CASE No. 1 Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823),[2] is a landmark decision of the U.S.

Supreme Court that held

that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall, the
successor in interest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to maintain an action of ejectment against the holder
of a federal land patent.
The case is one of the most influential and well-known decisions of the Marshall Court, a fixture of the first-year curriculum in
nearly all US law schools. Marshall's prosaic and eminently quotable opinion lays down the foundations of the doctrine of
aboriginal title in the United States, and the related discovery doctrine. However, the vast majority of the opinion is dicta; as valid
title is a basic element of the cause of action for ejectment, the holding does not extend to the validity of M'Intosh's title, much less
the property rights of the Piankeshaw. Thus, all that the opinion holds with respect to aboriginal title is that it is inalienable, a
principle that remains well-established law in nearly all common law jurisdictions.
Citation to Johnson has been a staple of federal and state cases related to Native American land title for 200 years. Like Johnson,
nearly all of those cases involve land disputes between two non-Native parties, typically one with a chain of title tracing to a
federal or state government and the other with a chain of title predating US sovereignty. A similar trend can be seen in the early
case law of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. The first land dispute involving an indigenous party to reach to the Supreme
Court was Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831).

Background
Thomas Johnson, one of the first Supreme Court justices, bought land from Piankeshaw Native American tribes in 1773 and 1775.
The plaintiffs were lessees of Thomas Johnson's descendants, who had inherited the land. The defendant, William M'Intosh
(pronounced "McIntosh"), subsequently obtained a land patent, according to the facts as Marshall accepted them, to this same
land from the United States federal government. In fact, the two parcels did not overlap at all.[3] Further, there is evidence that the
parties were aware the tracts did not overlap and purposely misrepresented the facts to the court to obtain a ruling.[4]
Prior history[edit]
The plaintiffs brought an action for ejectment against M'Intosh in the United States District for the District of Illinois, contending that
their chain of title was superior by virtue of Johnson's purchases. The District Court dismissed the claim on the grounds that the
Piankeshaw were not able to convey the land.
Opinion
Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the dismissal.
Marshall begins with a lengthy discussion of history of the European discovery of the Americas and the legal foundations of the
American Colonies. In particular, Marshall focuses on the manner in which each European power acquired land from the
indigenous occupants. Synthesizing the law of nations, Marshall traces the outlines of the "discovery doctrine"namely, that a
European power gains radical title (also known as sovereignty) to the land it discovers. As a corollary, the discovering power gains
the exclusive right to extinguish the "right of occupancy" of the indigenous occupants, which otherwise survived the assumption of
sovereignty.
Marshall further opined that when they declared independence from Great Britain, the United States government inherited the
British right of preemption over Native American lands. The legal result is that the only Native American conveyances of land
which can create valid title are sales of land to the federal government.[5]
Legacy
Law and economics
At least one commentator has noted that Johnson, by holding that only the federal government could purchase Native American
lands, created a system of monopsony, which avoided bidding competition between settlers and thus enabled the acquisition of
Native American lands at the lowest possible cost.[6]
Role in law school curriculum
Prof. Stuart Banner at UCLA School of Law, writes of the case:
Johnson's continuing prominence is reinforced every year in law schools, where it is the very first case most beginning students
read in their required course in Property. The best-selling property casebook calls Johnson 'the genesis of our subject' because it
lays 'the foundations of landownership in the United States.' Given current sympathies for Native American, the outcome of the
case has come to be viewed with disapproval in law school. Johnson has joined Dred Scott v. Sandford and a few others to form a
small canon (or maybe an anti-canon) of famous cases law students are taught to criticize. The leading casebook describes the
philosophy underlying Johnson as 'discomforting' and quotes with approval the recent view of a law professor that Marshall's
opinion 'was rooted in a Eurocentric view of the inferiority of the Indian people.' Johnson, though, might be the only member of this
anti-canon that remains the law, and that is still cited as authority by lower courts several times a year.
CASE No. 2

United States Supreme Court

CHAVEZ v. U S, (1899)
No. 14
Argued: Decided: December 22, 1899
main body

Mr. F. W. Clancy for appellant.

Mr. Matthew G. Reynolds and Solicitor General Richards for appellee.

Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of private land claims refusing to confirm the title of the appellant to [175 U.S. 552,
553] some 5,000 acres of land in New Mexico, about 1 league from the Manzano grant. The title is evidenced by a grant by the
territorial deputation of New Mexico, made in 1831, and the first question in the case relates to the authority of that body to make
the grant.
It is also contended that if the territorial deputation did not have the power to make the grant, and that power rested with the
governor of the department, his presence in the territorial deputation as its ex officio president when the grant was made, and, so
far as the record shows, his not protesting but acquiescing in its action, was equivalent to and the same as a grant made by
himself in his official character as governor.
It is further stated that by reason of the action of the governor in writing the letter dated December 22, 1831, and hereinafter set
forth, that officer ratified and confirmed the grant, and in effect made it his own.
It appears from the record that on February 28, 1831, citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya petitioned the honorable corporation of Tome,
and asked it that it would append to his petition its own report to the most excellent deputation, so that that body should grant him
the land described in the petition. The corporation of Tome, on the 19th of March, 1831, granted the prayer of the petitioner, and
adopted a resolution which provided that his petition should 'go before the most excellent territorial deputation, which, as the
authority competent, may accede to the donation of the land prayed for by the said petitioner without injuring the pastures and
watering places for the passersby.' The resolution was accordingly forwarded to the territorial deputation, and that body on
November 12, 1831, took action as follows: (Extract from record of proceedings of the territorial deputation, session of November
12, 1831.)
The foregoing record having been read and approved, a petition of citizen Nerio Montoya, a resident of Valencia, in which he asks
for the donation, for agricultural purposes, of a tract of vacant land in the Manzano within the limits of the Ojo de en Medio as far
as the rancheria, was taken up and the [175 U.S. 552, 554] report of the respectable corporation council of Tome, in which it is
set forth that there is no objection to the concession of the said land, having been heard it was ordered that it be granted.
... * *
The session was adjourned.
Santiago Abreu, President. (Rubric.)
Juan Rafael Ortiz. (Rubric.)
Anto. Jose Martinez. (Rubric.)
Jose Manl. Salazar. (Rubric.)
Teodosio Quintana. (Rubric.)
Ramon Abreu, Secretary. (Rubric.)
In accordance with this action, the following direction by the deputation, signed by its secretary, was given the alcalde of the
proper jurisdiction:
Santa F e, November 12, 1831
The honorable the deputation of this territory, having received the report of the constitutional council of Tome, appended to this
petition, has resolved in this day's session to grant the land prayed for by the petitioner, charging the alcalde of said jurisdiction to
execute the document that will secure the grantee in the grant hereby made to him. Abreu, Secretary.
The alcalde thereupon executed a document which, after reciting that, 'in obedience to the decree of the most excellent deputation
of this territory made under date of November 12 of the current year on the margin of the petition which, under date of February
28, the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya, resident of this said jurisdiction, presented to this honorable council, and on which petition
is recorded the report made by this council, in accordance with which report its excellency has deemed it proper to accede to the
petition of Montoya, granting him full and formal possession of the tract he prayed for,' etc., declared that 'Montoya, whenever he
may choose or think best to do, may notify me to proceed with him to the locality to place him in possession of the property [175
U.S. 552, 555] granted him, with all the customary formality,' etc. This was dated December 7, 1831, and signed by the alcalde.
On December 12 in the same year the same alcalde, 'in compliance with the provision made by this most excellent deputation of
this territory and the notification given me by the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya,' proceeded with Montoya to the tract of land
granted him and placed him in possession thereof, the act being signed by the alcalde.
There was also put in evidence on the trial of the action in the court below, on the question of ratification, the following:
Office of the Political Chief of New Mexico.
By your official communication of the 20th instant, I am advised of your having executed the decree of the most excellent
deputation granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land.
But in regard to the inquiry you make of me, as to how much your fee should be, I inform you that I am ignorant in the premises,
and that you may, if you choose to do, put the question to the assessor (asesor), who is the officer to whom it belongs, to advise
the justices of first instance in such cases.
God and Liberty.
Santa F e, December 22d, 1831.
Jose Antonio Chavez.
To Alderman Miguel Olona.
Various mesne conveyances were put in evidence on the trial, showing the transfer to the appellant of whatever title Montoya had
to the land described, and it was then admitted that the appellant herein has succeeded to all the rights of the original grantee, if
any, in this case. Evidence of possession under this grant was also given.
The court below held that the departmental assembly or territorial deputation had no power or authority to make a grant of lands at
the time the grant in this case was attempted to be made, and that the fact that the governor may have presided at the meeting at
the time the action was taken made no difference, as the power to make the [175 U.S. 552, 556] grant was exclusively in the
governor, and the territorial deputation had no jurisdiction in the matter. The claim was therefore rejected.
We think that in thus deciding the court below was right.
We refer to some of the cases which show the territorial deputation did not have the power to make a grant, but only the power to
subsequently approve it.
In United States v. Vallejo, 1 Black, 541, 17 L. ed. 232, it was held that the Mexican law of 1824 and the regulations of 1828
altered and repealed the Spanish system of disposing of public lands, and that the law and the regulations from the time of their
passage were the only laws of Mexico on the subject of granting public lands in the territories. It was also held that the governor
did not possess any power to make grants public lands independently of that conferred by the act of 1824 and the regulations of
1828. Mr. Justice Nelson, who delivered the opinion of the court in that case, refers to the various sections of the law of 1824, and
also to the regulations of November, 1828, for the purpose of showing that the governors of the territories were authorized to grant
vacant lands within their respective territories with the object of cultivation or settlement, and that the grants made by them to
individuals or families were not to be definitively valid without the previous consent of the departmental assembly, and when the
grant petitioned for had been definitively made a patent, signed by the governor, was to be issued, which was to serve as a title to
the party. This case did not decide that the territorial deputation could not make a valid grant, because the grant was made by the
governor, but the various extracts from the law and regulations indicate very plainly that the authority to initiate a grant of public
lands existed in the governor alone, and not in the assembly.
In United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, 20 L. ed. 602, it was held that departmental assemblies (territorial deputations) had no
power to make a grant.
In his argument, at the bar, counsel for this appellant contended that the territorial deputation had lawful power and [175 U.S. 552,
557] authority to make the grant to Montoya, and in order to maintain that proposition stated that it was necessary to discuss the
effect of the decision of this court in United States v. Vigil, 13 Wall. 449, 20 L. ed. 602. He claimed that what was said as to the
lack of power in the territorial deputation to make a grant was not necessary to the decision of the court in that case, and that such
expressions as were therein used regarding the question would not, therefore, constitute a precedent now binding on this court.
In Vigil's Case there was a petition to the departmental assembly, through the governor of New Mexico, asking for a grant of land
which in fact amounted to over 2,000,000 acres, the grantees binding themselves, if the grant were made, to construct two wells
for the relief and aid of travelers, and to establish two factories for the use of the state, and to protect them from hostile invasion.
The governor transmitted the petition to the assembly, but declined to recommend that favorable action should be taken upon it.
The assembly, notwithstanding this refusal, granted the tract on January 10, 1846, for the purpose of constructing wells and
cultivating the land, etc., and the question was as to the validity of this grant.
The opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Davis, who stated that it had been repeatedly decided by this court that the only laws in
force in the territories of Mexico, for the disposition of public lands, with the exception of those relating to missions and towns,
were the act of the Mexican congress of 1824 and the regulations of 1828. In the course of his opinion he said:
'These regulations conferred on the governors of the territories, 'the political chiefs,' as they are called, the authority to
grant vacant lands, and did not delegate it to the departmental assembly. It is true the grant was not complete until the
approval of the assembly, and in this sense the assembly and governor acted concurrently, but the initiative must be taken
by the governor. He was required to act in the first instance-to decide whether the petitioner was a fit person to receive the
grant, and whether the land itself could be granted without prejudice to the public or individuals. In case the [175 U.S. 552,
558] information was satisfactory on these points, he was authorized to make the grant, and at the proper time to lay it
before the assembly, who were required to give or withhold their consent. They were in this respect an advisory body to
the governor, and sustained the same relation to him that the Senate of the United States does to the President in the
matter of appointments and treaties.'
A subsequent portion of the opinion dealt with the case upon the assumption that the grant had been made by the governor, and
even in that case it was said the grant would have been invalid because it violated the fundamental rule on which the right of
donation was placed by the law; that the essential element of colonization was wanting, and that the number of acres granted was
enormously in excess of the maximum quantity grantable under the law. This in nowise affected the prior ground upon which the
opinion was based, that the departmental assembly had no power to make the grant. That was the essential and material question
directly involved in the case, while the second ground mentioned was based upon an assumption that, even if the governor had
made the grant, it would still have been void for the reason stated. The court did not base its decision that the departmental
assembly had no power to make the grant because of its enormous extent. It held that the assembly had no power to make any
grant, no matter what its size. It is, as we think, a decision covering this case.
In Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637 , 42 L. ed. 1174, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735, the grant was by the territorial deputation of New
Mexico, and it was stated by Mr. Justice White, speaking for the court, that 'it cannot be in reason held that a title to land derived
from a territory which the territorial authorities did not own, over which they had no power of disposition, was regularly derived
from either Spain or Mexico or a state of the Mexican nation.'
No presumption that the territorial deputations had authority to make grants can arise from the fact that in some instances those
bodies assumed to make them. The case in this respect bears no resemblance to United States v. Percheman, 7 Pet. 51-96, 8 L.
ed. 604-620, or to United States v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 436, 447, 453, 8 L. ed. 1001, 1005, 1007. In those cases it was not denied that
the governor had authority in [175 U.S. 552, 559] some circumstances to make grants, and it was therefore held that a grant
made by him was prima facie evidence that he had not exceeded his power in making it, and that he who denied it took upon
himself the burden of showing that the officer by making the grant had transcended the power reposed in him. There is in the case
before us no evidence that the territorial deputation had the power in any event to make grants other than the fact that in some
instances it assumed to make them.
The cases heretofore decided in this court, and some of which have been above referred to, show that such fact is inadequate to
prove the existence of the authority.
It is, however, urged that the record of the action of the territorial deputation in regard to this grant shows that the governor and ex
officio president of the deputation was present when the deputation decided to make the grant as petitioned for, and that his being
so present and attesting the action of the deputation was equivalent to the making of the grant himself as governor. We do not
think so. He did not assume to make any grant whatever, and certainly none in his character as governor. It does not even appear
beyond doubt that he was present when the deputation made the grant. His signature is perfectly consistent with a mere
authentication of the previous action of that body.
The petition of Montoya was addressed primarily to the corporation of Tome, and he requested that corporation to send his
petition, approved by it, to the deputation to make him a grant of the land described in his petition. Acting under that request, the
corporation of Tome sent his petition to the 'most excellent territorial deputation,' and asked that body to accede to the donation of
the land prayed for. In conformity to the petition, the territorial deputation itself made the grant. The fact that the governor, being ex
officio a member of the deputation, signed as president of that body the record of the act of the deputation, is not the equivalent of
a grant by him in his official character of governor, nor does such act bear any resemblance to a grant by him. No one on reading
the record would get the idea that the gov- [175 U.S. 552, 560] ernor was himself making the grant or that he thereby intended so
to do. It does not even show that he was in favor of the grant as made by the deputation. His signing the record constituted
nothing more than an authentication of the act of the deputation. It purported to be nothing else. He might have properly signed
the record if in fact he had voted against the grant, and had been opposed to the action of the assembly. He might have signed
the record as an authentication, and yet have been absent at the time of the action of the assembly. In any event, it was his
signature as an ex officio member or presiding officer of the deputation, attesting or perhaps assenting to its action, and it was not
his action as governor making a grant in that capacity. The signature by the secretary alone, to the instrument (above set forth,
dated November 12, 1831) which recites the previous action of the deputation, and charges the alcalde of the jurisdiction to
execute the document which will secure the grantee in the grant, is simply a direction to the alcalde, and has no materiality upon
this branch of the case other than as confirming the view that the grant was solely that of the deputation.
We cannot hold that, when the power was given under the laws of Mexico to the governor to make grants of lands, he in any
manner exercised that power or performed an act equivalent to its exercise, by presiding ex officio at a meeting of the territorial
deputation which made a grant of lands in conformity to a petition solely addressed to it, and by authenticating as president the
action of the deputation in deciding that the grant should be made.
The two positions, president of the deputation and governor, are separate and distinct, and the action of a governor merely as
president of the deputation, and of the nature above described, is not in any sense and does not purport to be his separate and
independent action as governor, making a grant of lands pursuant to a petition addressed to him officially. As governor he might
refuse the grant upon a petition addressed to himself, when as president of the deputation he might sign the record authenticating
its action in regard to a petition [175 U.S. 552, 561] addressed solely to that body. And it is obvious from the wording of the
record that the president of the deputation was not assuming to act as governor upon a petition addressed to himself, but only as
the president of the deputation. It might have been that he acquiesced in the assumption by the deputation of the right to make the
grant, but his act of signing the record cannot be tortured into a grant or as the equivalent of a grant by himself.
It is further urged that there has been what amounts to a grant by the governor by reason of his letter of December 22, 1831,
signed by him and above set forth, thus, as is claimed, ratifying the grant of the deputation and making it his own.
The only evidence that the person who signed the letter was the governor at that time is the heading of the letter, 'Office of the
Political Chief of New Mexico.' It will be also noted that the person signing it is not the same one who signed the record of
November 12, 1831, as president of the deputation. But assuming that Chavez was governor in December, 1831, when he signed
the letter, he therein simply acknowledged the receipt of the official communication of the alcalde, in which that officer reports that
he had executed the decree 'of the most excellent deputation, granting to the citizen Nerio Antonio Montoya a tract of land.' In
reply to the question as to how much the alcalde's fee should be, he answered that he was ignorant of the premises, and advised
the alcalde to put the question to the assessor, the officer to whom it belonged to advise the justices in the first instances in such
cases.
Now what does the governor ratify by this letter? Nothing.
The contention in favor of the grant, based upon the letter, is, that assuming the governor had power to make the grant, it was his
duty when he learned from the report of the alcalde that one had been made by the deputation, and that possession had been
delivered under it, to protest against and to deny the power of the deputation to make such grant, and unless he did so, his silence
was evidence of the fact that he not only approved the act of the deputation in making the grant, but that he approved it as his
own, and that such [175 U.S. 552, 562] approval was the same as if the governor had himself made the grant, and in substance
and effect it was his grant.
This contention, we think, is not founded upon any legal principle, and is in itself unreasonable. The writer of the letter is not the
same person who signed the record of the proceedings of the deputation. The report of the alcalde gave him the information
which, it is true, he may have had before, that the deputation had assumed the power to grant the land. His protest as to the
legality of such action would not have altered the fact that it had occurred, while, on the other hand, his silence might simply be
construed as evidence of his unreadiness at that time to dispute, or possibly of his belief in the validity of the action of the
deputation. Or his silence might have been simply the result of his approval of the act of the alcalde in obeying the commands of
the deputation, while he thought it was not the proper occasion upon which to contest or deny the validity of the grant which the
deputation had actually made. Many reasons for his silence might be suggested, but the claim that it equaled in law a positive
grant by the governor is, as we think, untenable.
While such silence is entirely consistent with other views that might have been held by the governor, it certainly cannot properly be
ascribed, as a legal inference from the facts stated, to his desire to make the grant himself, nor could it be said that his desire (if
he had it) was the legal equivalent of an actual grant.
His knowledge that another body had assumed to make a grant is not equivalent to the making of the grant himself, and he was
the person who alone had power to make it. There is nothing in the letter which aids the plaintiff herein.
Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to prove a valid title. In United States
v. Chaves, 159 U.S. 452 , 40 L. ed. 215, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57, the possession was under the claim of a grant made by the
governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by witnesses, and its
existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as was stated in the opin- [175 U.S. 552, 563] ion (page 460, L. ed. p. 219,
Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 60), to warrant 'the finding of the court below that the complainants' title was derived from the Republic of Mexico,
and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New Mexico, within
which the land was situated.' We do not question the correctness of the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to evidence
of possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances be drawn as to the existence of a grant.
We do not deny the right or the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give to
long- continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal title. We recognize and enforce such rule in the case
of United States v. Chavez, decided at this term, 175 U.S. 509 , 44 L. ed. --, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159, in which the question is
involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not of a duration long enough to justify any such inference.
There is no proof of any valid grant, but, on the contrary, the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which he bases the
title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and which,
therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this
grant alone that possession of the lands was taken. We cannot presume (within the time involved in this case) that any other and
valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in
1848, had not been long enough to presume a grant. Crespin v. United States, 168 U.S. 208 , 42 L. ed. 438, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53;
Hayes v. United States, 170 U.S. 637, 649 , 653 S., 42 L. ed. 1174, 1179, 1180, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Hays v. United States, just
decided, 175 U.S. 248 , 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80, 44 L. ed. --. The possession subsequently existing, we cannot notice. Ibid.
We think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
CASE NO. 3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1413 March 30, 1904
ANDRES VALENTON, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MANUEL MURCIANO, defendant-appellee.
Montagne and Dominguez for appellants.
Del Pan, Ortigas and Fisher for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
I. The findings of fact made by the court below in its decision are as follows:
First. That in the year 1860, the plaintiffs, and each one of them, entered into the peaceful and quiet occupation and possession of
the larger part of the lands described in the complaint of the plaintiffs, to wit [description]:
Second. That on the date on which the plaintiffs entered into the occupation and possession of the said lands, as above set forth,
these lands and every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied, and belonged to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands. That immediately after the occupation and possession of the said lands by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs began to
cultivate and improve them in a quiet and peaceful manner.
Third. That from the said year 1860, the plaintiffs continued to occupy and possess the said lands, quietly and peacefully, until the
year 1892, by themselves, by their agents and tenants, claiming that they were the exclusive owners of said lands.
Fourth. That on or about the 16th day of January, 1892, Manuel Murciano, defendant in this proceeding, acting on behalf of and as
attorney in fact of Candido Capulong, by occupation a cook, denounced the said lands to the then existing Government of the
Philippine Islands, declaring that the said lands every part thereof were public, untilled, and unoccupied lands belonging to the
then existing Government of the Philippine Islands, and petitioned for the sale of the same to him.
Fifth. That before the execution of the sale heretofore mentioned, various proceedings were had for the survey and measurement
of the lands in question at the instance of the defendant, Murciano, the latter acting as agent and attorney in fact of said Candido
Capulong, a written protest, however, having been entered against these proceedings by the plaintiff Andres Valenton.
Sixth. That on the 14th day of July, 1892, Don Enrique Castellvie Ibarrola, secretary of the treasury of the Province of Tarlac, in his
official capacity as such secretary, executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which said lands were sold and conveyed by him
to the defendant, Manuel Murciano, as attorney for the said Candido Capulong.
Seventh. That on the 19th day of July, 1892, said Candido Capulong executed a contract of purchase and sale, by which he sold
and conveyed the said lands to the defendants, Manuel Murciano.
Eight. That from the said 14th day of July, 1892, Manuel Murciano has at no time occupied or possessed all of the land
mentioned, but has possessed only certain in distinct and indefinite portions of the same. That during all this time the plaintiffs
have opposed the occupation of the defendant, and said plaintiffs during all the time in question have been and are in the
possession and occupation of part of the said lands, tilling them and improving them by themselves and by their agents and
tenants.
Ninth. That never, prior to the said 14th day of July,, 1892, has the defendant, Manuel Murciano, been in the peaceful and quiet
possession and occupation of the said lands, or in the peaceful and quiet occupation of any part thereof.
Upon these facts the Court of First Instance ordered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the plaintiffs had lost all right
to the land by not pursuing their objections to the sale mentioned in the sixth finding. The plaintiffs excepted to the judgment and
claim in this court that upon the facts found by the court below judgment should have been entered in their favor. Their contention
is that in 1890 they had been in the adverse possession of the property for thirty years; that, applying the extra ordinary period of
prescription of thirty years, found as well in the Partidas as in the Civil Code, they then became the absolute owners of the land as
against everyone, including the State, and that when the State in 1892 deeded the property to the defendant, nothing passed by
the deed because the State had nothing to convey.
The case presents, therefore, the important question whether or not during the years from 1860 to 1890 a private person, situated
as the plaintiffs were, could have obtained as against the State the ownership of the public lands of the State by means of
occupation. The court finds that at the time of the entry by the plaintiff in 1860 the lands were vacant and were public lands
belonging to the then existing Government. The plaintiffs do not claim to have ever obtained from the Government any deed for
the lands, nor any confirmation of their possession.
Whether in the absence of any special legislation on the subject a general statute of limitations in which the State was not
expressly excepted would run against the State as to its public lands we do not find it necessary to decide. Reasons based upon
public policy could be adduced why it should not, at least as to such public lands as are involved in this case. (See Act No. 926,
sec. 67.) We are, however, of the opinion that the case at bar must be decided, not by the general statute of limitation contained in
the Partidas, but by those special laws which from the earliest times have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the
colonies.
Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription against the State as to these lands; and if so, to what extend was it
recognizes? Laws of very early date provided for the assignment of public lands to the subjects of the Crown. Law 1, title 12, book
4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias is an example of them, and is as follows:
In order that our subjects may be encouraged to undertake the discovery and settlement of the Indies, and that they may live with
the comfort and convenience which we desire, it is our will that there shall be distributed to all those who shall go out to people the
new territories, houses, lots, lands, peonias, and caballerias in the towns and places which may be assigned to them by the
governor of the new settlement, who in apportioning the lands, will distinguish between gentlemen and peasants, and those of
lower degree and merit, and who will add to the possessions and better the condition of the grantees, according to the nature of
the services rendered by them, and with a view to the promotion of agriculture and stock raising. To those who shall have labored
and established a home on said lands and who shall have resided in the said settlement for a period of four years we grant the
right thereafter to sell and in every other manner to exercise their free will over said lands as over their own property. And we
further command that, in accordance with their rank and degree, the governor, or whoever may be invested with our authority,
shall allot the Indians to them in any distribution made, so that they may profit by their labor and fines in accordance with the
tributes required and the law controlling such matters.
And in order that, in allotting said lands, there may be no doubt as to the area of each grant, we declare that a peonia shall consist
of a tract fifty feet in breadth by one hundred in length, with arable land capable of producing one hundred bushels of wheat or
barley, ten bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as two yokes of oxen may plough in a day, and for the planting of other
trees of a hardy nature as much as may be plowed with eight yokes in a day, and including pasture for twenty cows, five mares,
one hundred sheep, twenty goats, and ten breeding pigs. A caballeria shall be a tract one hundred feet in breadth and two
hundred in length, and in other respects shall equal five peonias that is, it will include arable land capable of producing five
hundred bushels of wheat or barley and fifty bushels of maize, as much land for an orchard as may be ploughed with ten yokes of
oxen in a day, and for the planting of other hardy trees as much as forty yokes may plough in a day, together with pasturage for
one hundred cows, twenty mares, five hundred sheep, one hundred goats, and fifty breeding pigs. And we order that the
distribution be made in such a manner that all may receive equal benefit therefrom, and if this be impracticable, then that each
shall be given his due.
But it was necessary, however, that action should in all cases be taken by the public officials before any interest was acquired by
the subject.
Law 8 of said title 12 is as follows:
We command that if a petition shall be presented asking the grant of a lot or tract of land in a city or town in which one of our
courts may be located, the presentation shall be made to the municipal council. If the latter shall approve the petition, two deputy
magistrates will be appointed, who will acquaint the viceroy or municipal president with the council's judgment in the matter. After
consideration thereof by the viceroy or president and the deputy magistrates, all will sign the grants, in the presence of the clerk of
the council, in order that the matter may be duly recorded in the council book. If the petition shall be for the grant of waters and
lands for mercantile purpose, it shall be presented to the viceroy or municipal president, who will transmit it to the council. If the
latters shall vote to make the grant, one of the magistrates will carry its decision to the viceroy or president, to the end that, upon
consideration of the matter by him, the proper action may be taken.
It happened, in the course of time, that tracts of the public land were found in the possession of persons who either had no title
papers therefor issued by the State, or whose title papers were defective, either because the proper procedure had not been
followed or because they had been issued by persons who had no authority to do so. Law 14, title 12 book 4 of said compilation
(referred to in the regulations of June 25, 1880, for the Philippines) was the first of a long series of legislative acts intended to
compel those in possession of the public lands, without written evidence of title, or with defective title papers, to present evidence
as to their possession or grants, and obtain the confirmation of their claim to ownership. That law is as follows:
We having acquitted full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands territories, and possession not heretofore ceded away by our
royal predecessors, or by, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are
held without proper and true deeds of grants be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after reserving before
all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and
commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also the future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasturage, confirming them in
what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to
dispose of as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designated, at such time as shall to them
seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them,
and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of
proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be
disposed of at our will.
While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time,
yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed,
and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner.
In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have not been
granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who proceeded him. This statement excludes the idea that there might be lands
no so granted, that did not being to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all ungranted lands,
because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the law all the occupants of
the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be fixed by them, their title papers. And
those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of
the law that mere possession for a length of time should make the possessors the owners of the lands possessed by them without
any action on the part of the authorities. It is plain that they were required to present their claims to the authorities and obtain a
confirmation thereof. What the period of prescription mentioned in this law was does not appear, but latter, in 1646, law 19 of the
same title declared "that no one shall be 'admitted to adjustment' unless he has possessed the lands for ten years."
In law 15, title 12, book 4 of the same compilation, there is a command that those lands as to which there has been no adjustment
with the Government be sold at auction to the highest bidder. That law is as follows:
For the greater good of our subjects, we order and command that our viceroys and governing presidents shall do nothing with
respect to lands the claims to which have been adjusted by their predecessors, tending to disturb the peaceful possession of the
owners thereof. As to those who shall have extended their possession beyond the limits fixed in the original grants, they will be
admitted to a moderate adjustment with respect to the excess, and new title deeds will be issued therefor. And all those lands as
to which no adjustment has been made shall, without exception, be sold at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price
therefor to be payable either in cash or in the form of quitrent, in accordance with the laws and royal ordinances of the kingdoms
of Castile. We leave to the viceroys and president the mode and from in which what is here ordered shall be carried into effect in
order that they may provide for it at the least possible cost; and in order that all unnecessary expense with respect to the
collections for said lands may be avoided, we command that the same be made by our royal officers in person, without the
employment of special collectors, and to that end availing themselves of the services of our royal courts, and, in places where
courts shall not have been established, of the town mayors.
And whereas, title deeds to lands have been granted by officers not authorized to issue them, and such titles have been confirmed
by us in council, we command that those holding such a certificate of confirmation may continue to possess the lands to which it
refers, and will, within the limits stated in the confirmation certificate, be protected in their possession; and with respect to any
encroachment beyond such limits will be admitted to the benefits of this law.
Another legislative act of the same character was the royal cedula of October 15, 1754 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San
Pedro, 673). Articles 3, 4, and 5 of this royal cedula as follows:
3. Upon each principal subdelegate's appointment, which will be made in the manner prescribed in article 1 of this cedula, and
upon his receipts of these instructions, of which every principal subdelegate already designated or who may hereafter be
appointed shall be furnished a copy, said subdelegate will in his turn issue a general order to the courts in the provincial capitals
and principal towns of his district, directing the publication therein, in the manner followed in connection with the promulgation or
general orders of viceroys, presidents, and administrative courts in matters connected with my service, of these instructions, to the
end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication of said order, shall
have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated of tenanted, may, either in person or through their
attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are
occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which such documents must be presented a term sufficient in
length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose of making the presentation. Said
subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the
term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of an evicted from their lands, and they will be
granted to others.
4. If it shall appear from the titles or instruments presented, or if it shall be shown in any other legal manner that said persons are
in possession of such royal lands by virtue of a sale or adjustment consummated by duly authorized subdelegates prior to the said
year 1700, although such action may not have been confirmed by my royal person, or by a viceroy or president, they shall in no
wise be molested, but shall be left in the full and quiet possession of the same; nor shall they be required to pay any fee on
account of these proceedings, in accordance with law 15, title 12, book 4 of the Recopilacion de los Indias, above cited. A note
shall be made upon said title deeds to the effect that his obligation has been complied with, to the end that the owners of such
rival lands and their successors may hereafter be free from denunciation, summons, or other disturbance in their possession.
Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as
a valid title by prescription; provided, however, that if the lands shall not be in state of cultivation or tillage, the term of three
months prescribed by law 11 of the title and book cited, or such other period as may be deemed adequate, shall be designated as
the period within which the lands must be reduced to cultivation, with the warning that in case of their failure so to do the lands will
be granted, with the same obligation to cultivate them, to whomsoever may denounce them.
5. Likewise neither shall possessors of lands sold or adjusted by the various subdelegates from the year 1700 to the present time
be molested, disturbed, or denounced, now or at any other time, with respect to such possession, if such sales or adjustments
shall have been confirmed by me, or by the viceroy or the president of the court of the district in which the lands are located while
authorized to exercise this power. In cases where the sales of adjustments shall not have been so confirmed, the possessors will
present to the courts of their respective district and to the other officials hereby empowered to receive the same, a petition asking
for the confirmation of said sales and adjustments. After the proceedings outlined by the subdelegates in their order with respect
to the measurement and valuation of the said lands, and with reference to the title issued therefor, shall have been duly
completed, said courts and officials will make an examination of the same for the purpose of ascertaining whether the sale or
adjustment has been made without fraud and collusion, and for an adequate and equitable price, and a similar examination shall
be made by the prosecuting attorney of the district, to the end that, in view of all the proceedings and the purchase or adjustment
price of the land, and the media anata having been duly, etc., paid into the royal treasury, as well as such additional sum as may
be deemed proper, there will be issued to the possessor, in my royal name, a confirmation of his title, by virtue of which his
possession and ownership of lands and waters which it represents will be fully legalized, to the end that at no time will he or his
heirs or assigns be disturbed or molested therein.
The wording of this law is much stronger than that of law 14. As is seen by the terms of article 3, any person whatever who
occupied any public land was required to present the instruments by virtue of which he was in possession, within a time to be fixed
by the authorities, and he was warned that if he did not do so he would be evicted from his land and it would be granted to others.
By terms of article 4 those possessors to whom grants had been made prior to 1700, were entitled to have such grants confirmed,
and it was also provided that not being able to prove any grants it should be sufficient to prove "that ancient possession," as a
sufficient title by prescription, and they should be confirmed in their holdings. "That ancient possession" would be at least fifty-four
years, for it would have to date from prior to 1700. Under article 5, where the possession dated from 1700, no confirmation could
be granted on proof of prescription alone.
The length of possession required to be proved before the Government would issue a deed has varied in different colonies and at
different times. In the Philippines, as has been seen, it was at one time ten years, at another time fifty-four years at least. In Cuba,
by the royal cedula of April 24, 1833, to obtain a deed one had to prove, as to uncultivated lands, a possession of one hundred
years, and as to cultivated lands a possession of fifty years. In the same islands, by the royal order of July 16, 1819, a possession
of forty years was sufficient.
In the Philippines at a later date royal of September 21, 1797 (4 Legislacion Ultramarina, Rodriguez San Pedro, p. 688), directed
the observation of the said royal cedula of 1754, but apparently without being subject to the period of prescription therein
assigned.
The royal order of July 5, 1862 (Gaceta de Manila, November 15, 1864), also ordered that until regulations on the subject could be
prepared the authorities of the Islands should follow strictly the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and
the said royal cedula of 1754.
The royal order of November 14, 1876 (Guia del Comprador de Terrenos, p. 51), directed the provincial governors to urge those in
unlawful possession of public lands to seek an adjustment with the State in accordance with the existing laws. The regulations as
to the adjustment (composicion) of the titles to public lands remained in this condition until the regulations of June 25, 1880. This
is the most important of the modern legislative acts upon the matter of "adjustment" as distinguished from that of the sale of the
public lands.
The royal degree approving these regulations is dated June 25, 1880, and is as follows:1
Upon the suggestion of the colonial minister, made in conformity with the decree of the full meeting of the council of state, I hereby
approve the attached regulations for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine
Islands.
Articles 1, 4, 5, 8, and part of article 6 are as follows:
ART. 1. For the purpose of these regulations and in conformity with law 14, title 12, book 4 of the Recompilation of Laws of the
Indies, the following will be regarded as royal lands: All lands whose lawful ownership is not vested in some private, persons, or,
what is the same thing, which have never passed to private ownership by virtue of cession by competent authorities, made either
gratuitously or for a consideration.
ART. 4. For all legal effects, those will be considered proprietors of the royal lands herein treated who may prove that they have
possessed the lands without interruption during the period of ten years, by virtue of a good title and in good faith.
ART. 5. In the same manner, those who without such title deeds may prove that they have possessed their said lands without
interruption for a period of twenty years if in a state of cultivation, or for a period of thirty years if uncultivated, shall be regarded as
proprietors thereof. In order that a tract of land may be considered cultivated, it will be necessary to show that it has been broken
within the last three years.
ART. 6. Interested parties not included within the two preceding articles may legalize their possession and thereby acquire the full
ownership of the said lands, by means of adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner: . . .
(5) Those who, entirely without title deeds, may be in possession of lands belonging to the State and have reduced said lands to a
state of cultivation, may acquire the ownership thereof by paying into the public treasury the value of the lands at the time such
possessors or their representatives began their unauthorized enjoyment of the same.
(6) In case said lands shall never have been ploughed, but are still in a wild state, or covered with forest, the ownership of the
same may be acquired by paying their value at the time of the filing of the claim, as stated in the fourth paragraph."
ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are unlawfully enjoying within the
time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation in connection
with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the
ownership of the State over the lands, and will, after fixing the value thereof, proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same
which either because it may have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone is not deemed advisable to
preserve as the State forest reservation.
The other articles of the regulations state the manner in which applications should be made for adjustment, and the proceedings
thereon.
Do these regulations declare that those who are included in article 4 and 5 are the absolute owners of the land occupied by them
without any action on their part, or that of the State, or do they declare that such persons must seek an adjustment and obtain a
deed from the State, and if they do not do so within the time named in article 8 they lose all interest in the lands?
It must be admitted from the wording of the law that the question is not free from doubt. Upon a consideration, however, of the
whole matter, that doubt must, we think, be resolved in favor of the State. The following are some of the reasons which lead us to
that conclusion:
(1) It will be noticed that article 4 does not say that those persons shall be considered as owners who have occupied the lands for
ten years, which would have been the language naturally used if an absolute grant had been intended. It says, instead, that those
shall be considered owners who may prove that they have been in possession ten years. Was this proof to be made at any time in
the future when the question might arise, or was it to be made in the proceedings which these very regulations provided for that
purpose? We think that the latter is the proper construction.
(2) Article 1 declares in plain terms that all those lands as to which the State has never executed any deeds are the property of the
State that is, that on June 25, 1880, no public lands belonged to individuals unless they could exhibit a State deed therefor.
This is entirely inconsistent with the idea that the same law in its article 4 declares that the lands in question in this case became
the property of the plaintiffs in 1870, and were not in 1880 the property of the State, though the State had never given any deed
for them.
(3) The royal decree, by its terms, relates to lands wrongfully withheld by private persons. The word detentados necessarily
implies this. This is inconsistent with the idea that by article 4 of the plaintiffs, in 1870, became the absolute owners of the lands in
question, and were not therefore, in 1880, withholding what did not belong to them.
(4) In the preface to this decree and regulations, the following language is used:
SIR: The uncertain, and it may be said the precarious, state of real property in various parts of the Philippine Islands, as yet
sparsely populated; the necessity for encouraging the cultivation of these lands; the advantage of increasing the wealth and
products of the Archipelago; the immense and immediate profit which must result to all classes of interests, public as well as
private, from the substitution of full ownership, with all the privileges which by law accompany this real right, for the mere
possession of the lands, have long counseled the adoption of the provisions contained in the following regulations, which, after
consulation with the Philippine council, and in conformity with an order passed at a full meeting of the council of state, the
subscribing minister has the honor to submit for the royal approval. These regulations refer not only to tenants of royal lands in
good faith and by virtue of a valid title, but also to those who, lacking these, may, either by themselves reducing such lands to
cultivation or by the application of intelligence and initiative, causing their cultivation by others who lack these qualities, be
augmenting the wealth of the Archipelago.2
This preface is the most authoritative commentary on the law, and shows without doubt that those who held with color of title and
good faith were, notwithstanding, holding wrongfully, and that true ownership should be substituted for their possession.
(5) This doubt suggested by the wording of the law was the subject of inquiries directed to the officers in Manila charged with its
execution. These inquiries were answered in the circular of August 10, 1881, published in the Gaceta de Manila August 11, 1881,
as follows:
Should possessors of royal lands under color of title and in good faith seek adjustment?
It is evident that they must do so, for it is to them that article 4 of the regulations refers, as also the following article covers other
cases of possession under different circumstances. It should be well understood by you, and you should in turn have it understood
by other, that the adjustment of lands whose ownership has not passed to private individuals by virtue of cession by competent
authorities, is optional only for those within the limits of the common district (legua comunal) as provided by article 7. In all other
cases where the interested parties shall fail to present themselves for the adjustment of the lands occupied by them shall suffer
the penalties set forth in article 8 of said regulations.
In determining the meaning of a law where a doubt exists the construction placed upon it by the officers whose duty it is to
administer it is entitled to weight.
(6) There is, moreover, legislative construction of these regulations upon this point found in subsequent laws. The royal decree of
December 26, 1884, (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 117), provides in articles 1 that
All those public lands wrongfully withheld by private person in the Philippines which, in accordance with the regulations of June
25, 1880, are subject to adjustment with the treasury, shall be divided into three groups, of which the first shall include those
which, because they are included in articles 4 and 5, and the first paragraph of article 7, are entitled to free adjustment.
There were exceptions to this rule which are not here important. Article 10 provides that if the adjustment is free for those
mentioned in articles 4 and 5, who are included in the second group, the deed shall be issued by the governor of the province.
Article 11 says that if the adjustment is not free, because the applicant has not proved his right by prescription, then no deed can
be issued until the proper payment has been made. The whole decree shows clearly that the legislator intended that those
mentioned in article 4 and 5 should apply for a confirmation of their titles by prescription, as well as those mentioned in article 6. In
fact, for the adjustment of those of the first group, which necessarily included only those found within articles 4 and 5, a board was
organized (art. 15) in each pueblo whose sole duty it was to dispatch applications made said two articles.
(7) The royal decree of August 31, 1888 (Berriz Anuario, 1888, p. 120), is another legislative construction of this regulation. That
decree repealed the decree of 1884, and divided all lands subjects to adjustment under the regulations of June 25, 1880, into two
groups. In the first group were all those lands which bordered at any points on other State lands, and those which, though not
bordering on State lands, measured more than 30 hectares. In the second group were those which were bounded entirely by
lands of private persons and did not exceed 30 hectares. For the second group a provincial board was organized, and article 10
provides a hearing before this board, and declares
If no protest or claim shall be filed, and the adjustment must be free because the occupant has proved title by prescription, as
provided in articles 4 and 5 of the regulations promulgated June 25, 1880, the proceedings shall be duty approved, and the head
officer of the province will, in his capacity of deputy director general of the civil administration, issue the corresponding title deed.
The policy pursued by the Spanish Government from the earliest times, requiring settlers on the public lands to obtain deeds
therefor from the State, has been continued by the American Government in Act No. 926, which takes effect when approved by
Congress. Section 54, sixth paragraph of that act, declares that the persons named in said paragraph 6 "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and to have received the same." Yet such persons
are required by section 56 to present a petition to the Court of Land Registration for a confirmation of these titles.
We have considered the regulations relating to adjustment that is, those laws under which persons in possession might perfect
their titles. But there were other laws relating to the sale of public lands which contained provisions fatal to the plaintiff's claims.
The royal decree of January 26, 1889 (Gaceta de Manila, March 20, 1889), approved the regulations for the sale of public lands in
the Philippines, and it was in accordance with such regulations that the appellee acquired his title. Article 4 of those regulations
required the publication in the Gaceta de Manila of the application to purchase, with a description of the lands, and gave sixty
days within which anyone could object to the sale. A similar notice in the dialect of the locality was required to be posted on the
municipal building of the town in which the land was situated, and to be made public by the crier. Articles 5 and 6 declared to
whom such objections shall be made and the course which they should take. Article 8 is as follows:
ART. 8. In no case will the judicial authorities take cognizance of the suit against the decrees of the civil administration concerning
the sale of royal lands unless the plaintiff shall attach to the complaint documents which show that he has exhausted the
administrative remedy. After the proceeding in the executive department shall have been terminated and the matter finally passed
upon, anyone considering his interests prejudiced thereby may commence a suit in the court against the State; but in no case
shall an action be brought against the proprietor of the land.
Similar provisions are found in the regulations of 1883, approved the second time by royal order of February 16 (Gaceta de
Manila, June 28, 1883). Articles 18 and 23 of said regulations are as follows:
ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of alienable royal lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership
of the same, or for the adjustment thereof within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the bulletin of Sales of
the notice of sale thereof.
ART. 23. The judicial authorities shall take cognizance of no complaint against the decrees of the treasury department concerning
the sale of lands pertaining to the state unless the complainant shall attached to the complaint documents which proved that he
has exhausted the administrative remedy.
This prohibition appears also in the royal order of October 26, 1881 (Gaceta de Manila, December 18, 1881) which relates
evidently both to sales of public lands and also to the adjustments with the occupants.
Article 5 of this royal order is as follows:
During the pendency of proceedings in the executive department with respect to grants of land, interested parties may present
through executive channels such protest as they may deemed advisable for the protection of their right and interests. The
proceeding having once been completed, and the grant made, those who consider their interests prejudiced thereby may proceed
in court against the State, but under no circumstances against the grantees of the land.
The American legislation creating the Court of Land Registration is but an application of this same principle. In both systems the
title is guaranteed to the petitioner, after examination by a tribunal. In Spanish system this tribunal was called an administrative
one, in the American a judicial one.
The court finds that the plaintiffs made a written protest against the sale to the defendants while the proceedings for the
measurements and survey of the land were being carried on, but that they did not follow up their protest. This, as held by the court
below, is a bar their recovery in this action, under the articles above cited.
The plaintiff state in their brief that a great fraud was committed on them and the State by the defendant in applying for the
purchase of this lands as vacant and belonging to the public, when they were in the actual adverse possession of the plaintiffs.
We have seen nothing in the regulations relating to the sale of the public lands which limited their force to vacant lands. On the
contrary there are provisions which indicate the contrary. In the application for the purchase the petitioner is article 3 of the
regulations of 1889 required to state whether any portion of the land sought has been broken for cultivation, and to whom such
improvements belong. Article 9 provides that if one in possession applies to purchase the land, he renounces his right to a
composicion under the laws relating to that subject. By article 13 the report of the officials making the survey must contain a
statement as to whether any part of the land is cultivated or not and if the applicant claims to be the owner of such cultivated part.
In the regulations of January 19, 1883 (Gaceta de Manila, June 28, 1883) is the following article:
ART. 18. Possessors of such lands as may fall within the class of royal alienable lands shall be obliged to apply for the ownership
of the same, or for the adjustment thereof, within the term of sixty days from the time of the publication in the Bulletin of Sales of
the notice of sale thereof.
In view of all these provisions it seems impossible to believe that the legislators even intended to leave the validity of any sale
made by the State to be determined at any time in the future by the ordinary courts on parol testimony. Such would be the result if
the contention of the plaintiffs is to be sustained. According to their claim, this sale and every other sale made by the State can be
set aside if at any time in the future it can be proved that certain persons had been in possession of the land for the term then
required for prescription.
If this claim is allowed it would result that even though written title from the State would be safe from such attack by parol
evidence, by means of such evidence damages could have been recovered against the State for lands sold by the State to which
third persons might thereafter prove ownership but prescription. The unreliability of parol testimony on the subject of possession is
well known. In this case in the report which the law required to be made before a sale could be had it is stated by an Ayudante de
Montes that the tract had an area of 429 hectares, 77 ares, and 96 centares uncultivated, and 50 hectares, 19 ares, and 73
centares broken for cultivation. The official report also says (1890) that the breaking is recent. Notwithstanding this official report,
the plaintiffs introduced evidence from which the court found that the greater part of the tract had been occupied and cultivated by
the plaintiffs since 1860.
It is hardly conceivable that the State intended to put in force legislation under which its property rights could be so prejudiced.
We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by which the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of
these lands by prescription, without any action by the State, and that the judgment below declaring the defendant the owner of the
lands must be affirmed.
II. What has been said heretofore makes it unnecessary to consider the motion for a new trial, made by the defendant on the
ground that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence.
III. The exception of the defendant to the order vacating the appointment of the receiver can not be sustained. The defendant at
no time made any showing sufficient to authorize the appointment of a receiver.
The case does not fall under No. 4 of section 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither party in his pleadings asked any relief as
to the crops. They were not, therefore, "the property which is the subject of litigation."
Neither does the case fall under No. 2 of section 174, for the same reason.
Moreover, under No. 2 it must be shown that the property is in danger of being lost. There was no showing of that kind. The
pleadings say nothing upon the subject. In the motion for the appointment of the receiver it said that the plaintiffs are insolvent.
There is no evidence, by affidavit or otherwise, to support this statement. A bare, unsworn statement in a motion that the adverse
party is insolvent is not sufficient to warrant a court in appointing a receiver for property in his possession.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed. Neither party can recover costs in this court.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Cooper, McDonough and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Gaceta de Manila, Sept. 10, 1880.
2 Disposiciones officiales del Ramo de Montes de Filipinas, p. 34.
CASE NO. 4

Cansino vs Valdez
G.R. No. L-2468, July 16, 1906

FACTS:

The decision in this case was announced on the 30th of April, 1906. The grounds of that decision are as follows:

The case is almost identical with the case of Valenton vs. Murciano (which resolved the question of which is the better basis for
ownership of land: long-time occupation or paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860.
Defendant's predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892. The
lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not objecting to the administrative
sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription
in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not
owning the land, could not validly transmit it.)

Magdalena Cansino, bought the property in question, as public lands of the State from the Spanish Government and received a
deed therefor on the 27th of October, 1893. In the former case of Valenton vs. Murciano , the plaintiffs went into possession of the
land in 1860 and claimed ownership thereof by the extraordinary prescription of thirty years. In this case some of the defendants
testified that they went into possession in 1862 and they claimed the ownership of this land by the same extraordinary
prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lands occupied and possessed by Cansino for almost three decades could ripen into adverse possession by
virtue of extraordinary prescription.

HELD:

In Valenton vs. Murciano, the court decided that title to lands such as were involved in that case could not be acquired by
prescription while they were the property of the State. The decision in that case governs and controls this case and upon its
authority judgment in this case was affirmed.

CASE NO. 5

CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

MATEO CARIO vs THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906

FACTS: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Cario went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription as the owner of a 146
hectare land hes been possessing in the then municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and no other
documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor
of Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should be given to him by reason of immemorial use and
occupation as in the previous case Cansino vs Valdez & Tiglao vs Government.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mateo is the rightful owner of the land by virtue of his possession of it for some time.

HELD: No. The statute of limitations did not run against the government. The government is still the absolute owner of the land
(regalian doctrine). Further, Mateos possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a
grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant
portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose.

While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time,
yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed,
and until he did the State remained the absolute owner.
CASE NO. 6
Jones vs. Insular Government G.R. No. L-2506 ; April 16, 1906; 6 Phil 122

Facts:

F. Stewart Jones presented a petition to the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a certain tract
of land situatd in the Province of Benguet, and within the reservation defined in Act No. 636. The Solicitor-General appeared in the
court below and opposed the inscription upon the ground that the property was public land. At the trial he objected to any
consideration of the case on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to register land situated in that reservation. The
objections were overruled and judgment entered in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the Government appealed to this
court.
The act creating the Court of Land Registration (No. 496) gave it jurisdiction throughout the Archipelago. By Act No. 1224, which
was approved August 31, 1904, and which applied to pending cases, the court was deprived of jurisdiction over lands situated in
the Province of Benguet. That act, however, contained a proviso by which the court was given jurisdiction over applications for
registration of title to land in all cases coming within the provisions of Act No. 648. It is therefore requested that the land mentioned
be forthwith brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act and become registered land in the meaning thereof, and that
you proceed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 648. The court of Land Registration, acting upon this notice from the
Governor, issued the notice required by Act No. 627, and in pursuance of that notice Jones, the appellee, within the six months
referred to in the notice, presented his petition asking that the land be registered in his name.

First claim of the Government is that the provisions of Act No. 648 were not complied with in the respect that this letter of the
Governor did not amount to a certificate that the lands had been reserved.

Act No. 648 conferred power upon the Governor to reserve lands for public purposes, but it did not make that power exclusive.
The Commission did not thereby deprive itself of the power to itself make reservations in the future, if it saw fit; neither did it intend
to annul any reservations which it had formerly made. The contention of

the Government is true when applied to a case where the land has not been reserved by the Commission. In such a case it would
be the duty of the Governor to first reserve it by an executive order, and then to give notice to the Court of Land Registration, but
where the land had already been reserved by competent authority, it not only was not necessary for the Governor to issue any
executive order reserving the land but he had no power to do so. In such cases the only duty imposed upon him was to give notice
to the Court of Land Registration that the land had been reserved. This notice was given in the letter above quoted. The court had
jurisdiction to try the case.

Petitioner Jones, bought the land in question from Sioco Cario, an Igorot. He caused his deed to the land to be recorded in the
office of the registrar of property. Prior thereto, and while Sioco Cario was in possession of the land, he commenced proceedings
in court for the purpose of obtaining a possessory information in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This
possessory information he caused to be recorded in the office of the registrar of property. The evidence of Sioco Carino shows
that what he did in the way of presenting a petition to the Spanish Government in regard to a deed of the land was done by order
of the then comandante, and was limited to securing a measurement thereof, as he then believed. These acts did not interrupt the
running of the statute of limitations.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision is void that the act thereby disposes of public lands that Congress is the only authority that can take
such action, and that it has never authorized or approved the action of the Commission in applying the statute of limitations to
proceedings under Acts Nos. 648 and 627.

Held:

We do not think that this contention can be sustained. Section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides as follows:

SEC. 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands by the United States under the
treaty of peace with Spain, signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall
be designated by the President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are
hereby placed under the control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof,
except as provided in this act.

This gives the Government of the Philippine Islands power to dispose of these lands, and of all public lands, and to pass the law in
question, unless there is some provision in other parts of the act of July 1, 1902, which takes away or limits that power. The
government says that such limitation is found in section 13 of the act. That section and sections 14 and 15 are as follows:

SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this Act and except as herein provided, shall
classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into
effect or have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they
shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended
by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands:
Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

SEC. 14. That the Government of the Philippine

Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the
acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue
patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in
extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of
August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe,
by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of
said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands
as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person, and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one
thousand and twenty- four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, That the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or
grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title
of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents.

It is first to be noted that section 13 does not apply to all lands. Timber and mineral lands are expressly excluded. If the
Commission should pass laws relating to mineral lands without submitting them to Congress, as it has done (Act No. 624), their
validity would not be determined by inquiring if they had been submitted to Congress under section 13, but rather by inquiring if
they were inconsistent with other provisions of the act relating to mineral lands. In other words, the fact that such laws were not
submitted to Congress would not necessarily make them void.
The same is true of legislation relating to coal lands, as to which sections 53 and 57 contain provisions. By section 57 this
Government is authorized to issue all needful rules and regulations for carrying into effect this and preceding sections relating to
mineral lands. Such regulations need not be submitted to Congress for its approval. Act No. 1128, relating to coal lands, was not
submitted.
The act of Congress also contains provisions regarding the purchase of lands belonging to religious orders. Section 65 provides
as to those lands as follows:

SEC. 65. That all lands acquired by virtue of the preceding section shall constitute a part and portion of the public property of the
Government of the Philippine Islands, and may be held, sold, and conveyed, or leased temporarily for a period not exceeding
three years after their acquisition by said Government, on such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, subject to the limitations
and conditions provided for in this Act. . . . Actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government
shall have the preference over all others to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings within such reasonable time as may be
determined by said Government.
Does the clause "subject to the limitations and conditions of this act" require a submission to Congress of legislation concerning
such land? If it does, then Act No. 1120, which contains such provisions, is void, because it was never so submitted.

2 Section 18 of the act of Congress provides as follows:

That the forest laws and regulations now in force in the Philippine Islands, with such modifications and amendments as may be
made by the Government of said Islands, are hereby continued in force.

Must these modifications and amendments be submitted to Congress for its approval? If they must be, then Act No. 1148, relating
thereto, is void, because it was not so submitted.

It seems very clear that rules and regulations concerning mineral, timber, and coal lands, and lands bought from religious orders
need not be submitted to Congress. If they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act of Congress relating to the same
subjects, they are valid.
Congress, by section 12 of the act, gave to the Philippine Government general power all property acquired from Spain. When it
required the Commision to immediately classify the agricultural lands and to make rules and regulations for their sale, we do not
think that it intended to virtually repeal section 12. Such, however, would be the effect of the rule contended for by the
Govenrment. If, notwithstanding the provisions of section 12, any law which in any way directly or indirectly affects injuriously the
title of the Government to public lands must be submitted to the President and Congress for approval, the general power given by
section 12 is taken away.
There is nothing in section 14 which requires the rules and regulations therein mentioned to be submitted to Congress. But it is
said that although as to Act No. 648 submission to Congress was not required, it is nevertheless void when applied to one not a
native of the Islands, because forbidden by this section; and that this section limits the power of the Commission to declare
possession alone sufficient evidence of title to cases in which the claimant is native and in which the amount of land does not
exceed 16 hectares. Section 14 is not limited to agricultural lands, as are sections 13 and 15. It includes mineral and timber lands.
So far as it relates to proceedings theretofore taken under Spanish laws its benefits are not limited to natives of the Islands nor to
tracts not more than 16 hectares in extent. Where the only claim is possession, no possession for any definite time prior to August
13, 1898, is required, nor is proof of any possession whatever after that date demanded. According to the strict letter of the section
a native would be entitled to a patent who proved that he had been in possession for the months of July and August only of 1898.
It is not stated whether or not one who receives such a patent must occupy the land for five years thereafter, as required by
section 15. Neither is it stated whether or not a person who was in possession for the month of August, 1898, would be entitled to
a patent in preference to the actual settler spoken
The meaning of these sections is not clear, and it is difficult to give to them a construction that will be entirely free from objection.
But we do not think that authority given by the Commission to issue to a native a patent for 16 hectares of land of which he was in
possession during the month of August, 1898, was intended to limit the general power of control which by section 12 is given to
the Commission.

CASE NO. 7

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela
Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land
described in the second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela
Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela
Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special
defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and
control of the Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and
ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the
Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a
prior case between the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the
holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of
Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to
Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia
and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession
thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5,
1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed
of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in
question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and
public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913,
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon,
dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court,
Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said
application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five
years (Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin
Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the
proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in
question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M).
Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously,
adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director
of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally
and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land
a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period
of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of
Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an
action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of
the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession
thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 41 Phil., 935.
CASE NO. 8

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3793. February 19, 1908. ]

CIRILO MAPA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, Respondent-Appellant.

Attorney-General Araneta, for Appellant.

Basilio R. Mapa, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS DEFINED. The phrase "agricultural public lands" defined by the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means those public lands acquired
from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

This case comes from the Court of Land Registration. The petitioner sought to have registered a tract of land of about 16 hectares
in extent, situated in the barrio of San Antonio, in the district of Mandurriao, in the municipality of Iloilo. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the petitioner and the Government has appealed. A motion for a new trial was made and denied in the court below, but no
exception was taken to the order denying it, and we therefore can not review the evidence.

The decision of that court was based upon Act No. 926 section 54, paragraph 6 which follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect
of this act, except when prevented by war, or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter."cralaw virtua1aw library

The only question submitted to the court below or to this court by the Attorney-General is the question whether the land in
controversy is agricultural land within the meaning of the section above quoted. The findings of the court below upon that point are
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"From the evidence adduced it appears that the land in question is lowland, and has been uninterruptedly, for more than twenty
years, in the possession of the petitioner and his ancestors as owners and the same has been used during the said period, and up
to the present, as fish ponds, nipa lands, and salt deposits. The witnesses declare that the land is far from the sea, the town of
Molo being between the sea and the said land."cralaw virtua1aw library

The question is an important one because the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by said act of Congress of July 1, is
found not only in section 54 above quoted but in other parts of Act No. 926, and it seems that the same construction must be given
to the phrase wherever it occurs in any part of that law.

The claim of the Attorney-General seems to be that no lands can be called agricultural lands unless they are such by their nature.
If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct, and this land because of its nature is not agricultural land, it is difficult to see
how it could be disposed of or what the Government could do with it if it should be decided that the Government is the owner
thereof. It could not allow the land to be entered as a homestead, for Chapter I of Act No. 926 allows the entry of homesteads only
upon "agricultural public lands" in the Philippine Islands, as defined by the act of Congress of July 1, 1902. It could not sell it in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Act No. 926 for section 10 only authorizes the sale of "unreserved nonmineral
agricultural public land in the Philippine Islands, as defined in the act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two." It could
not lease it in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the said act, for section 22 relating to leases limits them to
"nonmineral public lands, as defined by section eighteen and twenty of the act of Congress approved July first, nineteen hundred
and two." It may be noted in passing that there is perhaps some typographical or other error in this reference to sections 18 and
20, because neither one of these sections mentions agricultural lands. The Government could not give a free patent to this land to
a native settler, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, for that relates only to "agricultural public land, as defined by act
of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two."cralaw virtua1aw library

In fact, by virtue of the provisions of Act No. 926, the Government could do nothing with this land except to lay out a town site
thereon in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V, for section 36 relating to that matter, says nothing about agricultural land.

The question before us is not what is agricultural land, but what definition has been given to that phrase by the act of Congress.
An examination of that act will show that the only sections thereof wherein can be found anything which could be called a
definition of the phrase are sections 13 and 15. Those sections are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 13. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, subject to the provisions of this act and except as herein provided, shall
classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness, and shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease,
sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands, but such rules and regulations shall not go into
effect of have the force of law until they have received the approval of the President, and when approved by the President they
shall be submitted by him to Congress at the beginning of the next ensuing session thereof and unless disapproved or amended
by Congress at said session they shall at the close of such period have the force and effect of law in the Philippine Islands:
Provided, That a single homestead entry shall not exceed sixteen hectares in extent.

"SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered on such terms as it may prescribe,
by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of
said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands
as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one
thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands,
whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy,
improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or
grantee can not alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title
of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is seen that neither one of these sections gives any express definition of the phrase "agricultural land." In fact, in section 15 the
word "agricultural" does not occur.

There seem to be only three possible ways of deciding this question. The first is to say that no definition of the phrase "agricultural
land" can be found in the act of Congress; the second, that there is a definition of that phrase in the act and that it means land
which in its nature is agricultural; and, third, that there is a definition in the act and that the phrase means all of the public lands
acquired from Spain except those which are mineral or timber lands. The court below adopted this view, and held that the land,
not being timber or mineral land, came within the definition of agricultural land, and that therefore Section 54 paragraph 6, Act No.
926 was applicable thereto.

1. There are serious objections to holding that there is no definition in the act of the phrase "agricultural land." The Commission in
enacting Act No. 926 expressly declared that such a definition could be found therein. The President approved this act and it might
be said that Congress, by failing to reject or amend it, tacitly approved it. Moreover, if it should be said that there is no definition in
the act of Congress of the phrase "agricultural land," we do not see how any effect could be given to the provisions of Act No. 916,
to which we have referred. If the phrase is not defined in the act of Congress, then the lands upon which homesteads can be
granted can not be determined. Nor can it be known what land the Government has the right to sell in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter II, nor what lands it can lease in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III, nor the lands for which it can
give free patents to native settlers in accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV, and it would seem to follow, necessarily, that
none of those chapters could be put into force and that all that had up to this time been done by virtue thereof would be void.

2. The second way of disposing of the question is by saying that Congress has defined agricultural lands as those lands which
are, as the Attorney-General says, by their nature agricultural. As has been said before, the word "agricultural" does not occur in
section 15. Section 13 says that the Government "shall classify according to its agricultural character and productiveness and
shall immediately make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public lands other than timber or
mineral land." This is the same thing as saying that the Government shall classify the public lands other than timber or mineral
lands according to its agricultural character and productiveness; in other words, that it shall classify all the public lands acquired
from Spain, and that this classification shall be made according to the agricultural character of the land and according to its
productiveness.

One objection to adopting this view is that it is so vague and indefinite that it would be very difficult to apply it in practice. What
lands are agricultural in nature? The Attorney-General himself in his brief in this case says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The most arid mountain and the poorest soil are susceptible of cultivation by the hand of man."cralaw virtua1aw library

The land in question in this case, which is used as a fishery, could be filled up and any kind of crops raised thereon. Mineral and
timber lands are expressly excluded, but it would be difficult to say that any other particular tract of land was not agricultural in
nature. Such lands may be found within the limits of any city. There is within the city of Manila, and within a thickly inhabited part
thereof an experimental far. This land is in its nature agricultural. Adjoining the Luneta, in the same city, is a large tract of land,
Camp Wallace, devoted to sports. The land surrounding the city walls of Manila, between them and the Malecon Drive on the
west, the Luneta on the south, and Bagumbayan Drive on the south and east, is of many hectares in extent and is in nature
agricultural. The Luneta itself could at any time be devoted to the growing of crops.

The objection to adopting this construction on account of its uncertainty is emphasized when we consider that whether certain
land was or was not agricultural land, as defined by the act of Congress, and therefore subject to homestead entry, to sale, or to
lease in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 926, would be a question that would finally have to be determined by the courts,
unless there is some express provision of the law authorizing the administrative officers to determine this question for themselves.
Section 2 of Act No. 926 relating to homesteads provides that the Chief of The Bureau of Public Lands shall summarily determine
whether the land described is prima facie under the law subject to homestead settlement. Section 13, relating to the sale of public
lands, provides simply that the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau
of Forestry whether the land applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes, but it says nothing about his
decisions as to whether it is or is not agricultural land in its nature. Section 26 relating to the lease of public lands provides that the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall determine from the certificate of the Chief of the Bureau of Forestry whether the land
applied for is more valuable for agricultural than for timber purposes and further summarily determine from available records
whether the land is or is not mineral and does not contain deposits of coal or salts. Section 34 relating to fee patents to native
settlers makes no provision for any determination by the Chief of Bureau of Public Lands in regard to the character of the land
applied for.

After homesteads have been entered, lands, sold, and leases made by the administrative officers on the theory that the lands
were agricultural lands by their nature, to leave the matter of their true character open for subsequent action by the courts would
be to produce an evil that should if possible be avoided.

3. We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural public lands," and after a careful
consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court
below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "Make rules and regulations for the lease, sale, or other disposition of the public
lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds, that is the only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands.
In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands. As was said in the case of Jones v. The Insular Government (6 Phil Rep., 122, 133) where these
same section of the act of Congress were under discussion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The meaning of these sections is not clear and it is difficult to give to them a construction that would be entirely free from
objection."cralaw virtua1aw library

But the construction we have adopted, to our minds, is less objectionable than any other one that has been suggested.

There is nothing in this case of Jones v. The Insular Government which at all conflicts with the result here arrived at. The question
as to whether the lands there involved were or were not agricultural lands within the meaning of the sections was neither
discussed nor decided. In fact, it appears from the decision that those lands, which were in the Province of Benguet, were within
the strictest definition of the phrase "agricultural lands." It appears that such lands had been cultivated for more than twelve years.
What that case decided was, not that the lands therein involved and other lands referred to in the decision by way of illustration
were not agricultural lands but that the law there in question and the other laws mentioned therein were not rules and regulations
within the meaning of section 13.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J. and Torres, J., concur.

Johnson, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

TRACEY, J., with whom concurs CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

By its title as well as throughout its text Act No. 926 is restricted to the "Public domain of the Philippine Islands" and to "public
lands" in said Islands. This act, drawn in furtherance of an act of Congress, must be interpreted according to the American
understanding of the words employed and the meaning of these terms as definitely fixed by decisions of the United States
Supreme Court.

"Public domain" and "public lands" are equivalent terms. (Barker v. Harvey, 181, U.S., 481, 490.

"The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to sale or other disposal under
general laws." (Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S., 761)

"A grant of public lands applies only to lands which at the time are free from existing claims. (Bardon v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co.,
145 U.S., 535, 543.)

These words do not include land reserved for the use of certain Indian tribes, although still the property of the United States
(Leavenworth, etc., v. United States, 92 U.S., 733), nor lands covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. (Mann v.
Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S., 273.) And the same was held of the words "unoccupied and unappropriated public lands." (Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S., 1.)

In Wilcox v. Jackson (13 Peters, 498, 513) it was held that whenever a tract of land has been legally appropriated to any purpose,
from that moment it becomes severed from the mass of public lands and no subsequent law will be construed to embrace it,
although no express reservation is made. There have been similar rulings in regard to reservations for military purposes, for town
sites, educational purposes, and for mineral and forest uses. Consequently Act No. 926 applies only to the lands of the United
States in these Islands not already devoted to public use or subject to private right, and this construction necessarily excludes
from its scope lands devoted to the use of municipalities, including public buildings and such tracts as Wallace Field and the strip
surrounding the walls of the City of Manila. As the act has no application to them, they are not public lands in this sense, and can
not be included within the term "agricultural public lands."cralaw virtua1aw library

In referring to agricultural lands as being defined in the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Commission must have had
in mind this well-settled meaning of the terms employed and have used the word "agricultural" to distinguish and include such
public lands, not otherwise appropriated as, were not devoted to forestry and mining which is consistent with the direction of
section 13 of the act of Congress that public lands, other than timber or mineral lands, should be classified according to their
agricultural character and productiveness.

In view of the restricted scope of these statutes under the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, this direction as to the
classification of all remaining lands not forest or mineral in character, "according to their agricultural nature and productiveness,"
may fairly be considered a definition of them as agricultural lands, with the result of freeing the act of the Commission from
ambiguity.

It was apparently the intention of Congress that such classification, in a general way, should be immediately made, but the fact
that it has been delayed does not prevent the designation of any particular parcel of land, upon being granted by the Government,
as coming under one of these heads.

For these reason, I concur in the interpretation put upon this act in the majority opinion.
CASE NO. 9

Cornelio Ramos vs. Director of Lands (G.R. No. 13298 November 19, 1918)

FACTS:

Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal
Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as such. Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of
the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered. Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had
not acquired a good title from the Spanish government. Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of
land is forest land. It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under
color of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title sufficient to give title to
the entire tract of land?

HELD:

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a
constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another. The claimant has color of title; he
acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the
community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be
said that he is in possession. Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the
premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the citizen
and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land
is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant. Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the
entire tract of land for which he asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted. The general
rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession
of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.
CASE NO. 10

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abella G.R. No. L-25010 October 27, 1926, (49 Phil. 49)

Facts:

This is a petition for the registration of a certain parcel or tract of land located in the municipality of San Jose, Province of Nueva
Ecija, Philippine Islands. It appears from the record that on the 21st day of September, 1915, the appellant Maria del Rosario
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance for the registration under the Torrens system, of the very land now in question by
virtue of her appeal.

On the 26th day of April, 1921, when the Acting Director of Lands presented the petition in the present case for the registration,
under the cadastral survey, of a portion of land located in the municipality of San Jose, which included the very land claimed by
Maria del Rosario in the former action.

Upon the issue and the proof adduced in the present case the Honorable C. Carballo, Auxiliary Judge of the Sixth Judicial District,
ordered registered in the name of Maria del Rosario, under the cadastral survey, lots 3238, 3240, 3242 and 3243, which are the
very lots which had been ordered registered in her name in the former action. From that judgment she appealed to this court upon
the ground that the lower court committed an error in not registering all of the land included in her opposition in her name. She
then presented a motion for rehearing and in support thereof presents some proof to show that the northern portion of the land in
question is not forestry land but that much of it is agricultural land.

Issue:

Whether or not there is an error in registering the lands

Ruling:

It was held that no error has been committed. Whether particular land is more valuable for forestry purposes than for agricultural
purposes, or vice-versa, is a question of fact and must be established during the trial of the cause. Whether the particular land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a question to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has, under the
authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private interest, set aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land
in question. (Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil., 10.) During the trial of the present cause the appellant
made no effort to show that the land which she claimed, outside of that which had been decreed in her favor, was more valuable
for agricultural than forestry purposes.
CASE NO. 11

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-13756 January 30, 1919
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, ET AL., petitioners.
VICENTE JOCSON, ET AL., appellants,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, objector-appellee.
Mariano Locsin Rama and J. E. Blanco for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MOIR, J.:
In the cadastral land registration for the town of Hinigaran, Occidental Negros, the appellants sought to register the three lots or
parcels of land involved in this appeal, which registration was opposed by the Director of Forestry.
The trial court found that lot 1104 was almost entirely "forestry" land, that a small portion of lot 1154 and all of lots 1158 were
"forestry" lands, to which appellants had no title, and declared the lots public lands, and refused registration of the parts of these
lots to which opposition had been filed by the Forestry Bureau. The claimants excepted and perfected their bill of exceptions and
brought the case to this court for review, setting up the following assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the facts that the lots 1104, 1154, and 1158 of the cadastral survey of
Hinigaran were possessed by Bibiano Jocson as owner during his lifetime and from a time prior to the year 1880, and, after his
death, by his heirs, on which lots nipa plants were planted and now exists and that these latter are not spontaneous plants utilized
by said heirs.
2. The court erred in not holding to have been proven the a part of lot No. 1158 is rice and pasture land that was possessed as
owner by Bibiano Jocson during his lifetime and peaceably long before 1880, a possession continued by his heirs who still enjoy
the use of the land up to the present time.
3. The court erred in not holding to have been proven that on that same lot 1158, there has existed since the year 1890, and still
exists, a fish hatchery which has been possessed and enjoyed by the heirs of Bibiano Jocson, as owners, for more than 27 years,
not counting the prior possession of their predecessor in interest.
4. The court erred in holding that lot No. 1158 and part of lots 1104 and 1154 are forest land, finding this fact as sufficiently proven
by the sole and absurd testimony of the ranger to the effect that nipa is a plant of spontaneous growth and in not planted; and , as
the photographs only refer to small portions of the area of the lot, the court also erred in holding that the whole lot was covered
with firewood trees, while in fact but a very small portion of it is covered with trees which protect the nipa plants and the fish
hatchery, it having been proven that a large part of the lot was sown with rice and used as pasture land.
5. The court erred in not holding that the parts of lots 1104, 1154 and 1158, covered by mangrove swamps, are agricultural land,
and in not holding to have been proven that these swamp are not available, inasmuch as they are drained at low tide; errors
committed with manifest violation of law and disregard of the jurisprudence established by the Honorable Supreme Court of the
Philippine.
6. The court erred in not holding that the claimants and appellants, by their peaceable, public, and continuous possession for more
than forty years, as owners, including that held by their predecessors in interests, had acquired by prescription lots 1104, 1154,
and 1158, in conformity with act No. 190, section 41, which, without exception, is applicable to the State as well as to private
parties, and by extraordinary prescription of thirty years.
7. The court erred in not adjudicating said lots to the claimants and appellants, in consideration of the possession they have had
for more than forty years, form the time of their predecessor in interest to the present time, thus violating the legal provision
whereby the holders of land who have been in its possession for ten years prior to the enactment of the land law, Act No. 926, by
the United States Philippine Commission, are to be deemed the absolute owners of such land, and to be presumed to have
applied for the same and to have complied with the Spanish laws and all the proceedings required by the Royal Decrees on the
composition of titles; and, therefore, pursuant to said Act now in force, the land in question should be adjudicated to the
possessors thereof.
8. The court erred in not granting the new trial requested by the appellants, the motion therefor being based on the ground that his
findings of facts, if there are any, are openly and manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence.
It is not necessary to consider all these assignments of error, for the main question involved is whether manglares [mangroves]
are agricultural lands or timber lands. If they are timber lands the claimants cannot acquire them by mere occupation for ten years
prior to July 26, 1904; if not, they can so acquire them under the Public Land Act, and no grant or title is necessary.
This being a cadastral case there are no findings of fact, but the trial court states that lot 1104 was in possession of claimants and
their ancestors for more than thirty years and lot 1154 for more than twenty-five years. Lot 1158 is declared to be wholly "forestal."
The are of the lots does not appear.
The evidence fully sustains the contention of the claimants that they have been in possession of all of those lots quietly, adversely
and continuously under a claim of ownership for more than thirty years prior to the hearing in the trial court. There is not a word of
proof in the whole record to the contrary. They set up no documentary title. They do claim the parts of the lands denied registration
are "mangles" with nipa and various other kinds of aquatic bushes or trees growing on them, and that in 1890 on lot 1158 they
constructed a fishpond (vivero de peces) which was later abandoned as unprofitable, and that part of this lot is pasture land, part
palay and part "mangles."
The attorney-General contends in his brief that the parts of the lands denied registration are public forest and cannot be acquired
by occupation, and that all "manglares are public forests."
In the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902, there is a classification of all public lands of the Philippine Islands, and in mentioning
forestry land the Act of Congress used the words "timber land." These words are always translated in the Spanish translation of
that Act as "terrenos forestales." We think there is an error in this translation and that a better translation would be "terrenos
madereros." Timber land in English means land with trees growing on it. The manglar plant would never be called a tree in English
but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it can not be called "timber land."
The photographs filed by the Government as exhibits in this case show that at two places there were trees growing on this land,
but the forester who testified for the Government always calls these lots "mangles," and he says the trees which are growing on
the lands are of no value except for firewood. The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglar or nipa swamp does not
change the general character of the land from manglar to timber land.
That manglares are not forestry lands within the meaning of the words "Timber lands" in the Act of Congress has been definitely
decided by this Court in the case of Montano vs. Insular Government (12 Phil. Rep., 572). In that case the court said:
Although argued at different times, five of these cases have been presented substantially together, all being covered by one brief
of the late Attorney-General in behalf of the Government in which, with many interesting historical and graphic citations he
described that part of the marginal seashore of the Philippine Islands known as manglares, with their characteristic vegetation. In
brief, it may be said that they are mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grow various kindered plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also
germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exists naturally, but which are also, to some extent,
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the mangrove, like trees, as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated
thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they can not be so regarded in the sense in
which the term is used in the cases cited or in general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they "may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains."
The court on page 573 further said:
It is a kindred case to Cirilo Mapa vs. The Insular Government . . . (10 Phil. Rep., 175).
As some discussion has arisen as to the scope of that decision, it appears opportune to reaffirm the principle there laid down. The
issue was, whether lands used as a fishery, for the growth of nipa, and as salt deposits, inland some desistance from the sea, and
asserted, thought not clearly proved, to be overflowed at high tide, could be registered as private property on the strength of ten
years' occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 of the Philippine Commission. The point decided was that such
land within the meaning of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was agricultural, the reasoning leading up to that conclusion being
that Congress having divided all the public lands of the Islands into three classes it must be included in tone of the three, and
being clearly neither forest nor mineral, it must of necessity fall into the division of agricultural land.
In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this court said that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st, 1902,
classified the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber
or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary
farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior
to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands the trial court should have considered them agricultural lands. If they are
agricultural lands then the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
Paragraph 6 of section 54 of that Act provides as follows:
All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two,
under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect
of this Act, except when prevented by war of force majuere, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the
provisions of this chapter.
xxx xxx xxx
This Act went into effect July 26th, 1904. Therefore, all persons who were in possession of agricultural public lands under the
conditions mentioned in the above section of Act No. 926 on the 26th of July, 1894, are conclusively presumed to have a grant to
such lands and are entitled to have a certificate of title issued to them. (Pamintuan vs. Insular Government, 8 Phil., Rep., 485.)
While we hold that manglares as well as nipa lands are subject to private acquisition and ownership when it is fully proved that the
possession has been actual, complete and adverse, we deem it proper to declare that each case must stand on its own merits.
One cannot acquire ownership of a mangrove swamp by merely cutting a few loads of firewood from the lands occasionally. The
possession must be more complete than would be required for other agricultural lands.
The appellants were in actual possession of the lots in question from 18821, and their ancestors before that date, and they should
have been declared the owners and title should have been issued to them.
There is no need to consider the other points raised on appeal.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is returned to the lower court, with instruction to enter a decree in
conformity with this decision. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Araullo and Avancea, JJ., concur.
CASE NO. 12

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil. 890

FACTS:

Oh Cho, the applicant, is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on January 17, 1940. The lower court declared that the
sale of the lot to the applicant was valid. Hence this appeal from a judgment declaring the registration of a residential lot located in
the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant,

ISSUE:

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to decree of registration of the lot, because he is alien, therefore is disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain.

predecessor in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its registration; and that
he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in interest to a decree of registration must be deemed
also to have been acquired by him. The benefits provided in the Public Land Act for applicant;s immediate predecessors in interest
should comply with the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the registration of
the land of which they had been i possession at least since July 26, 1894. The applican;t immediate predecessors in interest have
failed to do so. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The
only right, if it may thus be called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessor in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is disqualified. Thus, it is
urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the
applicant for registration dismissed.

CASE NO. 13

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 46936. April 18, 1941.]

GREGORIO REYES UY A recurrent against MAMERTA PREZ, and Isidore VILLAPLANA, appealed against.

D. Claro M. Recto, on behalf of the appellant.

D. Potenciano A. Magtibay, on behalf of the appeal.

1 syllabus. Public Land; article 45 of law no. 2874; case. - In accordance with article 45 of Law No. 2874, the appeal and its cause
had incoativo sunday right on the ground, which will empower you to request and obtain confirmation of this right and to issue the
certificate of title in accordance with the law of the registration of the property; they were also in favor of the presumption juris et
de jure that they had complied with all the conditions necessary for the granting of title; but until the title is issued did not have the
legal concept of being the true owners of the land or of jo to belong to the public lands in the state capable of alienation.

2. ID.; SALE BY PUBLIC AUCTION; ASSESSMENT AND DISPOSAL - How you want the land was public policy of the State when
the Sheriff sold at public auction to the complainant on 21 September 1934 and V. V. was not even the owner of the, it is obvious
that the first did not acquire the domain of the terrain that it still had the executed V. V. and, consequently, the sale was void and of
no legal effect. In addition, the sale cannot be declared invalid by virtue of the provision of article 116 of Law No. 2874, as
amended by article 23 of Law No. 3517, which prohibits the lien and alienation, except the government and official institutions, of
the land acquired by free of charge from the date of approval of the application and during the 5 years following the issuance of
the title or concession.

DECISION

IMPERIAL, M. :

is requested by the applicant in its request for a writ of certiorari to review and repeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
declaring null and void the sale made by the Sheriff the 21 of September of 1934 in the field of the dispute, declaring invalid the
sale of the existing meioras in the same and ordering that sold these improvements to meet the quantity that the recurring
payment as a price for the auction amounting to P379.86, without costs.
The appellant home the matter in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas to recover of the contested ownership and possession of
an agricultural plot of 10 hectares of surface, located in the municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas, as well as the
improvements that exist in the same consistent in 333 ponos cocos fruitful 200 first class and not fruitful.

The relevant facts in the matter exposes them to the Court of Appeal in these terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Martin Villaplana was possessor of a concept of owner, from the time of the Spanish Government, having declared by the end of
1902 year Millage, and having entered in the enhanced with coconut trees, the oldest of whom are now 60 years of age. The 27 of
May of 1916, Martin Villaplana sold the land to his son Vicente Villaplana, married to the respondent Mamerta Prez. The 7
December 1922 Vincent Villaplana as "Free Patent." Having Vincent Villaplana contracted a debt of P291.05 of Gregorio Reyes
Uy a the 13 February 1931, and having been sued for the payment of this amount and sentenced to pay the 5 May 1933, issued
the corresponding order of execution, which was completed on 21 September 1934, sold the estate to the Applicant (Exhibit A).
The 20 April 1935 was when he was issued to Vicente Villaplana ei free of charge. The 13 of December of 1934 was handed over
the possession of the land to Gregorio Reyes Uy a pursuant to an order of the Court of Peace of Guinayangan, Tayabas, but in
July 1935 the defendants, who are wife and son of Vincent Villaplana, returned to take possession of the same, having been
thrown of the 10 of September of the same year under a preliminary injunction issued in this cause."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court of Appeal declared, after reviewing the evidence submitted in the first instance, the land was public and that was part of
the public lands in the State which might be available through free consesion. In his first statement of error the Appellant submits
that such a conclusion is erroneous and incon wi zard with the facts set out in the Court of Appeal. He argues that having declared
the Court of Appeals that Martin Villaplana possessed the ground in concept of owner from the year 1902, declaring it in the
millage as his property and having grown planting in the coconut trees that now have more than 60 years of age and that his son
Vicente Villaplana and the wife of this it possessed in the same concept, the land ceased to be public land and became in private
and, therefore, do not apply the provisions of Law No. 2874, known by the Act of Public Land.

According to subsection (b) of article 45 of Law No. 2874, in force on the dates in which took place the possession of 105 appeals
and its cause and the issue of the title, which, by itself, or by means of their perpetrators would have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land in the public domain, claiming in good faith to purchase the
property, except against the Government, from the twenty-sixth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, have the
right to the confirmation of their rights and to the issuance of a certificate of title in accordance with the law of the Land Register,
and they have in their favor the presumption juris et de jure of having complied with all the conditions necessary for The granting
of the Government and shall have the right to a certificate of title under the provisions of that Law. In accordance with the legal
provision the appeal and its cause had incoativo sunday right on the ground, which will empower you to request and obtain
confirmation of this right and to issue the certificate of title in accordance with the Law of the Property Registry; assimismo had in
its favor the presumption juris et de jure that they had complied with all the conditions necessary for the granting of title; but until
the title is issued did not have the legal concept of being the true owners of the land or this ceased to belong to the public lands in
the state capable of alienation. That this was the legal status of the land until by the government were issued free of charge, is
confirmed by article 54 of the tnisma law which provides that in future will not be able to acquire title, legal right or right by reason
of equity on grounds of the public domain by prescription or possession or occupation in concept of dueiio, or agreement or by
virtue of any law in force prior to the American occupation, except as expressly provided for by the laws enacted after the
occupation of the Philippine Islands by the United States. The fact that Vincent Villaplana requested the 7 December 1922 title
free of the ground is another data that shows that in its feel perfect title acquired does not speak of the same and which remained
public land of the State. We conclude, therefore, that the Court of Appeals does not erred in declaring that the area was published,
and it was subject to the provisions of Law No. 2874.

In the second seiialamiento of error is that the Court of Appeals should have declared that the subject matter of the dispute could
not be granted by title free and that this title, issued on 20 April 1935, is null and of no value and cannot affect the rights that the
appellant had acquired in the field. Having declared that the land continued to be published on the date on which they are issued
free of charge, it is obvious that the consequence of continued subject to the provisions of the Law on public land and,
consequently, the title is issued in favor of Vicente Villaplana is legal and valid.

To support his theory that the ground had become private property, which Vicente Villaplana and its causing Martin Villaplana were
the sole owners of the same and that happened in the title of the first when purchased at public auction, the recurring appointment
as resolved by this Court in the affairs of Love v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U. S. 449, 53, Law. ed, 594,
597; 41 Phil., 935, 940-941; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. The Director of Lands, 27 Phil., 246, 248; and Susi v. Reason
and the Director of Lands, 48, Phil, 424, where it was stated that the agricultural land that has been owned under the conditions
prescribed by the Law on Public Land has ceased to be public land to become private property, and that the one who has owned
has the presumption juris et de jure have obtained concessions from the Government and that they have the right to register it to
your name in accordance with the Law of the Property Registry. The cases cited are distinguished, however, the present in that in
this field the possessed and which derives its rights the applicant is the same as that recognized the condition of the land to be
public property of the State and not only recognized that remained public land but requested that is issued free of charge in
accordance with the Law on Public Lands.

In the last seilalamiento error the appellant contends that the Court of Appeal should have confirmed the decision of the Court of
First Instance declared valid the sale by public auction of the land carried out by the Sheriff in his favor. As the land was public
policy of the State when the Sheriff sold at public auction to the complainant on 21 September 1934 and Vincent Villaplana was
not even the owner of the, it is obvious that the first did not acquire the domain of the terrain that it still had the executed Vicente
Villaplana and, consequently, the sale was void and of no legal effect. In addition, the sale cannot be declared invalid by virtue of
the provision of article 116 of Law No. 2874, as amended by article 23 of Law No. 3517, which prohibits the lien and alienation,
except the government and official institutions, of the land acquired by free of charge from the date of approval of the application
and during the five years following the issuance of the title or concession.

Being adjusted to the law the decision of the Court of Appeals, is denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, with costs to the
appellant. As well it is sorted.

Avancena, Pres., Diaz, Laurel And Horqilleno, GM, are correct.

CASE NO.14
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and
GLICERIA, both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-
appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR., private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City) dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the
parcel of land consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro, Municipality of San Juan, Province of
Batangas, and designated in amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act
496. They alleged that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio Zara, who in turn acquired the same
under a Spanish grant known as "Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should the provisions of the
Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b)
of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse
possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition
recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included in the
area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this Court,
which was decided by this same Court through the then incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September 30,
1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest over the land in question because for a period more than sixty
(60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious and
under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26, L.R.
Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in another
case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-G.R.
No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred by
prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case having
transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the
same grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land applied for had already been declared public land by
the judgment in the former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter
alia, that "once a parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject
anymore of another land registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can dispose of the same by sale,
by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee.
The decisive issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the previous case, denying the application of
Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a subsequent application by an
alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years, pursuant to
Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter.1wph1.t
The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.
It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for
judicial confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may
be that although they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is a bar to their claim as owners under the
first alternative, since the proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had constructive notice by publication. Even
so this is a defense that properly pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared the land in question to
be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public.
The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no
longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant.
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in
their favor, considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have furthermore applied for its purchase from the
Bureau of Lands.1wph1.t
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits,
with costs against the private oppositors-appellees.
Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concurConcepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., took no part