REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUPREME COURT
MANILA

WILLIAM B. TING and G.R. NO. __________

MARIANA B. ACOSTA,
Petitioner,

-versus-

NAPICO HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION III, INC.,
represented by its Vice
President ROSELLER D.
FORTICH,

Honorable
Commissioners REA
CORAZON GOLEZ-
CABRERA, ROLANDO B.
FALLER and DOMNINA T.
RANCES of the HLURB
Board of Commissioners
Third Division

Honorable Housing and

Land Use Arbiter
JOSELITO F. MELCHOR of
the HLURB Expanded
National Capital Region
Field Office
Respondents.
X----------- ------
- -X

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH PRAYER

FOR THE ISSUANCE OF PRELIMINARY

1
 MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND/OR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

NOW COMES the Petitioner, BY THEMSELVES, in the above-

entitled case, unto the Honorable Supreme Court, most
respectfully avers THAT:

PREFATORY STATEMENT
If the misery of the poor be caused
not by the laws of nature, but by our
institutions,
great is our sin.
Charles Darwin, Voyage of the Beagle

This is a Petition for Certiorari, with a Prayer for Preliminary

Prohibitory Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining
Order, asking the Most Honorable Court to SET ASIDE the
27 January 2012 Writ of Execution issued by the Honorable
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the 19 March
2015 2nd Notice to Vacate issued by the Office of the Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig City, including
preceding orders, decisions and resolutions issued by the
same court, the HLURB Board of Commissioners and
HLURB Arbiter and the Honorable Court of Appeals being
repugnant to the fair and orderly administration of justice
by not adhering to the doctrine of prospective application
of law and to the gross negligence of counsel that results
to outright deprivation of petitioners property.

Petitioner also begs the Most Honorable Court, pending

final resolution of this petition, to issue a preliminary
prohibitory injunction and/or a temporary restraining order
prohibiting the public respondents, and anyone acting
under their authority, stead or behalf, from implementing
the decision of the administrative agency a quo.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES AND

TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

2
1. On 20 March 2015, petitioners received a photocopy
of a 2nd Notice to Vacate issued by the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of Pasig City based on the Writ
of Execution dated 27 January 2012 issued by the Hon.
JOSELITO F. MELCHOR, Housing and Land Use Arbiter of the
HLURB Expanded National Capital Region Office. Said
notice is just giving herein petitioners ten (10) days to
voluntarily vacate and peacefully turn over/surrender
possession of our respective occupied premises embraced
and described in TCT NO. PT 121274 to respondent,
NAPICO Homeowners Association III, Inc.

2. This petition is an offshoot of a complaint filed by the

private 0respondent on 24 January 2007 seeking judicial
confirmation of herein petitioner from membership to
respondent association and from enjoyment of the
premises they are now occupying by means of eviction.

3. Petitioners, being not fully lettered with the intricacies

and technicalities of the law, gave so much trust and
confidence to their former counsel. The case treaded
various courses without petitioners knowing the possible
outcomes but resulted into gaining unfavorable judgment.

4. Petitioners, on the above-cited date, received the 2 nd

Notice to Vacate that prompted them to revisit all available
documents on hand only to find out that the controversy
was determined on technicalities attributable to the gross
negligence of the counsel.

Petitioners can no longer afford to engage the services of a

counsel who is a member of the bar and they submitted
for consideration of the Most Honorable Court that they are
litigating the instant case BY THEMSELVES. Again, herein
petitioners most respectfully submit to the Most Honorable
Court to consider that the absence of a counsel on record
should not affect their assertion of enforcing they legal
rights.

5. There is no appeal or any plain and speedy remedy in

the ordinary course of law that could resolve this very
important matter. Except, to beseech the Most Honorable
Court to use its expansive powers to review cases and
controversies, including the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or

3
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

6. Under Rule 65, petitioners have sixty (60) days from

20 March 2015 within which to file this petition. The 60 th
day falls on 20 May 2015 to consider that petitioner filed
the same on time. Petitioner will pay the docket and other
lawful fees simultaneous with the filing of this petition.

PARTIES

7. Petitioners WILLIAM TING and MARIANA ACOSTA are

residents of NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City but for facility
of serving pleadings, notices, orders and decisions of the
Most Honorable Court, these processes can be forwarded
to 1522 Monggo St., NAPICO, Manggahan Pasig City c/o
ARMANDO CANLAS.

8. Respondent NAHA III, represented by its Vice

President ROSELLER D. FORTICH, is an organization formed
and existing under the Philippine law with principal
address at 437 Chico St., NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City,
and it may be served with pleadings, notices, orders and
other processes at the said address.

9. The public respondents are the following public

officials: Honorable Commissioners REA CORAZON GOLEZ-
CABRERA, ROLANDO B. FALLER and DOMNINA T. RANCES,
Housing and Land Use Arbiter JOSELITO F. MELCHOR are
being sued in their capacity as the officials that will
implement the resolution of the Honorable Court of
Appeals Third Division. They may be served with notices,
orders and resolutions at Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, Kalayaan Avenue cor. Mayaman St., Diliman,
Quezon City.

BACKGROUNDS

10. The controv,ersy started when NAHA III filed an

initiatory pleading on 24 January 2007, when the
governing law on homeowners association was then
covered by Section 26 of the Republic Act 8763, otherwise
4
known as the Home Guaranty Corporation Act of 2000".
But when the case was being heard by the Honorable
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board and the
Honorable Court of Appeals, Republic Act 9904 (Magna
Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners Associations) was
already in effect.

11. Gross negligence of the petitioners counsel is evident

in the review of the records that no board resolution
expelling the petitioners (together with other respondents)
from the said association. No board resolution naming the
person who will represent the association in the case filed
against the petitioners and other respondents in the
expulsion case, including authority of the representative to
sign the verification.

12. Instead of considering that Republic 9904 was already

the governing law of homeowners and homeowners
association when the controversy was being determined
by the Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners,
specifically on matters of delisting members, the
Honorable HLURB Board of Commissioners instead
affirmed the decision of Honorable Joselito F. Melchor on
judicial confirmation of expulsion and eviction, which by its
nature is an action for Ejectment.

13. There was an oversight when both the Honorable

Arbiter and the Board of Commissioners rendered their
respective decisions in not applying the provision of RA
9904 pertain Resolutions Delisting or Expelling Association
Members in Land Tenurial Projects, which is the most
applicable section of the IRR of RA 9904, including the
issuance of the Writ of Execution.

14. Arguments and counter-arguments were put forth by

the parties and the case passed through the various
procedures until elevated to the Honorable Court of
Appeals for the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, and then to the Second Division of the Most
Honorable Court.

15. On 12 September 2012, the Second Division of the

Most Honorable Court issued a Resolution CLOSING AND
TERMINATING GR No. 202402.

16. On 22 March 2013, Hon. Joselito F. Melchor issued an

Order directing the petitioners to file comments/opposition

5
on private respondents Motion for Special Order, which
herein petitioners complied and filed said comments and
opposition on 16 May 2014. Copy of said order is attached
as Annex C.

17. In seeking petitioners comments, the Hon. Joselito

Melchor opened the door for assailing whatever
proceedings transpired. Petitioners did not change the
course of their arguments in their Comments and
Opposition but asserting that RA 9904 (Magna Carta for
Homeowners) is already in effect and should be applied.
Photocopy of the petitioners Comments and Opposition is
attached as Annex D.

18. The instant petition may be sufficiently important

to merit the Most Honorable Court review due to the
impact of the agency a quos and the lower courts
decision extends beyond the narrow interests of the
petitioner to affect the entire Community Mortgage
Program or a large segment of the population.

19. The decisions that disregarded the provisions of the

operative law, Republic Act 9904 or the Magna Carta for
Homeowners and Homeowners Associations and the non-
application of the dictum of prospectivity of law is a
serious invalidation of statutes not on constitutional
grounds are ordinarily of sufficient importance to warrant
review. Hence, the instant petition.

LOCUS STANDI OF PETITIONER

20. Petitioners as respondents in the case filed with the

HLURB and being an appellant to the Honorable Court of
Appeals has a legal standing to file the instant petition.
Settled in our jurisprudence that locus standi means
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the act complained of. Petitioners are proper parties
because they have sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining injury as concomitant result of the act being
assailed.

For a party to assert legal standing he needs only to prove

injury to his right or interest as first requisite, and the
reasonably perceptible causal connection between the
asserted injury and the assailed conduct.

6
21. Pertains the first requisite, petitioners sustained
and will be sustaining direct injury by losing their
respective familys abode and may be held to exist when
the administrative ruling will be implemented. About the
second requisite, it is complied with showing that the relief
being sought will redress the asserted injury. Petitioners
stand to suffer directly from the non-application of the
operative law that governs the instant case, and the same
act can be applied to other members and non-members of
CMP and other land tenurial programs of the government.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

22. Petitioner contends and most respectfully submits

that the decisions and resolutions rendered by the
Honorable Housing and Land Use Arbiter, the Honorable
HLURB Board of Commissioners and the Honorable Court
of Appeals is in direct conflict with the decisions of the
Most Honorable Court in the long line of cases applying the
operative law and the dictum of prospective application
of law in absence of retroactive provision.

23. Definitely, a lower court or a quasi-judicial body

cannot expressly reject a Supreme Court decision.
However, there are instances when an operative law or
dictum was overlooked, disregarded or misapplied,
consciously or unconsciously, that give rise to chances
that the quasi-judicial body or lower courts decision is in
tension with a decision of the Supreme Court.

24. In their respective decisions, the Honorable

Housing and Land Use Arbiter and the Honorable HLURB
Board of Commissioners applied Section 26 of Republic Act
580, as amended by Executive Order 535, transferring the
powers, authorities and responsibilities of the Home
Insurance Guaranty Corporation to the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, instead of applying the
provisions Republic Act 9904, which was already
signed into law and the governing law with respect
to supervision of homeowners associations when the
judicial confirmation and eviction case filed by NAHA III
against the herein petitioners was in the stage of hearing
and on appeal.

7
25. Public respondents probably become accustomed
to adherence to applying the principle of law applicable to
a certain state of facts is applicable to future cases having
substantially similar facts although the parties may be
different.

Although there may be an existence of similarity in the

state of facts but when factual variant is introduced,
especially when a new law was passed and operative,
application of said principle would be inappropriate. The
confusion of the agency a quo and the Honorable
Court of Appeals on what law should be applied
signaled that the issue is ripe for reexamination
and possible overruling or limitation.

26. The controversy is amply ripe for the Most

Honorable Courts adjudication. The rule of ripeness
found its basis on the doctrine that in order for the court to
act, there must be an actual controversy involving
disagreement of legal rights and assertion conflicting
claims susceptible of judicial settlement. Under the same
principle, the issue is not ripe when it is prematurely
lodged. Although there is no rigid or fast rule in
determining the ripeness of a controversy, the principle
gives emphasis that the court would find it difficult to
weigh up the realistic qualities of each party when the
controversy becomes concrete and required attention.

27. The requirement of ripeness is satisfied when a

party will sustain immediate injury and such injury will be
remedied by the relief sought. Respondents act has been
achieved or imminently to be accomplished to the injury of
the petitioners and large number of population having the
same plaint.

28. The instant petition involves petitioners who

questioned the manner respondents ignored requirements
laid down by law and established jurisprudence, which
would result in the unfair administration of justice,
satisfied the existence of justiciable controversy.

29. The instant petition involves matters of public

interest and transcendental importance that
warrant brushing aside technicalities of procedure,
if any. Indeed, the primordial policy is a faithful
observance of the Rules of Court, and their relaxation or
suspension should only be for persuasive reasons and only

8
in meritorious cases, to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. (Lazaro v.
Court of Appeals, 386 Phil. 412, 417 (2000). The emerging trend
of jurisprudence is more inclined to the liberal and flexible
application of the Rules of Court. However, we have not
been remiss in reminding the bench and the bar that
zealous compliance with the rules is still the general
course of action. Rules of procedure are in place to ensure
the orderly, just, and speedy dispensation of cases; (Heirs of
Cesar Marasigan v. Marasigan, G.R. No. 156078, March 14, 2008,
548 SCRA 409). To this end, inflexibility or liberality must be
weighed. The relaxation or suspension of procedural rules
or the exemption of a case from their operation is
warranted only by compelling reasons or when the
purpose of justice requires it. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (formerly Southern Energy
Quezon, Inc.), G.R. No. 159593, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 484,
496.)

30. The instant petition might be touching some issues of

Constitutional concern like doctrine of equal protection
and due process, which are of public interest and
transcendental importance; nevertheless, herein
petitioner is exerting all efforts in delimiting on a
solitary issue of non application of dictum of
prospectivity of law absence a retroactive
provision. Thus, as the issue raised herein is of public
interest, petitioners most respectfully beg that procedural
barriers, if any, in taking cognizance of this petition be
brushed aside.

31. Glimpsing back at the stage of formulation of

Republic Act 9904 and during plenary deliberation of
Senate Bill 3061, Senator Miguel Zubiri pointed out, x x x
"homeownership is not necessarily dependent on full and actual
ownership, as even those with beneficial ownership can be entitled
to the rights granted to homeowners."

He said "provided that lessees in government socialized housing

projects or urban estates and those in communities of
underprivileged and homeless citizens covered under the term
under Section 3 (1) of this Act, will be considered as homeowners for
the purpose of qualifying as a member of a homeowners' association
without need of such written consent or authorization."

The Majority Leader also clarified that "all homeowners can become
members of the homeowners' association and at the same time

9
allows homeowners not to engage or member in any homeowners
association as indicated in Article III, sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution,
stating "membership in homeowner's association is generally
voluntary, subject only to a few exceptions recognized by the
Supreme Court through various decisions on the matter."

He said that while the law recognized that membership in any

association is voluntary unless it is stipulated in the contract or
annotated in the title.

The proposed act likewise recognized two classes of homeowners

exist, non-member homeowners and the homeowner members.

"The rights of both classes are enumerated in the proposed

legislation, subject to any additional benefits which they may
receive by virtue of the homeowners' association by-laws," Zubiri
said.

"A non-member homeowner has the duty to pay the costs and
expenses incurred by the association for the payment of basic
community services."

"On grounds of equity alone, a non-member homeowner should

contribute in the community expenses that redound to his or her
benefit.

Nothing in the sponsorship speech touches about eviction

mainly on reason that the intention of the law is to provide
every Filipino an abode of his own.

32. Petitioners beg the Most Honorable Court to

consider Section 47 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9904 as applicable and the most
appropriate in the resolution of the case NAHA III filed
against the petitioner, which reads:

Section 47. Resolutions Delisting or

Expelling Association Members in Land
Tenurial Projects. In cases of CMP, GLAD
and other similar land tenurial
projects/arrangements, the resolution
delisting/expelling members from the
association, and the corresponding
substitutions, if any, shall be submitted to
the HLURB, within thirty (30) days from its
adoption. Otherwise, the delisting or
expulsion of members shall not be

10
 enforceable.

It is an accepted tenet that when the law is applied to

strictly and mechanically, the law cannot keep pace with
social developments. Equally, a return to the policies
outlining the basic supposition supporting potentially
relevant rules of law and the best guidelines for resolving
the dispute, if there is completely new situation.

33. Petitioners and their respective families are in the

verge of losing their abode due to non-application of an
existing law. Jurisprudence has consistently summoned
that a statute, whether original or amendatory, should
prospectively apply to avoid inequity and social injustice.
Former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa penned in Co vs.
Court of Appeals, et al, (227 SCRA 444, 448-455 (1993) this
Court, thru Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, held: The
principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or
amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961, (sic) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30,
1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested
the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back
pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an
offer of payment made before effectivity of the act;
Lagardo v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962),
ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June,
1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect,
in the absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64
SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive
Order No. 90, amending Section 4 of PD 1752, could have
no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 SCRA
640, holding that a person cannot be convicted of violating
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when the alleged
violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the
Official Gazette; Baltazar v. CA, 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the
emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, and
P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and
corn farm holdings, pending the promulgation of rules and
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 which
removed personal cultivation as a ground for the
ejectment of a tenant cannot be given retroactive effect in
the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-
An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old
Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded
retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500,
11
holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective
application; (see also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294
and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419). chanrobles virtual law
library

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to

administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, October 12, 1981, 108
SCRA 142, holding that a circular or ruling of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given
retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer; Sanchez v.
COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-
0590 of the Commission on Elections, which directed the
holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive
application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197 SCRA 168, where it
was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989
cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary
appointment had expired before the Circular was issued.

34. The RA 9904, including its implementing rules and

regulation, is the controlling law governing in the case filed
by private respondent against petitioners. Thus, the non-
consideration of the previously mentioned Section 47 of
the IRR of RA 9904 and other related provisions of the
same law defeats the compelling purpose of the legislature
and the intention of Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners Associations.

35. Republic Act 9904 expands the duties and

responsibilities of the HLURB, in addition to the powers,
authorities and responsibilities vested in it by Republic Act
No. 8763, Presidential Decree No. 902 - A, Batas Pambansa
Big. 68 and Executive Order No. 535, Series of 1981,
It is settled that, Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided," (Article 4 of the Civil
Code); thus, petitioners sees no reason why Magna Carta
for Homeowners was not resorted to during the stage of
hearing and appeal of the case filed by private respondent
against the petitioners.

36. The heart-breaking result of the present controversy

emanated from the gross negligence of the petitioners
counsel applying the doctrine negligence of the counsel is

12
negligence of the client. However, herein petitioners
believe that their present plight is an exception to the
doctrine. The Most Honorable Court, in the long line of
cases decided admitted exceptions to the general rule
when: (1) the client is deprived of due process, (2) the
application of the general rule will result in outright
deprivation of clients liberty or property, and (3) where
the interest of justice so requires, and accord relief to
client who suffered by reason of lawyers gross negligence.

37. Being poor and unlettered to the law, petitioners

cannot be faulted in reposing so much trust and
confidence to their counsel. Herein petitioners believed
that their counsel would amply protect their interest and
expected that the counsel will make good her
representation and take the necessary steps to defend the
case.

38. Petitioners case is analogous to the case of Escudero

vs. Dulay, G.R. No.L-60578, 23 February 1988 where the
Most Honorable Court held that the counsels blunder is an
exception to the rule that the client is bound by the
mistakes of counsel, and the Most Honorable Court made
this pronouncement:

Petitioners contend, through their new

counsel, that judgments rendered against
them by the respondent court are null and
void, because they were therein od their day in
court and divested of their property, without
due process of law, through the gross
ignorance, mistake and negligence of their
previous counsel. They acknowledge that,
while as a rule, clients are bound by the
mistake of their counsel, the rule should not be
applied automatically to their case, as the trial
counsels blunder in procedure and gross
ignorance of existing jurisprudence changed
their cause of action and violated their
substantial rights.

We are impressed with petitioners contention.

x x x Ordinarily, a special civil action under

rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not be a
substitute or cure for failure to file timely
petition for review on certiorari (appeal) under
Rule 45 of the Rules. Where, however, the

13
 application of the rule will result in a manifest
failure or miscarriage of justice, the rule may
be relaxed. x x x

While this Court is cognizant of the rule that,

generally, a client will suffer the consequences
of negligence, mistake or lack of competence
of his counsel, in the interest of justice and
equity, exception may be made to such rule, in
accordance with the facts and circumstances
of each case. Adherence to the general rule
would, in the instant case, result in the outright
deprivation of their property through a
technicality.

39. The Most Honorable Court is advancing effective

mechanism in dispensing justice like in the case of
Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Tiongco
and Escasa, G.R. No. L-18891, 28 November 1964, it
enunciated as follows:

Procedural technicality should not be made

a bar to the vindication of a legitimate
grievance. When such technicality deserts
from being an aid to justice, the courts are
justified in excepting from its operation a
particular case. Where there were something
fishy and suspicious about the actuations of
the former counsel of petitioner in the case at
bar, in that he did not given any significance
at all to the processes of the court, which has
proven prejudicial to the rights of said clients,
under a lame and flimsy explanation that the
courts processes just escaped his attention,
it is said that said lawyer deprived his clients
of their day in court, thus entitling said
clients to petition for relief from judgment
despite the lapse of the reglementary period
for filing said petition.

40. One specific point that petitioners beg the Most

Honorable Court to consider is the claim of ownership by
the respondent on the premises occupied by the
petitioners, which is a patent misrepresentation. There is
nothing in the Complaint that alleged herein respondent is
the absolute owner of the property being an essential

14
requisite of mortgage and it has the free disposal of the
property.

41. Even assuming that the land may subsequently be

acquired or owned by the respondent or by the program
beneficiaries, the complaint did not allege any contractual
lien or a right was given to respondent to secure loan
subjecting the property claimed in favor of certain creditor.

42. Respondent concealed some other documents like

the Deed of Sale between the respondent and Metro
Manila Development Authority, its alleged predecessor-in-
interest, the Deed of Mortgage between the respondent
and the National Housing Authority. The non-presentation
of said document will give rise to presumption that the
transfer certificates of title respondent presented are
spurious.

43. This presumption could be fully established by

the evidence discovered after the trial. If these
were produced and admitted at the trial, the
judgment will be altered due to its materiality and
weight. This evidence is the reply, dated 17 March
2015, of the DENR National Capital Region signed
by certain Ignacio R. Almira, Jr., Chief of the
Regional Survey Division, to the request of certain
Johny S. Atienza of 242 Kaimito Extension, NAPICO,
Pasig City. Second paragraph of the said reply
states:

Please be informed that per verification made

and based on records on file in the Land Records
Section, Surveys and Mapping Division of this
Office, Bgy. Mangahan of Pasig Cityhas not
yet been cadastrally surveyed, hence your
request cannot be granted. (Emphasized
supplied)

Photocopy of said letter-reply is attached as Annex E.

Petitioners procured a certified true copy of the said reply
but the office of origin did not issue one; nevertheless,
Johny Atienza is willing to testify on this matter once called
by the Most Honorable Court.

44. The concept of cadastre is either unfamiliar or

not clear to the population at large. This, however, is a
vital tool used by specialists involved in land and land

15
related dealings. In plain, a cadastre is an official
register showing details of ownership, boundaries,
and value of real property in a district, made for
taxation purposes (Collins English Dictionary 1979).
A cadastral map displays how boundaries subdivide land
into units of ownership. The cadastre is used as the
foundation for dealings in: land valuation and taxation
land registration and land transfers, land use
planning, determination of sustainable development,
applicable modes of environmental protection, mapping
management of leases and licenses, determination of
political territories and electoral boundaries, and other
land based administrative purposes. Although in the
present time, it is digitized by computer to deliver maps
showing the digital coordinates of land parcels and
supplementary information related to the land.

45. The Honorable Chairman and Members of the Court

of Appeals Sixth Division and the Honorable Chairman and
Members of the Most Honorable Supreme Court Third
Division were not named public respondent due to the fact
that they are also victims of the respondent who places
the administration of justice in mockery.

46. The active and material misrepresentation of

the respondent, the failure of the Honorable Arbiter
and the Honorable HLURB Commissioners to notice
substantial and material facts of the case, and the
gross negligence of petitioners former counsels
resulting to the outright deprivation of property
warrants nullification of the HLURB ENCRFO 21
January 2010 Decision and to forestall 27 January
2012 Writ of Execution.

In closing, a final and executory judgment can no longer be

attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or
indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, the Most Honorable Court has relaxed this rule in

order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special
or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence

16
of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. (APO Fruits Corporation and Hijo
Plantation, Inc. vs. Land Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
164195,October 12, 2010).

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere

tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the
Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had
already declared to be final. (Barnes v. Padilla 482 Phil. 903
(2004).

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner most
respectfully prays of the Most Honorable Court the
following:

1. That this Petition be given due course;

2. That a Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or

Temporary Restraining Order be issued pending resolution
of the instant petition;

3. That after notice and hearing, a final order be issued:

SETTING ASIDE AND OVERRULING HLURB ENCRFO 21
January 2010 Decision and to forestall 27 January 2012
Writ of Execution.

17
Other reliefs and remedies, which are just and equitable,
are likewise prayed for.

Pasig City for City of Manila; 26 March 2015

Respectfully Submitted:

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA

Petitioner Petitioner

VERIFICATION WITH DECLARATION

OF NON- FORUM SHOPPING

We, WILLIAM B. TING and MARIANA B. ACOSTA,

both Filipinos and of legal age, and presently residing in
NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City, after having been duly
sworn on oath, hereby deposes and states THAT:

1. We are the Petitioners in the above-entitled

petition;

2. We caused the preparation and filing of the above

Petition for Certiorari With Prayer for the Issuance
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and all the
allegations thereon were read by us and we found
them to be true and correct of my personal
knowledge and based on authentic records;

3. That we have not previously filed a similar

complaint, petition or any other action before the
Honorable Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Regional Trial Court or any other office or tribunal,
and if such complaint, petition, action or
proceedings will be discovered by us in the future,
we undertake to report the same to this Honorable
18
 Office within five (5) days from discovery thereof.

IN TRUTH WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands

this 26th day of March 2015 here at the City of Pasig,
Philippines.

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA

Affiant Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_____of March 2015 here at the City of Pasig, Philippines.
Affiants exhibiting to me his Voters Identification Card
bearing Number ____________as evidence establishing his
identity.

Notary Public

DOC. NO. _________________

PAGE NO. _________________

BOOK NO. ________________

SERIES OF 2015

Copy furnished:

NAPICO Homeowners Registry Receipt No.

Association III, Inc. as ______________Post Office
represented by Roseller Fortich ___ March 2015
437 Chico St., NAPICO,
Mangahan, Pasig City

Atty. Joselito F. Melchor Registry Receipt No.

HLURB Arbiter ______________Post Office
Housing and Land Use ___ March 2015
Regulatory Board-ENCRFO
Kalayaan Avenue cor Mayaman
St., Diliman, Quezon City

19
Board of Commissioners
Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board
Kalayaan Ave. cor Mayaman St.
Diliman, Quezon City
Registry Receipt No.
______________Post Office
___ March 2015

EXPLANATION

It is most respectfully explained that personal service

cannot be made because the undersigned has no facility
and personnel to cause such a personal service; hence,
served through registered mail. It is prayed that this
explanation be considered sufficient.

WILLIAM B. TING MARIANA B. ACOSTA

1522 Monggo St., NAPICO, 1522 Monggo St., NAPICO,
Mangahan, Pasig City c/o Armando Mangahan, Pasig City c/o Armando
Canlas Canlas

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
I, WILLIAM B. TING, Filipino, of legal age and presently
residing in NAPICO, Manggahan, Pasig City, after being
duly sworn on oath, depose and state:

1. I am the special messenger of the petitioners.

2. I served copies of the Verified Petition for Certiorari

with Prayer for the Issuance of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction filed before the Most Honorable Supreme Court
on the following parties at their respective addresses and
on the dates indicated below:

20
 Address Date of Service Mode of Service
Name

HOUSING AND LAND

Kalayaan Ave. cor
USE
Mayaman St.
Registered Mail
REGULATORY BOARD
Diliman 1101, Quezon
City

NAPICO Homeowners
Association III, Inc. as 437 Chico St., NAPICO, Registered Mail
represented by Roseller Mangahan, Pasig City
Fortich

Atty. JOSELITO F.
MELCHOR Housing and Land Use
HLURB Arbiter Regulatory Board-ENCRFO
Registered Mail
Kalayaan Avenue cor
Mayaman St., Diliman,
Quezon Cit

by delivering personally a copy of the Complaint Affidavit

on each of the above persons or duly authorized
representative and/or by leaving a copy of the same at his
residence or office, with a person of sufficient age and
discretion or by depositing a copy in the post office,
in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the
addressee at his residence or office, with postage
fully prepaid, and with instructions to the
postmaster to return the mail to the sender after
ten (10) days if undelivered.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my

hand this ___________day of March 2015 in the City of
Pasig .

WILLIAM B. TING

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day

of March 2015 in the City of Pasig, affiant exhibiting to me
his Community Tax Certificate No. issued on
_______________ 2015 at the City of Pasig.

21
 NOTARY PUBLIC

DOC. NO. _______

PAGE NO. ________
BOOK NO. _______
Series of 2015

22