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SUSANNE BOBZIEN
ABSTRACT
In this paper I argue that the "discovery"of the problem of causal determinism
and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a mix-up of
Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)inter-
pretationof Aristotle's philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of
Stoic theory of determinismand moral responsibility.The (con-)fusion originates
with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd cen-
turyA.D. It undergoesseveraldevelopments,absorbingEpictetan,Middle-Platonist,
and Peripateticideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision
and an exposition of the "free-will problem" in Alexander of Aphrodisias' On
Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him.
The last two types of freedom (6 and 7) differ from freedom from force,
etc. (5), in that the latter only rules out force, compulsion and neces-
sitation, whereas 6) and 7) also rule out full causal determination, e.g.
based on nothing but universal regularity of the respective causal factors.
The list of types of freedoms 1) to 7) is evidently neither exhaustive nor
exclusive.
2 Except perhaps the problem in Arist. EN III 5 (1114a3-1114b25), but even that
is doubtful.
I
To t6i)cvaTov elvat, TWV amkwv 6ca'VtO3v
1VptEaTIKOT(OV nEpt t E to autov at a)
obugv &h gi1oinwoi n?( nlfi4kveIv, GotEE 0.to. Cf. Nem. Nat. hom.
icyntvacxittov,
105.18-21 (Morani), Alex. Fat. 176.21-2; 181.21-5; 185.7-9, Mant. 174.2-7; see also
section 8.2 of my Determinismand Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford 1998).
4 Cf. Alex. Fat. ch. 13, Nem. Nat. hom. 105-6 and see below. Despite its simple
form, the definition is highly technical. For a detailed discussion see sections 8.1 and
8.4 of Bobzien, Determinismand Freedom....
6 Matters are complicated by the fact that when the one-sided causative ip' 'Iniv
9 Cf. the titles of chs. 22 and 23; see also Alex. Fat. ch. 39.
" Alcin. Didasc. ch. 26, Nem. Nat. hom. e.g. 110, 125-6, Calc. Tim. 142-187, [Plu.]
Fat. passim, Apul. Plat. 1.12, perhaps an echo in Alex. Mant. ch. 25 183.
Is So Moraux,Der Aristotelismus... II, 495-6, following Gercke and others. There
is a problemin thatthe texts thatreportfrom this theoryareeitherclearly later(Nemesius,
Calcidius) or cannot be dated with any certainty(Alcinous, [Plutarch]).It is also clear
that over time the theory underwent extensive step-by-step development, and many
elements of the theory as reportedby Calcidius and Nemesius are certainly later than
the 2nd century.
16 Nem. Nat. hom. 103-4, [Plu.] Fat. 570f.-572f., Calc. Tim. 155-6.
17 See e.g. Theophrastusin Stob. Ecl. I 89.2-5, Alex. Fat. 211.1-4, Mant. ch. 25,
Nem. Nat. hom. 112.13-15 for such lists.
30 We do not know who first broughttogether the Nicomachean Ethics and the De
Interpretationein this context. We do know that Aspasius wrote a commentary not
only on the former, but also on the latter, which is however lost; cf. Moraux, Der
Aristotelismus... II, 231.
n' The same ambiguity is connected with &ja in Aristotle's phrase &vatat -ja t&
aZVrtKielEVa from De Interpretatione13 23a3-4.
32 Cf. e.g. J. Dillon, Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism, Oxford 1993, 160-4.
Alcinous flourishedsome time between the Ist and 3rd centuryA.D. I assume the sec-
ond half of the 2nd century or the early 3rd century as a likely date; but he may be
even later: cf. T. Goransson,Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, Studia graeca et latina
gothoborgensia 61, Goteborg, 1995.
cEgi'ow
3 'H SE roi Suvaroi) p'ot; nE'XroE jietoa4i 0to TEaXIOoi ICaiToi Nie58oi),
&optUp &E OVTt a1sq m qnrEt (ooiep E'ROXEICal TO lp' fuiiV. O 8' av ?XogEVov TIROiv
i koSi
yevilrat, robco E&Yrat pis
`4 T6o8E 8uvatov ... &optaTaivov &?'rp ?P' iv 0v
T&iv iw' oioCEpov o-
caTa Xai-
iVEt TiOO id?VEvv fii . As Whittaker(in his comments in the Budd edition, Paris
1990, 134 n. 424) has pointed out, the whole section reflects Aristotelianthought and
terminology.
" The two passages quoted are most remarkablealso for the fact that in them Esp'
iqjAvdoes not refer to the things that depend on us, but to some kind of decision mak-
ing faculty.
36 Cf. Alex. Fat. 177.7-14; Boeth. Int. II 208.1-3. In the Alexander passage the
example of the sea-battle draws the link to De Interpretatione9 and the terminology
and theory is Stoic, although presumablynot early Stoic, and Alexander connects the
argumentwith the theory of fate.
37 On this point I agree with Bob Sharples, see Sharples in P. Moraux, Der
things for the most parthe is not concernedwith acts of choice, but with
the relationbetween one's choices and their realisation:38 far more often
than not one actually does what one has chosen to do. Alexander'stwo
examplesfor what happens"in equal parts"on the otherhandinvite a sta-
tistical interpretation.They are both cases where one cannot easily say
that Socratesdoes them more often than not, or less often than not.39
Thus Alexander,though acquaintedwith the concept of the "in equal
parts"seems not to have made the connectionbetween it and that which
depends on us. Nonetheless, it seems likely that he knew the account
of what dependson us which in Nemesius was identifiedwith that of the
"in equal parts";that he understoodit as implying indeterminism;and
that it was a precursorof his own concept. If we trustAlexander'sown
words, in his On Fate ch. 26 (196.24ff.) he presents one of a number
of argumentsof his opponentswhich were meant to criticise "that that
which dependson us is such as the commonconceptionof humanbeings
believes it to be." The main point of the argumentis the claim thata two-
sided Cp'i'JAvwould precludeit thatvirtuesand vices dependon us, since
at the time when we are virtuouswe are not capable of acting viciously,
and vice versa. The argumentbegins:
If, they say, those things depend on us of which we are capable of <doing> also
the opposites...40
Thus, the two new featuresare: (i) the elementof choosing or not choos-
ing (EXia6t) to performan action, insteadof simply acting and not act-
ing; (ii) the introductionof a power (etovaia) which the individualon
whom somethingdependspossesses.43Both featuresare significantin that
they reflectimportantdevelopmentsof the understandingof moralrespon-
sibility and its relationto freedomin later antiquity.
what depends on us (i.e. the simple account, without reference to choosing and/or
power) occurs only in the opponents' argumentin ch. 26. Of the four closest passages
one contains ?tovixa (Fat. 180.2), one the verb "to choose" (Mant. 174.32); the
remaining two (Mant. 170.1, 171.24) are from ch. 22 of the Mantissa which in any
event presents a position quite differentfrom Alexander's in his On Fate and Mantissa
ch. 23; of these Mant. 171.24 does not provide an account either. However, the fact
that the two first-mentionedpassages are so close to the "Middle-Platonist"one, and
each only adds one of Alexander's additional features, makes it the more likely that
Alexander's accounts are a development of the more basic "Middle-Platonist"one that
resulted from Aristotle exegesis.
" E.g. Fat. 180.26-8, 181.5-6, 13-14, 184.18-19.
4S In ch. 23, which seems to present Alexander's view, there is no definition of that
which depends on us with "to choose," but choosing plays a major role passim; e.g.
Mant. 174.9-12, 175.23-5. In ch. 22 xpoatp-ioOat is used instead of acdp6aOal(Mant.
171.22-4, 172.10-12).
4 Ex libero arbitrio, ut quod possum et velle et non velle, an velim hoc antequam
fiat incertum est.
4' I argue this point more fully in Bobzien, Determinism..., Section 7.1.
Nat. hom. 110.7-9, Max. Tyr. 41.5a, Justin.Apol. 44, Porphyryapud Stob. Ecl. 11 164;
see also Tacit. Ann. 6.22.
s This theory, the earlierst traces of which are preserved in Tacitus Ann. 6.22 and
Plu. Quaest. Conv. 740c, maintains that certain human activities are not fated but
caused by the person, whereas the consequences of these activities are fated. Cf. e.g.
Den Boeft, Calcidius..., 28-34.
the will. However, it is neither a separate faculty or part of the mind (i.e. one that
can be in conflict with other faculties or parts of the mind), nor is it free in the sense
of being causally independentin its choices.
who has the power from the things over which they have the power in a
way that cannotbe done in cases of type (2). The king's power over liv-
ing and dying can be concernedwith other people's lives. The king's
power to live and die is concernedwith his own condition.In case (1),
the agent becomes a "decisionmaker,"in case (2) this is not so. The syn-
onymity of "having the E'ouaia" and "being lCipto;" over something in
Alexandersuggeststhatwe have case (1) in his accountsof what depends
on us. Somethingdependson us if we are in controlover doing/choosing
and not doing/choosingit. This is noticeablydifferentfromthe earlierfor-
mulationwith biovaaOat: there clearly a two-sidedcapacitywas at issue.
But owing to the introductionof "doing/choosingsomething or its
opposite,"Kc6pto;and E4ouaia do not functionin the same way anymore
as they did in Aristotleand Epictetus:in the latterauthorsit was the fact
that nothinghinderedus from doing or choosing somethingthat made us
have controlover them. In Alexander'saccount,the termsare (at least at
times)58understooddifferently:what makes us have controlover things is
the fact that we are causally undeterminedin our decision and thus can
freely decide between doing/choosingor not doing/choosingthem. The
elementof free decision in Alexander'saccountthus lies not in the addi-
tion of the phrase"choosingor not choosing,"but in the introductionof
the term "Eoouaia." We can thus see that the change to tE>ouaia in the
account may have been of great significance,since it provideda way to
express that the agent is a causally undetermineddecision maker. The
introductionof the term into this context is then also one furtherstep
towardsthe conceptof a free will, since such a conceptrequiresan inde-
pendentfaculty of decision making.
It may also be worth consideringin this context the relationbetween
the expressions E4ouiaiaand au'tEnoGtoov. A link between them, although
in a deterministicsetting, can be observedalreadyin Epictetus.59 Some-
thing is in my own power (a uo,atoov) if I have power (F4ouaiaa) over
it in the sense thatnothingcan preventme from doing it. Epictetusclearly
contrastsau'e4oi'ato;with someoneelse's i4ovaia overoneself.AuT?,e0oiaO;
indicates that something is outside the sphere of influence of others,
and because of that in the sphere of my power. I suggest that a similar
60
r j
ti^tV 8xepov REpO5 tiV TO Icar&ti1v ttr? pav Opiiv ij5r
sogvou,
ytIvOEvov ([Plu.] Fat. 571d-e).
61 XyogEv toivvv yEvuKG 1rivva a 'i5u& i KIV K icpan6ieVa e p' fLVtVFvat ...
(Nem. Nat. hom. 114.15-16, cf. 102).
&yai cat ;n iodv aYtta, aurat duux, iv
62 OV yap itpoatpexEov il (p{ot; 11o
kyovrat q Sit' iowiv ytyvo6pEvat (Mant. ch. 22 172.7-9).
63 PoX?6o?6a &e iEpi ?Gv ?'
bpI v ica irpacov .... Twv 8' avOpZwv ?icamot
pouX6ovrat ax tpt (v 0i 'aOvr&ivrpa=Cov.. .. 'oa Yiverat S'6 TfLv, gii w,a-ui$toK
a8Et' ,
nept soivmv fo0v6gea.... Cf. also Arist. EN 11 2b27, 111Ib23-4, 26.
64 This is reminiscent of Plato' struggle with not-being, e.g. in the Sophist; cf. also
Cicero, Fat. 18... ut sine causa fiat aliquid, ex quo existet, ut de nihilo quippiam
fiat...; Augustine, Lib. arb. 201-5.
65 This is very different e.g. in Cicero's On Fate 11 and Alexander's On Fate
ch. 6, where the agents are envisaged as overcoming their nature or habit.
' Note also the strange restriction on indeterminism when he writes: "we have
this power of choosing the opposite and not everything that we choose has pre-
determiningcauses because of which it is not possible for us not to choose this" (Fat.
XIII. Results
The problemof the compatibilityof causal determinismand freedomto
do otherwise appearsto have been formulatedonly in the 2nd century
69 Cf. e.g. Alcin. Didasc. 153.4-5, i be np6t; V SXoy ; cv pyEta 8t& cra-o;
OVOl?VogE