Aadhar can plug massive misuse of subsidy: There is not one kind or

encouraging word mentioned in the SCF report on how Indian society can use
Aadhaar to deliver several welfare measures approved by the parliament to the
poor of India.

This is because it is the political class which is the biggest beneficiary of black
money generated by diverting PDS kerosene and residential LPG as well as from
the misuse of several welfare measures like the national rural employment
guarantee scheme (NREGA), etc.

I had predicted that politicians would try to kill Aadhaar in a research

report, Lessons learned from Attempts to Reform Indias PDS Kerosene
Subsidywhich I had for Global Subsidy Initiative.

It is a well known fact that there is a large amount of diversion of PDS kerosene
to the black market and also to blend with petrol and diesel. The same is true in
the case of highly subsidized residential LPG (which is a welfare measure of
sorts for the rich and the middle class).

What is not often discussed or highlighted is the amount of black money

generated by these illegal activities. Actually this is the mother of all corruption,
generating more than Rs 45,000 crore per year. This scam is shockingly far
larger than 2-G scam.

Since the amount is shared from top to bottom, the wily political class is not
interested in supporting a project which will result in killing the golden goose.
Only recently the research on the misuse of subsidy is bringing such facts to
public attention.

2. Aadhaar does not need Parliaments approval: Aadhaar is a tool to

deliver welfare measures: Therefore it does not require approval from the
parliament.

Once a welfare programme like PDS kerosene, subsidized food, NREGA, access
to high-tech facilities are approved by the government, is there a need for the
executive branch to get approval as to how best to deliver such programs with
minimum leakage?

Let me give an example of how the political class killed an efficient system of
delivering PDS kerosene in Karnataka. In the mid 1990s, at the suggestion of
Mysore Grahakara Parishat (MGP), the Karnataka government had implemented
a coupon system to ensure minimum diversion of PDS kerosene in Mysore.
It was so successful (dealers used to wait for consumers to come and buy their
quota which was unheard of), that the government wanted to expand it to the
whole state. However the dealers and all the political parties managed to kill the
project, not just in the State but outside too.

At the suggestion of the Planning Commission, a few states introduced a smart

card system to streamline PDS kerosene. Did any one raise an objection
claiming it is unethical for the government to adapt it without getting the
approval of the legislature?

Looks like history seems to be repeating itself the case of Aadhaar at the
national level.

3. Aadhaar does not compromise privacy: Critics of Aadhar have raised the
bogey of privacy. This is totally irrelevant as an issue.

An application for a drivers license demands a lot more information than

Aadhaar. Voters lists, provided to any one who asks for it, also have a lot more
information on citizens than Aadhar. Private agencies which help Indian
embassies to process passports handle a lot more information.

Has any one raised privacy questions? So why the hue and cry over Aadhar?

Many US Supreme Court findings (eg Schmerber v CA,384 US 757, 1966; US v

Dionisio, 410 US 1, 1973) imply that the use of biometrics does not invade an
individuals civil liberties or privacy.

The Supreme Court of India has instituted a committee under the chairmanship
of a former judge to look at PDS. The Justice Wadhwa report has suggested a
computer-based information system as well as the use of biometric smart cards
to reduce leakages. The committee was, in fact, recommending an Aadhaar
type programme even before Nilekani was entrusted with that task.

Why did the SCF fail to take into consideration the critical recommendations of a
Supreme Court instituted committee which is also as mindful of privacy as any
expert or activist?

4.Biometric technology is OK: Many including the SCF have pointed out the
inherent problems of the biometric technology in accurately identifying
individuals. But the truth is that the young technology, provides adequate
accuracy and is in fact advancing rapidly.

While the government has admitted that accuracy may be no more than 1%, it
has also suggested that there are in-built safety mechanisms not to deny any
legitimate person the assistance approved by the government.
According to UKs National Physical Laboratory, the probability of a false
negative ( person not being recognized) using biometric is 1 out of 10,000. The
probability of false positive is even order of magnitude less (1 out of
1,000,000). As far back as 2003, NPL had accepted the feasibility of using
biometrics (finger prints or iris) for identification of all UK individuals.

A report published by International Telecommunication Union in 2009should

remove any doubt people may have about the use of biometric tool for
individual identification.

That report has the following conclusions:

Within a fairly short period of time, biometric recognition technology has found
its way into many areas of everyday life. Citizens of more than 50 countries hold
machine-readable passports that store biometric dataa facial image and in
most cases a digital representation of fingerprintson a tiny RFID chip, to verify
identity at the border. Law enforcement agencies have assembled biometric
databases with fingerprints, voice and DNA samples, which make their work
more efficient and manageable. Commercial applications use biometrics in local
access control scenarios, but also increasingly in remote telebiometric
deployments, such as e-commerce and online banking, and complement or
replace traditional authentication schemes like PIN and passwords.

5. Aadhaar is ahead of its time: SCF has cherrypicked the UK example to

argue that Aadhaar may not work because the UK decided to drop their national
ID card. Why didnt SCF discuss examples of several countries like Brazil,
Australia, US and others where biometric based cards/documents are in use?

There are many similarities between the social security number system in the
United States and Aadhaar in India. A country like the US where privacy issues,
human rights, etc are high on the agendas has not found any problem. Aadhaar
is really a more sophisticated concept of SSN of the US.

If the US were to implement SSN now, more than likely they would have also
developed a scheme like Indias Aadhaar. SSN is given to any legal resident of
the US and so also Aadhaar. SSN has not created any security issue. The same
will be the case with Aadhaar. It can be argued that India has leapfrogged the
USA by implementing Aadhaar.

6. Aadhaar has no security issues: Some critics have tried to create a scare
by suggesting that Aadhaar should be treated as a national security issue
though the parliamentary standing committee did not discuss Aadhaar directly
from that point of view.
In todays networked society, there are so many data bases which should be of
much higher priority in terms of national security than a data base containing
biometric information on residents of India. On the other hand it can be argued
that Aadhaar data base may serve the purpose in getting information on
terrorists.

In some countries there are proposals to use biometric data bases to monitor
the movement of terrorists. By being creative and through building enough
safety features Aadhaar could make it very difficult for anyone to access
Aadhaar data while it can serve the national security purpose by identifying
terrorists.

7. Aadhars benefits outweigh its costs: It was shocking to find SCF

referring to some newspaper article quoting a high cost figure of Rs. 1,50,000
crore while the total budget request of UIDAI is for about Rs. 12,000 crores for
three phases.

The savings generated by using Aadhaar to better distribute welfare measures

can more than compensate its cost. Even assuming that the actual cost may be
more than what is budgeted, the avoidance of black money generation from the
diversion of PDS kerosene and residential LPG alone of Rs 45,000 crore per year
can easily pay for Aadhaar project.

In addition there is the additional money savings from improved welfare

delivery systems like food, fertilizer, MNREGA etc for which Aadhaar can be
used.

When SCF took the opportunity to scare the readers by quoting an

unsubstantiated cost figure of 1,50,000 crores, it did not take any effort to find
out the potential savings from the use of Aadhaar. A recent Karnatakas
Lokayukta report estimated that the misuse of food subsidy alone costs more
than Rs 1,740 crore per year for Karnataka.

8. Failure of bureaucracy cannot be held against Aadhaar: It is true that

coordination between different departments of the government who are the
stakeholders (Planning Commission, Registrar General Of India, Election
Commission, Ministry of Rural Development, Ministry of Urban Development,
State Governments) has not been satisfactory.

It is also true that there has not been proper planning or coordination between
different users of Aadhaar or agreement on using it for deriving maximum
benefits out of it (NPR, MGNREGS, BPL,census, UIDAI, RSBY, and bank smart
card).
The fact that the bureaucracy has failed or the government machinery has not
done its job in coming with an efficient ways of making use of a new technology
like Aadhaar should not reduce its usefulness. It is also true that prior to taking
up a major project like Aadhaar, UIDAI should have conducted a cost benefit
analysis and looked at all different alternatives. Unfortunately it failed.

Instead of taking a positive view of the study done by Ernst & Young, SCF was
critical of it to send back the bill. The study did show that among all different
alternatives Aadhaar is the best. Instead of making positive recommendations
to improve the inner workings of the government department in exploiting a
tool like Aadhaar , to throw doubts on the efficacy of Aadhaar is doing a
disservice to the country.

A high level committee consisting of elected representatives can be expected to

take an unbiased view of a new initiative like Aadhaar. SCF report unfortunately
is biased. The committee report quotes opinions of only the experts who are
critical of the project. Did they try to find at least one expert who is in favour of
the project?

9. Parliamentary committee raises irrelevant or inconsequential

issues: There are several nit picking issues raised against Aadhaar in SCF to
question its usefulness. For example is Aadhaar mandatory or not? For those
who do not want to avail themselves of welfare assistance it is not mandatory.
Human rights and privacy activists should appreciate such a position.

Is ration card mandatory today? It is not. However for those who want
subsidized food items or PDS kerosene it is mandatory. Is there any thing wrong
in imposing Aadhaar on the beneficiaries to ensure there is no leakage?
Aadhaar can definitely serve to identify but not as a proof of address. Is there
any thing wrong with that.

Can drivers license issued many years back or old water/telephone/electricity

bills serve as address proof? The same is true with Aadhaar. Aadhaar is only to
serve as identify from the beginning and not serve any other purpose. Only with
the purpose of throwing aspersions of Aadhaar these nit picking issues are
raised.

It is very unfortunate that the staff of SCF has not done a creditable job in
advising its members of the real issues. There is nothing wrong in sending back
the bill if only they had done an unbiased review and ended with some specific
recommendations to make better use of Aadhaar.

Let us not throw baby with the bath water.

.
 Arguments for:
Aadhaar can help eliminate duplication and impersonation in
muster rolls and beneficiary lists, plugging the leaks that currently
characterise most social welfare initiatives. Yet, the government is
endangering its own agenda with its apparent disinterest in giving
the programme a clearer definition in law, which might also address
some of the questions that hang over it, particularly on privacy.
Aadhaar is the most widely held identity document in the country
with around 92 crore people under it. Restricting its voluntary use,
they argue, would mean a majority of the population will not be
able to use it to access various social schemes.
They say it will impact nearly 1 crore workers under MGNREGA, who
use Aadhaar to withdraw their wages every month, and nearly
30,00,000 pensioners.
Countering the privacy argument, UIDAI says the data captured is
secure and encrypted right at the source and all biometrics are
stored in the Government of Indias servers with world class
security standards
Way Forward:
Such incidents underscore the fact that unless the UIDAI is
supported by legislation, the courts will continue to be the final
arbiters of its mandate. By making it a priority to codify both a right
to privacy that explicitly outlines a framework for the operation of
data collection agencies and the UIDAI itself, the Modi government
can remove the uncertainty that plagues Aadhaar and enable it to
realise its full potential