152
Founding Directors:
P. Dibon t (Paris) and R.H. Popkin (Washington University, St. Louis & UCLA),
Sarah Hutton (The University of Hertfordshire , United Kingdom), Richard Popkin (Washing-
ton University, St Louis & University of California, Los Angeles, USA)
Editorial Board: J.E Battail (Paris); E Duchesneau (Montreal); J. Force (Lexington);
A. Gabbey (New York); T. Gregory (Rome); C. Laursen (Riverside); J.D. North (Gronin-
gen); M.J. Petry (Rotterdam) ; J. Popkin (Lexington); Th. Verbeek (Utrecht)
Advisory Editorial Board: J. Aubin (Paris); B. Copenhaven (Los Angeles); A. Crombie
(Oxford); H. Gadamer (Heidelberg) ; H. Gouhier (Paris); K. Hanada (Hokkaido University);
W. Kirsop (Melbourne); P.O. Kristeller (Columbia University); E. Labrousse (Paris); A.
Lossky (Los Angeles); J. Malarczyk (Lublin); J. Orcibal (Paris); W. ROd (Miinchen); G.
Rousseau (Los Angeles); H. Rowen (Rutgers University, N.J.); J.P. Schobinger (ZUrich); J.
Tans (Groningen)
SCEPTICISM IN THE
ENLIGHTENMENT
Edited by
RICHARD H. POPKIN
Washington University, St Louis and University of California Los Angeles,
USA
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction ix
1. Scepticism in the Enlightenment
Richard H Popkin
2. Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter Part of the Eighteenth
Century
Richard H Popkin 17
3. The "Weakness" of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment
Giorgio Tonelli 35
4. Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment
Giorgio Tonelli 51
5. Kant and the Ancient Sceptics
Giorgio Tonelli 69
6. Leibniz and.Scepticism
Ezequiel de Olaso 99
7. The Two Scepticisms of the Savoyard Vicar
Ezequiel de Olaso 131
8. Scepticism, Old and New
Ezequiel de Olaso 147
9. New Views on the Role of Scepticism in the Enlightenment
Richard H Popkin 157
10. Berkeley in the History of Scepticism
Richard H Popkin 173
Index of Names 187
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
ix
R.B. Popkinet al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, ix-xiii.
1997 Kluwer AcademicPublishers.
x Richard H Popkin
The papers gathered here together, of which eight have appeared previously,
[Tonelli's paper on "Kant and the ancient sceptics" appeared in German, and
here appears in English translation for the first time] and two are published for
the first time, have a unifying theme of following out a new way of looking at
the kind of philosophical scepticism that developed during the eighteenth
century, a way that I believe is most illuminating in understanding the course
of philosophy at the time and thereafter. The discussion between myself and my
two cohorts in this enterprise, began immediately on my presentation in
Geneva in 1963. Giorgio Tonelli was present at the occasion and began a
research project on eighteenth century scepticism. He first published a lengthy
review of my History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes of 1960 in,
Filosofia XV, 2, 1964 (also appearing separately under the title Un libro sullo
scetticismo da Erasmo a Descartes, Torino 1964) dealing in great detail with the
special methodological problems of this theme, and thereafter publishing a
series of ground breaking articles which were intended to lead to a volume on
the history of scepticism in the eighteenth century, unfortunately not completed
because of Tonelli's untimely death in 1979.
Ezequiel de Olaso, whom I first met in 1965 when he was finishing his
doctoral studies at Bryn Mawr College with Jose Ferrater Mora , was working
out Leibniz's place in this new outlook on eighteenth century scepticism. He
published many important studies on the matter, including the one in this
volume. He also undertook to analyze Jean-Jacques Rousseau's place in our
story of scepticism in the Enlightenment, and in one of the unpublished papers
he sought to delineate some of the differences between ancient and modern
scepticism.
My two collaborators in this venture both sadly died in the bloom of their
scholarly achievements. I hope that this volume will make their most original
work on this subject better known, and better used in further studies by
scholars.
Before getting to the contents of this volume let me first given some
biographical facts about the authors. I was born in New York in 1923, and
did most of my university studies at Columbia University, plus one year of
graduate study at Yale. I earned my Ph.D. in 1950. I have taught in many
American universities, including the University of Connecticut, the State
University of Iowa, the Claremont Colleges, the University of California, San
Diego, Washington University, S1. Louis, and UCLA. I am now professor
emeritus from Washington University in S1. Louis and adjunct professor of
History and Philosophy at UCLA. I have been publishing about matters
concerning the history of scepticism since 1950. My book, which greatly
influenced both Tonelli and Olaso, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to
Descartes was first published in 1960. A revised edition covering from Erasmus
to Spinoza appeared in 1979, and I hope to complete a final version of the
volume covering the subject from Savonarola to Bayle's article on Savonarola
in the next couple of years. Oxford University has contracted to publish this
volume.
Giorgio Tonelli was born in 1928 in Italy. He did his undergraduate and
Introduction xi
Richard H Popkin
Pacific Palisades, California
April 1997
Introduction xiii
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DETAILS
They [the pyrrhonists] have a kind of weapon that they call the diallel, which
they wield at the first instant it is needed. After this is done, it is impossible
to withstand them on any subject whatsoever. It is a labyrinth in which the
thread of Ariadne cannot be of any help. They lose themselves in their own
subtleties, and they are overjoyed at this, since this serves to show more
clearly the universality of their hypothesis that all is uncertain, not even
excepting the arguments which attack uncertainty....
Later on in this essay, Bayle asserted , 'One must necessarily choose between
philosophy and the Gospel. If you do not want to believe anything but what is
evident and in conformity with the common notions, choose philosophy, and
leave Chr istianity. If you are willing to believe the incomprehensible Mysteries
of religion, choose Christianity and leave philosophy. For to have together self-
evidence and incomprehensibility is something that cannot be'. His officialview
is finally stated, 'Let us say also that the highest degree of faith is that which on
divine testimony embraces the truths which are the most opposed to reason'.
'This view has been set forth in a ridiculous light, coming from the pen of a
master [the free-thinker, St. Evremond]. 'The Devil take me if I believed
anything ', the Marechal d'Hocquincourt is made to say, 'But since that time I
could bear to be crucified for religion. It is not that I see more reason in it than
I did before; on the contrary, I see less than ever. But I know not what to say to
you, for I would submit to be crucified without knowing why or wherefore. So
much the better, my Lord, replied the Father, twanging it very devoutly
through the nose, so much the better; these are not human impulses, but are
inspired by heaven. Away with reason ; this is the true religion, away with
reason. What an extraordinary grace, my Lord , has heaven bestowed upon
you!"
Bayle's most forceful statement of the dubiousness of all rational theories,
and this as the prelude to completely blind faith , was followed in the next few
years by a series of polemical defenses of this view by 'the master of them that
doubt'. Over the next decades, Bayle's extreme scepticism was to be attacked by
all sorts of major and minor philosophers and theologians, while his avowed
fideism was to be ignored or ridiculed. Other new philosophies, like that of the
brilliant young George Berkeley, were to be interpreted and attacked as part of
Bayle's legacy.
4 R.B. Popkin
While Bayle, though he died in 1706, remained one of the major figures in
the intellectual world, another complete pyrrhonist - fideist turned up post-
humously to reinforce the concern with sceptical issues. The work of the
renowned scholar, Bishop Pierre Daniel Huet, who died in 1721, Le Traite de
lafoibless de l'esprit humain, was published over and over again in the 1720's, in
French, Latin, English, German and Italian." This opus caused a tremendous
stir, since Huet had used all the doubts of Sextus Empiricus, and of the
Montaigne tradition, to attack ancient and new philosophies as the prepara-
tion for the faith . The work was discussed and attacked all over the republic of
letters, and various Catholic authorities tried to maintain that it was a forgery,
produced to embarrass the church and to ruin the reputation of the most
erudite bishop of the age of Louis xiv,"
While Bayle and Huet remained living sceptical forces, there was a renewed
interest in publishing the original classic of pyrrhonism, the writings of Sextus
Empiricus. The first scholarly edition since 1621 was put out by the great
philologist J.A. Fabricius in 1718. Fabricius examined all of the manuscripts he
could find, gathered together all of the scholarly data on the subject (and
indicated that his countryman G.W. Leibniz had promised to write a commen-
tary and refutation of Sextus.") A few years later, in 1725, the Swiss
mathematician, Claude Huart, published the first complete French translation
of Sextus's Pyrrhoniaeum hypotyposes, with notes indicating that there should
be no conflict between complete scepticism and Christian faith, and that many
learned men from Montaigne, Charron and Gassendi, to Bayle and Huet, had
said the same thing. 10 These editions of Sextus, Bayle and Huet, plus the vast
number of articles in the journals of the time indicate that there must have been
a very great interest in and concern with pyrrhonism, and with its new variant,
Christian scepticism or fideism.
The negative side of the story shows this even more. From the very beginning
of the century, there are learned discussions by German professors about the
origins, causes and answers to scepticism. They debated whether Job and
Solomon were sceptics, and which one was the founder of the movement. One
such philosopher learnedly proclaimed in 1706 that the devil really started it
all, since he made our first parents doubt of the word of God himself. II
Various works indicated that pyrrhonists were everywhere, and were causing
all sorts of mayhem. The preface to the French translation of one of the earl of
Shaftesbury's works in 1710 explained that England was full of pyrrhonists.V
The Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay, who was to become Fenelon's
secretary and the teacher of Bonnie Prince Charlie, claimed that he was
initially led astray by a travelling pyrrhonist in Scotland .P The full expose of
the pyrrhonian menace was set forth, after years of work , by the Swiss
philosopher, Jean Pierre de Crousaz, in his Examen du pyrrhonisme. Crousaz
knew Claude Huart, the translator of Sextus, and discussed the problem of
pyrrhonism with him. Huart, according to Crousaz, was a complete pyrrho-
nist, but on his death-bed saw the light and was convinced of the dangers of the
view, and regretted having published his translation. Crousaz was apparently
impressed both by this personal tragedy, and by the moral, religious, and social
Scepticism in the Enlightenment 5
damage that he found everywhere from the deleterious views of Sextus, Bayle
and Huet.l" In various notes in the Bibliotheque germanique, from 1724
onward, mainly by Crousaz himself, it is reported that he is working on this
major opus, and that the work is most necessary because so many people are
being ruined by pyrrhonian doubt, especially as expressed in Bayle's writings. IS
Finally in 1733, the Examen du pyrrhonisme appeared, in folio, intended to be a
matching volume for those who owned Bayle's Dictionary, so that the antidote
could be next to the poison. Crousaz portrayed pyrrhonism as a universal
menace, undermining confidence in everything, and leading to such cata-
strophes as the South Sea island Bubble. With endless prolixity, Crousaz
launched his massive attack on every form of scepticism that appears in the
writings of Sextus , Bayle and Huet, with asides against bishop Berkeley.l"
This enormous tome represented, perhaps, the high point in concern with
the sceptical bacillus infecting the European intellectual world. What Crousaz
lacked in argumentation, he certainly made up for in bulk. Jean Le Clerc,
fifteen years earlier, had written a very detailed analysis and critique of Sextus
in reviewing Fabricius's edition. 17 Crousaz, though famous for his logic texts,
was unable to organize his critique by points, problems, arguments or anything
else; as the reviewers pointed out, and was unable to calm his suspicions about
the insidious effects of scepticism to try to see if the disorders of the world were
really due to Sextus, Bayle and Huet. Two other indefatigable anti-pyrrhonists
tried to salvage the meat of Crousaz's efforts , by reorganizing the opus, and
leaving out some of the McCarthyisms and innuendoes. J.H.S. Formey of the
Berlin Academy and Baron Haller did the best they could. Formey re-did the
work (and there is a touching letter of 1740 from Crousaz to Formey thanking
him for his efforts)! ", retitled it Le triomphe de l'evidence. Haller translated it
into German and added a preliminary discourse. Reorganized, cut, retitled, in
either French or German, the reviewers still found the work too diffuse and
imprecise to destroy the sceptical menace. 19 In view of the difficulty in locating
copies of either the Formey or Haller edition, the work did not seem to be as
popular as the bulky Crousaz original (which Mathieu Marais complained was
grossly overpriced at 24 or 25 livres. 'If it was in favor of pyrrhonism, this
would not be too dear. But against pyrrhonism, it is excessive'r'''
The great Crousaz crusade was ridiculed and rebutted in the 'Apologle de
monsieur Bayle, ou Lettre d'un sceptique sur l'examen du pyrrhonisme; pour
server de reponse au livre de m. de Crousaz sur le pyrrhonisme,' which
appeared in the 1739 edition of the Nouvelles lettres de Bayle. It was here
suggested that Crousaz was, perhaps, a pyrrhonist in disguise, really helping
the sceptics while pretending to attack them. Otherwise, why would his
arguments be so bad? And, the writer insists, pyrrhonism does lead to true
faith and not to irreligion. 'A pyrrhonist, a sceptic is truly in the state that the
Gospel prescribes for the faithful in matters of religion. He believes without
understanding, and even without seeking to understand.' This, the author
insists, really was Bayle's message, and not the melange of irreligion, immor-
ality, and doubt that Crousaz attributed to him. The effect of this confused
attack by Crousaz, it is claimed, is to make the sceptics surer that Bayle can't be
6 R.B. Popkin
refuted, and to make the dogmatists suspicious that they have no real defense
against Baylean scepticism. Hence, rather than saving the world from the ever-
increasing danger of pyrrhonism, Crousaz, in his own misguided way, has
really strengthened scepticism.i'
At the very moment when this claim was being made, the interest and
concern with scepticism was dying down almost completely, and a new
sceptical classic, Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature, was falling still-born
from the presses .F The last English edition of Bayle's Dictionary was just about
completed, soon to be replaced by the Encyclopedia Britannica. Huet was
turning into an historical curiosity rather than a serious philosopher, and
Sextus into a scholarly source. Young Hume was still living in a pyrrhonian
world, as other avant-garde thinkers around him were shifting their interests
and concerns to more positive, scientific ones. Hume was immersed in both
worlds, that of Bayle, and that of the Scottish naturalists who were applying the
Newtonian method to the moral subjects. His Treatise was an attempt to
introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects in the
tradition, he claimed, of Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Bishop Butler and
Francis Hutcheson, an attempt to solve all intellectual problems by finding the
Newtonian laws of human nature-a science ofman. 23 But it was also a struggle
with Bayle, and with the problem of the bas is of true and/or reliable beliefs.
We don't know the order of the composition of the work. It was written in
France from 1734-1737, after Hume's personal crisepyrrhonienne. In finished
form, it starts off most optimistically and 'scientifically'. After presenting his
law of the association of ideas that will explain so much , part ii presents a
struggle with Bayle's article 'Zeno of Elea', and the paradoxes of space and
time. Hume still is enthusiastic. He can answer the problems Bayle has posed.
Part iii develops a science of human reasoning in terms of the psychology of
belief. And then , though there are many clues of sceptical foreboding before,
the amazing part iv turns up on 'T he Sceptical and other systems of
philosophy, 'in which it is shown that the very principles of human nature that
keep us going as 'rational' beings, should lead us to complete doubt about all of
our reasonings and all of our sense experience. If we were consistent in our
mental behaviour, we should be in doubt about everything. Various Baylean
gambits are used to generate a scepticism with regard to reason, and a
scepticism with regard to the senses. The only thing that saves us from total
pyrrhonism is not blind faith, but nature. 'Philosophy would render us entirely
pyrrhonian were not nature too strong for it.'24 'This happy, therefore, that
nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from
having any considerable influence on the understanding. Were we to trust
entirely to their self-destruction, that can never take place , "till they have first
subverted all conviction, and have totally destroy'd human reason" , (Treatise,
i.iv. i).
The more we philosophize and analyze, the more we reveal the insoluble
sceptical difficulties that undermine the validity and reliability of all human
conclusions on any subject whatsoever. Sextus, Bayle, and Huet had all pointed
this out, with the utmost calm and serenity, and then had explained how we go
Scepticism in the Enlightenment 7
When he finds that the sceptical crisis is carrying him into 'philosophical
melancholy and delirium' to which there is no rational or scientific cure, it is
nature alone that saves him, not by providing any answers, but by diverting the
attention and the concern of the questioner (ibid.). For Hume, since religious
faith cannot provide the resolution, life becomes an alternation of sceptical
despair resulting from 'enlightened confidence' that we can find answers
through science, and the natural relief occasioned by animal faith , custom,
habit and instinct. For Hume, throughout all of his philosophical writings, the
sceptical crisis is never resolved, only temporarily abated by nature. We are
condemned to a schizophrenic existence, alternating between realizing that we
cannot find truth or certainty anywhere, and living dogmatically as if we had.
Hume reinforced Bayle's sceptical attack, enlarged on his and others psycho-
logical-biological explanation of how we do in fact acquire and retain beliefs,
and faced , in utter dismay, the havoc produced by the pyrrhonian challenge. He
could state the official answer of Bayle and Huet, as he did at the close of the
Dialogues concerning natural religion, that 'to be a philosophical sceptic is, in a
man ofletters, the first and most essential step towards being a sound, believing
Christian'r"
But, since he apparently could not make that first and most essential step, he
was faced with the terrifying realization of the uncertainty, the meaninglessness
and the emptiness of his world, and the terrors could only leave him when
nature kindly and miraculously took him out of the philosophical closet and
8 R.H Popkin
sent him into the diversions of the ordinary world. The new scientific data
about man, to which Hume contributed so much, would , he saw, provide no
hope of eliminating the problem, and of dispelling the nightmare of man
without faith .
Hume's picture at the conclusion of Book i of the Treatise of his desperate
loneliness and sceptical despair was shared by neither his intellectual friends in
Great Britain or France. The Treatise fell still-born from the presses , in part, I
believe, because no one could see why he was so sceptical, and why he was so
upset. Early reviewers could see that Hume was in the pyrrhonian tradition and
that he was not willing to accept his own sceptical conclusions. As one wrote "I
take it as well that his Paradoxes only favour pyrrhonism, and lead only to
consequences that the Author seems to disavow'v" What was troubling Hume
did not seem to affect his early readers. His friend Lord Kames, could make
little out of the Treatise, except for its psychological parts. When Hume's
reputation began to grow in the 1750's, and when he became the darling of the
French intellectual world, the problem was more evident. His admirers were
struck by the 'scientific' contribution of his History ofEngland and the Political
Discourses, but were left cold , unmoved and uninterested by his scepticism, and
his worries about the effects of a body of sceptical reasoning "that ... admit of
no answer, and produce no conviction'V" They saw that Hume was the
successor of Bayle in this respect, but they were not impressed by the
destructive efforts of either of them.
Professor Laurence Bongie, a couple of years ago, published a study, 'Hume,
" Philosophie" and philosopher in eighteenth century France', showing this
reaction amongst the leading thinkers of the French Enlightenment. Hume was
admired beyond belief by Grimm, Helvetius, Voltaire, Holbach among others.
His work in the moral sciences, and his critiques of religion were considered so
great that he was the only British writer admitted to their club on the Rue
Royale. The zenith of his fame and fortunes was during his tenure as secretary
to the British embassy in Paris , when he was invited to the salons, feted and
admired everywhere. But, his admirers could not find any value in his
epistemological writings, in his sceptical questioning. Prof. Bongie shows that
they read the Enquiry concerning human understanding, and found it diffuse and
uninteresting until they got to the essays, 'Of miracles', and 'Of providence and
a future state'. The Dialogues concerning natural religion dismayed some ,
because Hume was still raising doubts about the truth of atheism. The whole
complex of sceptical problems and untenable theories, the ever-enlarging
sceptical crisis , did not seem to make any sense, or to be of any importance to
the philosophes. Hume, the sceptic, was a man completely alone in the gay,
social whirl of the Paris salons. 28
The attitude of the philosophes to Bayle and to scepticism in general indicates
still further the gulf that existed between the one major living sceptic, and the
'enlightened' world around him. Voltaire had the greatest admiration for Bayle
'the greatest master of the art of reasoning that ever wrote', but Bayle 'has only
taught to doubt' and 'he combats himself.
Scepticism in the Enlightenment 9
the evidence of the senses, the distinction between the true and the false,
between good and evil, pleasure and pain, vice and virtue, etc. 'I will turn my
back on those who seek to draw me away from a simple question in order to set
me forth in dissertations on the nature of matter, on that of the understanding,
substance, thought, and other subject which have neither limits nor bounds'
(p.6l4a).
After refusing to take the sceptical questions seriously, though admitting that
they cannot be resolved, Diderot offered some final comments that seem to be a
rejection of Hume's schizophrenic pyrrhonism. A man cannot hold one view in
the closet, and another in society. What he has to believe in practice, he cannot
really doubt in theory. It would be a waste of time trying to argue with someone
who says he doubts there is an external world, or a self, since no one really
believes such things. Why bother with his arguments, if he cannot seriously
believe the conclusions? ' Let us occupy ourselves with something more
important' (p.6l4a). The strength of the sceptical arguments and their irrefut-
ability did not seem to bother Diderot, since the reasonable man had his basic
beliefs anyway, and had important matters to deal with in terms of these
beliefs, no matter how many questions the pyrrhonists, ancient and modern,
could raise about them. The philosophical delirium that troubled Hume,
caused by the fact that by nature we were believers, and by reason complete
doubters, did not disturb Diderot at all, since he was only concerned with our
actual beliefs, and was not affected by the manifold sceptical reasons for
doubting them.
Condillac made, perhaps, the most forceful exposition of this rejection of
pyrrhonism as a living issue in his Cours d'etude pour l'instruction du pr ince de
Parma. Here he discussed pyrrhonism, both ancient and modern, and
considered that the view, even in the Greek world, was an 'exces', leading to
absurdities. Considering the falsity of many ancient beliefs, Pyrrho might have
been more reasonable in doubting everything than in believing some of the
nonsense current in his times. But, what would have been more reasonable
would have been to look for better methods of knowing, once it was realized
that the then current ones were faulty." When he turned to modern scepticism,
Condillac first pointed out that the movement began again in the renaissance
as a kind of religious irrationalism, debunking reason in favor of faith . The
only modern sceptic who is discussed is Bayle, 'le plus savant et le plus
ingenieux sophiste qui ait jamais ete', His pyrrhonism may be understandable
if one supposed that there is no better method for seeking knowledge than that
of previous philosophy. 'But this scepticism falls of its own weight, if a good
method is pointed out for directing the mind, and if the demonstrated
discoveries are made clear. Now, what will appear astonishing is that the
century in which Bayle taught Pyrrhonism is precisely the century of the
greatest discoveries' (xx.iv. 190-191).
Then Condillac turns from Bayle to the 'vrais philosophes', the men of
genius who have discovered the truth. The section immediately following the
dismissal of Bayle is entitled , 'Beginning of the true philosophy, on astronomy
under Copernicus, Ticho- Brahe, Kepler and Galileo ' (xx.v. 191ff.). The scien-
Scepticism in the Enlightenment 11
had no meaning or relevance. The Condillacs and Condorcets were not going
to allow themselves to be side-tracked by questions about the ultimate validity
and certainty of their methods or their results. Action, not speculation, came
first, and the futile and fruitless quibbles of the sceptics were not to interfere .
While Hume, the man, flourished in the French Enlightenment, and Hume ,
the living embodiment of the pyrrhonian tradition and of its fundamental
challenge to human intellectual security and peace of mind, was ignored, a
glimmering of interest in the sceptical problems he posed appeared in two
other centers of the Enlightenment, Scotland and Berlin. The Scottish
philosopher, Thomas Reid, had been genuinely moved and shaken by Hume's
scepticism as posed in the Treatise, and saw that the pat answers of various
theologians missed the whole point. Reid, perhaps the first of his century, saw
that Hume , and Berkeley before him, indicated that all of modern thought led
to disastrous consequences concerning the possibility of man's attaining any
certain knowledge about the world around him. The resolution was to be found
not in ignoring Hume and Berkeley's challenge, or in scoffing at them, but in a
fundamental reconsideration of the whole structure of modern thought. Reid's
answer, which he worked on for many years, appeared in 1764.35 Hume was
not much impressed, as his letter to Reid indicates. He felt Reid had really seen
the problem, but had not found a solution, other than the one Hume himself
presented, that nature prevents us from being living sceptics, though we can
never resolve the sceptical problems. Hume's sole criticism of Reid was to point
out that there was a Scotticism in one of the chapters." Reid, in reply, said that
Hume's Treatise had led him to call in question the 'principles commonly
received amonly Philosophers'. If these principles are solid, then, Reid said,
there is no escape from Hume's sceptical finale to the history of philosophy. So,
his new theory, commonsense realism, was intended to save the entire
intellectual world from its pyrrhonian outcome that Hume had revealed.37
The Scottish realists, following on Reid, Richard Price, James Beattie, and
others , thought that they hadfinally found the answer to scepticism. Misguided
though I think they, and their more recent English followers may be, they saw
that Hume had posed a problem, and had unleashed a sceptical crisis that had
12 R.B. Popkin
1781, when Kant surveyed the whole problem to which he was addressing
himself, he pointed out that the dogmatic builders of metaphysical edifices had
sporadically been attacked by the sceptics, who were like nomadic tribes, never
settling anywhere. 'But their number was, very happily, small; and thus they
could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who persisted in raising
new edifices.' In recent times the hope had dawned all these disputes could be
settled by Locke's physiology of the understanding. But, this too was
challenged, and the very possibility of any knowledge put in question, by the
probing of Hume.t"
Kant shared Reid and Formey 's appreciation of the seriousness of Hume's
fundamental question, but he realized that a much more revolutionary
programme was needed to deal with it. Kant's Copernican revolution in
philosophy purported to reveal a compromise between an unvanquishable
scepticism about the possibility of any metaphysical knowledge about the
nature of reality, and a universal and necessary certainty (constituting genuine
knowledge) about the conditions of all possible experiences. Kant could see his
theory as the outgrowth and culmination of the history of scepticism, resulting
from seeing the full implications of what Hume had said. Kant could see that
Hume's bombshell had destroyed the hope of finding universal and necessary
knowledge by the experimental philosophy, the physiology of the understand-
ing of Locke and Newton, that had so impressed the philosophes. Hence, the
need for a complete and total reconsideration of the epistemological problem,
'How is knowledge possible?' Kant, and his disciple, Staiidlin, could see that
the central issue of eighteenth century thought, was how to deal with the
sceptical challenge, not how to ignore it. And , in putting scepticism back in the
centre of the stage, so that Kant 's achievement could appear as the final act of a
great dramatic struggle between scepticism and dogmatism, Kant actually
initiated the first act of a new period in the history of scepticism. Almost
immediately he was challenged on three sides, by three kinds of sceptical
critics, each posing an aspect of what had been part of the previous pyrrhonian
tradition. Solomon Maimon raised a Humean challenge against Kant's
structure of the a priori conditions of all experience. Schulze (signing himself
aensidemus) tried to show that the Kantian system led to a good old sceptical
denial of the possibility of any knowledge. And, that strange figure, J.G.
Hamann, reveled in the sceptical debacle he found in Hume and Kant, since,
for him, it provided the 'rationale' for an acceptance of faith without reason.
This survey of scepticism in the Enlightenment suggests, at least to me, that
the Enlightenment was pretty much a hiatus in the continuous development of
scepticism. The century opened with a tremendous amount of sceptical activity,
interest in sceptical themes, and controversies about scepticism. As far as
people in the mid-eighteenth century could see, the history of scepticism had
drawn to a close with Bayle and Huet. The new ways of knowing had
eliminated the need for doubt, and had opened up brilliant vistas of the
epistemological conquests to come. Bayle's total unraveling of the warp and
woof of man's intellectual world was at best an amusing commentary on what
life used to be like before the age of reason. Bayle and Huet's appeal to faith
14 R.B. Popkin
instead of reason was set aside in favour of a ferocious attack on the history
and nature of this faith. In this milieu, young Hume seemed to be an
anachronism, still worrying about Bayle's sceptical problems, instead of
spending all of his time usefully developing his science of man. Young Hume
worried, and practically panicked when he saw into the void that remained
when the fideistic element of the new pyrrhonism was removed. Though one of
the best practitioners of the experimental philosophy, he could find no ultimate
solace or answers in it, and could only waver between despair and diversion, as
reason or nature held sway. The French Enlightenment could adulate Hurne,
but only for his scientific work. They could neither appreciate nor share his
scepticism and his dismay. Their confidence was too strong to see any message
in the pyrrhonian tradition past, or living in their hero, Iebon David. Hume was
almost alone as the living representative of sceptical probing and the search for
some foundation or justification of man's intellectual world. The serenity of
Bayle and Huet was not his, since the Judeo-Christian tradition provided no
haven for him in this quest.
Though Hume may have lived most of his life in gay diversion, rather than in
agonizing searching , each time he wrote on the central issues of philosophy, the
same bottomless pits opened before him. Gradually he infected others with
concern - Reid in Scotland, Formey, Sulzer and Merian in Berlin. They saw
that Hume had exposed the raw nerve of modern thought, and all the
overconfident claims of Condillacs and Condorcets were not going to hide
this, or produce a remedy. When the sage of Konigsberg came to grips with this
problem, Hume 's one-man movement was soon seen as much more important
in man's intellectual journey through history, than that of anyone else of his
time. The scepticism that lived through the Enlightenment, in the person of
Hume , was to pose the challenge that we are still seeking to resolve - how can
we live with ultimate intellectual doubts about everything, and with an inability
to recapture the innocent faith of the pre-Enlightenment age?
NOTES
1. The French Reformed pastor, David Renaud Boullier, and Father Hubert Hayer refought this
battle ; cf. Boullier's Le Pyrrhonisme de l'eglise romaine, ou lettres du P.H.B.D.R.A.P. a mr.?" ,
avec les reponses (Amsterdam 1757); and Hayer's La Regie de foi vengee des calomnies des
Protestants; et specialement de celles de m. Boullier, ministre calviniste d'Utrecht (Paris 1761).
2. Besides some of the works to be discussed in this paper, see, for example, the abbe C.l Boncerf,
Le Vrai philosopher ou l'usage de la philosoph ie, relativement Ii la societe civile, Ii la verite et Ii la
vertu, avec l'histoire, l'expos ition exacts et la refutation du pyrrhonisme ancien et moderns (paris
1762); Jacob Brucke r, Historta critica philosophiae (2nd ed., Leipzig 1767), sections on
scepticism in vols. i and iv; lH.S. Formey, Histoire ahregee de la ph ilosophie (Amsterdam
1760); L. M. Kahle 's introduction to La Mothe Le Vayer's Cinq dialogues fa its Ii l'imitation des
anciens, nouvelle edition augmentee d'une refutation de la philosophie sceptique, ou preservatif
contre Ie pyrrhonisme (Berlin 1744); Lodovico Antonio Muratori, Delle forze del/'intendimento
umano , 0 sia il pirronismo confutato, opposto allibro del preteso monsignor Huet (Venezia 1745);
and the abbe Bon Francois Rivire Pelvert, Exposition succincte et comparaison de la doctrine des
anciens et des nouveaux philosophes (paris 1787), i.
3. See Harry M. Bracken, The Early reception ofBerkeley's immaterialism, 1710-1733 (The Hague
1959), where several critics who interpreted Berkeley this way are discussed.
Scepticism in the Enlightenment 15
4. See, for example, the review of Hume's Treatise in the Blbliotheque raisonne des ouvrages des
savans de l'Europe (1740), xxiv-324-355; (I 74 I), xxvi-411-427, esp. PP-328 and 353-355; and
M. Maty's review of Hume's Political discourses in the Journal britannique (1752), vii.243-267
and 387-411, esp. pp. 243-244, where Maty said that Hume's metaphysical and moral essays
were worthy of the pen of Pierre Bayle.
5. Carl Fridrich Staiidlin, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus (Leipzig 1794).
6. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique. The quotations are from my forthcoming new
translation of Selections from Bayle's Dictionary, 'Third Clarification', Indianapolis. Hackett
Publishing. 1991.
7. A list of editions is given by Muratori, op. cit, p.xxxv. The German translation is dated
Frankfurt-am-Mayn, 1724; and there were actually two English translations, one by Edward
Combe, The Weakness of human understanding (London 1725), second edition with appendix
(London 1725), and the other without indication of translator, entitled A Philosophical treat ise
concerning the weakness ofhuman understanding (London 1725); 2nd edition (London 1729).
8. See Memoires de Trevoux, (juin 1725), p. 989, where the authenticity of the work is denied. The
abbe Olivet defended the authenticity aga inst the claims made in the Memoires de Trevoux in his
Apologie (Paris 1726 and 1727). Each part of the Apologie was answered anonymously in the
same years. Olivet claimed that at least four manuscripts existed while Huet was alive. Jean Le
Clerc, in his review of the Traite, Bibliotheque ancienne et moderne (1722), xviii, p. 465, said that
he had seen a manuscript in Huet's handwriting, and that one cannot really doubt the work is by
him . The R . P. Baltus defended the orthodoxy of Huet's Christian scepticism, and claimed this
was the view of many of the church Fathers. See his 'Sentiment du R . P. Baltus jesuite, sur Ie
Traite de la foiblesse de I 'esprit humain', Cont inuation des Memoires de litterature et d 'histoire
(paris 1726), ii.I.i69-262.
9. Sextus Empiricus, Opera graece et latine (Leipzig 1718). See list of promised edition in
introduction for mention of the possibility of a commentary and refutation by Leibniz.
10. Sextus Empiricus , Les Hipotiposes ou institutions pirronienn es de Sextus Empiricus en trois livres
(traduit par Claude Huart) ([Amsterdam?] 1725). See preface, esp. pp . [3], [22].
II . Q.D.B.V. de scepticorum praecipuis hypothesibus, secundum constitutionem Fridericianum, Prae-
side Georgio Paschio (Kiloni [nod.]), p. 4. There are many dissertations on various aspects of
pyrrhonism, dating from the mid 17th century, onward until late in the 18th century, from
German, Dutch and other universities.
12. Cf. translator's preface to Shaftesbury's Essa i sur l'usage de la rail/erie et de 1 'enjoument dans les
con versat ions qui roulent sur les matieres les plus importantes (La Haye 1710), pp . iii.iv.
13. Cf. the manuscript autobiography of the Chevalier Ramsay at the Bibliotheque Mejanes, Aix-
en-Provence.
14. The discussion of Huart's case appears in Jean Pierre de Crousaz, La Logique ou systeme de
reflexions (4e ed ., Geneve 1741), V.II.129ff.
15. See Bibliotheque germanique (1724), vii.222; (1729), xviii.99-104; ( 1730), xx.114-144. Crousaz's
opus is reviewed in the Bibliotheque germanique (1733), xxvii-I4-36 and (1734), xxviii. 105-126.
16. Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonisme ancien &: modern (La Haye 1733). On the 3rd page of the
preface, Crousaz claims that the pyrrhonism of Bayle has led to corruption of the heart,
incredulity, and irreligion, and 'Qui pourroit meconnoitre les effets de l'Irreligion dans le Projet
& l'Oeconomie de ce qu'on a appelle Actions de Miss icipi, ensuite Direction du Sud , & tout
recemment dans celle de la Charitable Corporation?' Berkeley is attacked on p. 97.
17. Jean Le Clerc, review of the Fabricius edition of Sextus Empiricus, Bibliotheque ancienne et
moderne (1720), xiv. 1-113.
18. Letter of Crousaz to J.H.S . Formey, Lausanne, I June 1740, which is published at the end of the
German version of Formey's abridgement, entitled Prufung der Sekte die an allem zweifelt
(Gottingen 1751).
19. See, for example, the long review of Formey's Le Triomphe de l'evidence in the Bibliotheque des
sciences et des beau x arts (1757), vii.l60--185 and 472-491, esp. p. 161. Formey reviewed the
work in the Nouvelle bibliotheque germanique (1757), xx.87-93, and said on p.88 that his
pyrrhonian friend Louis de Beausobre (who will be discussed later) was the one who insisted
on the publication of the abridgement and revision that Formey had done years earlier.
16 R. H Popkin
20. Mathieu Marais, Journal et Memo ires, ed. par M. De Lescure (paris 1868), iv.451.
21. 'Apologie de mons ieur Bayle, ou lettre d'un sceptique sur I'Examen du pyrrhonisme; pour servir
de reponse au livre de M. de Crouzas sur Ie pyrrhonisme' in Nouvelles lettres de Mr. P. Bayle (La
Haye 1739), pp. xxv-Ixxxii. The quotation is on p. lviii. Barbier attributes the 'Apologie' to a M.
de Mon ier, ancien procureur general de la chambre des comptes de Provence.
22. David Hume, 'My own Life', published in The Letters of David Hume ; ed. by J.Y.T. Greig
(Oxford 1932), i.2, where he says, 'Never literary Attempt was more unfortunate than my
Treatise of human Nature. It fell dead-born from the Press; without reach ing such distinctions
as even to excite a Murmur among the Zealots '. E.C. Mossner , in his Life of David Hume
(Austin, Texas 1954), pp. 116-132 , shows that Hume had overstated the lack of interest or
response.
23. Hume, A Treatise ofhuman nature, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford 1951), title page and introduction.
24. Hume , An Abstract ofa treatise ofhuman nature (Cambridge 1938), P. 24.
25. Hume , Dialogues concerning natural religion, ed. by Norman Kemp Smith (London 1947), p.
228.
26. Review of Hume's Treatise in the Bibliotheque raisonnie des ouvrages des savans de l'Europe
(1740), xxiv.328. See also the review in the Nouvelle bibliotheque (1740), Vi.291-316, vii.44-63.
27. Hume , Enquiry concerning human understanding, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford 1951), p. 155n, where
Hume makes this remark about Berkeley's arguments in calling them actually sceptical ones.
28. Laurence Bongie, 'Hume,"Philosophe"and Philosopher in Eighteenth-Century France', French
Studies (1961), XV.213-227.
29. Voltaire , The Lisbon Earthquake.
30. Th is term appears at the beginning of Voltaire's Le Pyrrhonisme de l'histoire (M .xxvii.235). See
also the note explaining Voltaire's view of scepticism in his Steele de Louis XIV (M.xiv.76).
31. Douglas H. Gordon and Norman L. Torrey, The Censoring of Diderot's Encyclopedie, (New
York 1947)PP-47ff., 74-78.
32. Denis Diderot, 'Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophic', Encyclopedie xiii.613b.
33. Condillac, Cours d'etudes pour l'instruction du prince de Parme, iii.xxii, in Oeuvres philosophiques
de Condillac, ed. Georges Le Roy, (Paris 1948),ii.73-76.
34. Original version of a poem by Thomas Blacklock, as it appeared in Hume 's letter of 20 April
1756 to John Clephane, in Letters, i.231.
35. Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the human mind on the principles ofcommon sense.
36. Hume 's letter to Reid , 25 February 1763, in Letters, i.375-376
37. See Reid's reply of 18 March 1763, quoted in Letters, i.376n.
38. Hume , letter to William Strahan, 26 October 1775, in Letters , ii.301.
39. J.H .S. Formey, Histoire abregee de la philosophie (Amsterdam 1760), pp. 243-248 on 'De la
Secte des Sceptiques modernes'.
40. J.H.S . Formey, review of Philosophische Versuche iiber die Menschliche Erkenntniss, etc., in
Nouvelle bibliotheque germanique (1756), xix.78-109, 311-332; (1757), xx.57-86, 268-298;
(1757), xxi.65-81.
41. Formey's translation of Hume is entitled Essais philosophiques sur l'entendement humain
(Amsterdam 1758). J.B. Merian translated Hume 's Natural history of religion, in 1759, at the
request of Maupertuis, who couldn 't read English. Formey, Merian and Sulzer offered criticisms
of Hume in their translations, as well as in the proceedings of the Prussian Academy.
42. Louis de Beausobre, Le Pyrrhonisme raisonnable (Berlin 1755). There is another work with a
similar title which is attributed by Barbier to M.d'Autrey. This work is called Le Pyrrhonien
raisonnable, ou methode nouvelle proposie aux incredules (La Haye 1765). It contends that a
reasonable pyrrhonism, that is doubting what is 'really' dubitable, and accepting what is
plausible , leads to a defense of Catholic Christianity.
43. Platner's aphorisms appeared in Leipzig 1776-1782. J.C. Eschenbach's Sammlung der vornehm-
sten Schriftsteller die die wirklichke it ihres eignem Kiirpersund der ganzen Kiirperweltldugnen was
published in Rostock in 1756.
44. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Adickes (Berlin 1889), 'Vorrede zur ersten
Auflage vom Jahre 1781, p. 6.
R.H .POPKIN
In the twenty-five years that I have been examining the course of modern
scepticism, I have rarely ventured beyond Hume. In this paper I shall offer
some tentative views about the development of scepticism and anti-scepticism
in the latter part of the eighteenth century. In these decades the conflict
between two views seems to have been crucial for the future course of Western
thought. The way in which the conflict unfolded revealed the end of the Grand
Illusion that had dominated European man from ancient Greece until the
Enlightenment, that human rational activity could comprehend the cosmos .
In an early study on "Scepticism in the Enlightenment" 1 I contended that
philosophical scepticism , that is, the questioning of whether there can be
adequate or sufficient evidence to support knowledge claims about areas of
human concern, pretty much died out during the Enlightenment. The sort of
questioning posed by the sceptical tradition, primarily French, in the seven-
teenth century, seems to have ended with Pierre Bayle and Bishop Pierre-
Daniel Huet, along with its attendant avowal of fideism. The optimism of the
Enlightenment, with its conviction that human reason, properly freed and
illuminated, could find and was finding the truth, made scepticism part of the
dark pre-Newtonian, pre-Lockean age. Histories of scepticism, as a now
defunct movement, could be written , diagnosing why such a strange aberration
had flourished in by-gone ages." This is not to deny that some occasional,
mediocre versions of past glories of doubting did reappear on the scene in
France and Germany.' But for all practical or serious purposes, scepticism as a
living or vital movement was dead by the middle of the eighteenth century, save
in the person and thoughts of David Hume . Hume, raised in the glories of the
Newtonian epoch, and privately nurtured on the doubts of Pierre Bayle, sensed
a deeper and more modern sceptical crisis than his predecessors had perceived.
In his youth he had ventured on "a new scene of thought" and collapsed into a
nervous breakdown." He went to France in 1734, a youth of twenty-three ,
armed with his folio volumes of Bayle's Dictionary and Oeuvres diverses, to
compose his Treatise of Human Nature, a Newtonian attempt to introduce the
method of experimental reasoning into moral subjects.f The schizophrenic
result, of an optimistic psychologism that would explain all of man's intellec-
17
R.B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 17-34.
1997 Kluwer AcademicPublishers.
18 R. H. Popkin
As to the Scepticism with which the Author is charged, I must observe that
the Doctrines of Pyrrhonians or Scepticks have been regarded in all Ages as
Principles of mere Curiosity, or a Kind of Jeux d'Esprit, without any
Influence on a Man's steady Principles of Conduct of Life. In Reality, a
Philosopherm who affects to doubt of the Maxims of common Reason, and
even of his own Senses , declares sufficiently that he is not in earnest, and
that he intends not to advance any Opinion which he would recommend as
Standards of Judgment amd Action. All he means by these Scruples is to
abate the Pride of mere human Reasoners, by showing them, that even with
regard to Principles, which seem the clearest, and which they are necessi-
tated from the strongest Instincts of Nature to embrace, they are not able to
attain full Consistence and absolute Certainty. Modesty then , and Humility,
with regard to the Operations of our natural Faculties, is the Result of
Scepticism; not an universal Doubt, which it is impossible for any Man to
support, and which the first and most trivial Accident in Life must
immediately disconcert and destroy. 8
Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter 18th Century 19
'It seems evident, that the dispute between the sceptics and dogmatists is
entirely verbal, or at least regards only the degrees of doubt and assurance,
which we ought to indulge with regard to all reasoning: And such disputes
are commonly at the bottom, verbal, and admit not of any precise
determination. No philosophical dogmatist denies, that there are difficulties
both with regard to the senses and to all science; and that these difficulties
are in a regular, logical method, absolutely insolveable. No sceptic denies,
that we lie under an absolute necessity, notwithstanding these difficulties, of
thinking, and believing, and reasoning with regard to all kind of subjects,
and even of frequently assenting with confidence and security. The only
difference, then, between these sects, if they merit that name, is, that the
sceptic, from habit, caprice, or inclination, insists most on the difficulties;
the dogmatist, for like reasons, on the necessity."
as Adam Smith. The prevailing attitude to Hume in France is shown by the fact
that except for his History of England, his other works did not come out in
France or in French for about 100 years after the Revolution , although they
had been extremely popular earlier in the century. His Treatise of Human
Nature did not, in fact, appear in French until the 1940s.23 Hence concern with
Hume and his scepticism left the mainstream of French thought as the
Enlightenment came to realize that he did not shed conservatism and reaction
for progress and the new dogmatism of science.
In the British Isles, Hume's impact had a very different history. His views at
first were not as ignored as the author claimed, but whatever positive interest
there was seemed to come mainly from French Protestant refugees such as
Demaizeaux and Maty, familiar with Bayle's scepticism, and from Scottish
intellectuals such as Kames.i" Criticism started in the 1740s mainly from
ministers charging Hume with irreligion, scepticism, and with denying the
existence of causal connections in the world. In the early 1750s serious
arguments against Hume 's theory of knowledge began to be propounded, and
it is about this period that one can begin to speak of the development in
England of an anti-scepticism resulting from Hume 's efforts.
Henry Home, Lord Kames, Hume's relative and friend, is probably the first
serious critic. Kames, and the critics who were to follow up to Thomas Reid
and his commonsense school, seem to have been just continuing a traditional
English way of dealing with the sceptical crisis. Throughout the seventeenth
century, the great Anglican divines William Chillingworth, Archbishop John
Tillotson , Bishop John Wilkins (the founder of the Royal Society of England),
and Bishop Edward Stillingfleet had propounded a commonsensical answer to
the scepticism being raised against them by their Catholic opponents, and to
the scepticism they saw coming out of the Cartesian revolution in philosophy.
They had all admitted that in a fundamental sense, the sceptical challenge to
human knowledge could not be refuted; that it could not be established that
any human knowledge claims might not be false, or that human beings
possessed any infallible knowledge. However, in spite of this, the Anglican
theologians insisted, people are not in fact in doubt about everything, and they
do seem to possess adequate principles and information for the affairs of life,
sufficiently adequate for the development of sciences, the defense of religion,
and the erection of legal standards. If one examines why "reasonable" men are
not in complete doubt , one can find the bases of a kind of philosophy, but not
one that would satisfy a Descartes, a Spinoza, a Leibniz, or a Malebranche, in
that it did not claim to be based upon self-evident first principles, and it did not
claim to answer the fundamental sceptical problems. But it would be a
philosophy that represented the beliefs people live by. The Anglican divines
were not driven by the need for consistency or ultimate certainty, but would
settle for plausibility and as much certainty as the case admits of. They found in
the examination of commonsense beliefs about the character of the world
sufficient guides for the solutions of human problems. While passionate seekers
such as Pascal were driven to fideism and myticism in order to satisfy their
craving for complete certainty, the Anglicans developed a tepid middle ground
22 R.B. Popkin
retain his personal identity, till he reaped honor and reputation justly due to
his metaphysical acumen. Indeed, he ingeniously acknowledges, that it was
only in solitude and retirement that he could yield any assent to his own
philosophy; society, like daylight dispelled the darkness and fogs of scepti-
cism, and made him yield to the dominion of common sense. Nor did I ever
hear him charged with doing anything, even in solitude, that argued such a
degree of scepticism as his principles maintain. Surely if his friends
apprehended this, they would have the charity never to leave him alone."
The stories about Pyrrho of Elis, Reid, like Hume before him, regarded as
fantastic. Nobody could be that dubious and yet remain sane. There is nothing
he could do that would not belie his alleged complete scepticism. And if he did
not act, he would either go mad, or be destroyed by the course of natural
events.V
The incredibility of scepticism as a way of life Reid then took as a
"justification" for his own commonsense realism. The examination of what
sane, reasonable, commonsense people did in fact believe, and could not be led
to disbelieve by any amount of argumentation or evidence, then came to
constitute an anti-sceptical philosophy that people could live by, whose truth
ultimately rested on a conviction of God's veracity.
Hume was definitely unimpressed at first, as his letter to Reid of 1763 shows.
Reid had sent Hume the manuscript. After studying it, Hume came to the
conclusion that Reid had really perceived the problem, but had found no other
solution than the one that Hume had already presented, namely that Nature
prevents us from being actual living sceptics, even though we are unable to
resolve the sceptical difficulties. Besides a minor disagreement over a technical
point, Hume's only criticism was that there was a Scotticism in the book. 4 3
Reid, in reply, tried to explain to Hume that Hume's system was solid and
destroyed modern philosophy. Because of this, Reid had questioned the very
assumptions of modern philosophy, and offered an answer to its sceptical
debacle.v' But Hume seems to have seen that it was not really an answer, but
just another way of saying what Hume had already asserted, only with
adifferent emphasis. Perhaps Hume had noticed what Thomas Brown (who
started as a Reidian and ended up a Humean) later saw.
Sir J. Mackintosh relates that he once observed to Dr. Thomas Brown that
he thought that Reid and Hume differed more in words than opinions;
Brown answered, "Yes Reid bawled out we must believe in an outward
world; but added, in a whisper, we can give no reason for such a notion; and
whispers, I own we cannot get rid of it." 45
Mr. Hume, more subtle, and less reserved, than any of his predecessors, hath
gone still greater lengths in the demolition of common sense; and reared in
its place a most tremendous fabric of doctrine; upon which, if it were not for
the flimsiness of its materials, engines might easily be erected, sufficient to
overturn all belief, science, religious, virtue, and society, from the very
foundation.t''
gave an account of what we know and what the world is like, even though we
may not be able to justify this account. 51 Priestley's psychologism, like
Hartley's before him , tried to turn truth into scientific findings, without
realizing or caring about the sceptical difficulties in justifying such information
as revealing the true nature of things. (There is an interesting somewhat
sceptical work written against Priestley and the Scottish commonsense realists,
An Essay on the Nature and Existence ofa Material World [London, 1781]. The
work is anonymous, and is attributed to someone named Russell by the British
Museum . It indicates some sceptical opposition existed to the prevailing anti-
Humean trends.)52
The anti-Humean literature in England from 1750 to 1800 needs thorough
investigation . In my own work so far I have studied only samples of it. It
appears to me, from these soundings, to have failed fundamentally to come to
grips with the basic challenge raised by Hume. In readapting the standard
English response to the modern sceptical crisis, it tried to rest on a weak middle
ground, not answering the sceptics, but insisting on the importance of what
people have to believe. Post-Hume this position was even weaker than pre-
Hume, in that Hume had undermined the irrationality of the situation in which
our only way of making any sense or order out of our world resulted from
unjustifiable and inexplicable qualities of human nature that could not be
reconciled into any consistent pattern. Our beliefs could be sustained only by
an animal faith , if one no longer was willing or able to make the religious leap
into faith to resolve the sceptical crisis.
In the post-Humean era, to appeal to our need to believe and our will to
believe no longer constituted a genuine answer to scepticism, since Hume had
absorbed these into modern scepticism. To get beyond Hume would require
some basis for guaranteeing or justifying our knowledge that showed that we
could somehow know the nature of reality. The British answer, in failing to
come to grips with the basic epistemological issues, has left British philosophy
adrift ever since, vascillating between reporting what we have to believe, how
we speak, etc., and making a virtue of Humeanism in the form of positivism.
Occasionally, and only occasionally, as in the case of the later Bertrand Russell,
in his Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits,53 does the force of scepticism
come to the fore, only to retreat into scientism, psychologism, and naturalism.
Those, including myself, who find most Anglo-American philosophy trivial,
find it so, I believe, because of its failure from the seventeenth century onwards
to recognize the problem involved in the sceptical crisis, its farreaching
implications for modern man, and the situation left after Hume's analysis.
The anti-scepticism that pervaded England and Scotland in the late eighteenth
century represented a refusal to face up to the implications of Hume's work,
and a refusal to deal with it. The reasonable man, like the ordinary man
described by Hume, would be saved from the horrors of the sceptical crisis by
stupidity and inattention, and would get through life with his beliefs. Hume, so
sensitive to the abyss he had revealed, would have to struggle alternating
between sceptical despair and being a normal man believing what came
naturally.
28 R .H Popkin
If the English and Scottish reaction to Hume was tepid, uninspiring, and
unsatisfactory, the monumental reaction to ultimate scepticism occurred in
Germany, and has affected metaphysics ever since. In the middle of the
eighteenth century there were many signs that scepticism was being taken very
seriously. From the 1660s onward there was a stream of German dissertations
dealing with the refutation of scepticism. My favorite, of 1706, treated of the
problem of whether Job or Solomon was the founder of scepticism, and
concluded that it was the devil, since he made our first parents doubt the word
of God himself.54 From the time Hume appeared on the European scene, it was
the leaders of the Prussian Academy who translated and commented upon his
views. Formey and Merian, who did the French translation, and Sulzer, who
did the German, have not been studied. They recognized the tremendous
importance of Hume 's arguments, and tried to rebut him. Along with their
work, translations of portions of Sextus Empiricus appeared, as well as the
aphorisms of a genuine total sceptic, Platner (who later translated Hume's
Dialogues).55 The insipid English answers to Hume were also translated into
German.i" In this atmosphere, it is not surprising that Kant became aware of
what was afoot. The climax of the German Enlightenment came, of course,
when Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumbers by realizing what Hume
had accomplished. As Kant pointed out in his original preface, the sceptics had
previously been a small and ineffectual group ; Locke had seemed to put an end
to all disputes until Hume came on the scene and really raised the problem of
whether it was possible to have any knowledge. 57
Like Reid and the leaders of the Prussian Academy, Kant realized that Hume
had raised a fundamental problem. Unlike them, he was aware that the
problem could not be dealt with by evasions, but only by a revolutionary new
program. Kant's Copernican Revolution in philosophy had the effect of
simultaneously raising Hume's points to a transcendental status, while pur-
porting to offer a way of dealing with them. Kant claimed to find a compromise
between an unvanquishable scepticism about the possibility of any knowledge
of the nature of reality and a universal and necessary certainty (constituting
genuine knowledge) about the conditions of all possible experiences. Kant
could see that Hume had eliminated any hope of finding universal and
necessary knowledge by the experimental method of philosophizing that had
so impressed the philosophes. Kant transformed the issue by asking not "Is
knowledge possible"? but "How is knowledge possible"? In this way, one did
not have to argue with the sceptics, but instead one had only to explain the way
in which we actually overcame scepticism. And , in Kant's rendition, we
overcame it by conceding that it was unconquerable with regard to knowledge
of external or internal reality, but could be conquered in terms of our knowl-
edge of the form and conditions of experience. 58 The Kantian system, it seems
to me, embedded scepticism at such a fundamental level that it made
philosophy in its traditional sense impossible. It purported to get beyond
scepticism to become, in fact, an anti-scepticism, opening the way to a genuine
appreciation of the character and evaluation of what knowledge was possible.
One of Kant's disciples, Carl Friedrich Staiidlin, wrote a work in 1794 with the
Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter 18th Century 29
title History and Spirit of scepticism. It traced the history of scepticism from
Pyrrho onward. On the title page were portraits of the two main characters,
Hume and Kant. The second volume deals with them. Kant was portrayed as
the thinker who had finally emerged triumphant in the life and death struggle
between scepticism and dogmatism by finding a new way to accept the
unanswerable arguments of the sceptics about the knowledge of reality without
denying the existence of genuine knowledge about human experience. 59
Kant, in raising the sceptical arguments to a transcendental level, made them
central to all future metaphysics. His own claims to have gotten beyond
scepticism spawned new forms of scepticism and in turn radical new means to
escape the sceptical crisis. The intellectual battles fought in the last two decades
of the eighteenth century in Germany over the status and import of Kant's
critical philosophy have shaped the course of metaphysical theories ever since.
Kant was assaulted from all sides. What interests us here is those attacks
relating to the sceptical struggles. On the right wing was the criticism of his
friend, the religious fanatic J.G. Hamann. Hamann was immersed in Hume,
read English, translated portions of the Dialogues, and found in Hume "the
greatest voice of orthodoxy'V" Hume had seen that belief-faith was at the root
of any human comprehension of the world. Hamann pressed Kant to see the
fideistic core of any view of the world. Kant's second preface to the first
Critique, where he claimed he had eliminated knowledge to make room for
faith in the practical sphere, may have been an attempt to conciliate Hamann."
Hamann, as a result of confronting Hume's scepticism, rejected the Enlight-
enment, lock , stock, and barrel, and opted for faith, pure Biblical faith. He saw
Kant as weak-kneed in his reaction to Hume, refusing to follow the implica-
tions of total scepticism. Hamann translated the first and last of Hume's
Dialogues to try to bring Kant to his senses or to his faith. 62 Hamann's
irrationalist fideistic response was to open the road to Kierkegaard and then
to modern neo-orthodoxy. Hume had closed the door on reason, and thereby
made it possible to appreciate the need to return to pure faith . It was in fact
Hamann's Humeanism that converted Kierkegaard.f'
If irrationalism-fideism was one kind of sceptical response to Kant, another
was the stark drawing of the sceptical implications of Kantian thought, as was
done by G.E. Schulze-Aenisedemus. Schulze chose the name "Aenisedemus" to
indicate what he was trying to show, namely that Kantian philosophy, whatever
its assertions to the contrary, could not justify any knowledge-claims whatso-
ever. Schulze-Aenisedemus insisted that Kant's introduction of the "thing-in-
itself' was illegitimate and that all his elegant system dealt only with the world
of appearance. If Kant were consistent, Schulze-Aenesidemus insisted, he
would be reduced to the ancient sceptical position/"
While Hamann tried to drag Kant off to religion , and Schulze-Aenesidemus
to complete doubt, the most interesting development, at least to me, appeared
in the writings of the strange Jewish philosopher, Solomon Maimon, the man
whom Kant considered his most worthy opponent, and the only one who had
really understood him. Maimon had come from his Talmudic studies in
Lithuania into Enlightenment Germany. A friend of Kant's Jewish friends
30 R.H Popkin
Moses Mendelssohn, Marcus Herz, and Lazarus Ben David, Maimon showed
them his criticisms of Kant's Critique. Herz sent these to Kant, who wrote,
"But a glance at the manuscript soon enabled me to recognize its merits and to
see not only that none of my opponents had understood me and the main
problem so well, but that very few could claim so much penetration and sublety
of mind in profound inquiries of this sort as Herr Maimon".6s In his brief
philosophical career ending in 1800, Maimon tried to show the weaknesses of
Kant's attempt to overcome scepticism, and the opening of a new road beyond
scepticism that was to usher in the next metaphysical era with Fichte's
subjective idealism, set forth in his Vocation ofMan (1800).66 On the one hand
Maimon argued that Kant could not establish the relevance of the categories to
experience except a posteriori, and hence that no synthetic a priori knowledge
about experience was possible. On the other hand , he argued against Hume
and Schuize that there had to be an a priori structure; otherwise, nothing at all
made any sense. Logic and mathematics indicated this was not the case. His
position between Hume and Kant would amount to what later emerged as
logical positivism, except for his indication that the creative power of the mind,
its reflection of the power of infinite mind, opened a different door via intuition
and feeling to an understanding of experience. This turn to non-rational factors
as those constitutive of our knowledge began a road to romanticism, or
metaphysical idealism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte developed this new avenue.
Both Fichte and the young Hegel saw scepticism as the beginning moment of
philosophizing. The recognition of the limits imposed on human rational
efforts of previous philosophy then made one aware of the possibilities actually
open to man . For Fichte, one overcame scepticism only by a deliberate act of
the will.67 One's ego, through its own actions, creates the knowledge of reality
as well as reality itself. It is no longer necessary to try to bridge the gulf
between subject and object. One's own creative efforts provide the basis and
structure of both.
The German reaction to Hume's scepticism was more fundamental than the
one that occurred in France or England. In the person of Kant, the Germans
saw that traditional philosophy had reached a total impasse. It was not a
question of developing another, now hopeless, anti-scepticism, but rather a
post-scepticism. The Grand Illusion, developed from Greek days onward, that
human reason and science could gain knowledge of necessary essential features
of reality, had been ended. All that could be done was either to accept the
situation and describe the characteristics of what people "know" as Kant and
Husser! did, or to develop different avenues to knowledge as Hegel did. The
march of reason developed to the sceptical impasse. The creative power of the
mind, its immersion with universal reason , could carry it beyond by processes
beyond pure reason. Whether these have in fact revealed reality, or just more of
the human predicament, I do not know. Heidegger's rendition would seem to
indicate the utter hopelessness of these means to penetrate the Mystery of
Being.
Hume's scepticism produced, I believe, a monumental crisis for Western
philosophical thought. The reactions to it in France , England and Germany
Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter 18th Century 31
indicate the range of philosophical attempts to deal with it. The anti-scepti-
cisms of the latter part of the eighteenth century have shaped and formed the
course of thought ever since. We are now living in full realization of the
consequences of this period in intellectual history. The serious study of it may
reveal both the roots of our problems, and the possibilities for any further
constructive discourse between us and our world.
Reprinted by kind permission of the publishers from Paul Fritz and Richard
Morton, eds., Woman in the 18th Century and Other Essays. Publications of
the McMaster University Association for 18th-Century Studies, vol. 4 (Tor-
onto: Samuel, Stevens, Hakkert & Co., 1976), pp.319-43.
NOTES
Bongie, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp.
47-52.
13. Sec Mossner, Life ofHume , pp. 483-86.
14. See Denis Diderot's article "Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophe", in Encyclopedie, ou
Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, par une societe' de gens de lettres, 17
vols. (Paris, 1751-65), 13: 608a--614a. The section from pp. 613b--14a seems to be a rejection of
Hume's scepticism on these grounds.
15. Bongie, David Hume, pp. 34-39.
16. Ibid. , esp. chap. 4.
17. On De Maistre's and Bonald's use of Hume's ideas, see the references to them in Bongie, David
Hume , esp. pp. 159--62. The last chapter of De Maistre's Considerations sur la France (London,
1797) is entitled "Fragment d'une histoire de 1a revolution francaise par David Hume",
18. Sec the discussions of scepticism in Hughes Felicite Robert de Lamennais in his Paroles d'un
croyant (paris, 1834), and Essai sur l'indifference en matiere de religion, 4 vo1s. (paris, 1817-23).
Retat, in Le Dictionnaire de Bayle shows that the same happened with Bayle's ideas. See
especially pp. 445-448.
19. "Avertissement du traducteur", Dialogues sur la religion naturelle: Ouvrage posthume de David
Hume, Ecuyer (Edinburgh, 1780), pp. 43-46. T.E. Jessop lists this edition as, "despite the
imprint, probably printed and pub!. in France or Holland". See A Bibliography ofDavid Hume
and ofScott ish Philosophy (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966), p. 41.
20. Dialogues sur la religion naturelle, p. 3.
21. Catholicism is attacked on p.6: " Il pourra meme arriver que la sainte Inquisition , plus habile a
bruler qu'a raissoner, s'avise de regarder toute cette production comme un persiffage impie.
Mais quel bon ouvrage la superstition n'a-t-elle pas devoue aux flammes", Then the Inquisitors
of Lisbon and Rome are criticized for their hypocri sy.
22. Ibid., p. 5.
23. Hume , Traite de la nature humaine, trans. Andre Leroy (Paris: Aubier, 1946). A translation of
bk . I done by Chas . Renouvier and F. Pillon appeared in Paris in 1878.
24. See the review of Hume's Treatise by Desmaizeaux in the Biblotheque raisonnee des ouvrages des
savans de l'Europe 24 (1740): 324-55, and 26 (1741): 411-27. See also the review of Hume's
Political Discourses by Mat y in Journal britannique 7 (1752):243--67, 387-411. Henry Home,
Lord Kames, discussed Hume 's views, mainly critically, in his Essays on the Principles of
Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751).
25. On this Anglican tradition sec Henry Van Leeuwen, The Problem of Certainty in English
Thought , 1630-1690, International Archives of the History of Ideas, no. 3 (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1963); Van Leeuwen's introduction to John Wilkins , Of the Principles and
Duties of Natural Religion (1683; facsimile ed., New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1969); R.H.
Popkin, "T he Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfieet", Journal of the History of Philosophy 9
(1971)303-19; and Robert T. Carroll, The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop
Edward Stillingfleet, 1635-1699, International Archives of the History of Ideas, no. 77 (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).
26. See Edward Stillingfieet, A Discourse in Vindication ofthe Doctrine ofthe Trinity (London, 1696),
last chap.; The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Letter (London, 1697); and The
Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter (London, 1698). In Stillingfieet's
answer to Locke's first letter, he declared that "in an age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are so
much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous
consequence to Start such new methods of Certainty as are apt to leave men 's minds more
doubtful than before " (Answer to Mr. Locke 's Letter , pp. 38-39 ).
27. Sec John Locke's three answers, A Letter to the Rt . Re v. Edward, Lord Bishop of Worcester
(1697); Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his
Letter (1697); and Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worcester's Answer
to his Second Letter (1699). These three works comprise vo!. 4 of the 1801 edition of Locke's
Works.
28. Stillingfiect, in his Origines Sacrae (London, 1662), contended that there was sufficient, if not
complete, evidence that God exists and that scripture is his Word and provides the most
Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter 18th Century 33
plausible picture of what the world is like. A reasonable man, according to Stillingfieet, would
find it more likely that the biblical view is true than that it is false.
29. Hurne, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1902), X, II pp. 130-31. After giving his own rendition of the content of the
Pentateuch, Hurne offered Stillingfleet's criterion for accepting it as true : "I desire anyone to lay
his hand upon his heart , and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the
falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and
miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which is, however, necessary to make it be received,
according to the measures of probability above established". Hurne then concluded that because
a reasonable man could not believe Christianity on this standard, "that the Christian Religion
not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any
reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And
whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person,
which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe
what is most contrary to custom and experience".
30. See Kames's report to Boswell about going over the Treatise with Hurne right after it came out,
cited in Mossner , Life of Hume, p. 118. The copy Hurne gave to Lord Kames is apparently the
one in the Gomperz Collection at the University of Southern Californ ia.
31. Essays on the Principles ofMorality and Natural Religion, p. 156.
32. 2 vols. (London, 1755). The second vol. contains "Observations on Mr. Hume's Philosophical
Essays", as well as an answer to Bolingbroke. I have used the third edition of 1757.
33. There was an edition, apparently the sixth, in London in 1838. The work came out in German in
1755, a translation of the second edition with the criticism of Hume (covering 187 pages),
entitled Abriss der vornehmisten Deistischen Schriften, die in dem vorigen und gegenwiirtigen
Jahrhunderte in England bekannt geworden sind. Es werden in demselben Hrn. Humes philoso-
phische Versuchegepruft. . . (Hannover, 1755).
34. View ofthe Principal Deistical Writers, 3rd ed., 2 vols. (London, 1757), 1:258.
35. Ibid., p. 262.
36. Ibid., pp. 261--62.
37. Andrew Michael Ramsay, Voyages de Cyrus (Paris, 1807), bk. 6, pp. 229-35 .
38. Ed. J.T. Boulton (London: Routledge and Paul, 1958), p. 13.
39. "From Moral Sense to Common Sense: An Essay on the Development of Scottish Common
Sense Philosophy, 1700-1761" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 1966). See also
Norton, "Hume's Common Sense Morality ", Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (December,
1975) 523-43 .
40. Thomas Reid, An Inqu iry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, in
Philosophical Works, ed. with notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton,
and with an intro. by Harry M. Bracken, 2 vols. (Hildesheim : George Olms, 1967),1 :95.
41. Ibid., p. 102.
42. Ibid.
43. Hurne to Reid, 25 February 1763, Letters ofDavid Hume , 1 375-76 .
44. Reid to Hurne, 18 March 1763, Letters ofDavid Hume , I376n-77n.
45. Cited in George Henry Lewes, The History ofl'hilosophyfrom Thales to Comte, 2 vols. (London,
1867),2:383.
46. (Edinburgh, 1770), p. 200.
47. "Beattie's criticisms have not been given serious study. He does raise many interesting points ,
and, as I have pointed Out elsewhere, Beattie sharply and forcefully attacked Hurne's racist
views ("The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism," in Craig Walton and John P. Anton, eds.,
Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts: Essays in Honor of Herbert W. Schneider on His Eightieth
Birthday [Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1974], pp. 160-65, and reprinted in High Road
to Pyrrhonism).
48. The "Advertisement" appears in all editions of Hurne's Essays and Treatises after 1775. It is
described in Hume's letter to William Strahan, 26 October 1775, Letters ofDavid Hume, 2:301.
49. (London, 1774), pp. 5-6 .
50. Ibid., p. xxi.
34 R.H Popkin
51. David Hartley presented this position in his Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty and His
Expectations, 2 vols. (London , 1749), vol.I , chap. 3, "Of Propositions and the Nature of
Assent".
52. I have been unable to find out any more about this work than what is recorded in the British
National Library (British Museum) catalog . Coleridge is the only one I know of who mentions
having read it.
53. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948.
54. Q.D. B. V. de Scepticorum Praecipuis Hypothesibus, secundum constitutionem Fridericianuin,
Praeside Georgio Paschie (Kiloni , 1706), p. 4.
55. For information on this, see R.H. Popkin, "Scepticism in the Enlightenment", and Giorg io
Tonelli, "Kant und die antiken sceptiker ", Platner's translation, Gesprache jiber naturliche
Religion von David Hume (Leipzig, 1781), appears with a lengthy essay by Platner, "Ein
Gesprach iiber Atheismus", pp. 255-396, dealing with Hume, Sextus, Pyrrhonism, fideism,
and atheism.
56. Leland as well as major and minor Scottish opponents of Hume was quickly translated into
German.
57. Immanuel Kant , Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Erich Adickes (Berlin, 1889), "Vorrede zur
ersten Auflage vom Jahre 1781", p. 6.
58. Kritik, "Einleitung" and "Der Transendentalen Elementarlehre".
59. Carl Friedrich Statidlin, Geschichte und Geist des scepticismus (Leipzig, 1794).
60. Hamann, commenting on the conclusion of Hume's essay "Of Miracles", said, "So ist diess
allemal Orthodoxie, und ein Zeugniss der Wahrheit in dem Munde cines Feindes und Verfolgers
derselben". See Johann G. Hamann, Schriften, ed. F. Roth , S vols. (Berlin, 1821-43), 1:406.
61. Kritik, "Vorrede zur zweiten Auflage", B. xxx: "Ich musste das Wissen aufheben, um zum
Glauben Platz zu bekommen".
62. See Philip Merlan, "Hamann et les Dialogues de Hume", Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 59
(1954): 285-89 , and "Hume and Hamann", Personalist 32 (1951):111-18. See also R.H. Popkin,
"Kierkegaard and scepticism", in Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Josiah
Thompson (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 361-72.
63. See Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, (London : Oxford University Press, 1935), pp. 165-67.
64. Gottlob Ernst Schulze, Aenesidemus oder iiber die Fundam ente der von dem Herrn Re inhold in
lena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie. Nebst emen Vertheidigung des scepticismus gegen der
Vernunftkritik (n.p., 1792).
65. Cited in Samuel Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism : The Philosophy ofSolomon Maimon
(The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 5. On Maimon 's career, see his autobiography,
Solomon Maimons Lebensgeschichte (Munich: G. Muller, 1911). On his scepticism, see Atlas,
From Critical to Speculative Idealism, chap. 13.
66. On Maimon's relation to Fichte, see Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism, pp. 316-24 .
67. Cf. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen (Berlin, 1800) and Grundlage der
gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (Leipzig, 1794), Pt. 1.
G. TONELLI
35
R .B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 35-50.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
36 G. Tonelli
certainty too: "historical" pyrrhonism); for scepticism, the main point is the
quality of knowledge, the kind of certainty possible for man.
The limiting position, on the contrast, is concerned with the extent of
rational knowledge (of whatever kind).
Both positions, of course, may be complementary. For an absolute Sceptic
the problem oflimits does not even exist, but a moderate Sceptic, assuming the
possibility of probable knowledge, is generally interested in establishing the
limits of this knowledge. But many thinkers, while sponsoring a limiting
attitude, are by no means sceptics; they may consider demonstrative certainty
to be possible within the limits of human understanding (or rather, in fact, they
may set two different boundaries of knowledge the one for certain, the other for
probable knowledge); thus, they may consider absolute truth (or, at least,
necessary and universal knowledge) to be partially within the reach of man.
Before discussing the central problem of this paper, some other introductory
considerations are needed.
I have been mentioning the "Enlightenment" without any further qualifica-
tion; in fact, this term has generally been used as an overall label for
eighteenth-century philosophy, or at least for that part of it which is considered
to be more typical of that age. Now, if the "Enlightenment" is intended to mean
something more than the simple chronological notion of "eighteenth-century
philosophy", even disregarding both "reactionary" or somehow diverging
trends (like the so-called "pre-romantic" attitudes), and the sometimes im-
portant differences between eighteenth-century philosophical schools within a
given nation, it must be kept in mind that there are at least two basically
different Enlightenments: the one dominant first in England and Holland, and
later in France, Italy and Spain; the other dominant in Germany and
Scandinavia. Although both Enlightenments may have some, or even many,
traits in common, it seems to me that their differences are so prevalent and so
fundamental, that it is hardly possible to speak, even very vaguely, of one
Enlightenment. Some of these differences will be pointed out below.
Another difficulty is the problem of dating. disregarding the question of
periods within the Enlightenment, when does the Enlightenment begin? In
Britain, with Newton and Locke, or with Shaftesbury, Berkeley and the later
Newtonians? In France, with Bayle and Fontenelle, or with Voltaire, Diderot,
Condillac and Maupertuis? In Germany, with Leibniz and Christian Thoma-
sius, or with the pupils of Thomasius and with Wolff: In other words, is what
could be (and has been) called "pre-Enlightenment" a part of the Enlight-
enment, or not? Not to mention the question of the end of the Enlightenment,
which may be even more controversial.
I do not dare to propose a general solution to this problem; actually I do not
even know whether this may be considered as a real problem; in fact I think
that a solution may be possible only if this is considered as a "nominal"
problem, i.e. as a problem of focus: the "Enlightenment", after all, does not
exist except in the historian's mind, and in accordance with a certain historical
purpose. One must be aware of the relativity of methodological notions
employed, in order not only to avoid confusion and apparent contradictions,
The "Weakness" of Reason in the Age ofEnlightenment 37
figure shrank to that of a second or third class philosopher, and even today has
been but partially vindicated.
If many of Wolff's basic positions are Leibnizian origin, it must be
recognized that Wolff's philosophy is at the same time a very personal
reinterpretation of Leibniz' thought, and a daring attempt towards a recon-
struction of the whole body of philosophy on a new plan. Wolff's claim to be the
reformer of ontology was certainly justified-and in fact his thought in this field
was the conscious or unconscious, direct of indirect foundation of German
philosophy up to romantic idealism. Besides, Wolff ranks among the greatest
systematic minds of all times; certainly both in ontology and in methodology
his originality and importance cannot be questioned.
Therefore, Wolff's self-esteem was not unjustified; nevertheless, his attitude
cannot be considered as an example of intellectual modesty. And it is
significant in this connection to note that Wolff himself probably was the
eighteenth-century philosopher comparatively less ready to stress the limits of
human understanding: "Nullos cognitionis rationum decernimus limites", "We
do not see any limit to the [human] knowledge of reasons", he wrote at the very
beginning of his Logic." A closer consideration of Wolff's system reveals that
actually this thinker was aware of many factual limitations to the human power
of inquiry; still, his attitude rather answers in its main lines the statement I
have just quoted.
A similar, although humbler, attitude of intellectual independence was
shared by Wolff's opponents of Pietist extraction, i.e. by the disciples of
Christian Thomasius. In spite of his high reputation, Thomasius actually never
had , strictly speaking, a school: his first disciples (Budde, Joach, Lange, and
Rudiger) developed in the main in a largely independent way. Only Riidiger's
thought was able to survive the impact of Wolffian philosophy, because of its
higher intellectual sophistication. But it could survive only by undergoing
many basic reforms in order to compete successfully with Wolffianism; and
this was the achievement of Ad. Fr. Hoffmann, and especially of Crusius, who
became in the 1740's Wolff's main antagonist within the German philosophic
tradition. In fact, Hoffmann's and Crusius' reform of Pietist philosophy was
accomplished as a reaction to Wolff - a reaction, however, largely depending
on Wolff's system as a constant term of polemical reference. Therefore, it is not
astonishing if both Hoffmann and Crusius nurtured pretensions of intellectual
independence; they correctly looked upon the Thomasian roots of their
doctrines as a remote and obsolete background. And, of course, they were not
ready to acknowledge Wolff's stimulating influence, because they considered
counteracting Wolffianism to be the task of their lives - a task which, in fact,
had met with undeniable success.
Still, they were not unaware of the ambiguity of their situation. This
reasonably prevented them from claiming complete originality and a first rank
position within philosophy. Their independent attitude was matched with
discretion: they refrained from boasting about their own achievement as they
refrained from boasting about the capabilities of human reason in general. In
fact they were, within the German philosophic tradition of the first half of the
40 G. Tonelli
on the principles of reason; it was not dealing with words, but with the most
general truths,. This ontological background, together with a highly developed
science of logic, was bound to condition all further developments of German
philosophy - and this is another main difference between the Anglo-French
and the German Enlightenment.
The problem of several things beyond experience is also at the foundation of
several other questions deserving more particular consideration. First of all,
there is the question as to whether it is possible to know things "as they are in
the themselves"- mostly referred to objects of the outside world. This is a
problem which had been raised and negatively answered in the eighteenth
century by Geulinex , Burthogge, Simon Foucher and Bayle.
Many British and French Enlightenment philosophers shared this opinion. It
was generally connected with the reduction of the so-called "primary" qualities
to the "secondary" (colour, smell, etc.), and accordingly they held that any
quality, in as far it is perceived, is just a modification of the mind , and does not
represent a real character of things as they are in themselves. Hume states that
provided that the outside world exists - a fact which cannot be proved - we are
not able to penetrate the essence of things; and Bolingbroke's position was very
similar."
The Swiss-French philosopher Crousaz, while attacking scepticism , felt
compelled to grant: "What things are in themselves (Ce que Ie choses sont en
elles-memesi , and absolutely speaking, is not revealed by any perception; let us
suspend our judgment on this subject't'' This theme was largely developed by
Condillac: "We do not see bodies as they are in themselves"." Maupertuis,
d'Alembert and Bonnet!" supported the same view.
In Germany, Wolff assumed a basically different position , deriving from
Leibniz. If it is true that our sensible representation of the outside world is
purely phenomenal, the inferential procedure of reason makes it possible for us
to grasp , beyond perception, the metaphysical essence of matter consisting in
simple, unextended substances , Crusius' position was even closer to traditional
realism.
Nevertheless, Maupertuis succeeded in imposing his view of the problem in
some quarters of German philosophy: for instance, one of his followers,
Merian, supported his view. II
In several cases, this feeling of "learned ignorance" extended, as for Hume
and for some others , to the possibility of proving by rational demonstration the
existence of an outside world, which was asserted on the basis either of an
"interior felling" or even of simple conjecture.
The critique of the notion of substance had a special relevance, and not only
for philosophers opposed to ontology; in fact, it was an ancient locus communis
of anti-Aristotelian metaphysics in general.
The argument, as old as Petrus Ramus, at least, and repeated in the
seventeenth century by Descartes , Henry More, Locke. Burthogge and others ,
runs as follows: man can only perceive the forms and attributes of things, but
not their subject; abstracting from forms and attributes, the idea of a
metaphysical subject is completely empty, and corresponds to a mysterious
44 G. Tonelli
position. Wolff himself, very cautious in physical matters, was in the same
liner'" in fact, he thought that in metaphysics it was possible to establish the
general structure of substance, whilst in his opinion the connection between the
metaphysical and physical level was far from clear. In other words, we can infer
a knowledge of the intimate structure of bodies in every possible world but in
most cases we cannot claim to be able to explain the connection between this
basic structure and actual particular phenomena in the existing world. This
position was later resumed by Lambert ," and was also shared by Wolff's main
antagonist, Crusius. In Germany, the "corpuscular objection" proved to be
prevalent: in fact , the penetration of Newtonianism was slow, and hindered by
a number of local factors. In Britain, Holland and France, on the contrary, the
"corpuscular objection" was combined with, or superseded by, the Newtonian
one. Both were supported by the grea t Dutch physician chemist Boerhaave.l"
The second was sponsored by Pemberton an authority within British
Newtonianism.l" and found acceptance in France by Nollet, Maupertuis, and
d'Alembert. l"
I can only hint here at the difficult question of the critiques of the notion of
causality, refraining from discussing some of the more radical and typical (as
well as better known) approaches such as that of Hume and considering only
one more general feature of the problem.
The seventeenth-century scientists Boyle, Wallis, Roberval, Mariotte and
others had strongly recommended avoiding any inquiry into the first causes of
natural events, which they considered too remote and too mysterious to be
knowable man. The same view had been supported in philosophy by Locke.
Newtonianism, had a decisive influence on the spreading of this approach:
Newton himself had finally and at least officially condemned any attempt
toward an inquiry into the cause of attraction, recommending the pursuit of
the study of manifest correlations of experimental data only. The Cartesian
group simultaneously accuse Newtonianism of sponsoring in attraction an
"occult quality" and claimed, as a better alternative, the perfect intelligibility of
its own impulsionist explanation of natural events. On the Newtonian side, the
reaction was radical: it was contended that impuls ion is, in its first cause, not
less mysterious than attraction. What is, in fact, that particular something
called "power" or "force, "which is transferred from a moving body into a body
moved? Are not inquiries into the first cause of motion, both by attraction and
by impulsion, doomed to sterility, as trespassing the limits of both experience
and reason?
This radical view was supported in England by Berkeley, Hume and
Bolingbroke, In Holland by Niewentijt, in France by Condillac, Maupertuis,
and d'Alembert.
In Germany, Wolff did not share these perplexities: his approach to causality,
in accordance with his version of Leibniz' pre-established harmony, was still
rather traditional. But Thomasius and his disciples, including Crusius, were
contending, for religious much more than for scientific reasons, that the first
causes of the things cannot be grasped by the human mind: they lie within the
unfathomable depths of God's omnipotence. Once more, Pietist religious
46 G. Tonelli
preceding examples not from the boundaries imposed upon reason by the rule
of experience but from the intrinsic weakness of reason itself in its conceptual
capability. This concerns the notion of infinity. Infinity from this point of view
does not directly imply the notion of existence, and therefore is somewhat
independent of the rule of experience.
Infinity is of two basically different kinds: the qualitative infinity of God's
attributes, and the quantitative infinity of creation. The existence of the first
kind of infinity cannot be considered as a particular question , because it is
implied in God's existence; the second kind is considered as not actually, but
only potentially existent. An exception must be made of some thinks, mainly of
Spinozistic extraction, like Raphson or Terrasson, who considered the world as
actually infinite.
But the main point is whether this infinity, either existent in God or potential
in the world, can be conceived by human reason. It is almost superfluous to
recall that this is one of the many problems inherited by the Enlightenment
from the several thousand-year-old tradition of western philosophy. In the Age
of Reason, a negative attitude prevails in the assertion of an intrinsic weakness
of reason . Man as finite being, can have only a negative or imperfect notion of
infinity, although this notion is both essential and useful in many fields, from
theology to mathematics, and although its truth must be asserted even if it
cannot be grasped directly. In Britain, Raphson, Clarke, Collier, Berkeley,
Hume, and Maclaurin agreed on this point; in France, Crousaz, Buffon,
d'Alembert, Robinet. In Germany, Wolff, the apostle of the power of reason ,
tried to impose a solution of compromise but was contradicted by Crusius,
Reimarus, Lambert, and Kant.
Among the different aspects of the problem of limits I have been surveying,
hardly one may be found where eighteenth-century thought had not been
heralded in some aspects at least by thinkers of the proceeding century. This
happens, of course, in all ages and for all problems. In some cases, as for the
critique of the notions of substance and of that of infinity, eighteenth-century
philosophers were, in the main , repeating old arguments. But on the whole, the
Anglo-French Enlightenment gave to these attitudes an importance and a
diffusion previously unknown: opposition to ontology, and partially to logic,
agnosticism in respect of transcendent subjects in general, claimed ignorance
of the inner texture and properties of bodies and of the first causes. Opposition
to hypotheses and to general systems not founded on experience are, both in
their extention and in their stress, a basic novelty in modern philosophy. For
this, seventeenth-century philosophy was much more an Age of Reason than
was the Enlightenment; and this "reason" was unmasked by the Enlightenment
as a specious and obnoxious pretension of the human mind. The Enlight-
enment's reason sometimes merely paid lip service to Revelation ; however this
outer limit of reason was replaced by an inner and more effective one, which
could also be reconciled with Revelation, with the advantage, perhaps, of a
clearer "separation of powers".
The German Enlightenment was, as it were, more "traditionalist", especially
in Wolff's case: only a few of the limiting attitudes were accepted by Wolff. On
The "Weakness" of Reason in the Age ofEnlightenment 49
the other hand , the school of Thomasius and Crusius represented, for very
special reasons, a kind of via media, and was the catalyzer of a creative
synthesis between the Anglo-French and the German approach. In this way,
positions which could appear "Traditional" as sponsored by Wolff became the
foundation of future German philosophy ; "traditionalism" and "modernism"
in the history of thought are nothing but relative terms.
Ifwe may still speak of "traditionalism" then, the Enlightenment was on the
whole much less revolutionary that it has sometimes been represented; this has
already become clear concerning its political theory, but should also be
extended to other aspects of the century's thought.
The Anglo-French Enlightenment, with its intellectual modesty and respect
for its heralds in the preceding century, shows one side of this attitude, an
attitude matched in the practice of a very real quest for discovery, but exalted,
at the same time, by an equal respect for science. Philosophy, certainly, is no
longer the servant of theology, but it partially becomes the servant of science.
And this is shown, among other things, by the basic impact of Newtonianism
on the problem of limits, an impact which has not been as yet sufficiently
clarified. In fact, it is a commonplace in our day to talk about Newton's role in
the development of philosophy, but as soon as this role is clearly defined, an
escape is found in some vague and frequently erroneous statement.
The German Enlightenment, less humble in its intentions, showed its
modesty by facts: it refrained from relegating to the scrap-heap many basic
attitudes of eighteenth-century thought, and reshaped them into formulas
pregnant with future developments.
In contrast to romantic philosophy's frenzy for originality at any cost, the
Enlightenment philosophy was not haun ted by a quest for novelty for novelty's
sake. In fact it gave full regard to its predecessors while simultaneously opening
up numerous new directions for science to follow in the ensuing centuries.
NOTES
This paper is based on more than ten years of research on the subject. I have already published
provisory results on some sections of this field in the following studies: " La question des bornes de
I'entendement humain au XVlIIe siecle et la genese du criticisme kantien, particulierement par
rapport au probleme de I'infini", R evue de Metaphysique et de Morale (1959); "Critiques of the
Notion of Substance Prior to Kant ", Tijschrift voor Philosoph ie, XXIII (1961); "Die Anfange von
Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen und ihre Boraussetzungen im 18. Jahrhundert", Kant-Studien,
LBII (1966); "Hypothesis (1600-1770)", Historisches Wiirterbuch der Philosophie (Basel-Stuttgart,
forthcoming).
This paper intends (1) to summarize the results of these, (2) to anticipate those concerning other
sections of the field, (3.and to draw some general conclusions.
Precise references are given in the notes only for sections not covered by the above-mentioned
publications.
I. See G. Funke's Introduction "Das sokratische lahrhundert" to his anthology Die Aufkliirung
(Stuttgart: 1963); H. Vyverbert Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment (Cambridge ,
Mass., 1958).
50 G. Tonelli
2. R.H. Popkin, "Scepticisim in the Enlightenment", in Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth
Century, XXVI , 1962.
3. See my study on "Kant und die antiken Skeptiker", in Studien zu Kants philosophischer
Entwicklung, hrsg. V.H. Heimsoeth (Hildesheim: 1967).
4. Aram Vartanian, Diderot and Descartes (princeton, N.l, 1953).
5. There are only 5 reprints of different works of Descartes in the eighteenth century, no one later
than 1724; Malebranche's Recherche de la verite alone had 10 editions between 1700 and 1800,
including a Latin and a German translation. See: W. Risse, Bibliographialogica, I (Hildesheim :
1965).
6. Chr. Wolff, Philosophiarationalis sive logica (Francof. Et Lipsiae: 1728), Disc. Prel., 5.
7. David Hume, Enquiries, ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: 1902) pp. 152-155. H. St. Jochn Vise. Of
Bolingbroke, Works, III (London: 1754), p. 382.
8. lP. de Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonisme ancien et moderne (La Haye: 1733), p.58b.
9. Condillac, Oevures, IV (paris : 1803), pp. 383-385, 395.
10. Maupertuis, Oeuvres (Lyon: 1768) I, p. 278-283. D'Alembert Oeuvres (Paris: 1821), I, p. 185 f.
Ch. Bonnet, Essai analytique sur lesfacultes de l'Ame (Copenhague, 1760), Pref., p. xiv f.
11. Histoire de l'Acadamie Royale de Sciences et Belles Lettres, MDCCLIV (Berlin: 1756), p. 381.
12. Jo. Clericus , Operum philosophicorum. . . (Amstelodamii : 1722), IV, p. 206.
13. Chr. Thomasius, Introduction ad philosophiam aulicam (Lipsiae: 1688), p. 142.
14. Chr . Wolff, Anmerkung der die verniinfftigen Gedancken von Gott . . . (Frankfurt am Main: 1724),
p.317.
15. lH. Lambert, Neues Organon (Leipzig: 1764), II, p. 246.
16. H. Boerhaave , Opera Omnia medica (Venetiis: 1751), p. 477f.
17. H. Pemberton, A View ofSir Isaac Newton's Philosophy (London: 1728) p. 477f.
18. lA. Nollet , Lecons de physique experementale, I (Amsterdam: 1745), p.2. Maupertuis, op. cit. I,
pp. 94-98 . D'Alembert , Discours preliminaire de l'Encyclopedie, ed. Ducros (paris) : 1930, p. 48.
19. David Hume, A treatise ofHuman Nature, Ed. Selby-Bigge(Oxford: 1888),pp.xvii, 63, 217, 272.
20. C. Maclaurin, An Account ofSir Isaac Newton's PhilosophicalDiscoveries(London: 1748) p. 18.
21. Voltaire, Oeuvrescompletes, ed. BedoUiereand Avenel, V (Paris: 1888), pp. 681, 685, 750 f.
22. Condillac, Oeuvres,cit., IV, pp. 1,345,353,370-373.
23. D'Alembert, op. cit., pp. 24, 40, 66, 120.
24. P.H. Th . d'Holbach, Systeme de la Nature (Paris:1821) I, p. 1, 13.
a .TONELLI
In the year 1767 Pierre-Jacques Changeux published a work entitled Traite des
Extremes, ou des elements de la science de la realite (Amsterdam, 2 vol.), In the
"Avertissement" the author states that his work had been undertaken at first as
an article commissioned by the Encyclopedic, but that it had expanded so much
that it had not been finished in time (I, p. V). In fact, the volume of the
Encyclopedie with the letter R had been published in 1765, and included an
article "Realite" which was completely insignificant, which had nothing to do
with Changeux's ideas.
A summary of Changeux's books by Vallet was published in the Encyclopedic
d'Yverdon.' under the heading of "Extremes: (vol. XVIII, 1772). At the end of
the article more about Changeux's work was promised in an article "Realite",
but this article never was published (it should have appeared in vol. XXXVI,
1774). We do not know the reason for this omission, but it is quite possible that
the dangerous character of Changeux's work had been noticed in the mean-
while, and that timid de Felice had preferred to suppress that article.
Vallet's article was reproduced in the Supplement of Diderot's Encyclopedie
(Paris-Amsterdam 1776-77), and incorporated in the later editions of the
Encyclopedic; but the new article "Realite", still promised in Vallet's article
did not appear.
Changeux's book does not seem to have aroused much interest. As far as I
know, it was reviewed only in the Journal de Trevoux (Mars 1767, p. 440-453).
The review gives a fair account of the book, realizing its sceptical attitude
without stressing it, and concludes: "In general, this work, which at first sight
may seem very abstract, contains some learned researche [sic], some illuminat-
ing details, some sound maxims, on whose behalf we shall for gibe the author
some daring considerations, which could be misused" (p. 453). It seems that the
Jesuits retained that cautious sympathy for fideistic scepticism they had
manifested since the 20'S. 2 But it also seems that the blessing of the Jesuits did
not help Changeux to gain a larger reputation. In fact his work was hardly
noticed , and Changeux is completely ignored by 20th century biographical and
reference works; I never found him mentioned in any historical handbook or
monograph, general or specialized. From the article about him in Firmin
51
R.B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 51-68 .
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
52 G. Tonelli
Didot's Nouvelle biographie generale (vol. IX , Paris 1855) we learn that he was
born in Orleans on January 26, 1740, that he died on October 3, 1800, that he
studied at La Fleche, that his Traite was praised by D'Alembert, Condorcet,
Condillac and Buffon (unfortunately, no precise reference is given), and that he
also published works on grammar (1773), on physics (1778), on the barometer
and on meteorology (1781, 1783), and contributed articles to the Observations
sur la physique' edited by the Abbe Rozier (from 1771 to 1779).4
In my opinion, Changeux's main work deserves some attention for two
reasons. The first, and the most peculiar, is his notion of the "Extremes"; the
second is the fact that he is a rather typical (and comparatively late)
representative of that major sceptical trend in French 18th Century philosophy
whose importance has been hitherto almost entirely ignored.
Changeux's most peculiar thesis is that everything man is, or man can know,
lies in the middle of two extremes, which are an infinity of magnitude and an
infinity of smallness. All things, or their qualities are extremes, in as far as they
are extended or diminished as much as the imagination allows it II, 1). The
extremes are nothing but words expressing relationships (1. Vi). In the present
constitution of man, the extremes meet each other, without merging: and
reality lies in the middle (I, vi, 8). The extremes are not only terms connected
with relationships: they are relative to the different minds thinking them. They
also correspond to infinity as applied to all kinds of knowledge - but infinity is
conceived differently by the different men (I, vi, viii). The extremes do not
contradict each other (I, 3-4): in fact, the universe subsists through an
opposition of contraries (I, 9). The middle point (milieu) is the highest degree
of reality (I, 14), although this middle point is not the same for all men (I, 17);
there are infinite middle points which are only apparent (I, 18). XXX
This doctrine is certainly a revival and a systematization of some famous
passages of Pascal:
So, there are some properties all things have in common, whose knowledge
opens the mind to the greatest marvels of nature.
The basic one concerns the two infinites which can be found in all [things],
the one of greatness, the other of smallness.(...)
This means, in brief, that whatever motions, spaces, and times may be, there
is always a greater one, and a smaller one: so that they stand between
nothingness and infinity, being always infinitely far from both extremes. 5
What is, after all, man in nature? A nothingness if compared with infinity. A
whole if compared with nothingness, a middle point between nothing and
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 53
all. Infinitely far from the comprehension of the extremes, the end of things
and their beginning are for him irretrievably concealed in an impenetrable
secret, being equally incapable of seeing the nothingness wherefrom he
comes, and the infinity which swallows him. What is he going to do, but to
perceive some appearance of the middle point of things, in an eternal dispair
of knowing their beginning and their end? . . .
The one [extreme] depends on the other, and they touch each other, and they
meet by dint of moving apart from each other, and they meet in God, and in
God only...
Limited in all ways, this state being the middle point between two extremes
can be found in all our powers . . .6
The similarities between the two authors are striking; but, anticipating what
we shall see later about Changeux, their positions also reveal some basic
discrepancies. The doctrine of the extremes is for both of them strictly related
to their scepticism; but Pascal's scepticism arises from a theologian and
metaphysical foundation as a crisis of rationalism, while Changeux's scepti-
cism clearly derives from the French sceptical tradition of his time, largely
inspired by the old Gassendist trend and by Locke, and motivated by a
methodological and psychological background of empiristic origin. This is also
the reason why Changeux 's principle of the extremes, within the general frame
of his scepticism, will be used in a constructive way, while for Pascal it is
basically a principle intended to humiliate human reason without yielding any
positive cognitive compensation.
Unfortunately, Pascal's influence on 18th Century French thought has been
hitherto explored only very superficially," so that it is difficultfully to appraise the
significance of Changeux's "Pascalism". But I can list some documents of the
survival of the theme ofthe two infinities: L. Racine hints at in 1742,8 and Diderot
expands in 1745 into a paraphrasis of Pascal's text on the subject in a note to his
translation of Shaftesbury's Essay on Virtue and Merit .9 Less extensive, but
perhaps more important for Changeux (who frequently quotes Buffon showing
great consideration for him), is a passage in Buffon's Histoire naturelle:
... a perfectly hard body is nothing but an imaginary being [Etre de raison],
as a perfectly elastic body, again, is nothing but another imaginary being;
none of them exist in reality, because noting absolute or extreme exists in it
[reality] and because the word and the idea of [something] perfect is nothing
but the absolute or the extreme of the thing. 10
There is no clear indication that Buffon had Pascal's doctrine in mind on this
occasion, but this passage may have evoked in Changeux the memory of the
famous pages of the 18th Century Jansenist. As we shall see, Buffon belonged
to the sceptical trend in a way which has little or nothing to do with that of
Pascal, but which is very close to Changeux's position.
54 G. Tonelli
Among the many curious developments the principle of the extremes under-
goes in Changeux's work, I will relate only a rather peculiar one:
The idea of being, in connection with us, is nothing but a quality inseparable
from individuals: in nature we only can conceive the particulars; and, if we
study the idea of being [as extended] to the infinite, separating it from each
thing which we know to exist in this or in that way, we approach it to the
opposite idea of nothingness (I, 160).
This is, of course, the example of a case where the extremes meet each other;
and this is also the point were the vague flavour of Hegelian dialectic suggested
by Changeux's work reaches its climax. This similarity may be rather surpris-
ing, but we must resist the temptation of considering it anything more than a
simple coincidence. In fact, Changeux's point is certainly just a development of
an old and very widespread locus communis, the anti-Aristotelian criticism of
the notion of substance. (I mean by "Aristotelian" the scholastic version of
Aristotelianism): if we abstract from all accidents, what is left in that notion
amounts to nothing; this criticism was easy to extend, and in fact already had
been extended on some occasions, to the notions of being and of "materia
prima".11
I will consider now the second basic aspect of Changeux's work, i.e. its
scepticism, whose importance can be assessed only in connection with the
general development of this school of thought in the l Sth Century France. The
only survey of Enlightenment scepticism we have is a well known article by
R.H. Popkin.V which provides a broad frame of reference, but which neglects
many details . Using some research recently produced by other scholars, and
adding some elements of my own, I will try to draw a very summary picture of
18th Century French scepticism prior to Changeux. It will appear that
scepticism was much more largely diffused in France in that time than it has
been hitherto realized: so much, that it is probably justified to consider it as the
methodological trend by far dominating in that area. In comparison, German
contemporary scepticism was an extremely limited phenomenon.P as for
British scepticism, although it was represented by high ranking personalities
such as Hume and Bolingbroke, it does not seem to have mastered many other
adepts. 14
French ISth Century scepticism must be studied according to criteria of its
own. First, it must be taken into account that the French did not enjoy the
freedom of opinion to the same extent as their British contemporaries; there-
fore, the first preoccupation of a sceptic will be to declare that he writes in
order to refute scepticism. Besides, on many occasions, this preoccupation is
genuine, if the author in question means to refute pyrrhonian scepticism in
order to establish a constructive empirical relativism: a position which we must
historically consider as a form of scepticism, but which is not necessarily a self-
conscious kind of it. Furthermore, the typical French sceptic will carefully
make clear that there is no valid argument for proving e.g. the existence of the
outside world, or the spirituality of the soul, but sometimes he will finally
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 55
declare his belief in that existence or that spirituality, on the foundation that he
feels a repulsion against denying them, or that it is practically impossible for
him to disbelieve them. Now, it must be kept in mind that, although Buffier was
considered as their forerunner by the Scottish common-sense school, he hardly
had any followers in France; in French philosophy, an appeal to a kind of
interior sense for the truth in order to save the traditional convictions in
extremis, is usually nothing but a transparent tactical device; the belief may be
genuine in some cases, but then it is quite consciously just a belief and nothing
else. This is equally true if the beliefs in question are accepted as a practically
useful escape from abstract and idle problems the human mind cannot solve
anyhow, in order to concentrate on those problems it can solve, and which are
important for the conduct of life. Now, if the problems declared abstract and
idle, and settled with a practical belief and a theoretical ignoramus, are those
basic in traditional metaphysics, and if the rational solution man can find for
the other, practically useful problems is either purely mental (e.g. the truth of
mathematics as a kind of tautology) or purely empirical (probabilistic), I do not
see how a position of this kind could not be described as sceptic. IS
It is true that French scepticism around the middle of the century was much
more inclined to the academic than to the pyrrhonian doubt, i.e. more towards
constructive empir icism than towards metaphysical destructiveness: in other
words, Gassendi, in the long run had prevailed upon Bayle. But it must be
noticed that Gassendi did not prevail in person , but through his major follower
in methodology, Locke; this fact brought about another distortion in the
historical perspective, because the Frenchmen's allegiance to Locke was
interpreted by French Enlightenment experts according to the reading of this
author offered by most of the British 18th Century Lockeans, and these
preferred to restrain or to entirely ignore the basic scepticism of their patron.
But as Locke, in my opinion, was in fact an academic sceptic, French 18th
Century Lockeanism, being in most of the cases a kind of scepticism, seems to
me to be much more genuine than the British. If Hume as a sceptic did not
arouse much interest in France.l'' this may well have happened because the
"philosophes" were very well acquainted in advance with many basic traits of
Hume 's scepticism, which had been developed within the local tradition, e.g. by
Maupertuis.
As for the causes of this particular success of academic scepticism in France,
I have no hypothesis to offer: a more careful study of this phenomenon as a
whole is needed before we can try to propose some explanation for it. One
could of course remark that scepticism was much more deeply rooted in
France, from the Renaissance on, than in the other nations: but this amounts
to begging the question.
Usual basic characters of the academic brand of French scepticism are the
following: (1) we cannot know things as they are in themselves- all we can know
are our own ideas, and they do not represent the real essence of their objects; (2)
therefore, we do not know what matter and spirit are in themselves; (3)
furthermore, there is no proof for the real existence of bodies, and (4) of other
finite spirits; (5) but , if matter exists, then it cannot be proven that matter cannot
56 G. Tonelli
think, i.e. that the soul is spiritual (and, afortiori, that it is immortal); (6) finally,
several sceptics do not consider any proof for God's existence as absolutely
conclusive. In a few cases, (7) even the certainty of mathematics is questioned.
Two high ranking sceptics exert a profound influence on French thought at
the beginning of the 18th Century: Bayle and Fontenelle. I will not insist on the
ambiguity of the position of the first, who is considered by his contemporaries,
and by today's historians as well, sometimes as the fideistic sceptic he
pretended to be, and sometimes as the sceptical freethinker he was accused of
being. Anyhow, his scepticism is basically different from that of Fontenelle: it is
a kind of destructive pyrrhonism of metaphysical and historical extraction,
more useful to stir the waters and to stimulate his contemporaries and the
posterity to question many received tenets, than to make many proselytes
among the practically-minded "philosophes". Fontenelle's empirical relativism
was certainly much less aggressive, but much more apt to be accepted as a
basic attitude: it conveniently united the doubt of the scientist to the doubt of
the humanist, in a time when the most of the scientists were humanists, and the
most of the humanists tried hard to be scientists as well; and this doubt became
for Fontenelle a constructive critical spirit directed to submit reality to the
needs of man, and indifferent to transcendence.
A third great name should be added, that of Poiret, although his influence
was certainly not as great (in France at least) as that of Bayle and of Fontenelle.
His position is not ambiguous: his metaphysical pyrrhonism was not only
fideistic, but definitely mystical. He died in 1719, and during his last years he
still produced works of devotion.
The significance of a certain trend for a cultural area is of course different if
this trend is only sponsored by a few great personalities, or if it is sponsored by
them, and by a number of minor thinkers as well: the presence of proselytes
shows that the trend in question is not the product of some isolated superior
minds struggling against their time, but that it is deeply rooted in the spirit of
that age.
Pierre Brunet (active from 1686 to 1709) tempered his bent for immaterial-
ism and egoism with a position of vague general scepticism.!" Maubec (1709)
expounds an empiristic psycophysiology leading to a kind of sceptical
relativism.l'' In 1714, N. Berger published his French translation (Traite de
l'incertitude des connaissances humaines, Paris 1714) of the rather insipid work
(first published in 1700) of a British fideistic sceptic, Th. Baker. Also in 1714,
Gaultier produced a treatise combining a basic scepticism with an inclination
towards Spinozism.l" Dubos introduced in 1719 a very peculiar kind of
aesthetica1 irrationalism verging on scepticism.i"
In 1723 another major work by a fideistic pyrrhonian appeared: the
posthumous Traite de la foiblesse de /'esprit humain, by P.-D. Huet, who had
died in 1721.2 1 This book had many editions, and aroused several controver-
sies:22 Baltus wrote in its defense in 1726.23 Perhaps in the same year, or a short
time thereafter, an anonymous author composed another pyrrhonian treatise.i"
At this point, fideists Pyrrhonism seemed to be for a while a living issue in the
French-speaking area : Claude Huart published in 1725 his French translation
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 57
of Sextus, with notes indicating that he sponsored that view.25 The Memoires de
Trevoux had cautiously supported the same line since 1723.26 F. Cartaud de la
Villate,27 in his Pensees critiques sur les mathematiques (Paris, 1733), attacked
the certainty of mathematics: this is a clear symptom of extreme Pyrrhonism;
but Cartaud, who deserves to be better studied, was probably a freethinker,
Legendre de Saint Aubain has been considered as a sceptic." but I cannot see
in him anything else than a half-sceptic with a clear fideistic bias; besides, his
personality shows several archaic traits, and is certainly not very exciting.F' A
second anonymous author of a manuscript of 1738 is a pyrrhonist inclining
towards Spinozism.l" and a third is a fideistic defender of Bayle in 1739. 31 In
the same year, B. de Muralt published his Lettres fanatiques, documents of an
eclectical and quite raving mysticism: all science is despised, and revelation is
the real source of truth; but this revelation is not only the traditional, it is also a
kind of internal inspiration; nevertheless, some heathens can be led by the voice
of their conscience towards virtue, and towards a partial truth. It is clear that
Muralt shows a rather strong sceptical component in his thought. 32
But the empiristic scepticism of the deists and of the free-thinkers was
gaining momentum by then. In 1727 two works of importance for this trend
appear, the one by Quesnay, the other by D'Argens." The first is clearly an
adept of academic scepticism; the second pretends to be a fideistic sceptic, but
he is certainly not a fideist , and he is a sceptic only partially ; one suspects that
scepticism for him may be a cover for atheism and materialism.
Voltaire seems to have gone through a sceptical period in 1739, with
Micromegasi'" the same seems to have occurred in 1768, with L 'homme aux
quarante ecus.35 But probably Voltaire's frequent changes of attitudes are
mostly not the effect of successive issues, but of variations in his polemical
tactics; in other words, scepticism could simply have been adopted by him on
some occasions almost only for the sake of arguing.
If the attribution of the essay De la certitude des connaissances humaines
(1741) to Boureau Deslandes is correct.i" this is another document of
scepticism which leaves one wondering whether this is a genuine attitude, or,
partially at least, a cover for materialism, as Boureau Deslandes inclined to
it. 37 At this po int, the series of the unbelievers is interrupted by the mild
fideistic scepticism of Louis Racine (1742).38 But Themiseul De Saint
Hyacinthe, with his Recherches philosophiques (1743), is another momentous,
brilliant and humorous example of libertine scepticism. 39
The case of Vauvenargues (1746, 1747) is rather peculiar: from the point of
view of rational knowledge he was certainly a sceptic,"? but, on the other hand,
he relied on "instinct" and "feeling" for reaching some basic truths. Never-
theless , these powers have little or nothing to do with the English "common
sense" (in fact, they seem to be rather related to the Pascalian "coeur").
Because they only can act immediately, and they cannot be used as the
foundation of a body of rational knowledge: in other words, Vauvenargues'
remedy for scepticism is a form of irrationalism. 41
Condillac opens with his three first works (1746, 1749, 1754) the era of the
great relativistic empiricists: his position is clearly that of an academic
58 G. Tonelli
sceptic.V Ifhe asserts the unity of the soul, and its difference from the body,43
he also states that we do not know what the soul and the bodies are in
themselves, and that we cannot prove the real existence of matter. 44 Only later,
in 1755, he offered a proof for God's existence as a first cause,45 but I doubt
whether he really considered it as conclusive. Obviously, in his Cours d'etude
(1755), he took a more conservative stand;" but this is certainly due to the
pedagogical nature of that work . Diderot was clearly a sceptic in 1746 (Pensees
philosophiques); whether and how this scepticism persisted in his later evolution
is a subject of debate." Maupertuis (1748, 1750, 1752) is much more explicit:
our ignorance of conclusively demonstrated truths is total, if we except
mathematics; his proof for God's existence is only probabilistic.t" His friend
de Tressan seems to have approved of his views.49
Buffon (1749) deserves particular attention, because he was very highly
considered by Changeux. He states that the things we perceive in connection
with us, in themselves are nothing: they begin to exist for us only when we learn
their relationships with us and with each other and their properties.50 All
knowledge derives from the senses; all we know about things without us are the
effects of these things on our senses; but we entirely ignore the nature of the
causes (i.e. things as they are in themselves) of these effects.51 If we had
different sensory organs, we would know properties of matter different from
those we know. 52 Truth in mathematics depends on mere tautology, in physics
on the constant uniformity of phenomena: in fact, our ideas of the outside
world can be considered as real relations, in as far as these relations are
constant in connection with us.53 We cannot doubt our own existence, in as
far as we think; but the immateriality of our soul is asserted only hypotheti-
cally. On the other hand, there is no way to prove conclusively that matter
really exists.54
Sceptical empiric ism was becoming more and more fashionable; even La
Mettrie adopted it at a certain time (1751) , perhaps as an extenuating
circums tance for his basic materialism.55 And Formey, a former Wolffian,
declared in the article "Definition" of the Encyclopedic that definitions can only
be nominal, and that we cannot know the essences of substances, or the reality
of things. 56 For Bonnet (1755, 1760), the essence of both the soul and the body
cannot be penetrated; there is no way to prove the existence of the outs ide
world, and of other finite spirits; motion in bodies, freedom in the soul are
incomprehensible, as well as the nature of ideas in as far as they are
modifications of the soul (i.e, the metaphysical nature of ideas).57 In the
meanwhile (1755) De Beausobre had produced a rather insipid apology for
fideistic pyrrhonism.P
Maupertuis, in his capacity as president of the Academy of Berlin, exerted a
very considerable influence in favour of scepticism, In as far as our theme is
concerned, we already saw that Formey, secretaire perpetuel of the Academy,
had made some concessions. Two Swiss members of the Academy appointed by
Maupertuis, followed his course more enthusiastically: Begulin , in 1757,
attacked the validity of the principle of sufficient reason in general , and this
implies that the existence of the outside world cannot be demonstratedr'" and
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 59
have in fact the true middle point in common (although they are mostly not
aware of it)? Changeux' solution of this problem seems to me to be the
following: he refers to the doctrine of "a philosopher" who held that the
un iverse is an immense circle whose center is everywhere, and whose
circumference is nowhere (curious 18th Century revival of a doctrine of
Cusanus, which in our time is well known); and adds that, in connection with
us, the universe is a very narrow circle, of which we occupy the center (I, 10), as
a spider stays in the center of its web (1,74). Now, it is evident (1) that all things
we sense, and we know by ideas, must be located between the extremes;
everything which lies without this sphere, does not exist for us. (2) the center
of th is sphere is that [point] where the greatest degree of existence of these
things shall make itself sensed or perceived (I, 14). Returning to the image of
the circle, "we can compare the highest degree of reality to the center of an
almost infinite number of concentrical circles, which does not change, and is
always the same, although the circles may be larger or smaller; the more and
the less of the length of the rays of these circles is the measure of the extremes,
which are more or less extended for each man in particular" (I, 17-18).
Moreover, different circles subsist for the same man at the same time: "we put
the objects at different distances form us; we connect them by concentrical
circles, upon which we make them appear, and we occupy the center: (I, 74).
Now, what Changeux means is probably this: potentially, all men have the
same ideas and can order them in the correct way, because of the uniformity of
human nature and of the universe (Changeux assumes this proposition, which I
call the principle of uniformity, without feeling the need to prove it - a
proposition he hardly could prove, as it clearly is referred to human nature,
and to the universe, as they are in themselves; so that, according to Changeux,
we cannot know them). But in fact different men perceive different portions
(have different views) of the universe, so that those ideas they represent out of
the potential common stock are not the same, and this is true also for the
extremes. Now, if we apply to this the image of the "circle" (or, with some
change , that of the "sphere"), we may put things in the following way: on the
circumferences of the concentrical circles are located all couples of extremes,
which are the extremities of each diameter of the circles (on the image of the
diameter see I, 18); the circles are concentrical circles, because of the principle
of uniformity; each man is aware only of some extremes, i.e. of some points of
some circumferences; however, these extremes define a certain number of
diameters of the concentrical circles, and the point where the diameters cross
each other is identical to the true center of the circle, so that, in fact , all men
have this true center in common, although they are mostly not aware of it,
because they can err in establishing the middle point between each couple of
extremes, locating it, on the diameter between the two extremes, in a point
other than the center of the circle.
Changeux, in fact, writes that "there are as many orders of infinites, as there
are men reasoning"; but reality is the same for all men , "because reality
occupies the middle point between the extremes , or between the two kinds of
infinity characterizing the extremes, whatever be the order of this infinity" (I,
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 61
0711-VIII).
Thus, it seems that the extremes are conceived as invariants (with the help of
the notion of infinity); so that, even if the ideas we start with do not correspond
to reality, i.e. are not the exact middle point (51 the diameter) between their
extremes, we call first reach (on the circumferences) both extremes of each of
them, and then , starting back ; from the extremes, establish the true middle
point. And this is what makes a Science of Reality possible.P"
But there is a further difficulty: our author states that what is infinite for a
child may not be infinite for an adult; that what is infinite for the ignorant may
not be infinite for the learned, etc.; still, all of these (couples of) infinites have
their middle point in common. Moreover, each reader will conceive differently
of the particular extremes expounded by Changeux in his treatise , but they will
all agree on the reality of their middle point (1, VI-VIII). The ignorant will be
(in practice) in possession of the same general ideas, such as motion, space etc.,
as the learned the difference between them is that the learned knows how these
ideas originated (I, 86-87) , so that he has a correct awareness of them, and it
not distracted by apparent middle points.
All this suggests that the character of invariance attributed to each couple of
extremes transcends the particular awareness of the extremes in question; the
extremes may appear to different men in a different way, cut all these
appearances lead in practice to the same result (middle point). This difference
in appearances is expressed by the image of the concentrical circles: what
appears to be infinite to a child, appears to be finite to an adult, etc.; Changeux
means , in my opinion, that a child in this case locates his infinity on the
circumference of a smaller circle (or series of concentrical circles) than the
adult does; so that the adult still consider as finite the child's infinite, and will
locate his own extremes on the circumference of a larger circle. Then, the
invariance of the extremes consists in tile fact that while each Man proceeds in
both directions towards the extremes of an idea as far as he can go as an
individual, this happens in such a way that these extremes always reach the
extremities of a diameter of the circumference of sound circle, which has as a
center the Real middle point (and not the apparent one, i.e. the initial idea); and
this is a further consequence of the principle of the uniformity of human
nature. Now, the scientific study of the extremes as made by Changeux, will
bring about among the readers a convergence of their awareness of the real
middle point, without necessarily bringing about a convergence of their
awareness of the extremes.
I tried here to establish a certain consistency among some potentially
conflicting elements of Changeux' thought, but my interpretation is (only
hypothetical; in fact , these considerations are not systematically expounded
by our author, so that I must warn the reader that they are partially based on
inference and on conjecture.
But it is clear that Changeux, while holding his theories on a foundation he
identifies with empiricism (i.e. claiming that experience is the only foundation
for truth), strives to overcome the boundaries of traditional empiricism, as his
"principle of reality" allows him to establish truths lying beyond the empiri-
62 G. Tonelli
cists' perspectives (I, 55). This does not mean that we can know things as they
are in themselves: in fact, human science consists "in referring all ideas to some
fixed points , and in giving them an order and an arrangement founded on
nature, and on the way they are subordinated to each other". These "fixed
points" are the most general ideas, viz. the "immutable", "eternal truths" (I,
69-70) . In other words, all knowledge we can obtain only concerns the human
mind, and the way it represents the world. But about the world, as it is
represented by man, the Science of Reality seems to produce more knowledge
than some other empiristical methods. In fact, in the field of Metaphysics (a
science which does not study things in themselves, but the most abstract of our
ideas: I, 157), for one, Changeux is convinced to be able to settle many
questions other empiricists could not solve satisfactorily, or renounced to
consider at all. Notions such as being and nothingness, eternity and the instant,
past and future, time, life (in the sense of consciousness protracted in time),
infinite magnitude anti-smallness (both physical and mathematical), space, the
infinite divisibility of matter (I, l60f., 163, 164, 167, 175f., 187f., 197f., 205f.),
are supposed to find a solution to their difficulties.
In so doing, Changeux is certainly more radical (at least explicitly) than, say,
Locke or Condillac in renouncing all pretensions to establish any truth
reaching beyond the merely phenomenal world (e.g. God's existence); but
within this phenomenal, purely mental world, his method allows him to settle
more questions than, e.g. Locke could with the help of the function of
"intuition". Changeux, in fact, develops a kind of phenomenal rationalism, as
a complement to his empiricism , which claims greater achievements than the
rational component of "intuition" in Locke's method could yield. But I will
reconsider this point at the end of this paper.
The task of the Science of Reality consists in studying the general principles
of the different sciences; now, these principles are the opposite extreme to
simple, individual sensations ; but , as the extremes meet each other, the general
principles , or the most general ideas, are nothing but the expression of the
simplest facts, or of the simplest sensations (I, 64, 66-67). We can discern here
a clear echo of D'Alembert's basic doctrine, assert ing that the true principles of
each science are "simple and recognized facts", and not the "axioms".6s
Mathematics has the advantage over the other sciences of being founded on
clear perceptions; all its propositions are perfectly tautological (identical); but
they are not more evident than those of -the other sciences (I, 33); in fact they
do not concern absolute reality (I, 34) as they are founded on suppositions, i.e.
they are abstractions elaborated for us; for this conception of mathematics
Changeux correctly refers to Buffon's authority (I, 35). Beside metaphysical
and mathematical truths, there are physical, moral and theological truths (I,
34). Physical truths are founded on facts, i.e. on observation. Moral truths are
partially similar to mathematically and partially to physical truths.66 Theologi-
cal truths are revealed (I, 37-38). Human truth is valid for all men, but it is
always "contingent" or "hypothetical", i.e. dependent on the nature of men;
absolute truth belongs to a perfect being only (1,31-32). Truth, in conclusion is
nothing but a combination of ideas, viz. a relationship between ideas, and is
Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment 63
founded on evidence; while reality concerns what exists in connection with us,
and is founded on certainty (I, 39-10, 45). Only abstract ideas can be evident
(1,41); evidence has nothing to do with reality: e.g. the idea of the colour red is
evident, but it is nothing real (I, 43) We find in Changeux, as in many French
Enlightenment philosophers, the Lockean mental notion of truth as a mere
relationship between ideas.
According to Changeux, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes did not provide any
valid criterion for certainty. Locke, on the contrary, realized the limits of the
human mind: for him, certainty depends on our way of sensing. The
Pyrrhonians were wrong in that they trusted probability (I, 46-51, 128). Only
the Eclectics and the Empiricists reached a position acceptable by everybody
(I, 55). Basically, we can establish that knowing is nothing but sensing, and that
sensations never deceive us: error originates from reasoning (I, 57, 66).
The ideas of space, time and matter are abstract, and have nothing to do with
(external) reality (I, 64, 65,162,167,168,200,203), as all general ideas are only
expressions of the particular ideas from which they were abstracted, and do not
correspond to the essence of things. Even the idea of the Ego is something we
know only in connection with ourselves, i.e. we do not know what it is in itself
(what the soul is) (I, 68).
All sciences are nothing but collections of facts; therefore they are hypothe-
tical; a science of the essences of things does not exist (I, 73); from this point of
view, Ontology is completely useless (I, 77). In as far as Ontology studies the
cognitive principles, it is of some use, but the principle of contradiction is
sterile (I, 79); the principle of sufficient reason establishes that everything has a
cause, but it does not help to discover what the particular causes are; axioms
are of little use, because in our reasoning we are not helped by the principles,
but by correct and determinate ideas (I, 79-84). However, the axioms of the
Cartesians are more useful than the principles of contradiction and of sufficient
reason these axioms are: (I) all what is contained into the clear and distinct
idea of a thing can be asserted of that thing; (2) each perfection is dependent on
a being; etc. (I, 81-82). Here we find, again, a clear (and more specific)
influence of Locke, in his attack against the utility of the principles.f" but
Changeux found perhaps a nearer source of inspiration in D'Alembert. 68
'If man were capable of perfect science, this would consist of mere sensations
only, without any useless abstract idea: but this would be identical to complete
ignorance (I, 117-118); the most perfect reason is identical to the blindest
instinct; (I, 119) perfect esprit would be the same thing as perfect brutalite. This
is, of course, another application of the method of the extremes; and it is
justified in that perfect learning, would introduce so many distinctions into
abstract ideas, that they would be reduced to a collection of single ideas, and
this would meet total brutality, because the brute only has single ideas which he
cannot combine with each other. Besides, learning consists in the awareness
that all our knowledge is merely negative, and that it does not concern (external
or absolute) reality so that it meets complete ignorance (I, 122-24; see also 86-
87). Changeux also warns, in the spirit of his age, against the dangers of
"systems" (I, 131). As we can see, Changeux proposes a position of radical
64 G. Tonelli
preoccupation with this point, albeit leading to abortive results, is one of the
symptoms of a germinal reaction against skepticism, trying to proceed a new
plan , i.e. without reestablishing traditional dogmatism. of D'Alembert had
proceeded in the same direction, I have no evidence that he was fully aware of
it. In fact, disregarding the unwarranted assumptions underlying Changeux'
system, the method of the "extremes" is open to easy criticism, and as we have
seen, is not thoroughly established by its authors in an explicit and conscious
way at least.
The limits of this, method, too, are not clearly defined; obviously, mere
particular knowledge is empirical not only in as far as it proceeds from the
senses, but also in that it can reach probabilistic generality but not universal
validity for man . Only, I did not find Changeux explaining at which level this
kind of knowledge begins. It is not quite clear whether the laws of motion are
empirical or not; Changeux expounds Maupertuis principle of the least action
(which was considered by Maupertuis himself, and by other scientists of that
time, as the foundation of the laws of motion) , and he describes it as a
"geometrical truth" (p. 256-261) ; which suggests that he considers that law
to be absolutely necessary i.e. above empirical generality. In fact, D'Alembert
held the laws of motion for absolutely necessary, but Maupertuis, while
basically inclining towards the same position, had finally rejected it. If
Changeux was of the same opinion as D'Alembert, then the laws of nature
whose necessity cannot be proven belong to a level lower (more particular) than
that of the laws of motion but it is not clear where this level can be established,
as Changeux applies the method of the extremes, i.e. his meta-empirical
procedure, to notions such as generation and corruption (I, 309ff.), solidity
and liquidity (I, 316ff.), physical pleasure and pair S (I, 3S9-390), so that there
seem to be other principles of nature, belonging to physics, biology, physiology,
which are capable of an absolute foundation. Changeux certainly opens many
more problems than he is capable of solving.
NOTES
This research was made poss ible by a 1.S. Guggenheim Foundation Fellowship and by a grant
from the Research Foundation of the State University of New York . I wish to express my gratitude
to both institutions, and to my colleague, Prof. Anthony Preus, who read the manuscript and made
some valuable suggestions.
1. B. De Felice, Encyclopedic, ou Dict ionnaire universal raisonne des connaisances humaines, 42 viL,
Yverdon 177lJ-1775
2. R. Desautels, Les Memoires de rrevoux et le mouvement des idees aux XV/IIe steele (J 701-1734),
Rome 1956, pp . 173-186
3. Actually, the Biographie calls this journal Journal de Physique; but in the Abbe Rozier's time it
was still entitled Observations sur la physique. The title was changed in 1794. See E. Hatin,
Bibliograph ie historique et critique de la presse perodique francaise, Paris 1866 (Rp. Hildesheim
1965) pp . 36-37.
4. Other information is contained in Ch . Brainne, 1. Debar-Bouiller, Ch .-F. LaPierre, Les hommes
illustres de l'Orleans, 2 voL, Orleans 1852, 1. P. 308.
5. B. Pascal, Pensees et opuscules, ed. Brunschvieg, Paris 1912, p. 174. These passages were still
unpublished in 1768, but not those referred to in Note 6.
66 G. Tonelli
education, as was held by Harvey, Helvetius, etc. One could propose a connection, perhaps,
with Hobbes, whose influence in this field has not been studied adequately.
19.1.S. Spink , French Free-T'Hought from Gassendi to Voltaire. London , 1960, pp. 220-221. I could
not see personally Gaultier's work.
20. R. Mercier, La rehabilitation de la nature humaine ( 1700- 1750), Paris, 1960, pp. 205-207 .
21. See L. Tolmer, P.-D. Huet ( 1630-1721), Bayeux, 1949.
22. Popkin , op. cit., p. 1326.
23.1.-F. Baltus, Sentiment. . .sur Ie Traite de lafaiblesse. . ., in: P.-N. Desmolets , Continuation des
Memoires de littetature et d'histoire, T. II , Ie P., Paris, 1926.
24. Spink, op. cit., p. 307.
25. Popkin , op. cit. , p. 1327.
26. See n. 2 above.
27. W. Krauss , Cartaud de la Vii/ate , Berlin 1960.
28. Mercier, op. cit., pp. 185-186.
29. Gi-C, Legendre de Saint Aubain-sur-Loire , Traite de l'opinion (1733], Paris 1735. This is an
enormous and very tedious work of more than 3000 pages in 6 volumes, showing some erudition
but very little originality. Saint Aubain believes in magic (vol. II, p. 384), and discusses the
cabbala, oracles, omens, dreams, etc. He declares that pyrrhonism is dangerous and non-
sensical, but that a prudent doubt is salutary: he intends "to humiliate the human mind " (vol. I,
p. 2) in order to prepare it to receive "the light of faith", which cannot be submitted to reason ;
there are, however, some primary truths , founded on interior conviction, which cannot be
questioned . The pyrrhonian who denies this cannot be enlightened by Revelation, because he
has no criterion for distinguishing Revelation from imposture (vol. I, pp. 464-465) . In spite of
his praise of doubt, Saint Aubain seems to be rationally assured of a substantial stock of truths.
He produces a (rather trivial) proof for God 's existence as first cause of his own existence (vol.
II, pp. 215-216, 219), and knows, too, that the soul of animals is an intermediate substance
between matter and spirit (vol. II, p. 263). I am not ready, then, to consider Saint Aubain a
sceptic; in my opinion , he belongs rather to the "weakness of reason" trend. See G. Tonelli, The
Weakness of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment, in: Diderot Studies, XIV, 1971.
30. Spink, op. cit., pp. 309f.
31. Popkin , op. cit. , p. 1330.
32. Mercier, op. cit., pp. 433f.
33. F. Quesnay, Essai physique sur l ' econam ie animale (1737), Paris 1747. Another important
document of Quesnay 's scepticism is his article "Evidence" in the Encyclopedic (1756). See also
J.B. Ie Boyer d'Argens, La philosophie du bon sens (1737), Dresde 1754. I will discuss the
scepticism of Quesnay and d'Argens in a monograph on Maupertuis which is now in
preparation. See also E. Johnston, Le Marquis d'Argens, Paris 1928 (Rp . Geneve 1971).
34. F.M. Arouet de Voltaire, Micromegas, ed. Wade, Princeton, 1950. See Wade's Introduction and
notes, and pp. 141f.
35. F.M. Arouet de Voltaire, Romans et contes , ed. H. Benac, Paris 1958, p. 315.
36. This is not the opinion of R. Geissler, Boureau-Deslandes, Ein Materialist der Friihaufkldrung,
Berlin 1967.
37. I will discuss this work more extensively in my monograph on Maupertuis.
38. See his poem La Religion (1742), uiPoesies , Paris 1823.
39. See above, n. 36.
40. See, for example, L. de Clapier de Vauvenargues, Oeu vres completes , ed. Bonnier, Paris 1968, vol
I, pp. 251-252. (Reflexions sur divers sujets, 1. Sur Ie Pyrrhonisme).
41. Vial, op. eit., pp. 74--108.
42. E. Bonnot de Condillac, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1803 suiv., I, pp. 2-3 , 18, 110-112; III , pp.
373,385-386; IV,pp.222, 383-384 , 392- 393.
43. Condillac, op. cit., I, pp, 20-25 .
44. See references given in n. 42.
45. Condillac, op. cit ., pp. 125-146.
68 G. Tonelli
46. Popkin, op. cit., p. 1338, and also the different sections of Condillac's Introduction to the Cours,
to the Art de penser, and to the Art de raisonner, where he discusses the problems of God, the
soul, and the body.
47. See J. Schwartz, Diderot and Montaigne, Geneve 1966, pp. 60-85 ; Popkin, op. cit., p. 1336.
48. See n. 33. Maupertuis' basic works in this respect are: Reflexions sur l'origine des langues (1748),
Essai de Cosmologie (1750), and Lettres (1752). See P.-L. Moreau de Maupertuis Oeuvres, 4 vol.,
Lyon 1768.
49. A. Le Sueur, Maupertuis et ses correspondants, Paris 1897, pp. 355-356 and n.
50. G.L. Leclerc de Buffon, Oeuvres completes, Paris 1845, vol. I, p. 5.
51. Buffon, op. cit., I, p. 12; III pp. 115,119, 131,221 ,222.
52. Buffon, op. cit., III, p. 126.
53. Buffon, op. cit., I, pp. 11-12; III, pp. 115-116.
54. Buffon, op. cit., III, pp. 221, 222, 224.
55. 1. Offray de la Mettrie, Oeuvres, Berlin 11774 (Rp. Hildesheim 1970). pp. 30-31 .
56. Encyclopedie, vol IV, 1753, pp. 746-747.
57. Ch. Bonnet, Essai de Psychologie, Londres 1755, pp. 96, 105, 106, 118-122, 386; Essai
analytique sur les facultes de lame, Copenhague 1760, pp. XIV-XVI, 14,45,79,93,95,168,
467 . However, thought definitely seems to be different from matter: pp. XVIII-XX.
58. Popkin, op. cit ., p. 1342.
59. N. Beguelinm, Memoire sur les premiers principes de la metaphysique, I, in: Histoire de l'
Academie Royale des Sciences et Belles-Lettres {de Berlin], MDCCLV, 1757, in particular, p.
419.
60. 1.B. Merian, Discours sur la Metaphysique, in: Histoire etc., MDCCLXV, 1767, pp. 459-461 . The
Discours also had been published separately in 1765.
61. See G . Tonelli, "D'Alemberts Scepticism", to be published in The Review of Metaphysics.
62. Encyclopedie, vol. XIII, 1765, art. "Propriete"; Vol XV, 1765 art. "Sensations", p. 35, "Sentiment
intime",
63. Popkin, op. cit., p. 1342, n. 42.
64. I, pp. 45-46: "NOllS avons dit que ce n'est qu'en decouvrant quelle est notre constitution
presente, notre maniere de sentir, que nous pourrons juger de la realite dans nos sensations, &
par une consequence necessaire, de la certitude dans nos idees et dans nos raisonnements, & que
I'on ne peut autrement fixer cette maniere de sentir, qu 'en reconnaissant les deux Extremes entre
lesquels se trouve,"
65. 1. le Rond D ' Alembert, Oeuvres, vol. II , Paris 1805, pp . 29-30 (Rp. as Elements de Philosoph ie,
ed. Schwab, Hildesheim 1965).
66. See Buffon, op. cit., p. 12. For Locke, moral ideas had the same character as mathematical ideas:
1. Locke, An Essay concerning Human understanding, ed. Campbell Fraser, New York 1959, vol.
II , pp . 156-157, 208-209, 232-233 . This doctrine had not been accepted by the French
Lockeans.
67. Locke, op. cit., vol. II , pp. 275ff.
68. Condillac, op. cit ., vol. I, pp. 49-53.
69. Condillac, op. cit ., vol. I, pp. 49-53.
70. Changeux has some knowledge of Leibniz, probably from the French Leibnitians, but this
knowledge must be very superficial, considering that he constantly mispells "Leibniz" as
"Leikniz".
71. See, e.g. G. Berkeley, The Works, ed. Fraser, Oxford 1901, Vol. I, pp. 276-277, 424.
72. See above, n. 61.
73. See G. Tonelli , "Kant und die antiken Skeptiker," op. cit., pp. IIO.
G.TONELLI
1.
The historical problematic of the sceptical tradition since the Renaissance has
been raised again recently in a splendid book by Richard Popkin . 1 The author
traces the relationships between the revival of ancient scepticism and the new
sceptical attitudes from Erasmus to Descartes, and promises a future continua-
tion of his work that will reach down to Kierkegaard. Our investigation here is
intended as a contribution to the penultimate steps of that continuation. We
shall not be raising the general problem of Kant's relationship to scepticism: a
decision about this far-reaching question will first be possible when its
presuppositions (namely, the progress of the sceptical tradition up to Kant)
have been clarified. We will therefore mainly limit ourselves to one part of the
problem : Kant's relationship with the ancient sceptics, with special attention to
terminological questions.
It goes without saying that one should not believe that this part of the
problem can be considered wholly in isolation. One reason for this is that in all
likelihood Kant's knowledge of ancient scepticism was not based on a first-
hand study of the ancient Greek texts ," but rather on the received image of the
Greek sceptics, ma inly as it was to be found in the modern sceptics, their
opponents, and the historians of philosophy of the times. It will therefore be
necessary to allude to some aspects of the history of modern scepticism;
especially to Pierre Bayle and his followers in the eighteenth century.
An evaluation of the attitude of Kant toward the ancient sceptics naturally
also presupposes an assessment of his relationship with scepticism in general,
and especially to the scepticism of his times. But in respect to this question, as
in the case of the previous one, we will limit ourselves to generally accepted
features and certain special indications and particulars, in order not to go too
far out of the range of our problem .
2.
The traditional characterizations of the sceptics are certainly important for our
theme. Gassendi wrote: "Ipsi a Pyrrhone Pyrrhonei dicuntur; & cum dictum
69
R.B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 69-98.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
70 G. Tonelli
iam sit appellari eos quoque ab assensus cohibitione Epheticos, & a consider-
atione, discussioneque Scepticos , constat fuisse quoque Zeteticos vocatos, a
facta undequaque Veritatis inquisitione, itemque Aporeticos a dubitationibus
variis, quas obiicere Dogmaticis solent"? These characterizations can also be
found in Stanley, Bayle, Crousaz, Brucker, Baumgarten, and many others."
We observe in this a term that arouses our special interest: Zetetici. Kant
wrote in his Nachricht von der Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen in dem Winter-
halbjahre von 1765-1766 [Report on the Plan of his Lectures in the Winter
Semester of 1765-66J: "The proper method of investigation of worldly wisdom
is the zetetical method, as some of the ancients called it (from S11.1:1 v), that is,
the investigative method, which becomes dogmatic, that is, decisive, only where
already skillful reason has been applied to different matters" (Academy ed. II,
307). And this is bound up with the teaching that one should learn not
philosophy, but how to philosophize: philosophy is not grounded so firmly as
the historical and mathematical sciences, and a completely certain philosophy
is not yet available. It is only possible to teach youth how one can bu ild up a
ph ilosophy oneself.
This corresponds to the intentions that Kant expressed in his work on
Distinctness (1763): it would be necessary to determine the simple basic
concepts through an analytical process before one could build up a systematic
(and synthetic) philosophy. Kant now maintained that he had already made
substantial progress in this direction (II, 308). Writings like Negative Quantities
and Objects in Space doubtless belong to this research program, which finally
would lead to the revolution of the year 1769. Thus one can understand why
Kant associated the two terms "zetetic" and "critical" somewhat later (1772):
"The idea of metaphysics: is it a critique or a doctrine : is its procedure zetetic
or dogmatic"? (XVII, 558, Refl. N. 4455); and why he divided the proposed
work into a "genetic" and a "zetetic" part. The latter contained, among other
things, an "antithesis" and a "sceptical" part (XVII, 560, Refl. N. 4450). The
"critical" attitude appeared to him after 1769 as the true form of the earlier
"zetetic" procedure, and can thus also in a revised sense be called "zetetic", The
Logik Blomberg (1771) transmitted a Kantian definition of the Zetetic: "The
Zetetic is not one who has a maxim of rejecting each and every thing, nor to
decide each and every thing positively and without distinction, nor to maintain
it blindly, but rather one who reflects on his knowledge [denen Erkenntnissen],
and tests it". 5
3
The term "Zetesis" can only have come out of the sceptical vocabulary." In the
eighteenth century it was only drawn from there, and was even so very
uncommon." In the seventeenth century it appears almost exclusively in the
philosophical dictionaries," and even then it is only very seldom used.? This
origin is further confirmed when Kant opposes "zetetic" and "dogm atic" in the
above-mentioned place: this antithesis is typical both of the sceptical writings
and of the anti-sceptical literature.
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 71
"Dogmatic" and "dogma" were indeed used in the school philosophy of the
eighteenth century, but without relation to the sceptics , and in a wholly positive
sense. According to this usage, dogmatic knowledge was contrasted to
historical knowledge: the former consisted ofgeneral and rationally established
teachings, and the latter consisted of real and individual truths. All possible
rational knowledge consisted of dogmas; that is, of demonstrated teachings. 10
In this sense, for example, the expression "dogmatic theology" came into
general use in the first half of the eighteenth century (before Budde, in 1723,
very rare) . II In Semler's usage dogmatic theology is a kind of systematic
theology (that is, a theology that collects, combines, and mutually derives the
truths of the Holy Book) , "which has to do with the interpretation and
demonstration of the teachings of the faith; the credenda of the Holy Book ,
the theories that the holy order contains" - as opposed to historical theology,
which is purely a catalog of biblical teachings. 12
One can not indeed maintain that Kant already in 1764 rejected dogmatic
philosophy in the traditional sense. He still had the notion, as he expressed it in
Distinctness (1763), that he himself would one day be able to finally ground a
dogmatic philosophy "in different parts". Even later (1769), when he had given
up this hope, logic, morals, and the general science of nature were "dogmati-
cally pure philosophy" (Reflection No. 3957, XVII, 366), although this was in a
new, critical sense. In the year 1772 he was still of the opinion that one should
proceed dogmatically in morals; 13 and even in the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant wrote that Critique was opposed to dogmatism, but that it should be
"dogmatic, that is, firmly and a priori established on the basis of certain
principles" (B XXXV). Kant thus used the term "dogmatic" with two different
meanings, one positive and one negative, in his Critical period. This double
usage is very clear in Kant's lectures on logic of the early 1770's (Logik
Blomberg, 1771, and Logik Philippi, 1772). The first, positive sense emerges at
the places where Kant opposes dogmatic (general, rational, a priorii knowledge
to historical (a posteriori, concerned with individuals) knowledge.l" " D ogma-
ta" are items of knowledge that can be discovered a priori through pure reason,
as in mathematics; 15 but also items of knowledge that are based on experi-
ence.l" The second, negative sense emerges where "dogmatic" is used in
opposition to "sceptical", "critical", "problematical", and "dialectical". 17 This
negative sense, which derives from the usage of the sceptics, obtained in general
a greater influence .
Thus, we should come to the conclusion that for Kant "zetetic" meant the
same as "sceptical" (in the good sense) (also see below, section 4). If in the
Report of 1765 he avoided the term "sceptical", one should believe that this was
in deference to public opinion, which could take offense at it. I S
4
Thus Kant used the term "sceptical" as a characterization of his metaphysics or
his critical method. Already in 1769 the Critical philosophy was to be "zetetic,
sceptic, problematic" (Reflection No. 3957, XVII , 366). But the term "sceptic"
72 G. Tonelli
had a positive and a negative sense as well, as we have seen above in the Logik
Blomberg. The first , that signifies a careful procedure in which one does not
claim anything until one has considered all the pros and contras and arrived at
perfect certainty, without excluding the possibility that the truth may be
reached, had the most influence and meant the same as "cr itical" and
"problematical't.l" This "true" scepticism was set against the false, which
maintained doubt as a final goal, and thus lapsed into dogmatism.j" In the
Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia, from the years 1776-1780,21 Kant
called Critique a "sceptical method", to be "distinguished from the sceptical
philosophy't.P In the Critique of Pure Reason we read: "While the transcen-
dental dialectic does not by any means favor scepticism, it certainly does favor
the sceptical method" (B535). And the "sceptical method" as a pure "suspen-
sion of judgment" is later explained as "very useful to the critical procedure",
as long as it does not lead to scepticism (Logik, IX, 84). It is appropriate to
observe here that Formey characterized the sceptics as "critiques tres mor-
dans".23
As we have seen, Critique was dogmatic, without leading to dogmatism; and
it was also sceptical, without leading to scepticism. Critique is finally a tertium
between dogmatism and scepticism, which takes advantage of the benefits of
both styles of reasoning, and rejects the drawbacks. However, this somewhat
artificial balance can only be demonstrated indirectly by comparing the various
textual references. The relation of the critical method, or of the transcendental
dialectic, to the sceptical method is in fact mostly found (and obtains its
greatest influence) where Critique is opposed, often reciprocally, to dogmatism.
The influence of the sceptical way of thinking on Kant is thus considerable,
and not just terminological. Before investigating the meaning of this fact more
closely, we will draw attention to a few not unimportant particulars.
5
In the year 1770 a very important book for Kant appeared: A.G. Baumgarten's
Phi/osophia generalisf" edited by his student Joh. Chr. Forster. The latter
introduced the work with a " D isser t atio prooemialis de dubitatione et
certitudine", in which he counted four kinds of philosophical doubts: 1. the
Pyrrhonian, 2. the Academic, 3. the Cartesian, and finally, 4. an "ultima
dubitationis ratio", which is "sana et rationalis" (#2).
What Forster wrote about the first of these is of special interest to us:
"Primarium tantummodo locum ex Sexto Empirico adponam, quo recte
appareat sententia Pyrrhonis et scepticorum [he cites the Outlines ofPyrrhon-
ism, 1.4]. Quando <pCXtv6~EVCX et VOOU~EVCX , uti debent, a se invicem distinguun-
tur, ut illa sint, quae sensu percipiuntur, haec vero, quae mente, non vero sensu
cogitari possunt; praecipue quidem 'teX VOOU~EVcx, opposita habuerunt 't01.~
<pCXtV6~EVotC;, tamen vero simul <pCXtV6~EVCX <pCXtvO~EVOtC;, opposuerunt; unde
quoque explicari debent, quae scepticis adeo solemnia sun t: Ilnvrl AOY<P laoc;
CXl>'th(E'tCXt: ouoev opi.~O): ou ~w..AO)V rotiro ti f:xE'i vo ... Plato... et post eum
discipulus Speusippus utique sibi opposita censuerunt <pCXtV6~EVCX et VOOU~EVCX;
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 73
6.
The quotation from Forster also brings out another side of scepticism that was
of great interest to Kant: its antithetical method. Already between 1752 and
1756 Kant gave as the origin of scepticism the "division of opinions" and
alluded to the sceptical procedure of setting up arguments and counter-
arguments.'! In The Only Possible Proof (1763), too , such a procedure was
commended as the best method, and one that can lead to truth (II, 67-8); and
he said the same in a letter to Lambert of February 3, 1766 (X, 63). In the
Logik Blomberg (1771) this method of investigation was praised, and attributed
to Pyrrho, Socrates, and Hume.V
Kant wrote between 1776 and 1778:"Two Metaphysici, of which one proves the
thesis, and the other proves the antithesis, stand in the eyes of a third observer for
a sceptical proof'.33 And one reads in the Lectures on Philosophical Encyclopedia :
"The sceptical method is the method of opposition, by which we seek to find the
truth. When someone for example maintains something, one maintains the
opposite and investigates whether it may perhaps be true".34 Kant called this
method "Dialectic": "... Dialectic was considered necessary by the administrators
and lawyers in ancient times. The sceptics were very useful to them, because they
tried to bring people to uncertainty by maintaining first one thing, and then its
opposite'l" In Kant's Logic the sceptics or Academics were called "subtle,
dialectical philosophers", for whom "philosophy consists in the equivalency of
judgments and teaches us to uncover false appearances... Their teacher Plato had
started them on this, in that many of his teachings were dialogical, so that the
arguments pro and contra were brought out without him deciding between them,
although he was in other respects very dogmatic" (IX , 30-1).
74 G. Tonelli
7
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant referred to Zeno of Elea as one of the
predecessors of his own dialectic: "Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was
already severely rebuked by Plato as a mischievous sophist who, in order to
show off his art, tried to prove a proposition through plausible arguments and
then tried to destroy it through arguments just as strong ... To the critics of his
procedure he appeared to have the absurd intention of denying both of two
mutually contradictory propositions. But this accusation does not seem to me
to be justified... If two opposed judgments presuppose an inadmissible
condition, then in spite of their opposition, which does not amount to a
contradicition strictly so-called, both fall to the ground, inasmuch as the
condition, under which alone either of them can be maintained, itself falls"
(B530-l).
According to Zeno, the dialectic had another function : "Zeno of Elea... was
a man of great understanding and acumen. - Until then, dialectic meant the
pure use of the understanding; or it signified the ability to use one's under-
standing with respect to concepts isolated from all sensibility. - For that reason
we find so much praise of it among the ancients; and in this sense it is
praiseworthy. The philosophers that rejected this sense necessarily fell into
subtleties, and then dialectic arose in the sense in which we take it. It became an
art of supporting and opposing every proposition; it became purely an exercise
for sophists, lawyers, and public speakers 'C"
8.
In Kant's OpInIOn, the dialectic of the ancients was "not a science of the
probable, but of illusion [Schein]; and also not a critique of illusion, but if it
had been, it would have been admirable". In Kant's day, this dialectic had
"almost disappeared'V" and had become , as a part of formal logic, very
harmful: " Here we are taught to speak of things about which we know
nothing".38 This "sophistical art" developed when one tried to use formal logic
as an organon. A dialectic was permissible in formal logic next to an analytic
only if it were understood as a "critique of dialectical illusion" (B85-6) . This
would be a dialectic "which possessed signs and rules by which we could
recognize that something was not in accordance with the formal criteria of
truth, even if it appeared to be exactly in accordance with them . The dialectic in
this meaning would thus have a good use as a catharcticon of the under-
standing" (IX, 17).
The analytic and the dialectic of formal logic thus run in parallel to the
transcendental analytic and the transcendental dialectic. The first is a logic of
the truth, the second a logic of illusion (or a critique of dialectical illusion), that
has nothing to do with the empirical, but rather has to do with transcendental
illusions. This logic of illusion is not a teaching about probability; the latter
belongs to the analytical part of logic (B87-8; 349-52).
The following points from the foregoing should be especially underlined: 1.
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 75
9
It was a wide-spread opinion that Zeno had been the originator of dialectic;
yet, the invention of the term "dialectic" was denied him. We find correspond-
ing places in Gassendi, Bayle, Stanley, Darjes, Brucker, and others." As is well
known, Zeno's teachings were used already as support for scepticism by Sextus
Empiricus, and they were used a great deal by modern sceptics. He was often
pointed out as the first sceptic.t" Feder blamed him curtly for sophistry." But
the most important treatment of him was the article "Zeno" in Bayle's
Dictionary. One reads in Note B: "Cette Dialectique de Zenon semble avoir
a a
ete dest inee brouiller tout, & non pas eclaircir quelque chose. II ne s'en
servoit que pour disputer contre tout venant, & pour reduir les Adversaires au
silence, soit qu'ils soutinssent le blanc, soit qu'ils soutinssent le noir." But in
Note E Bayle endeavoured to vindicate Zeno. He referred to places in Seneca42
where Zeno was accused of scepticism (for example, "Zenon Eleates omnia
negotia de negotio dejecit, ait nihil esse. Circa eadem fere Pyrrhonii versantur,
& Megarici, & Eretrici, & Academici, qui novam induxerunt scientiam, nihil
scire... Tota rerum natura umbra est, aut inanis, aut fallax ..."), and opined
against that view, relying on Justus Lipsius and especially Fonseca, that Zeno
through his famous proofs only wished to refute Plato's teaching concerning
abstract unity, and that he did not arrive at a nihilistic conclusion.P
Brucker repeated these observations and suggestions from Bayle, adding the
opinions of Cudworth, Reimmann, and Morhof, but rejecting, with Bayle,
Seneca's opinion: "summum hoc scepticismi gradum esse". He came to this
conclusion: "suspicio non injusta est, a metaphysica Eleatica eum non
recessisse, nugis tamen & tricis dialecticis rem in se obscuram magis obscur-
asse & reddidisse implicitam.T'"
Darjes repeated a passage from Gassendi in which the antithetical method of
Zeno was especially clear: "Siquidem facta positione, sive quaestione aliqua,
v.c. An unum sit, vel, si mavis, utrum homo sit animal; potest, aut pars
affirmativa Est, aut negativa Non est , assumi: quod modo duae hypotheses,
sive suppositiones fiunt, nimirum, si est, si non est.. .".45
With this all of the presuppositions to Kant's pos ition concerning Zeno
76 G. Tonelli
become clear: he is a dialectician, at least after the fact; his method is similar to
the sceptical method; he was not a sceptic; but his musings were still
pernicious. The only one that Kant did not accept was the last, which was also
the most important. He endeavoured to show that Zeno had anticipated his
(Kant's) dialectic, and thus confirmed the value of Zeno's method. Zeno's
dialectic dealt with the pure understanding, as distinguished from the sceptical
dialectic (we saw above how, according to Brucker and Forster, the sceptics
also "opposed appearances to appearances'rj.'"
It should be emphasized that Kant first developed this understanding of
Zeno relatively late. In the lectures on logic of the early 1770's Socrates was
treated as the predecessor of scepticism.V One encounters there also a careful
vindication of Pyrrho (understood as the true originator of scepticism), who, as
a "good sceptic", never denied the possibility of reaching the truth. 48 (La
Mothe Le Vayer, Gentzkenius, and Boureau Deslandes had also understood
true Pyrrhonism in this way.'") His students were the first to fall into "dogmatic
doubt".50 There was no clear distinction between the Academic and the
Pyrrhonian sceptics. 51
10 .
II.
The second belief visibly derives from a) the relationship traditionally recog-
nized between Zeno and the sceptics, b) the fact that the method of the sceptics
was taken to be based on opposed propositions. Both of these were splendidly
expressed by a passage in Brucker: "Principium Scepticae, quo nititur, est
praecipue hoc: Omni rationi rationem aequalis ponderis & momenti opponi.
Protagoram primum fuisse, qui hoc dubitandi de omnibus principium in
philosophiam introduxerit, supra multis enarravimus, a quo ad Pyrrhonem
delatum, vanissimae arti fundamentum exhibuit miserrimum: quo ante Prota-
goram Zeno quoque Eleates, & post eum, qui magnis clamoribus Graeciam
replerunt Sophistae & Dialectici usi sunt ".65 The characterization of the
sceptics as "sophists" is also clear here.
Dommerich wrote: "The chief principle of the sceptics is this: One can not
know anything with certainty, since each proof can be opposed by a proof of
equal strength't'" Carpov, Panckoucke, and Merian had said the same. 67
The antithetical character of the sceptical way of thinking was especially
emphasized by Baumgarten in the above-cited work. The second chapter,
Certitudo philosophica, consists of two sections: 1. "Thetica", where the
different kinds of (dogmatic) certainty are reviewed; and 2. "Antithetica", where
the sceptical position is discussed, and indeed because "Habitu aliquid nec
ponendi nee tollendi gaudens est scepticus 'V" Baumgarten portrayed the
history of ancient and modern scepticism in his "Antithetica", and tried to
refute the sceptical arguments against the certainty of knowledge.
12.
For Kant, the dialectic of the sophists and the sceptics was (see above, #6-7) a
"dialectic in the sense that we take it... an art of defending and attacking each
proposition"; however, it had been "almost completely done away with" in
78 G. Tonelli
Kant's day. This dialectic was "not a science of probabilities, but of illusion",
and thus Kant wants to treat it as a critique of illusion.
As we have seen, Kant mentions the dialectic of the moderns in a way which
excludes the possibility that he understands dialectic (and logic in general) in
the Platonic-Ramist tradition. He can only be understanding the Logica
probabilium as that which had experienced a second blossoming in Germany
at the end of the seventeenth century but which in Kant's day was only carried
on by Darjes.f" The question arises, then, why Kant refused to characterize this
dialectic as a science of probability (as also within ancient dialectic he granted
no independent place to the Aristotelian Topics - he identified it expressly with
sophistic dialectic, B 86). The answer is very simple: Kant's concept of
probability was such that it had to come to the conclusion that the Aristotelian
Topics, just like the Logica probabilium of the moderns, has nothing to do with
the probable (in Kant's sense), but rather concerns illusion, and thus it was one
and the same as the sophistic-sceptical dialectic. A passage from Kant's Logik
is revealing in this respect: "A lot has been said about a logic of probability
(logica probabilium). But this is not possible; because if the proportion between
insufficient reasons and sufficient reasons cannot be weighed mathematically,
no rules will help" (IX, 82).70 The traditionallogica probabilium was thus only a
logic of plausibility (verisimilitudo) , as Kant had defined this concept (IX, 81-
82). For objective grounds for holding something to be true are only possible
through mathematics; and in this case, "in respect to the calculus probabilium of
the latter, it contains not probability, but very certain judgments about the
degree of the possibility of certain cases under given similar conditions" (IV,
369). The "teaching of probability" belongs thus to "the analytical part of
logic" (B, 349).
The Logica probabilium of a Darjes was thus for Kant a misunderstood logic
of illusion . This last conclusion makes it possible to evaluate more precisely the
influence of the sceptical tradition on the shaping of the Critique of Pure
Reason.
First, however, we would like to review the historical foundations of the
genesis of the Kantian conception of dialectic as a logic of illusion. 71
13
Already Leibniz had rejected the traditional Logica probabilium as worthless,
and drawn attention to the need for a true science of this matter. 72 This idea
was taken up by Wolff.73 Meanwhile , a mathematical science of probability was
developed from many sides. Important contributions came from Huygens,
Bernoulli, De Moivre, Sauveur, Rizetti, Petty, Pascal, Fermat, Craig, Teyler,
Euler, D'Alembert, Beguelin , Segner, Kastner, Syberth, Carstens, Unger,
Brunneman, Baudisius , Krone, De Cramer, SiiBmilch, and Lichtenberg."
From this arose a concept of probability not in the sense of imperfect (or
moral) certainty, as it had always been for Leibniz and Wolff, but understood
as a perfect mathematical (probabilistic) certainty, that nevertheless is distin-
guished from mathematical Eviden z. This concept was introduced into philo-
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 79
14
Frommichen distinguished the mathematically understood probable from the
false concept of the probable, which he designated as "resembling the truth" or
as an "illusion of certainty", to which belonged surmises, presuppositions,
conjectures, presumptions, hypotheses, and, most of all, pure opinions. That
which resembles the truth can first become probable insofar as we compare
appearances whose origins we do not perceive with similar appearances whose
origins we do perceive.f'' True probability makes things clear through a
"proof.. . which one draws out of the enlightenment of chance conditions, out
of origins and effects, out of circumstances and the results of a thing, as well as
out of secure datis and signs of truth; which leads one to objects that are not
simultanea, but rather successiva ; and which never permits of perfect Evidenz".
Frommichen also appealed to Feder, Search (A. Tucker), and Ulrich.?' He
distinguished further between a mathematical and a philosophical probability.
The first made things clear on the basis of a large number of similar cases, and
in the latter in contrast one relied on "one fact" (where one confronted
80 G. Tonelli
"individual circumstances"), for example where Cicero tried to prove that Milo
had acted in a situation of necessity above and beyond the law. In the latter, it is
required that one be familiar with all of the special circumstances of a case, and
of all the sources and motives of this kind of case. 92
Although Frommichen reached back into the realm of the old "resembling
the truth" in his "philosophical probability", he still maintained that the old
logica probabilium was mainly only a logic of illusion , in contrast to which the
true doctrine of probability was separated from logic, and in any case no longer
belonged to the realm of the opinabile.
Did Kant know this work by Frommichen? That cannot be demonstrated.
But the path of thought which led Kant to his concept of probability can not
have been very far from Frommichen's. Kant doubtless knew most of the
authors whose doctrines had led Frommichen to his views.
In his first essay on the "Logic of Probabilities", Kant had still used the term
in the traditional sense (I, 32). In his Logik Herder (between 1762 and 1764) the
dialectic was still related to probability.'" In contrast, the doctrine of prob-
ability appears in a transitional phase in the lectures on logic of the early 1770's
(1771-72). The Logica probabilium still belonged to probability, in contrast to
certainty; but the doctrine of probability is already expressed mathematically,
relying upon Bernoulli. This doctrine, however , had still not been system-
atically developed: it "should extend to the experience of all humans, and such
a one is not yet at hand".94 This probability became ever more defined as a
form of knowledge, "where the grounds for holding something to be true are
not sufficient'V" If uncertain knowledge is not mathematically grounded, but
philosophically, then one arrives at a pure "plaus-ibility" [Scheinbarkeit] that is
subjective and always subject to change. In contrast, "whatever is [mathemati-
cally] probable cannot be totally changeable, but stays one and the same ", and
is objective." The philosophical theory of subjective probability (plausibility)
"will never achieve perfection. Philosophical probability allows more of being
felt than employed", for example, concerning the question of the immortality of
the sou l.97
One may thus assume that Kant had basically taken the same path as
Frommichen before the appearance of the latter's work. Frommichen's work
nevertheless may have led Kant to a more exact definition of his doctrine of
probability.
15
Now we come back to the main problem: namely, to the influence of the
sceptical tradition - apart from the above-mentioned particulars - on the
formation of the Critique of Pure Reason. First, one can th ink of the
"suspension of judgment" as a kind of Cartesian doubt about metaphysics
before the introduction of the critical process, or until the perfection of the
critical grounding of metaphysical knowledge. This can easily be allowed.
Second, the dialectical method can be considered, as it is employed in the
transcendental dialectic, namely as a "method of opposition". One must
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 81
observe that for Kant this should be not an "art", but a "critique of illusion",
which does not lead to scepticism (#4_5).98
(In so doing one may disregard the special position which Kant grants to
Zeno. The doctrines of Zeno were at that time a part of the traditional sceptical
battery of arguments. One can only with difficulty speak of the "Zenonian
influence " as separated from the sceptical influence. Kant's engagement with
Zeno was rather a component of his argument with scepticism.) The question is
whether one should maintain that the "method of opposition", which Kant
understood ever more precisely, at its core is derived from scepticism.
Now, this should not be maintained without qualifications. First, actual
doctrinal contradictions were in fact available ad abundantiam in the "dog-
matic" schools, and Kant showed already in his Monadologia Physica that he
was perfectly aware of that. Second, an antithetical method was also employed
by non-sceptical thinkers. Examples include Fromondus.f" the well-known
Collier, and even some Pietistic theologians including Kant's teacher, Fr. A.
Schultz.l?" But the sceptical antithetic must also have played its role, especially
as it had been described and also personally employed by Pierre Bayle; and in
this sense one should speak more exactly about the influence of the ancient
sceptics. This is not only because he would have been aware of the teachings of
Bayle, but also in the sense that Bayle was the only one of the modern sceptics
that made the antithetic method the heart of his way of thinking, and in this
respect represented a true revival of ancient scepticism. Thus, Bayle's indis-
putable influence on Kant should be considered as in this respect an action at a
distance of ancient scepticism.
16.
This influence concerns the thing itself, rather than the term "dialectic" which
Kant applied to it. The sceptics were not called "dialecticians", as we have seen
above . This term came into traditional use only in relation to Zeno or to other
thinkers from outside sceptical circles. Kant took up this term in its "Critical"
sense relatively late: it appears for the first time in his work between 1773 and
1775,101 while the method of opposition was already developed in 1769. Soon,
however (1776-78), the dichotomy "transcendental analytic - transcendental
dialectic" appeared, with the observation: "logic of truth and of illusion". 102
However, the expression "analytic" as a logica veritatis, as much as its
opposition to "dialectic", are of indubitable Aristotelian origins; 103 and, as we
have seen, Kant regarded the logica probabilium of the later Aristotelians as a
logic of illusion.
Now, the reception of the term dialectic by Kant may have been influenced
by the Zenonian tradition. But its use as an antithesis to an analytic had
nothing at all to do with the sceptical tradition. It can only be understood
through its late Aristotelian usage. Although this did not ground the sense,
nevertheless it grounded the central position of this term as the chief point of a
transcendental logic. Now, concerning the sense of this term in Kant, th is was
broadly original, and his express reference to Zeno rests more on a construe-
82 G. Tonelli
17
A more precise comparison of individual doctrines of Kant's transcendental
dialectic with the teachings of the ancient sceptics (especially as reported by
Bayle) would probably reveal further similarities between them. But in no case,
in our opinion, not even in the teachings about the finiteness or infinity of the
world expressly drawn from Zeno, should one speak with assurance of a
sceptical influence on Kant. These questions were so universally discussed in
the eighteenth century that their origin cannot be precisely established. One
must observe that the influence of the sceptics (in general) should be no means
be limited to the foregoing questions, if for no other reason than because of the
relation between Hume and Kant, which, however, is outside the range of our
problem. We cannot help, however, drawing the general position of Kant with
respect to the main points of scepticism into consideration, since it goes
without saying that his position vis-a-vis the ancient sceptics depends upon it.
Above all, how should Kant's rejection of scepticism as a final resting place be
evaluated? That is, does it correspond truly to Kant's place in the history of
philosophy, or did Kant, in spite of all of his protestations, nevertheless make a
step in the direction of scepticism (or think he had done so)?
Kant has also been interpreted as a sceptic.l'" Did he become, like
Descartes, a "sceptique malgre lui", or does such an opinion partly correspond
to his actual intentions?
In order to provide at least a provisional answer to this question, we must
cast a glance at the destiny of scepticism in the eighteenth century.
18.
The great sceptics of the seventeenth century were still known by name in the
German enlightenment, but except for La Mothe le Vayer, Poiret, Huet, and
Bayle, they were no longer read . lOS Kant himself mentions, for example, Huet
and La Mothe le Vayer,106 but his knowledge of them probably comes from
Brucker's exposition of modern scepticism. Naturally, he knew Bayle in the
original. Bayle's Dictionnaire was known far and wide. In addition to the many
editions of his work in the early eighteenth century, Frederick II and d'Argens
published a selection from the Dictionnaire in 1765, which they described in the
forward as Ie breviaire du bons sens ; and they praised the dialectique admirable
de Bayle. The work should force one to the conviction that en metaphysique la
verite se trouve presque toujours au de-la des limites de notre raison, and thus that
it would be best not to make any decisions about it. 107 Furthermore, Gottsched
had translated the whole Dictionnaire into German (Leipzig 1741-47), furnish-
ing it with footnotes that were supposed to serve as an antidote to the sceptical
poison. lOS
In 1733, Crousaz had published his Examen du Pyrrhonisme ancien &
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 83
.moderne, directed mostly against Bayle. An extract from it, with some
additions, was published by Formey in 1756. 109 In addition, a history and
refutation of scepticism was published by Boncerf in 1762.110
Knowledge of ancient scepticism was spread through these works, as well as
through other contemporary works such as, for example, Dommerich's
Gedanken iiber den Skeptizismus (1767) and the above-cited textbook by
Baumgarten, in addition to the proper histories of philosophy. Even a direct
knowledge of Sextus Empiricus was relatively widespread, III as numerous
dissertations of those times demonstrate. 112 Occasional attacks on the sceptics
from the side of the "dogmatists" were also not infrequent. 113
But scepticism had also gained new weight in the eighteenth century. The
number of "mitigated" sceptics, like the earlier figures of Mersenne and
Gassendi.l!" had noticeably increased. These maintained that it was more or
less impossible to penetrate into the "true being" of things, and emphasized as
an alternative the role of the sciences of experience. On this account, knowl-
edge could not be obtained beyond the limits of human understanding, and
these limits enable us only to know that which is necessary for living. Such
knowledge is of purely empirical origin, and thus it is not metaphysically but
only morally certain. Its teachings are neither necessary nor absolutely
universal, and are valid only as far and as wide as experience confirms them.
Traditional metaphysics is only a silly academic game. The only possible
metaphysics is the study of human abilities insofar as these are actually
effective in voluntary actions and knowledge. I IS Parallel to this was the critique
of "systems": knowledge should not be built beyond the limits of experience
into systems (such as, for example, the vortex theory of the Cartesians, or the
theory of attraction of the Newtonians in natural science), since the first
principles of things remain unattainable for us. We know little or nothing of
things as they are , since we only know them as they are shown to us; that is, in
relation to our own senses. Mathematics alone, since it is grounded on
arbitrary concepts, is absolutely certain. Chief representatives of this line of
thinking were famous philosophers such as Hume, Bolingbroke, Voltaire ,
Condillac, D 'Alembert, Maupertuis, Bonnet. There was no lack of accusations
of scepticism against them, as for example by a late Cartesian like Bouillier.I'"
Kant himself mentioned only Hume and Voltaire as sceptics of his times , and
moreover he criticized them as extreme sceptics in his Logik Blomberg
(1771).117
19
The influence of this way of thinking was so strong that even the opponents of
scepticism had to indicate their agreement. Crousaz and Formey warned
against rash systems .I'" and Dommerich criticized the dogmatists as much as
the sceptics. 119 It should be observed that the philosophes very seldom admitted
to being sceptics (they meant: radical sceptics). This was best expressed by
Hume: he rejected "total scepticism" and praised "mitigated [gemiissigte]
scepticism or academical philosophy".120 The Refutation des Pyrrhoniens of
84 G. Tonelli
20.
Hume was not the only one who explicitly described himself as a "mitigated
sceptic". This was also the case with others, although their scepticism
amounted sometimes only to a "preliminary doubt", or served purely as the
limit of the realm of demonstrative certainty. Consider, for example, Joh.
Regius, who published an Oratio pro scepticismo in 1725.125 And Meiners
maintained in 1772 that the opposing opinions of the philosophers display to
us a proof of scepticism, and chose for his own "eclectic philosophy" the "half-
sceptical method". 126
There was also no lack of "radical" sceptics in the eighteenth century
(although the exact line between "mitigated" and "radical" sceptics becomes
harder and harder to draw as time passes). In England Bolingbroke already
stood on the border between mitigated and absolute scepticism . In France
some anonymous writers introduced themselves openly as total Pyrrhonists.
Cartaud de la Villate is also an interesting case: he adopted and strengthened
the sceptical doubts about mathematics. 128
But Germany appears to be the country where the radical scepticism of the
times found its most famous and open proponents. There were two reasons for
this. One was a deeply religious attitude, made possible by the fideistic
scepticism of a Joach. Lange,129 and later, among others.P" a Hamann.P!
Wieland, too, took a similar position, although not publicly.132 The second was
the personal inclination of Frederick 11,133 who supported the scepticism of a
D'Argens'j" and a Beausobre'i" in his circle. As we have seen, a selection of
Kant and the Ancient Scept ics 85
21.
What, then , is the state of the case with Kant's "scepticism"? First, one must
distinguish between the pre-Critical and the Critical periods . At the end of the
first, and indeed between 1765 and 1768, the "zetetic" attitude of 1765 and
many places in the Dreams ofa Spirit-Seer signal a certain approximation to
scepticism, with respect to which Hume probably played a certain role,
although not one which can be ascertained any more exactly.138 But Kant
should still not be considered as a follower of mitigated (and even less of
radical) scepticism in this period according to the traditional meaning of this
characterization, just as little as he should be considered an empiricist at that
time. Kant had indeed excluded from the realm of human knowledge many
areas of metaphysics and established that other areas were knowable only
empirically. He had also rejected all abstract and purely a priori grounded
metaphysics through his grounding "in concreto " of philosophy. But through
his proofs "in concreto" he thought he could reach some metaphysical truths of
absolute and not purely of empirically universal validity. His position thus
belonged to the problematic of the limits of human understanding, and not to
the classical problematic of scepticism. His undeniable bent toward scepticism
of this period was thus only selective and partial (in that in connection with
some problems concerning supersensible objects he was a radical sceptic; in
connection with other objects that are knowable purely empirically he was a
mitigated sceptic; and in connection with further problems concerning
metaphysically knowable objects, he was not sceptical at all). That is, his
doubts should be understood as preliminary (Cartesian) doubts. Kant's
position thus should not be considered sceptical in the true sense.
22 .
23
Thus, in general Kant consciously reacted against the dogmatists as much as
against the sceptics (although often he may have felt nearer to the latter): the
balance mentioned above (#4) represents his final position. Ifin the eyes of the
dogmatists Kant counted as a sceptic, he certainly counted in the eyes of the
empirical sceptics of his times as a dogmatist. He cannot be classified in any
previously known way under any previously known type of either scepticism or
dogmatism. His philosophy can thus count as a new kind of the former as much
as of the latter. There remains only to explore his claim to have established a
third way (that is, Criticism). Kant was fully conscious of this. He thought he
had grown beyond the old oppositions between empiricism and rationalism,
and between realism and idealism. It would be a very praiseworthy under-
taking to explore whether or not the theories of transcendence and of synthesis
of later German idealism can rather be traced to consciousness of this general
methodological viewpoint and conduct of Kant in the development of the
positions of modern philosophy that he brought about, than out of a pure
overcoming of his doctrine of the antinomies. This would apply at least in the
sense that Kant himself had already established in other and more general
respects the new formulas which were later used to overcome his position
concerning the antinomies.
The following observations are still to be added. First, that at the same time
as Kant at least one other important attempt at such an intervention was
undertaken by the Scottish philosophers of "common sense" (Reid, Beattie).
Kant's undertaking was thus perfectly in accord with the spirit of the times.
Second, that the spread of Kant's Criticism exerted a fundamental influence on
the destiny of mitigated scepticism, and deeply altered its terminology as much
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 87
as its problematic (it is enough to mention only Platner, Schulze, and Abicht).
Politz could even write that scepticism was closest "on the whole - if at the
same time it interpreted things in another way - to Criticism, of all the modern
systems of philosophy, because the latter also regarded the causal relationship
between the subjective and the objective as indeterminable and unresolvable
. . ".140 We will not go into the question of the validity ofthis observation. Even
if it is well-founded, this post-Kantian development should not influence our
judgment of the motivation, intention , and position of Kant in his own times. It
is indeed undeniable that the post-Kantian development of scepticism no
longer ran on the whole in the old pathways, but must be judged in important
ways by new, post-Kantian measures. But this also applies, taken in a
fundamental way, to post-Kantian dogmatism. Kant's influence so deeply
affected the standpoint of the problematic out of which both a modern
dogmatism and a modern scepticism could arise that it is impossible to trace
these back directly to the older sceptical and dogmatic traditions, since Kant
opened up such an important break in them (in spite of their survival in some
important single cases and pathways). In this sense, and only in this sense, can
Kant belong to the history of scepticism. And indeed this is not because he
should be seen as a sceptic in terms of the prevailing criteria in his times, but
rather because his doctrines became an important foundation for the history of
later scepticism, as they did for later dogmatism. After Kant, both of these
oppose each other in significantly modern form and on another plane, and they
must henceforth be considered according to modern, post-Kantian criteria.
NOTES
I. Richard H . Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, Assen 1960; see the
review by G. Tonelli, Filosofia XV, 2, 1964 (also appearing separately under the title Un libro
sullo scett icismo da Erasm o a Descartes, Tor ino 1964) for a detailed discuss ion of the special
methodological problems of th is theme. Further: M.L. Wiley, The Subtle Kno t. Creative
Scepticism in XVIlth. Century England, London 1952; H .G. Van Leeuwen, The Problem of
Certainty in English Thought 1630-1690, The Hague 1963; R.A. Watson, The Downfall of
Cartesian ism, 1673-1712, The Hague 1966; R.H. Popkin, "Scepticism and Counter-Reforma-
tion in France", Archiv fUr Reformationsgeschichte, LI, 1960; R .H. Popkin, "The High Road to
Pyrrhonism", American Philosophical Quarterly, II , 1965; R.H. Popkin, "The Traditionalism,
Modernism, and Scepticism of Rene Rapin", Filosofia, XV, 1964; and especially R .H . Popkin,
"Scepticism in the Enl ightenment", Studies on Voltaire and the XVIII Century, XXVI, 1963,
where the author simplifies the perspective set forth in his book, taking into account only
"absolute scepticism" and the reactions against it.
2. We have indeed found no grounds for assuming that Kant had even read Sextus Empiricus.
See, in general: A. Samson, Kants k ennis der Grieksche philosoph ie, Alphen a. d. Rijn, 1927
(Utrecht Dissertation).
3. P. Gassendi, Opera omnia , Lugduni 1658 (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt 1964) I, 24a ; compare 72b .
4. Mart. Schoockius De scepti cismo pars prior, Groningae 1652, p. 28: the sceptical sects were
also called " Setetica, Ephectica , Aporetica",
G. Hornius, Historiae philosophicae libri VII, Lugd . Bat. 1655, p. 210: (the sceptics) "Q uo
uno omia veterum sap ient ium placita, quibuscumque rationibus munita, funditus evertebant:
88 G. Tonelli
qui etiam eorum praecipuus scopus fuit. Unde etiam m<Elt'tllC01, ~TJtTJ'tlK01, & E<pEK'tlOl dicti:
quod semper essent in disquisitione, statuerent vero nihil."
Th. Stanley, Historia philosophiae [1655--60], Lipsiae 1711, II , p. 919 : "Hanc Zeteticam
appellarunt philosophiam, quod semper in inquirenda (hoc enim est ~TJtEiv) veritate
versaretur: Sceptica dicta est (a OKElttElV) quod dispiceret semper , nunquam reperiret:
Ephectica, ab eo, quod sequitur eam investigationem , quod est EdXElV, iudicii suspensio.
Aporetica, quod de omnibus dubitaret, hoc enim est ciltopEiv. Pyrrhonia, a Pyrrhone'
Compare p. 921.
S. Sorbiere, Lettres et Discours, Paris 1660, p. 155: "Cette Institution de la Sceptique se
nomme en autres termes de Zetetique, a cause de son action qui est toute occupee a la
contemplation et a la recherche de la verite." Also "Ephectique, Aporetique."
Ge. Joh. Vossius, De philosophorum sectis [1658], cum continuatione et supplementis Joh.
lac. a Ryssel, Lipsiae 1690, p. 109: "Nempe dicebantur l;Klt'tlKol, quia semper OxElt'tlOV, hoc
est, rem considerant, nee unquam decernunt. Alt0PTJ'tlK01, quia semper ciltopouat, hoc est,
dubitant. ZTJtTJ'tlK01, quia semper ~TJtOU01, quaerunt , nee reperiunt. 'E<pE'tlK01, quia longae
inquisitionis non alius eventus, quam Elt0Xl1, hoc est, judicii suspensio, sive assensionis
retentio ."
P. Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, Amsterdam 1734, Art . "Pyrrhon", A: "On les a
nommez Sceptiques, Zetetiques, Ephectiques, Aporetiques, c'est-a-dire examinateurs, inquisi-
teurs, suspendans, doutans'
G. Paschius, De variis modis Moralia tradendi liber, accedit introductio in rem literarium
moralem veterum..., Kiloni 1707, p. 701: the Pyrrhonians are also called sceptics, aporetics,
ephectics, and "~TJtTJ'tlX01, elm) ltOU ~TJtdv, sive a quaerendo, quia semper quaerebant, nee
unquam inveniebant."
Joach . Lange, Medicina mentis, Berol. 1708, p. 194: the sceptics as zetetics.
Fr. Gentzkenius, Histaria phi/osophiae, Hamburg 1724, p. 67: "Sectatores eius non modo
Pyrrhonii, sed etiam a philosophandi ratione dicti sunt Aporetici, Sceptici, Ephectici, ac
Zetetici."
Ephr. Chambers, Cyclopaedia , London 1727, Art . "Sceptiks": Pyrrhonians, Aporetics,
Ephectics, Zetetics (or investigators).
1. Fr. Buddeus, Compendium historiae philosophicae, Halae 1731, p. 16: "1;'It'l'tlxoiiC;, quod
semper veritatem quaerent, numquam invenirent.. ... (the sceptics).
p.] P. Crousaz, Examen du Pyrrhonisme ancien & moderne , La Haye 1733, p. 58: "La
Philo sophie de Sextus peut porter Ie nom de Zetetique; c'est-a-dire, de Philosophie qui
cherche, comme la Sceptique, considere ce qu'il ya a dire de part & d'autre , on peut I'appeller
Ephectique parce qu'elle enseigne a s'abstenir de decider. Aporectique, parce qu'elle doute &
hesite, Pyrronienne a cause de Pyrrhon.."
1.G. Walch, Phi/osophisches Lexikon [1736], Leipzig 1740, Art. "Scepticismus": .....Es wird
auch genennet institutio ~TJtTJ'tlKl1 von ~TJtdv, weil ehemals die Sceptici allezeit fragten, oder
die Wahrheit zwar suchten, aber niemals funden oder annehmen wolten,'
Jac. Brucker, Historiae critica phi/osophiae, I, Lipsiae 1742, p. 1318: "Eodem sensu dicti
quoque sunt Ephetici, a retinendo assensu, Zetetici, a perpetuis disputationibus, & quaestio-
nibus, Aporetici a dubitatione ubique admissa..."
Joh. Gottl. Heineccius, Operum, Genevae 1784, Vol. I, Historia phi/osophica [1743], p. 27:
the sceptics were also called Aporetici, Acataleptici, Pyrrhonici, Zetetici ("quia veritatem
semper quaerebant, nunquam inveniebant").
Themiseul de St. Hyacinthe (H. Cordonnier), Recherches Phi/osophiques, Londres 1743, p.
97: "Zetetiques, parce qu'ils alfectaient de chercher tofijours la verite, & de ne rien trouver qui
put les assurer d'elle. Aporetiques, parce qu'ils faisaient profession de douter de tout ."
J.H. Zedler, GrofJes vollstiindiges Universal-Lexikon , Halle-Leipzig 1733-50, Vol. XXX,
Art. "Scepticismus": "Ist ein griechisches Wort, welches von m<ElttEOSCll, das ist considerare,
herkommt. Es wird auch genennet institutio, ~TJtTJtlKl1 von ~TJtEiv, weil ehemals die Sceptici
allezeit fragten, oder die Wahrheit zwar suchten, aber niemals funden oder annehmen
wollten,'
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 89
Diderot, D'Alembert, Encyclopedie, Paris 1751-72, Vol. XIV, Art. "Scepticisme": "Zete-
tiques, gens qui cherchent, parce qu'i1s n'alloientjamais au dela de la recherche de la verite."
Got. Ploucquet, Commentationes philosophicae selectiores, Traiect. ad Rh. 1781, Disputatio
de Epoche Pyrrhonis [1758], p. 34: "Dogmaticis philosophis opponuntur Sceptici, qui &
Aporetici & Ephetici & Zetetici appellabantur... Zetetici, quia semper in via investigationis
haerent,"
a
Boncerf, Le vrai philosophe ou /'usage de la philosophie relativement la societe civile, avec
/'Histoire exacte & la Refutation du Pyrrhonisme Ancien et Moderne, Paris 1762, p. 357: "La
philosophie de Sextus peut porter Ie nom de Zetetique, c'est-a-dire, de Philosophie qui
cherche, comme Ie Sceptique considere ce qu 'on peut opposer de part & d'autre..."
A.G. Baumgarten, Philosophia generalis, ed. cum dissertatione prooemiali a Joh . Chr.
Forster, Halae Magd. 1770, #87: "Habitu aliquid nee ponendi nee tollendi gaudens est
scepticus (Zeteticus, Ephecticus, Aporeticus),"
In his Logik Blomberg Kant cited the histories of philosophy of Gentzken and Formey
(Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 28, lines 10-11), but they had no specific influence on his
characterization of scepticism.
5. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 213, lines 23-26. We are thankful to Professor G .
Lehmann for making it possible for us to use this volume before its publication.
6. Kant himself mentions the "Sceptici, Zetetici, Academici" in a Reflection: Kant, Ges.
Schriften, Prussian Academy edition, XVI , 60, No. 1636 (1760-72); also in the Logik Blomberg
(1771), ibid., Vol. XXIV p. 36, lines 7-8, and p. 213, line 19, where "Zetetici" is translated by
"Sucher, Forscher".
7. The term ~T]tT]tll<ol only appears once in reference to Plato's "dialogues de la recherche", in
A. Dacier, Bibliotheque des anciens philosophes, III, Paris 1771 (1699], p. 73.
8. 1. Hoeker, Cia vis Philosophica continens di/ucidas graecorum terminorum explicationes,
Tubingae 1613, sub Zl1tT]I.lCX, Zl1tT]cnc;, cru1;l1tT]cnc;: "Quaestio, quaesitum, interrogatio":
"Quotuplex sit : Quatuor potissimum dantur ~T]tl1I.lCXtCX & Quaesita. Aliud enim 1. est
Demonstrativum , quod ex propriis cui usque scientiae principiis infertur. 2. Aliud est
OICXAKtlKOV Topicum et probabile,... 3. Aliud est 1tlpCXcrtlKOV, Tentativum, quod in eum
Finem instituitur, ut alicuius scientia, quam sibi arrogat, exploretur. 4. Aliud est EPlcrtlKOV,
Quaesitum, litigiosum atfal/ax, quo Sophisticis rationibusfa//itur adversarius."
R . Goclenius, Lexicon philosophicum graecum, Marchioburgi 1615, sub "Zrirnou;": "est
actio animae interna, nempe investigatio, qua quaerimus in theoricis quidem veritatem, in
practicis vero KcxAOV ...; Zl1tT]crlC; igitur est theorica vel Practica; Theorica, vel per se aliquid
invenire conatur, & dicitur... inventio, vel versatur in aliorum inventis & scriptis meditando,
legendo, retexendo, & haec dicitur autorum Analysis. Practica vero indagat, quid agendum sit
a nobis vel aliis..."
Joh. Micraelius, Lexikon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum, Stetini 1662,
sub "Zl1tT]I.lCX, ~l1tT]cnc;" : "quaestio vel problema propositum." and even then it is only very
seldom used. This origin is further confirmed when Kant opposes "zetetic" and "dogmatic" in
the above-mentioned place: this antithesis is typical both of the sceptical writings and of the
anti-sceptical literature.
9. "Zl1tT]I.lCX" was used, to the best of our knowledge, only by Ge . Meier in his Gnostologia,
Wittebergae 1666, passim. In his Logica Hamburgensis, Hamburg 1957 [1638], L. V, De
Dialectica, Cap. II , De quaestione dialectica , #2 (p. 248), Jo. Jungius wrote "Quaestio,
~l1tT]cnc;, ~l1tT]I.lcx, Itp6PAT]I.lcx, duplex est. Quaedam enim Quaestio ita quaerit, ut responderi
possit Etiam vel Non, vcxl Ti oU. Alia in responsione terminum aliquem, aut termini partem
adijci postulat partibus in Quaestione comprehensis." The first of these was called interrogatio
by the Stoics (#3). The interrogatio dialectica is that "de qua aut in neutram partem sentiunt
homines, aut contradictoria statuunt. Prioris exemplum est, cum quaeritur, Sitne numerus
stel/arum par, an impar. Posterioris, utrum Sol multis partibus terrarum orbe major sit, necne'
(#11 , p. 249).
10. Joh. P. Reusch, Systema logicum, Jenae 1734, #754: "DOGMA Cel. Wolfius tam late sumit, ut
quamlibet propositionem universalem aut, ob defectum cognitionis, particularem de eo, quod
rebus pluribus est commune, per iIIud intelligat. IIIud opponit veritati historicae..."
90 G. Tonelli
Furetiere, art. Dogmatique: "Instructif; qui est propre a enseigner, ou a expliquer une
opinion, ou une science - Un Philosophe Dogmatique est un Philosophe qui assure
positivement une chose comme vraye. II est oppose au Sceptique, lequel doute de tout... -se
prend aussi pour Magistral, ou pedantesque"; art . Dogmatiser: "Enseigner, instruire. II se
prend d'ordinaire en mauvaise part"; art . Dogme: "Maxime; axiome; principe; ou proposition
qui conserne les sciences... II se dit particulierement des points de la Religion."
Trevoux, art. Dogmatique: "en termes de Philosophie & de Grammaire. .. Instructif, qui
appartient a quelque opinion, ou a quelque principe etabli en matiere de Philosophie ... un
Philosophe dogmatique est celui qui assure positivernent une chose, comme vraie, qui etablit
des dogmes en philosophie . II est oppose du Sceptique, lequel doute de tout ...- On appelle ton
dogma tique, Ie ton magistral et pedantesque"; art . Dogmatiser: "... il se dit mauvaise part,
pour enseigner une doctrine fausse ou dangereuse, particulierement en matiere de Religion";
art . Dogme: "Maxime, axiome, principe, enseignement servant de regie... il se dit particul iere-
ment des points de la religion."
Pierre Bayle, Oeuvres Diverses, La Haye 1731, Vol. IV, p. 536 (Letter to Minutoli , 31-1-
1673): " La plus generale discussion, qu'on ait accoiitume de faire de toutes les Sectes de
Philosophes, est de les distinguer en ceux qui croyent avoir trouve la Verite; ceux qui croyent
qu'elle ne se pouvoit pas trouver ; & ceux qui, ne croyant pas I'avoir trouvee, la cherchaient
pourtant toute leur vie"; namely, the dogmat ics, the academics, and the pyrrhonians. The
division of philosophers into dogmatics and sceptics in the foreword to Chr. Wolff,
Verniinftigen Gedanken von Gott ... Frankfurt and Leipzig 1720, was also not new: Joh. Fr.
Budde, Institutiones phi/osophiae eclecticae [1703], Halae Sax. 1719, I, p. 7, had already
ment ioned th is same division, but at the same time maintained that scepticism was no
philosophy (the same in Budde, Compendium , cited above, p. 15).
Kant himself divided philosophy into dogmatic and sceptical in his lectures after 1760:
Compare E. Feldmann , "Die Geschichte der Philosophie in Kants Vorlesungen", Phi/os .
Jahrbu ch der Giirres-gesellschaft, XLIX, 1936.
II . Joh. Fr. Buddeus, Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae, Lipsiae 1724. Compare E. Hirsch,
Geschichte der neueren evangelischen Theolog ie, II, Gutersloh 1960, pp. 325-6 .
12. S. Jac. Baumgarten, Evangelische Glaubenslehre. Mit Anm. Vorrede u. histor. Einleitung her. von
D.1. S. Semler, Halle 1759, pp. 20-21 ; see "Historical Introduction", pp. 107 and 134.
13. XVII , 553, Reflection No. 4445. And, in Reflection No. 4457 (XVII, 558): "In metaphysica
applicata there is much that is dogmatic." Later, too (1775-78 ), morals are treated as
dogmatic: Reflection No. 5105, XVIII , 89. Kant 's works are cited, ifnot otherwise indicated,
from the Prussian Academy edition (Kant, Gesammelte Schriften... Only where volume XXIV,
which has not yet appeared, is cited, will we repeat Gesammelte S chriften; for other references,
we will give only the volume and page numbers).
14. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 99, lines 12ff.; p. 398, lines 19ff ("... each event is
histor ical: all propositions are dogmatic"); p. 399, lines 5ff. (" Dogmatic propos itions are in
morals , religion, etc. etc. Metaphysics, as the orgnanon of the pure knowledge of reason and
logic as the organon of knowledge in general, should not contain dogmatic truths.")
15. Ibid., p. 206, notes 27-33; compare p. 327, line 12, and p. 399, line 3 (where dogma is defined
as "each general item of knowledge based on reason").
16. Ibid., p. 244,lines 3ff.
17. Ibid., p. 36, lines 35ff.; p. 37, lines 11-12; p. 159, lines 38ff.; p. 206, lines 4ff. ("The Methodus
Dogmatica Philosophiae thus consists in that we arrive at a fully secure certainty in all
judgments, not satisfied with indecision, and leaving nothing undecided..." - "The dogmatic
spirit in philosophy is also the proud language of the ignorant, that wish to decide everything,
and indeed are unable to investigate anyth ing"); p. 207, lines 3-5 ; p. 212, lines 7ff.; p. 398,lines
36ff. Also the term "problematic" as a form of judgment is related to Kant 's position vis-a-vis
scepticism: compare G. Tonelli, "Die Voraussetzungen der kantischen Urteilstafel in der Logik
des XVIII. Jhndts.", in Kritik und Metaphysik. Studien. H. He imsoeth zum achtzigsten
Geburtstag, Berlin 1966, pp. 155-6.
18. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV (Logik Blomberg, 1771), p. 211, lines 4ff. "The name
of a sceptic for the most part has become hateful among us; we think namely of one who does
92 G. Tonelli
not concern himself with anything else but throwing down the most certain and undeniable
truths.."
19. Ibid., p. 159, lines 17ft'.; p. 208, p. 7ft'. ("Skepticism, or the method of sceptical doubt, in which
one mistrusts oneself, and thinks over the grounds for and against the knowledge that one has,
and in this manner strives to come to perfect certainty: this is the catharcticon, the best means
of purification of reason.") ; p. 209, lines 27ft'.; p. 210, lines 27ft'. ("The true scepticism is
however of great utility..."),
20. Ibid. , p. 205, lines 20ft'.; p. 214, lines 1Ift'.; p. 209, lines 3-6, 24-7; p. 215, lines 1ft'.
21. I. Kant, Vorlesungen iiher Philosophische Enzyclopiidie, Berlin 1961, edited by G. Lehmann
[now in the Academy edition of Kant's works, volume 29.1 - translator's note). The evidence
for the dating is in our review of this volume, Filosojia XIII, 3,1962.
22. Kant, Vorlesungen , op. cit., p. 53. Compare Reflection No. 4851 (1776-78), XVIII , 8; and No.
5010 (1776-78), XVIII, 59.
23. lH. Formey, Histoire abregee de la philosoph ie, Amsterdam 1760, p. 107.
24. Baumgarten, Philosophia generalis, op. cit., see note 4.
25. Joh . Regius, Oratio pro scepticismo, Franequerae 1725, repeats (p.14) and comments on (p.17)
a place in Gassendi which deals with <PCXtv0IlEVCX and VOOUIlEVCX in relation to the sceptics.
Jac . Carpov, Idealismus ex concessis explosus, Vinariae 1740, Preface, pp. 5--6; Sextus
Empiricus "scepticam autem facultatem ttlV IiVtlSEtlXijV <pCXtv0IlEvrov rs XCXt vooouevev
XCXS'OlOV lillltOtE rponov, h. e. eam , quae sensibus adparentia, & ea, quae mente & intellectu
percipiuntur, confert inter se, & opponi quolibet modo, vocat".
Brucker op. cit., p. 1332: "Sceptica est facultas quae sensibus apparentia & ea, quae mente
& intellectu percipiuntur, confert inter se atque opponit quolibet modo. Probe in hac
definitione attendendum est, ad distinctionem inter ea, quae sensibus apparent, & ea, quae
mente & intellectu percip iuntur. Etsi enim <PCXIVOIlEVCX <pCXIV0J.lVOl<; quoque opponebant
Sceptici, incert itudinem tamen, nov <pCXIVOJ.lVroV in eo potissimum quaerebant, quod ta
VOOUIlEVex, sive ea, quae mente percipiuntur, & rationatione ex apparentibus concluduntur,
illis contraria sint, adeoque sensuum imagines cum notionibus intellectus non conveniant , sed
aliae videantur,"
The term "Noemata" appears in R. Burthogge , The Philosophical Writings , ed. Landes,
Chicago-London 1921, pp. 13-14 (Organum Vetus & Novurn, 1678): "We generally conceive
Faculties, Good, Evil, and other Not ions (under which the Minde apprehends things) to be
Realities , and to have an Existence of their own without the Minde, and though there were no
Minde to think of them , when indeed they are but Noemata, Conceptions, and all the formal
being any of them have, is onely it. And no wonder if he that takes No emata to be Realities
findes himself confounded by that mistake, in forming his Conceptions about them ."
26. Brucker ,op. cit., p. 673; p. 690: ta VOlltain contrast to ta cxicrSllta .
27. Goclenius, op. cit., sub <PCXIVOIlEVOV.
28. Kant, Vorlesungen, cit., p. 40: "Sie [the ancients) glaubten ein intellektuelles Anschauen. Die
Erkenntnisse, die dadurch erworben wurden, nannten sie Noumena und unterschieden sie von
den Phaenomenis"; and before: "Plato [was the philosopher) der intellektuellen Anschauun-
gen", Compare Reflection No. 1636, XVI, 60 (1760-72) ; No. 1643, XVI, 63 (1764-76) ; No.
4449, XVII , 555 (1772-78); and above all No. 4893, XVIII , 21 (1776-78) .
Compare also Kant, Gesammelte Schriften , Vol. XXIV (Logik Philippi, 1772), p. 327, lines
15ft'.: "Die Dogmatiker unterschieden sich - I. in die, welche aus principiis der Sinnlichkeit
und - 2. in die, welche aus principiis der Vernunft philosophirten. -In die VOOUIlEVOI und
<PCXtv0IlEVOt. Heraclitus machte den Unterschied. Die VOOUIlEVOI behaupteten, die Sinne waren
falsch, sie zeigten nicht wie die Dinge waren, sondern nur wie sie durch die Dinge geriihrt
wiirden . Sie glaubten, daB die Philosophie sich einschranke auf die intelligibilia ... Democritus,
Leukippus, Epicurus vertheidigten das Gegentheil , dass die gantze Philosophie sich auf die
Sensibilia beschranke,"
29. According to M. Wundt, most of Kant's knowledge of Plato came from Brucker : compare
" Die Wiederentdeckung Platons im 18. Jahrhundert", Blatter fUr deutsche Philosoph ie, XV,
1941, pp. 154-5 . But Kant certainly also knew Cudworth's Systema intellectuale in the Latin
translation, with important commentary, by Mosheim (Jena 1733).
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 93
30. Compare I. Kant, Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik (ed. Politz), Erfurt 1821 [Darmstadt 1964],
p. 14 (this part of the Metaphysik Politz dates from the years 1790-91).
31. Reflection No. 2660, XVI, 457. Compare No. 2664 (1773-5), XVI, 458.
32. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 209, lines 7ff.: "Der Pyrrhonische, d.i. der
Sceptische Zweifler hingegen sagte: allen, und jeden , oder aufs wenigste den mehresten
unserer urtheile Lasse sich immer ein anderes Urtheil entgegen setzen, und opponieren,
welches accurat das Gegentheil von dem, was in dem ersteren Urtheil enthalten ist, Behauptet;
dieses war also wircklich mehr als eine Art einer sehr schonen und vortreflichen Beobachtung,
als ein verwerflicher Zweifel anzusehen." P. 212, lines 36ff. (Socrates); p. 217, lines 21ff.
(Hume, who nevertheless had taken this method too far). Compare p. 438, lines 21ff. (Logik
Philippi, 1772).
33. Reflection No. 5051, XVIII , 61.
34. Vorlesungen iiber die philos. Enzykl., p. 52.
35. Ibid., p. 56. Compare Reflection No. 1629 (1780-89), XVI , 48; Vorlesungen tiber die
Metaphysik, p. 13.
36. Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik, pp. 10-11. Compare the parallel passage at IX, 28.
37. Vorlesungen iiber die philosoph. Enzykl., pp. 56-7 .
38. Ibid., p. 39.
39. Gassendi,op. cit., I, p. 38; Bayle, Dictionnaire, sub "Zeno", B.; Stanley, op. cit., II, p. 882; Jo.
Ge. Walch, Einleitung in die Philosoph ie, Leipzig 1730, p. 8 ("Man giebt den Zenonen Eleaten
vor den Urheber der Dialektik an, welches aber nur von der Zanck-Dialectic zu verstehen");
Zedler, op. cit., Vol. LXI, sub "Zeno von Elea"; J.G. Daries, Via ad Veritatem, Jenae 1732,
Historiae logicae , Ch. I, # II; Brucker, op. cit., pp. 1168-9; Saverien, Histoire des philosophes
anciens, Paris 1771-2, Vol. II, p. 21.
40. Compare Schookius, op. cit., p. 9; Chr. Mattt. Pfaffius, Oratio de egoismo, Tubingae 1722, p. 19
(where Zeno is even rebuked for egoism); P.D. Huet , Traite philosophique de la faiblesse de
l'esprit humain, Amsterdam 1723, p. 103; Buddeus, Compendium, cit., p. 18: "Praelusisse
tamen quodammodo scepticis viamque illis munivisse cred itur Zeno Eleates, eo quod
logicarum cavillationum summus esset artifex."; Zedler, op. cit., Vol. LXI, sub "Zeno von
Elea": .....man kan ihn also vielmehr fur den Erfinder der sophistischen Zankkunst ausgeben,
indem er sich darselben bloss bediente, urn allen zu widersprechen, nicht aber urn die
Wahrheit an das Licht zu bringen: wie dann auch die Sceptici und Pyrrhonici ihre meisten
Waffen von ihm bekommen haben." The dissertation of Joh. Lud. Crellius, De Zenone, Lipsiae
1724 was unfortunately unavailable to us.
41. Joh. Ge. Feder, Logik und Metaphysik, Gottingen and Gotha 1770, second edition [first
edition 1769], p. 315: "Der Eleatische Zeno wird als Erfinder dieser Wissenschaft [die
Dialektik] genennt. Aber die proben, die uns von seiner Dialektik iibrig geblieben sind,
beweisen, daf es eine verachtungswurdige Sophistik gewesen. Unterdessen hat man es
dazumal der Miihe werth geachtet, sich mit diesen Grillen den Kopf zu zerbrechen . Die
Megarische Secte machte sich dadurch einen Namen ..."
42. Seneca, Ad Lucilium, N.88, in fine .
43. P. Fonseca, Commentariorum... in Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Coloniae 1615 [Hilde-
sheim 1964], I, p. 618.44.
Brucker, op. cit., pp. 1170-1.
45. Darjes, loc. cit. Compare Gassendi , loc. cit.
46. Kant's reference to Plato is probably based on the Latin translation of a spurious Greek
passage from Timon that Bayle repeated sub "Zeno", note B.
47. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 207, lines 19-22; p. 212,Iines 20ff.; p. 330, lines 9ff.
This role was often given to Socrates in the above-cited pre-Kantian literature about
scepticism. Compare, for example, B. Stattler, Philosophia methodo scientiis propria explanata,
Vol. I, Augustae Vind., 1769, p. 7.
48. Kant, op. cit., p. 207, lines 38ff.; p. 213, lines 12ff.; lines 38ff.: "DaB Pyrrho viele Dogmata
geleugnet, und in sie ein gerechtes, und wohl uberlegtes Mistrauen gesezet, Ferner daB er ins
Besondere viele rationale Urtheile verworfen, ist unstrittig, und nicht zu leugnen, daf er aber
alle, und jede Dogmata geleugnet, ist grundfalsch. Derjenige, der gar keine Dogmata
94 G. Tonelli
annimmt, kann gar keine Sittlichkeit lehren... Man gab aber dem Pyrrho auch noch iiberdem
die Schuld, daB er an der Wahrheit aller Empirischen Urtheile gezweifelet , und denen selben
nicht getrauet habe. Dieses aber ist nichts als eine Erdichtung, die gar keinen Grund hat.;"; p.
330, lines 14ff.: "Er lehrte nur, daB man die Satze der Philosophie nicht sogleich annehmen
und entscheiden sondern anfiinglich daran zweifeln solle bis man untriiglich davon iiberzeuget
ist."
49. Gentzkenius, op. cit., p. 68: .....Proinde Fr . Mothaeus Vayerus Pyrrhum ver is sapientibus
annumerare non dubitat, quoniam dogmaticorum vanas & inutiles rixas evitaturus plurima
tantum probabilia esse, reputaverit; sectatores tamen ultra Magistri limites progressos esse,
haud verodissimile videtur,' A.F. Boureau Deslandes, Histoire critique de la philosophie,
Amsterdam 1765, second edition, II, p. 369: "N e croyez pas , dit Sextus , que Ie Pyrrhonisme
supose la destruction de toutes les Sciences , &, pour ainsi dire, un entier renoncement aux
lumieres de son espr it. Quel homme voudrait s'avilir & se degrader jusqu'a ce point?... Le
veritable Pyrrhonien est done celui qui examine les choses avec une attention scrupuleuse; qui
recherche la verite , mais qui la voit toujours fuyante a ses yeux ; qui balance les raisons du pour
& du contre; qui ne decide jamais, cra inte d'etre oblige de retracter Ie soir ce qu'il a cru Ie
matin; qui ne s'arrete point a des fausses lueurs ; qui se defie de ses sens tofijours infideles &
trompeurs; qui a s~u enfin se procurer Ie repos et la tranquillite si necessaires a un homme
d'esprit. J'avoue que Ie Pyrrhonien n'etablit aucun dogme; ma is pour cela , il ne se soustrait
point aux choses du gout & de sentiment.,' On p. 368 he wrote about Pyrrhonism: "Quoi de
plus propre a nous inspirer une juste defiance de nos faibles lumieres ! Quoi de plus capable de
tourner nos regards a la Religion !"
50. Kant,op. cit., p. 208, lines 36ff.; p. 213, lines 35ff.; p. 214, lines I Iff.; p. 330, lines 19ff.
51. Ibid. , p. 215, lines lff.; p. 337, lines 5-7.
52. Indeed, for Schookius, op. cit. , pp . 389ff., the sceptics are the destroyers oflogic, which is what
he called dialectic. Only A .F. Boureau Deslandes, Histoire critique de la philosophie,
Amsterdam 1765, second edition, II, p. 370, mentions dialectic in reference to the sceptics:
"Sextus explique ensuite ce que c'est que les dix Moyens de l'Epoque, je veux dire les dix
arguments sur lesquels s'appuye Ie Pyrrhonisme. Je doute qu'on pu isse deb iter une Dialectique
plus fine & plus imposante,'
53. Stanley, op. cit. , I, pp. 264, 293, 443 .
54. Heineccius, op. cit., p. 17.
55. Brucker, op. cit., p. 610.
56. Ibid., p. 671.
57. Ibid., p. 810.
58. Ibid., p. 905. Compare p. 914.
59. Ibid. , p. 1256.
60. Ibid. , p. 1324.
61. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 336, lines 20ff.; compare p. 387, lines 9ff. (Logik
Philippi , 1772) (That Eucl ides of Megara was the inventor of a degenerate dialectic was also a
widespread opinion : compare, for example, Boureau Deslandes, op. cit., II, p. 151).
62. Ibid., p. 337, lines 5ff.
63. Ibid., p. 206, lines 26-7, 38ff.
64. Compare G. Tonelli, " D er historische Ursprung der kantischen Termini 'Analytik' und
' D ialektik"', Archiv fia Begriffsgeschichte, VII , 1962.
65. Brucker,op. cit., p. 1333. Compare p. 769. On Carneades, compare Crousaz, op. cit., p. 58a.
66. Joh. Chr. Dommerich, Gedanken iiber den Skepticismus, Braunschweig and Hildesheim 1767.
67. Carpov, op. cit., Praef., p. 6: "Dum Scepticum dicit Sextus , Qui rerum argumenta quolibet
modo sibi invicem opponit". Ch. J. Panckoucke, Usage de la raison, ou Riflexions sur la vie et
les sentiments des anciens philosophes, Amsterdam 1753, p. 47: the sceptics "avaient pour
maxime qu'a toute raison, il y a une autre raison d'un egal poids qui lui est opposee", Merian,
"Memoire sur l'apperception de sa propre existence", in Histoire de l'Academ ie Royale des
Sciences et belles Lettres MDCCXUX, Berlin 1751, p. 424, on the sceptics: "Leur pretention
est que nous manquons de criterium pour discerner Ie vray du faux , & qu 'en toute question il y
a (icrocr8evE1Cx) equilibre de ra isons . De la on voit, dans Ie meme cas, tantot demontrer
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 95
a
I'affirmative, tantot la negative, suivant que cela leur vient propos." See also : 1. B. de Boyer
d'Argens, La philosophie du bon sens [1737], Dresde 1754, vol. I, pp . 147ff., 268ff., 323ff.
68. Baumgarten, Philosophia generalis, cited, #87.
69. Compare Tonelli , "Der historische Ursprung", cited above, pp. 133ff.
70. Compare Reflections Nos . 2605 and 2609, XVI , 437-8 (1776-89).
71. See: H . Blumenberg, "Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie", Arch ivflir Begriffsgeschichte, VI ,
1960, pp . 88ff.
72. Leibniz, Theodicee, #28 : "C'est toute autre chose quand'il ne s'agit que de vraisemblances, car
l'art de juger des raisons vraisemblables n'est pas encore bien etabli, de sorte que notre logique
a cet egard est ancor tres imparfaite, et que nous n'en avons presque jusqu'icy que l'art de juger
des demonstrations ."
73. Chr. Wolff, Philosophia rationalis sive Log ica, Francof. & Lipsiae 1740, #593: " Enimvero ad
aestimandam probabilitatem opus est principiis specialibus, quae a principiis ontologicis &
philosophicis aliis pendent. Sed ea constituunt Logicam probabilium, quam in desideratis esse
Leibnitius jam agnovit. Commodum accidit, si eam post artem inveniendi tradatur, propterea
quod principia hujus artis in ea habeant locum. Immo cum Logica probabilium ostendat,
quomodo veritates probabiles in apricum eruantur & gradus probabilitatis investigetur; altera
pars artis inveniendi recte habetur." Compare: H. W. Arndt, "Christian Wolffs Stellung zur
'Ars Characteristica Combinatoria"', Filosofia XVI , 1965.
74. K .H . Frommichen, Uber die Lehre des Wahrscheinlichen und den politischen Gebrauch
derselben , Braunschweig und Hildesheim 1773, p. 29. (This work is very rare. A copy is in
the possession of the "Serninario di Lingua e Letteratura tedesca", Section of Foreign
Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, University of Pisa.)
75. a
G. 1. s'Gravesande, Introduction la Philosophie [1737], leide 1748, ##582ff.
76. Fortunatus a Brixia, Philosophia mentis, Brixiae 1741, Vol. I, pp. 90ff.
77. D. Hume, An Enqu iry concerning Human Understanding (1748), Section VI.
78. A.F. Boureau Deslandes, Traite sur les differens degrez de la certitude morale, Paris 1750.
79. M . Mendelssohn, Schriften zur Philosophie..., ed. Brasch, Leipzig 1880, Vol. I, pp . 108ff. (Von
der Wahrscheinlichkeit, 1756).
80. D 'Aiembert, Oeuvres, Paris 1821, Vol. I, pp . 157ff. (Essai sur les elemens de philosophie , 1759).
81. Blumenberg,op. cit. , pp . 102-3.
82. Frommichen, op. cit., p. 31.
83. 1.H . Lambert, Neues Organon [1764], in Philosophische Hauptschriften, ed . H .W. Arndt,
Hildesheim 1965, II , p 356 (Phiinom. #187). On probability, see the whole of section V of the
Phiinom. See also Lambert, Beitriige zum Gebrauche der Mathematik, Berlin 1765-72, I and III
Parts. Th is logical doctrine of probability is already at the foundation of the distinction
between "objective" and "subjective probability" in Ad . Fried. Hoffmann, Vernunft-Lehre,
Leipzig 1737, Second Part, Chapter VIII, sections 29,35,37,61 ; chapter IX , sections 4ff.
84. Chr. Garve, De nonnulis quae pertinent ad logicam probab ilium, Halae 1766.
85. Frommichen,op. cit. , pp. 7-9; P. 9: "Die Dialektik, deren Gegenstand die EVOO~CXt waren, war
in den altesten Schulen eine philosophische Kenntnis der Meinungen, oder wie die Logik jetzt
redet, der Vorurtheile, der Gesinnungen, der Urtheile des Volkes nach schlichtem Menschen-
verstande, oder dessen, was das Publicum ohne tiefsinnige Einsicht der Griinde anzunehmen
pflegt: diese Kenntnis war eine Wissenschaft, welche zugleich der Redekunst zu Athen und
Rom, und der Disputierkunst der damaligen Zeiten brauchbar wurde."
86. Ibid., pp. 14-19.
87. Ibid., p. 22.
88. Ibid., pp . 26-9 .
89. Ibid., p. 23.
90. Ibid. , p. 32.
91. Ibid., pp . 3~ .
92. Ibid., pp . 51ff.
93. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 5, line 10.
94. Ibid. , p. 38, lines 2ff.; p. 196, lines 17ff.; p. 433, lines 7ff.
95. Ibid. , p. 436, lines 20ff.
96 G. Tonelli
96. Ibid. , p. 196, lines 25ff.; p. 436, lines 22ff.; p. 437, lines 14ff.
97. Ibid., p. 433, lines 18ff.
98. The question whether the zetetical method of 1764 was already a method of opposition cannot
easily be answered. One can only observe that no materials from before 1769 remain by which
we can determine that the method of opposition already then played an important role.
99. C. Fromondus, Labyrinthus, sive de compositione continui , Antverpiae 1631.
100. Fr. A. Schultz lectured until the 1770's on Theologia thetico-antithetica. Compare 1. Bohatec,
Die Religionsph ilosophie Kants in der 'R eligion innerhalb der Grenzen der blofJen Vernunft :
Hamburg 1938, p. 22. Other authors also used an antithetical procedure: for example, the
Fulda philosopher I. Graw, in his Universa phi/osophia eclectica experimentalis infasciculum
thesium utiliorum ac nonnullorum supra antitheses et animadversiones collecta, Fuldae 1750; or
later Leop. Ludw. Wilh. Brunn, in his work: Widersprechende Fragmente neuerer Phi/osophen,
aus ihrem Schriften, Wittenberg 1778-81.
101. Reflection No. 4676 (Duisb. Nachl.), XVII , 657.
102. Reflection No. 4896, XVIII, 22.
103. Compare Tonelli, "Die historische Ursprung", cit.
I04. For the first time doubtless by Hamann (compare 1. G. Hamann, Briefe, edited by W. Ziesemer
and A. Henkel , Wiesbaden 1955- 59, vol. IV, p. 283, letter to Herder of27 April 1781. Then ,
among others, by C. Fried . Stiiudlin, Geschichte und Geist des Skeptizismus, Leipzig 1794; and
sti11later, for example, by E. Maurial, Le scepticisme combattu dans ses principes . Analyse et
discussion du scepticisme de Kant , Paris 1857. [Others in the late eighteenth century would
include Solomon Maimon, "Aenesidemus" Schulze, and Thomas Wizenmann - translator's
note.]
105. La Mothe Ie Vayer's Cinq dialogues fa its Ii l'imitation des anciens , edited by L.M. Kahle ,
appeared in Berlin in 1744. Poiret was well-known in Germany (compare M. Wieser, P. Poiret,
Der Vater der roman tischen Myst ik in Deutschland, Miinchen 1932, especially pp. 23ff.); his
influence on Chr. Thomasius was very considerable (compare M. Wundt, Die deutsche
Schulphi/osophie im Zeitalter der Aujkliirung, Tiibingen 1945, pp. 21, 42, 52, 54); he was even
more of an influence on Joach . Lange (ibid., pp. 75ff.). Huet 's chief work was very topical : it
first appea red posthumously in 1723, and was immediately translated into German (under the
title Von der Schwachheit des menschlichen Verstandes in Erkiinntniss der Wahrheit, Frankfurt
1724). It also stirred up refutations, like that of Fr. Ph. Schlosser, Scept icismus fidei eversor,
Wittebergae 1725, and 10. Egger, De viribus mentis humanae, Disquisit io phi/osophica Anti-
Huetiana, Bernae 1735.
106. Reflection No. 1635,58; Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 211, line 3.
107. Extrait du dictionnaire historique et critique de Bayle , Berlin 1765, foreword pp. III-VI. The
Abbe F. de Mars y published an Analyse raisonnee de Bayle (London 1755,4 vols.), which was
continued by 1. B. Robinet (London 1770, 4 vols.).
108. See E. Lichtenstein, Gottscheds Ausgabe von Bayles Dictionnaire. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
Aujkliirung, Heidelberg 1915, especially p. 43.
109. 1.H.S. Formey, Le triomphe de l'evidence, Berlin 1756. This work is an expanded new edition of
an extract from Crousaz's work written by Formey before 1740, under the title "Abrege de
I'histoire du Pyrrhonisme de Crousaz". This extract rema ined unpublished in its original
version , but it was translated into German by A. von Haller and published under the title
Priifung der Secte, die an allem zweifelt , Gottingen 1751 (compare A. von Haller's Gedichte,
edited and introduced by L. Hirzel, Frauenfeld 1882, Introduction, pp. CLXXXVllIff.). This
work was recommended by Kant to his listeners (Kant, Gesammelte schriften, Vol. XXIV, p.
218, line 11).
110. See note 4, above.
lIl. An edition of his Opera graece et latine was published by 1. A. Fabricius in 1718. The
Hypotyposen were translated into French by C. Huart (Amsterdam 1725, London 1737).
Compare Popk in, "Scepticism in the Enlightenment", op. cit., p. 1324.
112. Compare Popkin, " Scepticism in the Enlightenment", op. cit. See, among others, G.
Ploucquet, Examen rationum a Sexto Empirico tam ad propugnandam quam impugnandam
Dei ex istentiam collectarum , Tubingae 1768. Compare also note 4, above.
Kant and the Ancient Sceptics 97
113. Compare for example B. F. Dalham, De ratione recte cogitandi, loquendi et intelligendi,
Augustae Vindel. 1762, L. I, p. III, Cap. V, Scepticorum causa convellitur & evidentia
propugnatur; Joh . Pet. And. Muller, Von dem menschlichen Verstande und den nothwendigen
Vernunftwahrheiten, die man den zufdlligen entgegen setzt, Halle 1769, pp. 159ff., and many
others.
114. Popkin, The History ofScepticism, op. cit. , pp. 131ff., 142ff.
115. For some aspects of this position, see G. Tonelli, "La question des bornes de I'entendement
humain au XVIIIe siecle et la genese du crit icisme kantien, particulierement par rapport au
probleme de l'infini", Revue de Mhaphysique et de Morale, 1959; " Critiques of the Notion of
Substance Prior to Kant", Tijdschrift voor Philosoph ie, XXIII, 1961; " Die Anfange von Kants
Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen und ihre Voraussetzungen im 18. Jhdt,", Kant-Studien, LVII,
1966.
116. D.R. Bouillier, Pieces philosophiques, s.l. 1759, pp. Iff.
117. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. XXIV, p. 210, lines 36ff.; p. 217, lines 13ff., 38ff.
118. Crousaz,op. cit., pp. 2, 42; Formey, Le triomphe , op. cit., I, p. 66, II , pp. XVIff.
119. Dommerich,op. cit., p. 63.
120. D. Hume, Enquiry, ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1902, pp. 116, 124, 129-30 ; A Treatise of Human
Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, Oxford 1888, pp. 180ff.
121. And. F. Boureau-Deslandes, De la certitude des connaissances humaines, London 1741,
chapter 1 (German translation, Quedlinburg 1744).
122. AI. Deleyre, Analyse de la philosophie du Chancelier Bacon , Leyde 1756, I, pp. 148ff: he set
forth the pros and the cons of scepticism, and pra ised the " liberte d'esprit" in the presence of
th is equivalence.
123. Ch. Bonnet, Palingenesie philosophique [1769], Oeuvres, vol. VII, Neuchatel 1783, p. 366.
124. Du Marsais, Essai sur les prejuges, Londres 1770, p. 276: " On blame avec raison un
scepticisme qui affecte de ne rien savoir, de n'etre sur de rien, de jetter du doute sur toutes les
questions. Des que nou s serons ra isonnables nous aurons distinguer les choses sur lesquelles
nous devons douter de celles dont nous pouvons acquerir la certitude. Ainsi ne doutons point
des verites evidentes que tous nos sens s'accordent anous montrer, que Ie temoignage du genre
humain nous confirme , que des experiences veritables constatent a tout moment pour nous .
Ne doutons point de notre existence propre; ne doutons point de nos sensations constantes et
reiterees ; ne doutons point de I'existence du plaisir et de la douleur... ne doutons point de
l'existence de la vertu ... - S'il n'est point permis a des etres raissonables de douter des verites
qui leur sont demontrees par l'experience de tous les siecles, illeur est permis d'ignorer & de
douter de Ie realite des objets qu'aucun de leur sens ne leur a ja mais fait connaitre; qu'ils en
do utent sur-tout quand les rapports qu'on leur en fait seront remplis de contradictions et
d'absurd ites; quand les qual ites qu'on leur assignera se detruiront reciproquement: quand
malgre tous les efforts de l'esprit il sera toujours impo ssible de s'en former la moindre idee.
Qu'il nous soit done permis de douter de ces dogmes theologiques, de ces mysteres
ineffables...".
125. Joh. Regius, Oratio pro scepticismo, Franequerae 1725, pp. 17-18: "Scepticismus igitur, quem
ego hodie laudabo, in eo consistit, videlicet, ut nemo cuidem assert ioni, alicui dogmati facile
calculum adjiciat nisi rationibus certis , evidentibus, e Principio indubitato petitis, post
iteratam meditationem diligentemque att entamque considerationem omnium, tam ratione
ipsius pr incipii, quam argumentorum ponderis & demonstrandi modi , satis fuerit convictus; si
vero his aliquid deesse, vel scrupuli aliquid superasse deprehendat, assensum suum prorsus
cohibeat, & tamdiu omnino existat dubius". For example, the connection between body and
soul (p. 46) and the or igin of the movement of heavenly bodies (p. 56) are indiscernible.
126. Chr. Meiners , Re vision der Philosophie, I, Gottingen and Go tha 1772, pp. 33, 78-81.
127. Compare for example the Traite de l'incertitude des scienc es, Amsterdam 1715 (pp . 244ff.: the
sciences are incapable of certainty, only revelation can help us). Other essays are cited in 1. S.
Spink, French Free-Thoughtfrom Gassendi to Voltaire, London 1960, pp. 307, 309, and Popkin ,
"Scepticism in the Enlightenment", op. cit., p. 1330. Also Huart, the translator of Sextus, was
a Pyrrhonian: see Popkin, op. cit., p. 1328.
98 G. Tonelli
128. N. Cartaud de la Villate, Pensees critiques sur les mathematiques, ou ron propose divers Prejuges
contre ces Sciences, Ii dessein den ebranler la certitude, & de prouver qu'elles ont peu contribue Ii
la perfection des beaux arts, Paris 1733, especially pp. 175ff., 212ff.
129. See note 105, above.
130. For example, Chr. Sonntag, Roth, Joh . Heinr. Schmidt, Ant . Sig. Jak . Apinus. See Tonelli, " La
question des bornes", p. 408.
131. Compare H. Schirmer, Die Grundlagen des Erkennens bei Joh. G. Hamann, Diss. Erlangen
1926; E. Metzke, 1.G. Hamanns Stellung in der Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, Halle 1934.
132. Compare K . Hoppe, Der junge Wieland, Leipzig, pp. 34, 42ff.
133. Frederick II's familiarity with scepticism can also be found in his essay, " Dissertation sur
l'innocence des erreurs de I'esprit" (Frederic II, Oeuvres philosophiques, Berlin 1848, I, esp. pp.
42-4), written in 1738 but published posthumously, and in his "Epitre sur la faiblesse de
I'esprit humain, a d'Argens" (Frederic II, Oeuvres du philosophe de Sans-Souci, Neuchatel
1760, II, pp. 180ff.), which first appeared in 1750 (ID.E. Preuss, Friedrich der Grope als
Schriftsteller, Berlin 1837, p. 118). Compare G. Rigollot, Frederic1Iphilosophe, Paris 1875, pp.
41ff. The Secretary of the Berlin Academy, IH.S. Formey, in L'Anti-Sans-Soucl, ou lafolie des
nouveaux philosophes Naturalistes, Deistes & autres Impies depeinte ou naturel, new edition,
Bouillon 1761, tried to prove that the "Epitre a d'Argens ", along with two other letters to
Maupertuis and Keith, could not have corne from the king: see vol. 1, preface : "L'on ne saurait
en effet supposer a un Roi, tel que lui, un coeur capable de mepriser toute Foi, toutes Loix, &
toute Religion , cornrne Ie font un Voltaire & autres effrontes Irnpies, la peste de la Societe
civile, & la honte de nosjours". Since it seems unbelievable that Formey did not know that the
king was the true author of the " Epitres", and Formey's fearful and pliant character exclude
the possibility that he could have rebelled against the king, it is very likely that his work should
be considered an official repudiation of the king's authorship, desired or permitted by the king
himself, designed to support the state religion . Nevertheless, later Frederick took literary
revenge in his "Epitre a d'Alembert" (1773), in Frederic II, Oeuvres , vol. XIII (Oeu vres
poetiques, vol. 4), Berlin 1849, pp. 104ff.; compare letter to d'Alembert of27 April 1773, ibid.,
vol. 24 (Correspondence, vol. 9), p. 597.
134. lB. Boyer d'Argens, La philosophie du bons-sens, Dresde 1754, second edition [London 1737,
first edition]. Before the beginning of the main text is the general title "Reflexions
philosophiques sur I'incertitude des connaissances humaines". D'Argens believed, however,
in the certainty of geometry, algebra, astronomy, and the experimental parts of physics.
135. L. de Beausobre, Le Pirronisme du sage, Berlin 1754 (second edition La Haye 1755 under the
title, Le Pirronisme raisonnable). L. de Beausobre was the son of an intimate friend of
Frederick II, the Berlin minister of French extraction, Isaac de Beausobre.
136. Compare I W. Yelton, John Locke and the Way ofIdeas , Oxford 1956, pp. 18-19,99-100.
137. Compare H. M . Bracken, The Early Reception of Berkeley's Immaterialism 1710-1733, The
Hague 1959, pp. 20-22.
138. Compare Tonelli, "Die Anfange von Kants Kritik der Kauzalbeziehungen", op. cit.
139. Compare Gassendi, Opera, op. cit. , I, p. 79; Van Leeuwen, op. cit. , pp. 6, 105.
140. Politz 's introduction to Kant's Vorlesungen iiber die Metaphysik, op. cit., p. LV.
141. The translator would like to thank Bram Anderson for his generous assistance with the
translation .
E. DEOLASO
The Spanish philosopher Ortega said, speaking of "the less brilliant periods" in
the history of philosophy, that the great thinkers had been the subject of a study
so exclusive as to prejudice that of other periods, of lesser brilliance but
decisive historical importance. As an example of this he used to say that there
had been three fairy godmothers at the birth of modern philosophy, about
whom we knew very little - modern stoicism, epicureanism and scepticism. 1
These lines were written in 1942; and since then we have learnt a great deal
about them, but most especially about modern scepticism. It was Richard
Popkin who explained how scepticism has come to exert so powerful an
influence upon modern philosophy'. As we know, Popkin pointed out that this
phenomenon had two causes, the first being the re-edited texts of Sextus
Empiricus and the appearance of the first Latin translations, the second the
growth of Protestantism and the Protestant rejection of the rule of faith . These
two causes grew in strength, inasmuch as in the course of their religious
polemics men again turned to one of the classic themes of Hellenistic
scepticism: the legitimacy of the credentials of any possible judge of their
disputes". The subsequent investigations of Charles B. Schmitt and others are
now shedding fresh light on important details of the genesis of modern
scepticism.' Leibniz has so far been a stranger to this story; and the only work
which has systematically explored any aspect of this relations with scepticism
(namely, his attitude to the principal French sceptics of his day, Huet, Foucher
and Bayle), is, as might have been foreseen, that of the tireless Popkin."
Although that work contains data and comments of great value, the reader
will understand that my general interpretation of those relations differs
considerably from that of Popkin.
The purpose of this study is twofold: I not only seek to show that no history
of modern scepticism would be correct or complete, if Leibniz' reactions to the
sceptic challenge were not recognized, but also to affirm that an interest in
scepticism played an extremely important part in the development of Leibniz'
own philosophy. The two hypotheses of Popkin's major work suffice to ensure
him of a place in such a history. Indeed, as we shall see, Leibniz at a very early
age made a profound study of what had been written about the controversy,
and was well aware of the problem of the judge of controversies, especially as
99
R .H. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 99-130 .
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
100 E. de Olaso
propounded by Hobbes . Besides, even if we were only to take into account the
impact of the printed editions of Sextus Empiricus, we should have to admit
that Leibniz is the only great modern philosopher who submitted an important
fragment of the canonical texts of scepticism to detailed criticism. Naturally, I
shall have to dwell upon these two aspects, hitherto neglected, of Leibniz'
position with regard to scepticism; but before doing so I must suggest a new
hypothesis which provides an adequate interpretation of Leibniz' philosophy in
so far as it relates to scepticism. This relationship cannot be altogether
understood without taking into account Zeno of Elea and Galileo. In spite of
the fact that they do not generally figure in the current bibliographies of
modern scepticism, the revival of interest in Zeno's and other similar para-
doxes, especially such as were expounded by Galileo, made Leibniz fear that, if
philosophy were not reformed, the way would lie open to the advance of
Pyrrhonism.
The novel character of the data which I shall bring forward (derived from
many different works of Leibniz), and the always fragmentary nature of the
latter's reflections on the subject of scepticism, will serve, I think, to explain
and perhaps to justify my frequent bibliographical references. The reader who
does not share my thirst for information, and considers superfluous or even
irrelevant the documentary "proofs" upon which I have presumed to base my
reconstruction, may read the text without troubling about the notes ; whilst the
reader who aspires to an improvement in our knowledge of the subject, may
find in some of them suggestions for further study.
In this study I have not analyzed the concept of scepticism, and have taken
scepticism, or Pyrrhonism, to be what Leibniz understood it to be. The problem
is worthy of deeper investigation , which is what I have tried to do in my book
Art of Doubting and Art of Thinking, this article representing a part of the
introduction thereto.
I shall begin, then , by showing how Leibniz was affected by some of Galileo's
reflections, and go on to describe briefly his reactions to Hobbes' proposed
solution of the problem of practical reason. In the next Section I deal
synthetically with Leibniz' attack on scepticism and discuss Popkin's inter-
pretation of it. Then I offer a resume of Leibniz' critical commentaries on
Sextus. The last two sections deal with scepticism in religion and historiogra-
phy. However, like all history, this one also has its prehistory, and the first
section is devoted to telling that tale.
I. FIRST REACTIONS
Precocious in all things, Leibniz was so also in his knowledge of scepticism. In
his earliest writings he mentions the sceptics of the Ancient World and the
Renaissance, pays serious attention to their opinions, and tries to refute them .
Here is a panorama of Leibniz' first reactions, during the 1660s. Perhaps his
first reference to scepticism is that which we find in his Specimen quaesti onum
philosophicarum ex iure collectarum, with which he obtained his master's degree
in philosophy at the end of 1664, that is to say at the age of 18. In the 11th
Leibniz and Scepticism 101
quaestio he deals with the sceptical thesis which denies that "all men are of the
same essence, common to them all", and quotes amongst its supporters,
Girolamo Cardano, Francisco Sanches and Sebastian Basso :
Italian, Spaniard and Frenchman respectively, all of them were physicians
and hostile to the idea of the common nature of the human species. I do not
know whether the first two were atheists, certainly they were outstanding
sceptics, and perhaps the last-named had within him something of the
Calvinist spirit. But as physicians they were very much aware of the infinite
diversity of men's characters, and did not appear to have discovered what all
men have in common.
After commenting very briefly upon passages from the works of these three,
he goes on to say that it is not necessary or relevant to refute them; and sets up
against them, also briefly, the doctrine of the juris consult, who were indeed
aware of the common essence of mankind.f Sanches infers the existence of
human differences from the diversity of human customs; and as far as I know,
Leibniz never again studied this aspect of scepticism. 6 Sanches' opinion seems
to be a mixture of the second and tenth tropes of Aenesidemus." In the 12th
quaestio Leibniz examines logical and metaphysical problems: whether two
mutually contradictory propositions may not both be false, and whether there
is a third possibility between being and non-being. He also examines, among
other problems, some insolubilia of the stoics, which he later attributes to the
sceptics, although the sources he refers to are none of theirs. In the 13th
quaestio he refers to the paradox of personal identity in the changing world of
the senses, and he quotes Sanches and Basso several times, disagreeing with
their opinions.' In these early references of Leibniz to scepticism we discover
that the author of De principio individui (1663) is disturbed by the views of the
Renaissance sceptics, with regard to the unity of the human race and the
identity of the individual man within the flux of the sensory world. Sceptic
objections of this type do not reappear as being specifically sceptic in the rest of
Leibniz' work, although our philosopher was never to lose his interest in the
problem of individuation.
At the beginning of 1666, the year in which he published his dissertation De
arte combinatoria, Leibniz wrote, at the request of his master Thomasius, a
"Conjecture as to Anaxagoras' reasons for affirming that snow is black".
Anaxagoras reasons thus: Snow is frozen water, water is black, therefore snow
is black. Leibniz makes use of a mechanist hypothesis to reconstruct the
argument, and afterwards asks himselffor what purpose it was conceived. This
argument, he says, "like Zeno's against movement", may have been written "to
convince a presumptuous sophist, or to make parade of his own ingenuity, or,
finally, to be adopted by the sceptics in order to demonstrate the separation of
reason and the senses, and the consequently necessary failure of one or other of
these". Leibniz considers that if Anaxagoras did not arrive at this opinion by
any process of reasoning, but simply because "snow seemed to him black, then
he must have been joking, knowing that his paradox was irrefutable." I think it
may be fairly safely inferred that when Leibniz was writing his "Conjecture", he
had before him the two passages of Hypotyposes in which Sextus transmits
102 E. de O/aso
whose solution by Gregory of St. Vincent interested Leibniz at an early age and
was to reach Hume as a paradigm of the irrational.P
who have dared to deny that "the whole is greater than the part", and there are
philosophers who have denied that "nothing is without a reason", although for
many people these propositions appear to be clear enough. Consequently, our
criterion cannot be that of what is self-evident or what is clear, since in that
case we have to accept the evidence of those who are doubtful of such
propositions, and "by discarding the absolute and rigorous universality of this
propositions, have questioned the certainty of all propositions discovered by
the mind of man". The conclusion which Leibniz draws from this generalized
state of doubt, which could pave the way for Pyrrhonism, is that we must re-
formulate our criterion of truth, which must no longer be that of what is clear
and distinct, as with Descartes, nor that of what is self-evident (per se notum),
as with the scholastics.P
Let us take one more case of mathematical paradox. The three problems
alluded to in the Theoria motus abstracti are paradoxes involving the infinite. A
similar problem of an arithmetical nature, which Leibniz believes to be
particularly likely to foster the growth of Pyrrhonism, is very diligently tackled
in his writings.
In his Discorsi e dimostraziont mathematiche, Galileo takes the case of the
series of natural numbers, which is endless because one unit, two units , etc., can
always be added to it. Galileo compares this series of all the numbers (the
roots) with that of their squares ; and observes that the series are bi-univocally
related , that is to say that each root has one square and one only, and each
square one, and only one, root.
123456789 ...
1 4 9 16 25 36 49 64 81 ...
There are as many numbers in the upper line as in the lower, but the numbers
in the upper line are all the numbers possible, and those in the lower line only a
part of all these. Hence, Galileo concludes, in infinity the part must be equal to
the whole. Years later, in an extant letter, Leibniz presents Galileo 's paradox in
rigorous form, thus:
But at this point Leibniz goes further than his predecessors. He has to
resolve Galileo's contradiction, since Hobbes has already demonstrated that
the whole is greater than the part.'" Therefore, our text concludes, there is no
such set or number of all numbers, or of all the squares; it is a chimaera."
We have seen how Leibniz, faced with attacks which might confirm the
opinion of the sceptics with regard to scientific knowledge, proposes a change
in our criterion of truth. He sets up a criterion offormal demonstration, which
only admits as indisputable, identical propositions, which alone are undemon-
strable, against the scholastic criterion of per se notum, and against the
Cartesian criterion of the evident.32
The controversy about the maximum number has had very important
consequences for philosophy. Indeed, doubts about the whole being greater
than the part provoked Leibniz' reaction . The affirmation that the whole is
greater than its parts is a traditional example of an axiom as are other
propositions such as: quantities equal to the same quantity are equal to each
other; equals added to equals or subtracted therefrom, have equal sums or
remainders, etc. 33 But the reflections of mathematicians and philosophers
immediately preceding Leibniz, have raised doubts as to the self-evident nature
of one of them. Leibniz, in a letter to Gallois in 1672, says that some of the
defenders of the concept of knowledge per se notum invoke "natural light".
Now if the first truths are per se notae by virtue of this "natural light",34 why -
he asks - are such truths self-evident to some, unacceptable to others , and
conditionally acceptable to others yet? Leibniz does not identify the philoso-
phers who hold these diverse alternatives .
Allow me to pause a while to consider a question whose consequences make
it important. If the scholastics are to be criticized by Leibniz for their
unjustified reliance on natural light, so must Descartes also. Let us remember
that Descartes had warned us that he was using the word intuitus in the
etymological sense of "vision", and that in translating it into French, he used
the expression "natural light".35 On the other hand Descartes himself equates
intelligere with "vision'v" For Leibniz, the Cartesian criterion of truth "is
nothing more than vision".37 Therefore such a criterion is incapable of
resolving the apparent contradictions arising in mathematics. Later on, when
Leibniz is planning to write his Scientiia generalis a part of the work is to be
devoted to refuting scepticism. In a draft which we have of this refutation of
scepticism he asserts : "Descartes has not explained what natural light is".38
Now, on at least one occasion Leibniz has turned to natural light to refute
scepticism. Here I restrict myself to pointing out the fact, since given the great
number of questions here involved, any reasonably complete analysis would
take us altogether too far afield. Lady Masham warns of a danger in
philosophical discussions: if we accept anything without reasons we are giving
up the standards of judgment that enable us to discern when acceptance of
something is justified, and when it is not, and we shall never know where to
stop or what should be the boundaries of assent. Or why I might not believe a
like one thing, as well as another.l" Leibniz appreciates that the central
problems of scepticism are tied up with this question, and relies by proposping
108 E. de Olaso
invested with authority to decide the question: the judge. Who is here the judge?
Reason. However, not reason as either of the disputants understands it, but
reason in the abstract, objective reason, that which we accept when we are
making mathematical calculations. This is not reason understood as a faculty
of the human mind, always swayed by the passions, but "sovereign reason". 58
This question of the judge of controversies has not been systematically
studied. Nevertheless it is very important because it has to do with an aspect
of the act of judging which is not generally taken into separate account, as it
should be, but which plays a leading part in the sceptical arguments regarding
the undecidibility of conflicting opinions.59
One of Leibniz' first systematic texts - in my opinion the first in which he
expounds the general tendency of his intellectual commitment - is Commenta-
tiuncula de iudice controversiarum seu trutina rationis et norma textus, written
about 1669-1671 but not published until 1930.60 This text begins with the
following statement: "The controversy of controversies is that of the judge of
controversies ". Leibniz goes on to say that this question is one which has
disturbed men at all times, but does so in a greater degree in his own because of
the increasing number of religious disputes. In controversies turning upon the
foundations of faith, the Pope's supporters maintain that some infallible judge
or some kind of God-given infallibility is necessarily called for; whilst the
Evangelicals sustain the necessity of a literal respect for the texts, without
adding or suppressing anything. But in so far as other controversies are
concerned, "which have not to do with the foundation of faith , there is no need
of an absolute infallibility, but only of a moral certainty or practical infall-
ibility" (sec.37). Leibniz considers different ways of settling controversies,
reaching the conclusion that "some kind of reason must be sought for, which
is not subject to the passions". He proposes "right reason taken in abstract. I
assert that this should be the judge of controversies in the world". Leibniz goes
on at once to deal with a sceptical objection, namely, that to discover such
reason another judge will be called for. He also mentions Hobbes' objections:
right reason is too abstract a concept, it is "useless, empty of meaning, foolish,
foreign to all activity"; and also that by right reason men really mean their own
reason , and are thus making their own decisions instead of submitting to an
objective authority (secs.54-55). Leibniz replies that in certain questions no
judge is necessary and in others right reason may serve in such capacity (sec
61).61 As an example of the former he gives instances of the first truths of fact
and reason, and draws from them the conclusion that it would be extraordina-
rily useful to construct a "balance of reason" (trutina rationis), by means of
which the weight of conflicting reasons could be determined with the greatest
nicety. This method "is of greater importance than the mythical science of
making gold" (sec.60) and constitutes "the true logic which until now no one
has given us, and most assuredly no one has applied" (sec.61), but which,
properly developed, would lead us "in all questions to a practical infallibility",
in the same way as our mathematical calculations lead us to a theoretical
infallibility. On various occasions Leibniz has proposed rules for this art of
disputation.
112 E. de O/aso
It is probable that Leibniz was helped on this way to this concept of recta
rati062 by Hobbes' impugning of reason as a faculty of the human mind, that is,
of individual men's self-interested reasons. Hobbes postulated an artificial
man, Leviathan, as the judge of controversies. Leibniz, on the other hand,
takes up the traditional concept in all its ambiguity.f?
In his enthusiasm for the unity of Christian religious denominations Leibniz
proposed his art of disputation as a mean of precisely determining the limits of
their mutual disagreements. He also proposed this art as a judge of contro-
versies in the specific case of fideism. He wrote, for example, a Dia/ogus inter
theologum et misosophum. In the first version he had written "sceptic" for
"misosopher". The latter is a partial incarnation of the personage later - and
not very properly - to be known as a "fidelst". The misosopher's basic postulate
is that of the separation of faith and reason, and the fundamental incompetence
of reason in matters of faith. To support his thesis the misosopher takes up very
similar positions to those of voluntarist theology and Latin Averroism. Leibniz
concludes by recommending reason as the means of settling disputes. "If you
reject syllogisms you reject all reasons since all reasons are always syllogisms
albeit imperfect", the theologian says to the misosopher; and sets up the value
of an authentic art of dispute, against " those who quibble about trivial details
and senseless questions", and thus demean this art. 64 Finally I should just like
to point out that the " Preliminary Discourse" in the Theodicy is a long
discussion with Bayle about the art of discussion in the case of the relationship
of reason and faith.
As against the sceptic reflections of Hobbes on the one hand and of the
fideists on the other, Leibniz recommended a return to the recta ratio as the
basis of practical reasoning. As yet there has been no study of the ambiguous
and difficult concept of recta ratio as it appears in the writings of Leibniz, but
by making one we could further our understanding of his thoughts about
ethics, among other branches of practical reason.
To summarize: We have examined the earliest writings in which it is possible
to study Leibniz' relations with scepticism. Then we have seen in some detail
what he felt to be the principal challenge to theoretical reason, that is,
apparently contradictory mathematical reflections. We have also taken a brief
look at certain challenges to practical reason, in particular Hobbes' objections
to recta ratio, and seen how Leibniz sets up a logic of dispute as a judge of
controversies. Now is the moment to show how Leibniz' relations with the
French sceptics of his time ought to be interpreted.
It is not a little curious that the Cartesian cogito should co-exist on equal
terms , epistemically speaking, with the sceptic acceptance of experiences. I
believe that Leibniz never developed this idea; and that perhaps he was only
moved to propound it on this particular occasion by his desire to defend Huet.
In any case Leibniz again points out that his philosophy is broad enough to
make room for the sceptics, and give them the exact place to which they are
legitimately entitled.
Let us return briefly to Foucher: in Leibniz's opinion scepticism performs a
very useful function of which Foucher makes nothing, for it is the sceptics who
demand proof of such propositions as are generally accepted without it.
Leibniz thought to be exemplary, "the difficulties set up by Sextus Empiricus
against the dogmatists, because they serve to take us back to principles'V" And
an important letter of his to Varignon he writes, whilst thanking him for his
criticism of the infinitesimal calculus: "If the basis of all the sciences is to be
truly laid, it is of great importance that there be those ... who contradict; in this
sense the sceptics were quite right to fight against the principles of geometry ...
I have often thought that a geometrician who answered Sextus Empiricus'
objections, and those which Francisco Sanches, author of Quod nihil scitur, sent
Leibniz and Scepticism 115
to Clavius, and others of the same kind, would be doing something more useful
than we imagine".86 Foucher, then, ought not only to say what he wants to do,
he must really put it into practice: "It's not enough to proclaim that truths must
be demonstrated from first principles, as did the Academics, we must really do
so, and practice what we preach".87So Foucher, encouraged by Leibniz, begins
to formulate axioms in the manner of the Academic School he seeks to
restore. 88 But he does so very halfheartedly. His curiosity, in Leibniz' opinion,
was very limited, and if his intention was to restore the Academic School "he
ought not to have been satisfied with generalizations: Plato, Cicero, Sextus
Empiricus and others could have shown him how to set about the matter".89
To keep this study within the bounds of prudence I have not spoken of
Leibniz' theory of empirical knowledge; but perhaps I may be allowed to refer
briefly there to inasmuch as the positions he takes up in this field are very close
to those of the modern sceptics, especially Foucher. To take a specific case:
Foucher, in his Critique de fa recherche de fa verite (1675), objected to the
Cartesian distinction between primary and secondary qualities; Bayle echoes
this in the article on Pyrrho in his Dictionnaire; and from thence Berkeley and
Hume seem to have taken and made use of it, in their rejection of nonempirical
philosophies.t" Now I presume that Leibniz arrived at the same conclusion
independently of Foucher. Leibniz' conclusion reads as follows: "With regard
to bodies I am able to demonstrate that not only light, temperature, colour and
other such qualities are apparent, but that motion, form and extension are so
toO".91 Leibniz upheld the thesis of the phenomenal nature of sensory things in
order to uphold, after the manner of Plato and against all empiricism, the
reality of the supra-sensory. 92
Hegel took an early interest in scepticism and incorporated it as a moment in
his own philosophy. In his opinion scepticism allows us to determine the
contradictions engendered by the senses and the understanding which can only
be overcome by reason; and for this very motive scepticism is an efficacious
introduction to philosophical thought." In similar manner Leibniz built
scepticism into his philosophy and set it up as an introduction to the study of
the true philosophy. Thanks to scepticism, Leibniz thinks, we can show that the
senses not, of themselves, lead to scientific knowledge.P" Hence the arguments
of the Academics and the sceptics constitute a very useful warning that the
senses are not the basis of all knowledge, something which the instability of
sensory things leads us to suspect.95 This concept of scepticism predisposed
Leibniz to see it as another form of Democritus' and Plato's philosophy.'" And
the more extreme forms of scepticism are open to the same criticism that
Leibniz levels at the dogmatists. Sceptics and dogmatists are alike mistaken
when they seek in the sensory world any reality other than the phenomenal.f"
Let us go back to the last years of the l670s. Leibniz is preparing his attack
on scepticism . His general strategy consists in showing the sceptic how some
things are beyond discussion and how legitimate are many of this warnings the
theoretical against overboldness and hastiness in making assertions about the
sensory world, and the practical against the inanity of the habitual disputes .
Now, what kind of sceptic is it that worries Leibniz? A new kind of intellectual,
116 E. de Olaso
part "philosopher" and part "man of the world" - the libertine. It is curious to
note for instance how Leibniz, in a letter to the Landgrave in 1683, expresses
his intention of resisting the attacks of the esprits forts, the libertines and the
impious, by means of sound metaphysical demonstrations. The Landgrave
confesses to being unsure of the metaphysical demonstrations "for I have only
passed through, and never dwelt in, that land of the Muses'; but even so he
encourages Leibniz with these words: "I rely much on your judgment and I do
not deny that they may be very useful against the must subtle of Pyrrhonians, if
not to convince them of the truth, at least to reduce and confine their restless
uneasiness'V" It is instructive to observe that both men find it natural to equate
"libertine" with "Pyrrhonian".
The character who plays the part of the wise man in the "Conversation du
Marquis de Planese" fears that the Marquis "is infected with the scepticism"
common to those of the fashionable world.99 On the other hand he who plays
the sceptic in the dialogue between a politician and a priest,100 evidently
represents libertinism. He is an impious man who has not yet ceased to
consider himself a Christian, a member of the European ruling class who has
given up trying to be an honnete homme and behaves like an esprit fort. Leibniz
fears that the access of men like this to positions of power in European politics
may be paving the way for the "general revolution which threatens Europe";
and he adds in an admonitory tone: "If they cure themselves of this spiritual
epidemic whose bad effects are starting to show, those evils will perhaps be
prevented; but if the disease continues to spread, it will engender a revolution,
and Providence will cure men by means of that" (Remnant's and Bennett's
translation). What disease is this? Leibniz' diagnosis at the beginning of the
18th century is that the absence of any fear of punishment beyond the grave has
unleashed men's passions. Generosity gives way to selfishness, public interest to
individual self-interest, patriotism to considerations of wealth and personal
"honour". The few survivors of our former political culture without any "good
morality and true religion" must inevitably disappear and leave no heirs".101 We
have here something which must be studied in depth since these terrible
practical consequences can be seen to have played an important part in moving
Leibniz to set about correcting the philosophical suppositions of scepticism .
Wishing to get to know Leibniz personally he spent nearly twenty days with
him and when he was taking his leave our author says to him: "Too often
you have very courteously told me that I am not without knowledge of
certain things. Now I am going to show you the fountains at which I have
drunk all that I know". Then he led him by the hand into a narrow room,
where he showed him a small number of books such as the works of Plato,
Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Euclid, Archimedes, Pliny, Seneca
and Cicero. lOS
On one occasion at least the volume of Sextus was the object of a systematic
study and exegesis which took the form of a tract of some 2500 words. As was
his custom with the rough copies of his research-papers Leibniz only wrote on
the left hand of the page, reserving the right hand side for extensive additions of
corrections. Only the first page contains numerous addenda which are difficult
to decipher. Thereafter his pen flows easily on, transmitting a notably well-
ordered train of thought. Towards the end his diminutive handwriting becomes
more painstaking and elaborate and the elegantly curving strokes of the last
line bring his reflections to a harmonious close. His oft-repeated transcription
of Greek technical terms makes it appear highly probable that Leibniz had in
his hand an edition of the Hypotyposes printed in the original language.
Furthermore Leibniz was not in the habit of using translations in his studies
of the ancient philosophers, and he recommended not doing so: "Certainly the
reading of Aristotle and other Ancient Greek philosophers in their original
form brings out many things of which the common run of philosophers take
little note".106 Lastly there was in Leibniz' library the bilingual edition
published in Geneva in 1621 by the brothers Pierre and Jacques Chouet. This
circumstance of course does not really prove anything since the volume in
question does not bear the name of its owner and there are in it no notes or
underlinings to help identify him. While other works were later bought and
added to the library, it seems highly probable that this was the copy Leibniz
used.
Let us pass to more substantial questions. There is no indication in the tract
as to when it was written . Leibniz refers to the Specimen, although he does not
name it in four letters written between 1711 and a few days before his death in
in statements1716, 107 nor made in 1716 to 1.G. Krause, editor of NeueZeitun-
118 E. de Olaso
admits that the sceptics form judgments (even if they be negative ones). But it
may be taken to mean that Leibniz infers from their search for truth the denial
(implicit in such action) of having found it. In a later passage Leibniz infers
propositional knowledge from the behaviour of the sceptics. It can also be
taken to mean that what Leibniz says about the sceptics not having lost hope of
discovering truth is in the same way inferentially derived.
Leibniz connects sceptical investigation with the equivalence expounded by
Sextus in chapters 4 and 6 which the former interprets as the equivalence of
mutually contradictory reasons, which we have hitherto held to be opposite,
should, measured against each other, be found to be always of equal value?
Would not this be something approaching the monstruous, something nearly
impossible of fulfilment for the God who sought to bring it about? The
argument which connects the zetesis and the isostheneia of the sceptics is this:
how can we go on hoping to discover the truth if,such equivalence - which
implies the impossibility of discovering the truth - be in itself a truth? Leibniz
suggests a solution: perhaps such equilibrium was valid with respect to the
reasons hitherto known to us, let us say, until the moment that the sceptic
speaks of it, and must necessarily be disproved by investigation and cease to
exist when the investigation is complete. A brief comment: Leibniz interprets
equivalence as the equilibrium established between reasons. Sextus and all the
ancient sceptics believe that phenomena can be mutually opposed. As far as I
can see Leibniz is right in his correction of Sextus: it is always reasons that are
opposed to one another whether they be based upon rational or empirical
considerations. Now in my commentary I shall consider to what extent Leibniz
does justice to the sceptics when maintaining that opposing reasons are
contradictory.
Leibniz invites us to propound this hypothesis : in the beginning the reasons
are of equal value, later a new reason is discovered and the equilibrium is
shattered, but then again another reason is discovered, contrary to the last, and
the equilibrium is restored. Would not the labours of a God, who went to such
lengths to alternate zetesis and isostheneia, be futile?
This refutation of isostheneia takes its stand upon probabilities. But Leibniz
believes that he can show absolute proof that the invariable equivalence of
affirmation and denial is impossible. The results of Leibniz' proof are at least
open to discussion. 121
Later Leibniz examines that which the sceptic seeks, which is the absence of
all perturbation (ataraxia); but he criticizes Sextus because in Leibniz' opinion
to be in a constant state of doubt is to be subject to the perturbations of hope
and fear. Knowing, on the other hand, is being able to adopt sure and
unperturbed decisions; and even believing that one knows, although it may
lead to error, is better than being in a state of perplexity. In my commentary I
draw attention to the fact that Leibniz interprets the suspension of judgment
(epochi) as "doubt" and doubt as an involuntary state of ignorance which leaves
us at the mercy of impulses originating in the passions. Obviously the man who
is prey to a passion is perturbed; and it would seem absurd to try to achieve
imperturbability through perturbations. 122
Leibniz and Scepticism 121
NOTES
Early versions of various parts of this paper were read between August 1983 and February 1984
at the Autonomous National University of Mexico, the State University of New York at Buffalo,
and the Warburg Institute (University of London) . I wish to thank the members of these institutions
who met there and discussed topics with me. I am especially grateful to lA. Robles, C.B. Schmitt,
R.H. Popkin , and M. Burnyeat.
1. "Pr610go a Histo ria de la filosofia de Emile Brehier", in Obras completes (Madrid: Revista de
Occidente, 1947) VI, 380-381.
2. See my review of the last edition of Popkin's work, The History ofscepticismfiom Erasmus to
Spinoza (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1979) in Notis XVIII ,
1 (1984), pp. 135-144.
3. Cicero Scepticus: A Study of the Influence ofthe "Academica" in the Renaissance (The Hague :
Nijhoff, 1972). The best up-to-date general view of research on that period is provided by
Schmitt 's study "Th e Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times" in The Skeptical
Tradition, ed. Myles Burnyeat (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London : University of California Press,
1983), pp. 225-251.
4. "Leibniz and the French Sceptics", Revue Internat ionale de philosophic 76-77 (1966), pp. 228-
248.
5. A VI, 1,87.
6. Que nada se sabe (Buenos Aires: Emeco, 1944), pp. 114-115.
7. "Sextus Empiricus" Outlines of Pyrrbonism (hereinafter abbreviated as "PH") I, 79f., and
145f. That Leibniz should consider scepticism compatible with atheism, as in the passage
quoted, or scepticism with impiety, as in De religionis magnorum virorum (Grua 37), is
something quite uncommon in his works. In general. sceptics are. for him , religious believers.
8. A VI, i, 88and 90-91
9. A II, i, 4-5 .
10. See PH I, 33 and II , 242-244 .
1I. The other sources from which the argument is drawn (Cicero, Academica II, 23 and 72;
Lactantius, Inst , III , 23, and Galen , De simpl. medic.) cannot have inspired these reflections.
The question as to whether Leibniz had indirect knowledge of Sextus' text has still to be gone
into . I have examined the question of Mario Nizolio having been responsible for the
transmission of Sextus' opinions . Nizolio, whom Leibniz knew well, mentions Anaxagoras'
saying, and quotes Sextus and Cicero, but not within the context of Leibniz' analysis of
Anaxagoras'opinion. See Mario Nizolio, De verts principii's et vera ratione philosophandi
contra pseudophilosophos libri IV, ed. Quirinus Breen (Roma : Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1956) I,
28. In his letter to Thomasius in 1670, Leibniz was to say that the major premiss of
Anaxagoras' argument - that is, that snow is frozen water - should not be allowed. If we
follow this path , he observes humorously, "Anaxagoras' sophism melts", A VI, ii, 436-437 .
12. A VI, i, 309.
13. A II, i, 24; reproduced in A VI, it, 443. We do not know to what extent Thomasius was
interested in scepticism.
14. VI, ii, 431.
15. Gaston Milhaud, Les philosophes geometres de la Grece. Platon et ses predecesseurs (paris:
Alcan, 1934), p. 15.
16. Yvon Belaval, Leibniz critique de Descartes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p. 40; see also pp. 63 and
67.
17. Even the first condition, which a modern philosopher would consider only trivially relevant, is
not so obvious, and if it be attributed to ancient scepticism, can be shown to be erroneous. See
Leibniz and Scepticism 125
M . Burnyeat's "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed ",
in Idealism Past and Present, ed. G Vesey (London, 1982).
18. A VI, ii, 264.
19. Leibniz seems to follow Sextus' version rather than Aristotle 's. See Adversus mathematicos
(hereinafter abbreviated to "AM" ) X, 139f. A very abbreviated version in PH III , 76-77.
20. Richard Sorabji , Time. Creation and the Continuum (London: Duckworth, 1982), pp. 321f. I
have found that some modern sceptics establish a parallel between geometrical reasoning
involving the infinite, and that of the Pyrrhonists. See Montaigne, Apologie de Raimond
Sebond, Essais II, 12, ed. Maurice Rat (Paris : Garnier, 1948), pp. 277-278. The academic
Foucher merely pointed them out , when he feared "Pyrrhonian arguments which would have
the tortoises move as quickly as Achilles". See the letter to Leibniz (1691), GP 1,400. See also
ibid., 411-412.
21. See Gueroult, Leibniz . Dynamique et metaphysique (paris: Aubier, 1967), pp. 8-12.
22. A VI, ii, 267. Leibniz says that "the very eloquent Belin had challenged the philosophers of all
the planet to solve them ". The editors of the Academy edition mention the works of Jean
Albert Belin, Les aventures du philosophe inconnu en la recherche et en l'invention de la pierre
philosophale (Paris , 1646), and Apologie du grand steele (Par is, 1659), but say they have not
found the passage to which Leibniz refers.
23. See Leonard Marande, Jugement des actions bumaines (1624), p. 71. D. Hume, Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding , Sec. XII . Quoted by Popkin , op. cit., pp . 98 and 273, n.
48. Leibniz early accepts Gregory of St. Vincent's proposed solution of the paradox of Achilles
and tortoise. Years later, he quoted it by heart to Foucher, GP 1,403 and 416. Gregory of St.
Vincent's work, here referred to, is Opus geometricum (Antwerp, 1647).
24. I follow Israel E. Drabkin's excellent exposition in "Aristotle's Wheel: Notes of the History of
a Paradox", Osiris 9 (1950), pp. 162-198
25. Les mechaniques de Galilee mathematicien (1634).
26. Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno a due nuove scienze (Leiden , 1638). Le Opere di
Galilei, Edizione Nazionale (Florence, 1899-1909), VIII, 68r.
27. Art. cit., P. 19 1. Boyle's work is an appendix to his A Defense of the Doctrine Touching the
Spring and Weight of the Air. Perhaps we shall better understand the place of the "S ceptical
Chymist" in the history of scepticism , if we study Boyle's work in the traditional Zenonian
manner. Zeno 's fourth objection (as expounded by Aristotle) is related by Bayle to the
problem of the two wheels, "Zeno of Elea" Rem . E, in Historical and Critical Dictionary.
Selections, ed. R.H . Popkin and C. Brush (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1965), p. 359,
n.57.
28. A VI, ii, 479-486. We came to know of this important study as late as 1966, thanks to the
Academy's edition .
29. Idem . This formula is a variant of Euclid's Elements, I, 9. Obviously there are crucial
differences between different statements of this axiom . I will not here take them into account.
Leibniz has made an effort to refute the position of those who deny that the whole is greater
than its parts, in order to obviate the possibility of consequences favourable to scepticism . On
the other hand, it is strange that he does not usually connect scepticism with the attitude of
those supporters of scientia media who deny the principle that "nothing exists without a
reason". Besides, in his elementa iuris naturalis (1671) Leibniz insists that demonstrative
knowledge can resist attack by the sceptics and that philosophers ought not to transmit
propositionsm simply because they are clear (the Cartesian criterion) or per se notae (the
scholastic criterion), but rather they must prove them. A VIm i, 369. Some details about this
question in my study "The Proofs of Axioms, Praise and Sarcasm", International Studies in
Philosophy VI (New York/Torino, 1974 and Beleval, op. cit., pp. 160 and i62f/
30. A VI, ii, 480.
31. To lCh. Bbhmer (1694) A I,x, 448-449 . Leibniz studies this, among other problems, in the
Discorsi in 1672 and 1673. His observations in A VI, iii, 163-168, and see especially 168.
"Chimaerical" refers to an idea which contains a contradiction, Discours de metaphysique 23;
GP IV, 449. To Burnett, GP 111, 257. But I am not arguing that Galileo was a sceptic or that
he preached any kind of scepticism in mathematics - rather I have drawn attention to the
126 E. de O/aso
sceptical consequences which Leibniz thought could spring from mathematical reflections.
w.L. Wisan has suspected Galileo of a kind of mild scepticism with regard to empirical
knowledge, before 1616, and from then on of a more radical kind. W.L. Wisan "Galilee's
Scientific Method : A Reexamination", in New Perspectives on Galileo, ed. R.E. Butts and J.e.
Pitt (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978), pp. 23-24. I thank Professor A. Guillermo Ranea for drawing
my attention to this study.
32. It is necessary to give at least brief information about two different problems that are implied
here. The first one is that an indisputable character is attributed by Leibniz sometimes to
identical propositions, and sometimes to first truths of fact too. In this essay I cannot examine
this ambiguity of Leibniz. The second problem is that it is especially difficult to obtain a
precise definition of what the scholastics understood by per se notum .For example Aquinas'
definitions are not very illuminating . Drawing upon the fourth book of Metaphysics , and also
from Posterior Analytics I, ch.3 sec 4, Aquinas, in his commentaries on the latter, gives us the
following definition: "Propositions per se notae, are those that are immediately (statim)
understood, as soon as note (notis) has been taken of their terms"(I, 7). All that we can
understand from this definition, is that "per se" means "immediately". If Aquinas is trying to
tell us something about notum, he is reasoning in a circle. Leibniz accepts doubts about
axiomatic propositions which have not been demonstrated, but does not accept any doubts
about demonstrations. Thus he confesses having been astonished to read ("non sine stupore
leg"'), that Hobbes doubted Pythagoras' theorem, A VI, ii, 432.
33. An . post. 76b ff.
34. Aquinas ' reliance on lumen naturale , stands out clearly. In his commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, he maintains that axioms apprehended for the first time without analysis, cannot be
afterwards confirmed by any external consideration : "Non sunt notae per exter iorem
rationem sed per interiorem ... lumine naturall intellectus" (I, 1, 19). See other texts quoted
by Ortega in La idea de principio en Leihn iz (Buenos Aires: Emmece, 1958), p. 209, where the
author notes a petitio in another passage of Aquinas, similar to the one I have commented in
the foregoing note. Ortega is, moreover, the only scholar who has drawn attention to Leibniz'
criticism of the per se notum criterion. See the work quoted from, at pp. 143,221 et passim.
35. To Mersenne, ATII , 599.See Laporte's Le rationalisme de Descartes (Paris:P.U.F.,1945), pp.
6f.
36. To Regius, AT III , 455.
37. GP IV, 328. Visions which, in their non-critical character, Leibniz sometimes compares with
those of the enthusiasts , GP Ill , 257-258.
38. C 516. See Discours de la methode III ; AT VI, 27; letter to Mersenne, AT 11,597.
39. To Leibniz (1704), GP III, 351.
40. To Lady Masham, GP III , 353. See a didactic version of what Leibniz understood by natural
light, in his letter to Queen Sophia Charlotte, GP VI, 503-506. The role played by Leibniz in
the process of "insulation", describe by Burnyeat in his contribution to this volume,
[Scepticism/rom the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, ed. R.H. Popkin and C.B. Schmitt] is
similar to that of Berkeley's.
4!. A III, i, 15-16. A version of this letter had already been published in the Academy edition, see
A 11, i, 222-229. The new version, published in 1976, seems to me preferable, inter alia,
because it is the only one which contains references to the Pyrrhonians.
42. Notes on Mariotte's Introduction aux sciences (May-July 1676 7), A VI, iii, 328. In this
restricted sense, he writes to Mariotte himself: "One should not argue contra negantem
principia" , A 11, i, 269.
43. AT X, 392, and Y. Belaval, op. cit., pp. 62--63 and 69-70
44. To Malebranche (1679) A 11, i, 477. There is a complication which I mention , but which I
shall not try to unravel. Leibniz givesup using the expression "evidence". In a letter to Calvor,
he writes: " It is certainly true, that what is most evident is most true; but that does not help us
much , because we are, precisely, looking for what is most evident, and what is the
characteristic of evidence. What I suggest, then, is this: the proposition must be identical, or
susceptible of being reduced to that condition by a simple substitut ion of equipollents",
Leibniz concludes by affirming that if "the Ancients had taken this into consideration, all the
Leibniz and Scepticism 127
disputes of the Academics would have vanished into thin air ", A II, i, 525-526. On the other
hand, he is at pains to preserve the expression per se notum. Here is an example of that
problematical adaptation: "Per se notae are such propositions as must be granted in the light
of experience or by virtue of their own terms, that is to say, when anything opposed to them
implies a contradiction", A VI, (Vorausedition, 1982, p. 20). As to our comprehension of the
infinite, see GP IV, 360.
45. For the first case, see GP IV, 359; and for the second, GP IV, 422f.
46. GP IV, 401. 46 GP IV, 401.
47. To Mersenne, AT Ill, 393, and Replies to the Second Objections , AT VII , 160. In these replies
Descartes accepts the analogy between the Absolutely Perfect Being and the maximum
number. See also C 191.
48. A II, i, 477. Leibniz' favourite examples are : the squaring of the circle, the fastest motion, the
greatest of all circles, the number of all possible units . From 1675 on, these examples figure in
Leibniz' correspondence. See letters to Oldenburg, to Eckhard and to Elisabeth, in A II , i,
250, 306 and 435-436, respect ively.
49. About Gassendi, see Ralph Walker 's "Gassendi and Skepticism"; in The Skeptical Tradition ,
quoted in note 3, p. 331. I note by the way, that C.B. Brush has pointed out that the great critic
of the Cartesian criterion of truth, ends up by relying on that of the per se notum . Walker, art.
cit., p.328. See Spinoza's letter to Boxel, Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl
Winters , 1925), IV, 260. Professor Leiser Madanes points out to me that in his Tractatus
Politicus (III, 8) Spinoza takes the proposition that "the whole is not greater than the part" as
an example of a proposition in which a man may believe, only if he renounces the faculty of
judgment.
50. Vita Leibnitii a se ipso breviter delineate, Klopp I, xxxix-xl .
51. Popk in, op. cit., chap . 1. Terence Penelhum has recently given us a good resume of that
discussion with reference to scepticism, see "Scepticism and Fideism", in The Skeptical
Tradition , especially pp. 293-295 .
52. see Confess io philosophi. A VI, iii, 117; Theodicy, Preface GP VI, 38, and letter to Basnage GP
III, 143.
53. Ad staterum iuris, C. 213. Theodicy , sec. 238; GP VI, 259-260 ; Grua 419, and Des methodes de
reunion in Oeuvres, II, 2.
54. The question of the relation of the judge of religious controversies and cognitive scepticism is
clearly expressed in Montaigne's Apologie, quoted in n. 20. p. 313. A preliminary research into
the systematic problem involved, will be found in my study "Perception and Criterion",
prsented at the Fourth Mexican National Congress of Philosophy in 1983.
55. To Eler (1716), D V 403-404; see also GP IV, 366; to Tolomei, GP VII , 466; to Burnett, GP
III, 193-194 and 259; to Jacques Bernoulli, GM III, 83; to Jean Bernoulli, GM III, 850. As to
the subject in general, see my study "Leibniz et l'art de disputer". SLS XV (1975), pp. 207f.
56. To Placcius (1696), D VI, I, 72.
57. GP VII, 64-65 , 125 and 200.
58. Dialogue entre un habile politique et un ecclesiastique d 'une piete reconnue. LHI, VI,4 , folio 7
recto .
59. See my study, "Thomas Hobbes and recta ratio", Manuscrito IV, 1 (Campinas, Brazil, 1980),
pp.29-30.
60. A VI, i. 548f. I have taken this paragraph from a study of mine quoted in n. 55. Years later
Leibniz returns to the study of the subject. Complimentary and hitherto unedited texts will be
brought out in A VI (Vorausedition, 1982), pp. 17-23 .
61. This is certainly not the only question taken up by Leibniz with Hobbes , involving matters of
scepticism. It has generally been understood that Hobbes' nominalism was a form of
scepticism; and Leibniz takes pains to refute this in his Dialogus (1677), GP VII, 190f. See
also, R.H . Popkin's "Hobbes and Skepticism", in History of Philosophy and its Making, ed.
Linus J. Thro (washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 133-148.
62. Theodicy, GP VI, 49, 84 and 226. See my study quoted in note 59.
63. The latest publication on the subject is the collective volume Right Reason in Western Ethics, a
special number of The Monist LXVI , 1(1983) .
128 E. de O/aso
64. Grua (pp. 18-23) for the first time published this dialogue with important errata. A careful
edition will be found in A VI (Vorausedition, 1982). The letters exchanged between Leibniz
and Rauschenberg in 1702 are interesting for the study of the logic of religious controversies
and scepticism. The Protestant Leibniz affirms that the "authority of the Scriptures is the
truth, otherwise Pyrrhonism will be favoured at the expense of Christianity. Scepticism
springs from the Catholics , who subscribed to the Council of Trent's proposition: captivare
intellectus in obsequium fidei". At this Reuschenberg explains, "I hate Pyrrhonism, one must
believe everything or nothing". See LB, 239-240. Leibniz's words are to be found on folio 10.
On the question of the Church as judge and witness, and a certain "vicious circle" in the proof
of the Scriptures by means of the Church, and of the Church through Scriptures , see Jean
Baruzi, Leibniz et l'organisation religieuse de terre (Paris 1907), p. 299. Regarding the art of
disputation as an instrument for settling religious controversies, Leibniz points out to
Reuschenberg, that there are two perils to be avoided "not to leave unanswered solutions
which have been proposed, and not to reason as the sceptics do", " who reject everyone's
opinions, on the excuse that everyone wants to be right. As if discussion were not necessary in
order to decide who us really right!" ibid., (September 1702), f.23r. Th is kind of discussion
with the sceptics sprang, I think , from his early confrontation with Hobbes. In 1680 he
defends recta ratio and again expounds the Hobbesian problem. "When one man argues , the
other does not examine his argument, but simply repeats the question , "how do you know that
your reason is better than mine? What is your creiterion of truth"? GP VII , 187-188, One
final observation: when Wachter contemplates the complete separation of theology and
philosophy, and says that philosophy "is based upon a sceptical ground, that is, the respective
reason whereby different men conceive things as they do, starting from hypotheses" . Leibniz
does not accept that true philosophy is founded on hypotheses. A theology which is at war
with philosophy, he says, is a false theology. There are not two truths, as the 15th and 16th
century Averroists sought to show, Animadversiones ad Joh. G. Wachteri Iibrum de recondita
Hebraeorum philosophia, in Refutation inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz, ed. Foucher de Careil,
(Paris: Briere, 1854), p. 74.
65. The Attack on Skepticism, EF 203-208, and textual note on pp. 209-254 .
66. See note 64.
67. Grua 18.
68. See note 58.
69. C 219.
70. C 514; see also 516.
71. A I, u, 69.
72. Nouveaux essais IV, xvii; A VI, vi, 491. P. Remnant and 1. Bennett do not note this detail in
their recent translation New Essats on Human Understanding (Cambridge Umo. Press. 1981).
73. C 183-184.
74. PH I, 166.
75. See note 4.
76. Ibid, p. 239.
77. GP I, 388.
78. GP I, 407 and 410-411.
79. GP I, 400 and 411-412 .
80. GP I, 422 and Nouveaux Essais IV, 2, 14; A NYI, vi. 374.
81. GP I 370f.
82. GP I, 372.
83. CP IV, 357.
84. GP IV, 327; A I, vi, 338.
85. GP I, 402.
86. GM IV, 94. See also C 191.
87. GP IV, 497; see also Nouveaux essais IV, ii , 14; A VI, vi, 374.
88. GP I, 408.
89. GP II , 566.
90. Popkin, art.cit, 230--231.
Leibniz and Scepticism 129
54, b. 193. Leibniz would approve of the Jesuits suppressing " this Pyrrhonisrn in their own
ranks", ibid.
117. To Lelong (1708) quoted by Daville, Leibniz historien (paris: Alcan 1909), pp. 475 and 476, n.
7. See also Conzc, op. cit., p. 53.
118. Daville, op. cit, p. 476. See D, 353. About Bierling, see Gerhardt's information in GP VII,
482--485, and his correspondence with Leibniz, idem, 485-511.
119. GP VII, 486.
120. W. Conze, op. cit., p. 53. See also Daville, op. cit, p. 477, where many references will be found
to historical Pyrrhonism, and Leibniz's attitude thereto. See also Y. Belaval , op. cit., p. 1021.
121. For a general presentation of the problem, see my contribution, "Objectiones inedites de
Leibniz au principe sceptique de l'equipollence", Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant Kongresses
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1974), pp . 52-59.
122. See my study, "The Meaning of Sceptical Doubt", Revista Latinoamericana de Filosojia I, I
(1975), pp. 27-37.
123. Some reflections in my study "Praxis sans Theone? La refutation pragmiste de pyrrhonisme
selon un texte inedit de Leibniz', Akten des 3. Internationalen Leibniz Kongresses (Wiesbaden:
Steiner, 1980) SLS III, 159-167.
124. See my study quoted in note 54.
125. " Scripsi innumers et de innumeris sed edidi pauca et de paucis", To Jacques Bernoulli, GM
III,61.
126. "Qui me non nisi editis novis , non novit", to Vincent Placeius, D VI , i, 65.
127. Malebrance et Leibni z. Relations personnelles, ed . A . Robinet (Paris: Vrin, 1955, 121.
E.DEOLASO
I have known Dick Popkin since the end of 1966. I was then preparing my
Ph.D dissertation about Leibniz' criticism of Descartes, exploring some issues
that were not considered in Yvon Belaval's famous book about the subject.
Both my thesis director - Professor Jose Ferrater Mora (Bryn Mawr College) -
and myself? considered that this research program was a natural sequence of
my Argentine dissertation "The Methodic 'Doubt' and Its Post-Cartesian
Criticisms" (Buenos Aires University, 1963). In 1966 Dick had just published
"Leibniz and the French Sceptics" in the Revue Internationale de Philosophie,
an article that distilled an always sincere although not always fair dislike of
Leibniz. In his essay Dick quoted Fabricius' claim that Leibniz once planned to
write a criticism of Sextus Empiricus and yet had not fulfilled his promise. I
immediately wrote to Dick pointing out to him that Leibniz had in fact written
that polemical work and that it was lying, with many other manuscripts, in his
unpublished legacy in Hannover. I thought that my remark was going to alter
Dick's plans and that an analysis of Leibniz' paper should find its place in
future editions of The History of Scepticism. As a matter of fact, I was the one
who had to change my plans. Indeed, Dick convinced me that I should decipher
Leibniz' Latin manuscript, and write a commentary about it, and that I should
change the subject of my dissertation to Leibniz' criticism of Sextus Empiricus.
In 1969, I defended my dissertation Leibniz and Greek Scepticism at Bryn
Mawr, and since then one of my permanent research programs is the study of
historical and epistemological aspects of the problem of scepticism. I have,
therefore, a great indebtedness to Dick and I am most grateful and pleased to
have this opportunity to write some pages to honor him. With them I intend to
enlarge Dick's domain of research and to suggest some alternative views
specially on the relevance of the distinction between different kinds of
scepticism.
I
Although in The History ofScepticism, Popkin reaches as far as the seventeenth
century, he has also done detailed research on several aspects of scepticism in
the eighteenth century. The essays compiled in The High Road to Pyrrhonism
131
RiH. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 131-146.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers .
132 E. de O/aso
are an eloquent proof of it. Less known is his pioneer article "Scepticism in the
Enlightenment" written in the early sixties ; it was perhaps the first all-
embracing survey of the period.' With the remarkable exception of Hume,
Popkin finds that, in respect of the problem of scepticism, the age of Enlight-
enment is perhaps as rich as the picture drawn by Popkin of scepticism in the
previous century.3
In the present essay I intend to include Rousseau for the first time in the
history of eighteenth century scepticism. Besides this historiographic point, I
suggest that two different kinds of scepticism coexist in Rousseau. This
problem is partly historical, partly epistemological. I am one of the few current
writers who think that Pyrrhonian scepticism cannot be entirely reduced to
Academic philosophy. I cannot go now over all the relevant aspects of one of
the oldest problems of philosophy, that was already considered old by Gellius.4
I suspect that this relic, that apparently can only attract erudites, is nowadays a
worthwhile challenge. I guess that some unsuspected new light will be thrown
on basic problems of the theory of knowledge, such as the problem of the
criterion as a consequence of restating of the old enigma.
In what follows I confine my attention to the first half of "The Creed of the
Savoyard Vicar". First, I show that Rousseau declares himself alien towards
the ordinary image of scepticism with which he was acquainted. Second, I show
that when Rousseau considers the cognitivity of the issues of classical
metaphysics (God's existence, the immortality of the soul, the structure of the
world the freedom of the will) he argues following a dialectical pattern that is
good enough for setting forth a debate, and even to win it, but certainly not to
prove that one is in possession of true knowledge. Finally, I show that
Rousseau's resort to sentiment, as an answer to all problems , unexpectedly
makes him a member of the Pyrrhonian tradition.
II
Is it possible to consider Rousseau as a true philosopher?
Let us keep these words in mind when we follow steps of the Vicar's spiritual
itinerary, because these words have been often forgotten by philosophy
teachers anxious to consider Rousseau as a fellow of the "Societe Francaise de
Philosophie'T'
Let us begin by making a distinction between two types of scepticism :
Pyrrhonian scepticism and Academic scepticism. Pyrrhonian scepticism has
been many things to many men. Let us depict two significant varieties of
Pyrrhonian scepticism which are relevant for a better understanding of Vicar's
Creed: Pyrrhonian scepticism as opposite to common sense and Pyrrhonian
scepticism as is established by Sextus Empiricus in the first book of his Outlines
The Two Scepticisms ofthe Savoyard Vicar 133
This is the kind of sceptic that I label "Academic". Instead of the "either black
or white" of the Pyrrhonian, the Academician defends the "either more or less"
of the knowledge that is attainable to us. The Academician could then be
considered as the founder of relevant aspects of modern theory of knowledge,
while the Pyrrhonian was surely the first who tried to ruin all possible theory of
knowledge.
Giorgio Tonelli was also the first philosopher to point out the importance of
this Academic scepticism in France about the middle of eighteenth century.
Gassendi and Locke were the ones who inspired it, Locke being much better
acclimated in France than in England. The Academic fashion continues with
Fontenelle and Quesnay, is freely assumed by Voltaire. Vauvenargues and
Condillac, reaches a high point with the first Diderot, Maupertuis, and Buffon.
and perhaps, its most representative philosopher is d'Alembert. 16 I now
examine Rousseau's text.
III
The Creed begins with a formal promise : the Vicar doesn't intend to argue; just
pretends to be sincere (p. 228). Once he has finished with his speech he reminds
us that he did not wish to philosophize (p. 253). Yet, it is not difficult to realize
that a large part of the Creed consists in a philosophical disquisition and,
furthermore, in a philosophical discussion. Is it necessary to emphasize once
more the intrinsical weakness of that "laborious and candid metaphysics'Y'" It
seems to be more fruitful to examine the Creed, taking it as the testimony of
what Pierre Villey calls (and Popkin adopts) "fa crise pyrrhonienne",18 which
Rousseau intends to overcome by Academic means. In this essay, I consider
only the first part of the Creed and I assume the hypothesis that the structure of
this work differs from the structure assigned to it by Rousseau when he says in
later discussions that the first part of the Creed is dogmatic and the second part
of it is dialectical or probable. I show that the first part is a brilliant exercise of
dialectical metaphysics, that is, a metaphysics which achieves only probable
conclusions.
Let us first recall the context in which the heated Vicar's meditation takes
place. The religious convictions of our hero have been shaken by a profound
crisis. When he later remembers it, he will be once more shaken by "the fear of
falling back again into my former Pyrrhonism" (p. 275). Does he intend to
regain happiness by means of knowledge? The Vicar is afflicted by two
important problems: God's existence and the fitness of a rule for his moral
duties. He finds himself in that same state, "of uncertainty and doubt" which he
considers analogous to the disposition required by Descartes for the search of
truth (p. 229). It has been often said that this analogy ends just in the moment
of his proposal. Yet, we should pay attention to the following differences: Rene
Descartes is a real man who plays the role of an imaginary Pyrrhonist.P while
the fictitious Vicar seems to suffer and behave as a real man . This impression is
not entirely baseless. As soon as Descartes finds his first evidence and his
criterion of truth, he abolishes methodic doubt. But the Vicar does not succeed
136 E. de O/aso
in eradicating the reasons for his doubt, and so the crisis, like his shadow,
follows him wherever he goes. The Vicar does not succeed in determining the
mark of truth, its criterion.P' because he is looking for a kind of truth that is
really different from the truth that Descartes looked for and found. These are
the Vicar's own words:
I love truth. I seek her, and cannot find her. Show me truth and I will hold
her fast; why does she hide her face from the eager heart that would fain
worship her? (p. 230)
Let us compare these words with the resignation at the end of the Creed's first
movement:
I have done all I can to attain to truth; but its source is beyond my reach; is
it my fault if my strength fails me and I can go no further; it is for Truth to
draw near to me (p. 258).
And after this mockery (in which plenty of doctrine is enclosed) we read :
our mind. The Academic sceptic knows that his metaphysics is more true-than
that of the materialists He also knows that we have "an unbridled under-
standing and a reason which knows no principle" (p. 254). The Vicar therefore
says that his dogma has an advantage compared with the dogma of his enemies.
Does this mean to say that his dogma is true? Not at all. It is the best of them,
but a rather poor best, indeed. Its only advantage consists in "making some
sense". But then, is the materialist dogma a sophism in dictione? Indeed, this is
what Rousseau seems to be suggesting. By bringing forth a first cause he makes
his speech rest hypothetically in a referent, while the materialist's speech,
lacking this referent, falls into the regressus and has no meaning at all. But if
the Vicar pretends to avoid a paralogism, namely, a regresses ad infinitum by
use of this article of creed we should nonetheless remark that by avoiding it he
is actually falling into another paralogism: the postulate. The hypothetical
God, established or postulated by the first dogma, seemed to be good enough
for the sake of defeating the dogmatists within a logic of discussion. Yet, it will
not be enough to appease the Vicar's anxieties.
I now examine the second dogma. The Vicar admits, as every moderate
sceptic does , that "the mechanism of the universe may not be intelligible to the
human mind". Yet, he polemically adds that "when a man sets to work to
explain it, he must say what men can understand" (p. 237). The materialist's
metaphysical explanation should once more be able to satisfy semantic
requirements. The second dogma is: "If matter in motion points me to a will,
matter in motion according to fixed laws points me to an intelligence" (ibid. ).
This dogma is openly grounded on the former one and it is as "obscure" as the
former one is. But if one admits that it is perhaps impossible to comprehend the
world 's mechanism, then there is only one topical argument left: given the same
difficulties, my explanation is (roughly) more intelligible than my adversary's. It
is a matter of a victory of one opinion over another, of the best over the not so
good. But it is still possible that both could be wrong, for both are grounded on
mere conjectures.
Finally, I consider the third dogma: "Man is therefore free to act , and as such
he is animated by an immaterial substance" (p. 243). The negative ground of
this dogma is: "To suppose some action which is not the effect of an active
motive power is indeed to suppose effects without cause , to reason in a vicious
circle" (idem). According to the Vicar, this proves that: "It is not the word
freedom that is meaningless, but the word necessity" (idem). I think that it is a
mistake to consider as a vicious circle the paralogism of speaking about
relational entities while suppressing at the same time the relation itself. Yet, it
is more important to observe that Rousseau is once more using the semantic
argument and the sceptic's logical weapons. But he is not acting as a
Pyrrhonist: he is trying to overcome the materialist's positions by means of a
positive thesis, and therefore he is liable to other sceptic objections. Indeed, to
assume the existence of an active principle just for the sake of avoiding
objections is tantamount to falling back once again into the postulate. In sum,
the Vicar uses the sceptic's weapons for the sake of refuting the materialists
while pretending to satisfy their objections. Is he proposing a metaphysics? The
The Tho Scepticisms ofthe Savoyard Vicar 139
Vicar says: "The jargon of metaphysics has never led to the discovery of any
single truth, and it has filled philosophy with absurdities of which we are
ashamed as soon as we strip then of their long words" (p. 236). However, the
metaphysicians are, without knowing it or without admitting it. the materi-
alists. But if it still makes sense to speak metaphysically, then the Vicar's speech
appears to have more explanatory power. I think that the Vicar has reasoned ad
hominem and also that he has been completely conscious of his position's limits.
Because if it is senseless to speak metaphysically, then both materialism and
spiritualism are equivalent dogmatic madnesses and therefore the isotheneia
appears once more . The Vicar gives up his "alarming show of philosophy: we
may be men without being scholars" (p. 254).
The most intimate voice, the voice that speaks in silence and is farther away
from any dispute, will then appear when the Vicar goes back to the level of
conscience after being displaced from it by the requirements of the art of
disputation.
IV
The Vicar intimately feels that God exists . He also feels that his soul is
immortal. But if he wants to go even farther and nourish the lust of knowledge
that disturbs the Dogmatists, he must then raise some Dogmatic problems such
as: "What is that life? Is the soul of man in its nature immortal?" (p. 246). The
Vicar's answer is instructive: "My finite understanding cannot hold the infinite;
what is called eternity eludes my grasp . What can I assert or deny, how can I
reason with regard to what I cannot conceive?" (idem). And since to affirm and
to deny are the ways by which we judge, then could I possibly judge? Yes, but
only about finite things . We are not confronted here with the Pyrrhonian epoche
which refrains from philosophy, but with the Academic epoche which refrains
from metaphysics. This limited epoche keeps him away from both Dogmatism
and Pyrrhonism.j"
Regarding the soul's immortality, he prefers to abstain; at least he does not
assert to it dogmatically. During his reflection, the Vicar imposed upon himself
as a methodic rule to leave in uncertainty "neither accepting nor rejecting" all
difficulties whose explanation was not useful for practical purposes (p. 232). He
tries to reach a conception that would be both reasonable and comforting
concerning immortality. Being unable to imagine how it could be possible for a
thinking being to die, he then concludes: as I cannot imagine how it can die. I
presume that it does not die" (p. 246). Surely, this is a provisional conclusion.
Indeed, once again we are in the field of topical logic. and not in the field of a
logic of necessary consequences. Both the Dogmatist who believes that he is
able to offer true demonstrations of immortality. and the Pyrrhonist who
suspends his assent concerning the truth of those dogmatic statements, are
not reflecting Rousseau's interests. His third position resorts to the concept of
presumption, which may be the most relevant concept in topical logic.25
Which is the epistemic status of the Vicar's creed? His relative certainty in
the immortality of the soul does not exclude the possibility of being refuted,
140 E. de Olaso
V
I have reached the main point of the Vicar's creed. Rousseau intends to point
out that goodness is not an essence or concept that dwells in an intelligible
realm, beyond the reach of our faculties: "The morality of our actions consists
entirely in the judgments we ourselves form with regard to them" (p. 250). I put
aside many interesting problems now to concentrate on the problem of
The Two Scepticisms ofthe Savoyard Vicar 141
and since we do not learn to seek, what is good for us and avoid what is bad
for us, but get this desire from nature, in the same way the love of good and
the hatred of evil are as natural to us as our self-love (p. 253).
And so here we face the statement that, according to my point of view, is the
clue to understanding Rousseau's position towards philosophy:
The decrees of conscience are not judgments but feelings. Although all our
ideas come from without, the feelings by which they are weighed are within
us. and it is by these feelings alone that we perceive fitness or unfitness of
things in relation to ourselves, which leads us to seek or shun these things.
(idem).
If we accept literally the doctrine of this paragraph, then we must also admit
that it would be attractive. although finally confusing to talk about 'dogma-
tism'. Indeed, if on the one hand the acts of conscience are irrefutable and this
makes them remarkably similar to dogmas - on the other hand they are not
judgments. Is it possible to talk , therefore, about a dogmatism that lacks
judgments?
Now then, what is the criterion for demarcating between the boundaries of
philosophy (either Dogmatic or Academic) and Pyrrhonism? I suggested that
Pyrrhonism embodies the view that one is, in one sense, "dogmatic" when one
assumes a philosophical doctrine, that is to say, a systematical or nonsystema-
tical set of judgments (probable judgments included), as a guide for one's own
life. To submit oneself to those judgments, even if they are probable, is the trap
into which philosophers fall. Not so the Pyrrhonist sage: he avoids the trap by
means of the epoche. The Pyrrhonist silently retires towards what is natural in
us: impulsions, instincts , habits , and routine operations, and he refuses to talk
dogmatically about Nature.
Rousseau would have accepted this strategy so far. However, his originality
consists in having discovered that Nature is not merely a residual and passive
state unaffected by the anguish nourished by opinion.P Rousseau's great
discovery consists in listening to the Voice of Nature in the most hidden part
(hidden by civilization) of one's intimacy. Instead of preparing himself to put
The Tho Scepticisms ofthe Savoyard Vicar 143
up with what is inevitable and adopt the Pyrrhonian mute intrepidity, he finds
that the voice of conscience is the voice of Nature and not the voice of men (pp.
253-254). This voice of Nature is the one that speaks in Rousseau's admirable
prose. It is a magical voice that says the same thing in everyman's conscience,
and it is also an unvanquishable, although non-cognitive, voice.
Conscience is, therefore, the rule of understanding and the principle of
reasonr''' Physis presents itself in conscience; it is the criterion looked for by
Pyrrhonians. Physis gives us the infallible mark.
The fulfillment of the requirements of Pyrrhonism produces, however, an
interesting displacement of its field of attention. Traditionally, the Pyrrhonist
used to attack philosophical Dogmatism. But in the second part of his Creed
Rousseau will raise once more Charron's flag and he will use his weapons
against religious Dogmatism, but not against the "natural" religion that
belongs to intimacy, established by Rousseau in the first part of the Creed,
and that seems to have been also accepted by the Pyrrhonian tradition."
I conclude with a brief historical remark. As all of you know, Kant was
fascinated by Rousseau's Emile. He read it passionately. Is it not plausible to
examine Rousseau's text as a relevant antecedent of the Antinomies of the
Transcendental Dialectic? Rousseau seems to be, from this point of view, the
last metaphysician to fall into the transcendental illusion . But he appears as
well to be the first metaphysician who acknowledges that his dogmas are part
of insoluble antinomies for theoretical reason, and that practical reason is the
only way of giving them a definite solution.V
All through this essay I argue that Pyrrhonism is not (to say the least)
completely reducible to Academic philosophy I have distinguished three kinds
of Pyrrhonism:
NOTES
1. An earlier version of this paper was read at the Center for Logic. Epistemology, and the History
of Science, Campinas State University, Campinas, Brazil. in October 1978. It was published in
Spanish in Manusonto. Vol. 3. 1980, pp. 7-23. I am grateful to the editors for permission to use
portions of that article .
2. "Scepticism in the Enlightenment", Studies on Voltaire and the Eighreenth Century, Vol. 24/27,
1963, pp. 1321-1345.
3. See Giorgio Tonelli, "La question des bornes de l'entendernent humain au XVIIIe siecle et la
genese du criticisme kantien", Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, Vol. 4, 1959, pp. 396-427;
"Die Anfange von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen und ihre voraussetzungen im 18.
Jahrundert", Kant-Studien, Vol. 57. 1966, pp . 417-456; "Kant und die antiken Skeptiker" in
Studicn zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung, hrsg. v, H. Heimsoeth, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967.
pp . 93-123. "The 'Weakness' of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment", Diderot Studies, Vol. 14,
1971. pp. 217-244. See also infra note IS.
4. Noc. At. II. See my essay "On Hume 's Scepticism Again," Manuscrito, Vol. I, 1978, pp .45-73.
5. See Rousseau Juge de Jean-Jacques . Deuxieme Dialogue. in Oeuvres Completes . Pleiade edition.
Vol. I. p. S38 (hereafter referred to as 'OC'). Letter to Mereau. March 1963. in Correspondance
Generate. Th . Dufour and Plan . eds., Paris . 192W1934. Vol. 9. pp. 140-141, and Letter to
Beaumont. OC. Vol. 4. p. 991. See P. Burgelin. La Philosophie de I 'Existence de 1.-J. Rousseau.
Paris : 1. Vrin, 1973. p. 42.
6. Yvon Belaval must be credited with this witticism. See his " Rationalisme sceptique et
dogmatisme du sentiment chez Jean-Jacques Rousseau". Annales de ia Societe 1.-1. Rousseau.
Vol. 38. 1969-1971. pp. 7-21. At the end of the present essay I examine an important thesis
offered by Belaval in this article .
7. Discours de la Methode. 3. in Oeuvres de Descartes. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. eds.. Paris :
1. Vrin .1897-1913 (hereafter referred to as 'AT). Vo1.6. pp. 2S-/9. Diogenes Laertius, Life of
Pyrrho, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers. R .D. Hicks. ed., Loeb edition. London: W.
Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1950. See also Descartes' Lettre-
Preface to Principes de la Philosophie AT, Vol. 9B, p. 6.51
8. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. by R.G. Bury, London: W. Heinemann,
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1933 (hereafter referred to as 'PH '), p. 7: Sexti
Empiric: Opera quae extant . . . Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposeon libri III. . . Henrico Stephano
interprete . .. etc. Paris , Geneva: P. & 1. Chouet, 1621, p. 2.
9. I argue in "The Meaning of Sceptical Doubt" (Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia Buenos
Aires, Vol. I, 1975, pp. 27-37) that if epochs is 2 suspension of dubious (and so of perturbing) -
judgments, it is at least confusing to identify doubt and epoche.
10. Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Emile, Barbara FoxIey, tr., London, New York: Everyman's Library,
s.d., p. 23Q. All passages quoted in the text are from this edition unless otherwise indicated. See
also Letter to Voltaire, OC, Vol. 4, pp. 1070-1071 and OC, Vol. I, p. 879.
II. Ibid., p. 272.
12. Jean Pierre de Crousaz, Examen du pyrrhonisme. The Hague: publisher unknown, 1733.
13. See the exposition of the ten modes as a (perhaps Democntean) counterpoint of physis and
nomos, PH, pp.59, 78, 87, 93,100-103, 119, 123, 125, 128, 129, 132, 135, 140, and 163. Except
for the ninth mode he appears always in search of physis .
14. PH, I, 22-24.
15. I have labeled this attitude "Limitationism", see supra note 9.
16. G. Tonelli, "Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment", Studia
Leibnitiana, Vol. 6, 1974, pp. 106--126; see especially : "But as Locke, in my opinion, was in fact
an academic sceptic, French XVIIlth Century Lockeanism, being in most of the cases a kind of
scepticism, seems to me to be much more genuine than the British. If Hume as a sceptic did not
arouse much interest in France, this may well have happened because the 'philosophes' were very
well acquainted in advance with many basic traits of Hume's scepticism, which had been
developed within the local tradition, e.g, by Maupertuis", p. 112. Compare this with Popkin's
The Tho Scepticisms ofthe Savoyard Vicar 145
claim in "Skepticism and anti-Skepticism in the Latter Part of the Eighteenth Century" in The
High Road to Pyrrhonism, San Diego: Austin Hill Press, 1980, pp. 58-59.
17. P.H. Masson, cited by Burgelin, op. cit., p. 100.
18. Pierre Villey, Les sources et l'evolutton des essais de Montaign e, Paris: Hachette, 1908. Richard H .
Popkin , The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza . Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University of California Press, 1979, p. 43 et passim .; The High Road to Pyrrhonism, p. 229.
19. Notae in programma, AT, Vol. 8, p. 367.
20. The term "critere", as Bouchardy points out, was diffused by Rousseau ; see DC , Vol. 3, p. 1248,
DC , Vol. 4, p. 1518, and Gouhier's remarks DC , Vol. 4, pp. cxci-cxcii.
21. "I find that the Cartesians are ridiculous because they want to give a reason of every natural
effect by means of their assumptions, and I find that the Newton ians are even more ridiculous
because they take their assumptions as if they were facts: et us be satisfied with our knowledge
of matters offact without pretending to investigate how things are, because such a knowledge is
beyond our means ", Memoire Ii Mably, DC , Vol. 4, p. 30. In a footnote Spink considers that "this
statement is too Pyrrhonian for 1740", DC, Vol. 4, p. 1264. footnote 6.
22. Les meditationa metaphysiqus de J-J Rousseau. Paris; J. Vrin, 1970, Ch. 2. In the first Part of
the Creed. Rousseau's attacks are directed mainly against the author of the article "Evidence" of
the Encyclopedie who, according to Rousseau , is either Condillac or Buffon, although nowadays
is supposed to be Quesnay ; DC , Vol. 4, pp. 1129 and 1304.
23. Nouvelle Heloise, Vol. 6, p. 2; DC , Vol. 2, p. 708. See also Emile. DC, Vol. 4, p. 1513.
24. The Vicar is not dogmatic regarding metaphysic, as Rousseau says to Beaumm . He is a sceptic.
Already in his letter to Voltaire he "ingen iously" confesses that in respect to God 's existence
"the light ofreason" show neither its pro nor its con ," and that if the theist bases his feelings on
probabilities, the athe ist, even less accurate , seems to base his own feelings only on the opposite
possibilit ies. Furthermore, the objections raised by both sides are always unsolvable because
they concern matters abou t which we do not have true ideas" (in manuscript "2" there are the
following crossed out words : "such as infinite, eternity, substance , matter, mind , necessity,
contingency, and other words that mean noth ing to us"). DC , Vol. 4, pp. 1070-1071 . See also the
important paragraph of Rousseau Juge de Jean Jacques, DC, Vol. I, p. 879. The conclusion is
paradoxical: the best metaphysics is the spiritualist, although it is certainly beyond the reach of
human mind and may even be false.
25. See my essay "Leibniz et I'art de disputer", Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa, Vol. 5, Wiesbaden :
Franz Steiner, 1975, pp. 207-228. Rousseau had this in mind when he wrote his letters to Sophie,
the Creed's first sketch: " I agree that they are only conjectures without probability, but if the
opposite cannot be proven then it is enough for me to infer those doubts that I desire to state.
Where are we? What do we see, what do we know, what does exist? We are only running after
evanescent shadows", DC , Vol. 4, pp. 1098-1099; see Nouvelle Heloise DC, Vol. 2, p. 707; and in
the same work: "we don't assume that we are active and free, we feel it. They have the burden of
proving ('c'est a eux de prouver ') not only that this feeling could deceive us, but that in fact it
does deceive us", DC, Vol. 2, pp. 683-684.
26. "Here 1 have, therefore , abandoned reason and consulted nature, i.e. the inner feeling that
guides my belief independently from reason" , Correspondence generale, Vol. 3, p. 287, quoted by
P. Burgelin in DC , Vol. 4, p. 1517, footnote 4.
27. Belaval's essay quoted supra in note 6. Yet Rousseau's originality, about which he was
completely aware, lies in his refusal to identify moral conscience's voice and judgment. See
Nouvelle Heloise , DC , Vol. 6, p. 7; DC , Vol. 2, p. 683.
28. Letter to Voltaire, DC , Vol. 4, p. 1072.
29. See supra note 14 and PH, I, 193.
30. The acts of conscience would, then, form an autonomous doma in, extrinsic to reason. For
analysis of the difficulties implied by this thesis for Rousseau's own doctrine, see Y. Belaval, " La
theorie du jugement dans L'Emile", in Jean Jacques Rousseau et son oeuvre, Paris : KJincksieck,
1963, p. 154. For some problems concerning the interpretation of this notion of conscience, see
L.G. Crocker, Nature and Culture. Ethical Thought in the French Enlightenment, Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963. pp. 171-176.
146 E. de Olaso
31. "Although, following the ordinary life, we affirm undogmatically that Gods exist and reverence
Gods and ascribe to them foreknowledge, yet as against the rashness of the Dogmatists we
argue as follows . .." PH, 3, 2. Is not this passage a rough anticipation of the Vicar's program
concerning religion?
32. As far as I know no one has yet studied the similarities between Rousseau's and Kant's style of
rejecting classical metaphysics. It has not yet even been remarked either by Cassirer or by later
commentators. See Ernst Cassirer's "Kant and Rousseau" in Rousseau, Kant, Goethe,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945, pp. 1-60, and S.J. Al Azm's, The Origins of Kant's
Arguments in the Antinomies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
33. See my booklet Scepticism and Enlightenment, Valencia: Carabobo University Press, 1982.
34. I wish to express my thanks to Leiser Madanes and Pina Montoreano who helped me translate
this essay from Spanish and also for translating some of Rousseau's texts from French. I also
express my thanks to Richard A. Watson for many valuable suggestions concerning the
translation into English.
[An earlier version of this paper was read at the Center for Logic. Epistemology,
and the History of Science, Campinas State University, Campinas, Brazil. in
October 1978. It was published in Spanish in Manuscrito. Vol. 3. 1980, pp. 7-
23. I am grateful to the editors for permission to use portions of that article.
E. DEOLASO
I
This is what I suggest: among the ancient Sceptics, the Pyrrhonists practice and
recommend a closed investigation, while the Academics, like the modern
Philosophers (and Sceptics), practice and recommend an open one. As I
conceive of it, a closed investigation fulfills at least the following requirements:
the person conducting it proceeds according to an unquestionable method,
knows in advance what results it will achieve and also knows that it will always
achieve its results. In other words, the investigator is not prepared to admit
anything new into her investigation, and changes of opinion are a limine
excluded . For us, a "dogmatic investigation" is an oxymoron, not for Sextus
(cf. PR 1 198, 199,200,208). This could be due to the fact that "dogma", in the
ancient sense, has no pejorative tone: "dogma" means simply "doctrine" (ref. 7,
pp 1-2). I will not follow this new convention because it erases the difference
between what we call a "Dogmatist" and an "academic Sceptic".
147
R.B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scept icism in the Enlightenment, 147-155.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
148 E. de O/asa
II
Zetesis is the word normally used by Sextus to designate the Pyrrhonists'
refutations, i.e. the argumentative activity they directed against dogmatic
doctrines. Their examination of sign is a "zetesis" (PH 11, 103; AM VIII, 143
and 394). It is also a "zetesis" their criticisms to proof (PH II, 182; AM VIII,
300) and to genres and species (PH II, 224). All the criticisms to Professors are
"zetesis" (cf. against grammarians AM I, 41, 43, 63, 71, 99, 119, 120;
rhetoricians, AM II, 46, 51; geometers, AM III , 6, 10; astrologers, AM V, 1;
musicians, AM V, 106 and AM VI, 38; logicians, AM VIII, 47, AM VII , 314,
AM VIII, 180, 182,394; physicists, AM VIII, 481; AM IX, 294, 436; AM X,
112, 169,247-8,310; and, finally, moralists AM XI, 39, 90, 110,203,257).
It is important to notice that the Pyrrhonists prided themselves in planning
their attacks with great care, as if contemplating military maneuvers or the
demolition of a building ( AM I, 40; PH II, 84). Descartes also recommended
his readers not to go through the series of particular things, because the ruin of
the foundations, "suffosis fundamentis", suffices to bring down the whole
building "quid quid Us superaedificatum est sponte collabitur" (Meditatio I). But
Scepticism. Old and New 149
while he aspired to find a firm bed of rock on which to erect his New Science,
Sextus recommends us to attack the foundations in order to bring everything
down, as with a wall which one does not plan to replace by a new construction
(PH II 194; AM V, 49; AM VIII , 142,338-9). Sextus also uses the metaphor of
the citadel which the Pyrrhonists must besiege and then conquer (AM IX, 2.
Cf. Fit. 54c; Ac., II, 7,20; 24,76; 46,142. AM VII, 191-200; PH I, 215; DL II,
93; for a possible reference to the cyrenaics, cf. ref. 9, pp. 205-6) .
The Pyrrhonists' zetesis, then, is "methodical". Sextus not only calls it so (PH
II, 194; AM VII, 2; AM VIII, 141, 300 and 337a), but openly rejects "a-
methodical" zetesis (PH II, 21; AM VIII, 300). Zetesis is an activity, it is not the
work of the senses, which are passive, but of the understanding (dianoia; AM
VII, 293). Finally, and what is more important for us, Sextus criticizes the
Academics, especially Clitomachus, who argue with the Dogmatists in no
order, tackling each difficultyas it appears, and suggests such behaviour should
be replaced by the pyrrhonian strategy which, being both economical and
successful, is also extremely elegant. The Sceptics do not go for a prey at a time,
but lay traps in which many fall in one swoop (AM IX 1-3; PH II, 84).
I think that the difference between the investigation of the Pyrrhonists and
that of the Academics is by now clear, so I shall not elaborate on this topic (for
some initial remarks on the subject , cf. ref. 10). Obviously, this martial
sounding prose is shocking, but even if Sextus could have avoided it (cf. PH
II , 103), it is clear that Sextus knows (or believe he knows) what his target is: he
is clearly committed to destroy the sciences. And this, if any, is to have strong
beliefs. These beliefs are a prominent feature of his refutatory activity.
III
If the intention with which the Pyrrhonists conducted their investigations has
proved difficult to grasp, that was probably due to Sextus himself, who
characterized them as those who continue to investigate (PH I, 1-4, 7). The
Dogmatists think they have reached the truth (so they cease to investigate),
while the Academics think one can never reach the truth (so they also cease to
investigate). Sextus did not lie; he did not say that the Pyrrhonists "continue to
investigate, hoping to find the truth", although the context certainly suggests it.
The passages I have mentioned, however, show that the sole purpose of the
Pyrrhonists' zetesis is refutation. Such zetesis will continue for as long as there
is a Dogmatist left on earth, but it does not aim at establishing any truth (AM
VII, 25-6; PH II, 6; AM 1, 5). Sextus never says or leads us to understand that
Scepticism would change, and his message is clearly the one that delenda est
episteme.
The way in which the texts of PH are written is misleading, because saying
that the sceptics "continue to investigate" suggests that the object of the
investigation can be reached , at least in principle. This brings immediately to
our minds the idea of an open investigation ; but Sextus, while making us
believe he professed an open zetesis, really professed a closed one.
150 E. de Olasa
IV
Most interpreters of ancient Scepticism have accepted the version of zetesis
given by Sextus at the beginning of PH . Burnyeat and Frede are very good
examples of this tendency, precisely because of the ability they have shown in
uncovering many of the implicit assumptions of Pyrrhonism.
Burnyeat holds that (1) the zetesis of the Pyrrhonist has no end; and this
implies that (2) he is possibly prepared to admit that there are answers. But
then , (3) as ataraxia depends on there always being equipollence, i.e. there
never being an answer, (4) if an answer appears, it would put ataraxia at stake
(ref 3, p. 52).
Burnyeat's first point (and I think also the first paragraph of ref. 11) is a
paraphrase of the beginning of PH. But Sextus does not say that zetesis has no
end. What he says, in words that are both exasperating and slippery, is that the
Sceptics continue to investigate. This does not mean that zetesis will never end.
But in order to understand it one must admit that the Sceptics' zetesis is
destructive and has a very narrow objective. As I have suggested, zetesis will
come to an end only when, and if, dogmatic assertions cease to be made (cf.
AM 1,120; AM III, 10; PH II, 9).
Burnyeat's second point is that no one continues to investigate unless she is
persuaded that there are answers . This clearly implies that Burnyeat considers
the zetesis of the Pyrrhonist to be an open one.
I agree with (3): ataraxy and open investigation are incompatible. And I
disagree with (4): ataraxy is not at stake because the Pyrrhonist will do
anything to preserve equipollence, or so the texts suggest.
Burnyeat has considered - and rejected - the possibility of interpreting the
Pyrrhonist's investigation as a closed one: "He is not a negative dogmatist
furnished with a priori objections that rule out the possibility of answers as a
matter of general principle once and for all" (idem .). It is obvious that we are
presented with an extreme case, and are in a sense blackmailed into rejecting
such an unsavory model. Nevertheless, this reading is doubtful because Sextus
never implies that he is ready to be persuaded about the existence of answers.
Pyrrhonists preserve ataraxia at the cost of maintaining universal equipol-
lence: they never consider non-equipollent oppositions. Modern Philosophers
abandon this ideal of tranquillity and so they are free as regards as universal
equipollence.
The prevailing interpretation of ancient Scepticism, according to which the
Pyrrhonist's zetesis is an open one, has acquired in recent years formal and
explicit credentials." Frede states that there is no great difference between
certain Pyrrhonists and their academic counterparts, and he believes what they
share is, precisely, a similar understanding of the Socratic elenchos, a similar
concept of investigation (ref. 6, pp. 257 ss.). Frede is simply saying in an
excessively clear way something which many interpreters of ancient Scepticism
take for granted. The problem is that the texts do not back what he is saying.
Frede also proposes that the Sceptic does not suspend belief completely, but
rather practices a minimal assent to some beliefs. The Sceptic involuntarily
Scepticism, Old and New 151
admits into her conscience some impressions, but her attitude is passive.
According to Frede, she is not involved in any way with those impressions.
"The Sceptic has no stake in the truth of the impressions he is left with. He is ever
ready to consider the matter further, to change his mind. He has no attachment
to the impressions he is left with. He is not responsible for having them, he did
not seek them out. He is not out to prove anything, and hence feels no need to
defend anything" (idem., p. 265). So one may say that the Sceptic believes in her
impressions, although in a very weak sense of the verb "to believe".
Few texts, however, support these proposals. And besides, how can we infer
that the Sceptic considers her impressions to be revocable? What the texts show
is that the Pyrrhonist never undergoes a change of opinion.
One may allege that the Sceptic does not have to admit that her impressions
are revocable, and not because she behaves like the Dogmatist. The Dogmatist
claims to be infallible, supposes her knowledge to be uncorregible. But a
Sceptic may admit into her conscience impressions for which she has no
Justification, and she would not admit being wrong because that would amount
to admitting she may know something. She cannot be wrong because she
cannot have a wrong knowledge - she does not know anything.
There is a sense in which a Pyrrhonist may change her arguments: when they
do not persuade the opponent. But these are external changes that have to do
with a closed investigation , rather than with an open one.
v
As investigation is one of the basic concepts of Pyrrhonism - if not the basic
concept- it is quite obvious that adopting my point of view would entail a
radical shift in the interpretation of Pyrrhonism now current. What is unclear is
the sense in which it also entails losing our attractive and interesting - although
maybe gratuitous - image of the Pyrrhonist.
Let us remember that the originality of Burnyeat's position consisted in
demonstrating, in a very persuasive way, that the Pyrrhonist not only suspends
the justification of belief, but suspends belief itself.3 I am inclined to think that
Burnyeat has been very modest in his commentary of the texts which back such
an interpretation: a dozen more could have been rallied to his support. II SO, let
us take this interpretation seriously and find out if the sceptic's suspension of
belief allows her to expect a charitable reading of his texts.
The majority of interpreters of ancient Scepticism (I leave aside Frede's
interpretation) (1) maintain that the ancient Sceptic suspends any belief
whatsoever (let us label this version of Scepticism "radical Scepticism") and
(2) they also endorse the general policy of admitting charity as a principle of
interpretation. I will argue, however, that these positions are mutually
incompatible.
Firstly, charity in general. The common and informal way of expressing the
principle of charity (let us call it the "sentimental" version) suggests that we
must always go for the strongest and most consistent version of the doctrine
under examination.
152 E. de Olasa
VI
However, it is not an inevitable decision. Apparently, the strict version of the
principle of charity is not the only one; recent interpreters may allege that this
version did not take into account the exegesis of ancient Scepticism, and that it
is unnecessary to link the principle of charity to the problem of belief. They
could also add that what the principle of charity demands is not that there be
coherence between the discourse of a Philosopher and her beliefs, but
coherence between her discourse and the rules that she has laid out for the
understanding of it.
I would like to draw the readers ' attention towards the rule that says: "of
none of our future statements do we positively affirm that the fact is exactly as
we state it, but we simply record each fact, like a chronicler, as it appears to us
at the moment" (PH I 4) (for more on the topic, cf. ref. 11). This is the
canonical text the Sceptics refer us to when we accuse them of holding certain
beliefs, because if you abstain from asserting that a fact is exactly as you
express it is, then you may also be said to abstain from believing it is true .
But in another key text of Scepticism we find the following characterization:
"Scepticism is an ability, or attitude, which opposes appearances to reasons in
any way whatsoever, with the result that, owing to the equipollence of the
things and reasons thus opposed we are brought firstly to a state of suspension
and next to ataraxy" (PH I 8).
There is an evident tension between restricting oneself to momentary
impressions and saying that equipollence always holds. And if charity in
interpretation must strive for coherence between philosophical discourse and
its rules, it is quite difficult to see what sort of interpretation can surmont such
an obstacle at its very beginning.
VII
The fact that the Sceptic always counts on there being equipollence reveals her
complete lack of charity towards the texts she examines. The Sceptic is not
charitable, she never acts as an interpreter, giving the best possible version of
philosophical statements, but rather uses them against each other in order to
154 E. de Olasa
NOTE
I have greatly benefitted from discussions with Julia Annas and Myles Bumyeat .
REFERENCES
1. 1. Annas (in press) "Sceptic ism, Old and New", Festschrift for Gunther Patzig. Edited by M.
Frede and G. Striker.
2. R.H. Popkin (1992) "Scepticism , Old and New", in The Third Force in Sevent eenth-Century
Thought. Leiden.
3. M. Burnyeat (1980) "Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?" Doubt and Dogmatism. Studies in
Hellenistic Epistemolog y, edited by M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat and 1. Barnes. Oxford .
4. M. Burnyeat (1984) "The Sceptic in His Place and Time", in Philosophy in History. Essays on the
Histo riography of Philosophy. Edited by R. Rorty, J.B. Schneewind and Q. Skinner . Ideas in
Context. Cambridge.
5. M. Frede (1987) "The Skeptic's Beliefs", in Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford .
6. M. Frede (1987) "The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Question of the Possibility of
Knowledge ", in Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford .
Scepticism, Old and New 155
7. 1.Annas and J. Barnes (1985) The Modes of Scepticism . Ancient Texts and Modern Interpreta-
tions. Cambridge.
8. H . Tarrant (1985) Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy ofthe Fourth Academy. Cambridge.
9. L. Robin (1948) La pensee Grecque. Paris.
10. E. de Olaso (1988) "Zetesis" Manuscrito XI, 2 (Campinas, Brazil): 7-32.
11. E. de Olaso (1996) "Scepticism and the Limits of Charity", in Scepticism in the History of
Philosophy. Edited by R.H.Popkin . Dordrecht, Kluwer.
11.1. Barnes (1982) "The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist", Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological
Society, 208 (New Series 28): 1-29 .
12. P. Aubenque (1962) Le probleme de l'etre chez Aristote: Essais sur la problematique aristotili-
cienne. Paris.
13. G. Vlastos (1991) Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher. New York.
R.H.POPKIN
157
R.H. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 157-172.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers .
158 R.B Popkin
18th Century Philosophy is there any attempt to see the 18th century
philosophical scene as it must have looked to cosmopolitan intellectuals of the
time,13 with equally important thinkers in France and Germany to those in the
British Isles.
Hume influenced Kant. Of that there can be no doubt. 14 But did he have
much impact on the developments in France? Did the philosophes have much
impact on the Kantian and post-Kantian world? Did the sceptical themes in
these different world interact, and continue into the 19th century? Present
Anglo-American historical presentations jump from Hume and Kant to
Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein, and see nothing of interest in between
except for a few logicians. After the 18th century Burne was pretty much
ignored in France. His Treatise was only completely translated in 1946. 15 Hume
remained important in the German world because of his impact on Kant, and
Kant's proffered solutions to the problems Burne posed.
In assessing the role of scepticism in the Enlightenment I think we have to
detach, at least partially, the question of influence in later times, and try to see
what scepticism represented during the 18th century, how it affected the major
thinkers of the time, and how it developed during the period. Scepticism was
regarded as a clearly distinguishable intellectual movement stemming from
ancient times, and having a recent continuous history from Montaigne and
Charron and La Mothe Le Vayer to Bayle and Buet. 16 There was an ongoing
debate by the opponents of scepticism about whether any sane person could be
a sceptic, or whether the view could be stated without contradicting itself. 17 Its
modern spokespersons interacted with the major philosophers from Descartes
to Spinoza to Malebranche to Locke and to Leibniz. The 17th century
intellectual world had not yet been carved up into just two camps - the
rationalists and the empiricists. The sceptics, and especially Bayle, were co-
equal contenders for serious attention in the Republic ofLetters with all of the
luminaries whom we now remember and study. Decades before anyone thought
of writing the history of British empiricism or of Continental rationalism, there
were historical sketches of scepticism ancient and modern.
Scepticism was seen as a set of arguments, and /or an attitude, challenging
knowledge claims of philosophers, theologians and scientists, ancient and
modern. It was also seen as both a defense of religion and as a potential or
real enemy of religion. From Descartes onward the leading philosophers spent
a good deal of their intellectual time, and their systems developing answers to
scepticism, which was at least as live an adversary position as Scholasticism.
At the very beginning of the 18th century Bayle packaged the best sceptical
arguments of antiquity and of modern times into a thoroughgoing assault on all
sorts of theories, and his packaging provided the Arsenal ofthe Enlightenment.
The French thinkers of the 18th century began with Bayle, as was also the case
for Berkeley in Ireland and Burne in Scotland. Hume, as I have argued many
times, was consciously wedding Bayle's total Pyrrhonism with the naturalistic
moral science of the Scots. IS The philosophes took a somewhat different route,
Bayle provided the basis for their rejection of the philosophies of the ancient
regime. They then developed their positive views from their reading of Locke
160 R.B. Popkin
and Newton, seen as limited sceptics, mitigated sceptics, who admitted that
there were narrow limits to what human beings could know, but believed that a
positive science was possible within these limits.
The studies of Bongie about the fortuna of Hume's scepticism in France. 19
and by Retat20 about thefortuna of Bayle's total Pyrrhonism in France, reveal a
most interesting development. Bayle and then Hume were heroic figures up to
the mid 1750's and then began to be seen as reactionary figures by the
philosophes, and as justifiers of traditional religion and politics by the ultra
conservatives. Diderot in his article on Pyrrhonism.f Voltaire sometimes, as in
his tribute to Bayle, and D'Alembert, began replacing the extreme or excessive
scepticism of Bayle and Hume with a modified sceptical outlook that justified
their scientific writings and activities.22 Turgot, once one of Hume's closest
friends and admirers, realized that Hume in his thorough-going scepticism was
really in complete opposition to the program of the philosophes for the reform
of human understanding and of human society. that Hume was in fact an
enemy of what the philosophes considered "enlightenment't.P
In 1768 Hume answered a letter of Turgot's in which the latter had said
something positive about Rousseau's ideas. Hume said, "I know you are one of
those who entertain the agreeable and laudable, if not too sanguine, hope that
human society is capable of perpetual Progress towards Perfection, that the
Encrease of knowledge will still prove favourable to good Government, and
that since the Discovery of Printing we need no longer Dread the usual returns
of Barbarism and Ignorance'V"
Hume then contended that events in England "appear a little contrary to
your System", and went on to generalize about the hopeless state of human
beings based on the Wilkes riots which had just taken place, Turgot replied that
Hume should not be blinded by little local events, and little jealousies and
should realize that both human beings and their knowledge are perfectible, and
that progress is inevitable.P Then Turgot in his last known word to his ex-
friend Hume, said "Adieu, monsieur - car Ie terns presse".
In assessing the way the philosophes moved away from Bayle and Hume, I
think one has to remember that the French thinkers of the 18th century were
first-class or better mathematicians, and that they really understood the
mathematics and physics of Newton's Principia, whereas Bayle was doing
mathematics Ii la Zeno of Elea, and was concerned more with challenging the
metaphysics of physics old and new than in appreciating the new scientific
world view of Newton and the Newtonians. Hume's mathematics was a
confusion of Bayle's and Cudworth's views on the subject, as Part II, Book I
of the Treatise attests. Hume may have thought he was applying the Newtonian
method to the social sciences, but he hardly had a clue of what the method was
beyond the simplest and crassest empiricism .
Though Keith Baker has shown that Condorcet, perhaps the greatest
mathematician amongst the philosophes, got his plan for applied mathematics
from one of the more baffling sections of Hume's Treatise, that on the
probability of chances.i" Condorcet and others saw the possibility of a serious
mathematical science of human problems. What most of the philosophes
New Views on the Role of Scepticism in the Enlightenment 161
good .l" Condorcet, on the other hand, (who never mentions Hume in his
published works),35 spent the pre-Revolutionary years offering solutions to
problems like eliminating slavery in the colonies." During the Revolutionary
period he was one of the most active persons in the government, writing up
proposals for reforming education, law, hospitals,prisons, writing a liberal
democratic constitution, and so on, politically projecting until the end of his
career and his life.
Another side of our theme involves the anti-sceptical views of the time. The
l Sth century began with the presentation of the most forceful sceptical
arguments since Sextus Empiricus in the most widely read Dictionaire histor-
ique et critique of Pierre Bayle, and with opponents claiming that scepticism
was one of the greatest dangers of the time, injurious to all mankind because it
tries to rob mankind of its most noble ornament, its certainty. In spite of the
fact that mankind has made so much progress since the Restoration ofLetters,
Pyrrhonism, it was claimed, has reached its highest point, and has to be fought
against most strongly.V This theme, the tremendous dangers of Pyrrhonism to
/'esprit humain, was reiterated when Bishop Huet's Traite de la Foiblesse de
/'esprit humain appeared posthumously in 1723,38 and culminated in the
massive diffuse Examen du Pyrrhonisme of Jean-Pierre Crousazr'" over 800
pages, blaming the decline in morals, the financial scandals, and all of society's
ills on Pyrrhonism, exuding from the folios of Bayle, the authority of Bishop
Huet, and the new editions of texts in Latin and French of Sextus Empiricus.
Crousaz's massive counter-attack on scepticism was too unfocused to
achieve its aim. The work was condensed and reworked by Haller and Formey,
but whatever force it had was soon outdated by the appearance of Hume's
efforts, and by the translation of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding
into French and German by leaders of the Berlin Academy, and later by the
posthumous publication of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion , and
its rapid dissemination in the French and German Enlightenment worlds.
Although it probably was considered a poor joke among avant-garde intellec-
tuals that Pyrrhonism could possibly be the cause of all of society's woes and
evils during the l Sth century, scepticism, in its weak or strong forms obviously
became a factor in the changing prevailing attitudes of the time. The weak form
of scepticism, the emphasis on the limits of understanding, made it a common-
place among the philosophes that metaphysical knowledge could not be
attained (since it required knowledge beyond the limits of human capacities)
and that traditional theology was nonsense, or superstition, but not knowledge
in any meaningful sense. The weakness of reason allowed for serious natural
and social science , and at most a deistic empirical theology, based on the
teleological argument, the argument from design.
The strong form of scepticism, that of Bayle, Huet and Hume,undermined
confidence in science, and deistic religion, leaving either religion based on
faith, or no defensible or probable religion/" Though Hume regarded atheism
as a non-sceptical view, a form of dogmatism, that no reasonable person could
accept;" sceptical arguments were extended to the knowledge claims of both
revealed and natural religion, leading to the surge of acceptance of agnosticism
164 R.H Popkin
affected so that the lives of the participants in the sceptical world were severely
changed, their values and purposes questioned; a state of affairs that was to
continue for the next two centuries, and during which many different attempts
would be made to overcome the basic doubts, dispel the anguish, and find some
new basis for some kind of satisfactory certitude to enable lives to go on. As we
shall see, the discussion, especially in Staudlin's introduction to his Geschichte
und Geist der Skepticismus, runs over most of the possibilities that have been
offered in the last two hundred years to deal with this situation.
It is strange that a work written by a friend of Kant's, the first large scale
history of scepticism, has been ignored in studies of Enlightenment scepticism.
I have referred to it briefly in earlier papers, and pointed out that in 1794 the
author could divide the history of scepticism into two parts and two volumes,
one from Pyrrho to Bayle and Huet, the other just on Hume and Kant, whose
portraits appear at the front of the volume. Staiidlin's work is an interesting
source, but is more significant as a work in its own right, and as an evaluation
of Kant as a sceptic by some one Kant admired and was friendly with.47
Staudlin at the time was a professor at Gottingen and a preacher.
He began with the problem of whether scepticism is a system, an attitude, or
a set of arguments, in which he ranges over discussions from Sextus down to
Kant and some of the post-Kantians of his day. Then he considered the source
and origin of scepticism as a personal intellectual problem. "There are in the
life of many intelligent and thoughtful people times when the awakening of
reason and their own examination of the teaching that they had up to then
believed in, can bring about a condition of doubtfulness which will often be
painful, convulsing their way of thinking and their emotional condition. This
will be decisive in the formation of their character and their future life and
happiness.v" Rousseau's confession of the Savoyard vicar, plus Rousseau's
own personal statement about scepticism are then presented. Staiidlin next said
that there are few who are able, like Rousseau, to work out a way of thinking in
which the passions subside and a quiet scepticism takes over the mind, which
overcomes passionate doubt, and allows one to proceed." Instead Staudlin
claimed most people start their sceptical journey by questioning the religion
they are brought up in. From questioning dogmas, they then doubt revelation
as such, and adopt a religion of reason until this becomes dubious too. This
happens not just to individuals but to whole societies. The abbe Raynal was
cited as saying that Catholicism moves incessantly towards Protestantism;
Protestantism towards Socinianism; Socinianism towards deism; and deism
towards scepticism. 50
Staudlin brought the matter to a personal level and discussed what
happened to his fellow students and himself at the university of Tubingerr'! as
they sank deeper and deeper into uncertainty. Reading Kant just made matters
worse. Staudlin quoted at length from the descriptions of personal crises
pyrrhonnienes that his fellow students wrote around 1786, shortly after Kant's
Critique ofPure Reason had appeared. The first account begins with disillusion
with religious teaching, followed by thinking for oneself, and rejecting what
one had been taught, then going through something like the Cartesian doubt.
166 R.H Popkin
But the human soul cannot sustain complete doubt, and "soon reverts to
accepting some belief or it will end in total despair, madness and even
suicide".52 So the sceptic vacillates between belief and doubt, between hope
and fear. Staiidlin cited a second correspondent who believed in God, but was
unable to believe that he could know anything about God's attributes or will,
and hence could not tell if anything that went on made any sense. "In all our
understanding of God we see nothing but fog, nothing certain, nothing that is
more true than untrue and imperfect."53
Doubt of the certainty of one's original religion is usually the beginning of
the sceptical condition, but it can also develop in many ways with differing
effects. Some find serenity and certainty in natural religion, others suffer the
shipwreck of reason and only reach a safe haven in revelation.54 As an example
of what can happen to a person, the story of Uriel da Costa is offered. who
abandoned Catholicism in Portugal, fled to Amsterdam where he became a
Jew, doubted the Judaism of the community and was excommunicated, finally
begged for readmittance, was expelled again, and in despair committed suicide.
His autobiography indicates he became a believer in natural religion, but
Bayle, in telling the story, had suggested if he lived longer, he would have
abandoned that too.55 In contrast Staiidlin describes Cardinal Pellison who
argued with Leibniz, and deserted reason to save his faith. 56
The march from doubts about one's original religious beliefs to learning to
think for oneself, to questioning everything as one searches for reasons for all
human knowledge and for objective truth, can lead to genuine philosophical
scepticism, in which ones ceases looking for absolute truth, and accepts that all
is uncertain, and one can have only personal opinions.57 This kind of
scepticism and the sceptic who adheres to it Staiidlin saw as no enemy of
mankind. A more frivolous scepticism is used as an excuse for immorality and
debauchery. Scepticism, if adopted as a way offreeing one from all constraints,
can lead to something like De Sade's behavior, or to Nietzsche's rejection of
accepted morality.58
Staiidlin then went on to portray the social and political consequences of
scepticism. "Our century is the century of revolution in the moral and political
world and of the secret political orders." Conviction in accepted political views
and institutions are questioned and undermined leading to new orders which
are also open to question .59
The study of the history of philosophy can lead to scepticism. Huet and
Bayle became sceptics this way. Seeing the variety of philosophical views and
that the non-rational influences on philosophers can lead to doubt about the
philosophical enterprise. Similarly the more that has been discovered about
nature has led to scepticism about the real nature of things.P"
If there are many factors leading people into scepticism, what is its effect on
them and on society? Ancient scepticism claimed that it brought its adherents
peace of mind, and that the adherents would be conformists who would not
cause any trouble to society, since they would accept the rules and laws of the
society undogmatically. Staiidlin refused to believe this would work in the
modern world, and pointed out that Bayle, Huet, La Mothe Le Vayer,
New Views on the Role ofScepticism in the Enlightenment 167
Montaigne and Hume accepted in the moral realm matters that they doubted
in theory?'
The attempt to make scepticism the road to faith is rejected. Staiidlin refused
to take the step that Kierkegaard was to make central. Perfect scepticism would
destroy both reason and faith . So Staiidlin advocated a modest scepticism that
regards metaphysics as open to endless doubts, but which accepts a kind of
subjective certainty. This is sufficient to accept the moral teachings of the
Gospel without needing theological justification. It is sufficient to challenge
dogmatic science, and to seek new outlooks on nature. This modest scepticism
becomes a constant urge to advance knowledge, and to deflate dogmatism.
Such a scepticism Staiidlin saw as the effect of Hume's views, which in turn led
to Kant's modest dogmatism, which will again lead to scepticism with its
critique of all previous dogmatisms. 62
The intellectual moral and social world Staiidlin portrayed in 1794 was
thoroughly infected by scepticism, challenging philosophical and religious
principles, and affecting acceptance of norms and standards in the social and
moral realms. Intellectually scepticism in various forms had taken over. The
sceptical arguments in Sextus Empiricus, Bayle. Huet and Hume undermined
dogmatic philosophy. The various attempts throughout the 18th century of the
philosophes, the deists, the Scottish common sense philosophers, the anti-
sceptics like Crousaz and Formey, did not succeed in eliminating scepticism.
Only Kant managed to deal with scepticism, and Staiidlin saw his efforts were
already spawning a new scepticism as presented in his own time by Schulze-
Aenesidemus and Jacobi. v'
The history of scepticism was offered as the vehicle for understanding the
current intellectual age. Staiidlin throughout his history deplored the malevo-
lent influence that unphilosophical scepticism could have on morals, society
and religion, while portraying philosophical scepticism as valuable for the
progress of human life and understanding from Pyrrho to Kant. This
philosophical scepticism was approximately a combination of the semi-scepti-
cism of the philosophes and the limited scepticism of Rousseau, but was hardly
the deep scepticism of Bayle or Hume.
Was this evaluation just one man's opinion or does it tell us something about
the temper of the times, and maybe about the import of Kant's philosophyr'"
The only study of Staiidlin that I know of is a recent article by John C.
Laursen'f on Kant and Staiidlin. The latter was not an isolated provincial
preacher. He came from Swabia, studied at Tiibingen, 1779-1784, (where
Schelling and Hegel studied a bit later) became a pastor, travelled extensively
in Germany, France and Switzerland, and spent a year in England. He was
appointed professor at Gottingen in 1790.66 He and Kant corresponded from
1791-1798, and Kant dedicated his Conflict of the Faculties of 1798 to him .
Both he and Kant were very active in the 1790's in opposing popular disruptive
kinds of scepticism. But Staiidlin not only favored what he called "philosophi-
cal scepticism" but he saw it emerging at the end of the century from Kant's
critical philosophy.
Even though nobody except Kant seems to have paid much attention to
168 R.H Popkin
Staiidlin, his picture throws light on how the Kantian revolution was seen at
the time. Those like Staiidlin who saw Kant in terms of the history of
scepticism, and saw him as a sceptic malgre lui, saw the 18th century ending
immersed in scepticism, and pregnant with new ways of dealing with it. Just
while Staiidlin was writing, Fichte and Hegel were beginning their intellectual
careers by seeking new ways of emerging from scepticism. Instead of offering
the semi-scepticism of the philosophes they sought to reach an intellectual
plane on which the sceptical problems were no longer so dominant.
Scepticism in the 19th century was a strong current that has not been
systematically studied. Hume was not a major figure until the latter part of
the century. The semi-scepticism of the philosophes turned into dogmatic
positivism. Hegel's bout with scepticism spawned a new metaphysical age, that
had to be challenged later on by reapplying sceptical arguments. New kinds of
scepticism appeared in the works of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and the
Russian neo-Orthodox theologians. It has recently been found that perhaps
the most important American philosopher of the period, Charles Saunders
Peirce, developed his fallibilist views after extensive study in the history of
philosophy, including a detailed examination of the texts of Sextus Empiri-
CUS!67
SO, contrary to my previous view, scepticism was not petering out in the
latter half of the 18th century. It was taking on different forms, and reacting to
different ways in which dogmatic philosophers tried to answer the sceptical
challenge. Some of its more popular effects involved undermining confidence in
the old orders of church and state in Western Europe, breeding a sceptical
"basis" for democratic and tolerant worlds if no traditional system of ideas or
institutions could be rationally defended.
Hume was the major presenter of sceptical arguments for the middle and end
of the 18th century. Others tried to mitigate the force of his complete
Pyrrhonism, and to show ways one could live with it, and still see possibilities
for the advancement of human knowledge. The closing moments of the century
saw what was later to be taken as a new stage of philosophy, Kant's Copernican
Revolution, almost immediate enmeshed in sceptical attacks, and interpreted as
another form of scepticism, or leading to new forms of scepticism. The
challenges of various post-Kantians such as Schulze-Aenesidemus, Maimon,
Hamann and Jacobi , sought to show that on Kant's terms one really could not
know anything about the conditions of experience or the world, But none,
perhaps with the exception of Hamann, saw the deep scepticism that this could
lead to. Hamann has read all of Hume, and had concluded that in the most
sceptical and most irreligious arguments, Hume really spoke as the greatest
voice of orthodoxy! by pointing out that one only knows by faith and not
reason or experience.
The 19th century began with scepticism still being the spectre haunting
European philosophy.
In the light of the above I would certainly no longer say, as I did in 1963,
"that the Enlightenment was pretty much a hiatus in the continuous develop-
ment of scepticism".68 Scepticism was an active force all through the period. It
New Views on the Role of Scepticism in the Enlightenment 169
may not have had original presenters of the view or attitude after Hume, but
the tradition of Sextus, Bayle, Huet and Hume lived on , and had to be
addressed in one way or another. Scepticism may not have been seen as deeply
and fundamentally troubling as it was for Hume, but in modified form it was
part of much of the basic philosophical discussion of the period, As Staiidlin
contended the popular and elite intellectual movements were affected positively
or negatively by the sceptical legacy, And at the very end of the l Sth century a
whole new era of scepticism versus dogmatism was about to be launched in the
wake of Kant's supposed resolution to the crise pyrrhonienne induced by
Hume's arguments.
It was only when one thought one had found better answers, and maybe
better questions, that historians of philosophy from the mid-19th century could
package their past, so that the 17th century was just the philosophies of Bacon,
Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz, and that of the l Sth century just the
philosophies of Berkeley, Hume and Kant. Hume was no longer a sceptic, but
the end man of the British empirical trinity-Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
This might have been comforting if one saw the intellectual world as the
triumph of either British empiricism or Continental rationalism. But each of
these movements was soon to be confronted with sceptical problems , and so
the dialectic of scepticism versus anti-scepticism goes on. And as one of
Hume 's friends wrote, "The wise in every age conclude, what Pyrrho taught
and Hume renewed, that dogmatists are fools".69
NOTES
I. R.H . Popk in, "Scepticism in the Enlightenment", Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century,
26:1963, pp. 1321-1335 .
2. R.H. Popkin, "Scepticism and Anti-scepticism in the Latter Part of the 18th Century", in Paul
Fritz and Richard Morton, eds., Woman in the 18th Century and Other Essays, Toronto and
Sarasota:Samuel Stevens Hakkert, 1976, pp. 319-343.
3. Giorgio Tonelli .t'Pierre-Jacques Changeux and Scepticism in the French Enlightenment",
Studia Leibn itiana, 55:1974, p. 108.
4. Keith M. Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics, Chicago, Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1975.
5. Ezequie1 de Olaso, Escepticismo e ilustracion, La crisis pirronica de Hume y Rousseau , Valencia,
Venezuela, 1981.
6. Ezequie1 de Olaso, "The Two Scepticisms of the Savoyard Vicar ", in R.A . Watson and J.E.
Force, The Sceptical Mode ofModern Philosophy, The Hague : Nijhoff, 1988, p. 44.
7. G.Tonelli, "Die Anfange von Kants Kritik der Kausalbeziehungen und ihre voraussetzungen im
18, Jahrhundert", Kant-Studien, 57:1966, pp. 417-456, and "Kant und die antiken Skeptiker",
Studien zu Kants philosophischer Entwicklung ; hrsg.v. H.Heimsoeth, Hildesheim: Olms, 1967,
pp. 93-123; John C. Laursen, " Kant in the History of Scepticism" in Martyn P. Thompson, ed.,
John Locke und/and Immanuel Kant, Philosophische Schriften , Band 3, Berlin, Duncker &
Humblot, 1991, pp. 254-268;and Danie l Breazale , "Fichte on Skepticism", Journal of the
History ofPhilosophy, 29:1991, 427-454.
8. See Oxford English Dictionary, entries on "scepticism".
9. Besides these editions there is a lengthy review of more than 100 pages by Jean Leclerc of the
Fabricius edition in the Bibliotheque ancienne et moderne , 14:1720, pp. 1-113.
170 R.H Popkin
10. Richard Kroll's discussion of the influence of Gassendi on English thought shows how easily
Locke could have imbibed Gassendi's mitigated scepticism . Cf. Kroll, The Material Word
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1991.
II. Done by Pierre Bayle's good friend , Pierre De Coste, who used the 17th century terminology in
French Pyrrhonian writings to express Locke 's theory of knowledge. His translation which
played such an important role in the Enlightenment on the Continent has not been given the
scholarly attention that it deserves.
12. Its study as been left to the French departments and the French historians. The recent
publication of a volume of philosophical texts by Voltaire, edited by Paul Edwards, is an
attempt to get Anglophone philosophers to realize this part of their intellectual heritage.
13. Lewis White Beck, Eighteenth Century Philosophy, New York :Free Press, 1966.
14. I put this in because in the 1960's I started a controversy about whether Hume ever read
Berkeley, and whether he was actually influenced by him . On the basis of a letter of Hume's that
turned up in Crackow, I finally wrote "So Hume did Read Berkeley", Journal of Philosophy,
61:1964, pp. 773-779.
In Kant's case the question is whether he read Hume's Treatise ofHuman Nature which had
not yet appeared in German. Portions of the Treatise did however appear in the German
translation of James Beattie, and in other works.
15. David Hume, Traite de la nature humaine, translated by Andre Leroy. A translation of Book I
was published by Charles Renouvier and Francois Pillon in 1877.
16. It is so treated by Jacob Brucker in his six volume history of philosophy, which was the first
attempt to place all of the modern philosophers in categories or schools . Constance Blackwell is
publishing a study on Brucker's views on the history of scepticism .
17. Cf. R.H. Popkin, " David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy", Review of Metaphysics,
6:1952-53, pp . 65-81.
Bayle, Huet and Hume all addressed these questions. As Huet said at the end of his Traite it is
one thing to philosophize and another to live.
18. R.H. Popkin, "Bayle and Hume", in Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, Indianapolis,
Hackett, 1989, pp, 149-160 .
19. Laurence Bongie, David Hume, Prophet ofthe Counter-Revolution, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1965.
20. Pierre Retat, Le Dictionnaire de Bayle et la lutte philosophique au XV/lIe siecle, Paris :Les Belles
Lettres, I971.
21. Denis Diderot, "Pyrrhonienne ou sceptique philosophie", Encyclopedie, 13:612ff.
22. Volta ire, The Lisbon Earthquake, where he said that Bayle, "the greatest master of the art of
reasoning that ever wrote, has only taught to doubt". Then he went on, "What do I learn from
Bayle, to doubt alone? Bayle, great and wise, all systems overthrows, Then his own tenets labors
to oppose. Like the blind slave to Delilah's commands, Crushed by the pile demolished his
hands". On D'Alembert's views on scepticism, see G. Tonelli, "The Philosophy of D 'Alembert.
A Sceptic beyond Scept icism", Kant-Studien 67:1976, pp. 353-371.
23. Cf. R .H . Popkin, "Hume, Turgot and Condorcet", in Condorcet Studies II, ed, by David
Williams, New York: Peter Lang, 1987, pp. 47-62.
24. David Hume, The Letters ofDavid Hume, ed. J.Y.T.Grieg, Oxford :Oxford Univ. Press, 1932, II ,
180, letter 417.
25. Turgot, letter in John Hill Burton, Letters of Eminent Persons addressed to David Hume ,
Edinburgh and London, 1849, 163.
26. Keith Baker, Condorcet, From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics , Chicago:Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1975, pp . 135-155 .
27. Cf. G. Tonelli,"The Weakness of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment", Diderot Studies,
14:1971, pp. 217-244, and "Changeux and Scepticism".
28. See Jean Pierre Brissot, Memoires de Brissot, ed. by De Lescure, Paris:Firman-Bidot, 1877, pp.
99-100 and 166-67. I have recently been informed by Laurence Bongie and by my son, Jeremy
Popkin, that Brissot's original proposal has turned up, and it is about sixty pages long . I hope to
examine it and analyze it in the near future . [In 1992 I examined it in the Archives Nationale in
Paris, and have discussed it in a forthcoming paper on Brissot's scepticism .]
New Views on the Role of Scepticism in the Enlightenment 171
48. Carl Friedrich Staiidlin, Geschichte und Geist des Skepticismus, vorziiglich im Riicksicht auf
Moral und Religion, Leipzig, 1794, p. 39. My quotations are from a translation of Staiidlin's
work prepared by Rosemarie Bock. A different translation is being prepared by the Foundation
for Research in Intellectual History.
49. Staiidlin, op. cit, p. 51-62.
50. Ibid., p. 63-64 .
51. Where there was great interest in the Scottish "answers" to Hume. Cf. M.Kuehn, Scottish
Common Sense in Germany, chap. iv.
52. Ibid ., p. 74.
53. Ibid., p. 81.
54. Ibid. , p, 84.
55. Da Costa story is told in Bayle's article "Acosta", and in Da Costa's Exemplar vitae humanae,
originally published as the appendix to the debate between the Remons trant Philip van
Lirnborch, and the Jewish philosopher, Orobio de Castro. At the end of the 18th century, as
Spinoza was becoming a central figure in German thought, Da Costa was being seen as his
brave, heroic predecessor, and maybe even his teacher. Spinoza never mentioned his case or his
death .
56. Bayle suggested his scepticism was extended to religion as such. Bayle, Dictionaire, art . Pellison,
rem. F.
57. Staiidlin, op. cit., pp. 89-93 .
58. Ibid. , p, 96-97.
59. Ibid. , p. 100.
60. Ibid. , pp. 104-107.
61. Ibid. , p. 117.
62. Ibid., pp. 135-136 .
63. Staiidlin did not seem to be aware of the efforts of Solomon Maimon , which even Kant thought
constituted the most incisive sceptical critique of his work.
64. One has to remember that Staiidlin's History was written at the time of the Reign of Terror in
France, and the repression of progressive ideas in England.
65. J.e. Laursen , "Kant in the History of Scepticism", pp. 254-268.
66. On his life and career see P. Tschackert, "Staudlin", in Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, Berlin,
1971, Vol. 35, pp. 516-520.
67. Cf.Robert G.Meyers and R.H.Popkin, " Early Influences on Peirce: A Letter to Samuel
Barnett ", Journal ofthe History of Philosophy, XXXI . 1993, pp. 607-21.
68. Popkin, "Scepticism in the Enlightenment", p. 1344.
69. This is the original version of poem by Thomas Blacklock as it appears in Hume's letter of April
20, 1756 to John Clephane, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. lY.T. Gre ig, 2 vols., Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1932, 1:231.
R.H.POPKIN
It may seem strange to discuss Berkeley's role in the history of scepticism, when
he (or his spokesperson, Hylas) proclaimed that he was the furthest from
scepticism of any of the philosophers of his time. Forty years ago in my article
in the Review of Metaphysics, entitled "Berkeley and Pyrrhonism",' I offered
the view that Berkeley saw himself as the one who could overcome the sceptical
challenge that was rampant at his time, following a century and half of modern
sceptical presentations, that took place after the rediscovery of the texts of
Sextus Empiricus, and culminating in the publication of the very popular
Dictionnaire historique et critique of Pierre Bayle in 1697 and 1702. Bayle had
drawn together many, many sceptical arguments, added new ones, and applied
them to various issues in seventeenth century philosophy, science and theology
up to the contributions of Malebranche, Leibniz, Locke and Newton.
Berkeley's Principles ofHuman Knowledge and Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous are each subtitled by the author as answers to scepticism; the
Principles subtitle states, "Wherein the chief causes of error and difficulty in
the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and irreligion are
Inquired into"; and the Dialogues subtitle states, "The Design of which is
plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the
incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity: in
opposition to Sceptics and Atheists". Berkeley, as his earlier notebooks show,
was well aware of the challenges raised by Pierre Bayle to all kinds of
knowledge claims, including those concerning real knowledge of bodies
through their primary and secondary qualities. Berkeley, using some of the
Bayle's arguments that appear in the notorious articles "Pyrrho" and "Zeno of
Elea",then contended that it was actually Berkeley's opponents, the followers
of John Locke, who would find themselves driven to scepticism because of their
distinguishing appearance and reality. Esse est percipi was presented as the way
of eliminating sceptical problems. Whatever is perceived is real, and appear-
ance is reality. Berkeley presented the claim at end of the Dialogues that the
"same principles which at first lead to scepticism, pursued to a certain point,
bring men back to common sense". This was supposed to show how Berkeley's
theory started out with sceptical arguments but then led beyond the doubts to
common sense and to Berkeley's form of immaterialism.
173
R.B. Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment, 173-186.
1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
174 R.B Popkin
obviously accepts much of Berkeley's view except for his spiritology and his
theology. 13
The phenomenalist beginning of a theory of knowledge was the view of
Condillac, Diderot, Maupertius and Changeux, and many others, and it was an
essential part of their special kind of scepticism. However, the Berkeleyan
theory that developed from this phenomenalism was seen as a "systeme
extravagant" which Diderot insisted could only have its origin among those
who were blind.
Among these French thinkers Berkeley was regarded as much more im-
portant in the discussion of the theory of knowledge and of scepticism than was
David Hume. The phi/osophes sought solutions for the problems posed by
Berkeley rather than those raised by Hume in his Treatise or his first Enquiry. It
is in the German philosophical literature, before and after Kant, that Hume
looms as a major figure in the history of scepticism, and Berkeley appears as
just a little amusing dialectician .
In 1963 I presented a paper at the first international congress on the
Enlightenment on "Scepticism in the Enlightenment". In it I contended that
Hume was the main , and possibly the only sceptic in the latter part of the 18th
century. 14 The late Giorgio Tonelli, who was present at my lecture, said years
later that "the only survey of Enlightenment scepticism we have is a well known
article by R.H. Popkin , which provides a broad frame of reference, but which
neglects many details ". 15 Tonelli then preceded in a series of excellent scholarly
articles to produce the details, as well as an exciting picture of the kinds of
scepticism that prevailed among the most significant figures of the time in
France and Germany. In the historical framework that he presented, some of
the fundamental theses of this French Enlightenment empirical scepticism were
quite close to some of Berkeley's well-known views. In Tonelli's list of the basic
characteristics of the academic (rather than Pyrrhonian) brand of scepticism
that developed among the French thinkers, he listed as generally held theses by
these philosophers (1) we cannot know things as they are in themselves-all we
can know are our own ideas, and they do not represent the real essence of their
objects; (2) we do not know what matter and spirit are in themselves; (3) there
is no proof for the real existence of bodies, (4) of other finite spirits; among the
central views of these thinkers . 16
A possible explanation of this apparently strange state of affairs, namely that
Berkeley, rather than Hume, was regarded as a central figure in the discussions
of this kind of scepticism, may be the following: Hume was a personal friend of
the phi/osophes, having met many of them when he was an English diplomat in
Paris 1763-5. Even earlier he had become the darling of the French Enlight-
enment figures, and continued in this state up to the time of his sad and
unfortunate involvement with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Shortly after Hume had
written up and circulated his own version of what caused the contretemps
between himself and Rousseau, he was dropped by Turgot who had been one of
his best friends in France. After reading Hume 's comments on recent events,
Turgot realized that Hume was really not on the side of the phi/osophes, was not
actually a believer in their view of infinite perfectibility of mankind, and the
178 R.B Popkin
disown his original realistic views, Voltaire offered a sceptical way of avoiding
Berkeley's conclusion. Hylas ought to have said that we know nothing about
this extended, solid, divisible, mobile , figured substance. We know no more
about the thinking feeling and willing subject, but this does not diminish the
existence of this subject since it has essential properties of which it cannot be
deprived. (Voltaire gave no indication about how he combined the avowed
scepticism about what we can know with his insistence that there were mental
and physical substances nonetheless.)
Berkeley's Three dialogues appeared in French in 1750. Alciphron, the New
Theory of Vision and Siris also were translated, the latter by one of Berkeley's
few admirers, the French Protestant pastor in London, David Renaud
Bouiller.i'' Points in the Dialogues, were discussed by Diderot in his Lettres
sur les aveugles. In the range of significant works on the theory of knowledge
written by French Enlightenment figures from 1746-1760+, Berkeley was of
some importance. Beginning with Condillac, the Irish philosopher is cited and
discussed. He also appears in the formulations of Diderot, d'Alembert,
Maupertius, Turgot, Changeux, Rousseau, Condorcet and J.P. Brissot, the
leader of the Girondins, among others.
Tonelli also presented his case about the character of French scepticism by
pointing out that the leading French Enlightenment sceptics were concerned to
show not only the power of reason, but also to show the weakness of reason. To
indicate the latter they stressed that there were limits of human knowledge.P
Condorcet in his survey of the progress of the human mind, written close to the
end of the l Sth century, praised Locke as the first one to set out the limits to
what human beings could know. 22
Several of these French thinkers were phenomenalists, who were concerned
to show how all of our knowledge starts from phenomena, and can be
accounted for in terms of phenomena.P The great thought projects that were
set out by Condillac, trying to show how all knowledge can be built up first
from the sense of touch, and then the other senses, and by Diderot, starting
with the experiences of blind persons, offered the most developed and detailed
empirical accounts of knowledge of the time. In the light of these views,
Berkeley's empirical theory was in accord with what the philosophes were
trying to accomplish. However, in order to make clear the virtues of their own
versions of constructive scepticism, the French philosophers used Berkeley's
strange conclusions to point out the lunacy that had to be avoided by the
philosophes. They combined what they regarded as the truly sceptical side of
Locke's views along with Gassendi's via media between scepticism and
dogmatism, thereby avoiding the complete Pyrrhonian scepticism of Bayle or
the flight into metaphysical fantasy of Berkeley. So, Berkeley's views were
needed, or at least were used, first as part of the exposition of their sceptical
empiricism, and then to delimit their views, and to show that they did not go to
excess, as happened in Bishop Berkeley's case.
The two French thinkers who devoted the most energy to discussing
Berkeley's views were Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, born in 1727, the impor-
tant economist, mathematician and political reform figure under Louis XVI ,
180 R.B Popkin
and Jean Pierre Brissot, the liberal journalist-philosopher who became the
leader of the Girondins during the Revolution.
From early in his intellectual career, Turgot felt it necessary to fight against
Berkeley's theory and to defend a kind of hypothetical materialism. Turgot
discussed Berkeley in two letters of 1750 written to the abbe de Cice about the
nature of our knowledge and about the faults in Berkeley's theory" Then he
further offered his criticism of Berkeley's philosophy in the article "Existence"
in the Encyclopedie. Turgot's critique of Berkeley's views is one of the best
offered at the time, taking seriously what Berkeley was arguing for, not
distorting or simply dismissing his theory. (When one compares his discussion
with those of nasty critics like Andrew Baxter, Turgot's is polite, considered,
measured and responsible.)
His letters began by saying that all that Berkeley actually proved was that
existing matter outside of us is not the immediate object perceived by our
minds. But how could he prove that this being outside of us, this cause of our
sensations , which people call matter, does not exist? Turgot insisted that our
experiences with lenses makes us realize that there has to be something more
than just our perceptions, that accounts for the various ways in which we can
see things. If body or matter does not exist then physics, the study of nature,
would be destroyed . We are nourished not by taste , which is an idea, but by an
unperceived digestion, a material process. Turgot went on to contend that the
common shared experiences of many people showed that there must be
something out there that they are all experiencing. Then appealing to what he
and his friends regarded as Berkeley's best point, his theory of vision including
the contention that distance is not directly perceived, Turgot said that, contrary
to Berkeley, this in fact shows that experience alone cannot teach us what is
there in the world.
In the second letter, Turgot continued to challenge Berkeley. He quoted him
as saying that nothing like our ideas can exist outside of us, because a being
which has reality only as perceived cannot exist unperceived. Turgot contended
that matter existing outside of us has geometrical properties which depend on
distance, shape, and motion. There has to be a common cause outside of us to
account for our common order of the sequence of experiences. Turgot insisted
that on Berkeley's account the orderly sequence would be bizarre and
incomprehensible. And the order supposes the existence of matter.
Turgot never seemed to catch on to Berkeley's way of explaining experience
as ideas in the mind of God which can persevere apart from individual
perceptions. Turgot contended that the order of ideas is inexplicable on
Berkeley's account. If, instead, one supposed real material factors , which are
not perceived, then one can account for the sequences of our ideas.25
"In a word , all is explained by supposing bodies: all is obscure - and bizarre
- in denying them.,,26 Turgot claimed his supposition about bodies made it
possible to explain how we get our ideas, how we have common ideas with
other people, and how we know that there are other people, all of which he
contended Berkeley could not account for. What led Berkeley astray, Turgot
asserted, is that he thought external realities would have to resemble our ideas.
Berkeley in the History ofScepticism 181
What they are like is not conceivable, but nonetheless they help us understand
our world in some sort of mathematized physics of bodies. Turgot rather
carefully tried to develop problems about Berkeley's (and Maupertuis's)
phenomenalism. He tried to show that Berkeley's attempt to explain the
constancy and coherence of our ideas by interpreting them as the result of the
order of ideas of God, really does not explain what is going on. Hence he
concluded that Berkeley's system is ridiculous .F
In the article "Existence" in the Encylopedie, Turgot again took on Berkeley.
He said that there are those who deny the existence of bodies and the material
universe. These people are called "immaterialists". The view, Turgot said, was
too subtle to be widely held. In fact, he said, it has very few partisans except
among Indian philosophers. However, "It is the famous Bishop of Cloyne, Dr
Berkeley, known for a great number of works filled with much spirit and
singular ideas, who, in his dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, has in our
time revived the attention of metaphysicians in this forgotten system". Most
have found it quicker and easier to denounce the view than to answer it. Turgot
insisted on his own answer that reality does not comprise just what is
immediately sensed.28
Turgot did not just jeer at Berkeley's views, but tried seriously to advance a
sort of hypothetical critical realism as a preferable theory to phenomenalism.
Jean Pierre Brissot de Warville, who one of the very last of the phi/osophes,
proposed to D'Alembert in 1777 that they join together and put out an
encyclopedia of Pyrrhonism. D'Alembert was not interested, but Brissot, who
was just in his early 20's at the time, worked on the project on his own. He
wrote a still unpublished 90 page manuscript on Pyrrhonism, and in 1782 he
published De la verite ou Meditations sur les moyens de parvenir Ii la verite dans
toutes les connoissances humaines (republished in 1792,29 a year before Brissot
was guillotined during the Reign of Terror), exploring whether there is any-
thing we can know with certainty in any of the sciences. Brissot's work (which
has not been studied at all by historians of philosophy) is, I believe, the most
extended presentation of French Enlightenment scepticism. In it he said, "Nous
ne pretendons pas renouveler le paradoxes de fameux Berklei sur l'existence des
corps".30 Berkeley's arguments, Brissot pointed out, have embarrassed modern
philosophy.I! He said that most thinkers have treated the reasonings of
Berkeley as just sophisms. This is not sufficient. It cannot just be treated as a
joke. One has to try to refute them.
Theologians would see Berkeley's theory if true as a dangerous badinage. The
resurrection of Jesus would be no more than an appearance of resurrection;
Jesus's miracles no more than appearances of miracles.
One can say, Brissot contended, that the Bishop of Cloyne has gone too far in
his system. He denied the existence of bodies. He is wrong in this. We always can
conclude concerning the reality or falsity of objects that surround us from our
individual sensations. If Berkeley revised his system so that he offered a simple
doubt, instead of a denial, he would not be attackable. His views would then be
reasonable, and if one wished, would be "pirrhoniste". Both Malebranche and
Berkeley have a similar view. But Brissot said, we, the sceptics. do not deny the
182 R.H Popkin
had to be refuted." (This was, of course, before the Scottish Common Sense
philosophers became known in Germany, and made thinkers aware of Hume
as the philosopher who had to be refuted.) Merian had referred to Berkeley as
"le savant Eveque de Cloyne" and as "un excellent homme". After Kant had
appeared on the scene, Merian wrote a piece in 1792 "Sur le Phenomenisme de
Hume", in which he joined with the German interpreters who now saw the
history of modern philosophy moving from Locke to Berkeley to Hume to
Kant. Finally in 1796 another member of the Prussian Academy, Ancillon,
wrote a dialogue of a discussion between Berkeley and Hume as the two super-
sceptics of the century who regretted what they had accomplished, and the
effect that it had had on the world of learning." In the dialogue, the Berkeley
character referred to Sextus Empiricus. Hume's Dialogues concerning natural
religion were translated into German by Plattner and by Kant's friend, lG.
Hamann.
Reid saw Berkeley as trying to avoid scepticism, rather than advancing it. He
portrayed Berkeley as the first to show that the systems of Descartes and Locke
and Malebranche lead inevitably to scepticism. However, Berkeley's own
answer, immaterialism or idealism, though eliminating one basic fault in the
previous systems, contained problems that Hume sowed also lead to scepti-
cism. Reid's disciple, James Beattie, however, said, "For did not BERKELEY
write his Principles of Human Knowledge with this express view (which does
him great honour), to banish scepticism both from science and from religion?
Was he not sanguine in the hope of success? And has not the event proved, that
he was egregiously mistaken? For is it not evident, from the use to which other
authors have applied it, that his system leads to atheism and universal
scepticism?,,36 Reid and his disciples were the first to portray the mainstream
of English thought as that of the trinity of Locke-Berkeley-Hume, advancing
from empiricism to consistent empiricism to total scepticism. Reid and Beattie
provided most German thinkers with their information about Berkeley, whose
writings were not generally known in Germany as they were in France . The
Dialogues had appeared in the 1756translation from the French by Eschenbach
which was hardly read. 37 Another translation, from the English appeared in
1781.38
The final part of our story is how Berkeley appears in C.l Staiidlin's Geist
und Geschichte der Skepticismus. Berkeley by now at the end of the 18th century
is a minor character in this story while Hume is portrayed as the major
sceptical figure before Kant. Staiidlin's book was published in 1794. The author
was a professor at Gottingen and a friend of Immanuel Kant's (who dedicated
a work to Staiidlin.) The work is the first full scale history of scepticism from
ancient times up to the present. The final part is entitled, "From Hume to
Kant", centering the then contemporary understanding of scepticism on Kant's
proferred solution, its roots in Hume's sceptical arguments, and the sceptical
attacks on Kant by German writers of the time like Maimon and Schulze-
Aenesidemus. (It should be noted that this lengthy history of scepticism ancient
and modern, up to almost the date of publication, precedes any history written
about modern empiricism or rationalism by several decades.)
184 R.B Popkin
There is a short discussion of Berkeley and his views in the section V of the
history of scepticism covering thinkers from La Mothe Le Vayer down to
David Hume. "Berkeley, just as eccentric as ingenious and charming a
philosopher described the terrible consequences of disbelief for the well being
and morality of human society.,,39 Berkeley's idealism Staiidlin saw as follow-
ing on the views of Descartes, Malebranche and Bayle "but Berkeley defined it
dogmatically". He held, according to Staiidlin, that there is nothing in this
world called matter. There are only spirits and ideas. "However much these
statements favored scepticism and contributed to its advancement", it was
pointed out that Berkeley said on the title page of the Dialogues that he was
answering scepticism and atheism. Staiidlin then gave a digest of Berkeley's
views and just repeated Berkeley's claim that they refute scepticism and
atheism, without comment. We are then told that at the end of his life Berkeley
began to doubt the certainty of all metaphysical investigations, and turned
towards politics and medicine (presumably the latter point referred to his
interest in tar-water as a medical cure). The discussion of Berkeley closes by
saying that "Few scholars acquired such a reputation for virtue as he did and
Pope immortalized him with this line: To Berkeley every virtue under
heaven'V'"
Staudlin's information about Berkeley came from the Dialogues, (which is
quoted), the 1781, Leipzig, German edition of Berkeley's works, and the
Annual Register for 1763, which said that at Trinity College Berkeley was
looked upon as the greatest genius or the greatest dunce. Later on he was
considered one of the best metaphysicians in Europe, though his analysis of
matter was considered most paradoxical ("the most ingenious paradox that
ever amused learned persons"?').
Berkeley is not made a major figure whose views, sceptical or otherwise,
flow from the sceptical tendencies of the English deists of the time. Instead he is
just put forth as a curiosity. Then, in the succeeding section on Hume, Berkeley,
along with Locke, is made a source of the views in Hume's Treatise, and Hume
is presented as developing "a moderately sceptical system which seemed to flow
naturally from Berkeley's and Locke's principlesv.V Staiidlin then devoted
himself to expounding Hume's views, Kant's reactions to them, and the
sceptical aspects of Kant's theory, and the sceptical attacks on Kant that were
taking place at the time. Staudlin considered Kant as a sceptic malgre lui.
This survey I have presented indicates the ways that Berkeley was regarded
in discussions of scepticism during the 18th century. In spite of Berkeley's
youthful enthusiasm that he had solved the crise pyrrhonienne, he was quickly
transformed into a key figure in 18th century French sceptical thought. His
immaterialism was seen as a kind of scepticism. By the end of the century, after
Reid and Kant had made Hume the key figure in 18th century scepticism,
Staudlin, writing the first "complete" history of scepticism, could just see him
as a minor curious figure whose odd views contributed to Hume's scepticism.
(In contrast Hamann insisted that without Berkeley there could not have been
a Hume, and without Hume there could not have been a Kant. 43)
In terms of Kant's contribution, Berkeley was to become significant in the
Berkeley in the History ofScepticism 185
NOTES
20. The translations are described in T.E . Jessop, A Bibliography of George Berkeley, 2nd edition,
The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973. Alc iphron appeared in French in 1734 in both The Hague and Paris.
On Boullier and his admiration of Berkeley 's philosophy, see R .H.Popkin, "David-Renaud
Boullier et l'eveque Berkeley", Revue philosophique de /a France et l'Etranger, 148:1958, pp. 364-
70. Boullier said that Berkeley was one of the outstanding philosophers of the time and one of
the most acute minds of the century.
21. The special character of Rousseau's scepticism, which was not treated by Tonelli , is discussed in
some detail by Ezequiel de Olaso in "The two scepticisms of Savoyard vicar" in R.A. Watson
and James E. Force, The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy, Dordrecht:K1uwer, 1988, pp.
43-59.
22. Condorcet, Equisse.
23. Giorgo Tonelli , "The Weakness of Reason in the Enlightenment", Diderot Studies 14:1971, pp.
217-244.
24. The letters were first published in 1808. They appear in Oeuvres de Turgot, edited by Gustave
Schelle, Paris.Felix Alean, 1913, Tome I, pp. I 85-93.It is not completely sure who the addressee
was .
25. Ibid., p. 189.
26. Ibid., p. 190.
27. Ibid., p. 193.
28. "Existence" in Encyclopedie, ou Dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, Pa ris,
1756, Tome XVI, p. 260.
29. Both printings were published at Neuchatel by the Imprimerie de la Societe typographique. The
second edition says on the title page that it exactly conforms to the original edition.
30. Jean-Pierre Brissot, Pyrrhon, Paris, Archives nationales, 446/AP/21 , fol. 12r.
31. Ibid., fol. 12v.
32. Ibid., fol. 19v.
33. Condorcet's notes on Hume's Treatise exist, and were used by Keith Baker in his important
study of Condorcet.
34. On interest in Hume and in refut ing him amongst members of the Berlin Academy see
Lawrence Bongie, David Hume: Prophet of the Counter Revolution in France, Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1993; and Manfred Kuehn, "Kant's Conception of "Hume's Problem", Journal of
the History ofPhilosophy, 21, 1983, pp. 177-78, note 7.
35. This work of IP.F. Ancillon appears in the 1796 issue of the Memoires of the Akademie der
Wissenschaften, Berlin .
36. James Beattie, Essay on the Immutability of Truth , Part II, chap. ii, 2.
37. Manfred Kuehn, Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800, Montreal:McGill-Queens
University Press ,1987, p. 178.
38. Jessop lists this edition (#98 in Jessop's bibliography) as Berkeley'sphilosophsiche Werke, Erster
Theil, aus dem Englishen iibersetzt, Leipzig, 1781. The translator is unknown.
39. Staiidlin, op.cit., V, p. 42.
40. Ibid., p. 44.
41. Ibid, note 125.
42. Staiidlin, VI.Hume to Kant and Platner, p. 3.
43. See the quotation from Hamann in Kuehn, op.cit ., p. 227.
INDEX OF NAMES
Abicht 86 57, 69, 70, 75, 82, 84, 88n4, 91n10, 99, 112,
Adam , Charles 126n43, l44n7 113, 115, 125n27, 129n103, 136, 158, 159, 160,
Addison, 1. 90n I0 161,162,163,165,166,167,168,17OnIl,
Aenesedemus , see Schulze, G.E. 172n55-6, 173, 178, 184
Aenesidemus 101, 121 Beattie, James 11,25-6, 33n47, 86, 183, 186n36
Agrippa, Marcus Vipsanius 122 Beausobre, L. de 12, 15n19, 16n42, 40, 58, 84,
Alembert, Jean Ie Rond d' 10,37,42,43,44,45, 98n135
47,48,50n23,52,59,62,63,64-5,68n65,78, Beck, D. 90nl0
83, 88n4, 95n80, 135, 160, 161, 176, 178, 179, Beck, Lewis White 158, 170n13
181, 185nl8 Beguelin 40, 58, 68n59, 78
Amoudru,B.66n7,66n9 Belaval, Yvon 102, 124n16, 126n43, 130n120, 131,
Anaxagoras 10I 141, 144n6, 145n27, 145n30
Ancillon , 1.P.F. 186n35 Bennett,1. 128n72
Anderson, Bram 98nl41 Berger, N. 56
Annas. J, 154nl, 155n7 Berkeley, Bishop George 1,3,5, I 1,12, 14n3,
Anton , John P. 33n47 15nI6 ,23,26, 36,44,45,48,59,68n71,85,
Aquinas, S1.Thomas 126n32, 126n34 115,158,159,161,169, 170n14, 173-86
Arbuthnot, John 31n4 Bernae 96nl05
Argens, J.B. Ie Boyer d' 57, 67n33, 82, 84, 94n67, Bernard, Edward 129n116
98n134 Bernoulli 78, 80
Aristotle 63, 136 Bernoulli , Jacques 127n55, 130n125
Arnauld 129n96 Bernoulli, Jean 127n55
Arndt, H.W. 95n73 Bierling, Friedrich Wilhelm 119, 130nll8
Atlas, Samuel 34n65-6 Blacklock, Thomas 16n34, 172n69
Aubenque, P. 152, 155n12 Blackwell, Constance 170n16
Autrey, M. de 16n42, 59 Blount 90nl0
Azm, S.1. 146n32 Blumenberg, H. 94n71, 95n81
Bock, Rosemarie 172n48
Bacon, Francis 37, 38, 63, 86, 169 Boerbaave, H. 45, 50nl6
Baker, Keith 157, 160, 161, 169n4, 170n26, Boeth ius, A.M .S. 79, 105
170n29-31, 171n33, 186n33 Bognie, Laurence 8, 16n28, 19, 31n12, 32n15-16
Baker, Th. 56 Bobatec,1. 95nl00
Baltus, J.-F. 15n8, 56, 67n23 Bohmer,1.Cb. 125n31
Barbier 16n21 Bolingbroke, Henry John 43, 45, 54, 83, 84
Barnes. J. 154n3, 155n7, 155nll Bonald 20, 32nl7
Baruzi, Jean 128n64, 129n99 Boncerf, Abbe C.1. 14n2, 82, 88n4
Basedow 79,84 Bongie, Laurence 160, 170n19
Basnage 127n52 Bonnet43,44,58,68n57,83,97nI23
Basso, Sebastian 101 Bossuet, 1.B. 90n I0
Baudisius 78 Boswell, James 33n30
Baumeister, F.Chr. 89nlO Boucbardy 145n20
Baumgarten, A.G. 70, 72, 77, 83, 89n4, 90n10, Bouillier, D.R . 14nl, 83, 97n1l6, 179, 186n20
92n24,94n68 Boulton, 1.T. 33n38
Baumgarten, S.1. 91nl2 Bourdaloue 90n I0
Bayle, Pierre 1,2,3,4,5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, Boxel127n49
15n6, 15n16, 17,21, 31n5, 36, 37, 43,55,56, Boyle, Robert 44, 45, 104-5, 125n27, 158
Bracken, H.M . 14n3, 33n40, 98n137, 174-5, Condorcet, M.J.A.N.C., Marquis de 10, 52, 157,
185n3-4, 185n8-9 158,160,161,162, 171n32, 176, 179, 182,
Brainne 65n4 186n22, 186n33
Breazale, Danie1169n7 Conze, W. BOn 120
Breen, Quirinus 124n11 Cordonnier, H . 88n4
Brissot, Jean Pierre 161, 170n28, 179, 181, Costa, Uriel da 166, 172n55
186n30-2 Coste, Pierre de 170n11, 178
Brown, Thomas 25 Cotes 46
Brucker, J. 9, 14n2, 31n2, 70, 73, 75, 76, 77, 82, Couturat, L. 128n69-70, 128n73
88n4 , 92n25-6, 92n29, 93n44, 94n55 -60, Craig 78
94n65 , 170016 Cramer, de 78
Brunet, Pierre 56 Crellius, 1.L. 93n40
Brunneman 78 Crocker, L.G . 145n30
Brush,C.B. 125027, 127n49 Crousaz, Jean Pierre de 4-6 , 15n14-16, 15n18, 43,
Bruyere, la 900 10 48,5008,70, 82,83,88n4,96nl09,97nI18,
Buch, Hartmut 129n93 133, l44nI2, 163, 164, 167, 174, 185n7
Budde , 1.Fr. 39, 71, 91n10 Crusius, Christian August 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48,
Buddeus, 1.Fr. 88n4 , 91n11, 93n40 86
Buffon, G.-L. Leclerc de, Count 48, 52, 53, 58, 62, Cudworth, Ralph 75, 90n10, 92n29, 160
66n10, 68n50-4, 68n66, 135, 176 Cuper 129n116
Burgelin, P. 144n5, 145n26 Cusa 104
Burke, Edmund 23-4 Cusanus 60
Burnet 129n102
Burnett 125n31, 127n55 Dacier, A. 89n7
Burnyeat, M. 124n3, 124n17, 126n40, ISO, lSI, Dalham, B.F. 96nl13
154n3-4 D'Argens, 1.B. Ie Boyer see Argens
Burthogge, R. 43, 92025 Daries, 1.G. 93n39
Burton, J.H . 31n12, 170n25 Darjes 75, 78, 86, 93n45
Bury, R .G. l44n8 Dascal, M. 171n31
Butler, Bishop 6 Daubert, F. Charles 129n98
Butts , R .E. 126n31 David, Lazarus Ben 30
Daville 119, 130n117-18
Cardano, Girolamo 101, 104 Debar-Bouiller, 1. 65n4
Carpo~J. 73, 77, 92n25,94n67 Deleyre 83, 97n122
Carrol, Robert T. 32025 Demaizeaux, Pierre 21, 182
Carstens 78 Democritus lIS, 129n96
Cartaud, F. 56--7 Desautels, Rene 65n2
Cassirer, E. 35, 146n32 Descartes, Rene 24, 37,43,47,63,69,82, 104,
Castro, Orobio de 172n55 107, 108, 118, 127n47, 129n96, 131, 133, 135,
Chambers, E. 88n4, 90n10 159,169,183
Changeux, Jean-Pierre 176,177,179 Desfontaines, Pierre 178
Changeux, Pierre-Jacques 51-65 Desgu1iers 46
Charles, Prince (of Scotland) 4 Deslandes, A.F. Boureau 57, 76, 78,83, 94n49 ,
Charron 1,4,158,159 94n52, 94n61, 95n78,97n121
Cheyne, George 31n4 Desmaizeaux 32n24
Chillingworth, William 21, 158 Dextus 129n96
Chouet, Jacques 117 Diderot, Denis 9-10, 16n32, 19, 32n14 , 36, 42, 44,
Chouet, Pierre 117 51,53,58, 78,88n4,90n10, 135, 160, 170n21,
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 79, 124n11, 158 175,176,177, 178, 179,185n12
Clarke 48 D idot , Firmin 51
Clavius 105, 114 Dommerich, 1.C. 77, 83, 94n66 , 97nl19
Clephane, John 16n34, 172n69 Donne90nl0
Clerc , Jean le 5, 15n8, 15n17, 44 Drabkin, Israel E. 105, 125n23
Clercius, 1. SOn12 Dresde 94n67
Collier 48, 81 Du Marsais 83, 97nl24
Collier, Arthur 12, 174 Dubos 56
Combe, Edward 15n7 Diiding, Klaus 129n93
Condillac, Abbe Etienne Bonnot de 10-11 , 16n33, Dufrenoy 118
31n2, 36, 37,42,43,44,45, 47, 50n9, 50n22, Dutens, L. 117, 129nl09-10, 129n112, 129n114
52,57,62,64, 67n42-4, 68n68-9, 83, 135, 175,
176,177,178,179 Eberhard 40
Index ofNames 189
125. R.M. Golden (ed.): The Huguenot Connection. The Edict of Nantes, Its Revocation,
and Early French Migration to South Carolina . 1988 ISBN 90-247-3645-5
126. S. Lindroth : Les chemins du savoir en Suede. De la fondation de l'Universite d'Upsal
a Jacob Berzelius. Etudes et Portraits. Traduit du suedois, presente et annote par J.-F.
Battail. Avec une introduction sur Sten Lindroth par G. Eriksson . 1988
ISBN 90-247-3579-3
127. S. Hutton (ed.): Henry More (1614-1687). Tercentenary Studies. With a Biography
and Bibliography by R. Crocker. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0095-5
128. Y. Yovel (ed.): Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. Papers Presented at the 7th
Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter (December 1986). 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0405-5
129. J.E. Force and R.H. Popkin: Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac
Newton 's Theology. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0583-3
130. N. Capaldi and D.W. Livingston (eds.): Liberty in Hume's 'History ofEngland '. 1990
ISBN 0-7923-0650-3
131. W. Brand: Hume 's Theory of Moral Judgment. A Study in the Unity of A Treatise of
Human Nature. 1992 ISBN 0-7923 -1415-8
132. C.E. Harline (ed.): The Rhyme and Reason of Politics in Early Modern Europe.
Collected Essays of Herbert H. Rowen. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1527-8
133. N. Malebranche: Treatise on Ethics (1684) . Translated and edited by C. Walton . 1993
ISBN 0-7923-1763-7
134. B.C. Southgate: 'Covetous of Truth' . The Life and Work of Thomas White
(1593-1676).1993 ISBN 0-7923 -1926-5
135. G. Santinello, C.W.T. Blackwell and Ph. Weller (eds.): Models of the History of
Philosophy. Vol. I: From its Origins in the Renaissance to the ' Historia Philosphica'.
1993 ISBN 0-7923 -2200-2
136. M.J. Petry (ed.): Hegel and Newtonianism. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2202-9
137. Otto von Guericke: The New (so-called Magdeburg) Experiments [Experimenta Nova,
Amsterdam 1672]. Translated and edited by M.G.Foley Ames. 1994
ISBN 0-7923-2399-8
138. R.H. Popkin and G.M. Weiner (eds.): Jewish Christians and Cristian Jews . From the
Renaissance to the Enlightenment. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2452-8
139. J.E. Force and R.H . Popkin (eds.): The Books of Nature and Scripture. Recent Essays
on Natural Philosophy, Theology, and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of
Spinoza's Time and the British Isles of Newton 's Time. 1994 ISBN 0-7923-2467-6
140. P. Rattansi and A. Clericuzio (eds.): Alchemy and Chemistry in the 16th and 17th
Centuries. 1994 ISBN 0-7923 -2573-7
141. S. Jayne : Plato in Renaissance England. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3060-9
142. A.P. Coudert : Leibniz and the Kabbalah. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3114-1
143. M.H. Hoffheimer: Eduard Gans and the Hegelian Philosophy ofLaw. 1995
ISBN 0-7923-3114-1
144. J.R.M. Neto: The Christianization of Pyrrhonism. Scepticism and Faith in Pascal,
Kierkegaard, and Shestov. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3381-0
145. R.H. Popkin (ed.): Scepticism in the History of Philosophy . A Pan-American
Dialogue . 1996 ISBN 0-7923 -3769-7
ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES
*
INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
146. M. de Baar, M. Lowensteyn, M. Monteiro and A.A. Sneller (eds.): Choos ing the
Better Part . Anna Maria van Schurman (1607-1678).1995 ISBN 0-7923 -3799-9
147. M. Degenaar: Molyneux's Problem. Three Centuries of Discussion on the Perception
of Forms. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3934-7
148. S. Berti. F. Charles-Daubert and R.H. Popkin (eds.): Heterodoxy. Spinozism, and Free
Thought in Early-Eighteenth-Century Europe. Studies on the Traite des trois
imposteurs.1996 ISBN 0-7923-4192-9
149. G.K. Browning (ed.): Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: A Reappraisal. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4480-4
150. G.AJ. Rogers, J.M. Vienne and Y.C. Zarka (eds.): The Cambr idge Platonists in
Philosophical Context. Politics , Metaphysics and Religion. 1997 ISBN 0-7923 -4530-4
151. RL Williams: The Letters ofDominique Chaix, Botanist-Cure. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4615-7
152. R.H. Popkin, E. de OIaso and G. Tonelli (eds.): Scepticism in the Enlightenment. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4643-2
153. L. de la Forge. D.M. Clarke (ed. and transl.): Louis de la Forge : Treat ise on the
Human Mind (1664). 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4778-1
154. S.P. Foster: Melancholy Duty . The Hume-Gibbon Attack on Christianity. 1997
ISBN 0-7923-4785-4