1. GMA Network v. COMELEC, G.R. No.

205357, September 2, 2014;

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits

FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and
one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press,
impairs the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative
to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming
elections.

Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the

previous per station airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also
required prior COMELEC approval for candidates television and radio guestings
and appearances.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on
airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime
limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability
of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people.
Here, the adverted reason for imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits
leveling the playing field does not constitute a compelling state interest which
would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and
political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the
imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the

aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the
Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of
languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the
electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his
message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people
may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different
dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself a
form of suppression of his political speech.

2. Makalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003;

G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a
member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated,
petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional
mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning
candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as
winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this
Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration,
an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume
actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of
registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant
or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of
the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one
yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately
preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court
may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it,
the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of
RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it
also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even
on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to
RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right
to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it
if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was
conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails
to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall
not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court
is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying
intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable
right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of
RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally
belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for
President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its
duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the
authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence
of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw
from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

3. Roque v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188456, September 10, 2009;

4. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 177508, August 7, 2009;
5. CenPEG v. COMELEC, September 21, 2010, G.R. No. 189546,
September 21, 2010;
6. Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991;
Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.

Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an
appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a
creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of
having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty.
Monsods past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the
foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

7. Brillante v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358;

8. Gaminde v. COA, G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000;
9. Estrella v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160465, May 27, 2004;
10. Dumayas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001;
11. Mamerto Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 10, 2013;
12. Alvarez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 142527, March 1, 2001;
13. Sarmiento v. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307;
14. Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 154796-97, October 23, 2003;
15. Kamarudin Ibrahim v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192289, January 14, 2013;
16. Abad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 128877, December 10, 1999;
17. Soller v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 139853, September 5, 2000;
18. Zarate v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129096, November 19, 1999;
19. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, October 23, 2003;
20. Typoco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, March 5, 2010;
A certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient evidence of the
true and genuine results of the election, only election returns are. In
cases wherein the correctness of the number of votes is involved, the
ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence. However, if such
cannot be produced or are not available, the election returns would
then be the next best evidence.

21. Matura v. COMELEC, 285 SCRA 493;

22. Baytan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 153945, February 4, 2003;
23. Municipal Board of Canvassers v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150946;
24. Villarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212953, August 5, 2014;
25. Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014;
26. Barato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149147, June 18, 2003;
27. Reyes v. Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 44;
28. Cayetano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011;
29. Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, 398 Phil. 257;
30. Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC, 548 Phil. 639;
31. Blanco v. COMELEC, 577 Phil. 622;
32. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780;
33. Garces v. CA, 259 SCRA 99;
34. Diocese of Bacolod, rep. Bishop Navarra v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
205720, January 21, 2015;
35. Gallando v. Judge Tabamo. 218 SCRA 253;
36. LDP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161265, February 24, 2004;
37. Luis Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808;
G.R. No. 193808 : June 26, 2012

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.

SERENO,J.:

FACTS:

Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act

No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its
constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and
to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service. Under the leadership of
the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party
participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two
different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC
a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
in the May 10, 2010 Elections.

The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and
Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.

On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course
to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two
factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed
two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said
party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.

On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel

Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the
COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and
Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of
Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list
nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-
general of CIBAC.

Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records
And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting
secretary-general, when she was not even

a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she
submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was
Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its
behalf.

In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records,
and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the Divisions findings.

Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by
special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and

2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.

HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed outside the
requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and final orders of the
COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, which states:

REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the

COMELEC and the COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.

Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission

on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by the aggrieved party
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.

The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the

immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the
allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of both
the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers to the
same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated,
as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65 provides for a period of
60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court,
while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days, viz:

SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned,
shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party
may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than
five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.

Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010. Upon
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the COMELEC
en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August 2010. This per
curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September 2010.16 Thus,
pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took petitioners to file
the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period of 27 days or until 28
September 2010 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari with this Court.

However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly
outside the required period.

POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes

In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that
the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a
necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election
laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the
COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been
settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the
COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate
officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the
COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the
determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may
resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an
incident of its power to register political parties.

ELECTION LAW: party-list system law

Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as

well as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law.
Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:

Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party,

organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45)
days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-
list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.

A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any
candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective
office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of
the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted
to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing
his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the
House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be
considered resigned.

Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC
with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing
the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on
Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations
Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections.
Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of
these Rules also required that:

The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the
nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the
sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent,
which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of
the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the
advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral
party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other
positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the
advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list
group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only
an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of
said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this
resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of
nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the

COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc.

The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-
general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of
CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its
Certificate of Nomination.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in

issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court
AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate
of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla.

38. AKLAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162203, april 14, 2004;

AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO,

INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
For resolution is the Petition1 for certiorari and mandamus filed by Aklat-
Asosasyon Para Sa Kaunlaran Ng Lipunan At Adhikain Para Sa Tao, Inc. (Aklat)
assailing the Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution2 dated January 8,
2004, which dismissed its Petition3 for re-qualification as a party-list organization,
and the Resolution4 dated February 13, 2004, which denied its Motion for
Reconsideration.5
Briefly, the facts are as follows:
On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a
party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its
petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the
Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court
in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec (Bagong Bayani
case)6 for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-
list elections. Accordingly, Aklat "re-organized itself in order that it will comply
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court"7 in the said case.
In its assailed Resolution dated January 8, 2004, the Comelec dismissed the
petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization representing
the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified under Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). According to the Comelec, Aklats statement
that it has re-organized itself does not cure this defect as "there is nothing in the
petition which will help us identify what particular marginalized and
underrepresented group AKLAT is now representing."8 Further, the Comelec held
that "AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of
regular members just to convince us that it is now cured of its defect."9
On January 15, 2004, Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 14,
2004, substantially averring that it has reorganized itself and taken the necessary
steps to make it an organization of, by and for the marginalized and
underrepresented groups of society, particularly the indigenous cultural
communities and the youth. To this end, it has allegedly effected a fundamental
change in its purposes as an organization, nature of its membership and focus of
its programs.10
The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13,
2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by
the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; the
petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list
organization having failed to meet the eight-point guidelines set by the Court in
the Bagong Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for
registration of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best
position to make such a determination.11
In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions
for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90)
days before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth
(90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition.
Hence, its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the
allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No. 632012 which requires the filing of
such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends
R.A. 7941.
It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the
Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000
persons who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has
established information and coordination centers throughout the country for the
benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and
factory workers including fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is
different from Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.)
which was previously de-registered by the Comelec. Because of all these, Aklat
contends that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its
petition for re-qualification.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment dated March 26, 2004,
stating that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict
with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope
of the authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting
the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system on
September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized
sectors to actively participate in legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient
time to evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing
oppositions to be filed to the end that only those truly qualified may be accredited
under the party-list system. Besides, Republic Act No. 843613 allows the Comelec
to change the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to
ensure their accomplishment.
The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply
with the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was
not properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador Buhain, the
signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly
authorized by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on
its behalf. Moreover, Aklat was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission only on October 20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition for re-
qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at least one (1) year prior to
the filing of the petition as required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG
also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with the documents
required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and
members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track
record or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors of society.
Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are
invariably known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence,
even as re-organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book
publishers, and publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous
cultural communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to
be.
For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the
period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period
beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the
documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.
Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and
amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides:
Sec. 5. Registration.Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by
its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals
[Italics supplied.]
By its wording, R.A. 7941 itself supports the Comelecs position that the period
stated therein refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for
registration should no longer be filed nor entertained. Put elsewise, it is simply the
minimum countback period which is not subject to reduction since it is prescribed
by law, but it is susceptible of protraction on account of administrative necessities
and other exigencies perceived by the poll body.
Verily, the Comelec has the power to promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to enforce and administer election laws. This power includes the
determination, within the parameters fixed by law, of appropriate periods for the
accomplishment of certain pre-election acts like filing petitions for registration
under the party-list system. This is exactly what the Comelec did when it issued
its Resolution No. 6320 declaring September 30, 2003, as the deadline for filing
petitions for registration under the party-list system. Considering these, as well as
the multifarious pre-election activities that the Comelec is mandated to
undertake, the issuance of its Resolution No. 6320 cannot be considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats
petition on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it
was Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-
organized and is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for
failure to comply with the guidelines set forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus,
the Comelec cannot be faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any
evidence in Aklats petition to the contrary, that Aklat is not an organization
representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, but is actually a
business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the promotion and
protection of the book publishing industry.
Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In
fact, four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators14 are also incorporators of
A.K.L.A.T.15 This substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the
conclusion that the supposed re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-
dressing as it has not really changed its character as a business interest of
persons in the book publishing industry.
The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled
The Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification
contain general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups
such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk.
These general statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the
Bagong Bayani case for screening party-list participants, i.e., that "the political
party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it
must showthrough its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history,
platform of government and track recordthat it represents and seeks to uplift
marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must
demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the
interest of such sectors."16
In this regard, the Court notes with approval the OSGs contention that Aklat has
no track record to speak of concerning its representation of marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies considering that it has been in existence for only
a month prior to the filing of its petition for re-qualification.
It should finally be emphasized that the findings of fact by the Comelec, or any
other administrative agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor,
are binding on the Supreme Court.17
In view of the foregoing, the Comelec can, by no means, be held to have
committed grave abuse of discretion to justify the setting aside of the assailed
Resolutions.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.

39. Buca v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155855, January 26, 2004;

40. Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013;
41. National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1;
42. Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712;
43. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, August 31, 2004;
44. Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272;
45. SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001;
SWS vs Comelec

Facts:
Petitioner SWS and KPC states that it wishes to conduct an election survey
throughout the period of the elections and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on
the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify
such restraint.

Issue:
Are the Comelec Resolutions prohibiting the holding of pre-polls and exit polls and
the dissemination of their results through mass media, valid and constitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior
restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a
category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period,
and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by
means other than suppression of freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal
activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so
vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.
46.
47. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529

Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was
scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other
pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of
the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region.
Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland
Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists,
commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.

Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or

should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.

Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises,
permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public
utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd
paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who
is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from
his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the
Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise
by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite
periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.

48. Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999;

49. Mitmug v. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54
50. Solita v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 141723, April 20, 2001;
51. Montejo v. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415;
52. Brillante v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004;
53. Cerafica v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205136, December 2, 2014;
54. Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, March 26, 2001;
55. Goh v. Bayron and COMELEC, G.R. No. 212584, November 25, 2014;
56. Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 192474, 192704, June 26, 2012;
G.R. No. 192474 : June 26, 2012

ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND DAN

ERASMO, SR.,Respondents.

ABAD,J.:
FACTS:

In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he
bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he began
occupying the house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election
Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters
registration record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr.,
respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due proceedings, the
ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos opposition.

Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered
voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list
of registered voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon his
domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos
appealed his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed
the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.

Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for
certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
which was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and
enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his
name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village voters list pending the
resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the
May 10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in it that he resided in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a joint
resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.

While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En
Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the
elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before

it,holding that the lower courts erred in excluding Jalosjos from the voters list of
Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and
Republic Act 8189 to vote in that place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA
decision before this Court in G.R. 193566.

Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for
reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election as Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy
the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of
Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred
his residence from that place toBarangayVeteransVillagein Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay.

Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass
upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for running for the position of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he
has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of
that office.

HELD:

POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions
affecting elections, such power is not without limitation.It does not extend to
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of
these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins.The Proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction
over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.

Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010, Jalosjos
had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the election.Thus, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the issue of his
qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the

proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule. Since the
COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his
proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia. For
Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010 order based on
Section 6 of Republic Act 6646.Section 6 provides:

Section 6.Effects of Disqualification Case.Any candidate who has been declared by

final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong.

Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had
as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second Divisions dismissal of the
disqualification case against Jalosjos.Thus, there then existed no final judgment
deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the congressional seat he
sought.The last standing official action in his case before election day was the
ruling of the COMELEC's Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list.Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his
proclamation pending its final resolution of his case.With the fact of his
proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for
the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET
to consider and decide.

Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the
elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.Necessarily,
Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning the validity of the
registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC's failure to annul his
proclamation also fail.The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the
Constitution solely on the HRET.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474,REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Bancs order dated June 3,
2010, andREINSTATESthe Commissions Second Division resolution dated February
23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr.Further,
the Court DISMISSED the petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of
jurisdiction over the issues they raise.

57. Tanada, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207199, October 22, 2013;

58. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013;

Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 207264 : OCTOBER 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH

SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of June 25, 2013
which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on
Elections and affirmed the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division.

Petitioner raised the issue in the petition which is: Whether or not Respondent
COMELEC is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque. Petitioner is a
duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.

The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner

submission.The crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed
on May 18, 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the proclamation of
petitioner on May 18 , 2013.

The June 25, 2013 resolution held that before May 18, 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its resolution dated May 14, 2013, cancelling
petitioner certificate of candidacy. The proclamation which petitioner secured on
May 18, 2013 was without any basis. On June 10, 2013, petitioner went to the
Supreme Court questioning the COMELEC First Division ruling and the May 14,
2013 COMELEC En Banc decision, baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not
by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner was denied of due process?

HELD: Petitioner was denied of due process.

POLITICAL LAW: administrative due process

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took
cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been
testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of
the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification
from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation
of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to
question and present controverting evidence.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the
technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of
Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in order to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every
action and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that
the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was
properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.

Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner
was given every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10
October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First
Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to
adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.

In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party
be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v.
COMELEC: The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not
necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due
process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.

In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent submitted records

of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport,
and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted no
proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.

The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

59. Sahali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 201796, January 15, 2013;

60. Bince v. COMELEC, 218 SCRA 782;
61. Relampagos v. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690;
62. Gallano v. Hon. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011;
63. Flores v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 484;
64. Veloria v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 907;
65. Lloren v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196355, September 18, 2012;
66. Divinagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016, July 27, 2009;
67. Nollen v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635, January 11, 2010;
68. Baraonda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005;
69. Saludaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189431, April 7, 2010;
70. Edding v. COMELEC, 246 SCRA 502;
71. Santos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155618, March 26, 2003;
72. Navarrosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003;
73. Gutierrez v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 413;
74. Ramas v. COMELEC, 286 SCRA 189;
75. Calo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 185222, January 19, 2010;
76. Camlian v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 757;
77. Guevara v. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269;
78. Galido v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 78;
79. Ambil v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000;
80. Cawasa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150469, July 3, 2002;
The appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI is a
grave electoral irregularity.

81. Salic Dumarpa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192249, April 2, 2013;

82. Filipina Engineering & Machine Shop v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25

FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON. JAIME N. FERRER

G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985

COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the manufacture and supply of voting
booths. However, the losing bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas
Engineering filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and Acme. The lower court
denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the lower court
has no jurisdiction over the case which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit
involving an order of the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from
its invitation to bid; and
2. Whether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the
premises against the COMELEC and Acme, the winning bidder, to enjoin them
from complying with their contract.

RULING:
It has been consistently held that it is the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction to review on certiorari; final decisions, orders or rulings of the
COMELEC relative to the conduct of elections and enforcement of election laws.

The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said
resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by
the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to
this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers.

;
83. Salva v. Makalintal, G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000;
84. Tan v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 353;
85. Mandalo Para sa Pagbabago v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190793, June 19,
2012;
G.R. No. 190793 : June 19, 2012
FACTS:
Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political
party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 10 May
2010 National and Local Elections.

COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is
common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several
innocent civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in
full battle gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing
violence and using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying
the laws of organized societies.

MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the COMELEC
En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for Early
Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means?

HELD: COMELECS Resolutions are sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: election

To join electoral contests, a party or organization must undergo the two-step

process of registration and accreditation, as this Court explained in Liberal Party v.
COMELEC:

x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged
participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.

x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization

or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request
for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out,
accreditation is the next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations
and coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means" shall be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section
61 of B.P. 881, which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its
goal through violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the

accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against
common right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an
unlawful act is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering
that the latter must still unite with evil intent for it to exist.

The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61
of BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility
of groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing
acts considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature.
Although this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability,
as it is only limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of
this Court in Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.

DISMISSED

86. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010;
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their
acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition
was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA
7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs
field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers,
and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly
ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality
in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation
of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the
Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere
blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather
than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

87. Phil. Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, April
29, 2010;
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No.
190529. April 29, 2010]
03 Oct
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for
reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA
7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis
supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it
did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the
resolution citing among others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v.
COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC
showing the excerpts from the records of Senate Bill No. 1913 before it became
the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941;
hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national,
regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.
First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law which
provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Second, MINERO is
diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore simply
cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not
violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration
of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply
the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of
notice and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances
that PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare
decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a
country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all
courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that
once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances
attendant in a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial
system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.
MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now
abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case law.
88.
89. Cocofed v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013;
90. ANAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013;
91. Coalitions of Associations of Senior Citizenz v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
206844-45, July 23, 2013;
92. Abang-Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206952, October 22,
2013;
93. Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136781, October 6,
2000;
Veterans Fed. Party v COMELEC G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.
7/15/2010
0 Comments

Facts: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held
simultaneously with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three
(123) parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the
COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list representatives from twelve
(12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total
number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed
representatives belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the
votes.

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (People's Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good
Government Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the
COMELEC a "Petition to Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives
provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as
provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA
7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be
declared winners, short of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit
in the House.

Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations filed their respective Motions for
Intervention, seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially
the same grounds. Likewise, PAG-ASA's Petition was joined by other party-list
organizations in a Manifestation they filed on August 28, 1998. These
organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA,
PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA, AFW,
Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan,
4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.

On October 15, 1998, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated the present
assailed Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of
herein 38 respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total
52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all times, the total number of
congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under
Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it identified three "elements of the party-list
system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52 seats should be filled
up.

Issue: How to determine the winners of the subject party-list election can be
settled by addressing the following issues:
 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in
Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In
other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit
provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional
seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the COMELEC are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of
the fourteen (14) sitting party-list representatives two for APEC and one each for
the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as
to costs. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: In sum, we hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that the thirty-eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions
are each entitled to a party-list seat, because it glaringly violated two
requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.

In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the

COMELEC effectively arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and
wholly vested in the legislature: the power and the discretion to define the
mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the propriety of
these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial
review.

The COMELEC, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-

related laws, cannot simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the
bounds of its authority. As a mere implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom,
propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to draft an amendment to the
law find lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.

In view of the party-list system elements per COMELEC

First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the
system should represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it
should encourage [the] multi-party system." (Boldface in the original.) Considering
these elements, but ignoring the two percent threshold requirement of RA 7941, it
concluded that "the party-list groups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 . . . should have at least
one representative."

In view of to whom should the seats be given

In the suits, made respondents together with the COMELEC were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise
entitled to party-list seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners
sought the proclamation of additional representatives from each of their parties
and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two percent of the total votes
cast for the party-list system.

On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the
COMELEC "to CEASE and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of
Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any other date and proclaiming as winners
the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions enumerated in the
dispositive portions at its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court."

In view of the 20% being mandatory

The COMELEC cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the
voters themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage,
determine who and how many should represent them.

On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may
result in a "mathematical impossibility," suffice it to say that the prerogative to
determine whether to adjust or change this percentage requirement rests in
Congress. Our task now, as should have been the COMELEC's, is not to find fault in
the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical extremes, but to
craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable,
implement it within the context of the actual election process.

In view of the 2% threshold

In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of
constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

In view of the 2.5% vote equivalent

"MR. MONSOD. . . . We are amenable to modifications in the minimum
percentage of votes. Our proposal is that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent
of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their votes in the last
elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a
constituency of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we
bring that down to two percent, we are talking about 400,000 votes. The average
vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000 families. We
believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly
because many of them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the
operational implication of our proposal.

Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of

their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio"
to ensure meaningful local representation.

In view of the Three-Seat-Per-Party limit

An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and
encourage a multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner
Monsod:

"MR. MONSOD: but we also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and
operation in the implementation of a concept that has very serious shortcomings
of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the
ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any
single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. This
way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to
earn their seats among the fifty. . . ."

In view of the method of allocating additional seats

Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling,
and having upheld the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the
three-seat limit imposed under RA 7941, we now proceed to the method of
determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions are entitled to.

In view of the Niemeyer Formula

Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party
would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to
be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the
product by the total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The
integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional seats that
the party concerned is entitled to.

The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no

application in the Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-
mandatory character of the twenty percent allocation. True, both our Congress and
the Bundestag have threshold requirements two percent for us and five for
them.

One half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list members. More

important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes
a three-seat limit to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system.

In view of the legal and logical formula for the Philippines

Step One. Rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each received. Then
the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for
all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of
the total votes are guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first" party.

Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the
distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be
allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is
entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.

The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales that a fractional
membership cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would,
in effect; deprive another party's fractional membership. It would be a violation of
the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. We said further that "no
party can claim more than what it is entitled to . . ."

In view of the formula for determining additional seats for the first party

The only basis given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of
the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to
receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to
twice the latter's number of seats and so on.

We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always
entitled to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent
the allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an
extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus
entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved
in the House of Representatives.

However, if the first party received a significantly higher amount of votes

say, twenty percent to grant it the same number of seats as the second party
would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party
getting only six percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives
as the one obtaining twenty percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the
first party a total of three seats; and the party receiving six percent, additional
seats in proportion to those of the first party.

In view of the formula for additional seats of other qualified parties

Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the
other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation.

In view of the 2% threshold rationale

The rationale for the 2% threshold can thus be synthesized as follows:

1.To avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system
as a fallback position;

2.To discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose
chances are very low, from participating in the elections;

3.To avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4.To encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn
their seats within the system;

5.To enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of

the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some
degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or
to an appointment by the President of the Philippines;

6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party

groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for
them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the
Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; 16 and

7. To ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be
represented.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the sectoral groups suffer from major
disadvantages in the competitive election arena. They sought to remedy this
inequality through an outright constitutional gift of reserve seats for the first three
terms of the sectoral representatives and no further. Thereafter, they have to earn
their seats through participation in the party-list system.

In view of the 3-seat limit rationale

The rationale for the 3-seat limit is to distribute party-list representation to as

many party groups as possible. According to Senator Tolentino, if one party will be
allowed to dominate, then the idea of giving as much as possible to the
marginalized groups may be defeated. The purpose is to allow as many as possible
of the marginalized groups that would be entitled to representation to have a seat
in Congress, and to have enough seats left for those who are way below the list.

The party-list system of proportional representation is based on the Niemeyer

formula, embodied in Art. 6(2) of the German Federal Electoral Law, which
provides that, in determining the number of seats a party is entitled to have in the
Bundestag, seats should be multiplied by the number of votes obtained by each
party and then the product should be divided by the sum total of the second votes
obtained by all the parties that have polled at least 5 percent of the votes. First,
each party receives one seat for each whole number resulting from the calculation.
The remaining seats are then allocated in the descending sequence of the decimal
fractions. The Niemeyer formula was adopted in R.A. No. 7941, 11.

Indeed, the goal should be to fill all seats allowed for party-list representatives,
which at present are 52. The provision thus fixes a ratio of 80 percent district
representatives to 20 percent party-list representatives. If in fact all seats reserved
for party-list representatives are not filled, that is due to the fact that the law limits
parties, organizations, and coalitions to three (3) seats each. To maintain this ratio,
the entire number of seats for the party-list system, after deducting the number of
seats initially distributed to the 2 percenters, must be allocated to them.

I see no legal or logical basis for the majority's fixation with designating the
highest ranking participant as a "first" party. This procedure, as admitted by the
majority, assumes that the seats to be allocated to the qualified parties depend on
the seats of the so-called first party.

In essence, the majority "formula" amounts simply to the following prescription:

(1) follow the "1 seat for every 2%" rule in allocating seats to the first ranking
party only and (2) with respect to the rest of the 2 percenters, give each party one
(1) seat, unless the first ranking party gets at least six percent, in which case all 2
percenters with at least one-half of the votes of the first ranking party should get
an extra seat..

The scheme adopted by the majority will prevent all 2 percenters, which are
not the first ranking party, from obtaining the maximum number of seats. This is
so because, with their votes being proportioned against the votes of the first
ranking party, there will never be an instance where the additional seats of these
parties will be equivalent to 2. Again, this is contrary to R.A. No. 7941, 11 which
contemplates the possibility of more than one (1) party obtaining the maximum
number of seats allowed by law.

94. Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589,
June 26, 2001;
95. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009;
96. Atona Paglaum, Inc., v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013;
97. Bello v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191998, December 7, 2010;
98. ABC v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193,256, March 22, 2011;
99. Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010;
100. De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760;
101. People v. Judge Inting, 187 SCRA 788;
102. COMELEC v. Silva, 286 SCRA 177;
103. People v. Judge Basilio, 179 SCRA 87;
104. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009;
105. Loong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133676, April 14, 1999;
106. Sambarani v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004;
107. Hassan v. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 125;
108. Yra v. Abano, 52 Phil. 380;
109. Asistio v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 191124, April 27, 2010;
110. Ututalum v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 335;
111. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245;
112. Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1;
113. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727;
114. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. no. 191970, April 24, 2012;
115. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, February 26, 2013;
116. Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010;
117. Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015;
118. Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001;
119. Cassi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229;
120. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006;
121. Grego v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997;
122. Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514;

RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and

ROGELIO DE CASTRO, respondents.

[G.R. No. 120940. March 7, 1996]

JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RENATO U.
REYES, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For resolution are special civil actions of certiorari. The petition in G.R. No. 120905
seeks to annul the resolution dated May 9, 1995 of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections, declaring petitioner Renato U. Reyes disqualified from
running for local office and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the
resolution dated July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc, denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the petition in G.R. No. 120940,
filed by Julius O. Garcia, has for its purpose the annulment of the aforesaid
resolution of July 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc insofar as it denies his
motion to be proclaimed the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, in
view of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
On August 1, 1995, the Court issued a temporary restraining order directing the
Commission on Elections en banc to cease and desist from implementing its
resolution of July 3, 1995. It also ordered the two cases to be consolidated,
inasmuch as they involved the same resolutions of the COMELEC.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992.
On October 26, 1994, an administrative complaint was filed against him with the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged, among other
things, that petitioner exacted and collected P50,000.00 from each market stall
holder in the Bongabong Public Market; that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the Department of Interior
and Local government were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor
reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and that he took twenty-
seven (27) heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after
the latter had reared and fattened the cattle for seven months.
In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan found
petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.
It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had terminated the
proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional Trial Court of
Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated
without giving him a chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order was
issued by the court on February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
from proceeding with the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan could not served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the
expiration of the temporary restraining order and without any injunction being
issued by the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision
upon petitioners counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the
decision. Subsequent attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also
failed, as he also refused to accept the decision.
On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice
Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for petitioner to vacate the position of
mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor. But
service of the order upon petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong.
On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of
Bongabong, sought the disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) which states:
40. Disqualification. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of any contrary order from the COMELEC,
petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
On May 9, 1995, the COMELECs Second Division issued the questioned resolution,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondent having been removed from office by virtue of
Administrative Case 006-94, he is hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for public
office, in conformity with Section 40, paragraph (b) of the 1991 Local Government
Code. The respondents Certificate of Candidacy is CANCELLED in conformity with
this resolution. The Election Officer of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro is ordered to
amend the official list of candidates in Bongabong to reflect the respondents
disqualification and to IMMEDIATELY circulate the amendment to the different
Boards of Election Inspectors in Bongabong upon the receipt of this decision.
On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong, apparently
unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed him the
duly-elected mayor.
On July 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the COMELECs Second Division, but his motion was denied. The COMELEC en banc
declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently,
set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor of Bongabong. Hence the petition
in G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of
discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative
case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could
not be used as basis for his disqualification. It is contended that the charges
against him were rendered moot and academic by the expiration of the term
during which the acts complained of had allegedly been committed. Invoking the
ruling in the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos, i[1] petitioner argues that his election on
May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
On the other hand, it appears that petitioner Julius M. Garcia, who obtained the
second highest number of votes next to petitioner Reyes in the same elections of
May 8, 1995, intervened in the COMELEC on June 13, 1995 (after the main
decision disqualifying Renato Reyes was promulgated), contending that because
Reyes was disqualified, he (Garcia) was entitled to be proclaimed mayor of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro.
In its resolution of July 3, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied Garcias prayer,
citing the ruling in Republic v. De la Rosaii[2] that a candidate who obtains the
second highest number of votes in an election cannot be declared winner. Hence
the petition in G.R. No. 120940. Petitioner contends that (1) the COMELEC en banc
should have decided his petition at least 15 days before the May 8, 1995 elections
as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and that because it failed to do
so, many votes were invalidated which could have been for him had the voters
been told earlier who were qualified to be candidates; (2) that the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan was final and executory and resulted in the automatic
disqualification of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need much time to decide
the case for disqualification against Reyes since the latter did not appeal the
decision in the administrative case ordering his removal; (3) that the COMELEC
should have considered the votes cast for Reyes as stray votes.
After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases, the Court resolved to
dismiss them for lack of showing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the resolutions in question.
G.R. No. 120905
First. Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
ordering him removed from office, is not yet final because he has not been served
a copy thereof.
It appears, however, that the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a
copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive
the decision. As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo,
stated in his certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision
on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the
decision. Manzos certification states:
On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila to furnish a copy
of the decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty. Rogelio V. Garcia, which said
counsel refused to accept.
On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay again went to the office of the
Mayor of Bongabong to serve the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes, himself
present, refused to accept the ORDER enforcing the decision citing particularly the
pending case filed in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as the basis of his
refusal.
On [sic] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER, mailed the same (registered mail
receipt No. 432) on the Bongabong Post Office to forward the ORDER to the Office
of Mayor Renato U. Reyes.
On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan with the following inscriptions on the back by the Postmaster:
1)1st attempt - addressee out of town -
9:15 a.m., 3-23-95
2) 2nd attempt- addressee cannot be
contacted, out of town, 8:50
a.m., 3-24-95
3) 3rd attempt - addressee not contacted -
out of town, 8:15 a.m.,
3-24-95
4) 4th attempt - addressee refused to accept
8:15 a.m., 3-27-95
On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went to Bongabong to
serve the same ORDER enforcing the decision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not
present so the copy was left on the Mayors Office with comments from the
employees that they would not accept the same.iii[3]
Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and
judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual
or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to
the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge
thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known.iv[4] Hence service was
completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his office in
Manila on March 3, 1995. In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner
Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service
was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995. v
[5]
If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to
him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be
considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it
to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.
Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case
had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his
client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. vi[6]
His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his
part to have a copy of the decision.
The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served
with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can
take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for
other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.
In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or
other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it,
and subject him to its legal effect.vii[7]
In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence
required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No.
7160, 67.viii[8] But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final
on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.
The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The filing
of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court did not prevent the
administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an
independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor
the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding. ix[9]
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of
the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the lower court. x[10]
In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was subsequently issued. The
temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on,
there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at the
hearing held on February 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the RTC, the
counsel of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to
effect service of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending final
resolution of the petition for certiorari.
The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan cannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It was illegal. And it
would have been no less illegal for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried
it out because R.A. No. 7160, 66(a) makes it mandatory that [c]opies of the
decision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately be furnished to
respondent and/or interested parties. It was the Sangguniang Panlalawigans duty
to serve it upon the parties without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the
service of the decision would have resulted in the Sangguniang Panlalawigans
failure to perform a legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its decision
served upon petitioner Reyes.
Second. The next question is whether the reelection of petitioner rendered the
administrative charges against him moot and academic. Petitioner invokes the
ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC,xi[11] in which it was held that a public official
could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his
reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that
case, before the petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision
removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged
misconduct was committed expired.xii[12] Removal cannot extend beyond the
term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not
removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is
thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two
Aguinaldo cases.
The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner
Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the
temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result
that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April
3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was
thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government
Code, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no
provision similar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any
elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could
not be given retroactive effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldo case: xiii[13]
The COMELEC applied Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act
7160) which provides:
Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
positions:
xxxxxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992 x x x. There is no provision
in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to
the present case.
Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the
decision of the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by the
petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition remains unresolved x x x.
At any rate, petitioners claim that he was not given time to present his evidence
in the administrative case has no basis, as the following portion of the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan makes clear:
On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from respondents counsel a
motion for extension of time to file a verified answer within 15 days from
November 23, 1994. In the interest of justice another fifteen (15) day period was
granted the respondent.
On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing his answer, respondent
instead filed a motion to dismiss and set the same for hearing on December 22,
1994.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied for lack of merit and the
order of denial was received by respondent on January 7, 1995. Considering the
fact that the last day within which to file his answer fell on December 5, 1994,
respondent is obliged to file the verified answer on January 7, 1995 when he
received the order denying his motion to dismiss.
In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995, the counsel for the
complainant manifested that he be allowed to present his evidence for failure of
the respondent to file his answer albeit the lapse of 19 days from January 7, 1995.
The manifestation of complainants counsel was granted over the objection of the
respondent, and the Sanggunian in open session, in the presence of the counsel
for the respondent, issued an order dated January 26, 1995 quoted as follows:
As shown from the record of this case, Mayor Renato U. Reyes of Bongabong failed
to file his answer within the time prescribed by law, after the motion to dismiss
was denied by this Sanggunian. The Sanggunian declares that respondent Mayor
Renato U. Reyes failed to file his answer to the complaint filed against him within
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. Counsel for respondent requested for
reconsideration twice, which oral motions for reconsideration were denied for lack
of merit.
Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to file his verified answer within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his
rights to present evidence in his behalf.
It is important to note that this case should be heard in accordance with what is
provided for in the constitution that all parties are entitled to speedy disposition of
their cases. It is pivotal to state that the Sanggunian Panlalawigan will lose its
authority to investigate this case come February 8, 1995 and therefore, in the
interest of justice and truth the Sanggunian must exercise that authority by
pursuing the hearing of this case.
Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto L. Manalo, et al., will present
his evidence on February 2, 3, and 6, 1995, and the counsel for respondent will be
given a chance to cross-examine the witnesses that may be presented thereat.
xxx xxx xxx
On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel despite due notice in open
session, and by registered mail (registry receipt No. 1495) dated January 27,
1995, failed to appear. No telegram was received by this body to the effect that
he will appear on any of the dates stated in the Order of January 26, 1995. Indeed,
such inaction is a waiver of the respondent to whatever rights he may have under
our laws.
All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a period of
sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he resorted to dilatory
motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor
furnished the complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent to file
his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be
considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of
Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All
persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Contitution).
Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his
answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would
be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to
appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for
postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of
delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.
G.R. No. 120940
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
denying petitioner Julius O. Garcias petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. xiv
[14] The doctrinal instability caused by see-sawing rulings xv[15] has since been
removed. In the latest rulingxvi[16] on the question, this Court said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second
placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by
either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
Garcias plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The
votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was
qualified and for that reason can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. xvii
[17] The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of
the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
As for Garcias contention that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in not deciding the case before the date of the election, suffice it to say
that under R.A. No. 6646, 6, the COMELEC can continue proceedings for
disqualification against a candidate even after the election and order the
suspension of his proclamation whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. For
the same reason, we find no merit in the argument that the COMELEC should have
seen right away that Reyes had not exhausted administrative remedies by
appealing the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and, therefore, should
have disqualified him before the elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. NO. 120905 and G.R. No. 120940 are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., concurs and dissents.

123. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630;

124. Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008;
125. Sobejana-COndon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, August 10, 2012;
126. Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013;
127. Marquez v. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538;
128. Rodriguez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996;
129. Esercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014;
130. Pangkat Laguna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148075, February 4, 2002;
131. Lato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006;
132. Penera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009;
133. Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010;
134. PNOC v. NLRC, G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993;
135. De Guzman v. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211;
136. Amora v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192280, January 25, 2011;
137. Jurilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105435, June 2, 1994;
138. Talaga v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012;
139. Tagolino v. HRET, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013;
140. Aratea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012;
141. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012;
142. Ycain v. Caneja, 81 Phil 773;
143. Monsale v. Nico, 83 Phil. 758;
144. Loreto-Go v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741, May 10, 2001;
145. Abcede v. Imperial, 103 Phil. 136;
146. Cipriano v. COMELEC, 479 Phil. 677 (2004);
147. Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205033, Jun3, 18, 2003;
148. Timbol v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015;
149. Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 121139, July 11, 2010;
150. Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010;
151. Casimira v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 19221, November 13, 2012;
152. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 122872, September 10, 1997;
153. Quizon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177927, February 15, 2008;
154. Luis Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, February 25, 2014;
155. Hayudini v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014;
156. Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008;
157. Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014;
158. Gonzalez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011;
159. Codilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002;
160. Albana v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703;
161. Alfais Munder v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194076, October 10, 2011;
162. Papandayan v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147909, April 16, 2002;
163. Bautista v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998;
164. Martinez v. HRET, G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010;
165. De La Cruz v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012;
166. Lato v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154858, November 16, 2006;
167. Garcia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010;
168. Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014;
169. Badoy v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 285;
170. Sanidad v. COMELEC, 181 SCRA 529;
171. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162777, august 31, 2004;
172. Pilar v. COMELEC, 245 SCRA 759;
173. Libanan v. HRET. G.R. No. 129783, December 22, 1997;
174. Punzalan v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 702;
175. Villagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168296, Janaury 31, 2006;
176. Garay v. COMELEC, 261 SCRA 222;
i

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iii

iv

vi

vii

viii

ix

xi

xii

xiii

xiv

xv

xvi

xvii