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A/T: TEACHER UNIONS ARE GOOD....................................................................................2

A/T: TEACHER UNIONS BENEFIT EDUCATION.....................................................................3
A/T: MORE MONEY MEANS MORE MOTIVATION.................................................................4
A/T: PEER REVIEW WORKS...............................................................................................5
A/T: TEACHERS DON’T GET PAID ENOUGH........................................................................6
A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS WORK TO SERVE..............................................................7
A/T: UNIONS PROTECT RIGHTS.........................................................................................8
A/T: UNIONS MAKE WORKPLACE SAFER............................................................................9
A/T: UNIONS FIGHT DISCRIMINATION.............................................................................10
A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS HELP THE POOR................................................................11
A/T: PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTORS HAVE SAME UNIONS.......................................................12
A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS ARE EFFICIENT..................................................................13
A/T: UNIONS MAKE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENT..................................................................14
A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR BENEFITS ARE JUSTIFIED................................................................15
A/T: PRIVATE SECTOR SUCKS (DISCRIM/CORRUPT)..........................................................16
A/T: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING GOOD.............................................................................17
A/T: FREEMAN AND MEDOFF STUDY...............................................................................18
A/T: PUBLIC WORKERS GET PAID THE SAME....................................................................19

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A/T: TEACHER UNIONS ARE GOOD

(__) Teacher unions obstruct and hold hostage our political process. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal of
Education Finance1:

, a battle has surfaced in

However, the wage premium that attracts and maintains high-quality teachers, also allures opponents who question the union's benefit to the production process. For example

New York where lawmakers and the teachers union (NYSUT) find themselves in opposition. The Governor
proposed a cap on the growth of school taxes limiting funds earmarked for education. The union responded to the
Governors request by withholding their endorsement of 38 senators who supported the Governors idea, and stating that

union members, who are also New York taxpayers, do not desire tax relief at the expense of school spending.

(__) Teacher unions use coercive tactics to deprive entire communities of resources. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in
the Journal of Education Finance2:
While the unions' objective is to produce a crop of students who are better suited to successfully lead our country in a diverse and interdependent world, there is another, less attractive, face of unions—that of a monopoly.

, the teachers unions' behave as rent seekers who use their bargaining power to obtain higher salaries
In this scenario

and benefits. If the compensation demands are met, states must reduce non-salary school expenses, cut other
areas of spending, or raise taxes. The crowding out of spending or subsequent tax increase either levels or reduces current
rates of growth and GSP per employee. Herein lies the theoretical unattractive face of the union, as residents and businesses suffer from higher tax rates
or reduced services, and students suffer from strapped resources.

1
Louis J. Pantuosco and Laura D. Ullrich. "The Impact of Teachers Unions on State-Level Productivity." Journal of Education Finance 35.3 (2010): 276-294. Project MUSE. 21 Feb. 2010 <http://muse.jhu.edu/>.
2
Ibid

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A/T: TEACHER UNIONS BENEFIT EDUCATION

(__) No way to determine how much a teacher has benefited a student.

(__) Costs have actually increased without a subsequent increase in student scores. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the
Journal of Education Finance:

inputs are measured by the state and local governments' finances allocated
Estimating the value added of unions to the education process is not a precise science. Typically,

toward teachers' salaries or spending per pupil. While, output is measured by the standardized test results of
the students educated by unionized teachers.7 Over the past three decades, public education per pupil costs has
increased. These costs include salaries, benefits, infrastructure, and supplies. During the same period,
standardized test scores have not improved.

(__) A 1% increase in teacher union membership will lead to a decrease in gross state product of over 100 million
dollars. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

The results indicate that the number of union members in a state, all else constant, is associated with a decrease in
state productivity in the following year. Specifically, in 1994, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of teachers belonging to a union in a bargaining state
would be expected to lead to a $0.04 decrease in per employee state productivity in the following year. Given mean employment in 1994 of 2,964,863, the model indicates that an increase in union

membership of only 1% would be associated with a mean decrease in GSP of $118,594,520. The coefficient in 2000 is smaller
and is not statistically significant.

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A/T: MORE MONEY MEANS MORE MOTIVATION

(__) Milwaukee is a case study that disproves the assumption that more money leads to motivated teachers. Pantuosco
and Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

the wage premium simply inspires ineffective teachers to

The positive aspects of teachers unions are challenged by some researchers. They argue that

continue working.12 While some researchers find that smaller class sizes can improve student outcomes13 others contend that education quality is not related to class size.14 Wright and
Gundersen (2004) agree that money is not the sole solution to educational woes. They discuss the case of
Milwaukee's public school system in which the Milwaukee unions' requests were consistently granted for 20 years.
Over the 20 year period, wages were improved, the student-teacher ratio fell, and dollars poured into the
school system. However, even with these improvements, the results were dismal. Milwaukee students' test scores ranked
among the lowest in the state, and morale was dreadful. They posit that this finding indicates that money alone cannot
solve the problems of our public school system.15 Rather, for the additional money to result in improved achievement and productivity, the money has to be appropriated to
the proper programs.16 But, teachers unions are not the only organized labor group that has been challenged to justify their productive value.

(__) A 1% increase in teacher union membership will lead to a decrease in gross state product of over 100 million
dollars. Pantuosco and Ullrich write in the Journal of Education Finance:

The results indicate that the number of union members in a state, all else constant, is associated with a decrease in
state productivity in the following year. Specifically, in 1994, a one percentage point increase in the percentage of teachers belonging to a union in a bargaining state
would be expected to lead to a $0.04 decrease in per employee state productivity in the following year. Given mean employment in 1994 of 2,964,863, the model indicates that an increase in union

membership of only 1% would be associated with a mean decrease in GSP of $118,594,520. The coefficient in 2000 is smaller
and is not statistically significant.

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A/T: PEER REVIEW WORKS

(__) All of these impacts are just speculative since principals are clearly not using peer review as the main method of
dismissing a teacher. Insofar as unions were the ones to enact these tenure procedures that make it nigh impossible to
fire a teacher, they are the ones at fault for creating this convoluted process.

(__)

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A/T: TEACHERS DON’T GET PAID ENOUGH

(__) Means unions haven’t been doing their jobs, thus no positive impact.

(__) The job of a teacher is something you need to build up, to become experienced before you can receive a decent
compensation.

(__) Pensions and healthcare benefits balance out these issues.

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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS WORK TO SERVE

(__) We can’t make huge generalizations like this. It is reasonable to assume some people become teachers to receive
tenure benefits and job security. There isn’t any way to accurately gauge this factor, so you shouldn’t consider this
argument due to it’s lack of reliability.

(__) A recent Brookings survey shows that there’s little commitment to public service in the public sector. Donald
Devine writes in the Journal of Labor Research3:

a recent
Consider first the civil service. The best way to evaluate the modem relevance of the civil service ideal is to assess the strength of its norms with the federal work force today. Looking closely at

Brookings Institution Center for Public Service study demonstrates that the "public service" incentive to work well -- the ideal of
public service for the public good -- has little support in today's federal government. Of the 1,051 federal employees interviewed, 59
percent replied that getting a paycheck was more important than doing something worthwhile for the country,
and 65 percent said job security was more important than helping the public or for maintaining pride in their
organizations (Light, 200 l). Two-thirds said their own agency did a "not too good" or a "not good at all" job in
disciplining employee performance. Only 30 percent thought their organizations did a very or somewhat good job with poor performers. Only half argued that their agencies were very
good at helping the people they serve.

3
Devine, Donald J. "The Future of Labor Relations in the Federal Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research XXV.1 (2004). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: UNIONS PROTECT RIGHTS

(__) Comparable worth legislation passed by public sector unions is watered down and doesn’t help women. Morley
Gunderson writes in the Journal of Labor Research4:
Public sector unions are also a main force behind the passage of comparable worth legislation in both the United States (Evans and Nelson, 1989; Wesman, 1988) and Canada (Gunderson, 1995; Hart, 2002). Such
initiatives have been applied mainly in the public sector and invariably through union complaints or initiatives which are viewed by unions as ways of injecting additional funds into the "pot" over and above those achieved
through collective bargaining. For that reason, public sector unions have tried to keep comparable worth settlements separate from bargaining settlements, so that comparable worth settlements are not subject to the give-

Public sector unions

and-take of the bargaining process where, for example, higher settlements in female-dominated jobs would have to come from lower settlements in male-dominated jobs.

have also tried to have comparable worth settlements not advertised as such so that employees may think they
are settlements won by the union. In Iowa in the 1980s, public sector unions effectively lobbied for alterations
in comparable worth awards that were initially announced but that would have led to pay cuts to male union
members. The lobbying led to an infusion of additional public funds as well as a reallocation of the awards towards male union members (Orazem and Mattila, 1990). Unions have also
been able to obtain exemptions for seniority in comparable worth legislation (Weiner and Gunderson, 1990:112), effectively
allowing male-female wage differences if they are the result of seniority. In Ontario, they have even obtained an exemption for "bargaining
strength." That is, after comparable worth has been achieved, pay differences between male and female jobs are allowed if they result from differences in bargaining strength (Gunderson, 2002).

(__) Public sector unions have a very different dynamic from 40 years ago. They are no longer the crusaders for rights
in the workplace, but now fat cats coercing politicians and communities into giving them more benefits. Unions don’t
represent your average grade school teacher or road worker, but a political machine in motion.

(__) Public sector unions are not affected by transparency and oversight legislation like the LMRDA, and thus are
more prone to being affected by undemocratic and corrupt practices. The Journal of Labor Research5 writes:

State employees clearly have fewer legal protections from undemocratic and corrupt practices in their unions
than their counterparts in the private sector and federal sector. Given that about half of all states permit collective bargaining and unionization (excluding
educational institutions), state and or federal legislators should consider adopting better and stronger statutory protections. By expanding LMRDA provisions to cover all public sector employees, there's no doubt that a
more uniform and consistent approach to union membership protections would evolve. Even with some of its weaker provisions, the LMRDA can enhance union democracy and encourage more open disclosure of those

The results of our study are indeed disquieting. As such, we recommend the expansion of the LMRDA provisions to all state
union activities that may affect its rank and file.
employees as a minimum, and perhaps even to all other public sector unionists where state statutory union membership protections fall short.

4
Gunderson, Morley. "Two Faces of Union Voice in the Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research. XXVI.3. (2005) Springer. April 29, 2010.
5
Fine, Cory R. "Public Sector Union Democracy: A Comparative Analysis." Journal of Labor Research XXII.2 (2001): 491-04. Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: UNIONS MAKE WORKPLACE SAFER

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A/T: UNIONS FIGHT DISCRIMINATION

(__) Police unions have been encouraging extensive fitness testing, which has been shown to be a huge disadvantage
for potential female officers. Sass and Troyer write in the Journal of Labor Research6:

If male officers oppose hiring women and fitness

The relationship between departmental composition and the incidence of fitness exams can also be informative.

exams serve to exclude females, there should be a positive correlation between the percentage of males on the
force and the use of fitness exams for new recruits. Similarly, there should be a negative correlation between the percentage of male officers and the use of periodic fitness
exams for non-recruits. Probit estimates of the probabilities that a department requires fitness exams for recruits and for experienced officers are presented in Table 4. Consistent with the idea of exams as a tool for co-
worker discrimination, the incidence of fitness tests for new recruits increases with the proportion of current officers that are male, and the use of recurring fitness exams for non-recruits is inversely related to the

Unionized departments are more likely to employ

percentage of male officers (columns 1 and 3). Interestingly, the impact of union status follows a similar pattern:

fitness exams for new recruits and less likely to require exams for experienced officers. This is consistent with
the notion that police unions represent the interests of their predominately male membership and runs counter
to our previous findings that (in some cases) union status is associated with a greater percentage of female recruits.

(__) There is no evidence to show there is greater discrimination in the private sector workplace. Fernandez and
Smith write in the Review of Public Personnel Administration:
Unions also have contended that there are social costs that are often ignored by governments when they choose to contract for services. For example, the public sector has been crucial in providing adequate employment

There is a
opportunity for minorities, in part, because of union activism (AFSCME, 2004; Kearney, 2003). Unions and antiprivatization factions asserted that contracting out will negatively affect minorities.

lack of evidence suggesting that minorities are harmed disproportionately by privatization, however (NCEP, 1988; Savas, 2000).
The claim that privatization opens the door to corruption, bribes, and kickbacks continues to be made, too,
although experts disagree about the incidence of such practices (e.g., AFSCME, 2004; Donahue, 1989; Rehfuss, 1989; Savas, 2000; Wesemann, 1981).

6
Sass, Tim R., and Jennifer L. Troyer. "Affirmative Action, Political Representation, Unions, and Female Police Employment." Journal of Labor Research XX.4 (1999). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS HELP THE POOR

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A/T: PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTORS HAVE SAME UNIONS

(__) The actions taken in the name of the public sector are clear, and should be isolated as the effects of public sector
unions. The arguments in this debate should stay true to the resolution, so they should focus solely on the impacts of
public sector unions.

(__) There are jobs that are clearly mostly public sector, like the NEA, and other unions that are not public sector, like
manufacturing unions.

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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS ARE EFFICIENT

(__) Public sector unions and their bureaucracies are always less efficient than private sector work. Donald Devine
writes in the Journal of Labor Research7:

public bureaucracies had no bottom line to

Actually, Ludwig von Mises had seen the fundamental problem much earlier. His magisterial Bureaucracy (1944) demonstrated that

measure their success. Top management had no way to track what was happening under them. If government could keep its
mission simple, with a sound appraisal system, it could do reasonably well as long as the passion of a charismatic leader allowed it to act. Over time, especially in a democracy, this will prove difficult to sustain.

People will demand competing goals, and legislators will be reluctant to disagree with them and support the
executive leadership. The private sector had a marvelous profit-and-loss system that keeps top management in
contact with the smallest unit to evaluate whether it is returning an adequate investment and that is why they
must inherently be more efficient institutions than public ones (Mises, 1944).

(__) Privatization does not necessarily mean lower wages or less work. Goerke writes in the Journal of Economics8:

Privatization does not necessarily lower wages, it does not have to cost jobs and involve harder work, and it
need not raise labor productivity if efficiency-wage effects are important. The theoretical analysis might therefore shed light on the
empirical observation [shows] that wages or employment do not fall or might even increase after privatization
and that labor productivity can be more or less unaffected by a change in ownership. Whether the fears of opponents and the
expectations of proponents of privatization are thus warranted, therefore depends, first, on the mechanism of wage determination and, second, on the precise impact of privatization on the behavior of firms, and on the
interaction of these two effects.

7
Devine, Donald J. "The Future of Labor Relations in the Federal Public Sector." Journal of Labor Research XXV.1 (2004). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.
8
Goerke, Laszlo. "Privatization and Efficiency Wages." Journal of Economics 67.3 (1998): 243-64. Springer-Verlag. Web. 15 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: UNIONS MAKE GOVERNMENT EFFICIENT

_______. Public Sector Unions Reduce Government Efficiency.

Edwards in 2010,
Chris Edwards [Director of Tax Policy Studies at the Cato Institute]. “Public Sector Unions and the Rising Costs of
Employee
Compensation.” Cato Journal. 30(1). Winter 2010.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj30n1/cj30n1‐5.pdf.
Accessed March 12, 2010.
The upshot of all this is that policymakers will need to make large budget reforms in the years ahead. They will to need to deliver public services more efficiently [and] to privatize services when feasible, to cut staffing levels, and to

the high level of unionization in many state workforces will make reforms
terminate low value programs. Policymakers often hesitate in making such reforms, but

even harder to achieve. During labor negotiations, for example, public officials often succumb to pressure to make
short‐term concessions that end up damaging public finances in the long run.

Unions reduce the ability of government managers to cut costs and increase efficiency in many ways. They protect
poorly performing workers, they push for minimum staffing levels, they resist the introduction of new technologies
that threaten their jobs, and they create a rule‐laden and bureaucratic workplace. In New York State, for example, “Virtually any idea for saving money
through outsourcing and consolidation of services must first be negotiated and agreed to by the union representing the employees who currently provide the service” (O’Neal and McMahon 2007: 17). A recent Cato paper describes some
of the structural problems with unions in the public sector (Bellante, Denholm, and Osorio 2009; see also Denholm 1994).

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A/T: PUBLIC SECTOR BENEFITS ARE JUSTIFIED

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A/T: PRIVATE SECTOR SUCKS (DISCRIM/CORRUPT)

(__) There is no evidence to show privatization harms minorities or leads to corruption. Fernandez and Smith write in
the Review of Public Personnel Administration9:
Unions also have contended that there are social costs that are often ignored by governments when they choose to contract for services. For example, the public sector has been crucial in providing adequate employment

opportunity for minorities, in part, because of union activism (AFSCME, 2004; Kearney, 2003). Unions and antiprivatization factions asserted that contracting out will negatively affect minorities. There is a
lack of evidence suggesting that minorities are harmed disproportionately by privatization, however (NCEP, 1988; Savas, 2000).
The claim that privatization opens the door to corruption, bribes, and kickbacks continues to be made, too,
although experts disagree about the incidence of such practices (e.g., AFSCME, 2004; Donahue, 1989; Rehfuss, 1989; Savas, 2000; Wesemann, 1981).

9
Fernandez, Sergio, and Craig R. Smith. "Looking for Evidence of Public Employee Opposition to Privatization: An Empirical Study With Implications for Practice." Review of Public Personnel Administration 26.4 (2006): 356-81.
SAGE. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING GOOD

(__) On balance, there isn’t a positive effect coming from collective bargaining. Bruce Kaufman writes in the Journal
of Labor Research10:
Second, it is evident that the union wage gain with bargaining is smaller than predicted by the simple monopoly model. In Panel A, the wage gain is Wz-W0; in Panel B it is WI-Wo. Bargaining thus serves to moderate the
size of the union monopoly wage gain, keeping the misallocation of resources and rent transfer smaller than otherwise predicted. Moreover, when the right to strike is limited or banned, as in many public sector situations,

Bargaining's positive contribution to efficiency is counterbalanced, however, by an

the union wage gain is smaller yet.

additional form of resource cost and inefficiency. The restraint bargaining provides on union rent-seeking is
not a free good. To "produce" collective bargaining requires scarce time and factor inputs of union, firm, and
government negotiators and mediators. More importantly, when coercive weapons are used, such as strikes, boycotts,
and slowdowns, production is lost and resources remain idle. Although strikes in recent years have occurred in only a small proportion of union negotiations
and, in general, resulted in very modest social cost, in the 1940s-1960s when union density and power was much higher so too were the incidence and cost of strikes (Gunderson and Melino, 1987; Kaufman, 1992).

an intangible but real cost of collective bargaining is that it heightens or gives outlet to an adversarial,
Finally,

sometimes bitter "we against them" relationship between the workers and the firm.

(__) Collective bargaining leads to a per capita increase of state debt by 250 percent. Marlow and Orzechowski write
in the journal, Public Choice11:
Public sector employees are commonly believed to favor an expanding role for the public sector (Tullock, 1974; and Buchanan and Tullock, 1977). This view predicts that public sector unionism exerts a positive influence

, a strong positive correlation has been shown between

on demand for public programs through their voting and lobbying efforts. As casual support of this hypothesis

per capita state debt and the scope of collective bargaining statutes (Indiana Chamber of Commerce, 1992). In states with no
collective bargaining statutes, average per capita state debt was $916; but, in states where all public sector
employees are covered by such statutes, average per capita state debt was 250 percent higher, or $2,264 per
resident.

(__) Collective bargaining is not a right. Richard Kearny writes in the Review of Public Personnel Administration12:

Unions exercise their greatest impact through collective bargaining over the terms and conditions of employment, including wages, benefits, and work
arrangements and procedures. What we do know is that in the absence of a facilitative legal environment mandating or permitting

bargaining, collective bargaining rights are difficult to win and exercise. All state and local employees have a
first amendment right to organize and join a union or employee association, but they do not have a
commensurate right to be recognized by management for purposes of collective bargaining. Bargaining does occur in some
scattered state agencies, local governments, and school districts without formal legal sanction (Dilts, Boyda, & Sherr, 1993; Rhodes & Brown, 1992), but the vast majority of bargaining relationships are carried out in the
context of a facilitative legal environment.

10
Kaufman, Bruce E. "What Unions Do: Insights from Economic Theory." Journal of Labor Research XXV.3 (2004): 351-82. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.
11
Marlow, Michael L., and William Orzechowski. "Public Sector Unions and Public Spending." Public Choice 1.16 (1996): 1-16. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.
12
Kearney, Richard C. "Public Sector Labor Management Relations: Change or Status Quo?" Review of Public Personnel Administration 30.1 (2010): 89-111. SAGE. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: FREEMAN AND MEDOFF STUDY

(__) Freeman and Medoff were insufficient in their analysis of union effects, so we should regard their studies as
obsolete and incomplete. Bruce Kaufman writes in the Journal of Labor Research13:
When one looks at the theoretical literature on unions, other union "faces" also emerge that seem important but under-emphasized by F&M. One such distinction, for example, is the "short run" and "long run" faces of

unions. Much of the theory and analysis in What Do Unions Do? is static, cross sectional, and short run. On one hand this
emphasis is to a degree unavoidable, given modeling complexities and data avail- ability. But economic theory also suggests that a preponderate focus on the short run is likely to impart a positive bias to the economic
scorecard on unionism. One reason is that more of the efficiency benefits from unions are realized in the short run (from the voice and monopsony-reducing effects); a second is that more of the efficiency costs from the

F&M use the median- voter model of

monopoly face of unions appear in the long run (due to factor misallocation and lower productivity growth). As a concrete example,

unions to derive a positive union effect on the short-run provision of collective goods in the workplace but fail
to consider the negative long-run implication of this model for employment, capital investment, and cost-push
inflation. Another example is the primary (but not exclusive) focus on the determinants of the cross-sectional differences in the level of productivity across firms, rather than on the dynamic path of productivity
growth between union and nonunion firms. Also largely neglected by F&M are the macroeconomic costs of unions, such as a

tendency for cost-creep inflation and higher unemployment in order to restrain union bargaining demands.

13
Kaufman, Bruce E. "What Unions Do: Insights from Economic Theory." Journal of Labor Research XXV.3 (2004): 351-82. Springer. Web. 7 Apr. 2010.

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A/T: PUBLIC WORKERS GET PAID THE SAME

Ramoni-Perazzi, Josefa, and Don Bellante. "Do Truly Comparable Public and Private Sector Workers Show Any
Compensation Differential?" Journal of Labor Research XXVII.1 (2007). Springer. Web. 13 Apr. 2010.

Decades of studies on public sector wages were focused incorrectly

, the idea that earnings of public sector workers were significantly above those received by their private
For years

counterparts generated a debate about the size of government, the efficiency of the public wage-setting system,
its contribution to fiscal stress, and the proper use of tax funds. In general, studies were based on the efficiency and
equity principles: Workers with similar productivity-related characteristics should be paid the same regardless
of the sector of employment.

Public sector workers actually do receive a wage premium

Our results indicate that public sector workers are paid a wage premium that ranges from 3.5 percent to 11.1
percent, compared to similar workers in the private sec- tor. This range becomes substantially smaller once the effect of unionization is excluded from the model,
varying from �1.6 percent to 6 percent. These wage differ- entials can be explained by differences in the returns to human capital and other productivity-related variables, rather than by the differences in the distribution of
these variables in each sector. In all the cases, the premium increases with the level of edu- cation, reaching its peak for workers with some college, and declining somewhat for workers with a college degree or more,
indicating a higher compression of the distri- bution of wages in the public sector compared to the private sector, as other studies have suggested. Differences in nonwage benefits amplify the wage inequality.

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