1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6732 October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN

VISA YAS, REGIONAL OFFICE NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE,
Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the
gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty.
Salvador N Pe, Jr. respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an in existent
decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by
Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written
communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter
requested a copy of the decision dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in
Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death
of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley Quioyo.1

On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for
a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case
No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was
then discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley
Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided
Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Rolando Austria, whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist,3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter
dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey
Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK.4
 2

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October
12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of
the situation.5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the
situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification.6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4,

2005,7 wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the
falsified decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of
Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the
respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in
an affidavit dated March 20, 2005.8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to
remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter
appeared and gave his sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas
the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for
falsification of public document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for
violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The
NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings
be commenced against the respondent.11 Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now
a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to the Office of the Bar
Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit,13 whereby he
denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on
Shirleys petition for the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent
laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy
Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy of what appeared to be a court decision;14 that
Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he
had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in an investigation; that Dy
Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in
Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from Atty.
Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique,
had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of
Atty. Orquia, Jr. to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for
making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo.15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondents counter-affidavit as his
comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006,17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of
the Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility , and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the
purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it appear that Special Proceedings No. 084
concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as
the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the petition for declaration of
 3

presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner;18 and that the
respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She rationalized
her conclusions thusly:

Respondents denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa
(deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement
of the widow of Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the
decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the
authentic decision on file in Judge Penuelas branch except for the names and dates? Respondent
failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely
invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he should have made this
known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought.
Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely
implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 200,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner by suspending the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-70921
denying the respondents motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063.
The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section
12(b), Rule 139-B22 of the Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondents comment/opposition as his
appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainants reply as his comment on the
petition for review; (3) to require the respondent to file a reply to the complainants comment
within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case
within 15 days from notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondents main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he
had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of
Dy Quioyo. He implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in
Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a
history of employing unscrupulous means to achieve his ends.

However, the respondents denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation
of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyos categorical declaration on the
respondents personal responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive
evidence, was not overcome by the respondents blanket denial, which by nature was negative
evidence.23

Also, the imputation of wrongdoing against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not
command credence.1wphi1 It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-
affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc resolution of May 10, 2005, had required him
to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than
an after thought.
 4

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared
that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But
such reliance was outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered
unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn
statement as proof of authorship of the falsification by the husband is immediately exposed and
betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic
decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for
having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession." Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyers disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.25 Specifically, the
deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of
justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign
tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing
that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity
and integrity.26 The Court will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among
them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorneys Oath for
them to:

x x x support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x
x not wittingly or willingly promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct themselves as
lawyers according to the best of their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to their clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a
privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny
the privilege to him who fails to observe and respect the Lawyers Oath and the canons of ethical
conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the
practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his
professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional
duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege to practice law confers upon him.27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary
authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer
misconduct committed either in a professional or private capacity.28 The test is whether the
conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the
Court.29 WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.
 5

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated

against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant
Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging
him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for
misrepresentation, deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several
demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best
friends wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance
of her United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who represented
himself as an immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of
Legal Services (Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of
a US immigrant visa in complainants favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration
therefor, complainant paid respondent the amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment and
undertook to pay the balance of P350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties
likewise stipulated that should complainants visa application be denied for any reason other
than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for records of criminal conviction and/or any
court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to return the said downpayment.4
However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the agreed period. Worse,
complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the demand for refund
of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for estafa and the
instant administrative complaint against respondent.5
 6

In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his
obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda),
who he had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount
given by the complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with
Pineda on the matter of facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including
himself. He happened to disclose this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend,
the complainant, whose previous US visa application had been denied, resulting in the execution
of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda reneged on his commitments and could no
longer be located but, nonetheless, assumed the responsibility to return the said amount to
complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent attached pictures supposedly of his friends and
family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails) purportedly coming from the
latter.8

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly,
recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a
warning that a repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a)
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he
contracted; and (c) being remiss in returning complainants downpayment of P350,000.00. The
Investigating Commissioner did not lend credence to respondents defense anent his purported
transactions with Pineda considering that the latters identity was not proven and in light of
respondents self-serving evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any
probative value.11

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period
of suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount of P350,000.0012
to complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the date of
demand.13

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.

The Courts Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR, provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
 7

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted
to complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the
amount of P350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has
no specialization in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported
US consul, who supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to
prove Pinedas identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-
serving and thus, as correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any
probative value and consequently cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondents
deception is not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it
reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law.15

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the
Contract, which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This
constitutes a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03
A lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is
duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such clients cause with
diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a
lawyers neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable
negligence for which he must be held administratively liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to
refund the amount of P350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a
lawyer a great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes
upon the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from
his client.19 Thus, a lawyers failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of
his client, as in this case, gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his
own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of
general morality as well as of professional ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondents acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases
where lawyers neglected their clients affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latters
money and/or property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a
period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement
with his client and to return the money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22 the Court
 8

suspended the lawyer for a period of two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client
gave him for his legal services which he never performed. In this case, not only did respondent
fail to facilitate the issuance of complainants US visa and return her money, he likewise
committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer, resulting in undue
prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver penalty should be imposed upon
him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to increase the period of suspension
from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, to two
(2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount
of P350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that "while the
Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the
determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be
clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature
- for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a
transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of his legal
fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1wphi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees
he received from the latter in the amount of P350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality
of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a
more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further,
let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8313 July 14, 2015

PILAR IBANA-ANDRADE and CLARE SINFOROSA ANDRADE-CASILIHAN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA, Respondent.

DECISION
 9

SERENO, CJ:

This is an administrative case filed against Atty. Eva Paita-Moya by Pilar Ibana-Andrade and Clare
Sinforosa Andrade-Casilihan. On 7 December 2009, this Court, through the First Division, issued a
Resolution1 referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from the receipt of records.

After the proceedings, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline transmitted to the Supreme Court on
18 November 2013 its Notice of Resolution,2 alongside the Records of the case. The IBP Board of
Governors also passed a Resolution3 on 13 February 2013 adopting and approving the Report
and Recommendation4 of the Investigating Commissioner for this case.

The Report and Recommendation summarizes the facts of this case as follows:

Here is complainants version. On October 3, 2007, complainant Pilar Andrade, stockholder and
Treasurer of Mabini College Inc. filed Civil Case No. 7617 for Injunction, Mandamus and Damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte when she was illegally suspended by
Luz Ibana-Garcia, Marcel Lukban and respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya. In the said case then
pending before the Honorable Executive Judge Arniel Dating, respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya
appeared as counsel for all respondents.

Complainant Clare Sinforosa I. Andrade-Casilihan likewise filed an illegal dismissal case against
Mabini College Inc. and now pending before the Honorable Court of Appeals. In the said labor
case, respondent stood as counsel for Mabini College, Inc. and co-respondent Luz I. Garcia and
Marcel Lukban.

In another illegal dismissal case filed by Alven Bernardo I. Andrade on September 28, 2005
currently pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent acted as counsel for Mabini College,
Inc. Luz I. Garcia and Marcel Lukban.

After the aforementioned cases were filed, complainants had found out that on June 27, 2008,
the Honorable Supreme Court promulgated a resolution in the case entitled Wilson Cham versus
Atty. Eva Paita-Moya docketed as A.C. No. 7484 suspending respondent from the practice of law
for one month.

Complainants were surprised. They later got a copy of the Office of the Bar Confidants
certification confirming that until date (apparently May 6, 2009, the dare [sic] OR No. 0304748
was issued) respondents suspension order has not yet been lifted.

On June 2, 2009, complainants were able to obtain a copy of the Supreme Court Circular No. 51-
2009 informing all courts that respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one month
and said suspension was received by respondent on June 15, 2008.

However, despite of the subject June 27, 2009 Resolution on July 15, 2008 and despite
knowledge of her suspension from the practice of law, the said resolution having been further
posted in the website of the Supreme Court and is available in CD Asias Lex Libris, respondent
continued to practice law in wilful disobedience of the Supreme Courts suspension order in A.C.
No. 7494.

In fact from June 27, 2008 until May 2009, respondent filed the following papers and pleadings as
counsel in Civil Case No. 7617, to wit:

Comment to Motion for Voluntary Inhibition dated July 15, 2008.

 10

Motion to Admit Answer which was undated but submitted on November 12, 2008.

An undated Comments/Opposition to the Petitioners Formal Offer of Evidence in Support of the

Application for Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction which was received by petitioners
counsel on November 26, 2008.Motion to Admit Amended Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 9, 2009 which was received by petitioners counsel on February 12, 2009.

Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2009.

Motion to File Position Paper dated April 13, 2009; and

Pre-Trial Brief for Respondents dated May 13, 2009.

Also in connection with complainant Casahilans Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
respondent never withdrew her appearance. The same is true in the case of Alven Bernardo
Andrade. Respondent never withdrew her appearance therein.

Likewise and notwithstanding such suspension, respondent continued to practice law and
respondent clients in other cases before the four (4) branches of the Regional Trial Court in Daet,
Camarines Norte. Supporting this truthful assertion are the following:

CERTIFICATION dated May 29, 2009 issued by Atty. Michael Angelo S. Rieo, Branch Clerk of Court,
Branch 38, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

CERTIFICATION dated November 24, 2009 issued by Atty. Elaine Gay R. Belen, Branch Clerk of
Court, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

CERTIFICATION dated November 19, 2009 issued by Mr. Eddie E. Balonzo, Acting Clerk of Court,
Branch 40, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte; and

CERTIFICATION dated November 5, 2009 issued by Mr. Chito B. Pacao, OIC/Legal Researcher II,
Branch 41, Regional Trial Court, Daet, Camarines Norte.

And per the November 5, 2009 letter of Atty. Michael Mortimer G. Pajarillo, Chapter President,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Camarines Norte Chapter, Daet, Camarines Norte, respondent
"xxx Atty. Eva Paita-Moya has not complied with the order of the Supreme Court relative to her
suspension from the practice of law from June 27, 2008 up to the present.5

Respondents version, as stated in the Report,6 is that she started serving the suspension order
on 20 May 2009. This was also her position in her Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings7 dated 30 September 2010. She likewise alleged therein that she had filed with the
Supreme Court in December 2009 an Urgent Motion to Lift Order of Suspension with the Supreme
Court, which was unresolved as of the date of her Manifestation.8 Additionally, she argued that
the resolution of the initial administrative case docketed as A.M. No. 7464 was material to her
position in this particular case.9

The issue in this case falls solely on the question of whether Respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, that is, the practice of law despite the clear language of this Courts
suspension order.

The Report and Recommendation recommended that Respondent be found liable. We adopt the
same, with modification.
 11

The suspension order was received by Respondent on July 15, 2008.10 Despite this, she
continued to practice law in various cases, as shown by the pleadings she filed and the
certifications noted by the Report.11 In fact, she continued receiving various fees for her services
throughout the duration of her suspension.12

It is important to note that her defense consists of an admission that she was indeed suspended,
and allegedly served her suspension.13 She claimed that she never received the resolution that
had allegedly suspended her.14 By logical inference therefore, her sole defense is ignorance of
the resolution that suspended her.

However, the records of this very Court belie her statements. Office of the Court Administrator
Circular No. 51-2009 stated the following:

For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of the Resolution
of the Third Division dated 27 June 2008, in Administrative Case No. 7494 entitled, "Wilson Cham
vs. Atty. Eva Paita-Moya", to wit:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Eva Paita-Moya is found guilty of gross misconduct and hereby SUSPENDED
for one month from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision. She is warned
that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

On 15 July 2008, Atty. Moya received the said resolution as per Registry Return Receipt No. 2320.
(Emphases supplied)15

Moreover, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued a Certification dated 8 May 2009 that the
suspension of Atty. Paita-Moya in A.C. No. 7494 had not yet been lifted.16

We had laid down guidelines in Maniago v. De Dios,

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, it is hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in
the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt
thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The
denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted
from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her
suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order
of suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a
ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.17
 12

This case is not without precedent.18 Previously, we had already stated the standard for
discipline upon erring lawyers who continue practicing despite being suspended by the Court,
viz: Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat, this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of
law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension.1wphi1 We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as
Regional Director despite lack of authority to practice law.19

The Commissioner recommended the suspension of respondent from the active practice of law
for six ( 6) months with stem warning that any similar infraction in the future would be dealt with
more severely.20 In light of this and the jurisprudence already cited, we adopt the
recommendation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA is found GUILTY of violating Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an
additional period of six (6) months from her one (1) month suspension, totaling seven (7) months
from service of this resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of
the Bar.

Atty. Paita-Moya is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to
determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

THIRD DIVISION

March 11, 2015

A.C. No. 7593

ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA LOZADA, Respondent.
 13

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
"Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada"3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation
of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final
and executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their information and guidance, and let
it be entered in respondent's personal records.

SO ORDERED.4

On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty. Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5

However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07
entitled "Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.," where complainant was one of the
respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and
her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his allegation, complainant
submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007
and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels,6 as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct examination and
cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial proceedings.7

Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended
from the practice of law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which
suspended her from the practice of law for two (2) years.

On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty. Lozada to comment on the complaint
against him.8

In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled in a legal
dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto
Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client.1awp++i1 She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice,
 14

and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.10

On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for investigation, report and recommendation.11

In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02,
Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the
practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Lozada.

On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with
modification the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it recommended instead
that Atty. Lozada be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months.

RULING

We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with modification.

Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this Court
orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must
desist from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period
of suspension.13

Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or "[rendering any kind of]
service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."14

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no doubt
that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her
husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose
that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007
were done within the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least,
Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada
appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in
the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year suspension, she, therefore,
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to
inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court if she
can represent her husband. While we understand her devotion and desire to defend her husband
whom she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should not forget that she is first
and foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, willful disobedience to
any lawful order of a superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law:
 15

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor.1wphi1 - A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose
of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15

Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out and extend a
helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse. Thus, considering that Atty.
Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her husband and that in essence, she was
not representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of
her penalty.

Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16
citing Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court suspended further respondents from the practice
of law for six (6) months for practicing their profession despite this court's previous order of
suspension, we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada for representing her husband as
counsel despite lack of authority to practice law.

Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge the law profession of unworthy
members of the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and honor of the legal profession.
While the Supreme Court has the plenary power to discipline erring lawyers through this kind of
proceedings, it does so in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its preservative
principle. The Court, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a less
severe punishment if, through it, the end desire of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista- Lozada is found GUILTY of

violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondents record as member of
the Bar.

Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, so that
we can determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
 16

A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16,
2012 filed by complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O.
Ailes (Orlando) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Facts

Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages
against his own brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented, together
with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint, Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-
774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893 /Issued on March 10, 2008."4
Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlandos IBP O.R. number
should have already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and
that he should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance,
not just the second.

Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate
case for grave threats and estafa5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was furnished a copy of
the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and
dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and
that he charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: " x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track
lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown
in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get
rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to
Terminate Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximina "x x x
has never done anything to protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not befitting his
representation as a seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous amount of
professional fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted services reached as far
only in preparing and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise
Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the
instant complaint charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and
prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.

In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late submission of
the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to Terminate
Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo
when the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted
that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were uttered in good faith.12

Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of
 17

guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or
annoying Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to drop his lawyer over
a case x x x. "14

IBP Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended
the dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE compliance
requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the required information
would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the
records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to
warrant any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the communication
between Orlando and Marcelo, who are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed
to Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third persons.

In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against Orlando, warning
him to be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was
however denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification deleting the warning.

Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review on certiorari.19

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint
against Orlando.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a lawyer has the duty to comport
himself in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the profession.21
Consequently, a lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private life, act in a manner
beyond reproach especially when dealing with fellow lawyers.22

In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the CPR provides:

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper
advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
 18

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession.1wphi1 The use of intemperate language
and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v.
People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English,"
"stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and injurious
which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting language to describe
the opposing counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal profession.25 In this case,
the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's mind, however,
the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to
malign and annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules.
Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he spoke ill,
insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.

On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions such that a lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal
profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct of nobility and uprightness which
should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be disciplined in the
event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private. As a
member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully aware
that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly
improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case,

constitutes unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While a
lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify
the use of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded the members
of the bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando
transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his client.29

With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the Court agrees with the IBP that his
failure to disclose the required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for damages he
had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall
only be cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the expunction thereof from the
records.30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 19

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011

[Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1506]

ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by Atty.
Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty.
Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as a notary public,
which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco), the
registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square meters, located
at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.

Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for Mandaluyong
City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in favor of Alexander
David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also stated that Atty. Linco and
Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly personally appeared before respondent on
July 30, 2003, despite the fact that complainants husband died on July 29, 2003.3

Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of Antipolo City
cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No. 292515 in the name of
Alexander David T. Linco.

Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's reprehensible
act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her children's rights but also in
violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor is unbecoming of a member of the
Philippine Bar.

In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of donation
executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T. Linco, as represented
by Lina P. Toledo.

Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an emissary in
the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence located at Guenventille
II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was then informed that Atty. Linco was
sick and wanted to discuss something with him.

Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but was
articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of donation and the
TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that Atty. Linco asked him a
favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along with the witnesses.
 20

However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told Algodon
and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their convenience so that
he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.

On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office and
informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was then asked to
notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as he found it to be his
commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed of donation, which was
actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.

During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that indeed
the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, likewise,
admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he, however,
performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco
died.81avvphi1

On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor appeared
before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just ministerial duty on his
part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD
pointed out that respondent should know that the parties who signed the deed of donation on
July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed and it was not yet a public instrument.
Moreover, since the deed of donation was notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco
died, the acknowledgement portion of the said deed of donation where respondent
acknowledged that Atty. Linco "personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of
respondent is also violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood."

The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be disqualified from
re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years.

On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11

On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP
Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-678 dated
December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and affirming the assailed
resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her comment.12

In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything new in
his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the recommendation of the IBP.
She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law and is unfit to continue being
commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned for his infractions.

On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the Office
of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is now ripe for
judicial adjudication.
 21

RULING

The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.

There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco
was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent
likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of
donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document after the lapse of more than 20
days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to notarize the deed of donation. The
sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty. Linco should have put him on guard and
deterred him from proceeding with the notarization of the deed of donation.

However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate
the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in
person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's
absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the
deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him
on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003,
because the latter died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.

We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in
an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a document unless
the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.15

Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached to the
act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document; thus, making
that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies
and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary
public and appended to a private instrument.16

For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form
of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.

This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver responsibility
is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such
duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.18 Respondent's failure
to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only in damaging complainant's rights over
the property subject of the donation but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He
should, therefore, be held liable for his acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.

In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon,19 respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary public,
the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two years and suspension from the practice of law for one year were
imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same penalty.
 22

WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, the notarial
commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He is DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is also SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of one year, effective immediately. He is further WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report
the date of receipt of this Decision in order to determine when his suspension shall take effect.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision likewise be attached to
the personal records of the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6622 July 10, 2012

MIGUEL G. VILLATUYA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. BEDE S. TABALINGCOS, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

In this Complaint for disbarment filed on 06 December 2004 with the Office or the Bar Confidant,
complainant Manuel G. Villatuya (complainant) charges Atty. Bcde S. 'L1halingcos (resrondent)
with unlawful solicitation of cases, violation of the ('ode or Professional Responsibility for
nonpayment of fees to complainant, and gross immorality for marrying two other women while
respondents first marriage was subsisting.1

In a Resolution2 dated 26 January 2005, the Second Division of this Court required respondent to
file a Comment, which he did on 21 March 2005.3 The Complaint was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the record.4

On 23 June 2005, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP (Commission) issued a Notice5
setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on 05 July 2005. During the
conference, complainant appeared, accompanied by his counsel and respondent. They submitted
for resolution three issues to be resolved by the Commission as follows:

1. Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by nonpayment of fees to

complainant

2. Whether respondent violated the rule against unlawful solicitation, and

 23

3. Whether respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for having married thrice.6

The Commission ordered the parties to submit their respective verified Position Papers.
Respondent filed his verified Position Paper,7 on 15 July 2005 while complainant submitted his on
01 August 2005.8

Complainants Accusations

Complainant averred that on February 2002, he was employed by respondent as a financial

consultant to assist the latter on technical and financial matters in the latters numerous
petitions for corporate rehabilitation filed with different courts. Complainant claimed that they
had a verbal agreement whereby he would be entitled to P 50,000 for every Stay Order issued by
the court in the cases they would handle, in addition to ten percent (10%) of the fees paid by
their clients. He alleged that, from February to December 2002, respondent was able to rake in
millions of pesos from the corporate rehabilitation cases they were working on together.
Complainant also claimed that he was entitled to the amount of P 900,000 for the 18 Stay Orders
issued by the courts as a result of his work with respondent, and a total of P 4,539,000 from the
fees paid by their clients.9 Complainant appended to his Complaint several annexes supporting
the computation of the fees he believes are due him.

Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in unlawful solicitation of cases in violation of

Section 27 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Allegedly respondent set up two financial
consultancy firms, Jesi and Jane Management, Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc., and used
them as fronts to advertise his legal services and solicit cases. Complainant supported his
allegations by attaching to his Position Paper the Articles of Incorporation of Jesi and Jane,10
letter-proposals to clients signed by respondent on various dates11 and proofs of payment made
to the latter by their clients.12

On the third charge of gross immorality, complainant accused respondent of committing two
counts of bigamy for having married two other women while his first marriage was subsisting. He
submitted a Certification dated 13 July 2005 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General-
National Statistics Office (NSO) certifying that Bede S. Tabalingcos, herein respondent, contracted
marriage thrice: first, on 15 July 1980 with Pilar M. Lozano, which took place in Dasmarinas,
Cavite; the second time on 28 September 1987 with Ma. Rowena Garcia Pion in the City of
Manila; and the third on 07 September 1989 with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso in Ermita,
Manila.13

Respondents Defense

In his defense, respondent denied the charges against him. He asserted that complainant was
not an employee of his law firm Tabalingcos and Associates Law Office14 but of Jesi and Jane
Management, Inc., where the former is a major stockholder.15 Respondent alleged that
complainant was unprofessional and incompetent in performing his job as a financial consultant,
resulting in the latters dismissal of many rehabilitation plans they presented in their court
cases.16 Respondent also alleged that there was no verbal agreement between them regarding
the payment of fees and the sharing of professional fees paid by his clients. He proffered
documents showing that the salary of complainant had been paid.17

As to the charge of unlawful solicitation, respondent denied committing any. He contended that
his law firm had an agreement with Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., whereby the firm would
handle the legal aspect of the corporate rehabilitation case; and that the latter would attend to
the financial aspect of the case such as the preparation of the rehabilitation plans to be
presented in court. To support this contention, respondent attached to his Position Paper a Joint
Venture Agreement dated 10 December 2005 entered into by Tabalingcos and Associates Law
 24

Offices and Jesi and Jane Management, Inc.;18 and an Affidavit executed by Leoncio Balena, Vice-
President for Operations of the said company.19

On the charge of gross immorality, respondent assailed the Affidavit submitted by William
Genesis, a dismissed messenger of Jesi and Jane Management, Inc., as having no probative
value, since it had been retracted by the affiant himself.20 Respondent did not specifically
address the allegations regarding his alleged bigamous marriages with two other women.

On 09 January 2006, complainant filed a Motion to Admit Copies of 3 Marriage Contracts.21 To

the said Motion, he attached the certified true copies of the Marriage Contracts referred to in the
Certification issued by the NSO.22 The appended Marriage Contracts matched the dates, places
and names of the contracting parties indicated in the earlier submitted NSO Certification of the
three marriages entered into by respondent. The first marriage contract submitted was a
marriage that took place between respondent and Pilar M. Lozano in Dasmarinas, Cavite, on 15
July 1980.23 The second marriage contract was between respondent and Ma. Rowena G. Pion,
and it took place at the Metropolitan Trial Court Compound of Manila on 28 September 1987.24
The third Marriage Contract referred to a marriage between respondent and Mary Jane E. Paraiso,
and it took place on 7 September 1989 in Ermita, Manila. In the second and third Marriage
Contracts, respondent was described as single under the entry for civil status.

On 16 January 2006, respondent submitted his Opposition to the Motion to Admit filed by
complainant, claiming that the document was not marked during the mandatory conference or
submitted during the hearing of the case.25 Thus, respondent was supposedly deprived of the
opportunity to controvert those documents.26 He disclosed that criminal cases for bigamy were
filed against him by the complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
Respondent further informed the Commission that he had filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void
the Marriage Contract with Rowena Pion at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bian, Laguna,
where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-3270.27 He also filed another Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage Contract with Pilar Lozano at the RTC-Calamba, where it was docketed as
Civil Case No. B-3271.28 In both petitions, he claimed that he had recently discovered that there
were Marriage Contracts in the records of the NSO bearing his name and allegedly executed with
Rowena Pion and Pilar Lozano on different occasions. He prayed for their annulment, because
they were purportedly null and void.

On 17 September 2007, in view of its reorganization, the Commission scheduled a clarificatory

hearing on 20 November 2007.29 While complainant manifested to the Commission that he
would not attend the hearing,30 respondent manifested his willingness to attend and moved for
the suspension of the resolution of the administrative case against the latter. Respondent cited
two Petitions he had filed with the RTC, Laguna, seeking the nullification of the Marriage
Contracts he discovered to be bearing his name.31

On 10 November 2007, complainant submitted to the Commission duplicate original copies of

two (2) Informations filed with the RTC of Manila against respondent, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos."32 The first criminal case, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 07-257125, was for bigamy for the marriage contracted by respondent with Ma. Rowena
Garcia Pion while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still valid.33 The other one, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 07-257126, charged respondent with having committed bigamy for contracting
marriage with Mary Jane Elgincolin Paraiso while his marriage with Pilar Lozano was still
subsisting.34 Each of the Informations recommended bail in the amount of P24,000 for his
provisional liberty as accused in the criminal cases.35

On 20 November 2007, only respondent attended the clarificatory hearing. In the same
proceeding, the Commission denied his Motion to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome
 25

of the petitions for nullification he had filed with the RTCLaguna. Thus, the Commission resolved
that the administrative case against him be submitted for resolution.36

IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 27 February 2008, the Commission promulgated its Report and

Recommendation addressing the specific charges against respondent.37 The first charge, for
dishonesty for the nonpayment of certain shares in the fees, was dismissed for lack of merit. The
Commission ruled that the charge should have been filed with the proper courts since it was only
empowered to determine respondents administrative liability. On this matter, complainant failed
to prove dishonesty on the part of respondent.38 On the second charge, the Commission found
respondent to have violated the rule on the solicitation of client for having advertised his legal
services and unlawfully solicited cases. It recommended that he be reprimanded for the violation.
It failed, though, to point out exactly the specific provision he violated.39

As for the third charge, the Commission found respondent to be guilty of gross immorality for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. It found that complainant was able to prove through documentary
evidence that respondent committed bigamy twice by marrying two other women while the
latters first marriage was subsisting.40 Due to the gravity of the acts of respondent, the
Commission recommended that he be disbarred, and that his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys.41

On 15 April 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, through its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-154, adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.42 On 01
August 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the recommendation to
disbar him was premature. He contends that the Commission should have suspended the
disbarment proceedings pending the resolution of the separate cases he had filed for the
annulment of the marriage contracts bearing his name as having entered into those contracts
with other women. He further contends that the evidence proffered by complainant to establish
that the latter committed bigamy was not substantial to merit the punishment of disbarment.
Thus, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the resolution to disbar him and likewise
moved to archive the administrative proceedings pending the outcome of the Petitions he
separately filed with the RTC of Laguna for the annulment of Marriage Contracts.43

On 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the Motions for Reconsideration and
affirmed their Resolution dated 15 April 2008 recommending respondents disbarment.44

The Courts Ruling

The Court affirms the recommendations of the IBP.

First Charge:

Dishonesty for nonpayment of share in the fees

While we affirm the IBPs dismissal of the first charge against respondent, we do not concur with
the rationale behind it.

The first charge of complainant against respondent for the nonpayment of the formers share in
the fees, if proven to be true is based on an agreement that is violative of Rule 9.0245 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer is proscribed by the Code to divide or agree to
divide the fees for legal services rendered with a person not licensed to practice law. Based on
 26

the allegations, respondent had agreed to share with complainant the legal fees paid by clients
that complainant solicited for the respondent. Complainant, however, failed to proffer convincing
evidence to prove the existence of that agreement.

We ruled in Tan Tek Beng v. David46 that an agreement between a lawyer and a layperson to
share the fees collected from clients secured by the layperson is null and void, and that the
lawyer involved may be disciplined for unethical conduct. Considering that complainants
allegations in this case had not been proven, the IBP correctly dismissed the charge against
respondent on this matter.

Second Charge:

Unlawful solicitation of clients

Complainant charged respondent with unlawfully soliciting clients and advertising legal services
through various business entities. Complainant submitted documentary evidence to prove that
Jesi & Jane Management Inc. and Christmel Business Link, Inc. were owned and used as fronts by
respondent to advertise the latters legal services and to solicit clients. In its Report, the IBP
established the truth of these allegations and ruled that respondent had violated the rule on the
solicitation of clients, but it failed to point out the specific provision that was breached.

A review of the records reveals that respondent indeed used the business entities mentioned in
the report to solicit clients and to advertise his legal services, purporting to be specialized in
corporate rehabilitation cases. Based on the facts of the case, he violated Rule 2.0347 of the
Code, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting cases for the purpose of profit.

A lawyer is not prohibited from engaging in business or other lawful occupation. Impropriety
arises, though, when the business is of such a nature or is conducted in such a manner as to be
inconsistent with the lawyers duties as a member of the bar. This inconsistency arises when the
business is one that can readily lend itself to the procurement of professional employment for the
lawyer; or that can be used as a cloak for indirect solicitation on the lawyers behalf; or is of a
nature that, if handled by a lawyer, would be regarded as the practice of law.48

It is clear from the documentary evidence submitted by complainant that Jesi & Jane
Management, Inc., which purports to be a financial and legal consultant, was indeed a vehicle
used by respondent as a means to procure professional employment; specifically for corporate
rehabilitation cases. Annex "C"49 of the Complaint is a letterhead of Jesi & Jane

Management, Inc., which proposed an agreement for the engagement of legal services. The
letter clearly states that, should the prospective client agree to the proposed fees, respondent
would render legal services related to the formers loan obligation with a bank. This
circumvention is considered objectionable and violates the Code, because the letter is signed by
respondent as President of Jesi & Jane Management, Inc., and not as partner or associate of a law
firm.

Rule 15.0850 of the Code mandates that the lawyer is mandated to inform the client whether the
former is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity. This duty is a must in those occupations
related to the practice of law. The reason is that certain ethical considerations governing the
attorney-client relationship may be operative in one and not in the other.51 In this case, it is
confusing for the client if it is not clear whether respondent is offering consultancy or legal
services.
 27

Considering, however, that complainant has not proven the degree of prevalence of this practice
by respondent, we affirm the recommendation to reprimand the latter for violating Rules 2.03
and 15.08 of the Code.

Third Charge:

Bigamy

The third charge that respondent committed bigamy twice is a serious accusation. To
substantiate this allegation, complainant submitted NSO-certified copies of the Marriage
Contracts entered into by respondent with three (3) different women. The latter objected to the
introduction of these documents, claiming that they were submitted after the administrative case
had been submitted for resolution, thus giving him no opportunity to controvert them.52 We are
not persuaded by his argument.

We have consistently held that a disbarment case is sui generis. Its focus is on the qualification
and fitness of a lawyer to continue membership in the bar and not the procedural technicalities
in filing the case. Thus, we explained in Garrido v. Garrido:53

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and
prejudicial questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of
desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer's qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the
practice of law, like criminal cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into
through this Court.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.1wphi1 For the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
convincing and satisfactory proof.54 In this case, complainant submitted NSO-certified true
copies to prove that respondent entered into two marriages while the latters first marriage was
still subsisting. While respondent denied entering into the second and the third marriages, he
resorted to vague assertions tantamount to a negative pregnant. He did not dispute the
authenticity of the NSO documents, but denied that he contracted those two other marriages. He
submitted copies of the two Petitions he had filed separately with the RTC of Laguna one in
Bian and the other in Calamba to declare the second and the third Marriage Contracts null and
void.55

We find him guilty of gross immorality under the Code.

We cannot give credence to the defense proffered by respondent. He has not disputed the
authenticity or impugned the genuineness of the NSO-certified copies of the Marriage Contracts
presented by complainant to prove the formers marriages to two other women aside from his
wife. For purposes of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage Contracts bearing the name of
respondent are competent and convincing evidence proving that he committed bigamy, which
renders him unfit to continue as a member of the bar. The documents were certified by the NSO,
which is the official repository of civil registry records pertaining to the birth, marriage and death
of a person. Having been issued by a government agency, the NSO certification is accorded
much evidentiary weight and carries with it a presumption of regularity. In this case, respondent
has not presented any competent evidence to rebut those documents.
 28

According to the respondent, after the discovery of the second and the third marriages, he filed
civil actions to annul the Marriage Contracts. We perused the attached Petitions for Annulment
and found that his allegations therein treated the second and the third marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements, rather than as special contracts contemplated under the then Civil Code
provisions on marriage. He did not invoke any grounds in the Civil Code provisions on marriage,
prior to its amendment by the Family Code. Respondents regard for marriage contracts as
ordinary agreements indicates either his wanton disregard of the sanctity of marriage or his
gross ignorance of the law on what course of action to take to annul a marriage under the old
Civil Code provisions.

What has been clearly established here is the fact that respondent entered into marriage twice
while his first marriage was still subsisting. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro,56 we held
thus:

We have in a number of cases disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as
a condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued
membership therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed
in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide
his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. He is expected
to be competent, honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the
laws in his private affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead
others in doing so. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. The administration of justice, in which the lawyer
plays an important role being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and
moral competency on his part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in
him.

Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member
of the bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.57 His acts of committing bigamy twice constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.58

Thus, we adopt the recommendation of the IBP to disbar respondent and order that his name be
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves the following charges against Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos as
follows:

1. The charge of dishonesty is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

2. Respondent is REPRIMANDED for acts of illegal advertisement and solicitation.

3. Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos is DISBARRED for engaging in bigamy, a grossly immoral conduct.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Bede S. Tabalingcos in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the name of Bede S. Tabalingcos from the Roll of
Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

 29

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8010 June 16, 2009

KELD STEMMERIK, represented by ATTYS. HERMINIO A. LIWANAG and WINSTON P.L. ESGUERRA,
Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LEONUEL N. MAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Per Curiam:

Complainant Keld Stemmerik is a citizen and resident of Denmark. In one of his trips to the
Philippines, he was introduced to respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas. That was his misfortune.

In one visit to the Philippines, complainant marveled at the beauty of the country and expressed
his interest in acquiring real property in the Philippines. He consulted respondent who advised
him that he could legally acquire and own real property in the Philippines. Respondent even
suggested an 86,998 sq.m. property in Quarry, Agusuin, Cawag, Subic, Zambales with the
assurance that the property was alienable.

Trusting respondent, complainant agreed to purchase the property through respondent as his
representative or attorney-in-fact. Complainant also engaged the services of respondent for the
preparation of the necessary documents. For this purpose, respondent demanded and received a
P400,000 fee.

Confident that respondent would faithfully carry out his task, complainant returned to Denmark,
entrusting the processing of the necessary paperwork to respondent.

Thereafter, respondent prepared a contract to sell the property between complainant,

represented by respondent, and a certain Bonifacio de Mesa, the purported owner of the
property.1 Subsequently, respondent prepared and notarized a deed of sale in which de Mesa
sold and conveyed the property to a certain Ailyn Gonzales for P3.8 million.2 Respondent also
drafted and notarized an agreement between complainant and Gonzales stating that it was
complainant who provided the funds for the purchase of the property.3 Complainant then gave
respondent the full amount of the purchase price (P3.8 million) for which respondent issued an
acknowledgment receipt.4

After the various contracts and agreements were executed, complainant tried to get in touch
with respondent to inquire about when the property could be registered in his name. However,
respondent suddenly became scarce and refused to answer complainants calls and e-mail
messages.

When complainant visited the Philippines again in January 2005, he engaged the services of the
Jimenez Gonzales Liwanag Bello Valdez Caluya & Fernandez Law Office to ascertain the status of
the property he supposedly bought. He was devastated to learn that aliens could not own land
under Philippine laws. Moreover, verification at the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Olongapo City
revealed that the property was inalienable as it was situated within the former US Military
 30

Reservation.5 The CENRO also stated that the property was not subject to disposition or
acquisition under Republic Act No. 141.6

Thereafter, complainant, through his attorneys-in-fact,7 exerted diligent efforts to locate

respondent for purposes of holding him accountable for his fraudulent acts. Inquiry with the
Olongapo Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) disclosed that respondent was in
arrears in his annual dues and that he had already abandoned his law office in Olongapo City.8
Search of court records of cases handled by respondent only yielded his abandoned office
address in Olongapo City.1avvphi1

Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent in the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the IBP.9 He deplored respondents acts of serious misconduct. In particular,
he sought the expulsion of respondent from the legal profession for gravely misrepresenting that
a foreigner could legally acquire land in the Philippines and for maliciously absconding with
complainants P3.8 million.10

Respondent failed to file his answer and position paper despite service of notice at his last known
address. Neither did he appear in the scheduled mandatory conference. In this connection, the
CBD found that respondent abandoned his law practice in Olongapo City after his transaction
with complainant and that he did not see it fit to contest the charges against him.11

The CBD ruled that respondent used his position as a lawyer to mislead complainant on the
matter of land ownership by a foreigner.12 He even went through the motion of preparing
falsified and fictitious contracts, deeds and agreements. And for all these shameless acts, he
collected P400,000 from complainant. Worse, he pocketed the P3.8 million and absconded with
it.13

The CBD found respondent to be "nothing more than an embezzler" who misused his professional
status as an attorney as a tool for deceiving complainant and absconding with complainants
money.14 Respondent was dishonest and deceitful. He abused the trust and confidence reposed
by complainant in him. The CBD recommended the disbarment of respondent.15

The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the findings and recommendation of the CBD with the
modification that respondent was further required to return the amount of P4.2 million to
respondent.16

We agree with the IBP.

Sufficiency Of Notice Of
The Disbarment Proceedings

We shall first address a threshold issue: was respondent properly given notice of the disbarment
proceedings against him? Yes.

The respondent did not file any answer or position paper, nor did he appear during the scheduled
mandatory conference. Respondent in fact abandoned his last known address, his law office in
Olongapo City, after he committed the embezzlement.

Respondent should not be allowed to benefit from his disappearing act. He can neither defeat
this Courts jurisdiction over him as a member of the bar nor evade administrative liability by the
mere ruse of concealing his whereabouts. Thus, service of the complaint and other orders and
processes on respondents office was sufficient notice to him.
 31

Indeed, since he himself rendered the service of notice on him impossible, the notice
requirement cannot apply to him and he is thus considered to have waived it. The law does not
require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile.17 The law obliges no one to
perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in
accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality.18

In this connection, lawyers must update their records with the IBP by informing the IBP National
Office or their respective chapters19 of any change in office or residential address and other
contact details.20 In case such change is not duly updated, service of notice on the office or
residential address appearing in the records of the IBP National Office shall constitute sufficient
notice to a lawyer for purposes of administrative proceedings against him.

Respondents Administrative Infractions

And His Liability Therefor

Lawyers, as members of a noble profession, have the duty to promote respect for the law and
uphold the integrity of the bar. As men and women entrusted with the law, they must ensure that
the law functions to protect liberty and not as an instrument of oppression or deception.

Respondent has been weighed by the exacting standards of the legal profession and has been
found wanting.

Respondent committed a serious breach of his oath as a lawyer. He is also guilty of culpable
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the code of ethics of the legal profession.

All lawyers take an oath to support the Constitution, to obey the laws and to do no falsehood.21
That oath is neither mere formal ceremony nor hollow words. It is a sacred trust that should be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times.22

Lawyers are servants of the law23 and the law is their master. They should not simply obey the
laws, they should also inspire respect for and obedience thereto by serving as exemplars worthy
of emulation. Indeed, that is the first precept of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.

This Court has interpreted this provision, as early as the 1947 case Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds,24 to mean that "under the Constitution, aliens may not acquire private or agricultural
lands, including residential lands." The provision is a declaration of imperative constitutional
policy.25

Respondent, in giving advice that directly contradicted a fundamental constitutional policy,

showed disrespect for the Constitution and gross ignorance of basic law. Worse, he prepared
spurious documents that he knew were void and illegal.

By making it appear that de Mesa undertook to sell the property to complainant and that de
Mesa thereafter sold the property to Gonzales who made the purchase for and in behalf of
complainant, he falsified public documents and knowingly violated the Anti-Dummy Law.26
 32

Respondents misconduct did not end there. By advising complainant that a foreigner could
legally and validly acquire real estate in the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the
property was alienable, respondent deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give
due regard to the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived
complainant and misled him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and
unprofessional. Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by
complainant for the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was
criminal in nature.1avvphi1

Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards.

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS
AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT.

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. (emphasis supplied)

A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal knowledge
to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear and present danger to
the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only tarnish the image of the bar and
degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, he also betrays everything that the
legal profession stands for.

It is respondent and his kind that give lawyering a bad name and make laymen support Dick the
Butchers call, "Kill all lawyers!"27 A disgrace to their professional brethren, they must be purged
from the bar.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leonuel N. Mas is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is
directed to immediately strike out the name of respondent from the Roll of Attorneys.

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to return to complainant Keld Stemmerik the total amount of
P4.2 million with interest at 12% per annum from the date of promulgation of this resolution until
full payment. Respondent is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court proof of payment of the
amount within ten days from payment.
 33

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is ORDERED to locate Atty. Mas and file the
appropriate criminal charges against him. The NBI is further DIRECTED to regularly report the
progress of its action in this case to this Court through the Bar Confidant.

Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant who shall forthwith record it in the
personal file of respondent, the Court Administrator who shall inform all courts of the Philippines,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall disseminate copies to all its chapters and
members and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio

EN BANC

A.C. No. 7940 April 24, 2012

RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE RULES OF
COURT,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving
moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice of law under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

The Facts and the Case

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor
Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes
approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor
Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of
the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for
his volleyball team.

Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang Panlalawigan

member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas letter and, using it, filed on June
24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for
alleged illegal disbursement of P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the
complaint a copy of what he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was
Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against
Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan
found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional as
minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the
 34

accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction.2 Since the
Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of
the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
appropriate action.

Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the
administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the
IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be disbarred after
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

The Courts Ruling

In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated the defenses
he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification case. He claims that the
Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral to the IBP was "factually infirmed"3
and contained "factual exaggerations and patently erroneous observation,"4 and was "too
adventurous."5

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of Abastillas
letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a
satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter, this
Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who
falsified the letter. This Court relied on the settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and
therefore guilty of falsification.6

This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. In In Re:
Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,7 the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is no longer called upon
to review the judgment of conviction which has become final. The review of the conviction no
longer rests upon this Court.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral
conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing
as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice,
honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.8 Moral turpitude includes
everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act
of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9

Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin?
 35

As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution.1wphi1 Being the most
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative reasons and in
clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and a member of the bar.10 Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude.11

Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although
his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his
sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.12

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most
sacredly bound to uphold the law.13 The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. As
such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.14

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from the
Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

March 16, 2015

A.C. No. 8330

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant

Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera
committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and
dishonor of several post-dated checks.

Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court.
The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in
relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2

According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is
acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to
Atty. De Vera.3
 36

Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed 500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
20,000.00 per month until fully paid.4 However, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De
Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary
Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No.
310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for 500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more
checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7

Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresitas sister in
the amount of 100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty. De Vera issued IBank Check No.
317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for 100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her
sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8

Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks
"bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks
for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed.9

Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations,
prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.10

The Quezon City Prosecutors Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable
cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a
warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11

In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.12

On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint.13

Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of the facts.

According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting
Project to Atty. De Veras group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe Telecom sites across
Northern and Southern Luzon.15

Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus,
they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while
Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her
195,000.00 per site.16

Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time, Teresita
had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have the
funds required for the application of building permits that costs around 100,000.00 for each cell
site.19

Teresita was constrained to borrow 500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita
approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The
main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding
the loan.20

Atty. De Vera denies the 100,000.00 loan from Teresitas sister.21 She only lent Teresita another
check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]"22
 37

Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value.
The checks were not meant to be deposited.23

Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out
that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutors Office were under reinvestigation since
she did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint.24

Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative
complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a
lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant."25

Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a]ll the bare
allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and
that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute
deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27

On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Veras Answer and referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within
ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"28

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory
conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits.29
Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the
Order."30

Both parties failed to file their position papers.31

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended
the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law.32 The Investigating
Commissioner ruled:

Respondents assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans
she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary
to the ordinary experience.

....

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent
incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to the latter
as security for the payment of the loans.

Assuming . . . that respondents version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious
misconduct.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . .
worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law
is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued
as an evidence of debt though not intended to be presented for payment has the same
effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
 38

....

As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in
violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.

. . . [A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but
also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)

In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her
oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility.34 The
Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:

Cannon [sic] 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.35

The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation36

reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is

recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law.37

In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioners
recommendation:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above- entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorneys Oath and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.39

(Emphasis in the original)

Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for
Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.

In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties respective motions:

RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent,

there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution
subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
 39

threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondents Motion for Reconsideration
was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading
under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus,
Resolution No. XX- 2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43

(Emphasis in the original)

The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the
Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After considering the parties arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and
approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors.

Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged
by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan.
She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the
criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately
intertwined with the criminal acts complained of."44

This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyers act of issuing
worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct.

In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for
issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:

In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against
respondent Collado. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised
against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment
charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not
have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid
that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We
consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious
misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is serious or
gross when it is flagrant.48

We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an
administrative case against a member of the bar:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the banking
system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of the offense defined
and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check,
or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting it in circulation;
the law is designed to prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of
issuing checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.

....

Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the law was penal in
character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated
 40

Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal
act to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyers Oath that enjoined
him to support the Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)

A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a
public or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

....

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD

THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

....

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary obligations from
Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She refused to answer for her
liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and claiming that the checks were mere "show
checks."51 However, she failed to present evidence to prove those allegations.

The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for 540,000.00,53
and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there was no
separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated
checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no
personal knowledge of any transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55

The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending"
her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is
presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued several post-dated checks for value
that were dishonored upon presentation for payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined 'not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, which showed him to be unfit for the

office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him."'571wphi1

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the land.
 41

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).

The Antecedent Facts

Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in
Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while
Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that Ulasos deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled,
which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San
Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for
falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana
alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany
Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the
minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8
February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela
Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with
this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a
lawyer.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few
years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa
was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb
(Macasieb), Busmentes former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in
Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana
was forged.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

 42

In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that
Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmentes collaborating counsel
in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer
worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD
found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the case, were all sent to
Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmentes only excuse was that
Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would
not reach him.

The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff,
alleging Macasiebs failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente.
The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that
there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices
from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at Busmentes office in
November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she
signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent
Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice
law using his office address without his knowledge and only due to Dela Rosas connivance with
Macasieb. As regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the
IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI
despite the lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for not less than five
years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of
Busmentes suspension to six months.

Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI stating that
the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its
office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011
Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmentes motion for
reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in
her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

The Ruling of this Court

We agree with the IBP.

Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his
services.5 The Court further ruled that holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts
indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law.6
 43

The Court explained:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.7

In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only
question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of
law.

Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa
was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another
member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb
resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005.
Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted
that Dela Rosas practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.

We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7
December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284
showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order,
Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It
would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the
files in Busmentes office.

Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of
the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the
specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The
report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer.
The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other documents signed by Busmente,
including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22
November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her
as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed
property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other
documents.

Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came
to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmentes
allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating
that:

a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo
Manila.
 44

b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila.

c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;

d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good
faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to
us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;

e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she
filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;

f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:

1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the
instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether
she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical
and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to
accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis
supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284
and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree
with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that
Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.1wphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
 45

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.

In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that respondent undertook to give him 20%
commission, later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the latter would receive in representing
Spouses Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he referred, in an action for partition of the
estate of the late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the Regional Trial Court of Aklan).
Their agreement was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995. However, respondent failed to
pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of
the total estate or about P 40 million. Instead, he was informed through a letter3 dated July 16,
1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his
attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of his commission4 which
respondent ignored.

Complainant further alleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards
required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom he has
two children, and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he has four children. He also
accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the required authorization
from the BangkoSentralngPilipinas.

In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery
and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his
July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and for the corresponding
sanction against complainant's counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a baseless
complaint.6

In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the Court resolved to refer this administrative case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10, 2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
 46

the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August

28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-
141 dated October 28, 2011.

After due consideration, We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.

The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are
expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts
and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their
professional or in their private capacity.

In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August
11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment
of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent
has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or
stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in
certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.

Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to
cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed.
The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13
Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
"unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently
established.1wphi1 A "business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of
customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money
to a single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a
consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of
lending.

Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded
that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and as member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed
under scandalous circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of
the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year as recommended.

WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the

Lawyers Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 9.02,
Canon 9 of the same Code and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1) YEAR
effective upon notice hereof.
 47

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 9604 March 20, 2013

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This administrative case arose from a Complaint tiled by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J.
Rustia (Rustia), both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L.
Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. larder (Atty. Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics
and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty, and Harassment.

The Facts

Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for
usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed
against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-employee in the Sugar Regulatory
Administration. The Complaint1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod
City, Negros Occidental.

When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied
that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia
showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature appearing above his name
as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit
to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his
supposed signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and
submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other
documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of
falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
 48

In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the
Complaint since the falsification of the counsels signature posed a prejudicial question to the
Complaints validity. Also, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for
Falsification of Public Document2 and Dishonesty3 be filed against Divinagracia, with Rustia and
Atty. Bancolo as complainants.

Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified
the signature of his former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit
dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolos instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document
and dishonesty filed against him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint
for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and Rustia.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal
case for falsification of public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The
dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without
prejudice to the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and
other offenses against Rustia and Tapay.

SO ORDERED.4

The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of
substantial evidence in a Decision dated 19 September 2005.

On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a
complaint5 to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolos law partner. The complainants
alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the
signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
attached a Report6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which
examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-
complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used
to harass and persecute innocent people.

On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to

Additional Information. They alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office, forged the signature of Atty. Bancolo.

In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that
the criminal and administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the
Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were
assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the assignment of
the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents.
However, due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and
communications be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. Respondents added
that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them since the cases filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and
 49

documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as
secretary of their law office.

Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were
directed by the Commission on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5
May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August 2006. On the said date, complainants were
present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25 September 2006 for
the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the
documents submitted to the IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to
participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants position paper
dated 18 October 2006 and respondents position paper dated 23 October 2006.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating

Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of
law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law
firm.

In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:

x x x. In his answer, respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in
the complaint filed against complainants Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the
Ombudsman were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures
appearing in the various documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such
pattern of malpratice by respondent clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9,
for a lawyer who allows a non-member to represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned
Canon. The fact that respondent was busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing
personally. After all respondent is a member of a law firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer.
The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute negligence and undersigned finds the
act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents ignored the notices sent by
undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and irresponsibility
as lawyers.

On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and
Associates Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of
his law firm. As a senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility".
x x x.

xxxx

Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995
and practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated
as Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary
diligence to find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner, it is his responsibility to
provide efficacious control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the
 50

law firm. Had he done that, he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty. Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is
administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.7

On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
The Resolution states:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent Atty. Bancolos violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.

However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors
RESOLVED as it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit.8

Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for
Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated
Comment/Reply to Complainants Motion for Reconsideration and Comment Filed by
Complainants dated 29 January 2008.

In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both
complainants and Atty. Bancolos motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.

The Courts Ruling

After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation
of the IBP Board and find reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively
liable.

Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the
Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of
Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW.

Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,9 where we held:

The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right
conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to
maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the
 51

public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession
enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make
possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law
makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.

In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation,10 we held that the preparation and signing of a
pleading constitute legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for
members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer, he may
not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay.11 Thus, by affixing
ones signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to these
matters and give legal effect to the document.1wphi1

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe
that he was a victim of circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional
trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty. Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take
any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia denying his signature to
the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26
January 2006. Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer,
Atty. Jarder threatened to file a disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he
was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the
verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.

In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the
communications and pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit
with his tolerance. Undoubtedly, Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. This violation Is an act of falsehood
which IS a ground for disciplinary action.

The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had
knowledge of, or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or
tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the IBP
Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.

In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is
warranted. We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. larder.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit.

We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for one year effective upon finality of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this
Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
 52

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice