On Meaning and Absurdity

MICHAEL LUGER

20TH CENTURY nihilism, its philosophical consequences, the

existentialist movement and absurdism share a specific central thesis,
namely that life is or may be inherently meaningless. Despite the absence
of a metaphysical meaning it most often remains unclear what this
meaninglessness itself is, or what this inherent meaninglessness expresses.
Prima facie it is argued that meaninglessness is a feeling or a lack of a
bigger point which is not further defined or simply taken as a
metaphysical certainity, a truth about the world, about everything there
is. Commonly this goes along with an absence of a supreme-court, a higher
order or a god. For Nietzsche, who diagnosed nihilism, there are no facts
nor metaphysical values, only interpretations. The highest values devalue
themselves. The aim is lacking, and Why finds no answer.1 Nihilism
will expose all cherished beliefs and sacrosanct truths as symptoms of a
defective western mythos. It postulates the collapse of meaning, relevance,
and purpose. Helmut Thielicke wrote that Nihilism literally has only one
truth to declare, namely, that ultimately Nothingness prevails and the world
is meaningless. 2

This essay mainly strives to give a notion rather than to form a

metaphysical theory. I will argue that the common statement, namely that
the world exhibits a lack of inherent meaning does not stand on firm
grounds. Further, I will outline that common demands for a higher order or
a metaphysical meaning are in the aspects of a human condition not as

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p. 9

2 Helmut Thielke, Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature, with a Christian Answer, 1969

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important as one might expect, or even unjustified. My essay strives to
give a notion of how thoughtless the contemporary terminology regarding
absurdity and meaning often is used. The contrasts between Nagels view
on the absurd and Camus will be examined and a reconstruction for the use
of the terms meaning and absurdity will be made.

The Use Of the Word Meaning

Our everyday language is often not precise. X is meaningless, I mean

that or This means have different one could say meanings.
Therefore one may conclude that our everyday use of the word meaning
does not relate to a sinlge definition, but holds a whole family of
definitions and often depends on the specific content. If nihilism states that
the world is inherently meaningless, there must be a definition according
to which something or everything could be meaningful at least, in the
abstraction of a scheme, in theory. In the most simple definition there
basically are three common types of meaning. I suggest that generally the
use of the word meaning could be seen as either i) an act of justification;
(something makes sense, is justified) something or someone does
something because of something ii) a certain explanation or expression;
(This means that) meaning has something that speaks of something
or iii) something that is appreciated (something meaningful). As a
result there are the following three basical terms for the use of meaning:
Type 1 justification-form, Type 2 expression-form, and Type 3 value-
form.

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I do not claim that this observation is all-encompassing but at this point it
seems the most appropriate to work with. This must be seen as a general
outline and orientation for the context in which the word meaning is
used.

What do the words inherent or instrinsic stand for? If the nihilist admits
at least subjective meaning in a single act (e.g. I take aspirin because I
have a headache), one can conclude that the words instrinsinc or
inherent must express something beyond that single act, therefore either a
settled act of justification an ultimate act of justification or a
metaphysical meaning that has to be found within all single elements of
reality, within the deepest structure of the world. I conclude that the word
intrinsic does only make sense in the justification-form of Type 1, or in a
metaphysical version of Type 3 (a meaningful and all-encompassing
value). The english language is in some specific aspects not very fortunate
and prone to complexification and confusion regarding the term meaning.
The expression-form (This means) is very different to Type 1 and 3,
which namely is trivially spoken meaning as such. In german, This
means can be translated to Das heit. For meaning as such the words
Bedeutung or Sinn are used which clearly seperates and differentiates
the two types.

One can conclude that it must be the justification-form of Type 1, or the

value-form of Type 3 that is refered to when talking about intrinsical
meaninglessness or a metaphysical meaning.

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 I) The Demand for settled Meaning

According to common nihilism, a world could be meaningful in the grand

scheme if for everything the world exhibits there is a settled justification.
Of course we will end up being caught in an endless cirlce of reproduction
there cannot be a settled meaning behind meaning regressus ad infinitum.
The demand therefore is logically a reach for the impossible a fallacy.

There is settled justification within one single act. One could try to create
a scheme of a totality, a sum of (arguably incoherent) chains and ask: But
what does that all mean? Whether this question is regarded to Type 1,
Type 2 or Type 3, of course, this totality means nothing beyond its
meaning. This totality is nothing bigger than its actual self.

What is a cash? A creation between a cat and a fish. Of course, this

diagonal-noun is nothing bigger than its actual form. There can neither be a
settled justification for the existence of an object. Argumentum a fortiori
the demands fail to state anything useful because the world itself is not
that one closed or connected entity. Diagonal-nouns itself do not make
sense. This view is often defended in different ontological theories, such
as seen in the ontological realism of Gabriel. The question What does that
all mean? is not any different to What does this (object) mean? What
does a cash mean or what does a cat mean, it both reaches for the same
a settled meaning for the existence of an object. Why do we exist? Why
does this (object) exist? For both questions the answer could either be for
nothing, or for something. But this something, whatever it would be,
can never constitute a settled justification for that objects existence.

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Demands for settled meaning reach for something that cannot logically be
satisfied and therefore for nothing in that sense. A settled justification does
not and can not exist. A demand for something that can logically not exist
is not a demand for something but a demand for nothing, therefore not a
demand, but a tautology. A demand for a settled chain of expressions also
cannot be justified. At some point something is simply not expressed by
something.

II) The Demand for God

If the world is created by accident, and not by god nothing can

objectively have meaning, according to common nihilist claims.
Argumentum e contrario, If god created the world, everything must
objectively mean something. This is were my objection starts.

How would a god-created world be different from this world besides there
being a god? If this god sanctifies everything speaks that everything
has meaning what would that sheer formulation express or mean,
besides the phrase that now everything magically matters?

How does a god prevent the god-created world from being questioned?
There still cannot be another meaning behind the existence of god, one can
always ask Why?. How would this supreme court constitute and justify
objectivity? If the statement You shall not kill is mere interpretation
(which is debateable) how would a god logically turn this into a certain

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objectivity? By sheer authority? My objection to this is, that authority
does not belong to the family of reasoning. Because god says so is not a
convincing argument. If god says there can be settled meaning, then god
must be wrong.

The questions speak for themselves. A god a higher entity or a supreme

court cannot lead to something that is called a settled meaning nor would
this change be very relevant regarding our absurd condition. Our lives
could still be argued to be absurd, meaningless or meaningful and as
demonstrated in I), the described demands could still be claimed.

According to Nietzsches nihilism There are no facts, only

interpretations. Of course, it could be argued that this must be if true a
fact. The lack of an all-encompassing meaning is often held as an argument
for a lack of any meaning, or for a lack of objective truth per se. Of course,
this is a fallacious misconception. According to Maurizio Ferrariss theory
of New Realism, the statement can not be true, as certain things are part of
unamendable reality, wheter we like it or not. H2O wettens even if I
interprete things differently.

There undoubtely are interpretations, subjectivity or social objects,

constructed parts of reality (which by themselves are real), but it is unclear
how a sanctifying god who says Everything is objective does by itself
not portray a subjective interpretation or view. Sheer authority does not
and cannot explain, it dictates. But what is dictation without logic? The
lack of a god cannot be taken as a stringent objection or argument
according to which our lives, or the world would be meaningless.

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Further, a metaphysical meaning as such does not change the premises.
Imagine a god-given, metaphysical meaning that states the following: The
meaning of life is to eat fish. So what? One could still ask all the same
questions. Nothing relevant has changed.

III) The Demand for universal Meaning

If one asks about the meaning of everything, he implies that the world is a
interconnected totality. But even this assumption is very debateable. In the
philosophy of Markus Gabriel (New Realism), there are many fields, but
not that one groundfloor according to which everything takes place. My
last objection is, that a metaphysical meaning cannot be applied onto a
world onto everything as such a totality of things simply does not
exist. Further, the structure of reality is not connected in a way according
to which something could talk about everything. Therefore, there cannot be
that one isolated thing or an allquantor that talks about everything at
once, to say it in Gabriels words. The structure of reality does not allow
it. My objection is, that meaning is commonly adressed as a universal
something one could say an isolated superthing that could simply be
drawn onto all the different parts and fields of reality. This is an illusion
resulting from a lack of a deeper analysis. The structure of reality is
diverse. A universal meaning as such is an abstract notion. There are
different meanings, justifications and expressions because there are
different acts and dialectics in different (non-connected) fields of the
world. Meaning is individual by nature. The idea there could be a certain
type of universal-meaning to fit into the individual fragments of the
world is almost likely a misconception or a simplified wish. One should

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reject the idea of a monistic understanding of the world. There is not that
one world, there is not that one meaning and most important, there
cannot be. One must not even agree with Gabriels field-ontology to admit
that the fields of the physical world are not in the same sphere as the field
of a poems meaning or the field in which qualia take place. To speak
metaphorically, it is the unreflected try to take a picture of the world of
everything there is while being inside the everything or as Nagel says,
it is the try to get a view from nowhere.

For a soccer player it could mean a lot to win the world championships
whereas a rock on the moon could not care less about that individuals
success. A metaphysical meaning of the world would have to be present in
all aspects of reality, from the rock to human beings, there would be a
single meaning for everything. Even if one defends the stance that the
world could be interconnected this view does not seem plausible.

IV) Reconstruction

Does that all mean that our lives cannot be absurd? Not necessarily.
Common nihilist demands are often not coherent. However, from there it
does not follow that our lives could not be absurd or sometimes even
considered meaningless. Whether the absurd is as Nagel states, a result of
inner collision or constitues a difference between our expectations of life
and the universe, as in Camus, the origins of the absurd base in our ability
to transcende our own thought. The thought looks at itself goes beyond
the usual boundaries. It must be analysed in depth, how the terms

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meaninglessness and absurdity are used. I want to seize a specific point
of Nagels critic on Camus as I think this example shows how two can talk
about different things while using the same terminology. Nagel claims that
Camuss absurd stance is not based on firm grounds and gives very well
elaborated conclusions. However, it seems that Camus means something
different when he talks about the absurd. In Nagels essay The Absurd,
he states the following:

Camus maintains in The Myth of Sisyphus that the absurd arises because the world fails to
meet our demands for meaning. This suggests that the world might satisfy those demands if it
were different. But now we can see that this is not the case. There does not appear to be any
conceivable world (containing us) about which unsettlable doubts could not arise.
Consequently, the absurdity of our situation derives not from a collision between our
expectations and the world, but from a collision within ourselves. 3

Nagels argument is two-fold. He seems to be correct about there cannot be

a different version of the world in which the absurd would not have a
groundfloor. The absurd arises from the seriousness we approach our lives,
and its inevitability. It is not something outside ourselves in that specific
aspect. The following is to be seen as a defence of Camus's version of the
absurd and a reconstruction of the term. Camus in The Myth of Sisyphos:

The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable
silence of the world. 4

3 Thomas Nagel, The Absurd, p. 721

4 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphos, p. 32

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One can conclude from there, that the world would not be absurd if the
universe would speak. For Camus, the absurd is a difference. In the Myth
of Sisyphos he gives various examples:

At certain moments of lucidity, the mechanical aspect of their gestures, their meaningless
pantomime makes silly everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone
behind a glass partition; you cannot hear him, but you see his incomprehensible dumb show:
you wonder why he is alive. This discomfort in the face of man' s own inhumanity, this
incalculable tumble before the image of what we are, this "nausea," as a writer of today calls
it, is also the absurd. Likewise the stranger who at certain seconds comes to meet us in a
mirror, the familiar and yet alarming brother we encounter in our own photographs is also
the absurd. 5

It seems clear, for Camus the absurd is not the same as for Nagel. They do
not talk about the exact same thing. The mechanical gestures I interprete
as a psychological metaphor. As most commonly argued in 20th century
nihilism, our gestures or emotions are not more than a biochemical
process, result of muscular and neuronal activity, and so on. There is
nothing, no god nor a metaphysical certainity that cherishes us. Scientific
progression and enlightenment could therefore be seen as the siblings of
the absurd or casually spoken as a slap in the human face. Its the
inhumanity of ourselves we are confronted with. This has striking
similarity to something called the medical gaze which is part of
Foucaults descriptive work The Birth of The Clinic. This doctor does not
see you as a person, but as a biological machine presenting with a
dysfunctional lung or an oversized left atrium, for instance. Of course this
can be argued to be reductionist. It could be argued that we still are more
than living machines, but I think Camus wants to express something
metaphorically, a notion.

5 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphos, p. 15

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In any case, it can be said that we tend to long for something that is outside
our human spectrum, maybe a god, or maybe less extreme. We simply
want a lot of things to be different and excactly this creates the
difference, or the absurd in Camus. A three years old child dies of cancer,
a serial killer wins the lottery, an insane psychopath gets elected for
president. These are examples that should create absurdities based on one
persons views, and usually do. The world is not rational. Things happen for
no apparent or rational reason and often there are no appropriate
consequences. It gets clear, in Camus, the lack of a meaning is not adressed
as a logical lack, but states a certain lack of an all-encompassing, rational
regulation. There is no Why when there should be. One could say that the
common human conceptions and values do not fit the designs of reality.

The absurd comes with the realisation that the world is not rational. Camus
goes on in a different chapter: I said that the world is absurd, but I was too
hasty. This world in itself is not reasonable, that is all that can be said 6
For Camus, the absurd has something to do with irrationality. Something is
absurd, if it does not meet our demands or is irrational. This gets even
more clear, when Camus talks about it being absurd for a soldier that
looks to fight against an army. Therefore, one can conclude that Nagels
view on the absurd is correct per se, but his critics on Camus base on a
misunderstanding, a different use of the term. From there it is
understandable that Nagel suggests us to confront the absurd with less
heroism and contempt, but with a sense of irony when for Camus it is
questionable how one could view a childs death with the same sense of
irony.

6 ibid. p. 22

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What can be absurd for one, must not necessarily be absurd for the other. I
therefore conclude that in Camus there is not that one absurdity - THE
absurd condition but many individual absurd conditions. The absurd
could be argued to be the difference between ones subjective demands and
a life that does not meet them. From there we can imagine a life that meets
the demands of all or at least one person. A reality in which one cannot be
murdered, one without disease, one without the possibility of luck or bad
luck a life in which everything is grounded and fair to a persons views
and values call it wonderland. Here comes god into play. It is imaginable
that an allmighty god could create such a life or a different condition. Life
could theoretically be less absurd, or even not absurd at all provided that
the term absurd is used according to Camuss definition, and not to
Nagels. It does not really matter whether there is a god or not, but whether
that god would be able to change reality or the universe and therefore
change our conditions.

Nagel is correct when he says that in the logical aspect, our lives would
still be absurd if we were immortal, or if we were the center of the
universe. However, in the light of Camus, it now appears that differences
(absurdities) often relate to these certainities. We face certainity of death
when we want to live, we see the certainity of the Copernican Turn, when
we want to be on the center court. And even if we were on the center court,
who would watch? Who would care? We seek attention. One could draw a
parallel to Freud who suggested three historical wounds: The Copernican
Turn (we are not the center of the world), the darwinian Theory of
Evolution (we are not a sanctified species), and the freudian thesis itself
(we are or might not be our own master). I suggest that the absurd also
can be found among wounded human values.

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A person who has no demands at all or has all his demands and
expectations of life satisfied does not lead an absurd life. But, once
knowing the absurd, it is practically impossible to escape this condition.
Camus suggests his absurd stance as a concept of thought an idea of how
one could answer to the conditions faced. Life as it presents to us produces
dialectical differences that give us reasons to rebel on.

Conclusion

I outlined two popular uses of the term absurd which must be

differentiated. One that basically refers to a collision within, one that
refers to a difference that can be found outside of ourselves. It remains
very questionable whether there even could be something all-
encompassing or a interconnected totality of all the things that would
provide the possibility of a metaphysical meaning. Values have to be
spotted by an individual. In some aspects values are limited to an
individuals view and condition, namely when it is not the subject of any
type of moral questions, or questions that could give rise to moral realism
versus moral anti-realism debates and such, but the subject of personal
appreciation. Absurd conditions as defined by Camus can be seen as
individual cases. There may be many different absurd conditions
depending on each individuals expectations of life and their personal
situation. A distinction between different types of the word meaning has
been suggested.

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Common nihilist claims fail as arguments. What should rather be argued is
something that is more trivial but less vague, namely that the world
presents itself in a certain way, and we do not always like that way.

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