACTS:
Rodolfo Espano was convicted of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act. He was found of 12
plastic bags containing crushed flowering tops
and 5.5 grams of Marijuana. According to the
policemen, they saw him selling something to
another person in Manila, so they came to him
and told them they were policemen and frisked
him. They searched Espano and asked him if
there were more so he said that there are
others in his house. Indeed, they found more in
his house. After that he was charged of
possession of prohibited drugs. He also
resulted positive in the drug test. But according
to Espano, he was just sleeping in his house
and was awakened because he was beiong
handcuffed. He said that the policemen were
originally looking for his brother-in-law but,
when was not found, brought him to the station
instead. He was not believed because the
prosecution was found more credible and
trustworthy.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE FACTS:
Petitioner contends that convicting him was a
mistake because 1. The evidences seized were
inadmissible 2. He should be presumed
innocent till found guilty 3. he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to
compulsory process and 4. his conviction was
based on evidence which was irrelevant and
not properly identified
ISSUE: Was he properly convicted
HELD: Yes, First, it is a well settled doctrine
that findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses deserve a high degree of respect. In
this case, the findings of the trial court that the
prosecution witnesses were more credible than
those of the defense must stand.Furthermore,
the defense set up by petitioner does not
deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping at
the time of the incident. This Court has
consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has
the burden of proving that he was not at the
scene of the crime at the time of its
commission and that it was physically
impossible for him to be there. He was caught
in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal trade
of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer
saw petitioner handing over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two cellophanes
of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful
and the two cellophane bags of marijuana
seized were admissible in evidence, being the
fruits of the crime. As for the ten cellophane
bags of marijuana found at petitioners
residence, however, the same are inadmissible
in evidence.
21. People v. Musa
FACTS: There was an information that Mari
Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by
NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The
informer gave instructions on to how they can
reach Musas house and gave the description
of Musa's appearance. Sgt. Ani tried to buy and
was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried
marijuana for P10.00.
Because of that, a 'buy-bust' operation was
planned for the next day. In this plan, Sgt. Ani
was to raise his right hand if he successfully
buys marijuana from Musa. The NARCOM team
positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters
away. Musa came out of the house and asked
Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more
marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked
money. Musa went into the house and came
back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and
inspected it. He raised his right hand as a
signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the
house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room
but did not find the marked money because it
was given to his wife who has managed to
escape. T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to
the kitchen and found a cellophane colored
white and stripe hanging at the corner of the
kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents
but failed to get a response. So they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa
was then placed under arrest.
ISSUE: Was the search and seizure of the
cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen. valid?
HELD: No, it was an unreasonable search and
seizure and therefore cannot be admitted as
evidence. The warrantless search and seizure,
as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control. Objects in the plain
view of an officer who has the right to be in
the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.
The plain view doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. It will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the
object is not apparent from the plain view of
the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag
was not in the plain view of the police. They
arrested the accused in the living room and
moved into the kitchen in search for other
evidences where they found the plastic bag.
Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic
bag was not immediately apparent from the
plain view of said object. Therefore, the plain
view does not apply. The plastic bag was
seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of
the Constitution.
29. Manalili vs Court of Appeals
GR 113447, Oct. 9, 1997
Facts: At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988,
Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street,
in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. This
was done after receiving information that drug
addicts were roaming around said area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen
chanced upon a male person, the petitioner, in
front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The petitioner had reddish eyes and was
walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen,
but the officers were able to introduce
themselves and asked him what he was
holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted.
Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see
what the petitioner had in his hands. The
petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the
officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu found
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside.
He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents
and took petitioner to headquarters to be
further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.
Issue: Whether or not the search and seizure
of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable,
and hence inadmissible as evidence.
Held: The general rule is a search and seizure
must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and
seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation
of this constitutionally guaranteed right is
legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of
moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure
may be made only with probable cause.
Probable cause being at best defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged; or the existence of such
facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by is in the
place to be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been
adopted as another exception to the general
rule against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively
waived the inadmissibility of the evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise the
issue or object thereto during the trial.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and
Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer
IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum,
to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to
PAY a FINE of SIX THOUSAND PESOS. Costs
against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Terry vs. Ohio
392 US 1
Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may
perform a search for weapons without a
warrant, even without probable cause, when
the officer reasonably believes that the person
may be armed and dangerous.
Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking
with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same
street. The men would periodically peer into a
store window and then talk some more. The
men also spoke to a third man whom they
eventually followed up the street. The officer
believed that the Petitioner and the other men
were casing a store for a potential robbery.
The officer decided to approach the men for
questioning, and given the nature of the
behavior the officer decided to perform a quick
search of the men before questioning. A quick
frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed
weapon and the Petitioner was charged with
carrying a concealed weapon.
Issue. Whether a search for weapons without
probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution (Constitution)?
Held. The Supreme Court of the United States
(Supreme Court) held that it is a reasonable
search when an officer performs a quick
seizure and a limited search for weapons on a
person that the officer reasonably believes
could be armed. A typical beat officer would be
unduly burdened by being prohibited from
searching individuals that the officer suspects
to be armed.
Dissent. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas)
dissented, reasoning that the majoritys
holding would grant powers to officers to
authorize a search and seizure that even a
magistrate would not possess.
Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) agreed with the
majority, but he emphasized an additional
necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to
investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (J. White) agreed with the
majority, but he emphasized that the particular
facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a
violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.
Discussion. The facts of the case are
important to understand the Supreme Courts
willingness to allow the search. The suspicious
activity was a violent crime, armed robbery,
and if the officers suspicions were correct then
he would be in a dangerous position to
approach the men for questioning without
searching them. The officer also did not detain
the men for a long period of time to constitute
an arrest without probable cause.
The infringement on personal liberty of any
"seizure" of a person can only be "reasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment if we require the
police to possess "probable cause" before they
seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful
distinction between an officer's mere inkling
and the presence of facts within the officer's
personal knowledge which would convince a
reasonable man that the person seized has
committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a particular crime. "In dealing with
probable cause, . . . as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act."
Until the Fourth Amendment, which is closely
allied with the Fifth, is rewritten, the person
and the effects of the individual are beyond the
reach of all government agencies until there
are reasonable grounds to believe (probable
cause) that a criminal venture has been
launched or is about to be launched.
There have been powerful hydraulic pressures
throughout our history that bear heavily on the
Court to water down constitutional guarantees
and give the police the upper hand. That
hydraulic pressure has probably never been
greater