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Bradwell v.

State of Illinois (1873) exercise is in no manner governed or controlled by citizenship of


Mr. Justice Miller the United States in the party seeking such license.

Facts: Mrs. Myra Bradwell applied for a license to practice law in


Illinois. A state statute required a license obtained from two
justices of the state supreme court to practice law. The Illinois
Yick wo vs Hopkins
Supreme Court denied her admission and held that as a married
woman, she would not be bound in her contracts. The state
supreme courts opinion also held that the legislature never Facts of the case
intended that women be admitted to the bar.
An 1880 ordinance of the city of San Francisco required
Issue: Can a qualified female citizen claim under the fourteenth
amendment the privilege of practicing law? all laundries in wooden buildings to hold a permit
issued by the city's Board of Supervisors. The board
Held: No. Judgment affirmed. had total discretion over who would be issued a permit.
Although workers of Chinese descent operated 89
Ruling: The fourteenth amendment declares that citizens of the percent of the city's laundry businesses, not a single
United States are citizens of the state where they reside. The
protection designed by that clause has no application to a citizen Chinese owner was granted a permit. Yick Wo and Wo
of the state whose laws are complained of. If the plaintiff was a Lee each operated laundry businesses without a permit
citizen of the state of Illinois, that provision of the Constitution and, after refusing to pay a $10 fine, were imprisoned
gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation. by the city's sheriff, Peter Hopkins. Each sued for writ
of habeas corpus, arguing the fine and discriminatory
There are privileges and immunities belonging to citizens of the
United States, which a state is forbidden to abridge, but the right enforcement of the ordinance violated their rights
to admission to practice in the courts of a state is not one of them. under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
This right does not depend on citizenship of the United States. As Amendment. Noting that, on its face, the law is
to the courts of a state, the right would relate to citizenship of the nondiscriminatory, the Supreme Court of California and
state. As to federal courts, it would relate to citizenship of the the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
United States.
California denied claims for Yick Wo and Wo Lee,
The right to control and regulate the granting of license to practice respectively.
law in the courts of a state is one of those powers which are not
transferred for its protection to the federal government. Its

1
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256
Question (1896).
Facts
Did the unequal enforcement of the city ordinance
Plessy (P) attempted to sit in an all-white railroad car. After
violate Yick Wo and Wo Lee's rights under the Equal
refusing to sit in the black railway carriage car, Plessy was arrested
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? for violating an 1890 Louisiana statute that provided for
segregated separate but equal railroad accommodations. Those
using facilities not designated for their race were criminally liable
Conclusion under the statute.

Yes. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice T. At trial with Justice John H. Ferguson (D) presiding, Plessy was
Stanley Matthews, the Court concluded that, despite found guilty on the grounds that the law was a reasonable exercise
the impartial wording of the law, its biased enforcement of the states police powers based upon custom, usage, and
violated the Equal Protection Clause. According to the tradition in the state. Plessy filed a petition for writs of prohibition
Court, even if the law is impartial on its face, "if it is and certiorari in the Supreme Court of Louisiana against Ferguson,
applied and administered by public authority with an asserting that segregation stigmatized blacks and stamped them
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make with a badge of inferiority in violation of the Thirteenth and
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in Fourteenth amendments. The court found for Ferguson and the
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the Supreme Court granted cert.
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of Issue
the Constitution." The kind of biased enforcement Can the states constitutionally enact legislation requiring
experienced by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded, persons of different races to use separate but equal
amounted to "a practical denial by the State of that segregated facilities?
equal protection of the law" and therefore violated the Holding and Rule (Brown)
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Yes. The states can constitutionally enact legislation requiring
persons of different races to use separate but equal
segregated facilities.
Thirteenth Amendment issue

2
The statute does not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment. The two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting and
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary even requiring their separation in places where they are liable to
servitude, except as a punishment for crime. Slavery implies be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
involuntary servitude and a state of bondage. The Thirteenth either race. Such laws have generally been recognized as within
Amendment however was regarded as insufficient to protect the scope of the states police powers. The most common instance
former slaves from certain laws which had been enacted in the involves the establishment of separate schools, which has been
south which imposed upon them onerous disabilities and burdens held to be a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts
and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty and property of States where the political rights of blacks have been longest and
to such an extent that their freedom was of little value; and that most earnestly enforced.
the Fourteenth Amendment was devised to meet this exigency.
Disposition
Fourteenth Amendment Issue
Judgment for Ferguson (Plessy loses).
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof are made citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside, and the States are forbidden from
making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.

The proper construction of this amendment involves a question of


exclusive privileges rather than race. Its main purpose was to
establish the citizenship of former slaves, to give definitions of
citizenship of the United States and of the States, and to protect KOREMATSU VS US
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States from
hostile legislation of the states. Case Summary
It was intended to enforce the absolute equality of the two races Fred Korematsu refused to obey the wartime order to
before the law, but it was intended to abolish distinctions based leave his home and report to a relocation camp for
upon color, or to enforce social equality, or a commingling of the Japanese Americans. He was arrested and convicted.

3
After losing in the Court of Appeals, he appealed to the ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his
United States Supreme Court, challenging the loyalty and good disposition towards the United
constitutionality of the deportation order. States. Justice Robert Jackson noted that comparable
burdens were not imposed upon descendents of the
The Court's Decision other nationalities (German, Italian) with whom the
United States was also at war.
The Supreme Court upheld the order excluding persons
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war zone More on the Case
during World War II. Three justices dissented.
After the war, Fred Korematsu continued his efforts to
Justice Hugo Black delivered the opinion of the Court.
clear his name. The ruling in Korematsu troubled jurists
He began with the observation that legal restrictions on
and civil libertarians because it suggested that basic
the rights of a single racial group will always be
civil rights could give way to prejudice and hysteria.
suspect and that courts must subject them to the
Congress enacted the Japanese American Evacuation
most rigid scrutiny. However, they are not necessarily
Claims Act of 1948 to provide some monetary
unconstitutional. The exclusion order imposed
compensation to citizens who had lost their homes or
hardships upon a large group of American citizens.
businesses during the internment. Ultimately, in 1983,
But hardships are part of war.Compulsory exclusion
Korematsu succeeded in persuading a federal judge in
of large groups of citizens from their homes, except
San Francisco to set aside his conviction for violating
under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is
the wartime order.
inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
But when under conditions of modern warfare our Congress reassessed the internment in the early 1980s,
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to and in 1982 and 1983 issued a report called Personal
protect must be commensurate with the threatened Justice Denied which determined that military
danger. considerations had not required the removal of
Japanese Americans and concluded that
Justice Owen Roberts wrote in his dissent that this is
the Korematsu decision had been overruled in the
the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not
court of history. In 1988, Congress issued a formal
submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp,
apology for the suffering and loss of property the
based on his ancestry, and solely because of his
internment order had caused, and in 1989 authorized

4
reparations of $20,000 to each of the approximately
60,000 survivors of the internment camps. Many of Conclusion
those who were imprisoned had been farmers in
California who were pressured to sell, at rock-bottom No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Felix Frankfurter, the Court
prices, land that is now worth millions of dollars. In concluded that the Constitution "does not preclude the States from
1998, President Clinton presented Fred Korematsu with drawing a sharp line between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological
the Presidential Medal of Freedom. insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards." The Court found that
the Michigan legislature, in enacting the statute, could have
determined that allowing women to bartend could "give rise to moral
and social problems against which it may devise preventive
GOESAERT VS CLEARY measures." The Court, Justice Frankfurter concludes, is in no position
to "cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of
Facts of the case
Michigan legislators."
A Michigan statute required that all bartenders hold licenses in cities
with populations greater than 50,000, but the statute also stated that a
woman could not be issued a license unless she was "the wife or
daughter of the male owner" of a liquor establishment. Two female
bartenders challenged the law, requesting an injunction against its
enforcement, on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A three-judge panel of the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan Citation. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
rejected the bartenders' claim.
Brief Fact Summary. After its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka, the Supreme Court of the United States
Question (Supreme Court) determines that the lower courts in which the cases
originated were the proper venue for determining how to best
Did the Michigan statute, in denying female bartenders access to implement racial desegregation.
licenses, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?

5
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The lower courts in which the cases of Brief Fact Summary. California operated a disability
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka first originated are the proper insurance system that paid benefits to employees of
venue for determining how to best implement racial desegregation in private employers when workers compensation did not
light of varied school problems and different local conditions. cover certain disabilities that prevented those
employees from working. However, many pregnancy
Facts. The Supreme Court, after ruling that racial segregation in related disabilities were excluded from coverage
public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth because of expenses to the program.
Amendment, determined that the lower courts in which the cases of
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka first originated would be the Synopsis of Rule of Law. Underinclusive legislation is
proper venue in determining how to implement racial desegregation. appropriate under the Equal Protection Clause, so long
The Supreme Court acknowledged that these lower courts should as the line drawn by the State is rationally
structure this desegregation because of varied local school problems supportable.
and local conditions. The Supreme Court stated the lower courts
would be guided by equitable principles, recognizing the need for
elimination of obstacles in making the transition to desegregation.
Facts. California operated a disability insurance system
Issue. How to implement the racial desegregation in public education that supplemented workers compensation, in that it
in light of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. provided for payments for disabilities not covered by
workers compensation. The list of disabilities paid for
Held. Remanded. The lower courts, which originally heard these by the State of California was not exhaustive. Among
cases, will determine how to implement racial desegregation in public those disabilities not paid for were certain pregnancy
schools with all deliberate speed. related conditions. Suit was brought challenging the
system as an unconstitutional gender-based
Discussion. In light of the ruling of Brown v. Board of Education of classification.
Topeka, declaring segregation in public schools unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the lower courts to Issue. Does the exclusion of the pregnancy-related
implement racial desegregation with all deliberate speed. conditions violate the Fourteenth Amendments Equal
Protection Clause?
GEDULDIG VS AIELLO

6
Held. No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
The list of conditions covered by the disability Date: Decided in 1978
insurance system is not exclusive. Furthermore, there
are conditions not covered by the system that affect Program Challenged: The case involves the
both men and women. The excluded conditions do not admissions program to the University of California
affect women alone. Medical School at Davis. Out of an entering class of
The savings given the program by the exclusion of such 100, UC set aside 16 spaces for students admitted
conditions benefit both men and women. That is, through a special admissions program for minority
inclusion of the excluded conditions would result in applicants.
lesser amounts of funding for all other conditions.
Supreme Court Decision: A majority of the Supreme
Dissent. Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) argues Court five justices -- held that while the UC program
that by disallowing payments related to pregnancy, the was unconstitutional because it involved a quota, it was
State inevitably discriminates against women. lawful to take race into account in admissions. Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall and White (the so-called
Discussion. The majority reaches its conclusions Brennan 4) joined in Section V(C) of Justice Powells
through viewing the problem as one of underinclusive opinion which says:
legislation, while the dissent focuses on the inevitable
connection of the unfunded conditions with a single In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race
sex. of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to
recognize that the State has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised
admissions program involving the competitive
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason,
so much of the California court's judgment as enjoins
Court: U.S. Supreme Court (on appeal from the petitioner from any consideration of the race of any
California Supreme Court which struck down the applicant must be reversed.
program and entered an order prohibiting any use of
race in admissions)

7
The other four justices (Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Opinion of Brennan 4: Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
Rehnquist) agreed that the UC quota program was Marshall and White would not have applied strict
unlawful but they would not have decided it under the scrutiny to the use of race in college admissions. They
constitution. Rather, they would have ruled it unlawful believed that a less exacting standard was appropriate
under Title VI, the federal civil rights statute. when the use of race was remedial. And, they found
that the need to remedy past discrimination was a
There were six opinions written. Justice Powells sufficient rationale to support the use of race in college
opinion is the controlling opinion of the Court because admissions.
his opinion is the narrowest ground supporting the
majoritys conclusion that race can be used in college Opinion of Stevens, Burger, Stewart and Rehnquist:
admissions. The three major opinions are summarized
below. These justices agreed with the other five that the
UC quota program was unlawful but would not have
Justice Powells Opinion: Justice Powell wrote the decided the question of whether the program was
controlling opinion of the Court because his opinion is unconstitutional. Rather, they found that the UC
the narrowest ground supporting the use of race in program was unlawful based on Title VI, the federal civil
college admissions. Powell wrote that the use of race rights statute.
should be subject to strict scrutiny meaning that: (1)
there should be a compelling governmental interest in
using race; and (2) the program must be necessary or Personnel administrator vs feeney
narrowly tailored to achieve -- that interest. Powell
found that the educational benefits of diversity were a Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Feeney
compelling governmental interest justifying the use of (Respondent), challenges the Petitioner, Personnel
race as a plus factor in admissions. Powell said that Administration of Massachusettss (Petitioner), rule that
race can be considered as one of many factors and can provides a hiring preference to military veterans.
influence admissions decisions when the university is
trying to achieve overall diversity. Synopsis of Rule of Law. A gender neutral statute that
adversely impacts one gender does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States

8
Constitution (Constitution) if it does not have a MICHAEL M. VS SUPERIOR COURT
discriminatory purpose and it does not actually classify
one gender. Brief Fact Summary. Californias statutory rape law
holds only males, not females, criminally liable for
having sexual intercourse with females under the age
of 18.
Facts. Respondent claims that by having a hiring
preference for veterans over non- veterans for civil Synopsis of Rule of Law. A statutes gender-based
service positions, the Petitioner is discriminating classification is constitutionally permissible if the
against women. classification bears a substantial relationship to an
The District Court found that this practice has a severe important governmental interest.
impact on job opportunities for women, since most of
the veterans are men.

Issue. Does the hiring practice that favors veterans Facts. The Petitioner, Michael M. (Petitioner), a
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States seventeen and a half year-old male, sought to have
Constitution? Californias statutory rape law declared
unconstitutional, on state and federal grounds, because
Held. No. The benefit of this act was offered to any the law defines statutory rape as an act of sexual
person who was a veteran. The law is a preference for intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of
veterans of either sex over non-veterans of either sex. the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of
It was not designed to favor men over women. 18 years, and thus, unlawfully discriminates on the
Discussion. This statute was designed to reward and basis of gender. The California trial and appellate courts
help veterans reenter society after their service. At the denied the Petitioners request for relief. The Supreme
time only 1% of the veterans were women. So, it Court of California upheld the judgments of the lower
appeared that this legislation was meant for men only. courts. The ruling of the Supreme Court of California
But, in its application and by definition a veteran is was affirmed.
gender neutral.

9
Issue. Whether Californias statutory rape law violates pregnancies under its gender-based statutory rape law
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth than there would be if the law were gender
Amendment of the United States Constitution neutral . . . .
(Constitution) because it only holds males criminally Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) Californias
liable for sexual intercourse as defined under the statute should apply to males as well as females
statute. because sexual intercourse between a male and a
female constitutes two guilty wrongdoers not just
Held. (J. Rehnquist) No. The Californias statutory rape one. According to the Constitution, state laws must
law bears a substantial relationship to important govern impartially.
governmental objectives, and thus, the statute passes Concurrence. The concurring opinions are as follows:
constitutional muster. The judgment of the California Justice Potter Steward (J. Stewart). Despite recognizing
Supreme Court is affirmed. the significance of the physiological differences
The California statute withstands a constitutional challenge becausebetween
it men and women the fact that only women
supports the states effort to prevent illegitimate pregnancies, to can become pregnant the Supreme Court of the
prevent significant social, medical, and economic consequences for United States ruling does not use these differences as
both the mother and her child, to prevent abortions, and to prevent merely a pretext for invidious discrimination, but
children born, as a result of illegitimate pregnancies, to become wards
instead looks to the overriding state interest to protect
of the State. young women who, because of their physiological
The California statute protects young women from differences, are not similarly situated as men and thus,
sexual intercourse that can cause consequences that are faced with substantial physical risks that are not
are profound[ly] physical, emotional, and shared by men.
psychological. Because only women can become Justice Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun). The California
pregnant, the consequences of sexual intercourse and statute is constitutional because it helps to curtail the
pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the problem of teenage pregnancy and supports a
male. substantial relationship to an important governmental
objective.
Dissent. The dissenting opinions are as follows:
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) California has not Discussion. When men and women are situated
proven its burden that there are fewer teenage differently, a statute creating gender-based

10
classifications can withstand a constitutional challenge Established in Columbus, Mississippi, in 1884,
if the purpose of the statute can pass the intermediate Mississippi University for Women (MUW) historically
level of scrutiny. limited its enrollment to female students. In 1974, the
university instituted a four-year baccalaureate program
MISSISSIPPI UNIV. OF WOMEN VS HOGAN in nursing. Five years later, the plaintiff, Joe Hogan,
applied for admission. The plaintiff, a registered nurse
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan (1982), in Columbus, Mississippi, did not possess a bachelors
the U.S. Supreme Court explored the applicability of the degree. Although he otherwise met enrollment
Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause requirements, the plaintiff was denied admission to the
within the context of admissions and gender. In a five- nursing program on the basis of his gender. Officials at
to-four decision, the Court held that officials at the Mississippi University for Women informed the plaintiff
publicly funded womens university, in denying that he could audit courses in which he was interested
admission to a male nursing applicant on the basis of but could not enroll for credit.
his gender, violated the Equal Protection Clause, The plaintiff filed suit in a federal trial court, arguing
because the admission policy was not substantially that the nursing schools single-sex admission policy
related to a compelling governmental interest. The violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court rejected
Court also reasoned that exemptions provided to the plaintiffs claim, deciding that maintaining MUW as
single-sex institutions within the text of Title IX of the a single-sex public institution bore a rational
Education Amendments of 1972 did not exempt relationship to Mississippis stated interest in providing
university officials from compliance with constitutional the greatest practical range of educational
obligations. Hogan stands out as significant, because opportunities for females.
the Court relied on it in subsequent gender admissions On further review, the then Fifth, now Eleventh, Circuit
cases in higher education, including, perhaps most reversed in favor of the plaintiff. The court was of the
notably, United States v. Virginia (1996), in which it opinion that because the admissions policy
found that the Virginia Military Institutes refusal to discriminated on the basis of gender, the trial court
admit women violated the Equal Protection Clause. improperly analyzed the case using the rational
relationship test rather than the higher intermediate
Facts of the Case scrutiny standard. This higher standard of review
required the state to carry the more substantive burden

11
of demonstrating that the gender classification was to demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive
substantially related to an important governmental justification for the gender classification that served an
concern. important governmental objective. In addition, the
On rehearing, the university argued that through Court expected officials to show that the single-sex
enacting Section 901(a)(5) of Title IX of the Education admission policy was substantially related to achieving
Amendments of 1972, which provides some exemptions the aforementioned objective.
from Title IXs gender prohibitions for single-sex The record reflected that Mississippi University for
institutions, Congress expressly authorized officials at Womens primary objective for maintaining the single-
Mississippi University for Women to continue the single- sex admission policy was that it compensated for prior
sex admission policy. The Fifth Circuit rejected that discrimination against women, thereby constituting
argument, pointing out that Congress could not educational affirmative action. Yet, the Supreme Court
authorize states to continue practices that otherwise posited that Mississippi made no showing that women
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. lacked opportunities to obtain nursing education and
training. Rather, the Court interpreted the exclusion of
The Supreme Courts Ruling males from admission to the nursing program as
perpetuating the perception of nursing as the exclusive
In 1982, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuits province of females.
judgment in an opinion authored by Justice Sandra Day The Supreme Court added that the policy also failed the
OConnor. The majority determined that Mississippi second prong of the equal protection test, noting that
University for Womens single-sex admission policy Mississippi did not demonstrate that a gender-based
violated the Equal Protection Clause and that Title IXs admission classification was substantially or directly
exemptions did not nullify constitutional obligations related to the proposed compensatory intent. Instead,
owed by the university. the Court observed that allowing men to audit classes,
At the heart of its rationale, the Supreme Court ruled but not enroll for credit, undermined officials claim that
that the case should have been analyzed through the separating the genders benefited female students. The
frame of intermediate scrutiny, not the lower level of Court quickly dispensed with MUWs Title IX argument,
rational basis scrutiny, because the admission policy finding it unclear that Congress intended to exempt
discriminated on the basis of gender. The Court was Mississippi University for Women from any
thus of the view that university officials were required

12
constitutional obligation through Section 901(a)s When the Duarte chapter of Rotary International
exemptions. violated club policy by admitting three women into its
In his dissent, Justice Powell argued that the case active membership its charter was revoked and it was
required only rational basis analysis, not intermediate expelled. The California Court of Appeals, however, in
scrutiny, because it was grounded on the mere reversing a lower court decision, found that Rotary
inconvenience of travel to another public institution for International's action violated a California civil rights
the student. Justice Burger agreed, but wrote act prohibiting sexual discrimination.
separately to emphasize that the majoritys holding
was limited to the context of a public nursing program. Question
As a result of Hogan, in 1982 Mississippi University for Did a law which required California Rotary Clubs to
Women changed its admission policy and so began admit women members violate Rotary International's
admitting men to all programs. First Amendment rights of association?
Courts have applied Hogan in later challenges to male-
only admission policies at public military institutions. Conclusion
For example, in Faulkner v. Jones (1995), the Fourth Sort: by seniority by ideology << decision 1 of 2 >>
Circuit held that The Citadels exclusion of women also UNANIMOUS DECISION
violated the Equal Protection Clause; accordingly, the MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
court ordered officials at the institution to admit Thurgood Marshall
women. Moreover, in United States v. Virginia (1996), in Marshall
an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme William J. Brennan, Jr.
Court asserted that Virginia Military Institutes exclusion Brennan
of women violated the Equal Protection Clause, Byron R. White
couching its analysis in intermediate scrutiny in a White
fashion akin to that of Hogan. Harry A. Blackmun
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
BOARD OF DIRECTORS VS ROTARY CLUB Powell
William H. Rehnquist
Facts of the case Rehnquist

13
John Paul Stevens not of the intimate or private variety which warrants
Stevens First Amendment protection. Writing for the unanimous
Sandra Day O'Connor Court, Justice Powell argued that because many of
O'Connor Rotary's activities (including their meetings) are
Antonin Scalia conducted in the presence of strangers, and because
Scalia women members would not prevent the club from
UNANIMOUS DECISION carrying out its purposes, there was no violation of
MAJORITY OPINION BY LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. associational rights. Furthermore, even if there were a
Thurgood Marshall slight encroachment on the rights of Rotarians to
Marshall associate, that minimal infringement would be justified
William J. Brennan, Jr. since it "serves the State's compelling interest" in
Brennan ending sexual discrimination.
Byron R. White
White
Harry A. Blackmun
Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Powell
William H. Rehnquist
Rehnquist Fragante v. City & County of Honolulu
John Paul Stevens 888 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1989)
Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor Facts:
O'Connor Fragante applied for a clerks job with the City and
Antonin Scalia County of Honolulu. Although he placed high enough on
Scalia a civil service eligible list to be chosen for the position,
No. Considering the size, purpose, selectivity, and he was not selected because of a perceived deficiency
exclusivity of Rotary's membership, the Court found in relevant oral communication skills caused by his
that the relationship among the club's members was heavy Filipino accent.

14
There is no doubt from the record that the oral ability
Fragante brought a Title VII suit, alleging disparate to communicate effectively in English is reasonably
treatment on the basis of national origin. related to the normal operation of the clerks office.
History: (3) The legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was not a
The district court dismissed Fragantes complaint. mere pretext.

The oral ability to communicate effectively and clearly The hiring process involved scores on a variety of
was a legitimate occupational qualification for the job in categories, and Fragante was given a 3 on a scale of 1-
question. 10 for speech.
There were no proof of a discriminatory intent or Furthermore, the record does not show that the jobs
motive by the defendant. went to persons less qualified than Fragante: to the
Issue: contrary.
Was this a case of discrimination on the basis of In sum, the court noted, Fragante was passed over for
national origin? employment because of the deleterious effect of his
Filipino accent on his ability to communicate orally, not
Holding: merely because he had such an accent.
No. Affirmed.
Rule: An adverse employment decision may be
Reasoning: predicated upon individuals accent when but only
Using the McDonnell Douglas Framework: when it interferes materially with job performance.

(1) P established a prima facie case.

The court assumed this was satisfied.


(2) D articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for Ps nonselection.
BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA VS DALE

Facts of the case

15
The Boy Scouts of America revoked former Eagle Scout significantly affect members' abilities to carry out their
and assistant scoutmaster James Dale's adult purpose. Furthermore, the court concluded that
membership when the organization discovered that reinstating Dale did not compel the Boy Scouts to
Dale was a homosexual and a gay rights activist. In express any message.
1992, Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging
that the Boy Scouts had violated the New Jersey statute Question
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual Does the application of New Jersey's public
orientation in places of public accommodation. The Boy accommodations law violate the Boy Scouts' First
Scouts, a private, not-for-profit organization, asserted Amendment right of expressive association to bar
that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with the homosexuals from serving as troop leaders?
values it was attempting to instill in young people. The
New Jersey Superior Court held that New Jersey's public Conclusion
accommodations law was inapplicable because the Boy Sort: by seniority by ideology
Scouts was not a place of public accommodation. The 54 DECISION FOR BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA
court also concluded that the Boy Scouts' First MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST
Amendment freedom of expressive association William H. Rehnquist
prevented the government from forcing the Boy Scouts Rehnquist
to accept Dale as an adult leader. The court's Appellate John Paul Stevens
Division held that New Jersey's public accommodations Stevens
law applied to the Boy Scouts because of its broad- Sandra Day O'Connor
based membership solicitation and its connections with O'Connor
various public entities, and that the Boy Scouts violated Antonin Scalia
it by revoking Dale's membership based on his Scalia
homosexuality. The court rejected the Boy Scouts' Anthony M. Kennedy
federal constitutional claims. The New Jersey Supreme Kennedy
Court affirmed. The court held that application of New David H. Souter
Jersey's public accommodations law did not violate the Souter
Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of expressive Clarence Thomas
association because Dale's inclusion would not Thomas

16
Ruth Bader Ginsburg considers race and admits virtually every qualified
Ginsburg applicant from certain groups determined to be
Stephen G. Breyer underrepresented minorities. Beginning in 1998, the
Breyer OUA used a point system in which students were
Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William awarded an additional 20 points for being a member of
H. Rehnquist, the Court held that "applying New an underrepresented minority, and beginning in 1999,
Jersey's public accommodations law to require the Boy the University established an Admissions Review
Scouts to admit Dale violates the Boy Scouts' First Committee to provide an additional level of
Amendment right of expressive association." In effect, consideration.
the ruling gives the Boy Scouts of America a
constitutional right to bar homosexuals from serving as In 1995, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher both
troop leaders. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the applied for admission to the University of Michigan
Court that, "[t]he Boy Scouts asserts that homosexual College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) as
conduct is inconsistent with the values it seeks to residents of the state of Michigan. Both are of
instill," and that a gay troop leader's presence "would, Caucasian descent. Both were denied admission and
at the very least, force the organization to send a told that, although they were qualified, they were not
message, both to the young members and the world, competitive enough applicants to be admitted on first
that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a review. In October 1997, Gratz and Bollinger filed a
legitimate form of behavior." class action suit against the University, the LSA, Lee
Bollinger, and James Duderstadt. They argued that the
admission procedure discriminated against certain
GRATZ VS BOLLINGER racial and ethnic groups in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Facts of the case Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court
The University of Michigans Office of Undergraduate held that the respondents had shown that a racially and
Admissions (OUA) considers a number of factors in its ethnically diverse student body produced significant
evaluative process, such as high school grades, academic benefits but that the admission policies of
standardized test scores, curriculum strength, alumni 1995-1998 were problematic because they amounted
relationships, geography, and leadership. The OUA also to holding seats for certain minority groups.

17
Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the Anthony M. Kennedy
petitioners with respect to the admissions policies for Kennedy
1995-1998 and for the respondents with respect to the David H. Souter
policy that began in 1999. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Souter
the Sixth Circuit heard this case the same day as Clarence Thomas
Grutter v. Bollinger, a similar case, and upheld the Thomas
Universitys admission policies in that case. The Ruth Bader Ginsburg
petitioners in this case then asked the Court to grant Ginsburg
certiorari, despite the lack of opinion from the lower Stephen G. Breyer
court, to resolve the issue. Breyer
Yes. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist delivered the
Question opinion for the 6-3 majority. The Court held that the
Did the University of Michigans use of racial OUAs policies were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to
preferences in undergraduate admissions violate the meet the strict scrutiny standard. Because the policy
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide individual consideration, but rather
and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? resulted in the admission of nearly every applicant of
underrepresented minority status, it was not narrowly
Conclusion tailored in the manner required by previous
Sort: by seniority by ideology jurisprudence on the issue.
63 DECISION FOR GRATZ
MAJORITY OPINION BY WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST In her concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day OConnor
William H. Rehnquist wrote that the record showed that the only
Rehnquist individualized consideration in the admissions process
John Paul Stevens came through the Admissions Review Committee.
Stevens Because the Committee played only a small part in the
Sandra Day O'Connor overall admissions process, it was not sufficient to
O'Connor satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Clarence
Antonin Scalia Thomas wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
Scalia he argued that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits

18
any racial discrimination for the purposes of higher dissent. Justice Ginsburg also wrote a separate
education admission. The admission policy in question dissenting opinion in which she argued that, because
failed because it did not allow for sufficient there is no evidence that the OUA policies attempt to
consideration of non-racial factors in determining the limit or decrease enrollment by any particular racial or
admissibility of a candidate from an underrepresented ethnic group and there is no evidence of saving seats,
minority group. In his separate opinion concurring in the policies do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
the judgment, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that, in Racial information about an applicant can be useful in
cases dealing with the Equal Protection Clause, the admission considerations because it often serves to
Court should distinguish between policies of inclusion show what a student has accomplished and why the
and policies of exclusion because the former are much student is worthy of admission. Justice Souter joined in
more likely to prove consistent with the intent of the the dissent.
Clause.

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in


which he argued that, because neither of the PEOPLE VS CAYAT
petitioners could receive any benefit from the relief 8 Phil. 12 Political Law Constitutional Law Equal
being requested, precedent required that the case be Protection Requisites of a Valid Classification Bar
dismissed. While they are entitled to relief for past from Drinking Gin
wrongs, they cannot seek injunctive relief to prevent
future harms to other parties. Justice David Souter In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native
joined in the dissent. In his separate dissent, Justice non-Christians from drinking gin or any other liquor
Souter wrote that, by making race only one of a outside of their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a
number of factors to be considered, the admissions native of the Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in
policy meets the requirements established by previous violation of this Act. He was then charged and
Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence. Because the sentenced to pay P5.00 and to be imprisoned in case of
point system and the Admissions Review Committee insolvency. Cayat admitted his guilt but he challenged
operate in conjunction with each other, there cannot be the constitutionality of the said Act. He averred, among
the holding of seats phenomenon that the majority others, that it violated his right to equal protection
opinion fears. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined in the afforded by the constitution. He said this an attempt to

19
treat them with discrimination or mark them as upon accident of birth or parentage. The law, then,
inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as an
with their instant challenge. The law sought to inferior or less capable race. On the contrary, all
distinguish and classify native non-Christians from measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
Christians. public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of
their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
protection clause. brothers. But as there can be no true equality before
the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met government has endeavored, by appropriate measures,
the requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC to raise their culture and civilization and secure for
emphasized that it is not enough that the members of a them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate
group have the characteristics that distinguish them end in view of placing them with their Christian
from others. The classification must, as an brothers on the basis of true equality.
indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. The requisites
to be complied with are;
HIMAGAN VS PP OF THE PHILIPPINES
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; 237 SCRA 538 Political Law Constitutional Law Bill
of Rights Equal Protection Suspension of PNP
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and Members Charged with Grave Felonies

(4) must apply equally to all members of the same Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao
class. City. He was charged for the murder of Benjamin
Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The Benjamins younger brother, Barnabe. Pursuant to
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was
imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based

20
placed into suspension pending the murder case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of
law provides that: the case. The second sentence of the same Section
providing that the trial must be terminated within
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
in form and substance against a member of the PNP for limit the first sentence. The two can stand
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six independently of each other. The first refers to the
(6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall period of suspension. The second deals with the time
immediately suspend the accused from office until the from within which the trial should be finished.
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety The reason why members of the PNP are treated
(90) days from arraignment of the accused. differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is
42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses
only. He claims that an imposition of preventive against them, as succinctly brought out in the
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil legislative discussions.
Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws . If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
protection guaranteed by the Constitution. obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 uniform and armed. the imposition of preventive
of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
gives no other meaning than that the suspension from does not violate the suspended policemans
office of the member of the PNP charged with grave constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
offense where the penalty is six years and one day or
more shall last until the termination of the case. The

21
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days
from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be
lifted?

The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the


mandatory word shall before the phrase be
terminated within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in
RA 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension
of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated
within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to
decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, ISAE vs. QUISUMBING
in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to OCTOBER 23, 2012 ~ VBDIAZ
criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF
delayed without fault of the accused such that he is EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON.
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the
a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the
accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR.
prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the
habeas corpus. Superintendent of International School-Manila;
and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.,

G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000

FACTS:

22
Private respondent International School, Inc. (School), ISAE filed a notice of strike. Due to the failure to reach
pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational a compromise in the NCMB, the matter reached the
institution established primarily for dependents of DOLE which favored the School. Hence this petition.
foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. The decree authorizes the School to employ
its own teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other ISSUE:
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending Whether the foreign-hires should be included in
their employment, except laws that have been or will bargaining unit of local- hires.
be enacted for the protection of employees. School
hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires
and (2) local-hires. RULING:

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not NO. The Constitution, Article XIII, Section 3, specifically
accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a provides that labor is entitled to humane conditions of
salary rate 25% more than local-hires. work. These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace the factory, the office or the field
When negotiations for a new CBA were held on June but include as well the manner by which employers
1995, petitioner ISAE, a legitimate labor union and the treat their employees.
collective bargaining representative of all faculty
members of the School, contested the difference in Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 248 declares it
as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate
be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage
eventually caused a deadlock between the parties. membership in any labor organization.

23
The Constitution enjoins the State to protect the rights fundamentally the combination which will best assure
of workers and promote their welfare, In Section 18, to all employees the exercise of their collective
Article II of the constitution mandates to afford labor bargaining rights.
full protection. The State has the right and duty to
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These In the case at bar, it does not appear that foreign-hires
relations are not merely contractual but are so have indicated their intention to be grouped together
impressed with public interest that labor contracts, with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining.
collective bargaining agreements included, must yield The collective bargaining history in the School also
to the common good. shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires
However, foreign-hires do not belong to the same enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform
bargaining unit as the local-hires. similar functions under the same working conditions as
the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
A bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given benefits not granted to local-hires such as housing,
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
body of employees, consistent with equity to the travel allowances. These benefits are reasonably
employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
collective bargaining provisions of the law. foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would
not assure either group the exercise of their respective
The factors in determining the appropriate collective collective bargaining rights.
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART.
duties, or similarity of compensation and working
conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267,
collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of 25 June 2013
employment status. The basic test of an asserted posted in RESWRI2 cases by katcobing
bargaining units acceptability is whether or not it is

24
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 an invalid law.

Facts: Private respondent Rosalie filed a The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but
petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary however, denied the petition for failure to raise the
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial
to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, attack on said law.
and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
her children and of financial support and also a victim
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner. Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on
the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
said TPO, private-respondent filed another application
for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not violative of the equal protection clause.
be modified. After the given time allowance to answer,
the petitioner no longer submitted the required WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding
comment as it would be an axercise in futility. that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of
the Constitution
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition
with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due violence to the policy of the state to protect the family
process and equal protection clauses, and the validity as a basic social institution

25
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as extends its protection.
invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue
delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials. 3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of
the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the
Decision: 1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as
have authority and jurisdiction to consider the violative of the right to due process.
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible 4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be justified. Petitioners contention that by not allowing
raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to
may not be considered in appeal. protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall
protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
that all persons or things similarly situated should be This is so because violence is not a subject for
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and compromise.
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is 5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, Barangay officials. Judicial power includes the duty of
which means that the classification should be based on the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; involving rights which are legally demandable and
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not enforceable and to determine whether or not there has
limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
on a valid classification and did not violate the equal Government while executive power is the power to
protection clause by favouring women over men as enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary

26
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao
executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.
with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials
and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo
their duty executive function. Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different
issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of taxpayers suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52
merit. regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the
length of the campaign, and the provision which bars
persons charged for crimes from running for public
office as well as the provision that provides that the
mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
95 SCRA 392 Political Law Constitutional Law ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan
Equal Protection Eligibility to Office after Being 65 have a cause of action.

Judicial Review; Requisites thereof HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of
this case for this case should have never been merged.
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have
Vizcaya. He has already retired from his office and he separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the
has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review.
There are standards that have to be followed in the
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1)
Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest
law provides, among others, that retirees from public personal and substantial by the party raising the
office like Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function
Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the

27
necessity that the constitutional question be passed be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our
upon in order to decide the case. political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might
be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. good elective local officials.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring Retirement from government service may or may not
persons charged for crimes may not run for public be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
office and that the filing of complaints against them officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from
and after preliminary investigation would already government service at ages, say below 65. It may
disqualify them from office as null and void. neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65,
for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
equal protection is neither well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official
is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
can be treated and regulated differently from another running for the same office from which he had retired,
class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 as provided for in the challenged provision.
years of age, have been validly classified differently
from younger employees. Employees attaining that age
are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978)
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be February 15, 2013 markerwins Tax Law
more than 65 years of age at the time they assume Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance
office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be 6537 requiring aliens (except those employed in the
a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor diplomatic and consular missions of foreign countries,
General has intimated, a good policy of the law should in technical assistance programs of the government

28
and another country, and members of religious orders
or congregations) to procure the requisite mayors
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
City of Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty
for the violation of the ordinance is 3 to 6 months ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
imprisonment or a fine of P100 to P200, or both. vs. THE TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON.
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of Ormoc City and
or a tax. ORMOC CITY, Defendants-Appellees.

Held: The ordinances purpose is clearly to raise money Facts:


under the guise of regulation by exacting P50 from
The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed a municipal tax
aliens who have been cleared for employment. The ordinance imposing on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar
amount is unreasonable and excessive because it fails milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. one percent per export
to consider difference in situation among aliens sale to the US and other foreign countries. Said company filed
required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part- before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc, its
time, rank-and-file or executive. Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging sasid ordinance is
violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity
of taxation, among other things. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. was
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, the only sugar central in Ormoc City at the time.
oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to
aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, Issue:
liberty and property and therefore violates the due
WON the constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically
process and equal protection clauses of the the EPC and uniformity of taxation, were infringed.
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down
any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the Held:
exercise of his discretion, thus conferring upon the
mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ] Yes. Though Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. is the only sugar central in
the city of Ormoc at the time, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. Said
ordinance shoouldnt be singular and exclusive as to exclude any

29
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as HELD:
plaintiff, for coverage of the tax. 1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required
to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
EPC applies only to persons or things identically situated and every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly
doesnt bar a reasonable classificationof the subject of legislation. indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the
A classification is reasonable where: 1) it is based on substantial act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. In the case at bar,
the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of franking privileges is
present conditions but also to future conditions which are merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
applies only to those who belong to the same class.
2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the
mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an
TITLE: Philippine Judges Association vs Prado entirely new provision. The court also added that said the bill in question
CRUZ, J .: was duly approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of the House
FACTS: of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by President the
The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not
measures withdraw the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTC, MTC and inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with officers of Congress. An enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The
certain other government offices. The petitioners are members of the lower court therefore declined to look into the petitioners' charges. Both the
courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
above-named measures. The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
7354 (see ISSUE for the grounds stated by the petitioners). department of the government.

ISSUE: 3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds: guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made
1) its *title embraces more than one subject and does not express its by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make
purposes; real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
(2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and privilege (Pres, VP, Senators etc.). If the problem of the respondents is the
printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government. The problem is not
the independence of the Judiciary. solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially

30
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO
vs.
Therefore, Sec 35 of RA 7345 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

x -x
-----------------------
G.R. No. 193036
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, JR., REP.
* "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, SIMEON A. DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, SR.
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and vs.
for Other Purposes Connected Therewith." EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR. and DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD
** Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the FACTS:
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered
69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
or unauthorized use thereof. and accessories during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in
disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the


BIRAOGO VS PTC PTC from performing its functions. They argued that:
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

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(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the quasi-judicial body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation. latters jurisdiction.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative 4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause
Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority because it was validly created for laudable purposes.
of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to ISSUES:
create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
Truth Commission. 1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question
E. O. No. 1;
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested 2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by
the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for
superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 public offices, agencies and commissions;
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987. 3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets
for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous RULING:
administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
and argued that: personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue
Presidents executive power and power of control necessarily include the of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative 1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled a body to which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies. Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds institution.
because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already
appropriated by Congress. Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to
the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

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properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
of sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the
implementation of E. O. No. 1. 2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of
existing funds already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
interest rule. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for the
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
entitled to the avails of the suit. subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in
the funding.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, 3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their
does so as a representative of the general public. He has to show that he is respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will
entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in complement those of the two offices. The function of determining probable
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen or cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains
taxpayer. to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and performance of his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain laws of the land.
direct injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos
assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental importance to 4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
executed. The powers of the President are not limited to those specific requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in
powers under the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The improper execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such

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classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the Quinto V. COMELEC
same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive
are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
imposed. facto resigned from their positions.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
FACTS:
protection clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate
and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr.
administration is plain, patent and manifest. filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
officials who filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal facto resigned from their positions. In this defense, the
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
ISSUE:
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at
least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private
HELD:
rights determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being NO.
unconstitutional.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election
protection clause of the Constitution Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials

34
in comparison with appointive officials. Incidentally, the because they would be attending to their campaign
Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the rather than to their office work.
two and pronounced that there was no violation of the
equal protection clause. Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they
However in the present case, the Court held that the occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly,
discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter a utility worker in the government will also be
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his
repealing clause. It didnt squarely challenge Sec. 66. certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is
absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive his position in the government to wield influence in the
and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a political world.
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with
the second requirement that it must be germane to The provision s directed to the activity any and all
the purpose of the law. public offices, whether they be partisan or non partisan
in character, whether they be in the national, municipal
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to or brgy. level. Congress has not shown a compelling
prevent the use of a governmental position to promote state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved
ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or on such a sweeping scale.
coercive influence of the electorate. The measure is
further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and
discipline of the public service by eliminating the
danger that the discharge of official duty would be League of Cities v. Comelec
motivated by political considerations rather than the
welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by Action:
the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with
electorate arena, while still in office, could result in prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the
League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of

35
Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas assailing the ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and No. 29.
enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and
respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites During the 13th Congress, the House of
pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
FactS: approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16
other municipalities into cities. cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on requirement in RA 9009.
30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the
Local Government Code by increasing the annual On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives
income requirement for conversion of a municipality approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved
into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of
rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The
words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a various dates from March to July 2007 without the
larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite Presidents signature.
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the their municipality into a city.
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section

36
10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation Local Government Code and not in any other law,
of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament including the Cityhood Laws.
that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into
cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside distribution of the national taxes to local government
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government units.
Code.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the
Issue: Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory
Article X of the Constitution; and construction.
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to
exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA
Held: 9009 remained an intent and was never written into
We grant the petitions. Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X
of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a
retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws
2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
five years later. Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the

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