DUE PROCESS
before their compulsory retirement
CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT
FACTS: In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92),
limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject
to yearly renewal or cancellation
On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbour Pilots Association
and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas,
questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92
On December 23, 1992, the OP issued an order directing the PPA to
hold in abeyance the implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92On
March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary
for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and
lifted the restraining order issued earlier
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
damages, before Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 is constitutional
HELD: the Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in
stark disregard of respondents' right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court said that In order to
fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur,
namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done
without proper observance of due process. As a general rule, notice
and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due
process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the
nature of a property right. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92
unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their profession
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
An information is filed against former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada a.k.a. 'Asiong Salonga' and 'Jose Velarde,' together with
Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan
or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas
and John Does & Jane Does of the crime of Plunder under RA
7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder)
o June, 1998 to January 2001: Estrada himself and/or in
connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused, who are
members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates and/or
other persons, by taking undue advantage of his official
position, authority, relationship, connection, or influence,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or
indirectly, ill-gotten wealth of P4,097,804,173.17 thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines, through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means
o Received P545,000,000.00 in the form of gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit, by
himself and/or in connection with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, and John Does and Jane Does, in
 consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling
o Diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting or
misusing directly or indirectly, for his or their personal
gain and benefit, public funds of P130,000,000.00, more
or less, representing a portion of P200,000,000.00)
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of
Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself and/or in
connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and other John Does & Jane
Does
o For His Personal Gain And Benefit, The Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) To Purchase
351,878,000 Shares Of Stocks, More Or Less, And The
Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 Shares Of
Stock, More Or Less, Of The Belle Corporation worth
P1,102,965,607.50 and P744,612,450.00 respectively
and by collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by
himself and/or in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does, commissions or percentages by reason of said
purchases which became part of the deposit in the
equitable-pci bank under the account name Jose
Velarde
o by unjustly enriching himself from commissions, gifts,
shares, percentages, kickbacks, or any form of pecuniary
benefits, in connivance with John Does and Jane Does,
P3,233,104,173.17 and depositing the same under his
account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-Pci Bank
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since
for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal
prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code
April 4, 2001: Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations, docketed as:
1. Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659
2. Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively
3. Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees)
4. Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal
Code)
5. Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085)
April 11, 2001: Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds
of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. - Denied
April 25, 2001: Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case
No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused
June 14, 2001: Estrada moved to quash the Information in Crim.
Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based
was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than 1 offense Denied
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari are:
1. The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague
2. The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate
crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to
due process
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum,
and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so classify it
ISSUES: W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional (consti1)
HELD: Petition is dismissed. Plunder Law is constitutional. YES
Miserably failed in the instant case to discharge his burden and
overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law
Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature
of his violation.
Combination- at least two (2) acts falling under different
categories of enumeration
series - must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration
pattern - at least a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d)
Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine - a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law
o The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice
o can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly
vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
clause or by construction
o a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
o the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle
o As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications
Overbreadth Doctrine - a governmental purpose may NOT be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms
o overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to
protected conduct
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from
their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases.
CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE PERFECTO LAGUIO
FACTS: On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District
which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the
enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC
reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as
tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs
can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City
reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as
provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the
purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC
noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for
the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching,
is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject
to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the
public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was
an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The Classification of Hotels, motels, Hostel, and lodging house are
different from sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls. The
Supreme Court Said that it is baseless and insupportable.
In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it
substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its
property. Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of
property must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules
and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid. The Ordinance
however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is
an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and personal
rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of
trade, it cannot, even under the guise of exercising police power, be
upheld as valid
ACEBEDO OPTICAL VS CA
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to
operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists,
Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached
various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent
upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists.
Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city
(but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was
charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the
validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that
Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it
acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special
conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions
were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the
permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor
is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its
business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the
jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the
mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application
therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of
police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in
the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or
ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the
granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege
estoppel does not apply
SUFFRAGE
KABATAAN PARTY-LIST VS. COMELEC
FACTS: In the instant case, the petitioners, Kabataan Party-List, seeks
to extend the voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and
local elections from October 31, 2009, as fixed by COMELEC
Resolution No. 8514, to January 9, 2010 which is the day before the
120-day prohibitive period starting on January 10, 2010.
The petitioners anchor its ground on the provision of Section 8 of R.A.
8189 which reads: "The personal filing of application of registration of
voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer
during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be
conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special
election."
On the other hand, COMELEC maintains that the Constitution and the
Omnibus Election Code confer upon it the power to promulgate rules
and regulations in order to ensure free, orderly and honest elections;
that Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 authorize it
to fix other dates for pre-election acts which include voters
registration; and that the October 31, 2009 deadline was impelled by
operational and pragmatic considerations, citing Akbayan-Youth v.
COMELEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has the authority to fix the
voter's registration beyond the prohibitive period set forth by R.A.
8189.
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.
It held that the right of every Filipino to choose its leaders and
participate to the fullest extent in every national or local election is so
zealously guarded by Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
The Court explained that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 decrees that voters be
allowed to register daily during office hours, except during the
period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before
a special election. The Court is bound to respect the determination of
Congress that the 120 day or 90 day period, as the case may be, was
enough to make the necessary preparations with respect to the
coming elections and COMELEC's rule making power should be
exercised in accordance with the prevailing law.
R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436 is not in conflict with the mandate of
continuing voter's registration under R.A. 8189. R.A. 6646 and R.A.
8436 both grant COMELEC the power to fix other period for pre-
election activities only if the same cannot be reasonable held within
the period provided by law. However, this grant of power, is for the
purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage -- the
common underlying policy under R.A. 8189, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 8436.
In the case at bar, the Court did not find any ground to hold that
continuing voter's registration cannot be reasonably held within the
period provided by R.A. 8189.
With regard to the Court's ruling in Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, The
court explained that if the petitioners had only filed their petition, and
sought extension, before the 120 day prohibitive period, the prayer
would have been granted pursuant to the mandate of R.A. 8189.
As a result, the petition was granted and the COMELEC resolution
fixing voters registration for the May 10, 2010 national and local
elections on October 31, 2009 was declared null and void.
ROMUALDEZ VS RTC
FACTS: Philip G. Romualdez is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
and a son of a former governor of Leyte Benjamin Kokoy and sole
nephew of First lady Imelda Marcos. He served as a barangay captain
of the said place during snap election in 1986. He fled the country and
went to U.S. and sought asylum, took special studies in the
development of Leyte-Samar with International business studies as
well. When Romualdez came back in the Philippines and run in
National Congress the Commission on Election allowed him to vote
and have him registered on precinct 9 of Tolosa, Malbog Leyte where
he had resided. However, Advincula filed a petition questioning the
registration of Romualdez to the said Municipality in MTC. The former
allege that Romualdez was not a resident of the said municipality
because he leave the country and resided in U.S. Massachussets. He
just recently arrive here and didnt acquired 1 year residency here yet.
The MTC denied the petition of Advincula in the Registration of
Romuladez on the said precinct and the right to suffrage. But the RTC
reverse the discretion and disqualified the voter registration of
Romualdez favoring the petitioner. The respondent prayed that the
MTCs discretion over questioning his right to suffrage will be affirmed.
ISSUE:
1. WON MTC and RTC will find jurisdiction over respective petitions.
2. WON respondents court will not stray the investigation
regarding his sudden leave in the country, abandoning his residency in
Tolosa.
RULING:
The petition was impressed merit, although the said respondent had
leave the country. He Is still a sovereign here in the Philippines and not
to question his right to suffrage. The self-exile of the respondent was
for the purpose of safety and security to his family from the rage of
Marcos regime. The respondent was a domicile in U.S. but it doesnt
mean that there would an estopped to exercise his privilege as a
Filipino citizen in registering his name from the said precinct in Leyte:
questioning right to suffrage. The petition was GRANTED WITH DUE
COURSE, RTCs discretion was reverse and the TRO issued is in
permanent to question the decision of the trial court, initiating a no
cost promulgation, and MTCs decision is hereby REINSTATED.
AKBAYAN VS COMELEC
FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other
youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters
for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended
on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21
be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-
Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able
to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8
of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth
however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the
COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can
reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if
the original period is not observed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to
the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no
voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the
regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by
measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power,
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that
even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted
authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not
indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and
the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA
8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.
Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration,
COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will
substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters
because the additional voters from the special two day registration will
have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be
inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information
sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001
elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes
after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience
than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are
disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths pleading
was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter
about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters
registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et
al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension
because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not
appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who
slumber on their rights.
MACALINTAL VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity
of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions
the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an
immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of the
requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote
for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects
the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates
for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it
violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered
to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are
required to physically reside in the Philippines within the period
required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in
election laws, domicile and resident are interchangeably used.
Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws
is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an
affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is
considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being
 qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be exact). If the Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing
immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified and proclamation of the presidential and vice presidential
as an absentee voter. elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.
intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that