Malanyaon v.
Lising amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was
suspended from office but he died during his
incumbency, and while the case was pending. The
case was dismissed due to his death. Petitioner
sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his
period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA
3019 which provides - should a public officer be
convicted by final judgement he shall lose all
retirement or gravity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and
to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to
receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal
the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal
Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of
the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such
municipality during the period of his suspension from
August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However,
Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that
the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal due to his
death amounted to acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the
death of the accused constitutes acquittal.
Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the
suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that
after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer
will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to
acquittal.
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO
PALOMAR, in his capacity as THE POSTMASTER
GENERAL
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest", which called for participants to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each
Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
Participants were not required consideration nor pay a
fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also
required to be made. Entry forms were to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a
sealed can would be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
for the transmission of communications relative
thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery
provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the
request, arguing that the said contest violated the
provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought
judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its
favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the
same argument that the said contest violated the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
Issue:
Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest"
fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law.
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift
enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or
of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or
drawing of any kind".
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest" by CALTEX is not a lottery nor a gift
enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of
property by chance, which the law does not prohibit.
The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy
playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs,
etc., and various forms of gambling. The three
essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The
contest in question, lacking the element of
consideration, cannot be deemed al lottery. The
rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable
consideration of some kind being paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term gift
enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar.
As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which
the chance offered is attached as an inducement to
the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified
contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the
appellee's products.
By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217
aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the
element of chance is concerned it is only logical
that the term under a construction should be accorded
no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so
construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the "gift enterprise"
therein included.
Amelito Mutuc vs Commission on Elections gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of
existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling
station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of
Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the
Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school
Constitutional Convention (1970). His candidacy was
building which is San Miguel Elementary School and
given due course by the Commission on Elections
church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No
(COMELEC) but he was prohibited from playing his
neighbors were called as witnesses when actual
campaign jingle on his mobile units because that was
measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio
an apparent violation of COMELECs ban (via a
City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly
COMELEC resolution) to purchase, produce, request
populated area with commercial/residential buildings,
or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
houses closed (sic) to each other which still
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever
endangers the lives and safety of the people in case
nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes,
of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time
and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin. It
especially during gas filling which tend to expose
was COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed
residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of
to be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a
traffic.
singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
(falling under and the likes category), and under the
resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed
above COMELEC rule, the same is subject to
a case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline
confiscation.
filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
ISSUE:
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied
1. Whether or not COMELECs contention is correct.
by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her
HELD:
gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was
1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words
an invalid exercise of the latters police powers
following any enumeration must be of the same class
HELD:
as those specifically referred to. COMELEC
The respondent is barred from denying their previous
contended that the ban makes unlawful the
claim that the gasoline filling station is not under Sec
distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention
44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : That the
being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic
business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the
matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the
zoning code and not as a service station as differently
words and the like. For COMELEC, the last three
defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning
words sufficed to justify such an order. The Supreme
code;
Court did not agree. It is quite apparent that what was
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were
contemplated in the said law violated by Mutuc was
conclusive on the municipality, the party making them.
the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a
hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings
means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for
alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance,
the candidate responsible for its distribution. It does
respondents could not insist that gasoline service
not include campaign jingles for they are not gadgets
station under Section 44 necessarily included
as contemplated by the law.
gasoline filling station under Section 21. Indeed, the
2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression.
activities undertaken in a gas service station did not
The Constitution prohibits the abridgment of the automatically embrace those in a gas filling station.
freedom of speech. As for the main issue, the court held that the
respondent municipality invalidly used its police
Parayno vs Jovellanos
powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioners
G.R. No. 148408
gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the
Subject: Public Corporation
power to take actions and enact measures to promote
Doctrine: Police power
the health and general welfare of its constituents, it
Facts:
should have given due deference to the law and the
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in
rights of petitioner.
Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
A local government is considered to have properly
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of
exercised its police powers only when the following
said municipality for the closure or transfer of the
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
station to another location. The matter was referred to
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal
class, require the interference of the State and (2) the
Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for
means employed are reasonably necessary for the
investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished
Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or
and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement
transfer of location of petitioners gasoline station. In
refers to the equal protection clause and the second,
Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing
to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due
process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50.
While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of
petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest
public school and church, the records do not show
that it even attempted to measure the distance,
notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in
determining whether there was an actual violation of
Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never
conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioners business could not be
considered a nuisance which respondent municipality
could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its
police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance
per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one
affecting the immediate safety of persons and
property, hence, it cannot be closed down or
transferred summarily to another location.
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline
station to the lives and properties of the people of
Calasiao, we again note: Hence, the Board is inclined
to believe that the project being hazardous to life and
property is more perceived than factual. For, after all,
even the Fire Station Commander.. recommended to
build such buildings after conform (sic) all the
requirements of PP 1185. It is further alleged by the
complainants that the proposed location is in the
heart of the thickly populated residential area of
Calasiao. Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate
the allegations as the same is within a designated
Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease
and desist from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against
petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer
her gasoline station to another location.
ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS. ANTONIO
VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER
STEVEDORING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989)
FACTS:
Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia,
owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the port at
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After
said vessel had landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation took over the exclusive control of the
cargoes loaded on said vessel pursuant to the
Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and
petitioner Aboitiz.
The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside
the vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of
said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by
unloading the cargoes from said vessel. While the
crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had
already disembarked from said vessel obviously
remembering that some of his cargoes were still
loaded in the vessel, went back to the vessel, and it
was while he was pointing to the crew of the said
vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded
that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of
the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought
to the hospital where he later expired three (3) days
thereafter.
Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for
damages against petitioner for breach of contract of
carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that
at the time of the accident, the vessel was completely
under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring
Corporation as the exclusive stevedoring contractor of
Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from
the vessel of Aboitiz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable
for the death.
HELD:
Yes.
x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory
negligence, but it was the negligence of Aboitiz in
prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre
operator for the unloading of cargoes which was the
direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's
death.
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger
continues until the passenger has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the vessel owner's
dock or premises. 11 Once created, the relationship
will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the
carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who
remain on the premises a reasonable time after
leaving the conveyance are to be deemed
passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined
from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable
time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. 12 The carrier-passenger relationship is
not terminated merely by the fact that the person
transported has been carried to his destination if, for
example, such person remains in the carrier's
premises to claim his baggage.
It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted
the Court to rule as it did in said case is the fact of the
passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's
premises. That reasonableness of time should be
made to depend on the attending circumstances of
the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the
nature of its business, the customs of the place, and
so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of
the time element per se without taking into account
such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in
the cited case of La Mallorca there was no
appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to
leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at
bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the
victim met the accident. The primary factor to be
considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as
will justify the presence of the victim on or near the
petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.
It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of
petitioner's business as a shipper, the passengers of
vessels are allotted a longer period of time to
disembark from the ship than other common carriers
such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of
cargoes and the number of passengers it can load,
such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger
volume of both as compared to the capacity of a
regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship
passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual
practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his
baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off
the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period
of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim,
through the bare expedient of comparing the period of
time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that
the ruling in La Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at
bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine
enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in
reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana was still a
passenger at the time of the incident. When the
accident occurred, the victim was in the act of
unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do,
from petitioner's vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is
duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
their destination but also to afford them a reasonable
time to claim their baggage.
Centano v. Villalon-Pornillos
Case No. 54
G.R. No. 113092 (September 1, 1994)
Chapter V, Page 228, Footnote No. 203
FACTS:
In 1985, the officers of Samahang Katandaan ng
Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose
of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay in Bulacan.
Martin Centeno, chairman of the group, approached
Judge Angeles, President of Tikay, and the latter
solicited P 1,500. However, this solicitation was made
without a permit from the DSWD and as a result, it
was contended that Centeno violated P.D. 1564,
which states Any person to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes
shall secure a permit from the regional Office of the
Department of Social services and Development.
ISSUE:
W/N the phrase charitable purposes in P.D. 1564 is
meant to include
religious purposes.
HELD:
No. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by
interpretation or construction, be extended to others.
The 1987 Constitution treats the words charitable
and religious separately and independently from
each other. Since P.D. 1564 merely states that
charitable or public welfare purposes need a permit
from DSWD, this means that the framers of the law
never intended to include solicitations for religious
purposes within its coverage. The term charitable
should be strictly construed to exclude solicitations for
religious purposes. Moreover, since this is a criminal
case, penal law must be construed strictly against the
State and liberally
in favor of the accused.
Manabat v. De Aquino
Case No. 161
G.R. No. L-5558 (April 29, 1953)
Chapter V, Page 229, Footnote No. 208
FACTS:
Petitioners were ordered to pay P 1,261.74 plus
interest for usury, wherein the couple failed to appear
in court and present evidence in the hearing. Notified
of the decision on September 7, 1951, they filed for an
appeal by registered mail on September 22 of that
same year. However, the papers were actually
received by the court on September 24. Thus, the
Judge of First Instance declared that the appeal was
late and dismissed it.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the appeal was deemed filed on
September 22, when they were
deposited by registered mail, or Sept 24, when they
were actually received
by the court.
2. W/N the appeal has been perfected within 15 days.
HELD:
Yes. The appeal was perfected within 15 days. Rule
27 Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court must be applied which
will result to the date of deposit in the post office by
registered mail of court papers as the date of filing.
Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify
procedure. Thus, Petitioners filed their appeal just in
time.