Outline in

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Atty. Crisostomo A. Uribe

I. INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW

I Tolentino, Civil Code, pp. 1-10 (1990 Edition)
Balane, The Spanish Antecedents of the Philippine Civil Code,
54 PLJ 1st Quarter, p. 1

II. EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS - NCC 1-18

A. When do laws take effect?
NCC 2
Revised Administrative Code (RAC) Secs. 18-24
Exec. Order 200 Sec. 1 & 2

Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984

Executive Order No. 626-A should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because,
as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official
Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in
article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the
public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators
of the executive order can be bound thereby.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or
document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal
effect."

Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 551 of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders shall become
effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise publicly promulgated".

People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984

Even though the Official Gazette was dated as the April 9, 1979 issue; it was only made available
to the public on June 14, 1979; thus, it is the latter date, the date of actual publication, that
would govern the reckoning point as to when the law was actually made known to the public
through publication.

Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, April 24, 1985

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in
the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a
list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular

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persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in

the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

MRCA v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 344, December 19, 1989

Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if
it lays down a new rule of procedure.

Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591, December 22, 1989

As to this case, if a memmo is directed to a specific person, no need to publish. This presumes
that there is no general applicability of the memo.

Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official Gazette, does not
apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs
addressed to his subordinates. the customs collectors.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 (an Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of
the Official Gazette) enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette besides
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines. Executive
and administrative orders and proclamations, shall also be published in the Official Gazette,
except such as have no general applicability." CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to
comply strictly with Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular
persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors). "It need not be published, on the
assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned"

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely
providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before
that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable to be able to
give effect to the law. The phrase unless otherwise provided refers to a different effectivity date
that the law stated other than the generic fifteen days following its publication in the Official
Gazette. This, however, does not imply that the requirement of publication is dispensed with
altogether. The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case
Tanada v. Hon. Tuvera.

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note
that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had
any legal force and effect.

B. Ignorance of the law - NCC 3

Kasilag v. Rodriquez, 69 Phil 217

Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith, but possible, excusable
ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner in this case is not conversant with the

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laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on
the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the
land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as
clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.

C. Retroactivity - NCC 4, NCC 5

cf. NCC 2252- 2269
Revised Penal Code (RPC) 22
Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 , January 31, 1989
While it may be argued that Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application
of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions. A statute operates
prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made
manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implications. As pointed out
above, PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions.

Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591 , January 30, 1989

A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in
Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being
procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners,
as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in
that sense and to that extent.

MRCA v. CA, supra

BPI v. IAC 164 SCRA 630 , August 19, 1988

As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended
the bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intended to sell the US dollars to
the Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum
would never have been entered into at all.

Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank within
one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB Circular No. 20, it
must be considered as one which falls under the general class of prohibited transactions. Hence,
pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly, it affords neither of the parties a cause of action
against the other. "When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the
contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall
have no cause of action against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is
one on behalf of the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and one such
exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a
statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away
vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already
existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws
are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive application is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily, no vested rights generally attaches
to or arises from procedural laws.

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 D. Waiver of rights - NCC 6
cf. NCC 301.
E. Repeal of laws - NCC 7
cf. 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3

Guingona v. Carague,. 196 SCRA 221 , April 22, 1991

Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

F. Duty to render judgment - NCC 9

cf. RPC. 5

G. Applicability of custom - NCC 11-12

cf. 1987 Constitution, Art, XII Sec. 5
Rules of Court Rule 129 (2) (3)

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79 , December 27, 1910

It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants
to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner
in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It
has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby
make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people.

H. Legal periods - NCC 13: Periods

Cf. Rules of court (ROC) Rule 28
RAC Sec. 31

Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989

The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a period, the first
day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not Identical to Section 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless otherwise specially provided, the time
within which an act is required by law to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day
and including the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well
as the old Rule 28 of the Rules of Court which stated that "In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by order of a court, or by any other applicable
statute, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to
run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which
is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." In applying this rule, the Court considered the day as
synonymous with the date.

Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969

In the language of this Court, in People vs. Del Rosario, with the approval of the Civil Code of
the Philippines (Republic Act 386) ... we have reverted to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code
in accordance with which a month is to be considered as the regular 30-day month ... and not the
solar or civil month," with the particularity that, whereas the Spanish Code merely mentioned
"months, days or nights," ours has added thereto the term "years" and explicitly ordains that "it
shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days."

I. Binding effect - NCC 15

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Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933
Articles 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such to
be done the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the
courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the
Philippines to be affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government
believes is contrary to public order & good morals.

The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted
to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be ratified and confirmed, clearly
indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to
secure for themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our
law.

Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or
permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign
courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals.

Tenchavez v. Escao, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965

Since the divorce decree was acquired by Escano when she was still a Filipino citizen, the divorce
decree cannot give her any right to remarry because at the time she obtained the divorce decree,
she was still bound by the laws of the Philippines in relation to family rights and duties or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons.

Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989

Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Since , private respondent already obtained a
valid divorce decree abroad, he is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing
to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.

J. Human Relations - NCC 19-21

People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 March 5, 1991

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It does not mean that if a crime is not punishable under the RPC no liability can be created. In
this case, the SC granted damages with the Art. 21 as basis (acts contrary to morals, good
customs, public order or public policy). This is becasuese during this time, the crime of
phedophelia is not yet enacted.

Moral and exemplary damages awarded to the victims heirs despite acquittal of accused on
grounds of reasonable doubt.Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Rule III,
Section 1) The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not criminally liable, may still be
civilly liable. We reiterate what has been stated in Urbano v. IAC, supra. x x x While the guilt of
the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court
of Appeals, 129 SCRA 559). x x x Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her
grandmothers house. Circumstances forced her to succumb and enter this unfortunate
profession. Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have certainly suffered mental anguish,
anxiety and moral shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected in the records of the
case. Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize
that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only the constitutional presumption
of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight case for conviction which saved
him, not that the facts of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there is the likelihood
that he did insert the vibrator whose end was left inside Rosarios vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. True, we cannot convict on probabilities or possibilities but
civil liability does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court can order the payment of
indemnity on the facts found in the records of this case.

Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

III. CIVIL PERSONALITY

A. Persons and Personality - NCC 37- 39
Concepts of person and personality
Classes of persons and there distinctions
Elements of civil capacity
Juridical capacity v. personality
Juridical capacity v. capacity to act
B. Commencement and termination of personality
1. Natural Persons
NCC 40- 41
1987 Constitution Art. II Sec. 12
P.D. 603 Art. 5; FC 164
RPC Arts. 256-259

Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973

When pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human gestation
period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is
complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation seldom will survive much
beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively denied. Laws should not be that
rigid.

The Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet evading
review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at each stage of
judicial review, and not merely when the action was initiated.

Geluz v. CA, . 2 SCRA 801 July 20, 1961

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Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person does not cover unborn foetus.
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is
not endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf.Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.The damages which the parents of
an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).

Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970

Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by
those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article
742. Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.

De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 November 28, 1933

It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the recognition of unborn
child is really not different from that presented in the ordinary case of the recognition of a child
already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular
individual intended with the name used.

The words of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of two constructions.
They refer to a baby then conceived which was expected to be born in June and which would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it was in the end given the
name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child which the defendant
intended to acknowledge is clear.

It is undeniable that from the birth of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the
mother, in which they lived together with the defendant. This situation continued for about a
year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, when the idea entered the defendant's
head of abandoning her.

NCC 42

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by
legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood the reason was one in the nature of
a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations
of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after
death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal
fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the
executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased.
the underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the
deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from
the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

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Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472 April 30, 1976
As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not have been, validly
served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).

Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether
Vitaliana was dead or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of
course or as a mere perfimetory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is
exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to appear to the judge to whom the
petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the writ. While the
court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ
should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima
facie case for relief.

NCC 43
cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3 1989 Revised code rules on Evidence

Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 May 29, 1953

It is the "particular circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required
to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean
beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may be plain enough to justify a finding of
fact."

2. Juridical Persons
Public corporations
Private corporations
Partnerships
NCC 44- 47

Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919

A corporation having alien stockholders, is entitled to the protection afforded by the due-process
of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act
No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co. Ltd.,
the right to register vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious
species of class legislation which must always be condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the police power, and so does not offend against the
constitutional provision. Provisions such as those in Act No. 2761, which deny to foreigners the
right to a certificate of Philippine registry, are thus found not to be as radical as a first reading
would make them appear.

Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 November 24, 1906

The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical entity in the Philippine Islands, and under Article 46
of the Civil Code, juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization.

It is not necessary or important to give any name to this right of possession and control exercised
by the Roman Catholic Church in the church buildings of the Philippines prior to 1898. It is not
necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the buildings. It is
sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same, for the
purposes of its creation, existed.
It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church
had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal right to
administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated.

IV. RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY

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 A. General rule : presumption of capacity

Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911

A person suffering from monomania of wealth is not really insane and therefore is deranged and
incapable of binding himself in a contract.

B. Restrictions on capacity to act - NCC 38-39

1. Minority
Age of majority R.A. 6809
Suffrage, Sec. 1 Art. V 1987 Constitution
Marriage FC 5; cf R. A. 6809
NCC 1327
NCC 1390 (1) 1403 (3) ; 1397, 1399
NCC 1489
NCC 1426-1427

Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215 December 1, 1917

The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not,
is valid, and they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law.
Young v. Tecson, 39 O.G. 953
The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other
contracting party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no
moment, because his previous misrepresentation has already estopped him from disavowing the
contract

Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil. 417 January 30, 1928

The contract of purchase and sale of real property executed by a minor is vitiated to the extent of
being void as regards said minor.

Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
Since appellee's conveyance to the appellants was admittedly for and in virtue of a pre-existing
indebtedness (unquestionably a valid consideration), it should produce its full force and effect in
the absence of any other vice that may legally invalidate the same. It is not here claimed that the
deed of sale is null and void on any ground other than the appellee's minority. Appellee's contract
has become fully efficacious as a contract executed by parties with full legal capacity. The
circumstance that, about one month after the date of the conveyance, the appellee informed the
appellants of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee's previous misrepresentation had
already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Said belated information merely leads to the
inference that the appellants in fact did not know that the appellee was a minor on the date of
the contract, and somewhat emphasizes appellee's had faith, when it is borne in mind that no
sooner had he given said information than he ratified his deed of sale upon receiving from the
appellants the sum of P500.

De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959

The failure of the minor to disclose his minority when making a contract does not per se,
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit. In order to hold the minor
liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive.

Although the written contract is unenforceable because of non-age, however, the minor shall
make restitution to the extent that he may have profited by the thing he received.

Where minority is set up only as a defense to an act on, without the minor asking for any positive
relief from the contract, the four-year period fixed by Article 1301 of the Civil Code may not be
applied.

Criminal Liability, RPC 12 (2) (3); RPC 13 (2); PD 603 Secs. 189-204

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2. Insanity

Effect on marriage, FC 45 (2)

Effect on contracts, NCC 1327, 1328
Criminal liability, RPC 12 (1)
Rule 101, Rules of court

US v. Vaguillar, 27 Phil. 88 March 13, 1914

One who, possession of a sound mind, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which way temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shield from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only
excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person
committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequences of his insanity.

Standard Oil v. Arenas, supra

People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving
his affirmative allegation of insanity, Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing
evidence regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on
Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the
period immediately before or at the very moment the act is committed.

3. Deaf Mutism
NCC 1327 (2), 807 & 820
4. Prodigality
ROC Rule 92 Sec. 2
5. Civil Interdiction
RPC 34, 41
6. Family Relations
FC 150; cf. FC 87
7. Alien age
8. Absence
NCC 381- 396
9. Insolvency Trusteeship
NCC 1491 & 1381

V. DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE

Juridical person, NCC 51
Natural persons, NCC 50; FC 68 & 69

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

The COMELEC found that petitioner Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a
registered voter thereat. With these findings, the COMELEC disqualified the petitioner as
governor of the province of Leyte. The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is
erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the
required residence to qualify her to run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that
under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the
principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else." In the instant case,
there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte
in 1975 to pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that she established her
residence in Ormoc City with her husband and considers herself a resident therein. The intention
of animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte therefor, is nor present.
The fact that she occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an
intention to continue her residence therein. It is common among us Filipinos to often visit places
where we formerly resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives therein although
for intents and purposes we have already transferred our residence to other places.

10
VI. THE FAMILY CODE
A. Effect and Retroactivity
E. O. 209 as amended by E.O. 227, RA 6809 and RA 7160
B. Repeal and Amendment
FC 253

VII. MARRIAGE
A. Concept and nature
1 Tolentino 217-221
1. Definition
FC 1
NCC 52
Article XV Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution
Art. II, Sec. 12, 14
Art. XV
2. Nature
FC 1
Muslim Code (MC) (PD. 1083) Sec. 14
Rule 131 Sec. 3; NCC 220
3. Breach of promise to marry
NCC 19- 21; NCC 2176
MC 22

Cabague v. Auxillo, 92 Phil. 294 November 26, 1952

The understanding between the plaintiffs on one side and the defendants on the other, really
involves two kinds of agreement. One, the agreement between Felipe Cabague and the
defendants in consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo. Another, the agreement
between the two lovers, as "a mutual promise to marry". For breach of that mutual promise to
marry, Geronimo may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and evidence of such mutual
promise is admissible. However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper, because it is to enforce
an agreement in consideration of marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias Auxilio
this action could not be maintained on the theory of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it
be regarded as action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual promise to marry."

Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471 February 8, 1916

Verbal agreements made upon the consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry, are not rendered invalid for not being in writing. The law only states that such
agreements cannot be proven in court if not in writing; however, since there was no objection to
the presentation of evidence to prove such verbal agreement, it is considered a waiver of the
provisions of law.

Hermosisima v CA 109 Phil 629

Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing apart from right to recover money or
property advanced upon faith of such promise. Damages can be claim if seduction was involved
though, in this case the dude being 10 years younger than the girl, seduction could not have been
present says the SC.

Wassmer v. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 December 26, 1964

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about
to be solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21.

Estremos v. Ephan, (CA) 83 OG 4022 No. 35

A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. The SC previously emphasized
that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that
would have it so.

11
The Supreme Court, however, laid down certain exceptions, as in the case of Wassmer v. Velez
(Dec. 26, 1964). Under Art. 21 of the Civil Code, the SC found that to formally set a wedding and
go through the preparation and publicity only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different [from a breach of promise to marry]. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages
in accordance with Art 21.

Tanjanco v. CA, 18 SCRA 994 December 17, 1966

In an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Baksh v. CA, G.R. 97326 Feb. 19, 1993

[T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love
by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the
Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code
because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.

4. Not subject to stipulation NCC 221

Panganiban v. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367 September 9, 1933

Although RPC allowed the offended party to give pardon to his or her offender spouse, this
doesnt mean that the purpose of the legislature is to legalize adultery and concubinage. A
notarized contract that permits concubinage and adultery is not judicially recognizable. Although
the consent of a party is a bar to the prosecution of the said crimes, the acts are still contrary to
customs, good morals and against the sanctity of marriage which is constitutionally provided for.

In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940

The contract(stating that the contracting parties, husband and wife, were authorized to marry
again and at the same time giving the authorization to renounce or waive each members right
against the party marrying) executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad
Colares upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and
acknowledged by him as a notary public is contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital
foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the preparation and
acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from
the practice of law.

Selanova v. Mendoza, 64 SCRA 69 May 19, 1975

12
A document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the spouses and licensing
either one of them to commit any act of infidelity is a void instrument because it contravenes the
provisions of Article 221 of the Civil Code declaring the nullity of contracts for the personal
separation of husband and wife and for extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership.

Lichauco-De Leon v. CA, 186 SCRA 345, June 6, 1990

Marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code
provides: Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations.

B. Requisites

Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849

The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while
the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.

1 Tolentino 222-269
1. Kinds of requisites, FC 2, 3, 5; cf. NCC 53
2. Kinds of non-compliance
3. Effect of non-compliance
4. Essential requisites
a. Legal capacity
(1) Gender, FC 2 (1)
(2) Age, FC 5; FC 35 (1); R.A. 6809, NCC 54 & 80 (1)
(3) Parental consent, FC 14; FC 45, NCC 61 & 85 (1)

Sison v. Te Jay Li (CA) 48 OG No. 9

Although as a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of consent which was
clearly manifested to determine its reality, the rule has been announced, however, that mere
words without any corresponding intention will not create the marriage relation, and that
notwithstanding the formalities indicating consent have been complied with, there not a valid
marriage where the parties do not intend to enter into the marriage. And while it is true that it is
the policy of the law to maintain the marriage ties, when it is amply proved that the marriage is
effected through duress and intimidation and without consent and against the will of one of the
parties, there are no ties to be preserved and the marriage should consequently be annulled.

b. Consent Freely Given

(1) mistake as to identity, FC 35 (5); NCC 86 (1)
(2) Insanity, FC 45 (2)
(3) Fraud FC, 45 (3); NCC 1338- 1344
(4) Force, intimidation and undue influence, FC 45 (4); NCC 1335- 1337
(5) Physical incapacity, FC 45 (5)
(6) Affliction with STD. FC 45 (6)
5. Formal Requisites
a. Authority of the solemnizing officer
1. who are authorized
FC 7, 10, 31 & 32
NCC 56, 74, 76
1991 Local Govt Code, Sec 444 (b) (1) (xviii)
455 (b) (1) (xviii)
2. how authorized
FC 7 (2)

13
 Villar v. Paraiso, 96 Phil 659 March 14, 1955
The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the
minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it informed of any change in his
religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially
so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the
law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). Registration must be made in the Bureau of
Public Libraries

Aranes v. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, April 11, 2002

Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

3. effect of absence of authority

FC 4; FC 35 (2)
b. Marriage Ceremony
1. Form, FC 3 (3); FC 6

Martinez v. Tan, 12 Phil. 731 February 5, 1909

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and
wife. The petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they
had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the
marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace,
stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that
witnesses of the marriage were produced.

2. Place FC 8, FC 28-29 FC 32-33

3. Marriage certificate, FC 6, FC 22

Madridejo v. Deleon, 55 Phil. 1 October 6, 1930

The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does
not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites
required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

Macua v Avenido, G.R. No. 173540, January 22, 2014

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a
persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

4. Duties of the solemnizing officer, FC 23- 24

5. Effect of irregularity, FC 4
c. Marriage license

(1) where to apply FC 9- 10

(2) requirements for issuance
a. Application, FC 11
b. Proof of capacity, FC 12-14, FC 21
c. Parental advice, FC 15
d. Marriage counseling FC 16
e. Publication FC 17
f. Investigation of impediments, FC 18
g. Payment of Fees FC 19
h. Family planning certificate, P.D. 965

14
 (3) Place where valid, FC 20
(4) Period of validity, FC 20
(5) Duties of the Civil Registrar, FC 24-25
(6) Marriages exempt from license requirement, FC 27-34

Abbas v. Abbas, G.R. No.: 183896, January 30, 2013

The reliance of Gloria on the marriage to prove that a marriage license existed is not sufficient in
light of the fact that Syed was able to present evidence to show that the marriage license number
stated in their marriage certificate was registered to another couple. Without the actual marriage
license to prove its existence, the Court held that the marriage was void for absence of a formal
requisite.

Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, March 8, 2001

Marriage Licenses; Husband and Wife; Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; Requisites.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other, 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time
of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at
least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing
officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.

Ninal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, March 14, 2000

(Art.34 of the Family Code now applies and a perfect 5-year cohabitation period is no longer
needed based on Uribes lecture.)

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have
lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only
about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in
fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid
under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.

C. Law Governing Validity

1 Tolentino 260- 263

1. General Rule on contracts

a. As to form, NCC 17
b. As to substantive requirements, NCC 15 & 17

2. Special rule in marriage

a. Lex Loci celebrationis, FC 26
b. Exceptions, FC 26 in relation to FC 35 (1), (4)(5), 36-38; NCC 71

D. Presumption of marriage - NCC 220, Rule 131 Sec. 3

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him
in 1923, the CA correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not
actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be
overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy.

15
Fiel v. Banawa, 76 O.G. 4 619
Philippine law does not recognize common-law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who co-habit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
In the Philippines, the property of such common-law relationships are governed by Art. 144 of
the Civil Code:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.

For Art. 144 to apply, two requisites must be satisfied:

1) The couple must not be incapacitated to contract marriage; and
2) That the properties must have been acquired through the work or industry of both or
either of them.

E. Void Marriages
1 Tolentino 270- 310
1. General rule, FC 4
2. Absence of requisites, FC 35, cf FC 234 (repealed by R.A. 68 09)
3. Bigamous and polygamous marriages FC 35 (4), 39, 40, 41, 44 RPC 349

People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 645 September 28, 1954

Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless: (a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; (b) The first
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without
the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null
and void by a competent court.This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage
contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until
declared null and void by a competent court.1wphl.nt

People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 February 28, 1957

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annullable marriages.

Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 May 30, 1983

Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of
the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that
she is the lawful surviving spouse of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the
correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased. The suit below is a proper
remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of
right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the
individual most affected, is a party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and
defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party defendant.

16
In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with
private respondent and that the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby
rendered false, it may be corrected. While documents, such as death and birth certificates, are
public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and
will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy.

Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 August 19, 1986

Marriage; Nullity of marriage; Proof that first marriage was vitiated by force, not necessary in an
action for a declaration of nullity of marriage filed by the second husband; Reason.There is no
need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85,
Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear
that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).

Introducing evidence about existing prior marriage, not necessary as the first marriage though
void, still needs a judicial declaration of such fact; Womans marriage to second husband void;
Case at bar.There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage
of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 April 15, 1988

Prejudicial Question; Nature and concept of a prejudicial question.A prejudicial question has
been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the
issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and
a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.

Requisites of a prejudicial question, not present in case at bar; Issue of nullity of the second
marriage filed by the second wife before the juvenile court is not determinative of the husbands
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy.The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain
in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donatos guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioners second wife,
the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the
second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner husband has not shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by
the use of threats, force and intimidation.ln the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently
shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and
intimidation.

The rule on prejudicial questions cannot apply since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that petitioners consent to the marriage was obtained by duress, violence and intimidation.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the
rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioners consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation

17
in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such
the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at
bar.

Petitioner husband merely raised in case at bar the issue of prejudicial question to evade the
prosecution of the criminal case against him,Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of
prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to
petitioners second marriage on September 26,1978, he had been living with private respondent
Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioners averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belied by the
fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had
lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years. One month and one
day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was
private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Terre v. Terre, 211 SCRA 6 July 3, 1992

Marriage contracted in good faith with woman already married is valid. Hence, contracting a
subsequent marriage with another woman would be bigamous.Even if we were to assume,
arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will
follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant
Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

Republic vs. Cantor

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-
founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. The burden of proof rests on the present
spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is
the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts
the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with him/her. He who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

4. Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of absent spouse

FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44
NCC 390 391, FC 55 (9), FC 101

Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 March 6, 1937

The Court held that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven
consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his
or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the
spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

In re Szatrow, 49 OG 243
In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner
against her absent husband. Neither is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or
status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact for the petition does not pray for a declaration
that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years.

This declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because
such a presumption is already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if
final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for

18
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

The disputable presumption established by the rule of evidence that a person not heard from in
seven years is dead, may arise and be invoked and made in a case, either in an action or in a
special proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot be
invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special proceeding.

5. Bad faith of both spouses under FC 44

6. Psychological incapacity
FC 36, cf FC 68- 73
Sempio-Dy, Major Changes Introduced by the Family Code Appendix A.
Cases under Canon Laws

Republic v. CA and Molina, 240 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997

The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological not physical. Although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained.
Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood

19
 changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect
by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee
from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Choa v.Choa, 392 SCRA 641, November 26, 2002

A medical examination is not a condition sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so
long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity adequately. Here,
however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological
examination.

Barcelona v. Court of Appeals and Tadeo R. Bengzon, September 24, 2003

A petition for nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity should specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from
complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of
marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need
not be alleged.

20
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, 428 SCRA 735, May 20, 2004
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness.We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other
evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly
helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his
illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.

As ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness.We must remember that abandonment is also a
ground for legal separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance
of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from
the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis
of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms for determining psychological
incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine
psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.

Republic v. Encelan, G.R. No. 170022, January 9, 2013

Sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from
discharging the essential marital obligations

7. Incestuous marriage
FC 37 cf NCC 963 967
8. Marriages against public policy
FC 38; Compare FC 38 (9) with NCC 80 (6)

21
 NCC 80(7), 82
Cf. NCC 963-967
9. Non compliance under FC 53
10. Effect of nullity
FC 50-54; FC 40, compare with NCC rule
FC 237
RA 6809
FC 147- 140

Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489 June 9, 1969

There are two doctrines in this case.
1. The presumption of marriage - When a man and woman lives together as husband and
wife, the presumption is they are married. Thus follow the rule on CPG (see date of
marriage)
2. Since this case involves a bigamous marriage, meaning there is impediment to marry
each other, then follow the rule on Co-ownership. Thus, there is a need to show actual
contribution.

"When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership." But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship
envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by conditions, the existence of which must first be
shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One such condition is that
there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to
the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established,
petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or
title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the
existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting. Injunction
indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract
right. At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better
safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded
administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to the control of the
probate court. Having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal
partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina
Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.

11. Who can invoke nullity - FC 39

Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured
party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior
spouse is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial
and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognise
a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment
to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013

In this case, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.

12. Prescription

22
 FC 39; FC 36 par. 2 in relation to FC 255; FC 42, par. 2,
FC 237, for minors
13. Procedure in action for declaration of Nullity.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages

Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014

The entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she
was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims
that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into
such contract. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108
were complied with. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document
examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies
and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject
marriage certificate was different from respondents signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards.The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondents signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged.
Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

(a) Requisite for valid remarriage FC 40

Wiegel v. Sempio- Diy, supra

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed
against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely
viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. There is likewise no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact.

Terre v. Terre, supra

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In
the first place, respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which
underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to
Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly
first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument
ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely,
that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we
are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre
must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

Morigo v. People, 422 SCRA 376, February 6, 2004

FC - A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining
such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as void. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was
performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone,
without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner
might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he
contracts a subsequent marriage.

23
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 272, February 18, 2004
[T]he declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
is not an indicator that petitioner's marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
(legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the
solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code,
any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. In this case, all the essential and formal
requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the
presence of at least two witnesses.

Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum
between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal
effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written
into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to
thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. It is a settled
rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.

People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013

Bigamy; Elements of.An examination of the information filed against respondent, however,
shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained
all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: (1)
That the offender has been legally married; (2) That the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistance of the first marriage.
(Montaez vs. Cipriano, 684 SCRA 315 [2012])

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary,
"shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to

24
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued
by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls
under Section 3 of Article 35 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or
fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning." Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and
void ab initio and non-existent.

(b) Support and custody pendente lite FC 49.

(c) Safeguards against collusion FC 48.
(d) No confession of judgment FC 48; cf NCC 2035

Jocson v. Robles, 22 SCRA 521 February 10, 1968

A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the
absent spouse has already dead.

Tolentino v. Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1 March 15, 1974

Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a
decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or
by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the parties exists, and
if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence
for the plaintiff

F. Voidable Marriages:

1 Tolentino 270 310

1. Void v. Voidable marriages FC 4 cf. 45

2. Grounds for annulment
a. Absence of parental consent FC 45 (1), 47 (1); RA. 6809
b. Insanity FC 45 (2), 47 (2)
c. Fraud; FC 45 (3), 46, 47 (3), NCC 1338- 1344

Buccat v. Buccat, 72 Phil. 19

VALIDEZ.-Marriage is a very sacred institution is the foundation upon which the society. To
unselect, they are necessary to clear and convincing evidence. In this case there are no such
evidence.

There is no fraud. It is unlikely that the plaintiff Godofredo had not suspected anything about
Luidas condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy. As she gave birth
less than 3 months after they got married, she must have looked very pregnant even before they
were married. Since Godofredo must have known that she was not a virgin, the marriage cannot
be annulled.

Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil. 19.

The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At
this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent especially since she was
naturally plump. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the womans
abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent.

Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97

25
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit
as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest
such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her
consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was
solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to
the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.

d. Force, intimidation and undue influence

FC 45 (4) 47, (4) NCC 1335- 1337,
RPC 344 Last paragraph

Sison v. Te Lay Li, supra.

While a marriage effected by force or intimidation may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation,
such cohabitation must be voluntary and must be something more than merely living together in
the same house or even occupying the same bed, but is the living together of the parties as
husband and wife, and including sexual relations.

Ruiz v. Atienza, (CA) 40 OG 1903

The Marriage Law (sec 30, Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force"or "violence", does not seem to
include mere intimidation, at least where it does not in legal effectamount to force or violence.
(See article 1267, Civil Code.)

People v. Santiago, supra

e. Impotence, FC 45 (5), 47 (5)

Sarao v. Guevara, (CA) 40 OG 1st supp. 263

It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In
this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported
by the opinion of the doctor that the existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily
render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her uterus and ovaries
rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendants
sterility cannot be a ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground for
annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.

Jimenez v. Canizares, 109 Phil. 273 August 31, 1960

Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part,
yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise
or be inferred, because women of this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not
submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority.

This the Court may do without doing violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A
physical examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense.
She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. "Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed.

The presumption is in favor of potency." The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is
physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.

f. Affliction with STD

FC 45 (6), compare with FC 46 (3)
3. Who can seek annulment, FC 47
4. Prescription, FC 47

26
 5. Procedure in annulment
a. support and custody pendente lite FC 49
b. safeguards against collusion FC 48
c. no confession of judgment FC 48; cf NCC 2035

Jocson v. Robles, supra

On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion
for summary judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for
summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.

Tolentino v. Villanueva, supra

6. Effects of annulment FC 49-54, FC 237 for minors; RA 6809

7. Marriage when one spouse is absent
FC. 41 44, compare with NCC 83, 85 (2) and 87 (2)
cf. RPC 349

Jones v. Hortiguela, supra

Lukban v. Republic, 98 Phil 574 February 29, 1956

Lukban does not need to secure a judicial declaration of presumptive death of her husband
because the Civil Code and not the Family Code governs their marriage which was celebrated in
1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that each former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Gue v. Republic, 107 Phil. 381 March 24, 1960

PERSON UNHEARD FROM IN SEVEN YEARS; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH
UNNECESSARY.A judicial declaration that a person unheard from in seven years; being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proofs, cannot reach the state of finality or
become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact
finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had
not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption ,is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of not benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act (Petition for the
Presumption of death of Nicolai Szatraw, 81 Phil., 461).

8. Marriage dissolved abroad, FC 26, DOJ Opinions,

Cases under NCC 15

9. Illegal Marriages
FC 4; FC 16
NCC 84
RPC 351-352

People v. Masinsin, (CA) 49 OG 3909

If the widow contracts the marriage in good faith in the belief that her husband was permanently
impotent or sterile, there is no liability.

27
VIII. LEGAL SEPARATION AND DIVORCE
1 Tolentino 311 337
A. Concept and Historical Background

Benedicto v. Dela Rama 3 Phil. 34

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; SUSPENSION OF BOOK 1 OF THE CIVIL CODE.Titles 4 and
12 of book 1 of the Civil Code, which deal respectively with matrimony and the register of civil
status, are not in force, they having been suspended by order of the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands shortly after the extension of the Civil Code to this Archipelago.

SUSPENSION OF LAWS; POWER OF SPANISH GOVERNOR-GENERAL.It Was within the

power of the governor-general of the Philippine Islands, under the Spanish regime, to suspend
the operation of a general law, such as the Civil Code.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; LAW OF 1870 NOT OPERATIVE IN PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

The Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 was never extended to the Philippine Islands, with the
exception of articles 44 to 78 thereof, which were promulgated in the Archipelago in 1883.

CANON LAW; COUNCIL OF TRENT.The canon law had no binding force outside of the
church except as to such parts thereof as by the action of the civil authorities became part of the
civil law of Spain. The decrees of the council of Trent have the force of law in Spain and
determine the requisites, form, and solemnities for the celebration of canonical marriage.
Although the decrees of the council of Trent authorize the separation by the church of husband
and wife they do not state what the causes of such separation are, and the laws of the church
which do so state the causes have not the force of civil law.

1. Distinguished from separation in fact, cf FC 238-248

2. Agreement to separate, cf NCC 221 (1)

Albano v. Gapusan 71 SCRA 26

There is no question that the covenants contained in the said separation agreement are contrary
to law, morals and good customs. Those stipulations undermine the institutions of marriage and
the family. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. The family is a
basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Marriage and the family are
the bases of human society throughout the civilized world. To preserve the institutions of
marriage and the family, the law considers as void any contract for personal separation between
husband and wife and every extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership. Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the extrajudicial
dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction was void.

In re Atty. Rufillo Bucana 72 SCRA 14

The Agreement (which in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband
and the wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with
another man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to
commit bigamy) is contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the
foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither civilization nor
progress.

3. Distinguished from absolute divorce

a. Divorce decreed abroad, FC 26

Tenchaves v. Escano, supra

28
Van Dorn v. Rommillo, supra
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.

Pilapil v. Somera, supra

Garcia-Recio v. Garcia, 366 SCRA 437, October 2, 2001

Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.

b. Muslim divorce MC 45-55

B. Grounds for legal Separation

FC 55, compare with NCC 97
1. Sexual infidelity or perversion
FC 55 (8) compare with NCC 97 (1)
RPC 333 and 334

Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 242

The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate maintenance when he has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to
furnish support the option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving and
maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the same.

People v. Zapanta, 88 Phil. 688

ADULTERY EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME. Adultery is a crime of result and not
of tendency, as the Supreme Courts of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an
instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the
carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho
Penal, Vol. II, p. 569).

LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS
ACTS. True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the
same person the offended husband, the same status the union of the husband and wife by
their marriage, and the same community presented by the State for its interest in maintaining
and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not
argue against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts
consummated, for as long as the status remains unchanged, the nexus undissolved, an
encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal
provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.

JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED; REASON. A second complaint charging the commission
of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double
jeopardy clause of the Constitution, otherwise the adultery by the made defendant charged in the
second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence
that he did not know that his codefendant was married woman, would remain or go unpunished.
The defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer
be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint,

29
he already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her.

ADULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE OF UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR

PURPOSE. The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction
favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; unity of appeal provision infringed upon violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision
are united ion one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose
or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In adultery, the last unity does not exist, because the culprits perpetrate the
crime in every sexual intercourse and they not do another or other adulterous acts to
consummate it.

PARDON BY HUSBAND. Even if the husband pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would
not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after
the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent,
adulterous act.

Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725

A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction
is necessary.
It is not mere sexual infidelity that constitutes the ground for legal separation. Such infidelity
must constitute adultery or concubinage as defined by the Revised Penal Code.

2. Drug addiction habitat alcoholism, lesbianism or

homosexuality, FC 55(5) compare with FC 46 (4)

3. Attempt on the life of the other spouse

FC 55 (9) compare with NCC 97 (2)

Munoz v Barrios, (CA) 51 OG 5247

An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an intention
to kill the person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful examination of the
evidence produced by appellant we cannot make up our mind to declare that the alleged
maltreatments of respondent to his wife were moved by such intent to kill. On the contrary, we
share the opinion of the trial judge who declared that said maltreatments cannot constitute
attempts on the life of appellant as provided in Article 97, No.2, of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

C. Who can ask for legal separation?

FC 55, compare with NCC 99-100
D. When may petition be filed?
FC 57, compare with NCC 102, NCC 99

Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222 May 29, 1970

The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after
the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence
of the cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social
institution so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its
status.

Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 January 31, 1972

An action for legal separation is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop
or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being

30
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.

Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil. 709 October 25, 1960

While defendant's act of cohabiting with a woman other than his wife constituted concubinage, a
ground for legal separation, nevertheless, the complaint should be dismissed, because it was not
filed within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred (Art. 102, new Civil
Code).

The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse,
provided the latter has not condoned or consented to the adultery or concubinage committed by
the other spouse (Art. 100, new Civil Code; and plaintiff (innocent spouse) having condoned
and/or consented in writing to the concubinage committed by the defendant husband, she is now
underserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. Such acts
necessary implied forgiveness. A single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent
spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially
as against the husband.

E. Effect of pungency of the petition

1. Right of consortium, FC 61 par. 1
2. Administration of property, FC 61, par. 2.
3. Support and custody pendente lite, FC 62 cf. FC 49; FC 198

Yangco v. Rohde, 1 Phil. 404 October 13, 1902

The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where the existence of the
status is put in issue by the pleading it can not be presumed to exist for the purpose of granting
alimony.

4. Cooling-off period FC 58

De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13 July 31, 1920

It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband. This rule
is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the
wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it
ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But the authorities are unanimous in
holding that this is not an absolute rule.

Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of her husband where
the theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of
the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband
or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a
forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile.

Furthermore, the SC ruled that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband,
in which the partition of the conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a
preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the latter from alienating or
encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.

Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709 July 31, 1956

"COOLING OFF" PERIOD; PURPOSE OF; CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ALIMONY AND
SUPPORT "PENDENTE LITE" MAY BE DETERMINED DURING THE SIX-MONTH
PERIOD.Article 103 of the Civil Code provides that "an action for legal separation shall in no

31
case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition." The period of
six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible a
reconciliation between the spouses. But this practical expedient does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony
and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law
expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, 46 SCRA 110 July 29, 1972

Ancillary remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction is not barred by the six-month statutory
suspension of trial in action for legal separation.The court where an action for legal separation
is pending according to Article 103 of the Civil Code is to remain passive. It must let the parties
alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for
the view that an ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not be
acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such
codal provision. That the law, however, remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial
power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in Article 104 of the Code. Here there
would appear to be a recognition that the question of management of the spouses respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may
even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under Article 103 is thereby eased. The parties may in
the meanwhile be heard.

Lerma v. CA., 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is,
support of the wife by the husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to
be taken from the conjugal partnership property. We do not see that the distinction is material in
this case. In the first place Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal right to receive
support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall
be taken from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It
does not preclude the loss of such right in certain cases. In the second place, the said article
contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a prima facie showing
that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof
will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61,
supra, which requires, among other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the
court determine provisionally "the probable outcome of the case."

F. Defenses
1. Consent; FC 56 (2), NCC 100

Matubis v. Praxedes, supra

People v. Sansano, 58 Phil. 73

The husband abandoned his wife who later live with another man. After serving her sentence for
adultery, the husband did not take her back and told her to live however she wanted to live. The
husband later on lived in Hawaii and returned after 7 years to file an action for legal separation
on the ground of adultery. The husbands conduct warranted the inference that he had consented
to the philandering of his wife.

People v. Schneckenberger, 73 Phil. 413 November 10, 1941

Prior Consent; Pardon.The document executed by and between the accused and the
complainant in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accin en cualquier acto y en
todos conceptos", while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless
a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the
illicit acts of the other.

32
It was said before (People vs. Guinucod), 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended
party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly
after the crime has been committed. This is a narrow view in no way warranted by the language,
as well as the manifest policy, of the law.

The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides: "The offended party
cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." As the term
"pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been
intended, agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No
logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both
instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor; he/she becomes
unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a
husband who delivers his wife to another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where,
upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. Held:
That prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from
prosecuting the offense.

2. Condonation; FC 56 (1)

Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 December 28, 1956

The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party,
after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured
party of its commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation; but this presumption
may be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73)

Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation (27 C. J. S., section 6-d).

3. Recrimination; FC 56 (4)

Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168 October 18, 1957

Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual
consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in
pursuance of agreement, to defend divorce proceedings

4. Collusion
FC 60
FC 56 (3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 231 (3)

Brown v. Yambao, supra

Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35 February 23, 1960

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT; EXISTENCE OF EVIDENCE OF ADULTERY
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONFESSION. - Where there is evidence of the adultery independently
of the defendants statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted, since it would not be based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by the
plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively on defendants confession.

ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSION MADE OUTSIDE OF COURT. - Article 101 of the new Civil
Code does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of
the court.

COLLUSION MAY NOT BE INFERRED FROM CONFESSION. - Collusion may not be inferred
from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery, desires the divorce
and makes no defense.

33
CONDONATION; FAILURE OF HUSBAND TO SEARCH FOR ERRING WIFE. - In the case at
bar, the wife left her husband after the latter discovered her dates with other men. Held: The
failure of the husband actively to search for his wife and take her home does not constitute
condonation or consent to the adultery. It was not his duty to search for her.

5. Prescription

cf. Brown v. Yambao, supra

The appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation
proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release
from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can
not be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred.

G. Court Procedure
FC 58-60
H. Effect of Decree of Legal Separation

1. Personal relations, FC 61, 63

2. Custody of children
FC 63 (3); FC 213
NCC 106 (3)
P.D. 603 (CYWC) Art. 17 par. 3

Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil. 340 May 30, 1956

CUSTODY OP MlNOR CHILDREN; GlVEN TO WIFE BY HUSBAND'S PERMISSION; ITS
EFFECT.Since petitioner merely obtained the husband's permission to bring the minor
children to Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather,
petitioner obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. She
holds it in the name, on behalf and by authority of husband, whose agent she, in effect, is. He
may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with
such demand. She cannot even question his authority to make it, although she is free to seek a
review of the order or decision awarding the custody of minors to him, and to ask that they be
placed under her charge
.
3. Property relations; FC 63 (2), FC 64
4. Support, FC 198
5. Use of surname; NCC 370-372

Laperal v. Republic, 116 Phil 672

The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the legal separation has been
decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This
is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the wife should continue to use the name
indicative of her unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.

6. Right to inherit - FC 63 (4)

7. Cost of litigation - FC 94 (10; FC 121 (9)

I. Reconciliation
1. How done, FC 65
2. Effects reconciliation, FC 66-67

IX. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES

1 Tolentino 338-355

A. Obligation to live together

34
 FC 68; FC 72; RPC 11(2); RPC 247

Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng, 103 Phil. 255 March 29, 1958
WHERE WIFE ESTABLISHES RESIDENCE APART FROM THAT PROVIDED BY
HUSBAND.Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and assistance (Art. 109) and that the wife is entitled
to be supported, our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her husband
where even without legal justification she establishes her residence apart from that provided for
by the former, yet and in Such event there is no plausible reason why she should be allowed any
support from the husband.

Goitia v. Campos Rueda, supra

Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54 August 11, 1921

It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. The court can only admonish the wife in its decision.

Ramirez-Cuaderno v. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505 November 28, 1964

The court CANNOT impose on the Husband and wife to live together EVEN if this is an
obligation under the NCC (even now in FC) to live together.

Family Domicile

1. General rule: jointly

FC 69 par. 1, compare with NCC 110

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

Mere absence from one's residence or origin-domicile-to pursue studies, engage in business, or
practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence.' ...
The determination of a persons legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which
may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The party who claims that a person has
abandoned or left his residence or origin must show and prove pre-ponderantly such
abandonment or loss.

2. Exemption, FC 69 par. 2

C. Management and Family Support

FC 70-71

D. Exercise of Profession
FC 73, compare with NCC 117
Art. II sec. 14, and Art. XIII Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
cf. NCC 113.

X. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE

A. What made; governs marriage settlements

1. When made; modifications
FC 1; FC 76

(Modifications after marriage)

FC 66, 67, 128, 135, 136

2. Form of MS; registration requirement

FC 77
3. Celebration of marriage
FC 81

35
 4. Who may enter into MS?
a. Minor, FC 78
b. Persons under civil interdiction
c. Incapacitated persons
FC 79, in rel. to NCC 38-39
B. Which law governs property relations?

1. Stipulation in marriage settlements

FC 81
2. If both Filipinos
3. Mixed marriage between Filipino and alien
4. If both aliens
5. Property located outside RP
FC 80 (2) and (3) in rel. to NCC 16
FC (3) in rel. to NCC 17
C. Donations propter nuptias
1. Definition, FC 82

2. Who may be donors?

3. What may be donated by the spouses?

a. Present property FC 84
b. Future property
FC 84; NCC 761
c. Encumbered property
FC 85
d. Donations in the marriage settlements
FC 81
4. Void donations by the spouses
FC 87
a. Donations during the marriage
b. Donations in common law marriages

Matabuena v. Cervantes 38 SCRA 284

While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the
marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality
require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the
old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of
the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al
otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I,
De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy
to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be
doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would
not be just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law,
reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise
attach to concubinage.

c. Exceptions
5. Revocation of donations propter nuptias; FC 86
a. Revocation by donors, FC 86; NCC 765

36
b. By operation of law, FC 43; 44; 81
D. Absolute community of property (ACP)

1. When applicable, FC 75

2. Commencement, FC 88
3. Waiver during marriage, FC 89
4. Waiver after marriage, FC 89 par. 2
5. Suppletory Rules: co-ownership, FC 90; have NCC 484-501
6. What constitutes ACT, FC 91?

a. All property at time of marriage

b. Property acquired subsequently
c. Winnings from gambling, FC as of NCC 164
d. Presumption of ACP, FC 93 of NCC 160
7. What is excluded from ACP, FC 92; FC 197: FC 95

Spouses Abrenica V. Law Firm of Abrenica, G.R. No. 180572, June 18, 2012
Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as
well as the house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of the absolute community
regime. However, Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the community property the
property acquired before the marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that property. Neither these two vehicles nor
the house and lot belong to the second marriage.

8. Charges of ACP, FC 94

a. Family expenses of FC 100 (3)

b. Debts of spouses
c. Subsidiary liabilities
d. Sole obligations of a spouse
e. Gambling losses, FC 95

9. Ownership, FC 90, FC 96 in rel. to NCC 206

10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP
a. Joint administration, FC 96; FC 90; NCC 486; NCC 491
b. Sole administration
(1) Incapacity FC 96
(2) Separation in fact FC 100 (3)
(3) Abandonment, FC 101
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61

c. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 96-98

11. Effect of separation de facto, FC 100, of FC 239
12. Effect of abandonment, FC 101; FC 72
13. Dissolution of ACP, FC 99
a. Death, FC 103
b. Legal separation, FC 63 (2); FC 66
c. Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
d. Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
14. Effects of dissolution
a. Liquidation procedure, FC 102
b. For cause other than death, FC 43 (2); FC 63 (2)
c. Termination due to death, FC 104
15. For marriages before FC, FC 104

37
Delizo v. Delizo, 69 SCRA 216
(Sorry mahaba, pero this is a long case and importante yung figures, I just pasted yung sinabi ng
SC and yung pertinent provisions in the NCC, compare that with FC 104. Basically this case
illustrates how FC 104 is applied - Kikoy)

The total mass of the properties should be divided between the conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each partnership. Therefore the second conjugal partnership is
entitled to 46/64 of the total mass of properties and the second conjugal partnership is entitled to
18/64. The share of the estate of Nicolas Delizo is pro indiviso of the net remainder of the
conjugal partnership gains of the first and second marriages which is equivalent to of the
whole estate. This will be distributed equally to his children of both marriages and his widow will
have a share equivalent to one child. Additionally, De Ocampo is also entitled to of the net
remainder of the second conjugal partnership and Villasfers share is equivalent to of the net
remainder of the first conjugal partnership therefore these would amount to 23/64 and 9/64
respectively.

Computation of Sharing:
(Whole Estate 64/64)
Share of Rosa Villasfer = 9/64 to be divided among three children
Share of Each Child of 1st marriage (3 children) = 9/64 +1/26 = 142/1664
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo = 23/64 +1/26 = 662/1664
Share of Each Child of 2nd marriage (9 children) = 1/26 = 64/1664
Whole Estate = 32/64 + 13/26 = 1664/1664

APPLICABLE LAW AND RATIONALE:

Article 189. Whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more marriages contracted by
the same person should be carried out at the same time, in order to determine the capital of each
partnership all kinds of proof in the absence of inventories shall be admitted; and in case of
doubt, the partnership property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion
to the duration of each and to the property belonging to the respective spouses.

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry,
and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

Article 185. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership of gains shall be divided equally
between the husband and the wife or their respective heirs, unless a different basis of division
was agreed upon in the marriage settlements.

Article 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.

Article 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants
and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or
widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child

16. Support during ACP liquidation

E. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Ballados v. CA, November 19, 1990

Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 333 February 16, 1989

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife (Art. 160, Civil Code).

Registration of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it
being conjugal. And there are cases where there was proof that the properties, though registered

38
in the name of only one spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired
during the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the adverse party
having presented proof to rebut the presumption.

Ansaldo v. Sheriff, 64 Phil. 115

PROPERTY RlGHTS; CONJUGAL PROPERTY; WHAT IS.The fruits of the paraphernal
property form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership.

LIABLE FOR WHAT DEBTS.The fruits of the paraphernal property which form part of the
assets of the conjugal partnership, are subject to the payment of the debts and expenses of the
spouses, but not to the payment of the personal obligations of the husband, unless it be proved
that such obligations were productive of some benefit to the family. (Civil Code, arts. 1385, 1386.)

WHEN RIGHT TO SHARE IN CONJUGAL PROPERTY VESTS.The right of the husband or

wife to one-half of the property of the conjugal partnership does not vest until the dissolution of
the marriage, when the conjugal partnership is also dissolved.

ESTOPPEL.In the enforcement of a judgment against the husband, the judgment creditor, who
caused to have certain amounts belonging to the joint bank accounts of the spouses levied on
execution, can not be said to have been intentionally and deliberately led to believe that said
amounts were conjugal property subject to all debts and obligations of the husband, only because
the spouses failed to allege that said amounts were the exclusive property of the wife, when, as a
matter of fact, they claimed that, while said amounts form part of the assets of their conjugal
partnership, they could not be levied upon, because they were not subject to the payment of the
personal obligations of the husband.

Castro v. Miat, 397 SCRA 271, February 11, 2003

Where the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of the
New Civil Code apply.Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the
Family Code, the provisions of the New Civil Code apply. Article 153(1) of the New Civil Code
provides as follows: The following are conjugal partnership property: (1) Those acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; x x x. The records show that the Paco
property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly
conjugal property.

Art. 160 of the New Civil Code, which provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, does not require proof that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnershipthe presumption applies even when the manner in which the property
was acquired does not appear.Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does
not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.

1. When CPG commences and applies

a. Marriages under FC, FC 107 of FC 88
b. Marriages before FC, FC 105 (2) of FC 256
c. When applicable, FC 105 of FC 74-74
d. Suppletory rules, FC 108

PNB v. Quintos, 46 Phil. 370

The conjugal partnership is liable for obligations contracted during marriage, and in default of
conjugal property, the spouses are jointly liable therefor with their private properties, unless by
express stipulation, they shall have bound themselves solidarily

2. What is excluded from CPG?

a. Brought as exclusive property, FC 109 (1)

39
Laperal v. Katigbak 10 SCRA 493
There is no denying that all properties acquired during the marriage are, by law, presumed
conjugal. (Art. 160, Civil Code) The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, for the same law is un equivocal that it exists only "unless it be proved that it (the
property) belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife." And, examining the records and
evidence in this suit, We hold that this is a case where the presumption has been sufficiently and
convincingly disproven.

Barciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53

Retirement premium forms part of conjugal estate, absent proof to contrary.As to the
retirement premiums totaling P9,700.00, the same is presumed conjugal property, there being no
proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article 160,
New Civil Code). Such being the case, one-half of the amount belongs to the wife as her property
in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased Judge which
shall in turn be distributed to his legal heirs.

b. Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage FC 109 (2) of FC 113; FC 115

Veloso v. Martinez, 28 Phil. 255

PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY RlGHT OF WlFE TO RECOVER WHEN SOLD BY HUSBAND
WITHOUT HER CONSENT.V claimed that he had purchased certain jewels from F. M, the
wife of F, claimed that such jewels were her sole and separate property, acquired from her
mother; that as such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over them; that she had the
exclusive control and management of the same; that they had not been delivered to her husband
to be administered or controlled by him; that, inasmuch as they had not been delivered to her
husband to be administered by him, she could not be deprived of them by any act of his, without
her consent, and without a compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code. (Arts. 1382, 1384.)
Held: That M was entitled to recover from V the possession of said jewels.

c. Acquired by redemption, FC 109 (3)

Plata v. Yatco 12 SCRA 716

The subsequent conveyance of paraphernal property does not transform it from paraphernal to
conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid came from common or conjugal
funds.

Lim v. Garcia, 7 Phil. 320

One claiming that certain property is the separate estate of the husband, brought by him to his
marriage, must establish that fact by evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption
established in article 1407 of the Civil Code that all the property of the spouses is conjugal
partnership property (bienes gananciales).

d. Purchased with exclusive money, FC 109 (4) of FC 118-119

3. Administration of exclusive property

a. By the spouse-owner, FC 110

b. By the other spouse, FC 110 2nd par. FC 142, FC 75

Veloso v. Martinez, supra

Manotok Realty v. CA, 149 SCRA 372

The Court concluded that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is
void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such
being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company
or the probate court.

40
 4. Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive property FC 111- 112, of FC 236,
Amended by RA 6809

Palanca v. Smith-Bell, 9 Phil. 131

When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property belonging to his wife, with the consent of
the latter, the money becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are invested in the construction
of a house the building is likewise conjugal property and is liable for the debts of the husband.

Lim Queco v. Cartagena, 71 Phil. 163

The wife alone borrowed the money from "El Ahorro Insular" although she guaranteed
repayment with a mortgage on her parapherna executed with her husband's consent. Since the
wife does not have the management or representation of the conjugal partnership where the
husband is qualified therefor, the loan to her constituted a transaction that did not involve the
community, and the creditor could seek repayment exclusively from her properties. Logically, as
this Court then held, the money loaned to the wife, as well as the property acquired thereby,
should be deemed to be the wife's exclusive property.

5. What constitutes CPG?

a. Definition, FC 106
b. Presumption of CPG, FC 116

Torela v. Torela, 93 SCRA 391

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was
acquired during the marriages.While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to
be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for
the application of the presumption.

Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first prove that the same was
acquired during the marriages.While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to
be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes the presumption must first prove
that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua non for
the application of the presumption.

PNB v. CA, 158 SCRA 435

When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata
Montemayor, widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage
loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted
and registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of
Donata Montemaor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and
no more. On its face the properties owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no
reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof.
Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.

The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land gas a
right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispose with the need if
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160: All
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The presumption applies to property
acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the
title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow.
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. The PNB had no reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the

41
properties mortgaged. For all legal purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time
the mortgage covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the
title of the mortgagor.

At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions,
however, they are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties
thereto. The PNB not being a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear
that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage
loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have
approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without
requiring the consent of all other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were
sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is
beyond question.

Magallon v. Montejo, 146 SCRA 252

(Another long case, basically yung doctrine is, if the land is acquired through fraud the
presumption that it is part of the CPG is not applicable. Another doctrine is that the phrase
Married to_______ is merely descriptive of the civil status of the owner. - Kikoy)

From the averments of the petition, it is evident that the petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on
the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named
therein, Martin Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on the certificate of title has been
established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not
procured through fraud. Moreover, on the authority of Litam vs. Rivera 17 and Stuart vs. Yatco,
18 the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said
certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin Lacerna, the registered owner,
and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner
hereyn. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the Civil
Code that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being
no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin Lacerna except that which arises by implication from
the aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the
homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's
marriage to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents. The ruling in Maramba vs.
Lozano 19 that the presumption does not operate where there is no showing as to when property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired applies with even greater force here.

Cuenca v. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife," In the cases of Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, (153 SCRA 435
[August 31, 1987); Magallon v. Montejo (146 SCRA 282 [December 16, 1986]) and Maramba v.
Lozano (20 SCRA 474 [June 29, 1967]) this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the
property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when
property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.

In the case at bar, the documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not
show that the claims to the subject parcels consisting of homestead lands were perfected during
the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre. The perfection of the
homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. (See Magallon v.
Montejo, supra) The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino Cuenca and approved
during the marriage of Agripino Cuenca and petitioner Engracia Basadre is not determinative of
the issue as to whether or not the parcels were the conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.
Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels covered by the documents are titled in the
name of either respondent Meladora Cuenca or respondent Restituto Cuenca. The presumption
cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third
parties are involved. (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra citing Nable Jose v.

42
Nable Jose, 41 Phil. 713) Under the circumstances of this case, the non-applicablility of the
presumption should also be upheld.

Dela Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, February 8, 2012

Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife. Although it is not necessary to prove that the property was acquired
with funds of the partnership, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.

Andrade v. Tan, G.R. No. 171904 and 172017, August 7, 2013

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.Pertinent to the resolution of
this second issue is Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that [a]ll property of the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife. For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must,
however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held
in Go v. Yamane, 489 SCRA 107 (2006): x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of
[Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. In other words, the presumption
in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be
conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear,
categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one
of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.

c. What are included in CPG FC 117

Zulueta v. Pan AM, SCRA 1

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiffs contract of carriage with defendant, for
which plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said
damages, therere fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous
title during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the
provisions of Article 148 NCC or other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I
NCC, which chapter is entitled Paraphernal Property. What is more if that which is acquired
by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses
and that which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband: belonging
exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which is acquired with money of
conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof.

Mendoza v. Reyes, 124 SCRA 154 (1988)

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who
contends that the disputed property is paraphernal.

d. If property bought by installments FC 118

(Under NCC: Castillo v. Pasco, 11 SCRA 102)

It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in 1932,
the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or
separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article
1396 of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.
On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:

1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only.

43
The last clause in Article 1401 (par. 1) indicates that the circumstance of the sale of the fishpond
in question being made by the original owners in favor of both spouses, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. and
Macaria Pasco, is indifferent for the determination of whether the property should be deemed
paraphernal or conjugal.

e. Credit due, FC 119

f. Improvements on CPG property

Calimlim v. Fortun 129 SCRA 675 (1984)

Article 158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to
one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed
to the spouse who owns the same.

The Court held that both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land. The spouse owning the
lot becomes a creditor of the conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value would be
reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.

The conversion from paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to retroact to the time the
conjugal buildings were first constructed thereon. The acquisition by the partnership of these
properties was subject to the suspensive condition that their values would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the effects of the fulfillment of the condition
should be deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil
Code)

Maramba v. Lozano, 20 SCRA 474

It has been held by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the
exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.

It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may use both the land and the building,
but it does so not is owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct.

The ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment
can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership

6. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121

a. With consent

Javier v. Osmena, 34 Phil. 336

Inasmuch as "the fruits, revenue, or interest collected or accrued during the marriage coming
from the partnership property, or from that which belongs to either one of the spouses," is
community property, according to article 1401; and, further, as the law expressly provides that
"the fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, and
are liable for the payment of the marriage expenses" (art. 1385), hence it follows that the creditor
of the husband may bring his action, not against the paraphernal property, but against the fruits
and revenues of this private property of the wife.

This conclusion is not barred by the provision of article 1386, to wit, that "the personal obligation
of the husband cannot be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal property unless it be proven
that they were incurred for the benefit of the family." It is chiefly upon this article that appellee's
whole brief is based.

Vda. De Sta. Romana v. PCIB, 118 SCRA 330

Conjugal Partnership; Unpaid purchase price of lot bought by the deceased husband in behalf of
the conjugal partnership chargeable against the partnership assets as the obligation was

44
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The action filed by private respondent
against the petitioner Ramon Sta. Romana was clearly a suit to enforce an obligation of the
conjugal partnership. Civil Case No. 7678 arose out of the failure of Ramon Sta. Romana to pay
the purchase price of a lot he bought from C.N. Hodges presumably in behalf of the conjugal
partnership. Petitioner does not deny the conjugal nature of both Lots Nos. 1258-G and 1258-F.
Indeed she bases her contention on the claim that at least Lot No. 1258-F, together with its
improvements existing thereon, constitutes property of the conjugal partnership. It may not be
denied, therefore, that the liability incurred by Ramon Sta. Romana is chargeable against the
conjugal partnership assets, it being undisputed that the said obligation was contracted by the
husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 161 [1], Civil Code.)

Inclusion of wife as party defendant in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation either
pertaining to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership in order to bind the
conjugal partnership property, not necessary; Reasons.The non-inclusion of the herein
petitioner as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 7678 is immaterial. There is no rule or law
requiring that in a suit against the husband to enforce an obligation, either pertaining to him
alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership, the defendant husband must be joined
by his wife. The contrary rule is prescribed in Section 4, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court and Article
113 of the Civil Code, but not the other way around, obviously in recognition of the legal status of
the husband as the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 112, Civil Code.) There was,
therefore, no need of including the petitioner as a party in Civil Case No. 7678 for the purpose of
binding the conjugal partnership properties for the satisfaction of the judgment that could be
rendered therein.

DBP v. Adil, 161 SCRA 307 (1988)

The right to prescription may be waived or renounced. Article 1112 of Civil Code provides: Art.
1112. Persons with capacity to alienate property may renounce prescription already obtained, but
not the right to prescribe in the future. Prescription is deemed to have been tacitly renounced
when the renunciation results from acts which imply the abandonment of the right acquired.
There is no doubt that prescription has set in as to the first promissory note of February 10,
1940. However, when respondent Confesor executed the second promissory note on April 11,1961
whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous promissory note on or before
June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, said
respondent thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription
of the action covering the first promissory note. This Court had ruled in a similar case that"x x
x when a debt is already barred by prescription, it cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new
contract recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable x x x.
Thus, it has been heldWhere, therefore, a party acknowledges the correctness of a debt and
promises to pay it after the same has prescribed and with full knowledge of the prescription he
thereby waives the benefit of prescription.

Effects of a new express promise to pay a debt.This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a
debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new
promissory note is the pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory
limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a debt
barred xxx will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as this proceeds
upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the remedy and does not discharge
the debt, there is something more than a mere moral obligation to support a promise, to wita
preexisting debt which is a sufficient consideration for the new promise; the new promise upon
this sufficient consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action. x x x x x It is this new
promise, either made in express terms or deduced from an acknowledgment as a legal
implication, which is to be regarded as reanimating the old promise, or as imparting vitality to
the remedy (which by lapse of time had become extinct) and thus enabling the creditor to recover
upon his original contract.

Conjugal Partnership; Husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership under Art. 165 of
the Civil Code.WE disagree. Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations

45
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the second promissory
note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this
obligation.

b. Without consent

Luzon Surety v. de Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969)

The benefit accruing to the family must be clear and not fanciful and remote before the conjual
partnership can be held liable. While Garcia by thus signing the agreement may be said to
enhance his reputation, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to
come within the express terms of the provision.

BA Finance v. CA 161 SCRA 608

The fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the spouses does not destroy its
conjugal nature. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the
husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against
the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily

Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he
incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A & L Industries,
to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for the
said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.

Carlos v. Abelardo, 380 SCRA 361, April 9, 2002

While Manuel Abelardo did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by
his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to
purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of Manuel Abelardo and his family.
Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of Manuel Abelardo, under Art. 121 of the
Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

c. Personal debts, FC

People v. Lagrimas, 29 SCRA 153

Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon spouses may be charged against the partnership
assets even before the liquidation of the partnership.Fines and indemnities imposed upon
either husband or wife "may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities
enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if it should be insufficient." It is quite plain, therefore, that the period during which
such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. The
termination of the conjugal partnership is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt
may still remain should be erased by the concluding portion of Article 163 of the Civil Code which
provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the partnership such spouse shall be charged for
what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned."

Reason for Article 163 of Civil Code.The reason for Article 163 of the Civil Code is in accord
with the principle that every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable. If the fines
and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife were to be allowed only after liquidation of
the conjugal partnership, the effect would be to exempt the accused from civil liability and the
heirs of the offended party would be made to suffer still further. Article 163 of the Civil Code
minimizes the possibility that such additional liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory.
In doing justice to the heirs of the victim, no injustice is committed against the family of the
offender because it is made a condition under this article of the Civil Code that the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 covering primarily the maintenance of the family and
the education of the children of the spouses as well as other obligations of a preferential
character are first satisfied.

46
Proof of requisites for applicability.Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 of
the Civil Code are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal
partnership is- made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity to show that
the requisites for the imposition and enforcement of the fines and indemnities against the
conjugal partnership are obtaining, should not be most exacting, ordinary credibility sufficing.
Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the conjugal partnership,
may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery
of the family of the offended party,

d. Winnings from gambling, FC 123 (cf FC 95)

7. Ownership, administration, enjoyment and disposition
a. Joint administration, FC 124 (cf FC 96)

NCC: Ysasi v. Fernandez 23 SCRA 1079

Husband is the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership.The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. This is a right clearly granted to him by law (Article
165, Civil Code). More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitledas of
rightto joint administration (De la Rosa vs. Barruga (unreported), L-2368, June 30, 1950). The
husband may even enforce right of possession against the wife who has taken over the
administration without his consent. And, the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal
to deliver to him the conjugal assets (Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 211). She may be required
to render full and complete accounting of such properties (Perkins vs. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil.
271, 281).

When wife may ask the court to remove administration of the conjugal properties from the
husband.Of course, it is the wifes prerogative to ask the courts to remove administration of the
conjugal properties from the husband for her protection. This, Article 167 of the Civil Code
concedes, thus: Art. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a receivership, or
administration by the wife, or separation of property (Italics supplied).

b. Sole administration

(1) Incapacity, FC 124

(2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3)
(3) Abandonment, FC101
(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
b. Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125 of FC 97

NCC: Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon, 120 SCRA 628

According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of
the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case-Gimena
had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not
even to the husband alone but to both spouses. The view that the contract made by Gimena is a
voidable contract is supported by the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband
without the consent of the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance
during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil Code.)
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the
marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the
party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not
likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely
had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena.
What she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

47
Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares 410 SCRA97, August 28, 2003
[T]here is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal property having been purchased using
the conjugal funds of the spouses during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil
therefore that the sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent of
Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986,
before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil
Code. Even if we reckon the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente
and the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-2, Ignacias action
would still be within the prescribed period.

8. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127 (cf, FC 100); of FC 239

9. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 (cf. FC 101)

De la Cruz v. De La Cruz, 22 SCRA 333

If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the
husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal
properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and
religiously gives support to his wife and children, as in the case at bar, we are not disposed to
grant the wife's petition for separation of property. This decision may appear to condone the
husband's separation from his wife; however, the remedies granted to the wife by articles 167
and 178 are not to be construed as condonation of the husband's act but are designed to protect
the conjugal partnership from waste and shield the wife from want. Therefore, a denial of the
wife's prayer does not imply a condonation of the husband's act but merely points up the
insufficiency or absence of a cause of action.

10. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126

a. Death, FC 126 (1)
b. Legal separation, FC 63 (2), FC 66
c. Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2)
d. Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
11. Effect of dissolution, FC 129

a. Liquidation procedure, FC 129

b. Cause other than death, FC 129; FC 43 (2), FC 63 (2)
c. Termination due to death: FC 130 (cf. FC 104)

Beumer v. Amores, G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012

W/N a foreigner may seek reimbursement from a former spouse in a petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership?

IN THIS CASE, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase
the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that respondents personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1, he
likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to acquire the same. Evidently,
these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court
with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.

In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner
given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void, vests no rights,
creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of
the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an
illegal contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot
salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

48
 12. For marriages before FC, 131
13. Applicability of rules of court, FC 132
14. Support during CPG liquidation, FC 133

Santero v. CFI, 153 SCRA 728

Fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is not a determining
factor of their right to allowance under Art 188 of the Civil Code; While the Rules of Court limit
allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the Civil Code gives
the surviving spouse and his or her children without distinction.The fact that private
respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be
regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of
Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the
New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the
private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to
allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.

Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and the
children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such
right cannot be impaired by Sec. 3 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule;
"Spouse" interpreted to be the legitimate spouse, not common-law spouse.Since the provision of
the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to
receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be
impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however
that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses
who are the mothers of the children here).

F. Regime of Separation of Property

a. When applicable
(1) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146
(2) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130
(3) Reconciliation in legal separation FC 66 (2)
b. Property covered, FC 144
c. Administration
(1) By owner, FC 145
(2) By other spouse, FC 142

d. Family expenses, FC 146

G. Judicial Separation of Property

1. When possible, FC 134
2. For sufficient cause, FC 135, cf . FC 55 (10)

Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136 of FC 74-75, FC 134

Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, 24 SCRA 837

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new Civil Code provides:
In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.

49
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they have creditors who will
be prejudiced by the said arrangements.

4. Effects of judicial separation of property

a. Liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 par. 1
b. Support pendente lite, FC 137 par.2
c. Regime after JSP, FC 138 of FC 66 (2)
d. Binding effect on third parties, FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)
5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 of FC 67
6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142
H. Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage
Review: FC 35-38; 53 FC 41, 44, FC 45
1. Unions under FC 147

Maxey v. CA, 129 SCRA 187 of NCC 144

Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal
civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an
equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation
was recognized through decisions of this Court.

With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through
judicial precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-
ownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is
only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs
through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them.

The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a
woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's
material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household,
husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from household tasks, and otherwise
performing the traditional duties of a housewife.

Salas, Jr. v. Aguila, G.R. No. 202370, September 23, 2013

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad
faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall

50
belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.

Under this property regime, property acquired during the marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couples joint efforts and governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the present case, Salas did not rebut this presumption. In a similar case where the ground for
nullity of marriage was also psychological incapacity, we held that the properties acquired during
the union of the parties, as found by both the RTC and the CA, would be governed by co-
ownership. Accordingly, the partition of the Discovered Properties as ordered by the RTC and the
CA should be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains.

2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 43 (2) and FC 50

Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306

It has been consistently ruled by this Court that the co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of
the Civil Code requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there
is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under the aforecited
provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to
the conjugal partnership of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of
Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of
the jeepney which figured in the collision.

Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 615

MARRIAGE; ILLEGAL MARRIAGES; WHEN MARRIAGE MAY BE COLLATERALLY
ATTAQCKED. Where the marriage contracted is bigamous and null and void for being in
violation of Section 29 of the Marriage Law, the marriage is subject to collateral attack in the
intestate proceedings instituted by judicial administratix for the forfeiture of the husbands share
in the conjugal property.

BURDEN OF PROOF As a general rule, a marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse is null and void. The only exceptions are mentioned in subsections (a) and (b) of Section 29
of the Marriage law. The burden is on the part of the party invoking the exception to prove that
he comes under it.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; TERMINATION; FORFEITURE OF SHARE OF SPOUSE

Facts: Defendant contracted two marriages. The second marriage was contracted by the first wife
from the second wife. The second marriage was contracted in 1935 when the Spanish Civil Code
was still in force and terminated in 1958 when the NCC was already in force. May the second
wife invoke Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code and have a declaration of forfeiture of share of
the husband in the conjugal partnership having given cause for the nullity of the second
marriage? Held: No, the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage terminated by the
husbands death in 1958. By that time, the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in force.

Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315

The respondent GSIS had correctly acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement
insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should be divided equally between his first living wife
Rosario Diaz, on the one hand, and his second wife Basilia Berdin and his children by her, on the
other; and the lower court did not commit error when it confirmed the action of the GSIS, it being
accepted as a fact that the second marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted
in good faith. The lower court has correctly applied the ruling of this Court in the case of Lao, et
al. vs. Dee Tim, et al., 45 Phil. 739 as cited in the stipulation of facts and in the decision appealed
from.5 In the recent case of Gomez vs. Lipana, L-23214, June 30, 1970, 6 this Court, in
construing the rights of two women who were married to the same man a situation more or
less similar to the case of appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz held "that since
the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status

51
as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the property here
in dispute.... " And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before
judicial declaration of its nullity, "[t]he only lust and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and
her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage."

Yap v. CA, 145 SCRA 229

There is no dispute that the marriage of Talina Bianong to Maning Yap was valid and that the
second marriage contracted by the latter with Nancy Yap was illegal and void pursuant to Act
3613 of the Philippine Legislature, the Marriage Law which was in force when the two marriages
were celebrated. Second wife got no share in the estate of the husband only the legal wife.

Carino v. Carino, 351 SCRA 127, February 2, 2001

Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not
be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of
the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. Considering that the two marriages are void
ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal
partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the
Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which
refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a
state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons,
multiple alliances of the same married man,x x x In this property regime, the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral
inspiration, are excluded in this regime.

Go- Bangayan v. Bangayan, G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013

The SC had ruled that the words married to preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership.
Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership
under Article 148 of the Family Code.

Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda, G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
Edilberto himself admitted to the need to prove contributions in such a union wherein he quoted
the ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar in his petition where he stated that it is necessary for each of
the partners to prove his or her actual contributions to the acquisition of propery in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply. Such statement is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in

52
 common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.

XI. THE FAMILY

A. What governs family relations, FC 149?

Alavado, City of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230

Public and open cohabitation as husband and wife, birth and baptismal certificates of children
born unto them after the celebration of the questioned marriage, and a statement of such
marriage in subsequent document were held to be competent evidence as proof of said marriage .
A review of the records of this case failed to disclose any evidence whatsoever which will
overthrow the aforementioned presumption in favor of claimant's marriage to the deceased
Alavado

Arroyo v. CA, 203 SCRA 753

It should also be noted that while Article 344 of the Revise Penal Code provides that the crime of
adultery cannot be prosecuted without the offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has
been filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor. Enforcement of our law on
adultery is not exclusively, nor even principally, a matter of vindication of the private honor of
the offended spouse; much less is it a matter merely of personal or social hypocrisy. Such
enforcement relates, more importantly, to protection of the basic social institutions of marriage
and the family in the preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy
here involved is of the most fundamental kind.

B. Family Relations FC 150-151

Cf. NCC 2035; ROC Rule 6 Sec. 1 ( j )

Gayon v. Gayon, SCRA 104

Inasmuch as a sister-in-law, nephew or niece is not included in the enumeration contained in
Article 217,Civil Code, which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general
rule, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure
to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.

Wainwright v. Versoza, 26 SCRA 78

Since the present action also revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on
future support is prescribed, then the conclusion is irresistible that an attempt at compromise of
future support and failure thereof is not a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It
need not be alleged in the complaint.

Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014
No motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent
was filed in the trial court and neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that
respondent brought before the Court of Appeals.Therefore the rule on deemed waiver of the non-
jurisdictional defense or objection is wholly applicable to respondent.

53
XII. THE FAMILY HOME
A. What constitutes the family home (FH)
B. Who may constitute the family home, FC 152, FC 161?
C. When deemed constituted, FC 153
D. When terminated, FC 153 compare with FC 159
E. Beneficiaries, FC 154
F. Exemptions, FC 155, FC 160

Modequilio v. Breva, 185 SCRA 766

It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing
family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means
that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
FC. The debt and liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity
of the Family Code.

Siari Valley v. Lucasan, 109 Phil 294

The reason why a family home constituted after a debt had been incurred is not exempt from
execution is to protect the creditor against a debtor who may act in bad faith by resorting to such
declaration just to defeat the claim against him. If the purpose is to protect the creditor from
fraud it would be immaterial if the debt incurred be undisputed or inchoate, for a debtor acting in
good faith would prefer to wait until his case is definitely decided before constituting the family
home. Indeed, it may result, as in this case, that the Supreme Court may affirm the judgment of
the lower court. If the contention of respondent be sustained a debtor may be allowed to
circumvent this provision of the law to the prejudice of the creditor. This the Court cannot
countenance. Hence, we are persuaded to conclude that the money judgment in question comes
within the purview of the word debt used in Article 243 (2) of the new Civil Code.

Spouses De Mesa v. Acero, Jr. G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission to assert their right within a
reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to
assert it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is
incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it
is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

XIII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

A. Paternity and filiations in general, FC 163
B. Legitimate children, FC 164

Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97

Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place especially if the testimony is uncorroborated. In the absence of proof
that marriage did not take place a man and a woman living together as husband and wife are
presumed married.

De la Purrta v. CA, 161 SCRA 661

As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from Dominga because of
Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show
unusual closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him toys, are
not convincing enough to prove paternity. The same must be said of Exhibits A, A-1, B and B-
1,which are pictures of Jewel and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each

54
other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity, and much less would it prove violation of
complainants person and honor

1. Conceived during marriage cf. ROC rule 131 Sec. 5 (11)

2. Born during marriage
3. By artificial insemination
4. Terminated marriage under FC 42 in rel. to FC 43 (1)
5. Void marriage under FC 54 in rel. to FC 36 and FC 53
6. Voidable marriages
7. Adopted children
8. Legitimated children
9. Rights of legitimate children, FC 173-174 cf. NCC 364, 374, 376

Moore v. Republic, 8 SCRA 282

If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of
the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result
a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the
child in the community.

Naldoza, Republic, 112 SCRA 658

Mothers desire to change her childrens surname should not be the sole consideration for the
change.To allow them, at their mothers behest, to bear only their mothers surname (which
they are entitled to use together with their fathers surname) and to discard altogether their
fathers surname, thus removing the prima-facie evidence of their paternal provenance or
ancestry, is a serious matter in which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be
consulted. The mothers desire should not be the sole consideration. he reasons adduced for
eliminating the fathers surname are not substantial enough to justify the petition. To allow the
change of surname would cause confusion as to the minors parentage and might create the
impression that the minors are illegitimate since they would carry the maternal surname only.
That would be inconsistent with their legitimate status as indicated in their birth record s;
Minors entitled to know their parentage; Minor when he fully appreciates the circumstances and
is capable of selecting a name for himself and wants to use his mothers surname only is qualified
to apply for change of surname.

Legitimes of NCC 888, NCC 979

D. Illegitimate children
1. Under NCC
2. FC 165
3. Rights of illegitimate children, FC 175-176

Mangulabnan v. IAC, 185 SCRA 760

An illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private respondent herein,
is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a
natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required
before support may be granted. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which
the right to support is derived and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be
provisional, that is, by affidavits.

Osmena de Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222

Plaintiffs may use the surname of their father as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that
they are legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code,
without more, grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of
their father. In other words, said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not
be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may
happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can stop
countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."

55
 E. Action to impugn legitimacy
1. Grounds, FC 166
a. Physical impossibility of access

Andal v. Macaraig, 69 Phil 165

Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so
serious that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice
hoarse,yet that is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnalintercourse. There are
cases where persons suffering from this sickness can do the carnal act even in the most crucial
stage because they are more inclined to sexual intercourse.

Macadangdang v. CA, 100 SCRA 73

During the initial 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child, there was no
concrete or substantial proof that was presented to establish physical impossibility of access
between Elizabeth and Crispin.Elizabeth and Crispin continued to live in the same province,
therefore there is still the possibility of access to one another.

Tan v. Trocio, 191 SCRA 764

Jewel Tan was born in 1972, during wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the
presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was
impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate
and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth certificate as the legitimate child
of the Complainant and her husband, Tan Le Pok.

b. Biological or other scientific grounds

Jao v. CA, 152 SCRA 359

Blood grouping test can establish conclusively that the man is not the father of the child but not
necessarily that a man is the father of a particular child. Blood tests are conclusive as to non-
paternity and inconclusive to paternity.

Amurao v. CA, 168 734

Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of the trial court's
order dated September 26, 1977, thereby binding himself to give support to his child, the private
respondent herein, is a finding of fact which this Court may not review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

2. Contrary declaration by mother, FC 167

Chua Keng Giap v. PAC, 18 SCRA 18

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than
anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say as indeed she has said these many years--that Chua
Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.

3. In subsequent marriages, FC 168, 169

4. Presumptions FC 170, 171

Lim v. IAC, 166 SCRA 451

Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code is not well-taken. This legal provision
refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their
inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner
Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's
child at all. Being neither a legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child
by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.

5. Prescription

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 6. Who may impugn

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563, March 7, 2002

The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does
not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot
choose to be the child of his mothers alleged paramour.

F. PROOF OF FILIATION
1. Of legitimate children, FC 172-173
a. Record of birth

Reyes v. CA, 135 SCRA 439

The birth certificate, to be sufficient recognition, must be signed by the father and mother jointly,
or by the mother alone if the father refuses, otherwise she may be penalized; and if the alleged
father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, or doctor or
registrar, is incompetent evidence of paternity of said child. Since any of the certificates of birth
presented were not signed by Francisco Delgado, it cannot be taken as record of birth to prove
recognition of Irene Delgado; nor can this birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public
instrument.

Castro v. CA, 173 SCRA 658

Strictly speaking, a birth certificate to be sufficient for purposes of recognizing a child must be
signed by the father and mother. It was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported
and registered. There is no indication in the records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919
that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have signed the certificate and seen
to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps including
judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary
period to do so.r jointly and if the father refuses, by the mother alone otherwise she may be
penalized.

Mendoza v. IAC, 152 SCRA 445

Recognition or acknowledgment of a natural child under said Code must be made in a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in some other public document. In the case
at bar, the only document presented by Modesta Gabuya to prove that she was recognized by her
mother was the certificate of birth and baptism signed by Rev. Fr. Filomeno Singson, Assistant
Parish Priest of Pardo, Cebu City, stating therein that Modesta Gabuya is an illegitimate
daughter of Nicolasa Gabuya.10 However, Philippine jurisprudence is consistent and uniform in
ruling that the canonical certificate of baptism is not sufficient to prove recognition.

b. Final judgment declaring filiation

Ramos v. Ramos, 61 SCRA 284

It is true that the acknowledgment of the plaintiffs is not evidenced by a record of birth, will or
other public document (Art. 131, Old Civil Code). But the record of Civil Case No. 217, which is
relied upon by the defendants to support their defense of res judicata, indubitably shows that the
plaintiffs were treated as acknowledged natural children of Martin Ramos. The reasonable
inference is that they were in the continuous possession of the status of natural children of
Martin Ramos, as evidenced by his direct acts and the acts of his family. Even the lower court,
after treating the plaintiffs in 1913 in the intestate proceeding as acknowledged natural children,
had no choice but to reaffirm that same holding in its 1961 decision in this case.

c. Admission in a signed public document

Lim v. CA, 65 SCRA 160

The marriage contract presented by Felisa Lim does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity
prescribed by article 131 of the Civil Code of 1889. Such contract is not a written act with the
intervention of a notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and
certified by him. The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the contracting parties, in the

57
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal age, that they take
each other as husband and wife, signed by signature or mark by the said contracting parties and
the said witnesses, and attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. The marriage contract
does not possess the requisites of a public document of recognition. Be it remembered that
recognition, under the Civil Code of 1889, "must be precise, express and solemn."

d. Signed and handwritten private instrument

Ranas v. Ranas, 64 SCRA 260

e. Open and continuous possession of status

Mendoza v. CA, . September. 24. 1991

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is
necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that
the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent
character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the
child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though
without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent
intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear
manifestation of paternal affection and care.

The plaintiff lived with her mother and not with the defendant although they were both residents
of Omapad, Mandaue City. It is true, as the respondent court observed, that this could have been
because defendant had a legitimate wife. However, it is not unusual for a father to take his
illegitimate child into his house to live with him and his legitimate wife, especially if the couple is
childless, as in this case. In fact, Vicente Toring, who also claimed to be an illegitimate child of
Casimiro, lived with the latter and his wife, apparently without objection from the latter. We also
note that Teopista did not use the surname of Casimiro although this is, of course, not decisive of
one's status. No less significantly, the regularity of defendant's act of giving money to the
plaintiff through Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza has not been sufficiently established.
The trial court correctly concluded that such instances were "off-and-on," not continuous and
intermittent.

2. Of Illegitimate Children, FC 175

Vda de Alberto v. CA, 173 SCRA 436

A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is
not competent evidence of paternity.

Baluyot v. Baluyot, 166 SCRA 606

There is no evidence as required by Article 278 which proves that the petitioners were recognized
by the deceased during his lifetime as his spurious children. The petitioners' records of birth,
although in the name of Enrique Baluyut, were not signed by the latter. There was no authentic
writing presented nor any statement in a court of record which would prove that the petitioners
were recognized by the deceased.

Paterno v. Paterno, 186 SCRA 630

True, certain inconsistencies may be noted in the testimony given by the witnesses for the
private respondents, but it is on the whole unanimous and consistent as to the really crucial fact
that Dr. Paterno treated and acted towards said respondents, from their birth onward, in a
manner only a real father would and leaving little doubt that he recognized and considered them
as in truth his children. The simple denials of the widow, petitioner Jacoba T. Paterno, do not
suffice to refute such proof.

Compulsory recognition
Cf. RPC 345
RPC 46. 59

58
Gapusan v. CA, 185 SCRA 160
Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by
the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. It provides that a
voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing." Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her
voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to
her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's
death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the
judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto.
Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore
judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her
ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the
proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she
was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter.

People v. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811

It is, of course, also true that the record does not show the identity and personal circumstances of
the child born out of the rape of Filomena. Even so, the Court correctly sentenced the accused "to
acknowledge and support her off-spring" considering the provisions of Article 345 of the Revised
Penal Code:

Article 345. Civil Liability of Persons Guilty of Crimes against Chastity. Persons guilty of
rape, seduction, or abduction shall also be sentenced:

(2) to acknowledge the off-spring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing;
(3) in every case to support the off-spring.

and Article 283 (1) of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Article 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as
his natural child:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides
more or less with that of the conception;

People v. Rizo, 189 SCRA 265

We note, however, that the trial court has ordered the defendant-appellant to recognize the
offspring John Paul Valencia as his legitimate son despite the fact that said accused is a married
man. The rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the
offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. That
portion of the judgment appealed from, ordering the accused to recognize the child John Paul
Valencia as his legitimate son, should, therefore, be eliminated.

Demsey v. RTC, 164 SCRA 364

As part of the civil liability in its judgment, the trial court required the accused to recognize
Christina Marie as his natural child. This should not have been done. The recognition of a child
by her father is provided for in the Civil Code and now in the new Family Code. In this criminal
prosecution, where the accused pleaded guilty to criminal charges and the issue of recognition
was not specifically and fully heard and tried, the trial court committed reversible error when it
ordered recognition of a natural child as part of the civil liability in the criminal case.

Mendoza v. CA, supra.

People v. Barranco, 177 SCRA 103 (Filipino language was used in original)

Subalit mayroong pagkakamali ang mababang hukuman ng ipag- utos nito na kilalanin
ng nahahabla bilang anak ang bunga ng kanyang kasalanan. Ang nahahabla ay may-

59
 asawa. Hindi maaari na kilalanin ang batang bunga ng kasalanan na anak ng isang
may-asawa. Subalit may katungkulan siyang sustentuhan ang bata ayon sa batas.

G. Legitimated Children

1. Who may be legitimated, FC 177

2. How legitimating takes place, FC 178, FC 180
3. Retroactivity and effect, FC 180-181
4. Action to impugn, FC 162
5. Rights of legitimated, FC 179

XIV. ADOPTION

Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250

Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to
prove his adoption by acts and declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory
presentation of the judicial decree of adoption.

Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested
in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of
the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 99, March 15, 1996

While there was notice given by publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
made in compliance with Rule 99, 4. In that notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor was
stated. Nothing was mentioned that in addition the correction of his name in the civil registry
was also being sought. The local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of
the opportunity to be heard. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil
registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction
of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was
concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.

A. Who may adopt

1. Age and capacity required, FC 183
2. Husband and wife jointly, FC 185-186

Republic v. CA & Bobiles, January. 24, 1992

Furthermore, the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he actually joined his
wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and subsequent confirmatory testimony
in open court was sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Future of an innocent child must not
be compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of the
pleadings.

In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim

Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at
bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of
the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The
affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he
must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of
RA8552. The requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt

60
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects
of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and
efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

3. Need for consent, FC 188

Santos v. Aransanzo, 16 SCRA 344

Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have
abandoned their children, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge, 159 SCRA 369

Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have
no child of their own the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation
of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however,
is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his
opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to promote that
objective.

Nieto v. Magat, 136 SCRA 533

The fact that the petitioners reside temporarily in Guam does not disqualify them from adopting
the minor child? A reading of Articles 27 and 28 of P.D. No. 603 gives a negative answer.

Duncan v. CFI, 69 SCRA 298

The parental consent required by law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who have not
abandoned their child. Thus, where the natural and unwed mother turned over her three-day old
child to another person and from that date on to the time of the adoption proceedings in court,
she is considered to have abandoned her child and her consent to the adoption is no longer
necessary.

Cang v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 128, September 25, 1998

From the provisions of teh law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly
intemperate. The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even without the written consent
of the parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient
to warrant exemption from compliance therewith.

4. Aliens as adopters

Bobanovic v. Moniks, 142 SCRA 485

The Ministry of Social Services and Development did not appeal the order granting the adoption.
Moreover, in all its pleadings, the MSSD has not once insinuated that the Social Workers report
was in any way erroneous, incorrect or faulty. Respondent seems only to stubbornly insist and
maintain that the prerogative to make a case study pertains exclusively to the MSSD. Neither
has it shown any specific fact or circumstance warranting the denial of the travel clearance.
Absent any proof that prejudice would be caused to the Adam Christopher if he joins his adoptive
parents, the MSSD should be faulted for declining to issue the travel clearance.

Pardo de Tavera v. Cacdac, 167 SCRA 686

It may be that respondent Trial Court had not complied strictly with the provisions of P.D. No.
603 on adoption. As it had reasoned out, however, it was satisfied with the Case Study Report
submitted by the Court Social Worker. Prior to Executive Order No. 91, amending the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, the MSSD did not have the exclusive authority to make a case study in

61
adoption cases. The Court evaluated the Report of its social Worker and found that it was based
on "very honest insight and opinion based on personal interviews and home study painstakingly
made ..." The objections which the MSSD have (sic) against the petitioners Gordon are all
reflected in "... the case study report and such have been passed upon by the Court in its decision
granting the adoption" (P. 30, Rollo). The MSSD did not allege that the Social Worker Report was
faulty or incorrect. It thus appears that the objective of trial custody had been substantially
achieved, which is, "to assess the adjustment and emotional readiness of the adopting parents for
the legal union"

B. Who may not adopt, FC 184

C. Who may be adopted FC 183, FC 185

In re Adoption of Edwin Villa, 21 SCRA 399

The fact alone that petitioner wife and minor are siblings should not prevent the adoption.There
is no express provision in law that disallows relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one
another.

D. Who may not be adopted, FC 187

E. Effect of adoption

Cervantes v. Fajardo, supra

In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child; Provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5
years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
cases involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters welfare is
paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5) years of
age, will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion.

1. Status, FC 189 (1)

2. Parental authority, FC 189 (2), FC 186

In Re: Habeas Corpus of Angelie Cervantes, 1169 SCRA 579

Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested
in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the
natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be
exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of
the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

3. Succession, FC 189 (3)

F. Effect on testate succession, FC 190

G. Rescission of adoption
1. By the adopted, FC 191
2. By the adopters, FC 192
3. Affect of rescission, FC 193

XV. SUPPORT
A. What comprises support, FC 194
B. Who are obliged to provide support?

Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual
obligations to which the spouses were bound together to support each other. In this issue, the

62
husbands duty is to pay for the medical services rendered to his wife, not the father nor the
mother in law.

Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110

HUSBAND AND WlFE; ALLOWANCE FOR SUPPORT; RlGHT OF HUSBAND TO ESTABLISH
ADULTERY AS DEFENSE AGAINST AN ACTION FOR SUPPORT "PENDENTE LITE".The
Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of
determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application. Adultery on the part
of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil., 285).
Consequently, as to the child, it is also a defense that it is the fruit of such adulterous relations,
for in that case, it would not be the' child of the defendant and, hence, would not be entitled to
support as such. But as this defense should be established, and not merely alleged, it would be
unavailing if proof thereof is not permitted. It is not of course necessary to go fully into the merits
of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertian the kind and amount of evidence which it
may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or the other, in view of
the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered.

Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803

Adultery can be used as a defense in an action for support.The alleged adultery must be
established by competent evidence. .However, it is doubtful whether adultery will affect her right
to alimony pendente lite she is asking for support to be taken from their conjugal property, not
Manuels personal funds.

C. Source of support, FC 197-195 cf. FC 40, 70, 94, 122.

Lerma v. CA, 61 SCRA 440 December 20, 1974

The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property,
presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live
separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which states that after the filing of
the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A
petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered
as within the intendment of the law granting separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the
same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient, be he a forced heir or
not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the
causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The
loss of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for
support pendente lite. What has been said above, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of
either the legal separation proceeding pending in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery
pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light of Rule 61, Section 5, of
the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite.

D. Order of Support
E. Manner and Time of Payment, FC 200-204

Canonizado v. 127SCRA 610

With regard to the issue of payment of current support, Article 303 of the New Civil Code
provides that the obligation to give support shall also cease "when the recipient may engage in a
trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved his fortune in such a way
that he no longer needs the allowance for his subsistence;" When any of the above circumstances
occurs, the support stops since the recipient no longer needs it for subsistence. It does not mean,
however, that the obligation to give or the right to ask for support also ceases permanently
because the lack of a need for it may only be temporary. In other words, the above circumstances
do not affect the right to support between spouses but only the action to make it demandable,
such right being born from the law and created as such by the marriage tie. It subsists
throughout the period that the marriage subsists.

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A judgment for support is never final in the sense that not only can its amount be subject to
increase or decrease but its demandability may also be suspended or re-enforced when
appropriate circumstances exist.

F. Amount of support, FC 200-208

G. Support pendente lite, FC 188

XVI. PARENTAL AUTHORITY

A. Concept of Parental Authority, FC 209
B. Transfer of Parental Authority, FC 210 cf. CF 234
C. Who exercises Parental Authority, FC 211-213?

Hontiveros v. IAC, 132 SCRA 745

While the petitioner would have US believe in his reply that the private respondent is unfit to
take care of his child, it is too late in the day to do so because under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
only questions of law may be raised in this Tribunal What the petitioner should have done is to
bring out the questions of fact in Special Proceedings Nos. 9788. It is just too bad that the case
for custody was dismissed for lack of interest on the part of the petitioner.Clearly, the private
respondent has a clear legal right under Article 17 of P.D. 603 to the custody of her minor child,
there being no compelling reason to the contrary.

Unson v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183

Criterion in awarding custody of a minor child to one of the parents. It is axiomatic in Our
jurisprudence that in all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
Never has this Court diverted from that criterion.

Custody of minor child not awarded to the wife who has immoral influence over the child;
Reasons.With this premise in view, the Court finds no difficulty in this case in seeing that it is
in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say
immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted
by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and
most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about
her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right
and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar
relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sisters mother, is
hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life. No respectable
father, properly concerned with the moral well being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected
to have a different attitude than petitioners in this case. Under the circumstances thus shown in
the record, the Court finds no alternative than to grant private
respondent no more than visitorial rights over the child in question.

Decisions of Supreme Court on custody of minor children always open to adjustment as

circumstances demand.Anyway, decisions even of this Supreme Court on the custody of minor
children are always open to adjustment as the circumstances relevant to the matter may demand
in the light of the inflexible criterion We have mentioned above. We deem it a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge to have acted precipitably in issuing his order of
December 28, 1979 here in question.

D. Substitute Parental Authority, FC 214-216, FC 233

E. Special Parental Authority, FC 218-219, FC 233
CF. FC 221 In Rel. To NCC. 2180

Exconde v. Capuno, 101 PHIL. 843

The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is
obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which

64
imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while, on the other hand,
gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way by which they can
relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage which Delfin failed to prove.

Palisoc v. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548

The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the
activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at
the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil
Code, by (proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage. In the light of the factual findings of the lower courts decision, said defendants failed to
prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which
prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his teacher or in the school before
heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for the tortious acts of their students.

Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA, 315

The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was immaterial if
he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is that
he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the rector, high school principal and
the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined
in the provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the students and not direct
control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.

Salvosa v. IAC, 166 SCRA 274

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The rationale of such liability is that so
long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the latter stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the student. Likewise, the phrase used in [Art. 2180 so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been at
attendance in the school, or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically,
therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos, 376 SCRA 473, February 6, 2002

Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not
be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

F. FILIAL PRIVILEGE, FC 215

ROC RULE 130 SEC. 25 CF. SECS. 22 & 23
G. Parental Authority Over the Childrens Person, FC. 220-222

Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 602

After Petitioner gave birth to a child, she left said child to the care of the doctor that helped
Petitioner to give birth. Petitioner never visited the said child, nor gave any money for support.
After instituting an action claiming custody of the said child, the court held in favor of the
respondent who took care of said child since birth. Supreme Court stated: While our law
recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of the basic
principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the

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latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother.

Luna v. IAC, 167 SCRA 7

In child custody cases, execution of final judgment of appellate courts awarding custody to childs
biological parents may be stayed where during hearings on execution the child manifests that she
will kill herself and escape if given to custody of her biological parents. This means that the best
interest of the minor can override procedural rules and even the rights of parents to the custody
of their children.Since, in this case, the very life and existence of the minor is at stake.

*Disciplinary measures, FC 223-224

H. Parental Authority Over the Childs Property, FC 225-227

Linda v. CA,. 212 SCRA 725

Under Art. 320 (NCC), a parent acting merely as a legal administrator of the property of his
minor children does not have the power to dispose of or alienate the property of the said child
without judicial approval. And under Rule 84 (Code of Civil Procedure), the powers and duties of
the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property are merely powers of
possession and management. Hence, the power to sell, mortgage, encumber or dispose must
proceed from the court (Rule 89). Moreover, the private respondent spouses are not purchasers in
good faith as they knew right from the beginning the the transaction was without judicial
approval. Further, the minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed.

I. Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority

1. Permanent termination, FC 228 cf. RA 6809
2. Non-permanent termination, FC 229 cf. FC 193
3. Suspension of Parental Authority, FC 231-232

Chua v. Carandang, 27 SCRA 791

She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or
after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody. Her
claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the Cabangbangs were powerful
and influential, does not deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child
would go to any extent to be reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of the petitioner
once informed, as she alleged, and her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs should
have been to move heaven and earth, to use a worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to
recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.. Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents
of parental authority over their children.

4. Revival

XVII. EMANCIPATION
A. Cause of emancipation, FC 234 as amended
B. Effect of emancipation, FC 236 as amended cf. FC 15, NCC 2180

XVIII. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, FC 238-253

XIX. SURNAMES, NCC 364-330, RA 8805

Naldoza, v. Republic, supra

The child should, and in the course of time must, know of his parentage. " If, when he fully
appreciates the circumstances and is capable of selecting a name for himself, he wants to use his
mother's surname only and to avoid using his father's surname, then he should be the one to
apply for a change of surname.

Johnston v. Republic, 7 SCRA 1040

Use of surnames; Surname of adopted child to follow that of adopter. The provision of Law
(Article 341, par. 4, Civil Code) which entitles the adopted minor to the use of the adopters

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surname, refers to the adopters own original family surname and not to her surname acquired
by virtue of marriage. As petitioner-appellant made the adoption without concurrence of her
husband, her name as adopter was her maiden name. The adoption created a personal
relationship between her and the adopted, and the consent of her husband to the adoption by her
individually did not have the effect of making him an adopting father, so as to entitle the child to
the use of the husbands surname. Since adoption gives the person adopted the same right and
duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter (Article 341, par, 1, Civil Code), much
confusion would result if the adopted child were allowed to use the surname of the spouse who
did not join in the adoption. It would mislead the public into believing that the child has also
been adopted by the husband, and, later, if questions of successional rights arise, the husbands
consent to the adoption might be presented to prove that he had actually joined in the adoption.

Llaneta v. Agrava, 57 SCRA 29

The principle that disallows change of name as would give the false impression of family
relationship, relied by the respondent judge, remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. The petitioner has
established that she has been using the surname Ferrer for as long as she can remember; that all
her records in school and elsewhere, put her name down as Teresita Ferrer; that her friends and
associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late Serafin Ferrer's nearest of
kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname Ferrer. Indeed, a sudden shift at
this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita Llaneta (in order to conform to that appearing
in the birth certificate) would result in confusion among the persons and entities she deals with
and entail endless and vexatious explanations of the circumstances of her new name.

Tolentino v. CA. 162 SCRA 66 (1988)

We rule that the use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the rights of the petitioner.
Considering the circumstances of this petition, the age of the respondent who may be seriously
prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to further legal procedures in reconstituting
documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname Tolentino, and the effects
on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a surname different
from the surnames of her own children, we find it just and equitable to leave things as they are,
there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a
basis for injunctive relief.

Legamia v. IAC, 131 SCRA 479

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the
name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman.
The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of
women can be Identified who are living with men prominent in political, business and social
circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely
ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of
violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society.
It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must be construed. In the case at bar,
Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to the public as his
wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or personal material
gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy
of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant to
criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably had their own
Corazons.

XX. ABSENCE, NCC 381-396, FC 41

Reyes v. Alejandro, 41 SCRA 65

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have
to be taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384,
Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil
Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the

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marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an
absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the
wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72,
80).

Eastern Shipping v. Lucero, 124 SCRA 425

Presumption of death under Art. 391 of Civil Code, not applicable; Presumption must yield to the
rule of preponderance of evidence.There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances
attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing
facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and
that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of
death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence.
As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of
preponderance of evidence controls.

Tol-Noquera v. Villamor, 211 SCRA 616

It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior
to a petition for administration. This was the ruling in Reyes v. Alejandro, 3 reiterating Pejer v.
Martinez. 4 In the latter case, the court declared that the petition to declare the husband an
absentee and the petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the
wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same proceeding. The purpose of the cited rules is
the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the administrator. Thus, the
question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not
controlling. What is material is whether she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration
of absence of Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix of his
estate. The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him
should be resolved in another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed
administratrix cannot be denied outright by reason alone of such issue. Even if it be assumed
that the title obtained by Diosdado Tol is already indefeasible because of the lapse of the one-year
period for attacking it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one who
is unjustly deprived on his property. One of these is a claim for reconveyance, another a
complaint for damages. 5 The petitioner can avail herself of such remedies if she is appointed
administratrix of the estate of the absentee.

XXI. FUNERALS, NCC 305-310

Eugenio v. Velez, supra.

We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in
Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-
vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to
marry her in her lifetime. Thus, it is Vitalianas full-blooded siblings that have the right in
burying her; and not the common-law spouse.

XXII. CIVIL REGISTER. NCC 407-413

ROC RULE 108

Republic v. Sayo, 188 SCRA 634

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature.

Republic V. Valencia, 141 SCRA 462

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a

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proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that a right in law may be enforced and a
wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres to the
principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February
20, 1970 while questioning the use of Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to be corrected should be threshed out in
an appropriate proceeding.

Republic V. Marcos, 182 SCRA 223

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with
the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register
could be corrected or changed through mere summary proceedings and not through appropriate
action wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented, the door
to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic 168 SCRA 294

A mere petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the ROC cannot change a childs status
from legitimate to illegitimate. Rule 108 "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier
mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the
Civil Code.

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