LIBRARY
Call Number
CGSC Label 13
if
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FLAK AND FLAK INTELLIGENCE
IN THE
NINTH AIR FORCE
Prepared by
Flak Section
H<i. Ninth Air Fore* (Adv.)
APO 696. U. S. Annv
Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Commanding
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY NINTH AIR FORCE > : < ' 7 / v
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
j 1
HOTT S. VANDENBERG
Commanding
The Mission , i
IX Bomber Command 9
II
Other Defenses 47
Flak Tactics . 52
Chain of Command 60
III
FLAK COUNTERMEASURES
Routing 65
Evasive Action 69
Counterflak (Air) 73
Counterflak (Ground) 77
Formations 79
Radio Countermeasures 83
IV
Battle of France 93
Fall Campaign 95
German Counter-Offensive 97
Io1
March to the Rhine
I0
Battle of Germany 3
V
SUCCESS OF FLAK INTELLIGENCE
A Backward Glance 107
In the European Theatre of Operations flak reached its majority when the back
of the German Air Force was broken in the first months of 1944. Enemy antiaircraft
artillery replaced enemy aircraft as the major combat risk of Allied air fleets.
The Army Air Forces through the efforts of Gen. Arnold's AAA adviser, Maj.
Gen. H. R. Oldfield, were quick to note the growing importance of this menace from
the ground and to anticipate the developing destructive capabilities of flak weapons.
Immediately intelligence and analysis of German technique, equipment, tactics,
etc. were intensified, and trained personnel were assigned to all Air Forces to counter
the increasingly potent threat of the enemy's ground defenses.
Results of this counter-flak program were a major factor in enabling Allied
air power to retain complete supremacy of the skies.
To meet the ever-increasing threat of German The mission of these sections was to study and ana
antiaircraft artillery, which was fast becoming of lyze German flak defenses and to prescribe counter
age, flak intelligence sections were established measures which would defeat this enemy defense
throughout the Ninth Air Force in all echelons a defense which had become capable of reaching
above group level during March and April of 1944. up and knocking our planes from the air or of
severely damaging these aircraft and of killing or wound
ing the men who manned them.
Specifically the mission above included, among
other vitally important tasks, the following:
a. Advising the Commanding General and his opera
tions staff on matters pertaining to enemy antiaircraft
defense as these matters affected current and future oper
ations.
b. Maintaining and disseminating to lower units
information regarding the position and strength of enemy
antiaircraft artillery defenses, materiel, tactics, techniques,
and capabilities.
c. Recommending routes of approach and withdraw
al and target attack technique to be employed by air
craft.
d. Training through lectures, memoranda and
inspection, of both ground and flying personnel in the
particulars of enemy antiaircraft defense measures.
Accomplishing this assigned mission was a major
task, fraught with the many difficulties incident to estab
lishing a new section in the Air Force, teaching a new
subject to new pupils, and producing results operation
ally valuable all in time to make the invasion dead
line which was less than two months away.
However, within a very short time after arrival in
the theatre flak analysis personnel were deep into the
many problems involved, and flak intelligence in the
Ninth was in full scale operation by D-Day.
AND
Herein are contained brief histories of the developments and methods of opera
tions of major Ninth Air Force flak sections in combatting problems posed by the
German AA defenses. Though basically similar, all procedures varied slightly to
meet circumstances peculiar to each command.
Main Function section to undertake its new tasks amid the secrecy,
the tenseness, the imminence, and the adventure
As regards the flak section at Air Force level of the coming D-Day.
the missions mentioned in the first chapter were
actually additional to the main function which con Organization
cerned the collection, collation and speedy dissem The very intimate structure of the Ninth and
ination of basic flak location data and flak reac the Second Tactical Air Forces demanded particu
tion in the tactical or battle area for all units of the larly close staff procedure; thus in endeavouring to
Ninth Air Force plus all other Allied air echelons fulfill as completely as possible this requirement, the
in the European Theatre of Operations. flak intelligence sections of these two headquarters
The Ninth had been selected as the American amalgamated all flak information and procedures
Air Force to play the role of closely supporting the even to the extent of occupying the same office space.
Allied ground armies in their continental attack This close contact proved highly satisfactory and
along with the British Second Tactical Air Force. was instrumental in the establishment of standard
The nerve center of the air-ground team in England flak procedures in all Allied flying units.
was located at Uxbridge, Middlesex, and to this Certain procedures were duplicated under the
spot key members of the operations and intelligence above plan so that when the Ninth Air Force and
staffs of both these headquarters came to operate Second TAF went their separate ways in July, 1944,
the pre-invasion and invasion period air missions each flak section was able to function efficiently even
which proved so effective in sealing off the initial though widely separated. Relations established dur
battle area and in keeping the Hun continually ing our combined operational period served to
unbalanced throughout the whole European cam facilitate greatly the flow of information throughout
paign. To this spot too came the Air Force flak the entire campaign.
* Air Force Adv
\J
Personnel
In the beginning one officer
and one enlisted man (plotter)
carried on the function of the Air
Force flak section. However it
soon became apparent that, dur
ing this period prior to invasion
when target lay-on and initial
planning for eleven medium bomb
er groups and fifteen fighter-
bomber groups was accomplished
at Air Force level, one officer was
insufficient, and another officer
joined the section to allow more
detailed flak analysis of the tar
gets assigned.
Later when the Advanced sec
tion of the Air Force headquarters
moved to the continent, the mis
sion of providing information in Standing: ist Lt. E. G. Slaughter, Lt. Col. R. D. Curtin, ist. Lt. J. C. Gregg
the tactical area became a pri- Kneeling: S/Sgt. A. Alerriman, Sgt. P. E. Hughes
mary responsibility and an addi
tional enlisted plotter was added. Still later, in an Source Material
attempt to accomplish more in field of flak appre In accomplishing the missions outlined in pre
ciation and evaluations for other air and ground vious paragraphs the flak section at Air Force
commands, yet another officer was assigned to do operated under procedures which were developed
research and aid in the establishment of a more in the course of early operations. Because the whole
complete flak service. Thus throughout the entire structure of flak intelligence and analysis is based
period the maximum personnel engaged in flak on sound source material, much effort was expended
was three officers and two enlisted men. in the early stages in the establishment of these
The flak analysis officers at the various other sources so that usable data could be expected to
Air Force echelons were guided and administered flow automatically and continuously into the Air
under the senior flak officer who was directly re Force flak center for use at that level and for quick
sponsible for the operating policies and general guid dissemination to lower units.
ance of these officers. The chief of intelligence at Prior to the invasion of the continent source
each echelon however was in charge of each of the material was quite centralized in the British War
flak analysis officers, they being members of the Office flak intelligence center (M. I. 15). This office
intelligence staff of each headquarters. furnished six figure map coordinate locations of
FLAK INFORMATION
n
I22U.S. ARMY 6P. 7V U.S. ARMY I'FRENCH ARMY
|v U.S. ARMY. 3 " U S . ARMY 9UUS. ARMY BRITISH
WAR OFFICE PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERR
PHOTO INTCRP. PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERP. PHOTO INTERP
K. M.I. 19
67'-" TAC/RN
GROUP
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I5-'CAN. ARMY
APIS.
GROUP
2BR. ARMY SECOND T . A . F . NINTH AIR FORCE
TH
20 P. 1.0 UNITS
.. A. P. I.S. FLAK SECTION KIMTH AIR FORCE 363"-5 TAC/RN
ADVANCED GROUP
2 1 " ARMY OP.
A.P.I.S.
912 TAC/RN.
GROUP
\, (PRN.)
1
9PVOM8 DIV.
|
IX T.A.C.
|
XIX T.A.C
|
XXIX T.A.C. IX T.C.C. HIALLIEO 8ISA.F. IX A.O.C. SECONO WAR
A/B ARMY T.A.F. OFFICE
UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS UNITS M.I. 16
1 :
!
F t t S . ARMY SeuS.ARMY &U.S.ARMY l2|gARMY OPT]
TT
'
3 # = Lt. Flak
7 =Hvy.Flak
Scale l"= 3.95 miles ei W ,
Hqs. Ninth Air Force
furnished to all European Theatre air and ground weeks. This Air Force flak bulletin was sent out
echelons all flak information in the area approxi many times daily and contained all of the collated
mately one hundred miles east of the ground battle lines. flak data from ground sources, prisoner of war inter
Jointly with the information gathered by the rogations, and other sources.
extensive photographic sources was combined the
information derived from the mission reports of
Operational Use
flak fire received. It can be readily seen that when As in all of the lower echelons the flak section
the ground battle became a rout, as in the battle at Air Force level worked in close conjunction with
of France, photographic coverage could not pos the combat operations and target intelligence sec
sibly uncover the flak which was moving all over tions. All targets, prior to selection for attack by
the countryside. Thus was established a procedure medium bombardment division, were checked to
of analyzing combat crew reports of flak fire received determine that the target at the time was not too
during missions over enemy territory. By plotting heavily defended to make it impractical for medium
this flak reaction on a 1:250,000 scale map of the level bombardment. Such factors as sun, weather,
operational area, noting kind and intensity, and present situation regarding German flak tactics,
combining these plots with a current knowledge of gun densities, etc. were considered, and in every
the ground battle situation (lines of communica case the analysis and estimate of the flak officer was
tion, dumps, new airfields, vital communications weighed in the final selection or discarding of the
centers, ground topography, etc.), together with proposed target. Very often special coordinated
the flak analysis officer's familiarity with the Ger attacks on densely defended targets and target
man capabilities of flak employment, a very reason systems were prepared by the flak section. Also the
able answer was arrived at which would indicate G-2 (Air) section of 12th Army Group Headquar
flak areas. These areas were disseminated along ters received on request special studies on flak and
with the photographic pinponts and their use by the its capabilities in a ground role.
flying crews proved sound. Later photography of the To facilitate flak presentation and quick ana
area concerned would often prove the method feas lysis the flak section after much experimentation
ible by evidence of the presence of flak. constructed and printed frequently editions of a
1:250,000 scale flak map containing actual pin
Dissemination point locations of heavy flak guns plus area densities
In the dissemination of flak intelligence speed of all known and suspected light flak areas from
was of the essence since the entire operational area both photographic and other sources. A previous
was constantly changing and flak information arriv map (1:500,000) was constructed by this section
ing late for briefing could result in the unneces and issued frequently during the early stages of the
sary loss of men and aircraft. Thus all flak bulletins invasion to facilitate intelligence, especially rout
in the Air Force were routed by speedy operational ing, on targets during the very mobile phases of the
priority teletype channels, with the time differen campaign. These maps were kept current by changes
tial of photography to pinpoint stage varying from issued daily via the flak bulletin and proved parti
twelve to forty-eight hours a tremendous im cularly valuable to fighter-bomber units employed
provement over the earlier intervals of one to two in close ground support roles.
IX Bomber Command
- IX TAC
on \ia tonh'ncnr
Early in April 1944 flak intelligence and analy were constructed by the Command flak analysis
sis was established in the IX Tactical Air Command officer which indicated correct attack headings and
with the arrival of antiaircraft officers at Command also the relative hazard of various defended targets.
and Wing headquarters. These curves were pioneers in this field of flak anal
Flak intelligence in those early days at Com ysis, and proved a great aid in operational planning
mand, Wing and some for fighters and fighter-
of the Group flak sec bombers.
tions was kept current
by plotting heavy and D-Day Preparation
light positions on the Prior to D-Day flak
conventional 1:50,000 lectures had been made
scale overlaid maps, at all units with the
while the remaining officers of both Com
Groups depended on the mand and Wing expend
flak map and the speci ing much effort in this
fic information sent regard in an endeavor
down to them for each to familiarize the pilots
mission from the Wing with their most danger
headquarters. In this ous foe and ways of
stage of the war, a few defeating it. At that time
months before the inva all flak pin-points within
sion, information receiv 300 miles of the English
ed from Ninth Air coast had been recorded
Porce and MI 15, as throughout the TAC,
well as from photo inter and so the intelligence
pretation units attached stage was set for the big
to the IX TAG and gest show of the century.
First Army, was screen Major General Elwood R. Quesada IX TAC flak was
ed and collated at Com really in on the ground
mand and passed down to Wings and Groups floor of the invasion, as one of its Wing flak officers
rapidly via the teletype circuit. hit Omaha beach on D plus 2, and the Command
One of the first big problems attacked and flak section came in on D plus 10 and started its
-solved by the Command section was that of flak operations. Communication difficulties during the
analysis for light flak. Curves of relative damage initial invasion stages led to a change in the basic
13
Maj. A. W. Haaland
ist Lt. F. R
Morrissey
reporting system. Verbal exchange of reported flak The flak sections had so proven their worth
fire was devised for more immediate dissemination by this time that throughout the Command these
of the operationally important intelligence. This sections were a working partner of combat opera
was necessary because it was no longer possible tions on ever\- mission, a set-up which lasted through
to contact the Group S-2's to brief on each individual out the European campaign.
target. Complete flak traces were still kept at Com With large volumes of photo and crew reports
mand and Wing levels, while the Groups main pouring in to all flak sections, flak personnel were
tained the information only in their operational bending under the strain. The ground battle situa
area. As these areas changed, bulletins were sent tion was so fluid that 84th Wing used a 1:250,000
from Wing to cover the new area. scale map indicating crew experience for the last
Studies For First Army 48 hours only. Flak fire was so common an occur
rence that an analysis of even this short a period
Several special tasks immediately presented
gave a good picture of flak dispositions in the parti
themselves, among which was a flak analysis made
cular operational area.
for the final assault on Cherbourg. Another was an
analysis of enemy ground defenses using flak dis
positions to indicate main concentrations. This
Flak Estimate at Remagen
second analysis was researched for First Army On all occasions the Command flak section
before the St. Lo offensive. worked very closely with the Army. When the
Remagen bridgehead was established, First Army
requested a complete analysis of enemy flak capa
bilities which the enemy could use in a ground role
to contain or counterattack the bridgehead. This
was completed and forwarded in three hours and
materially aided the Army G-2 in estimating the
enemy strength.
Throughout the war the flak officers continually
visited the Squadrons, as pilot turnover was high
and it was extremely essential to keep the pilots,
new and old, informed on the latest flak situation.
When the war drew to a close eleven months
later, IX TAG, the big brother of the tactical air
commands, could reflect with pride on its accom
plishments with the victorious First Army. No small
part of its operational success can be claimed by
its energetic and resourceful flak analysis section.
15
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