VINUYA VS. SEC.

ROMULO

FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by
Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the
DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and
military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took
the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been
fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them;
and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international
tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort
women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.

ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.

Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-
established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and
the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they
advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a
foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive
all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.

The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby
creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive
Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration
the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of
espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further
steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a
government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is
resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining
redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the
position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus
cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered
peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified
only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Case outline: Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q.
Ramas, Elizabeth Dimaano G.R. No. 104768

The Case

Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas,

Elizabeth Dimaano G.R. No. 104768

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25
March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.

The first Resolution dismissed petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Amended

Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth
Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners (Republic of the
Philippines) Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
for further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its
evidence.

Statement of Facts

Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)

o President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon assuming Malacaang,

enacts Executive Order 1 (EO No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on
Good Governance (PCGG). It is mandated to recover all ill-gotten wealth
of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates.

o EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:

(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to

accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order and the
power

(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be

necessary to carry out the purpose of this order.

o Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,

created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate
reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel,
whether in the active service or retired.

AFP Board

o The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q.
Josephus Ramas.

o On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on Ramas
alleged ill gotten wealth. It submits the following findings:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of

a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon
City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City may be
estimated modestly at P700,000.00.
 He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City.
The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.

Communication equipment and facilities are found in the

premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a Confidential Agent of the
Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the
PC Command of Batangas.

These items could not have been in the possession of

Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications

equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications

equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus

Ramas mistress. She does not have any means to acquire the
communications equipment as well as the aforementioned
money.

o The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General Josephus
Ramas for ill gotten wealth and unexplained wealth in the amount of
P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

o Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be

prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property.

o On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic
Act No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) against Ramas.

o Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas

acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired
property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.

o The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a
previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe that respondents
have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended Complaint prayed for, among
others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in
favor of the State.

Ramas Answer:

o Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential house at

La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out
of proportion to his salary and other legitimate income.
 o He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house
of Dimaano.

o Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-
November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house
by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan

o On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the

complaint in order to charge the delinquent properties with being subject
to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano
alone x x x.

o Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a year.

o on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial

because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of
justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file
an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner
that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

o Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic

v. Migrino.The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of
mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former
President Marcos.

o Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby

rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement
as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit,
but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry
and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

o The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon.
Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases
under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

o Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance

with the rulings of the Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve
the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in

criminal cases was conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute

a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items

confiscated.
Issues

1. PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

2. Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of

Evidence Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing
the case before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.

3. Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house
as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a
significant effect on petitioners case since these properties comprise most of
petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not have much
evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are
inadmissible in evidence.Ruling

1. First issue:

1. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the
two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP
personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate
family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of
their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP
personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the
President assigns their cases to the PCGG.

2. Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before
the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that
Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos
because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army. Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders
directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a
subordinate of former President Marcos.

3. We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in

the sense contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

4. Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a
showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos.

2. Second issue:

1. Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case,
we find that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the
presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four
years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.

3. Third issue:

1. On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos

residence a search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but Dimaanos
cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in
the seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search
warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with
two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
2. Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team
conducted the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the
successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that a revolutionary
government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking
power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner
asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private
respondents exclusionary right.

3. Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an

illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights
under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the
time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies
and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her
since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.

4. Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

5. The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was
bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the
interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by
loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of
the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection accorded to
individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the interregnum.

6. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not
operative during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection
accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained
in effect during the interregnum.

7. During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary

government were the supreme law because no constitution limited the
extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation of the
1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal
law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government.
Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a
Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

8. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A

revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject
to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government
or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence. In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined
as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a community is nullified
and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order
itself.

9. During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a

revolutionary government bound by no constitution. No one could validly
question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However,
upon the adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered
 companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of
Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

10. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary
government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant
or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to
say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects
of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the
revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the
de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape
responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.

11. During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,

directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as
these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary
government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon
proper application, specified the items to be searched and seized.
The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.

12. It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did
not include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land
titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search warrant did not
particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize
these items without showing that these items could be the subject
of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the raiding team exceeded
its authority when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was
therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding
seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the lawful
owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could
not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the
possessor. We thus hold that these items should be returned immediately
to Dimaano.

The Dispositive

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037,
remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the
evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
are AFFIRMED.
British American Tobacco Corporation v. Finance Secretary Camacho, BIR
Commissioner Parayno (2009)

Doctrine:

A levy of tax is not unconstitutional because it is not intrinsically equal and uniform
in its operation.The uniformity rule does not prohibit classification for purposes of
taxation

Facts:

British American Tobacco filed a Motion for Reconsideration for the Courts decision
in 2008

Petitioner interposes that the assailed provisions: (1) violate the equal protection
and uniformity of taxation clauses of the Constitution, (2) contravene Section 19,[1]
Article XII of the Constitution on unfair competition, and (3) infringe the
constitutional provisions on regressive and inequitable taxation.

Petitioner further argues that assuming the assailed provisions are constitutional, it
is entitled to a downward reclassification of Lucky Strike from the premium-priced to
the high-priced tax bracket.

Lucky Strike reiterates in its MR that the classification freeze provision violates the
equal protection and uniformity of taxation clauses because older brands are taxed
based on their 1996 net retail prices while new brands are taxed based on their
present day net retail prices.

HELD: Petition is denied

Without merit and a rehash of petitioners previous arguments before this Court

The rational basis test was properly applied to gauge the constitutionality of the
assailed law in the face of an equal protection challenge The classification is
considered valid and reasonable provided that: (1) it rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future conditions; and (4) it applies equally to all
those belonging to the same class.

The classification freeze provision was inserted in the law for reasons of practicality
and expediency.

Since a new brand was not yet in existence at the time of the passage of RA 8240,
then Congress needed a uniform mechanism to fix the tax bracket of a new brand.

The current net retail price, similar to what was used to classify the brands under
Annex D as of October 1, 1996, was thus the logical and practical choice

The classification freeze provision was in the main the result of Congresss earnest
efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of the tax administration over sin
products while trying to balance the same with other State interests
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v Duque III
Facts:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by
President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of
Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.

Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of the
land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in accord with
intl agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR.

Held:

Sub-issue:

Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional
declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not
been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8. However,
the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such as the Milk
Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.

No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions
pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is
being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules
(opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby
legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA Resolutions
(specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to 24
Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how
to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW
non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of
intl law.
Main issue:

Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f)
->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,

Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children uo to 24 months

And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .

These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.
 MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty. On January
6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate
their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.

Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for more than just a
generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.

In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right
of citizens to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared that
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the
inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position
that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of
R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this
rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the
territorial sea.

In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to

enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry into our
internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of
long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing out that such has nothing to
do with its the US acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear international responsibility
under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner,
which has been actively supporting the countrys efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting
our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate
in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of
UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention,
for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account
characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond

dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and
not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact,
it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
 The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition
for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental
law.