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Mister/Madam President, Your Excellencies, I am Kristine Licup representing the Applicant, and I will be speaking for 21

minutes for Amestonias last two submissions the first one concerning the illegality of Kafkers detention, and the second
concerning the cyber-attacks against The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham law firm. May it please this Honorable
Court.

We submit that the arrest and detention of Joseph Kafker violated international law because it deprived him of
two rights:
First, his right to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention; and
Second, his right to be informed of the charges against him.

The UN Security Council, in its resolutions, has always considered terrorism as a criminal offense. Laws on terrorism, like
Rieslands Terrorism Act, therefore, are penal in nature and they contain intent to prosecute. Hence, we submit that the
detention contemplated in the Act is a pretrial detention.

Kafkers arrest and detention violated Article 9 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or ICCPR
which states that no one shall be arbitrarily arrested or detained. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights or OHCHR, a detention is arbitrary when any of these conditions are met:
One, when procedures established by law are not observed;
Two, when the detention or arrest was done without reasonable ground; and
Three, when the law authorizing the detention is itself arbitrary.

Kafkers arrest was and his detention continues to be arbitrary because it was done without any reasonable ground and
because the Terrorism Act itself is atrbirary.

According to the OHCHR, the most common legitimate reason for deprivation of liberty is that a person is reasonably
suspected of having committed an offense. In a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights, the court said that
having a reasonable suspicion presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective
observer that a person may have committed an offense.

Nothing in the compromis reveals that Kafker can be suspected of committing any of the offenses enumerated in Section
3 (a) of the Terrorism Act. When he was detained, Kafker was a 70-year-old retired public official who posed no terrorist
threat and was, in fact, so harmless that he was invited to speak at Rieslands largest law school. The facts show that
Kafker was simply a passionate environmental advocate who frequented the longlivethehive website and used his
freedom to express his views on the Internet. Paragraph 36 provides that there was a memorandum from Riesland to put
Kafker under surveillance because he was considered a high-level suspect with Ties to The Hive, including the planned
contamination of a large shipment of honey with toxic variants of neonics in 2014. However, results of the investigation
conducted by the Bureau analysts of Riesland showed that Kafker simply committed innocent acts like liking posts or
participating in online chats at the longlivethehive website.

Absent any reasonable ground, Kafkers arrest and detention are arbitrary and in violation of international law.

Furthermore, the Terrorism Act in itself is arbitrary. It allows Riesland to violate a suspects right to be tried within a
reasonable time or to be released pending trial. These safeguards are found in Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR.

The Terrorism Act allows Riesland to detaine a foreign national suspect for 180 days or six months. The law even allows
this period to be extended for 540 days or one and a half years.

Your Excellencies, as of today, Kafker has been detained for 360 days. Not a few days. Not a few weeks. Not even a
month. But 360 days or a little over 51 weeks.

The Human Rights Committee implied that the six-month pretrial detention period established in Yemens national law was
too long a period to be compatible with the ICCPR-guaranteed right to be tried within a reasonable time or to be released
pending trial. We therefor invoke this Courts power to rule that since the Terrorism Act itself is arbitrary, Kafkers detention
which is anchored in this Act is also arbitrary.

Finally, we humbly submit that Kafkers arrest and detention violated Article 9 (2) of the ICCPR which requires that anyone
who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, the reasons of his arrest, and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him.

Your Excellencies, when Kafker was detained, Rieslands police officers simply informed him that he was being arrested
pursuant to the Terrorism Act. In the case of Fox, Campbell, and Hartley, the European Court of Human Rights held that it
is not sufficient for the arresting officer to simply inform the person concerned that he has been arrested under a particular
law on suspicion of being a terrorist. He must be told in simple, non-technical language he can understand the essential
legal and factual ground for his arrest.

Kafker was left in the dark and remained clueless of the reason of his detention the whole time his liberty was curtailed by
the police.

As Riesland violated all these rights provided for by international law, we humbly ask this Court to rule that Kafkers
detention is arbitrary, and that Riesland has the obligation to immediately release him from detention in accordance with
Article 9 (4) of the ICCPR, to disclose all information said to substantiate the allegations against him in keeping with Article
9 (3), and as provided for in paragraph 5 of the same Article, to compensate Kafker for being arbitrarily detained.
As to our last submission, we submit that the cyber-attacks against The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham
constitute an internationally wrongful act attributable to Riesland, and therefore Amestonia is entitled to
compensation.

First, I will establish that the cyber-attacks are attributable to Riesland and then I will establish that these cyber-attacks
constitute a breach of an international obligation.

We submit that the cyber-attacks are attributable to Riesland. Rule 7 of the Tallinn Manual on International Law Applicable
to Cyber Warfare provides that when a cyber operation has been launched or originates from governmental cyber
infrastructure, it is an indication that the State in question is associated with the operation. The Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts or ARSIWA considers an act as an act of State when it is done so by any of its
States organs.

Rieslands role in the cyber-attacks is undeniable.

Investigation showed that the malware used in the hacking of the computers of The Ames Post and Chester and
Walsingham was traced to IP addresses within Rieslands territory and that the cyber-attacks came from
Rieslandic governmental computer infrastructures. This is found in paragraph 38, in relation to clarification 9 of the
compromis.
In the same paragraph, it is established that the cyber-attacks were done using malware that contained significant
segments of code that were also used in the Bureaus Blaster program. We invite this Courts attention to the fact
that these codes were not known to be available to the general public.

All these facts lead us to conclude that the cyber-attacks came from an organ of the Government of Riesland, making the
attacks attributable to the State.

Amestonia asserts that the cyber-attacks also constitute a breach of Rieslands international obligation to respect other
States territorial sovereignty.

The principle of territorial sovereignty is a fundamental norm that has long been established. It is the right of a State to
exercise its functions and power over its own territories without the interference of another State. This has two aspects
this first one referring to the exclusivity of the right of the State with respect to its own territory, and the second referring to
the obligation of that State to protect the rights of other States.

Cyber operations may violate a States territorial sovereignty. In his analysis on the incident between Sony and North
Korea, Michael Schmitt said that it would seem reasonable to characterize a cyber-operation involving the emplacement
of malware by a State to cyber infrastructure located in another State as a violation of the latters sovereignty. Accordingly,
the Tallinn Manual states that a cyber operation by a State directed against cyber infrastructure located in another State
that causes damage certainly violates the latters sovereignty.

Your Excellencies, this is exactly what happened to Amestonia.


First, the cyber-attacks disabled the computer networks and communication switches at The Ames Post and
Chester and Walsingham. As a result, The Ames Post had to shut down their operations from the time of the
attack till June 2015. Furthermore, a significant number of proceedings before Amestonian courts were delayed
for months because of Chester and Walsinghams inability to access its files.
Finally, the cyber-attacks damaged the infrastructure of The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham, resulting to
the loss of 90% of the information and other losses amounting to 45-50 million euros.

These are facts indicating a clear violation of Riesland to Amestonias right to enjoy its sovereignty over its cyber
infrastructures and activities.

As these cyber-attacks of Riesland constitute an internationally wrongful act, we submit that as provided for in Article 36 of
the ARSIWA and Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual, Riesland should take responsibility and pay Amestonia compensation for
the loss and damages it suffered as a result of the said attacks.

In conclusion, the Applicant submits that the detention of Kafker violated international law and that the cyber-attacks
against The Ames Post and Chester and Walsingham constitute an internationally wrongful act by Riesland.

Unless Your Excellencies have further questions, this concludes my submissions. May it please this Honorable Court.