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THE EMPIRICAL THEORISTS OF
DEMOCRACY AND THEIR CRITICS:
A Plague on Both Their Houses
QUENTIN SKINNER
Christ's College (Cambridge, England)
A UTHOR 'S NOTE: I amiparticularly indebted to John Burrow. Jolrh Dunn and Johnt
Thompson Jbr reading and commren.tingo)t successive drafts of thlisarticle.
Political Theory, Vol. 1 No. 3, August 1973, ? 1973 Sage Publications, Inc.
[287]
[288] POLITICALTHEORY / AUGUST 1973
Dahl (1956b) has three main concerns: to consider (at the start) two
major traditions of democratic political theory: to examine (at the end)
[2901 POLITICALTHEORY / AUGUST 1973
II
I now turn to consideration of the nature of the argumentswhich the
critics of empirical theory have advanced in order to establish that this
type of an account of the democratic "system" is conservative and
ideological ratherthan purely descriptiveof "the system."
The main current argument, recently describedas a "new revolutionin
political science," has been summarized as follows: "To confine oneself
exclusively to the description and analysis of facts is to hamper the
understandingof these same facts in their broadest context. As a result
empiricalpolitical science must lend its support to the maintenanceof the
very factual conditions it explores" (Easton, 1969: 1052). The argument,
thus, is that the conservatismof empirical theory resides precisely in the
fact that it is concerned in a neutral and scientific spirit with the
description of the system-when the point is to change it (see, e.g.,
Somjee, 1971: 464, for a paraphraseof Wolfe and Surkin, 1970: 21).
But this argument does not really try, and certainly fails, to establish
the main accusation against the empirical theorists-the accusation that
their allegedly neutral analyses have included the making of a false and
ideological move. This criticism presupposes, on the contrary, that the
empirical theorists have achieved, intentionally, a purely neutral stance,
for it is precisely their success in maintaining this stance which is being
denounced. Empiricaltheorists have found little difficulty in adjustingto
this criticism. It has allowed them to go on insisting that, as Dahl (1967a:
166) recently put it, they have indeed "withdrawn from the task of
evaluatingpolitical systems," while they concede that this may not be an
altogetherdesirablestate of affairs.
There is a second argument,however, which cuts deeper than this, by
purporting to show that the empirical theorists have not merely been
describingdemocraticpolitical systems, but also commending the type of
system they have described, and specifically commending it "as an
efficient and stable system" (Duncan and Lukes, 1963: 168). In this way,
they have "substituted stability and efficiency as the prime goals of
democracy" (Walker, 1965: 289), and in the process have, inevitably,
abandonedpure descriptionand contaminatedit with a set of conservative
political values (for a general discussion of this claim, see Rousseas and
Farganis,1963).
Many empirical theorists have undoubtedly been concerned with the
businessof "maintainingstable and effective democracy"(see Almond and
Verba, 1963: 473) and thus with the attempt to establish "generalizations
[2921 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1973
III
I now wish to go on to argue, however, that there is an apparently
elusive, but extremely simple ideological move which has, in fact, been
made by all the empiricaltheorists.
My point of departurelies in consideringtwo connected facts about the
term democracy itself. The first is that the term has become a subject of
ideological debate, and is to that extent free-floatingwith respect to the
nature and range of the circumstanceswhich may be held to license its
applicationas a description of a given political system. The second is that
the term makes two points about any political system which it is used to
describe: one is that the system possessesa more or less determinateset of
characteristicswhich may be taken to constitute "ruleby the people"; the
other is that the system deservesto be commended. It is a fact about the
prevailingmeaning and usage of the term democracy that it has become a
member of the class of so-called evaluative-descriptiveterms which
philosophers of languagehave recently been much concerned to analyze.
Such terms are applicableif and only if a certain state of affairs obtains,
but whenever the relevant state of affairs does obtain, then to apply the
correspondingterm is not only to describe the state of affairs, but also
(and eo ipso) to perform the speech-act of commendingit (for the best
brief discussion, see Searle, 1962: 428-430, 432; for criticism,see Hare,
1970; for a restatement,see Warnock,1971).
A brief considerationof the history of the termdemocracyprovidesthe
simplest means of illustrating these facts and the connection between
them.3 There was originally a greater degree of clarity and agreement
about the nature of the political system or state of affairswhich could be
appropriately described by the term. The Greek model offered clear
indications as to who constitutes the demos and what should count as rule
by the demos. This consensus, however, had an obvious connection with
the fact that, until relativelyrecently, few wished to commend the state of
affairs which the term described.4 During the past century, however,this
consensus has been eroded. (The recent dispute between the empirical
Skinner I EMPIRICAL THEORISTS OF DEMOCRACY [299]
theorists and their critics serves, indeed, to illustrate this point.) This
erosion has had an obvious connection with the growing belief that
democracy (still construed as "rule by the people") refers to a commend-
able form of government. The upshot has been the two results I have
cited: the debate about what range of circumstancesshould be held to
count as a case of "rule by the people" (and thus a case of democracy);
and the fact that the use of the term democracyperforms the speech act
of commending what is described(a fact noted, e.g., by Benn, 1957: 338;
and Sartori, 1968: IV, 112).5
If we now turn, with these features of the concept of democracyin
mind, to reconsider the ideal of a democraticsystem as set out in a work
such as Dahl (1956b), it becomes clear that his allegedly neutral and
empirical presentation of the ideal is in fact based at two points on making
the same simple but crucial ideological move. The first is made when Dahl
synthesizes his democratic ideal out of his critical account of the two
major traditions of democratic thought. The ideal is presented in such a
way that we are obliged to accept it as commendable.This follows from
the (empirical) claim that the ideal embodies the conditions necessaryand
sufficient for being able to say of a political system that it is genuinelya
democracy, and from the (linguistic) fact that to make this assertionabout
a political system is standardlyto commendit. The identical move is made
when the alleged social preconditions for democracyare set out. They are
described in such a way that we are obliged to accept them as
commendable. This follows in the same way from the (empirical) claim
that they are necessary for maintaininga genuinely democratic political
system, and the (linguistic) fact that to call a political system a democracy
is to commend it.
So far I have conceded that at least Dahl's statement of his political
ideal of democracy is left unscathed even by Taylor's attack. It seems by
no means to be left unscathed, however, by this attack on its employment
of evaluative descriptions. It is no longer open to Dahl to insist that
although some empirical theoristsmay commend what they describe,they
could equally well condemn what they describe,so that their descriptions
must remain independent of any evaluations put upon them. The
distinction cannot be sustained, because they have describedthese systems
as democracies, and it is a "non-contingent fact" (as Searle puts it in
discussingthe general relations between meaning and speech acts) that to
describe a political system as democraticis to perform a speech act within
the rangeof endorsing,commending,or approvingof it.
I have now sought to identify the ideologicalmove which Dahl and the
[300] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1973
IV
I turn finally to the other, more positive way in which the idea of an
operational definition serves to give the empirical theorists their air of
producing an apologia for the workings of certain existing political
systems. This derives from the fact that the commendatory force of the
term democracyis sufficiently strong for its use to serve as a defence and
legitimation of these political systems against the two major criticisms
which politicalscientists have usually made of them.
The nature of these criticisms can best be indicated by recallingcertain
long-suspected and by now familiar facts about the present political
system of the United States, which have been furnishedby two converging
lines of research. The first has focused on the behavior of voters at
American elections (these facts have been classically summarized by
Berelson et al., 1954: ch. 14; the account is paraphrasedby Duncan and
Lukes, 1963: 161-162). The classic studies in this genre-the pioneering
study Votingand the more recent study of The American Voter(Campbell
et al. 1960: 543)-have produced, as the authors of the latter study put it,
"a portrait of an electorate almost wholly without detailed information
about decision-makingin government." The meaningful participation of
the voter in the political process appearsto be confined almost exclusively
to the exercise of a generally ill-informed choice between rivalcandidates
who periodicallypresent themselves to compete for such votes at national
elections. The other convergingline of researchhas focused on the role of
[302] POLITICALTHEORY / AUGUST 1973
leaders in this type of system. They are seen to constitute what Key has
not scrupled to call a "ruling class" or at least an "activistsubculture,"
making most of the major decisions about the actual business of
governmentindependently of those whom they nominallyrepresent(Key,
1956: 537, 542). This was Schumpeter's(1965: 285) view summarizedin
his claim that in democraciesit is the politicans who rule. And his account
has been endorsed by most of the more recent empirical theorists,
includingDahl (1956b: 130-133; Almond and Verba, 1963: 478).
The significanceof these facts is that they appearto license, and indeed
to require,the applicationto such a political system of at least two general
descriptionswhich also serve to evaluateit in a conspicuouslyunfavorable
way. The first is that this type of system seems highly elitist. The empirical
theorists have in fact found this description very hard to reject. Some
(notably Dahl [1966: 297, n.] himself) insist that such a descriptionmust
be "inaccuratein implication,"but others (notably Lipset [1962: 33] and
Almond and Verba [1963: 490, 476, 478]) feel obliged to concede that
the political systems they have-analyzed do presuppose"the maintenance
of elite power" (for other instances, see, e.g., Komhauser,1959: 16; Key,
1956: 9, 542). The other, even more strongly unfavorabledescriptionis
that such a political system must in effect be an oligarchy. This
characterizationwas at first accepted by a number of early writers on
political parties, including Mosca and Ostrogorski,and of course Michels
with his formulation of the claim in terms of an "iron law" (for a
discussion of this group of writers, see Runciman, 1963: ch. 4, 64-86).
Again, however,the more recent empiricaltheoristshave tried to repudiate
it, and to insist (as Dahl himself puts it) that any suggestionsabout "covert
oligarchy" give a "misleading"view of the systems they have analyzed
(Dahl, 1970: 7;see also Dahl, 1961b: 312-313).
Consider now the significance of these facts in relation to any
attempted legitimation of the workings of a political system of this type,
such as operatesin the United States. Any apologist will need to be able to
show that these unfavorablecharacterizationscan in some way be defeated
or at least overriden. One of the main ideological tasks for such an
apologist will thus be to discover how such a reevaluation may be
achieved. Several different strategies will be theoretically possible. One of
the most powerful, however, will clearly consist of trying to establish, as a
purely empirical claim, that the same facts about the given system can
with equal plausibility be described in favorably evaluative terms. The
strategy will consist, that is, of trying to apply a rival evaluative
description to the same political system which in turn fulfills two
Skinner / EMPIRICAL THEORISTS OF DEMOCRACY [3031
NOTES
1. Dahl (1966: 298) has protested this tactic.
2. Most empirical theorists exhibit this commitment to the idea of a strict logical
distinction between factual and evaluative statements (see, e.g., the introductory
remarks in Cnudde and Neubauer, 1969: 1;Mayo, 1960: vi;Sartori, 1965: 4-5).
3. I owe this suggestion to Mr. John Dunn (1972).
4. Democracy, as it was used at least until the end of the eighteenth century,
expressed disapproval (see, e.g., the use by Johnson in Boswell: I, 529).
5. It tends to be said that the term implies approval, which is somewhat
misleading (see, e.g., Parry, 1969: 141).
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6. Castles D
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A clear, well written discussion of the importance of sociological
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of political life. Topics covered include sociology and the discipline
of politics, the elementary forms of political life, and the relation-
ship between theory, evidence and insight. Castles also looks at
functionalism and the analysis of conflict as sociological metatheories,
and at the idea of anomie and the theory of mass society.
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