Constitutional Law Due Process

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 [ ATTY AQUINO]
[G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE

TANODBAYAN, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; DELAY OF THREE YEARS IN THE
TERMINATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, A VIOLATION THEREOF. We find the long delay
in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the
requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the
prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
constitutional rights.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LONG DELAY IN FILING OF INFORMATIONS AGAINST
ACCUSED WARRANTS DISMISSAL OF CASES. We are constrained to hold that the inordinate delay
in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the instant case is
violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process and to a speedy
disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499,
10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed.
DECISION
YAP, J p:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction, dated October 16, 1985,
petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Tanodbayan of April 7, 1985, and the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated August 9, 1985, August 12, 1985 and September 17, 1985,
and to enjoin the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan from continuing with trial or any other
proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503, all entitled "People of
the Philippines versus Francisco S. Tatad."
The petition alleges, among other things, that sometime in October 1974, Antonio de los Reyes,
former Head Executive Assistant of the then Department of Public Information (DPI) and Assistant
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Broadcasts, filed a formal report with the Legal Panel,
Presidential Security Command (PSC), charging petitioner, who was then Secretary and Head of
the Department of Public Information, with alleged violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action was taken on said
report.
Then, in October 1979, or five years later, it became publicly known that petitioner had
submitted his resignation as Minister of Public Information, and two months after, or on
December 12, 1979, Antonio de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan (TBP Case No.
8005-16-07) against the petitioner, accusing him of graft and corrupt practices in the conduct of
his office as then Secretary of Public Information. The complaint repeated the charges embodied
in the previous report filed by complainant before the Legal Panel, Presidential Security
Command (PSC).
SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 1
On January 26, 1980, the resignation of petitioner was accepted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
On April 1, 1980, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint of Antonio de los Reyes to the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. On June 16, 1980, Roberto P. Dizon, CIS
Investigator of the Investigation and Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation Report, with
the following conclusion, ". . . evidence gathered indicates that former Min. TATAD had violated
Sec. 3 (e) and Sec. 7 of RA 3019, respectively. On the other hand, Mr. ANTONIO L. CANTERO is
also liable under Sec. 5 of RA 3019," and recommended appropriate legal action on the matter.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming immunity from prosecution by
virtue of PD 1791, but the motion was denied on July 26, 1982 and his motion for reconsideration
was also denied on October 5, 1982. On October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits
were with the Tanodbayan for final disposition. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a
resolution, dated April 1, 1985, prepared by Special Prosecutor Marina Buzon, recommending that
the following informations be filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan, to wit: LLphil
"1. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of R.A. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private
corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official functions through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith;
"2. Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of R.A. 3019 for receiving a check of
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said
corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum in 1973;
"3. Violation of Section 7 of R.A. 3019 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978."
Accordingly, on June 12, 1985, the following informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan
against the petitioner:
Re: Criminal Case No. 10499
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses Francisco S. Tatad with
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of July, 1973 in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did
then and there, wilfully and unlawfully demand and receive a check for
P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading
Corporation as consideration for the payment to said Corporation of the sum of
P588,000.00, for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention
Referendum of January, 1973, wherein the accused in his official capacity had to
intervene under the law in the release of the funds for said project.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accused FRANCISCO S. TATAD
with Violation of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1974 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
Information, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully fail to prepare and file
with the Office of the President, a true detailed and sworn statement of his assets
and liabilities, as of December 31, 1973, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1973), as
required of every public officer.
the Tanodbayan on June 20, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses FRANCISCO S. TATAD
with Violation of Section 3, paragraph (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on the about the month of May, 1975 and for sometime prior thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer being then the Secretary of the
Department (now Ministry) of Public Information, did then and there, wilfully and
unlawfully give Marketing Communication Group, Inc. (D' Group), a private
corporation of which his brother-in-law, Antonio L. Cantero, is the President,
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
functions, through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, by allowing the
transfer of D' GROUP of the funds, assets and ownership of South East Asia
Research Corporation (SEARCH), allegedly a private corporation registered with
the Securities and Exchange Corporation on June 4, 1973, but whose organization
and operating expenses came from the confidential funds of the Department of
Public Information as it was organized to undertake research, projects for the
government, without requiring an accounting of the funds advanced by the
Department of Public Information and reimbursement thereof by D' GROUP, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of
the Tanodbayan on May 16, 1980.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
That on or about the 31st day of January, 1977 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
with the Office of the President, a true and sworn statement of his assets and
liabilities, as of December 31, 1976, including a statement of the amounts of his
personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year (1976), as required of every public officer.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
That on or about the 15th day of April, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer being then the Secretary of the Department (now Ministry) of Public
with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of his assets
and liabilities, as a December 31, 1978, including a statement of the amounts and
sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year (1978), as
required of every public officer.
That the complaint against the above-named accused was filed with the office of
CONTRARY TO LAW."
On July 22, 1985, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a consolidated motion to quash the
information on the following grounds: LLjur
"1. The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due process of law and of the
right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of
jurisdiction to file the informations;
2. Prescription of the offenses charged in Crim. Case Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501;
3. The facts charged in Criminal Case No. 10500 (for failure to file Statement of
Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an offense;
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Cases Nos.
10500, 10502 and 10503;
5. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10199 for Violation of Sec. 3, par. (b) of R.A. 3019, as amended;
6. No prima facie case against the accused-movant exists in Criminal Case No.
10501 (for Violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended."
On July 26, 1985, the Tanodbayan filed its opposition to petitioner's consolidated motion to quash,
stating therein in particular that there were only two grounds in said motion that needed
refutation, namely:
1. The offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500 and 10501, have
already prescribed and criminal liability is extinguished; and
2. The facts charged in the information (Criminal Case No. 10500 For failure to
file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973) do not constitute an
offense.
On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan citing the case of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122
SCRA 538, contended that the filing of the complaint or denuncia in the fiscal's office interrupts
the period of prescription. Since the above-numbered cases were filed with the Office of
the Tanodbayan in 1980 and the alleged offenses were committed on July 16, 1973, January 31,
1974 and in May 1975, respectively, although the charges were actually filed in Court only on July
9, 1985, the Tanodbayan has still the right to prosecute the same, it appearing that the ten (10)
year prescriptive period has not yet lapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such
asBatas Pambansa Blg. 195, extending the period of limitation with respect to criminal
prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is constitutional.
Tanodbayan likewise said that the requirement for the filing of the Statement of Assets and
Liabilities in P.D. 379 is separate and distinct from that required pursuant to the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law, as amended. For while the former requires "any natural or juridical person
having gross assets of P50,000.00 or more . . ." to submit a statement of assets and liabilities ". . .
regardless of the networth," the mandate in the latter law is for ALL government employees and
officials to submit a statement of assets and liabilities. Hence, the prosecution under these two
laws are separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained that delay in the
conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and
that neither will it render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D. 911,
the law which governs preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it fixes a period of
ten (10) days from its termination to resolve the preliminary investigation. prcd
On August 9, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding therefrom, We find, and so hold, that the accused's
"Consolidated Motion to Quash" should be as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit.
Conformably to Rule 117, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
defect in the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 being one which could be
cured by amendment, the Tanodbayan is hereby directed to amend said
information to change the date of the alleged commission of the offense therein
charged fromJanuary 31, 1974 to September 30, 1974 within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED."
On August 10, 1985, in compliance with the Sandiganbayan's resolution of August 8, 1985, the
Tanodbayan filed an amended information in Criminal Case No. 10500, changing the date of the
commission of the offense to September 30, 1974.
On August 30, 1985, petitioners filed a consolidated motion for reconsideration which was denied
by the Sandiganbayan on September 17, 1985. Hence, petitioner filed this petition on October 16,
1985 assailing the denial of his motion to quash. On October 22, 1985, the Court, without giving
due course to the petition, resolved to require the respondents to comment thereon and issued a
temporary restraining order effective immediately and continuing until further orders of the
Court, enjoining the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan from continuing with the trial
and other proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503. In
compliance with said resolution, the respondents, through Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,
filed their comment on January 6, 1986.
On April 10, 1986, The Court required the parties to move in the premises considering the
supervening events, including the change of administration that had transpired, and the
provisions for Sec. 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court insofar as the public respondents were
concerned, which required the successor official to state whether or not he maintains the action
or position taken by his predecessor in office. On June 20, 1986, the new Tanodbayan manifested
that since "the charges are not political offenses and they have no political bearing whatsoever,"
he had no alternative but to pursue the cases against the petitioner, should the Court resolve to
deny the position; that in any event, petitioner is not precluded from pursuing any other legal
remedies under the law, such as the filing of a motion for re-evaluation of his cases with the
Tanodbayan. The new Solicitor General filed a manifestation dated June 27, 1986 in which he
concurred with the position taken by the new Tanodbayan.LexLib
Pursuant to the above manifestation of the new Tanodbayan, the petitioner filed a motion for
re-evaluation with the Office of the Tanodbayan, dated July 21, 1986, praying that the cases in
question be re-evaluated and the informations be quashed. The Court is not aware of what action,
if any, has been taken thereon by the Tanodbayan. However, be that as it may, the filing of the
aforesaid motion for re-evaluation with the Tanodbayan has no material bearing insofar as the
duty of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the instant petition is concerned.
Petitioner has raised the following issues in his petition:
1. Whether the prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the
Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the right
to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
2. Whether the crimes charged has already prescribed.
3. Whether there is a discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan.
4. Whether Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the
petitioner.
5. Whether petitioner's contention of the supposed lack or non-existence of prima
facie evidence to sustain the filing of the cases at bar justifies the quashal of the questioned
informations.
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary
investigation and in filing the corresponding informations only after more than a decade from the
alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and
authority to file the informations. The respondent Sandiganbayan dismissed petitioner's
contention, saying that the applicability of the authorities cited by him to the case at bar was
"nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to grant the "radical relief" prayed for by
petitioner at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere allegations of "undue delay" do not
suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of
any alleged procedural right granted or allowed to the respondent accused by law or
administrative fiat" or in the absence of "indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse"
committed by the Tanodbayan in the conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and
circumstances as would establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other
constitutionally guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
Said the Sandiganbayan:
"That there was a hiatus in the proceedings between the alleged termination of
the proceedings before the investigating fiscal on October 25, 1982 and its
resolution on April 17, 1985 could have been due to certain factors which do not
appear on record and which both parties did not bother to explain or elaborate
upon in detail. It could even be logically inferred that the delay may be due to
painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former
high-ranking government official. In this respect, We are of the considered opinion
that the provision of Pres. Decree No. 911, as amended, regarding the resolution
of a complaint by the Tanodbayan within ten (10) days from termination of the
preliminary investigation is merely "directory" in nature, in view of the nature and
extent of the proceedings in said office.
The statutory grounds for the quashal of an information are clearly set forth in
concise language in Rule 117, Section 2, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
and no other grounds for quashal may be entertained by the Court prior to
arraignment inasmuch as it would be itself remiss in the performance of its official
functions and subject to the charge that it has gravely abused its discretion. Such
facts and circumstances which could otherwise justify the dismissal of the case,
such as failure on the part of the prosecution to comply with due process or any
other constitutionally-guaranteed rights may be presented during the trial wherein
evidence for and against the issue involved may be fully threshed out and
considered. Regrettably, the accused herein attempts to have the Court grant
such as radical relief during this stage of the proceedings which precludes a
precocious or summary evaluation of insufficient evidence in support thereof."
This bring us to the crux of the issue at hand. Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the
Constitution? May the court, ostrich-like, bury its head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage
of the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only after the trial? prcd
In a number of cases, 1 this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to
spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear
that the has been deprived of due process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of
course, it goes without saying that in the application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases,
particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
Coming to the case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on record and are largely
undisputed. The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing
charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019against then Secretary of Public Information
Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979
when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with
President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint
was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan and docketed as TBP
Case No. 8005-16-07. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was
around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by
referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report.
On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of
charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By
October 25, 1982, all affidavit and counter-affidavits were in and the case was ready for
disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was
approved by the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations
against the accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.
A painstaking review of the facts can not but leave the impression that political motivations
played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case. Firstly, the
complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding
investigation and report. cdphil
We find such blatant departure from the established procedure as a dubious, but revealing
attempt to involve an office directly under the President in the prosecution was politically
motivated. We cannot emphasize too strongly that prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid,
giving the impression that their noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly,
for political ends or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental
objective of serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by strict
adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the impartiality of the
prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be justified
on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While
we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the
other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly
can not be assumed that the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in
the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of preliminary
investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for
the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural due process constitutionally
guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause,
but under the constitutionally guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is
violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We
are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in
the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by
the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation
merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official." In the first place, such a
statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file
his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly
did not involve complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged giving of unwarranted
benefits to a relative, while presenting more substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not
warrant or justify the period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation should not
be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant
dismissal of the information. True but the absence of a a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device
for setting back time. LexLib
After a careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we are constrained to hold that
the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in the
instant case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to due process
and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. Accordingly, the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502 and 10503 should be dismissed. In view of the foregoing,
we find it unnecessary to rule on the other issues raised by petitioner.
Accordingly, the Court Resolved to give due course to the petition and to grant the same. The
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10502 and 10503, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Francisco S. Tatad" are hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued
on October 22, 1985 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 72335-39, [March 21, 1988], 242 PHIL 563-577)
[G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986.]
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY

CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., M. BELLARMINE BERNAS,
O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO,
JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO
GARCHITORENA, ** ANDREW GONZALEZ, JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ,
FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR., CECILIA MUOZ PALMA, JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ,
JOSE B.L. REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID SYCIP, ENRIQUE
SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE
JAYME, *** , petitioners, vs.SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by
Justice Manuel Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and
Bienvenido Vera Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ
(Ombudsman) and GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG.
GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B.
TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA, CAPT. ROMEO M.
BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE
MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT. CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA,
SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M.
DESOLONG, SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA
CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO LAZAGA, AIC
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and HERMILO
GOSUICO, respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.

Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FINDINGS OF COMMISSION THAT PROCEEDINGS HAVE

BEEN VITIATED BY LACK OF DUE PROCESS, UPHELD; CASE AT BAR. The Commission submitted
the following recommendation: "Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence
showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided
the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity
to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer
all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final
outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the
better opinion and judgment of this Honorable court, that the proceedings in the said case have
been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the
petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled
'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted." The Court adopts and approves the Report and its
findings and holds on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record set that the then President
(codenamed Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino Galman murder case;" and that
"the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist,
and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of
the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil
liability. The Court finds that the Commission's Report and findings and conclusions are duly
substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of
proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the practice of law (55 years)
and in the prosecutorial and judicial services (86 years in the trial and appellate courts), experts
at sifting, the chaff from the grain, the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented
and denials made by public respondents.
2. ID.; ID.; MOCKERY OF JUDICIAL PROCESS; A CASE OF. The record shows suffocatingly that
from beginning to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, and
borned out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitur), since the resolution prepared by his
"Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's
dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators
back to the streets and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the
unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang
conference, would accomplish the two principal clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. Indeed, the
secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called together the Presiding
Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel
headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial
and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined ignominious final
outcome are without parallel and precedent in out annals and jurisprudence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECRET CONFERENCE AT MALACAANG AND THE ENTIRE PROSECUTION PANEL
REGARDING IMMINENT FILING OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THE ACCUSED; VITIATED ALL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN. The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of
January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal
charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have
been confirmed by him to the then President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day)
is not denied. It is without precedent. This was illegal under out penal laws. This illegality
vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very
Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to
Malacaang and their ready acquiescence thereto the circumstances then obtaining, are in
themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. . . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of
independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment
they stepped inside Malacaang Palace on January 10, 1985."
4. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID AB INITIO IN VIEW COLLUSION AS TO HANDLING AND TREATMENT OF
CASES. No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very
President who by an amendatory decree made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan,
can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases
should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too
easily transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases." This criminal
collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondent at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders
moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly
General Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence or
witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas as police investigator
do not make him an accessory of the crimes he investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of
the testimonies of the witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to

present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein
ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL; DECLARED UNLAWFUL AND VOID AB INITIO; CASE AT BAR. The
Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor
and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. The Court is constrained to declare the
sham trial a mock trial - the non-trial of the century and that the predetermined judgment of
acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CANNOT BE INVOKED WHERE PROSECUTION IS DENIED DUE
PROCESS.- No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked
against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the
Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; VOID WHERE DENIAL OF RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS APPARENT. "The cardinal
present is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their
jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional
issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due
process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction
(Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973], 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a 'lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
8. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WHEN APPLICABLE. "Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated
July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper
basis for a claim of double jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs.
Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction
when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. "In effect, the first jeopardy was
never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the
lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy." Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan
judgment of acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in
double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People Court of Appeals, which is fully
applicable here, as follows: "That is the general rule and pre-supposes a valid judgment. As
earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgmentfor
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment
is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be
attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds
nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. . . .
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; CANNOT BE INVOKED IN A SHAM AND MOCK TRIAL. More so does the rule against
the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial
was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the
respondent-accused. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan
maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its intention to terminate the
proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The
prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)" and
their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
situation for the defense.
10. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT; VOID WHERE VERDICT WAS DICTATED, COERCED AND SCRIPTED. A
dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void
judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such
judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw." It is a terrible and unspeakable
affront to the society and the people.
11. ID.; ID.; COURTS; CALLED UPON TO RENDER JUSTICE WHERE IT IS DUE. "Private respondents
invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail, the scales must be balance. It is not to be
dispensed for he accused alone. The interests of the society, which they have wronged must also
be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A verdict of
acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party wronged, to the society
offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play a vital role. They render
justice where justice is due.
12. ID.; ID.; JUDGMENT ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN DURING PENDENCY OF
FINAL ACTION OF SUPREME COURT; CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Although no
restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately
issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This
is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilzan, wherein the Court is setting aside the hasty convictions,
ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the
very least to hold in abeyance the promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But
prudence gave way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the
cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge
manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
13. ID.; ID.; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; OPINION IN LUZON BROKERAGE CO.,
INC. vs. MARITIME BLDG., CO., INC. (36 SCRA 305 [1978], NOT APPLICABLE. Respondent
invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., is
inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court
and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost case once
more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an end and no
second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should be kept
pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration). This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners' second
motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial under date
of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's
Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is not being resolved within five months of its filing after the
Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only last
August 26th. Then the second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new material
ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the first motion
for reconsideration, i.e., the secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to
light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as proved in the
Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian president had dictated
and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without
any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; GRANTING
THEREOF JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE CERTAIN SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NOT
PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED TO THE COURT. Considering that certain significant facts and
circumstances not previously disclosed to the Court were found by the Commission constituted by
this Court, purposely to inquire and ascertain the veracity of the same, to be duly established by
sufficient evidence and are indicative of "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case . . .;" and that there exists "adequate credible
evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and
to offer all the evidences it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the outcome
of the case; . . ." I join in granting petitioner's second motion for reconsideration.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR. As it is, the prosecution failed to fully ventilate its position and to lay out before
respondent Court all the pertinent facts which could have helped that Court in arriving at a just
decision. It had, thus, failed in its task. "A public prosecutor is 'the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice and every definite sense the servant of
the law, the two fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
(Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 [1940]). "He owes the state, the court and the accused the duty to
lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence to the end that the
court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, the innocent may not suffer, and the guilty may not
escape unpunished" (People vs.Esquivel, 82 Phil. 453 [1948]).
2. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER COURTS AND COURT PERSONNEL; SANDIGANBAYAN;
EQUALLY CULPABLE FOR MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE; CASE AT BAR. Respondent Court, in showing
partiality for the accused from beginning to end, from the raffle of the subject cases to the
promulgation of judgment, which absolved the accused, en masse, from any and all liability, is
equally culpable for miscarriage of justice. Due process of law, which "requires a hearing before
an impartial and disinterested tribunal" and the right of every litigant to "nothing less than the
cold neutrality of an impartial Judge" (Gutierrez vs. Santos, 112 Phil. 184 [1961]; Castillo vs.Juan,
62 SCRA 124 [1975]), was violated.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; NULL AND VOID AB INITIO; VITIATED BY
LACK OF DUE PROCESS. The proceedings below, having been vitiated by lack of due process, to
the detriment of the State and the People, were invalid and the judgment rendered null and
void ab initio. There having been no trial at all in contemplation of law, there is likewise no
judgment on which a plea of double jeopardy may be based. "To entitle the accused to the plea of
former jeopardy, the proceedings must have been valid (State vs. Bartlett, 164 N.W. 757;
State vs. O'Day 185 So. 290). The lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the
judgment would make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings (Steen vs. State,
242 S.W. 1047).
4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; ATTACHES EVEN IF COLLUSION TAKES PLACE AND THE ACCUSED
WERE NOT A PARTY TO THE SAME; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. The accused,
however, argue that double jeopardy attaches for, even assuming without conceding, that
pressure and collusion did take place, they were not a party to the same; and, for those who were
charged only either as accomplices or accessories, they contend that their alleged offense
involved only a cover-up in the investigation of the crime so that, whatever pressure was exerted
could only have benefited the principals, consequently, to subject them to a re-trial is to put
them twice in jeopardy. It is true that where an accused was not a party to the fraud, a conviction
cannot be avoided by the state (State vs. Heflin, 96 So. 459, 19 Ala. App. 222). However, that
exception is inapplicable to the cases at bar where both the prosecution and the Trial Court itself
were parties to the fraud and collusion. Nor can it be said that the accused were not a part
thereof. The agreement to file the murder charge in Court so that, after being acquitted as
planned, the accused could no longer be prosecuted under the doctrine of double jeopardy; the
"categorization" of the accused into principals, accomplices and accessories so that not all of
them would be denied bail during the trial, were fraudulently conceived for their benefit and for
the purpose of protecting them for subsequent prosecution. It is, thus, no bar to a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense (Coumas vs. Superior Court, 192 P. 2d. 449, 452, 31 C. 2d. 682).
"A verdict of acquittal procured by the accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put
him in jeopardy; and consequently, it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense (State vs.
Lee, 30A, 1110, 65 Conn. 265, 48 Am. S.R. 202, 27 L. RA. 498).
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J p:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third
anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost opposition leader former Senator
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years since the imposition of martial law
in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing
squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been committed long before the
declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial
process by civil courts he repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are
admittedly not courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as created
by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and that he had already been publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President
of the charges in a nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the
evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming." 1 This followed the Plaza Miranda
bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the opposition Liberal Party candidates
for the November, 1971 elections (when eight persons were killed and practically all of the
opposition candidates headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured),
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 889 on
August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly attributed to the communists but the truth has never
been known. But the then President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the country to undergo
successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and despite the regime's refusal to give him a
passport, he sought to return home "to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on
justice." He was to be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane
that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at past 1 p.m. His
brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by a murderous assassin,
notwithstanding that the airport was ringed by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and
"from a military viewpoint, it (was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The
military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose
identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman,
although he was the personal friend of accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his
house on August 17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned
him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to
this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot.
The then President instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally
televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he said,

in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that "if the purpose was to
eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged the free world.
The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning and came out in
millions in the largest and most orderly public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for
his martyrdom and their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. LibLex
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983
[which] has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the
early distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so that all right thinking and
honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent and dispassionate
investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After two false starts, 5 he finally constituted
the Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983
(including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies
of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority
and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. This was to mark another first
anywhere in the world wherein the minority report was submitted one day ahead by
the ponente thereof, the chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then
President who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority report of
one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution through the legal
system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which was better known as a graft court; and the
majority report of the four other members was submitted on the following day to the then
President who coldly received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their
report with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with what you have
done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as
propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the
NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had
no subversive affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase with
Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the assassin of
Sen. Aquino" and that "the SWAT troopers who gunned down Galman and the soldiers who
escorted Sen. Aquino down the service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another,
gave a perjured story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the
mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was the product of
a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that
the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the
case headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and
therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando
Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude
nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six persons who were on the service stairs while
Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could
not have been planned and implemented without his intervention." Cdpr
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The epilogue to our
work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action that the Office of the President may
thereafter direct to be taken." The four-member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the
epilogue (after warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology
against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered institutions"), that
"the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of what unchecked
evil would be capable of doing" They wrote: cdphil

"The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late former
Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the Board to
uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over irrationality,
humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test, the inevitable
result of which will restore our country's honored place among the sovereign
nations of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom, and justice are a
way of life.
"More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the
late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading
Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been haunting
this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of peace and
order, economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an increasing
number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble institutions in our
country the military and law enforcement agencies. We are, however,
convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and men of these
institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated to their noble mission
in the service of our country and people.
"The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears of
what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign Minister
Abba Eban observes. 'Nobody who has great authority can be trusted not to go
beyond its proper limits.' Social apathy, passivity and indifference and neglect
have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the values held
sacred by freedom-loving people.
"To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public
officials should regard public service as a reflection of human ideals in which the
highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
"A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that
followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the Armed
Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem and respect
and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend all other
considerations."
It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts and statements
from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's above findings and insisted on the
military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no
involvement of anyone in his government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP
Manila Bureau Chief) in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am convinced that if
any member of my government were involved, I would have known somehow . . . Even at a fairly
low level, I would have known. I know how they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told
CBS in another interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings) the
following:
"CBS: 'But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict earlier
reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the guards
may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy)."
"MARCOS: 'Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are the
newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence still
proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there were
intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing.'" 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going on leave of absence
upon release of the Board's majority report implicating him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more
aware, general, that the circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its
findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and testimony. And we are
deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called evidence, you have been so accused by some
members of the Board," and extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy
resolution of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his position
as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an interview on June 4, 1985 with the
Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that
"as will probably be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo
Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other
petitioners, composed of three former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former
university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and
solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan
and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did
not represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to
present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution and that
the Sandiganbayan Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that
their acts "clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the truth
about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary
restraining order restraining the respondent Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the
merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that
judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. 10
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it,
the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court
also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and
respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the
prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the signature page of which alone had been submitted
to the Court as Annex 5 of his comment. cdll
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse,
12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days
earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. 13 The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent
Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them and
which they alleged was "very material to the question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within
which to file a consolidated reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to
three vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal
did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing
on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression
of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs
demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an
unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict
because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not
impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2,
1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for
reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled,
respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged,
declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another
unusual first in that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando
Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very information and
evidence submitted by the prosecution. In opposition, respondents submitted that with the
Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On
February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit, with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for
reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the
startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in
the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then
President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and
the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26
respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. cdrep
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration
and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed on April 11, 1986
that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April 8, 1986 when he was replaced by the
new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales, but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition,
he added "relative to the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera,
herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the
premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the
case after preliminary investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2)
murder cases below against herein private-party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of pressure. That there
were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never been denied." 15a He submitted that
"even as he vehemently denies insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in
any alleged attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable Court
find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases below, he would welcome
such development so that any wrong that had been caused may be righted and so that, at the very
least the actuations of herein respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined,
confident as he is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated
his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales in his comment of
April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact,
he urged that the said cases be reopened in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9,
1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the
basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the
former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured
into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering
Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only to allow
justice to take its course." Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a
separate comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied about is
not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note or of any note of any kind
intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of the prosecution; and requested for an
investigation by this Court to settle the note-passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986 affirmed the allegations in
the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and

Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
He amplified his revelations, as follows:
"1. AB INITIO, A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the fate
of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando
Galman on August 21, 1983 was dooned to an ignominous end. Malacaang wanted
dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating
Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto Bernabe and Leonardo
Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted by the panel, and a resolution
charging all the respondents as principals was forwarded to the Tanodbayan on
January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL.
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former
President) summoned to Malacaang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the
Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding Justice) and
all the members of the Panel.
Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former President
had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as principals),
evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the contents
thereof. LLjur
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot Aquino
at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the theory, to
remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former President became
emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about Aquino
and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal Panel.
Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: 'It will be bloody . . .
Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor Johnny does not
know what to do' . . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is that his stint is only
temporary, but he is becoming ambitious;' . . . 'the boys were frantic when they
heard that they will be charged in court, and will be detained at city jail.'
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic approach.
The former President more or less conceded that for political and legal reasons all
the respondents should be charged in court. Politically, as it will become evident
that the government was serious in pursuing the case towards its logical conclusion,
and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the other hand, legally, it was
perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted, double jeopardy would inure. The
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was ordered
to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and Director Jolly
Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their respective institutions.
The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to commanding officers of members
of AFP charged in court) was never mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally handle
the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in four to six
months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: 'Magmoro-moro na lang kayo.'
The parting words of the former President were: 'Thank you for your cooperation. I
know how to reciprocate.'
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested his
desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This, as well
as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that with sufficient
evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution, all involves in the
trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and injustice of
proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to say on."
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the holding of a
"make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the Informations with the
Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there were no members of the media; the
installation of TV monitors directly beamed to Malacaang; the installation of a "war room"
occupied by the military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the
suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about the "scrambling" of
Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and the bias and partiality of the
Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea that it "should not decide these cases on the
merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding
Justice's over-kill with the declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil
liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has been the
prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only occasion where civil liability is
pronounced in a decision of acquittal." He "associated himself with the motion for
reconsideration and likewise prayed that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its
decision be declared null and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted that a declaration of
mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence supportive of petitioners' claim of
suppression of evidence and collusion. He submitted that this would require reception of
evidence by a Court-appointed or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was
done in G.R. No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R. No.
70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were substantiated, a reopening of the
double murder case is proper to avoid a miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would
no longer be a valid basis for a double jeopardy claim. prLL
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial.
Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the government was to file a direct action
to annul the judgment of acquittal and at a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and
pressures.
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the
issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment
of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver
and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void
for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof
falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the
nullity.
After petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed of retired
Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired Intermediate Appellate Court
Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence,

testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters,
upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition.
The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986 and ending on July
16, 1986. On the said last day, respondents announced in open hearing that they decided to
forego the taking of the projected deposition of former President Marcos, as his testimony
would be merely corroborative of the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and
Tanodbayan Fernandez. On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16
wherein it discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its findings
in capsulized form, as follows:
"1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and the Special
Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe and Special
Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the twenty-six (26)
respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should all be charged as
principals of the crime of double murder for the death of Senator Benigno Aquino
and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacaang learned of the impending filing of the said charge before the
Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having already prepared a draft
Resolution recommending such course of action, President Marcos summoned
Justice Fernandez, the three members of the Special Investigating Panel, and
Justice Pamaran to a conference in Malacaang in the early evening of January 10,
1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with
the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and disputed the findings
of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was convinced of the
advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after being acquitted as
planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the doctrine of
double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied
bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged with capital offenses,
President Marcos directed that the several accused be 'categorized' so that some
of them would merely be charged as accomplices and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the case be handled
personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in the earliest possible
time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacaang conference were followed to the letter;
and compliance therewith manifested itself in several specific instances in the
course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of the resolution of the special
investigating panel, the filing of the case with the Sandiganbayan and its
assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some vital evidence, harassment of
witnesses, recantation of witnesses who gave adverse testimony before the Agrava
Board, coaching of defense counsels, the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings,
and even in the very decision rendered in the case.
8. That expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he wanted the
Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted sufficient pressure
on those involved in said task to comply with the same in the subsequent course of
the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no revulsion
against complying with the Malacaang directive, Justice Herrera played his role
with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and predetermined
manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case, as
stage-managed from Malacaang and performed by willing dramatis personnae as
well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the omni-present influence of an
authoritarian ruler."
The Commission submitted the following recommendation. prcd
"Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond
their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully
ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise
presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission
is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and
judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been
vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the
prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted."
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with copies of the Report
and required them to submit their objections thereto. It thereafter heard the parties and their
objections at the hearing of August 26, 1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's
resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the basis thereof and of
the evidence received and appreciated by the Commission and duly supported by the facts of
public record and knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President
(code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and
predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that
"the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same
acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist,
and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of
the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil
liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by reference) and findings and
conclusions are duly substantiated by the evidence and facts of public record. Composed of
distinguished members of proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the
practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86 years in the trial and
appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the grain, 17 the Commission properly
appraised the evidences presented and denials made by public respondents, thus:
"The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of in a
manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to be
expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide
international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those
then in power who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive to
eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President Marcos
came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was
killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore,
not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a
manner consistent with his announced theory thereof which, at the same time,
would clear his name and his administration of any suspected guilty participation
in the assassination.
"The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish thus purpose . . .
"President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them. From the
start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation of the
investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as principals of
the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who shot Senator
Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not supported by evidence
that could stand in court. He discussed and argued with Justice Herrera on this
point. Midway in the course of the discussion, mention was made that the filing of
the charge in court would at least mollify public demands and possibly prevent
further street demonstrations. It was further pointed out that such a procedure
would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and
subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall
appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
"After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it, but
with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or accessories, and
the question of preventive custody of the accused having thereby received
satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of who would try the
case and how long it would take to be finished.
"According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point blank'
to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No similar
denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-day
testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have been given
inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan would try the case
and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a division and not to a
particular Justice thereof.
"It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such
presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact
that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division
headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the
circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the
Malacaang conference wherein the said directive was given . . .
"The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked as to
how long it would take him to finish the case.
"The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an
agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused,President Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and
that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate,' did not receive any denial or
contradiction either on the part of Justice Fernandez or Justice Pamaran. (No
other person present in the conference was presented by the respondents.
Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their intention to present
Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was abandoned without any
reason having been given therefor.).
"The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the mind
of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is that
pressure from Malacaang had indeed been made to bear on both the court and
the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-Galman case. The
intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the personality of the one
who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over those to whom his
instructions were directed, the motivation behind such instructions, and the
nature of the government prevailing at that time which enabled the then head of
state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the conference called to script or
stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the Aquino-Galman case was
considered as something anomalous that should be kept away from the public eye
is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy. None but those directly involved were
called to attend. The meeting was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the
First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President.
The conferees were told totake the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall
waiting to see the President. Actually, no public mention was ever made of this
conference until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later
when the former President was no longer around.
"President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he wanted
to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it
personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist the
presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome implications on
their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily inferred from their
unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was made, despite the
existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame excuses that they went
there out of 'curiosity,' or 'out of respect to the Office of the President,' or that it
would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from the President.' Such frame of
mind only reveals their susceptibility to presidential pressure and lack of capacity
to resist the same. The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in
themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. Their abject deference to
President Marcos may likewise be inferred from the admitted fact that, not having
been given seats during the two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was
not that long, but did not say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking
most of the time, they listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any
avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became
illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacaang Palace on January
10, 1985." 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more significant inquiry is on
whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such
pressure, as may be gauged by their subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the
case." It duly concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference held on
January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino-Galman [murder] cases" as
manifested in several specific incidents and instances it enumerated in the Report under the
heading of "Manifestations of Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution charging all the twenty-six
accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver
and Olivas and 6 others as accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for
the latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by saying that, in
the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence to justify that all of the accused
be charged as principals. The majority of the Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and
recommended that all of the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of
such finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance with the

standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most serious possible offense or
in the highest category so as to prevent an incurable injustice in the event that the evidence
presented in the trial will show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical
course of action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to charge all
the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez readily opted for categorization
which, not surprisingly, was in consonance with the Malacaang instruction." It is too much to
attribute to coincidence that such unusual categorization came only after the then President's
instruction at Malacaang when Gen. Ver's counsel Atty. Coronel, had been asking the same of
Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that,
as of that time, [the Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity
with that of the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as
principals of the crime of double murder. 19 As the Commission further noted, "Justice Fernandez
never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit
'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as principals] was to have been the subject of a press conference on
the afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them to go to
Malacaang in the early evening of said date." 20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses: "Realizing, no doubt, that a party's
case is as strong as the evidence it can present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted
in behalf of the accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify [the
accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were sought to be suppressed, and
some were indeed prevented from being ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled,
perjured or threatened either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses: 21 Cesar Loterina, PAL
employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who recanted their testimonies before the
Fact Finding Board and had to be discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial.
Witnesses Viesca and Raas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and
could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to stifle Kiyoshi
Wakamiya, eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful flight on August 21, 1983 and
described them as "palpable, if crude and display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not
even allowed to return to Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary
of Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next plane for Tokyo.
The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his testimony before the Japanese police in
accordance with their law and Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English
transcription of his testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there was no clear
showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription which was in Nippon-go. Upon his
arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial,
"a shot was fired and a soldier was seen running away by media men who sought to protect
Wakamiya from harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to leave
the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request to let him stay until he
could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the case of principal eyewitness Rebecca
Quijano, the Commission reported that Cdpr
". . . Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed
testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts
exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the case of
Wakamiya . . . She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life, having been
hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was ransacked, her
family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their house by the local
Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the request of its manager to
talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a certain William Farias offered
her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor Rudy Farias of Laoag City kept on
calling her sister in the United States to warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy
and William Farias offered her two million pesos supposedly coming from
Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in
Hongkong, and the punishment of the persons responsible for the death of her
father, if she would refrain from testifying.
"It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments, or
perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by Justice Fernandez of the displeasure
expressed by Olympus at Justice Herrera's going out of his way to make Ms.
Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend the birthday
party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms. Quijano's testimony on
May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with her testimony, however, did
not end with her taking the witness stand. In the course of her testimony several
notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, the defense counsel who
cross-examined her, one of which suggested that she be asked more questions
about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of having coached her as to what to
declare (Exhibit 'D'); and on another occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a
power brownout occurred; which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the
courtroom into darkness, and making most of those present to scamper for safety,
and Ms. Quijano to pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the
courtroom. It was verified that the brownout was limited to the building housing
the Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the
Finance Building Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the
Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room occupied by
Malacaang people who were keeping track of the proceedings."
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th hearing that the
two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls) disappeared on September 4, 1984, two
weeks after Ninoy's assassination. And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl)
who jotted down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On January 29,
1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the common-law wife of Rolando
Galman, was kidnapped together with a neighbor named Rogelio Taruc. They have been missing
since then, despite his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for
these five persons because they said Marcos was in power [despite his appeal to the Minister of
National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one is looking for these people." And he
appealed to the new leadership for its assistance in learning their fate.
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen: "While it is true that the U.S.
airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of the Philippine Air Force to divert the
plane to Basa Airfield or some other place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the
theory of the prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila
International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such attempt of scrambling
Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or
three other plans designed to accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any
event, even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not be
successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the prosecution to totally
discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor inconsistencies contained therein, its
introduction could have helped the cause of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would
even favor the defense, as averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the
same would have been totally uncalled for. LLjur
"4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse developments: "When the Supreme
Court denied the petition of Justice Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by
the military respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter almost
immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the reconsideration of said
denial, for the reason that it would be futile to do so and foolhardy to expect a favorable action
on the same . . . His posture . . . is, in the least, indicative that he was living up to the
instruction of finishing the trial of the case as soon as possible, if not of something else.
"6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice Herrera testified
that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank to handle the case.
The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such instruction crumbles under the actuality of such
directive having been complied with to the letter . . .
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by President
Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the
Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a
division thereof. The evidence before the Commission on how the case happened
to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that such assignment
was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice
Pamaran . . . Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be
presented by the respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid
Memorandum, such was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could
not, or would not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or
employees of the Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were
present during the supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice
Pamaran as regards the said raffle.
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case
were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the
members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18
minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual
assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not extraordinary,
considering that before a case filed may be included in the raffle, there is need for
a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If such preliminary
requirements were done in this case within the limited time available therefor,
the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence of media people would
ring with truth.
"What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been actually
conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence on how or why it was
handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the decision thereof, and not by
any one of the two other members of his division . . ."
7. The custody of the accused; their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail:
"When the question of custody came up after the case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter
issued an order directing the confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was
not carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that there was no
space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same information was given when the custody
was proposed to be given to the National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau
of Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No. 1950A which
authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with their respective Commanding
Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said Presidential Decree was not known even to the
Tanodbayan Justice Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to
request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime . . .
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang
personnel. "There is an uncontradicted evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan as well as the developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacaang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take remedial measures as may
be necessary, Justice Pamaran had candidly admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the
label of 'Office of the President of the Philippines'" were installed in the courtroom for that
purpose. There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously called 'war room', wherein
military and Malacaang personnel stayed to keep track of the proceedings," the close
monitoring by Malacaang showed its results oh several occasions specified in the
Report. Malacaang was immediately aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence in
Justice Herrera's office on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having
the Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise, Col. Balbino
Diego, Malacaang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the National Bureau of Investigation
office when the "crying lady" Rebecca Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation
and therein sought to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission
noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the Sandiganbayan and
attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's
inescapable finding: "It is abundantly clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as
to how the case should be handled. He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be
complied with.
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That President Marcos had wanted all of
the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said
manner is an integral part of the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two
principal objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then
administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public clamor for the
suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and [2] the foreclosure of any
possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the same offense in the event that President
Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was glaringly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded. . . . It was deemed not
sufficient to simply acquit all of the twenty-six accused on thestandard ground that their guilt
had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate way of
justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of evidence that could show
guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to pronounce them 'innocent of the
crime charged on the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil
liability.' It is a rare phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such
total absolution. . . .
"Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices who concurred
with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was revealed by Justice Herrera who
testified that in October, 1985, when the decision was being prepared, Justice Augusto Amores
told him that he was of the view that some of the accused should be convicted, he having found
difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that Justice Pamaran
made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacaang had instructions to acquit all of the
twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p. 49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he
would confirm this statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second
Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93). This testimony of
Justice Herrera remained unrebutted." (Emphasis supplied).
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President used, or more
precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to
corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As
graphically depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitura 22 ), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential
Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was
unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not
acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused
after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang conference, would accomplish the two
principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in
court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacaang conference at which the authoritarian President called together
the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution
panel headed by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro)
the trial and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-determined
ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence.
To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975 letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus,
25 "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "anyexecutive
officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any
case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice." 26 His obsession
for "the boys'" acquittal led to several first which would otherwise be inexplicable:
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact Finding Board that he
himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy and national shame" of the "treacherous
and vicious assassination of Ninoy Aquino" and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent
and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators.
"2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day ahead of the four
majority members and instantly referred it to respondents "for final resolution through the legal
system" as if it were the majority and controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members
when they presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26
respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven under the chairman's
minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict of acquittal, he totally
disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of fact and publicly insisted that the
military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify
the soldiers' incompetence and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to
their alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and sealing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect convicted Rolando Galman as
Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was not on trial but the victim according to the very
information filed, and evidence to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by Justice Amores who wanted to
convict some of the accused) granted all 26 accused total absolution and pronounced them
"innocent of the crimes charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither
criminal nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact Finding
Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman being Aquino's killer
a "perjuredstory, given deliberately and in conspiracy with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacaang conference of January 10, 1985 at which the authoritarian
President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution
panel the matter of the imminent filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused
(as admitted by respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then
President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied. It is without
precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This illegality vitiated from the very
beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan court headed by the very Presiding Justice who
attended. As the Commission noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacaang and their
ready acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure
dramatized and exemplified . . . Verily, it can be said that any avowal of independent action or
resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside
Malacaang Palace on January 10, 1985." LLphil
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President who
by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984
on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the known P.D. 1850 at
the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal offenses committed
by military men 26a ) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an
impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive,
which could be much too easily transformed into a means ofpredetermining the outcome of
individual cases." 26b This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the cases by
public respondents at the secret Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months
by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab
initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories,
that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous
conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and considerations
at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court. LLphil
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law andjustice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the
enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor
and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at
stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a
civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the "treacherous
and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead
once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the non-trial of the
century and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the
Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
"Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
case, its right to due process is thereby violated. 27a
"The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of
the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971] which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78;
Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or
decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a 'lawless
thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head' (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
"Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
"Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
(People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was not competent as it was
ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due
process.
"In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to
a second jeopardy."
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered
respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire
proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of all the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera
which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the case, as it was his belief that its
eventual resolution was already a foregone conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and
abuse of the overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its witnesses, secure their
recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the prosecution's difficulties in
locating witnesses and overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify,
respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or less than a year, pursuant to the
scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile
attitude towards (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt
proceedings as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of
being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances that if given a certain
period, they will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of
preparation of its evidence" and cited other pending cases before respondent court that were
pending trial for a much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not
maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied
due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar
is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and
unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the
authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law,
he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. prLL
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ends the case
which cannot be appealed or reopened, without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully
disposed of by the Court in People vs. Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows:
"That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out, however,
respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without
jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being
worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone.
All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail, the scales must
balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of the society, which they
have wronged must also be equally considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a
denial of justice. A verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the
party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where the Courts play
a vital role. They render justice where justice is due. 30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. The private prosecutors had
filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on
grounds of manifest bias and partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now
Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to
defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the hearing of June 25,
1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the
case on the merits without first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted
the exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's "following the script of
Malacaang"
"PJ PAMARAN
"Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal later
on with that. After all the most important thing here is, shall we say, the decision
of the case."
"J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the capacity
of the Justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything else." (p.
13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Italics supplied by Herrera)." 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly blamed him, in the
decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for inhibition, contrary to the facts
above-stated, as follows:
". . . the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the
contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution neither
joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a similar
motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now is not
alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance." (Page 22,
Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of respondents
Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the 1969 case of Paredes vs.
Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent court might result in a verdict of acquittal,
leaving the offended party without any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule,
not to mention the overriding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of
denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the Tanodbayan to present
the complete evidence for the prosecution is substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and
lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision
had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent
Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the
accused pending the final action of this Court. This is the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan 35 ,
wherein the court in setting aside the hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that
(respondent judge) refrain from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave way to imprudence;
the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the cases [hastily without awaiting this
Court's action]. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his
part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents. The other related objections of respondents' counsels must
be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration that the trial was a mock trial and that the
predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul the judgment, instead of
the present action which was timely filed initially to declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition
of the void judgment. And after the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its
nullity, following the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the Court's
findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not only by lack of due
process but also by the collusion between the public respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the
rendition of a predetermined verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused. cdll
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities in the conduct of the
proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the integrity or validity of the judgment or
verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the sovereign people are not
entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence
cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted the pressure applied by the
authoritarian president on public respondents and that no evidence was suppressed against them
must be held to be untenable in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained
wholesale exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg.
Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein held that a party should be entitled to only one
Supreme Court and may not speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his
lost case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation be put to an
end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration reiterating the same arguments should
be kept pending so long (for over six (6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first
motion for reconsideration). This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here, petitioners'
second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20, 1986 following the denial
under date of February 4th of the first motion for reconsideration and the same was admitted per
the Court's Resolution of April 3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing
after the Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the Court only
last August 26th. Then, the second motion for reconsideration is based on an entirely new
material ground which was not known at the time of the denial of the petition and filing of the
first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the secret Malacaang conference on January 10, 1985
which came to light only fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per-adventure
(as proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the authoritarian
president had dictated and predetermined the final outcome of acquittal. Hence, the ten
members of the Court (without any new appointees) unanimously voted to admit the second
motion for reconsideration. 37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. There has been the long dark night of
authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan
Ponce Enrile (as now admitted by Enrile himself) was staged to trigger the imposition of martial
law and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the abolition of the
office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his valedictory to the new
members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years, the judiciary was under heavy attack by an
extremely powerful executive. During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the
judiciary perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was
overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its true
manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring public faith and
confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither the power of the sword nor of the
purse. Its strength has mainly in public confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its
judgments. This has been built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiality, integrity
and fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which compels
acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower courts draw their bearings from
the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment today declaring the nullity of the questioned
judgment or acquittal and directing a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of
becoming instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The end of
one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of another. This simply means that
the respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had
denied the people and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to the
accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way of knowing when
justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed. cdrep
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their
primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the
people or the Constitution must be discarded. The function of the appointing authority with the
mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the
appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service,
the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must
be rendered to the Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of
office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor
minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office,
guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation. The Court expresses its appreciation with thanks for the invaluable
services rendered by the Commission composed of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M.
Vasquez, chairman, and retired Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa
as members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and without
remuneration thorough, competent and dedicated service in discharging their tasks of hearing
and receiving the evidence, evaluating the same and submitting their Report and findings to the
Court within the scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of
November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying
the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering
a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful
regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice
done to all.

This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, Fernan and Narvasa, JJ., took no part.
Feliciano, J., I join Gutierrez, Jr., J., in his statements in the last three paragraphs (prior to the
dispositive paragraph) of his Separate Concurring Opinion.
||| (Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670, [September 12, 1986], 228 PHIL 42-102)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO

JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.]
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO

SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner Bayani M. Alonte.

Ramon C. Casano for petitioner in 131728.
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for respondent Judge.
SYNOPSIS
Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna and Buenaventura

Concepcion were charged with rape based on the complaint of Juvielyn
Punongbayan. During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, Juvielyn,
assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance. The
petition for change of venue was granted and the case was raffled to respondent
judge who issued warrants of arrest for petitioners. Juvielyn reiterated her
"decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance." Petitioners pleaded not guilty
when arraigned and waived pre-trial. Immediately following arraignment the
prosecution presented Juvielyn who testified to the validity and voluntariness of
her affidavit of desistance and that she has no interest in further prosecuting the
action. The Prosecution then manifested that the State had no further evidence
against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She then moved for the
"dismissal of the case" against both accused-petitioners. The two accused did not
present any countervailing evidence, did not take the witness stand nor admitted
the act charged in the information. Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the

case was submitted for decision." On December 18, 1997, a decision was rendered
convicting petitioners of rape. IEaCDH
Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over
the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard;
and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above
constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable.
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of
the Rules of Court which should be strictly adhered to. There can be no short-cut
to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of
honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
An affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the
so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case
once the action has been instituted.
Prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the highest
degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal which
has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow. TEDaAc
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS;

REQUISITES. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal
proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c)
that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural
due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
2. ID.; ID.; THERE CAN BE NO SHORT-CUT TO THE LEGAL PROCESS AND THERE CAN
BE NO EXCUSE FOR NOT AFFORDING AN ACCUSED HIS FULL DAY IN COURT. The
existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences." Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed
as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver. The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners

have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates
therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent
Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged in
the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. There can be
no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an
accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost
place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN PROBATIVE
VALUE. In the case of People vs. Junio, the Court held that: Thus, we have
declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given
value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court
of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on changed his mind
for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and
place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits
of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for
monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as
exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
4. ID.; COURTS; WITH INHERENT POWER TO COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF ANY
PERSON TO TESTIFY. Courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance
of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not precluded
from invoking that authority.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE; THOUGH CONSTRUED AS PARDON IN
"PRIVATE CRIMES," IT IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL OF CRIMINAL ACTION. An
affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
"private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the
action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier
intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any
other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. EaSCAH
6. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES; IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT A COURT IS
IMPARTIAL, IT MUST ALSO BE PERCEIVED TO BE IMPARTIAL. Relative to the
prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case,
the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be
best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the personalities here
involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old
case of Luque vs. Kayanan could again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing
short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty
of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to the fairness and
integrity of the Judge. It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be
perceived as impartial.
7. ID.; ATTORNEYS; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE AND UNKIND ASCRIPTIONS
CAN HARDLY BE JUSTIFIED. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his client
or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be
done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have a place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a
treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it. DHEcCT
8. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTORS; EXPECTED TO ACT WITH UTMOST
DEVOTION AND DEDICATION TO DUTY. Finally, it may be opportune to say, once
again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time
with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that the zeal
which has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a
disappointment on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to
follow.
PUNO, J., separate opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; RECANTATION; CONSTRUED. A recantation usually
applies to a repudiation by a complainant or a witness, either for the prosecution
or the defense, who has previously given an extrajudicial statement or testimony
in court. Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by sworn statement, or by
testifying on the witness stand.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY LOOKED UPON WITH DISFAVOR. Mere retraction by a
witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily vitiate the
original testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is that courts look
with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. This rule
applies to crimes, offenses as well as to administrative offenses. The reason is
because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover,
there is always the probability that they will later be repudiated and there would
never be an end to criminal litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule for courts
to reject testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on changed their minds for one reason or
another. This would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of
the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION. The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit
should not be peremptorily dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. There are
instances when a recantation may create serious doubts as to the guilt of the
accused. A retracted statement or testimony must be subject to scrupulous
examination. The previous statement or testimony and the subsequent one must
be carefully compared and the circumstances under which each was given and the
reasons and motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each
statement or testimony must be tested by the credibility of the witness which is
left for the judge to decide. In short, only where there exists special
circumstances in the case which when coupled with the retraction raise doubts as
to the truth of the testimony or statement given, can a retraction be considered
and upheld.
4. ID.; ID.; AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE, GENERALLY WITH NO PERSUASIVE EFFECT.
An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a sworn statement executed by a
complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he or she is discontinuing the
action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever reason he or she may cite. The
court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance especially when executed as an
afterthought. However, as in retractions, an affidavit of desistance calls for a
reexamination of the records of the case. cAHDES
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WEIGHT IN PRIVATE CRIMES. In private crimes, an affidavit of
desistance filed by a private complainant is also frowned upon by the courts.
Although such affidavit may deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly an
instance when this Court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed the case on
the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon mere affidavit of
desistance of the complainant, particularly where there exist special
circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.
6. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRIVATE CRIMES; CANNOT BE PROSECUTED EXCEPT
UPON COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED PARTY. Private crimes cannot be prosecuted
except upon complaint filed by the offended party. In adultery and concubinage,
the offended party must implead both the guilty parties and must not have
consented or pardoned the offenders. In seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents or guardian. The complainant must not have expressly pardoned the
offender. The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the
guilty parties. It is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding without
which the fiscal and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case. Once the
complaint is filed, the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
7. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; MODES. Article 344 also
provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It mentions two
modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and timely made, result in the
total extinction of criminal liability of the offender. The pardon in private crimes
must be made before the institution of the criminal action. In adultery and
concubinage, the pardon may be express or implied while in seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In all cases, the
pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal action. After the case
has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by
sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability. The
only act that extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been
imposed is the marriage between the offender and the offended party.
8. ID.; ID.; PARDON IN PRIVATE CRIMES; MUST COME BEFORE INSTITUTION OF
CRIMINAL ACTION. Pardon by the offended party extinguishes criminal liability
when made while the crime is still "private" and within the control of the offended
party. But once the case is filed in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto operate to
dismiss the case. After the institution of the criminal action, any pardon given by
the complainant to the offender would be unavailing, except of course when the
offender validly marries the offended party. The offended party's pardon of the
offender in a seduction case after the criminal action had been instituted
constitutes no bar to said action. A pardon given in a rape case after the filing of
the action in court "comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from public
notice."
9. ID.; ID.; DESISTANCE, NOT A GROUND. Article 344 does not include desistance
of the offended party from prosecuting the case as a ground for extinction of
criminal liability whether total or partial. Hence, only when the desistance is
grounded on forgiveness and pardon and is made before the institution of the
criminal action, can it extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not
equivalent to pardon.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of
Juvielyn is not an express pardon of the accused and the crime committed. Private
complainant desisted from prosecuting the case against the petitioners because
she wished "to start life anew and live normally again." She reiterated this reason
on the witness stand. She complained that members of the media were bothering
and harassing her and that she wanted to go back to her normal life. She never
said that she forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve them from their
culpability. She did not give any exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about
her rape. She did not say that she consented to petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover,
the rape case is already in court and it is no longer her right to decide whether or
not the charge should be continued.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; ACCUSED DENIED
THEREOF WHERE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION WAS RENDERED WITHOUT TRIAL.
Justice Puno agrees with the majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings
could not have been a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not
conform with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In the case at bar, petitioners were never instructed to present
evidence to prove their defenses. The parties were never given the opportunity to
present their respective evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant.
There was no admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to
justify a change in the order of trial. Second, the admission of private
complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in response to
respondent judge's own questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent judge
used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it
formally offered before the court. Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature
of the criminal proceedings before the court, this doubt must be resolved in favor
of the accused who must be given the widest latitude of action to prove his
innocence. It is in petitioners' favor that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be
treated as a hearing on the motion to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule
otherwise will effectively deny petitioners due process and all the other rights of
an accused under the Bill of Rights and our Rules in Criminal Procedure. AHacIS
12. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RULES STRICTLY ADHERED TO. Our
criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death. This rule also applies to all other
criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
The reason for this is to assure that the State makes no mistake in taking life and
liberty except that of the guilty.
13. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED, NOT TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION. Evidence not formally offered in court will not be taken into
consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence
which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be
offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. Indeed, following
respondent judge's finding and assuming that the November 7, 1997 hearing was
already a trial on the merits, petitioners were never afforded their right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. The court did not, at the very least,
inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine private
complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to
cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they cannot
be deemed to have waived said right by inaction.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner
Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner
Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"),
Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated. llcd
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani
M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion
predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information
contained the following averments; thus:
"That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian,
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
above named accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Bian,
Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made
her dizzy and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion without having

participated as principal or accessory assisted in the commission of
the offense by bringing said complainant child to the rest house of
accused Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna and
after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani
Alonte who subsequently raped her.
Contrary to Law." 1
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch
25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor ("ACSP") Leonardo
Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a
Change of Venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the
case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997,
Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and counsel, executed an affidavit
of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
"I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident
of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon
City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after
having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor
Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of
Bian, Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary
issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme
Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and
after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President,
on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel
of the State Prosecutor's Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and
(c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I
have already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And
when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are
finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my
schooling to attend the hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family
has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give
up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to
stop his schooling, like myself;
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I
simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we
can start life anew, and live normally once again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape
and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a
prima facie case although the information has not been filed, and
that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new
cases, whether criminal, civil, and or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will
put to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor,
premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be no
reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or
any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who extended
assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in
Quezon City.
"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Complainant
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
"In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in
Quezon City.
"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer" 2
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have
the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot
in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab
filed his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not
aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in
any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor
who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed
for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No.
97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for change of venue. The Court said:
"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being
used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte
and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her
private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not
fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing
her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed
to some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible
miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to
transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna
to the City of Manila.
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian,
Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC
Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its
branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be
raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings
filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and determine the
voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC
of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive
Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B
upon receipt of this Resolution." 3
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by
the Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with
respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted
to the Manila court a "compliance" where she reiterated "her decision to abide by
her Affidavit of Desistance."
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the
issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion "without
prejudice to, and independent of, this Court's separate determination as the trier
of facts, of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance
in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab."
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago
Toledo of the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), while Concepcion,. in his
case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded "not guilty" to
the charge. The parties manifested that they were waiving pre-trial. The
proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to
proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. 4 According to Alonte, however,
Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the
question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. 5
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution
presented private complainant Juvie-lyn Punongbayan followed by her parents.
During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her
affidavit of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive
testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no interest in further
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to
desist because of the harassment she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that
no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo
from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i)
Punongbayan's parents, who affirmed their signatures on the affidavit of
desistance and their consent to their daughter's decision to desist from the case,
and (ii) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the
affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents in his presence
and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily.
Finally, Campomanes manifested that in light of the decision of private
complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved
for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." 6
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail."
Assistant State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date,
stated that the State interposed "no objection to the granting of bail and in fact
Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting
of bail."
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for
Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and
in accord with justice and fair play to Join the aforestated motion."
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997,
8th December 1997 and 10th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second,
Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for
petitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC Manila Branch 53, notifying him
of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the
case. The counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of
the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the promulgation of the
decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the
NBI clinic and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel
would appear not to have been notified of the proceedings. The promulgation,
nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2)
accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as
defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation to Article 27
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
for which each one of the them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for
twenty (20) years; and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
"In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura
'Wella' Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
and rendered without any further force and effect.
"SO ORDERED." 7
On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for
reconsideration. Without waiting for its resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam" for certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail,
Recusation of respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC
Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorariand mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the
decision nullified and the case remanded for new trial; thus:
"The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the

petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III,
1, Constitution).
Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory provisions
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and
order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment
(Rule 120; Annex A).
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard
of the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal
jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A)
on the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan's and Balbin's)
which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the
prosecution, nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to
cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of
petitioner's right to due process (Article III, 1, Constitution).
Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts
which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner
(Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous
precedent where heinous offenses can result in conviction without
trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up
with the same result)." 8
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his
own petition; thus:
"1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of
resolving the prosecution's motion to dismiss the case is a patent
nullity for having been rendered without jurisdiction, without the
benefit of a trial and in total violation of the petitioner's right to
due process of law.
"2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as
far as petitioner is concerned.
"3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of
the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge whose
actuations and outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister
desire to ride on the crest of media hype that surrounded this case
and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a
higher court.
"4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence
in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he
has been charged only as an accomplice in the information." 9
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case
milieu, the prematurity of petitioners' invocation, i e., even before the trial court
could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has
proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the waiver by the parties of the
pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that
"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence
during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or
deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private
complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly
affirmed and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their
respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for
decision merely on the basis of the private complainant's so called
'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough for their
purposes. They left everything to the so-called 'desistance' of the
private complainant." 10
According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted
on 07 November 1997, aside from the arraignment of the accused, was merely a
proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative Case
No. 97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of
desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct
of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have well been avoided had not
the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception taken lightly. And in this
shortcoming, looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not
alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the
fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment,
trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable."
Jurisprudence 11 acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in
particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed
with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the
accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered
only upon lawful hearing. 12
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and
indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed
in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." 13
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of
the Rules of Court; viz:
"Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge
and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional
remedy in the case.
"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence
only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue
orally or to submit memoranda.
"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission
charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
In Tabao vs. Espina, 14 the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to
the above rules. It reminds that
". . . each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the
trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence
in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient
opportunity to present his defense. So, with the prosecution as to
its evidence.
"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should
always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the
case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of
their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but
also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be
wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice
and fairness. 15
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that

"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on
07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of choice. None of
their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim
Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in answer to
respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and
truth of her two affidavits one detailing the rape and the other
detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was
missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the
right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and
may be waived."' (emphasis supplied)
It should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be
positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires that it "not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 Mere
silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver. 17 The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the deviations
from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1)
Petitioners have not been directed to present evidence to prove their defenses
nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; 18 (2) the parties
have not been given the opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have
dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; 19 and (3) petitioners
have not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any
modification in the order of trial. 20 There can be no short-cut to the legal
process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in
court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in
our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied
even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case
would have to be sent back to the court a quo, thisponencia has carefully avoided
making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or
as pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court
likewise deems it appropriate that all related proceedings therein, including the
petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial
court. LLpr
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of
desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan,

hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that disavows the
veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed
to withdraw" her complaint and to discontinue with the case for varied other
reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs. Junio, 21 should be instructive.
The Court has there explained:
"The appellant's submission that the execution of an Affidavit of
Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her mother
supported the 'inherent incredibility of prosecution's evidence' is
specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is
shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the
police, positively identifying him as the person who raped her,
enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court by
recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and
declare that '[a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she)
find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.'
"Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would
be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court
of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make
a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for
monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such
affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA
622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA
128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] 22
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People
vs. Ballabare, 23 a murder case, the Court has ruled:
"The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit
executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To
recant a prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally
and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State,
41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really
recant what she had said during the trial. She only said she wanted
to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao,
Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case against
accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
"3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the
complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute
the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance
before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic) with
my father's desire;
"It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and
scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an affidavit
withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the
defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a
public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely
affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. In this case,
Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on
her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband,
Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to
did not even bear on the substance of Tessie's affidavit. He
testified that accused-appellant was not involved in the
perpetration of the crime.
"In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically
would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People
vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita
had made a retraction, this circumstance alone does not require
the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not
necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos, 229
SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon
retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations.
[People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a
situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not
automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of
the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be
given credence through a comparison of the original testimony and
the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano
vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we think the trial
court correctly ruled." 24
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the
attendance of any person to testify in a case pending before it, and a party is not
precluded from invoking that authority. 25
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in
the so-called "private crimes," is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal case
once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier
intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any
other piece of evidence, would be up to the court for proper evaluation. The
decision in Junio went on to hold
"While '[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint
filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or
guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be,' [Third
par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code,] the pardon to justify the
dismissal of the complaint should have been made prior to the
institution of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162,
cited by People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in
People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss
to which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the
institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be
serious in 'signifying (her) intention to refrain from testifying' since
she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier
affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering
that while it was dated 'April 1992,' it was only submitted
sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information
was filed before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated as
such to coincide with the actual filing of the case." 26
In People vs. Miranda, 27 applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states -
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes
of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any
case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of

guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes."
the Court said:
"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a
prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if
the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named
persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance
of a prosecution in the offended party pardons the offender after
the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of
said cause. The only act that according to article 344 extinguishes
the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is
the marriage between the offender and the offended party." 28
In People vs. Infante, 29 decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the
Court similarly held:
"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to
dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an
affidavit executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his
guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot
prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of
the Revised Penal Code which is in question reads: 'The offended
party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both
the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision
means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before
the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further,
that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party.
To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code provided:
'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his
wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour
shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773,
section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The Revised

Penal Codethereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and
in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its provisions
which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second
paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the offended party
again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more,
however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come
before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for
both offenders to be effective circumstances which do not
concur in this case." 30
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than
what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further
hearing the case, the Court is convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible animosity between the
personalities here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of
this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan 31 could again be said: All suitors
are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just
decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion as to
the fairness and integrity of the Judge. 32 It is not enough that a court is impartial,
it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of
proper language before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting the cause of his
client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands
that it be done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified nor can have
a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal
profession is a treasured tradition that must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not
merely to discharge their duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. 33 The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited
many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment on few occasions,
will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that
(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by
Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been
filed AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935,
DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12
December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL AND
VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from further
hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall

immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other
branches of that court for proper disposition .
No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., took no part: related to one of counsel.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The facts are critical and need to be focused. Petitioners were charged with rape
in Criminal Case No. 15993 which was raffled to Br. 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna.
The charge is principally based on the following affidavit dated October 31, 1996
of Ms. Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, a 16-year old minor, viz.:
REPLY-AFFIDAVIT
(TUGON SA MGA SALAYSAY NILA MAYOR BAYANI ALONTE, WELLA
CONCEPCION, RICARDO LACAYAN at JAIME MENDOZA)
Ako si JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, Filipino, walang asawa, 16
years old, at kasalukuyang nasa pangangalaga ng Department of
Social Welfare and Development, matapos makapanumpa ayon sa
batas, ay nagsasaad:
1. Wala pong katotohanan ang lahat nakasaad sa mga salaysay ni
Mayor Bayani Alonte at Buenaventura "Wella" Concepcion, ng
kanilang mga testigo na sila Ricardo (Ading) Lacayan y Aguilar at
Jaime Bagtas Mendoza.
2. Ang totoo po ay inabuso ako ni Mayor nung September 12, 1996,
katulad nga ng naihayag ko na sa aking sinumpaang salaysay. Ayon
sa driver ng tricycle na nasakyan ko pagkatapos ng insidente, hindi
lang po ako, kundi marami pa pong babae ang inabuso ni Mayor.
Sabi pa nga ng driver ay naaawa siya sa akin, at lumaban daw ako.
Tinawagan ko na rin po ang lahat ng mga babae na naging biktima
ni Mayor; wag silang matakot, lumabas at ilahad ang pangaabuso ni
Mayor.
Ang detalya nung panggagahasa
ni Alonte at ang partisipasyon
ni Wella Concepcion
3. Nakalahad po sa sumusunod na talata ang detalya ng
pang-aabuso sa akin ni Mayor. Pinakikita rin dito kung paano siya
nakipagsabwatan kay Wella Concepcion. Sa pamamagitan nito ay
mapapabulaanan na rin ang mga nakasaad sa salaysay nila at ng
mga testigo nila.

4. Nakilala ko si Wella Concepcion, dance instructor, nung bandang
last week ng August 1996. Noon ay naghahanda ako para sa "Miss
Education" beauty contest sa Perpetual Help College of Laguna.
Doon ako nag-aaral. First year college ako, at education ang
kursong pinili ko. Ang nasabing contest ay ginanap nung Sept. 20,
1996. Kapag nagkikita kami ni Wella para sa ensayo,
nagkukuwentuhan din kami, at nabanggit niya na may kaibigan
siyang bakla na nagdadala ng babae kay Mayor Alonte. Waway daw
ang pangalan ng bakla. Hindi ko pa kilala si Waway noon.
5. Nung Sept. 7, niyaya ako ni Wella na sumali sa dance contest sa
"Sang Linggo NAPO SILA" sa Channel 2, na itatanghal sa Sept. 11,
1996. Wala na daw po akong aalalahanin. Siya daw ang bahala sa
costume at transportation. Pumayag ang nanay ko, dahil wala na
kaming gagastusin. Hindi ko tinanong kay Wella kung saan galing
ang costume. Akala ko may ipapagamit lang siya sa akin.
6. Nung Sept. 8, pinakilala ni Wella si Waway sa akin. Si Waway ang
nagturo sa amin ng sayaw para sa TV contest. Mula nung araw na
yon hanggang Sept. 10 ay nagsanay kami sa bahay ng kapatid ni
Waway sa St. Francis Subdivision, Bian, Laguna. Tatlo kami sa
dance group: ako at ang dalawang lalaki na ipinakilala sa akin ni
Waway: si Melchor at Darius.
7. Nagpunta kami sa studio sa Delta nung Sept. 11. Bago kami
magsayaw, habang inaayos ni Wella yung damit ko, sinabi niya
na dapat manalo kami dahil si Mayor Alonte daw ang nag-sponsor
ng costume namin. Noon ko lang ito nalaman. Hindi kami nanalo sa
contest, pero nagkaroon pa rin kami ng premyong P1,500.00 na
pinaghatian namin.
8. Pagkatapos ng contest, at nung nakapagpalit na ako ng damit,
binabalik ko kay Wella ang costume ko. Sabi niya iuwi ko daw ito
dahil gagamitin ko ito sa Miss Education contest, sa presentation
ng mga candidates. Mula sa studio, nagpunta kaming lahat sa isang
kainan sa tapat ng Delta at, pagkatapos namin kumain, humiwalay
yung ibang kasama namin.
9. Dinala ako ni Wella sa isang department store at binili niya ako
ng sandals. Inikot niya ako sa lugar na yon at binili niya ako ng
pagkain. Tapos ay sumakay kami ng bus pauwi sa Laguna. Nung
nasa bus kami, niyaya ako ni Wella na magpunta sa bahay ni Mayor
para magpasalamat ng personal para sa costume namin. Pumayag
ako at sabi ko kay Wella na sunduin niya ako sa bahay ng 10:00 a.m.
sa susunod na araw, Sept. 12. Nakarating ako sa bahay ng 5:00 p.m.
ng araw na yon, Sept. 11.
10. Nung Sept. 12, hinintay ko si Wella ng 10:00 a.m. Nung hindi
siya dumating umalis kami ng Tita ko dahil sinamahan ko siya sa
health center. Sumunod pala si Wella doon, pero hindi kami
nagkita kasi saglit lang kami doon. Bumalik siya sa bahay, at doon
na kami nagkita. Tapos ay umalis kami ni Wella papunta kay Mayor.
Tumawid kami ng kalye, at pumara ako ng tricycle. Pero kahit
marami na akong pinara, ayaw ni Wella na sumakay doon.
Maya-maya, may tricycle na dumating na hindi naman pinara ni
Wella. Basta huminto na lang sa harap namin. Doon kami sumakay
ni Wella. Si Wella ang nagturo sa driver kung saan kami pupunta.
Nag-uusap sila ng driver habang papunta kami kay Mayor.
11. Bumaba kami sa tapat ng bahay na bukas ang gate. May
swimming pool sa loob, alam na alam ni Wella and pasikot-sikot
nang bahay tuloy-tuloy siya sa loob at sumunod naman ako. Wala
kaming taong nakita, pero bukas pati yung pintuan ng bahay.
Dinala ako ni Wella sa sala. Napakaganda ng loob ng bahay.
Mayroong wallpaper na may design na leaves and flowers; may
carpet sa sahig. May mahabang hagdan patungo sa dalawang
pintuan.
12. Tinanong ko kay Wella kung nasaan si Mayor. Sabi niya ay nasa
munisipyo daw; darating na daw maya-maya. Pagkaraan ng mga 15
minutes, dumating si Mayor na nakasakay sa green na kotse.
Lumabas siya sa kaliwang pintuan sa harap ng kotse. Wala siyang
kasama.
13. Pumasok si Mayor sa loob ng bahay. Naghubad siya ng sapatos.
Sabi ni Wella: "Mayor, si Juvie; Juvie si Mayor."
14. Umupo si Mayor sa tabi ko. Kinamayan niya ako at sinabi niya:
"Hi, I'm Arthur" sabay hinalikan niya sa ako sa lips. Hindi ako
naka-react dahil nagulat at kinabahan ako.
15. Nagmamadaling nagpaalam si Wella. Kinuha ni Mayor ang
wallet sa bulsa sa likod ng kanyang pantalon. Dumukot siya ng
P1,000 na buo. Inabot niya ito kay Wella. Patayo na ako pero
hinawakan ni Mayor ang braso ko. Wag daw akong sasama kay
Wella. Sinabi ko kay Wella na wag niya akong iiwanan, pero parang
wala siyang narinig. Basta tuloy-tuloy siyang umalis.
16. Nung kami na lang ni Mayor ang natira, pinainom niya ako ng
mineral water. Uminom ako dahil nauuhaw ako. Nanlabo ang
paningin ko at nanghina ako.
17. Nawalan ako ng malay. Ang sumunod ko na lang na natatandaan
ay nandoon na ako sa kwarto. Wala akong damit. Nakadagan si
Mayor sa akin. May malaking salamin sa pader. Doon ko nakita na
walang kadamit-damit si Mayor.
18. Hawak ako ni Mayor sa magkabilang braso. Pinipisil niya ito
kaya nagkaroon ako ng pasa sa kaliwang braso (at ito ay nawala
lang pagkatapos ng tatlong araw).
19. Naramdaman ko na pilit na pinasok ni Mayor ang ari niya sa
aking ari. Nasaktan ako. Nagmakaawa ako. Umiiyak ako nung sinabi
ko sa kanya na tigilan niya ako; nasasaktan ako; may anak rin
siyang babae. Sabi niya wag daw akong maingay at i-embrace ko na
lang daw siya. Lalo akong umiyak dahit nandidiri ako sa kanya, at
sa ginagawa niya sa akin. Naghalo ang galit, pandidiri at takot.
Wala akong magawa kundi magmakaawa. Hindi ko siya maitulak
dahil nanghihina ako, nakadagan siya sa akin, mataba siya, at
hawak-hawak niya ang braso ko. Pero kahit nagmamakaawa ako,
tinuloy pa rin niya at pinasok niya ulit ang ari niya sa aking ari.
20. Maya-maya ay tumigil siya. Tumayo siya at sabi niya: "ang
panty mo, nasa tabi mo." Kinuha ko ang panty ko, tumayo ako at
sinuot ko ito. Hinanap ko ang damit ko, at nakita ko ang walking
shorts, bra at t-shirt ko sa sahig. Pinulot ko ito at sinuot ko. Habang
sinusuot ko, umiiyak pa rin ako. Pagkatapos kong magbihis, umupo
ako sa mahabang upuan sa may gilid ng kama.
21. Samantala, pagkatapos sabihin ni Mayor na nasa tabi ko ang
panty ko, nagpunta siya sa banyo na transparent ang pinto. Wala
siyang suot pagpunta niya doon. Paglabas niya, nakasuot na siya ng
checkered brief na kulay black and white. Pumunta siya sa kabilang
gilid ng kama. Kinuha niya ang damit niya na nakahanger sa pader.
Sinuot niya ito. Lumabas siya ng kwarto. Hindi nagtagal ay pumasok
siya ulit at sinabi niya na nandiyan na daw ang sundo ko.
22. Tumayo ako. Sinabi ko na aalis na ako. Nung papunta na ako sa
pintuan, lumapit si Mayor sa akin. May hawak-hawak siyang
dalawang pirasong P1,000. Tiniklop niya ito; binaba niya yung
neckline ng t-shirt ko, at pinasok niya ang pera sa aking bra.
Nagalit ako. Kinuha ko ang pera at tinapon ko ito sa kanya. Sabi ko
hindi ako bayarang babae. Nagalit siya at pinagbantaan ako. Sabi
niya: "Pag nagsalita ka, alam mo na kung ano ang mangyayari sa
iyo." Tiningnan ko siya, at umalis ako pababa.
23. Mayroon tricycle na nakaabang sa labas. Sumunod si Mayor.
Lumapit siya sa driver at binigyan niya ito ng P100. Tapos ay umalis
na kami.
24. Umiiyak pa rin ako nung nasa tricycle. Sabi ko sa driver na
ginahasa ako ni Mayor. Sabi niya masuwerte daw ako at maaga
akong pinauwi dahil yung mga ibang babae daw na dinadala kay
Mayor ay pinauwi ng madaling-araw o hating-gabi. Minsan, dalawa
o tatlo pa nga daw ang dinadala doon, at yung iba ay naka-uniform
pa. Naaawa daw siya sa akin, kaya magsumbong daw ako.
Nakokonsensiya daw siya dahil isa siya sa dalawang tricycle driver
na naghahatid ng mga babae doon. Sabi pa nga niya, babae din daw
ang ina niya, kaya din siya nakokonsensiya. Dinagdag pa niya na
kung may kasiyahan kina Mayor, isang van ng mga babae ang
nadoon. Pagdating namin sa bahay ng Lola ko, sabi niya bago siya
umalis: "Lumaban ka."
On December 13, 1996, the private complainant thru her counsel, Atty. Remedios
C. Balbin and Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., of the
Department of Justice petitioned this Court for a change of venue. They cited as
ground the great danger to the lives of both the private complainant, the
immediate members of her family, and their witnesses as they openly defy the
principal accused, Mayor Alonte who is acknowledged as a powerful political
figure and almost an institution in Bian, Laguna . . ."

On March 31, 1997, the private complainant, thru the then Secretary of Justice,
the Honorable Teofisto Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio Zuno filed a
Manifestation and Motion for the early resolution of the petition for change of
venue. They submitted the affidavits of the private complainant, her counsel Atty.
Remedios C. Balbin, Dolores Mercado-Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan and Evelyn
Celso to prove their allegation that they "are exposed to kidnapping, harassment,
veiled threats and tempting offers of bribe money all intended to extract an
'affidavit of desistance' from the private complainant." Worth bright lining are the
two (2) affidavits ofAtty. Remedios C. Balbin, counsel for the private
complainant, relating the fantastic amount of P10M bribe money allegedly
offered to her. The first affidavit dated February 24, 1997 states:
I. Remedios C. Balbin, of legal age, Filipino, married, with
residence at #5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision,
Quezon City, after having duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:
1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 96-19-B
for rape, filed with the Bian RTC, Branch 25, entitled 'People of
the Philippines vs. Bayani Arthur Alonte, et al.;
2. That as Private Prosecutor, it is my avowed duty to be faithful to
the interests of my client, Ms. Juvie-lyn Punongbayan;
3. That on several occasions, I was visited at my Office at the
Quezon City Hall Compound, by a lawyer who introduced himself as
Atty. Leo C. Romero, representing the Accused Mayor Bayani
Arthur Alonte;
4. That my calendar at the People's Bureau, Quezon City Hall,
shows that he came to see me about eight (8) times, but we talked
only about three (3) times because I was always busy attending to
the problems of Quezon City's urban poor and the landowners of
private properties illegally occupied by them;
5. That in two (2) occasions, Atty. Romero conveyed to me the
message of Mayor Alonte, namely, to drop the rape case against
him, and that he would give a consideration of Ten Million Pesos
(P10 Million) to be apportioned as follows:
Five Million Pesos (P5M) for the Private Complainant
Three Million Pesos (P3M) for me as Private Prosecutor
Two Million Pesos (P2M) for him as the mediator
6. That I explained to Atty. Romero that money does not matter at
all to the Complainant and her family even if they have very
modest means; that they want justice, which means a conviction
for the charge of rape;
7. That I also explained to Atty. Romero that the money he was
offering me was of no consequence to me because I had access to
the resources of my two (2) daughters, both of whom are in the
medical field abroad, and of Mr. Filomeno Balbin, Labor Attache
then assigned in Riyadh;
8. That I told him that I cannot be tempted with his offer because
spiritual consideration are more important to me than the
material. Also, that I usually handle cases pro bono (at abunado pa)
where the litigant is in dire need of legal assistance but cannot
afford to pay for the lawyer's fees, as in Juvie-lyn's case;
9. That I gave Atty. Romero a copy of the decision of the Supreme
Court promulgated December 10, 1996, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Robert Cloud" (GR No. 119359; Crim. Case No.
Q-90-12660) for parricide involving the death of a 2 1/2 year old
boy. I wrote on page one of the xerox copy of the decision: 'To Atty.
Leo Romero so you will understand,' and to which I affixed my
signature.
10. That I told him explicitly: 'we cannot simplify the entire
proceedings. You advise Mayor Alonte to surrender (one mitigating
circumstance), plead guilty (another mitigating
circumstance), get a conviction and suffer the corresponding
penalty. Otherwise, we have nothing to talk about.'
11. That I emphasized that his suggestion for Mayor Alonte to plead
guilty to 'act of lasciviousness' merely was ridiculous;
12. That when the Complainant's Affidavit on the offer of Ms. Emily
Vasquez for a valuable consideration in exchange for an affidavit of
desistance in the rape was exposed by media, Atty. Romero came
to see me and thanked me for not exposing him in similar fashion. I
assured him that he will not be an exception and that I was just too
busy then to execute an affidavit on the matter, as I do now;
13. That I have not received other similar offers of valuable

material consideration from any other person, whether private
party or government official. However, I have been separately
advised by several concerned persons that I was placing my
personal safety at great risk. The victim's family will have great
difficulty in finding another lawyer to 'adopt' them in the way I did,
which gives them strength to pursue their case with confidence and
the accused Mayor is aware that I am the obstacle to an
out-of-court settlement of the case. Also, that I had my hands full,
as it is, as the Head of the QC People's Bureau, Housing
Development Center, and Special Task Force on Squatting and
Resettlement, and the numerous cases filed by me or against me,
connected with my performance of official duties, and I should not
add more legal problems despite my authority to engage in private
law practice.
14. That this affidavit is executed in order to put on record the
attempt to influence me directly, in exchange for valuable
consideration to drop the rape charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur
Alonte.
February 24, 1997, City of Manila.

SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26th day of March, 1997,
Metro Manila.
Community Tax Certificate - 5208733
Date Issue 2-10-97
Quezon City
NOTARY PUBLIC
SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA

ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL Dec. 31, 1997
PTR No. 63-T-033457
ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-97
TAN-161-570-81
Doc. No. 950;
Page No. 170;
Series of 1997."
In her second Affidavit dated March 26, 1997, Atty. Balbin declared in no
uncertain language that the bribe offer for private complainant to make a
desistance was increased from P10,000,000.00 to P20,000,000.00, viz:
"REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA ) s.s.
"AFFIDAVIT
"I, REMEDIOS C. BALBIN, of legal age, Filipino, married, and with
postal address at No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue
Subdivision, Quezon City, after having duly sworn in accordance
with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in the rape case filed by the
minor Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte
of Bian, Laguna;
"2. That earlier, I reported to Secretary Teofisto Guingona, State
Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., and Director Jude Romano of the Witness
Protection Program, the instances of offers of substantial amounts
amounting to several millions, to my client, to her relatives,
including her maternal grandmother, and to myself;
"3. That despite the published declaration by the Department of
Justice of its determination to prosecute those who offered the
bribes, new emissaries of Mayor Alonte persist in making offers, as
follows:
"a. On Thursday, March 6, 1997, at about 3:15 o'clock in the
afternoon, Atty. Dionisio S. Daga came to see me at my
office at the People's Bureau, Office of the Mayor, of
Squatting case which I filed against his clients;
"b. That after a brief exchange on the status of the case, he
confided to me his real purpose; cdrep
"c. That he started off by saying that he was the legal
counsel of the gambling lords of Malabon for which he gets a
monthly retainer of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00),
exclusive of transportation expenses, etc.;
"d. The he also stated that the network of gambling lords
throughout the country is quite strong and unified;
"e. That I then asked him: 'What do you mean is Alonte
into gambling too? that he is part of the network you speak
of?'
"f. That Atty. Daga did not reply but instead said: 'they are
prepared to double the offer made to you by Atty. Romero
which was published in the newspapers' at P10 Million;
"g. That I told him that all the money in the world will not
make me change my position against my client's executing a
desistance, and that only Alonte's voluntary surrender, plea
of guilty in rape, conviction and the imposition of the
corresponding penalty will satisfy the ends of justice;
"h. That I told him that my client's case is not isolated, there
being five (5) other minors similarly placed; and Alonte
should be stopped from doing more harm;
"i. That Atty. Daga then told me in Pilipino 'if you do not
accede to a desistance, then, they will be forced to . . .'.
"j. That because he did not complete his sentence, I asked
him directly: 'What do you mean? What do you intend to do?
And he replied: Go on with the case; Buy the Judge.'
"k. That unbelieving, I reacted, saying; 'but they have
already done so, Judge Francisco at Bian suddenly changed
his attitude towards the Prosecution. Perhaps, you are
referring to the next Judge when the petition for change of
venue is finally granted?'
"l. That Atty. Daga did not reply, and he reiterated that his
principals, referring to them again as 'gambling lords,' want
a desistance, after which he excused himself and left.
"4. That I execute this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the
incident with Atty. Dionisio S. Daga which occurred in the
afternoon of March 6, 1997, at my Office, stressing herein my
surprise over his daring in making yet another monetary offer to
me in exchange for my client's desistance, and my feeling of fear
for the first time since I started 'handling' this case against Alonte;
"5. That despite what I perceived as veiled threats of Atty. Daga, I
will seek justice in behalf of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, with the
indispensable initiatives, participation and support of the
Department of Justice under Secretary Teofisto Guingona.
"FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.
SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Affiant
"REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA ) s.s.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 26th day of March,
1997.
Community Tax Certificate 5208733
Date Issued 2-10-97
Quezon City
NOTARY PUBLIC
SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA

ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL Dec. 31, 1997
PTR No. 63-T-033457
ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-87
TAN-161-570-81
Doc. No. 948;
Book No. 190;
Page No. XLIII;
Series of 1997."
After the alleged bribe money was increased from P10M to P20M the complexion
of the case changed swiftly.
On June 25, 1997, Atty. Balbin filed a Motion to Resume Proceedings in Br. 25 of
the RTC of Bian, Laguna. Attached to the Motion was the Affidavit of Desistance
of the private complainant which states:
"I, Juvie-lyn Yambao Punongbayan, 17 years of age, a resident of
No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon

City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after
having duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
"1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor
Bayani 'Arthur' Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch 25 of
Bian, Laguna;
"2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary
issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme
Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and
after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President,
on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel
of the State Prosecutor's Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and
(c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;
"3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I
have already lost two (2) semesters of my college residence. And
when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are
finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my
schooling to attend the hearings;
"4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family
has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give
up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to
stop his schooling, like myself;
"5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I
simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we
can start life anew, and live normally once again;
"6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape
and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a
prima facie case although the information has not been filed, and
that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new
cases, whether criminal, civil, and or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;
"7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will
put to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;
"8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor,
premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be no
reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or
any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who extended
assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.
"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in
Quezon City.
SGD. JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
"Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
In the presence of:
(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in
Quezon City.
"(Sgd) ILLEGIBLE
Administering Officer
RTC Branch 94
Quezon City"
Obviously, the Motion to Resume Proceedings was intended to get the trial
court's approval for the dismissal of the rape case against the
petitioners. cdasia
Indeed, three days thereafter or on June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino moved
in behalf of the petitioners to dismiss the petition for change of venue then
pending in this Court citing the affidavit of desistance of the private complainant.
On August 22, 1997, however, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Guiyab opposed the
motion. He alleged that he has control of the prosecution of the rape case and
that he was not aware of the desistance of the private complainant.
The legal maneuvers to dismiss the rape case against the petitioners on the basis
of the alleged affidavit of desistance of the private complainant did not find the
favor of this Court. On September 2, 1997, this Court unanimously granted the
petition for change of venue, ruling among others, viz:
xxx xxx xxx

"These affidavits give specific names, dates and methods being
used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte
and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her
private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not
fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing
her complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed
to some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible
miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to
transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna
to the City of Manila.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian,
Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive Judge of RTC
Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its
branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B shall be
raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings
filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna and determine the
voluntariness and validity of petitioner's; desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC
of Bian, Laguna is ordered to personally deliver to the Executive
Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B
upon receipt of this Resolution."
On September 17, 1997, Criminal Case No. 9619-B (re-docketed by the Clerk of
Court of Manila as Crim. Case No. 97-159955) was raffled to Br. 53 of the RTC of
Manila, presided by the respondent judge, the Honorable Maximo A. Savellano.
On October 9, 1997, the respondent judge issued warrants of arrest against the
petitioners after a finding of probable cause.
On October 28, 1997, an Administrative Order of the DOJ was issued empowering
First Assistant City Prosecutor Marilyn R. O. Campomanes to prosecute the case at
bar. Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., who opposed the affidavit
of desistance was relieved from the case. The reason given in the Administrative
Order was ". . . in the interest of public service." Prosecutor Campomanes was
authorized "to move for its (case) dismissal if the evidence on record so
warrant. . ." 1
The arraignment of the petitioners took place on November 7, 1997. The State
was represented by Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes. Petitioner Alonte was
represented by Atty. Jose Flaminiano and Atty. Sigfrid A. Fortun. Petitioner
Concepcion was represented by Atty. Ramon C. Casano. Atty. Remedios Balbin
who had previously exposed under oath the threats to the life of the private
complainant and her witnesses and the repeated attempts to buy complainant's
desistance was absent. 2
Petitioners pled not guilty to the charge of rape upon their
arraignment. 3 Pre-trial was then waived by both the prosecution and the defense.
The proceedings continued and Prosecutor Campomanes presented the private
complainant, Ms. Punongbayan who testified on her affidavit of desistance. She
declared that her desistance was her "personal" decision with the consent of her
parents. 4 She said she was neither paid nor pressured to desist. On questions by
the respondent judge, however, she affirmed the truth of her affidavit dated
October 31, 1996 that she was raped by petitioner Alonte. Prosecutor
Campomanes marked and offered her affidavit of desistance as Exhibit "A". 5 She
called on other witnesses to testify on the voluntariness of the affidavit of
desistance. The parents of the complainant Pablo 6 and Julie 7 Punongbayan
declared that they did not receive any monetary consideration for the desistance
of their minor daughter. Neither were they pressured to give their consent to the
desistance. Fourth Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente averred that the
affidavit of desistance was signed and sworn to before him in the presence of the
complainant's parents and private counsel, Atty. Balbin. He said he explained the
affidavit to them and that the complainant voluntarily signed the same. 8
After their testimonies, Prosecutor Campomanes made the manifestation that
"with the presentation of our witnesses and the marking of our documents (sic) we
are now closing the case and that we are praying for the dismissal of the
case." 9 The respondent judge ruled "the case is submitted for decision.'' 10 Atty.
Flaminiano orally prayed that petitioner Alonte be granted bail and Prosecutor
Campomanes offered no objection. 11
On November 10, 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an Urgent Motion to Admit to
Bail. 12 In her Comment, Prosecutor Campomanes agreed and averred, viz.: 13
xxx xxx xxx
1. That she received a copy of the Petition for Bail.
2. That on the hearing of the instant case on November 7, 1997,
the Prosecution presented its witnesses who vehemently
signified their intention not to further prosecute the case in
Court, and there being no other witnesses to present, the
undersigned is left with no alternative but to seek the
dismissal of the instant case considering that without the
testimony of said witnesses this case has nothing to stand
on in Court.
3. That for the aforestated reason, the People interposes no
objection to the granting of Bail and in fact justice and
equity dictate that it joins the accused in his prayer for the
granting of bail in the amount of P150,000 (ONE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS).
4. That for the aforementioned bases, the People hereby
manifests its position that the case be immediately
dismissed or at least the accused be granted bail since the
record proves that there is no more evidence to sustain the
charge against him such that the granting of bail is proper
and in order.
5. That as a general rule, a hearing on the petition for bail is
necessary to prove that the guilt is not strong but in this
particular case there is no need for hearing since the
prosecution cannot prove its case against the accused as it
has no other evidence or witnesses to be presented.
On November 17, 1997, petitioner Alonte, thru counsel, filed an Urgent Plea to
Resolve the Motion for Bail. 14 On the same date, Prosecutor Campomanes
manifested that "she deems it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to
join the aforestated motion." 15
On November 25, 1997, December 1, 1997, December 8, 1997 and December 10,
1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Motion for
early resolution of his petition for bail. 16 In all these motions, Atty. Fortun,
counsel of petitioner Alonte, alleged that copy of the motion "... could not be
served in person upon the private prosecutor" (Atty. Balbin) in light of the
distance between their offices. 17 He relied on section 13, Rule 11 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure. The motions were not resolved by the respondent judge.

On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge promulgated his Decision
convicting the petitioners and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua. On whether
of the affidavit of desistance can be a ground for dismissal of the rape case
against the petitioners, the respondent judge held:
"The first issue to be determined and resolved is the 'voluntariness
and validity of petitioner's desistance in the light of the opposition
of the public prosecutor Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo
Guiab.' (p. 7, SC Resolution En Banc, dated September 2, 1997;
[Rollo, p. 253]) It is appropriate to quote again a portion of the
7-page Resolution En Banc of the highest tribunal, to wit; 'Indeed,
the probability (exists) that in desisting from pursuing her
complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to
some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible
miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition for
change of venue . . . (Rollo, p. 202).
"The Court shall narrate the facts leading to the desistance of the
private complainant which are embodied in the two (2) affidavits
of her lawyer, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, with whom the private
complainant lives at No. 5 Uranus St., Congressional Avenue
Subdivision, Quezon City. One affidavit is dated May 24, 1997, (sic)
while the other one is dated March 26, 1997. The said affidavits are
attached as exhibits to the aforementioned Manifestation and
Motion for the Resolution of Petition for Change of Venue filed by
the private complainant Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan. Exh. "C", dated
May 24, 1997, (Rollo, pp. 216-219) is hereby quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It clearly appears in the abovequoted affidavit that repeated bribe
offers from a lawyer representing the accused Mayor Bayani Arthur
Alonte in the total amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
were made to Atty. Balbin, allocated as follows: (1) Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) for the private complainant Juvie-lyn Y.
Punongbayan; (2) Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00) for her (Atty.
Balbin); and (3) Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) for the
mediator.
In the subsequent affidavit, dated March 26, 1997, executed by
Atty. Remedios C. Balbin (Exh. F, Rollo, pp. 224-225) she narrated
in detail the continuing veiled threats and the very tempting and
escalating offer to increase the amount of the bribe money offered
to her and the private complainant after her first affidavit, by
doubling the first offer of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to
Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00), in exchange for her client's
desistance, but also accompanied with veiled threats, if refused.
Said affidavit is quoted, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The Court underscores paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i),
(j), (k), and (l), particularly paragraphs (i), (j) and specially
paragraph (k) of the abovequoted affidavit of Atty. Balbin which
insinuates that the presiding Judge of the RTC Bian, Laguna, had
already been bought, and that accused Alonte, thru his numerous
emissaries, will also buy or bribe the 'the next judge when the
petition for change of venue is finally granted.' In view of this
insinuation, the undersigned presiding Judge is very careful in
deciding this case, lest he be placed under suspicion that he is also
receiving blood money that continues to flow. The Court wants to
have internal peace the peace which money cannot buy. Money
is not everything. It is said that money is the root of all evil. The
Holy Scriptures also remind judges and jurists: 'You shall not act
dishonestly in rendering judgment. Show neither partiality to the
weak nor deterrence to the mighty, but judge your fellow men
justly.' (Leviticus 19:15). The Scriptures further say: 'What does it
profit a man if he gains the whole world but suffers the loss of his
soul?' (Mt. 16:26) and 'No one can serve two (2) masters. . . You
cannot serve God and mammon.' (Mt. 6:24, Luke 16:13). It is not
out of place to quote the Holy Scriptures because the Honorable
Supreme Court has been doing so in its quest for truth and justice.
Thus, People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164, 174, the highest tribunal, in
ruling that the flight of an accused is evidence of guilt on his part,
quoted the old Testament, as follows:
"It was written in the literature of Old Testament several

centuries ago that:
'The wicked man fleeth though no man pursueth, but
the righteous are as bold as a lion.
(Proverbs, 28:1)'
Subsequently, on June 25, 1997, the private complainant and her
lawyer suddenly somersaulted or changed their common positions
or attitudes in the prosecution of this case. Evidently, veiled
threats and money had replaced the 'spiritual consideration' which
earlier, to them were 'more important than the material' to quote
Atty. Balbin in her first affidavit (Rollo, p. 217), and her reply to
Atty. Dionisio S. Daga that 'all the money in the world will not make
me change my position against my client's executing a desistance,
and that only Alonte's voluntary surrender, plea of guilty to rape,
conviction and the imposition of the corresponding penalty will
satisfy the ends of justice.
On June 26, 1997, the private complainant, thru her counsel, Atty.
Remedios C. Balbin, filed a Motion to Resume Proceedings, dated
June 25, 1997, (Rollo, pp. 238-244) praying therein that the RTC,
Bian, Laguna, where this case was still pending, vacate its Order
to Suspend Hearings, to enable it to act on all incidents including
private Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance attached thereto.
(Rollo, pp. 240-241) which affidavit of desistance is quoted
hereunder as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court, as the trier of facts, is tasked by the highest tribunal to
find out if the private complainant, a minor 'may have succumbed
to some illicit influence and undue pressure, in order to prevent a
possible miscarriage of justice.' Evidently, the veiled threats and
acceptance of the bribe money in allocated amounts which was
subsequently raised to the irresistible amount of at least
P20,000,000.00, compelled, impelled and/or tempted the private
complainant, her father Pablo Punongbayan and her mother Julie Y.
Punongbayan, and her lawyer and private prosecutor Atty.
Remedios C. Balbin, who did not appear in Court on November 7,
1997, despite notice, to execute the said 'Affidavit of Desistance'
which was the ultimate goal of the accused. It is very obvious that
the private complainant, a minor, 'succumbed to some illicit
influence and undue pressure,' to borrow the language of the
Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. It would be the height of
extreme naivete or gullibility for any normal individual to conclude
otherwise. The Court does not believe that the private
complainant, her lawyer, and her parents did not receive a single
centavo when they executed and signed the said affidavit of
desistance. The private complainant was definitely lying and/or
somebody taught her to lie when she testified in Court on
November 7, 1997 that she has 'not received any single cent.'
This Court cannot close its eyes to the realities in this case. It
cannot play the role of blind, deaf and dumb or one who has eyes
but cannot see or refuses to see. It cannot live in a world of make
believe or let us say pretend. The 'Affidavit of Desistance'
executed by the private complainant assisted by her lawyer and
signed by her parents, was and is undoubtedly, heavily tainted with
acceptance of bribe money which together with the continuing
veiled threats accompanying the same, invalidated the said
affidavit. The rule of law, and not the roll of money and threats,
should and must prevail."
On December 19, 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner assailed his conviction without due process of law and
the refusal of the respondent judge to dismiss the case in light of the desistance of
the private complainant. He argued:
xxx xxx xxx
"In People vs. Caruncho, L-57804, January 23, 1984, 127 SCRA 16,
the Supreme Court made ineluctably clear that it is the right of an
offended party to withdraw the further prosecution of a grievance
especially where, as in this case, a personal offense is the subject
thereof:
'. . . True it is, that in criminal cases society is the ultimate
aggrieved party for which reason the People of the
Philippines is designated as the plaintiff. True it is also that
except as provided in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
a pardon by the private offended party does not extinguish
criminal liability. And true it is further that the dropping of
criminal cases by the execution of affidavits of desistance
by complainants is not looked with favor. These are
Hornbook doctrines. But what is actually done in our
criminal justice system?" First, there is plea bargaining
between the prosecution and the defense. For instance,
murder is charged but in exchange for a plea of guilty the
charge is reduced to homicide and the accused is allowed to
claim a number of mitigating circumstances. It is not
uncommon for estafa, libel, physical injuries and even
homicide cases to be dismissed because the complainant has
lost interest or alleged that the complaint was filed as a
result of a misunderstanding. A number of examples can be
given and they can fill a book.'
Again, in People vs. Evangelista, L-45089, April 27, 1982, 113 SCRA
713, 720, the Supreme Court further declared:
'It may be noted that the crimes in question (forcible
abduction with rape) are among those enumerated in Article
344 of theRevised Penal Code, which crimes cannot be
prosecuted de officio. In other words, the crimes of
abduction and rape are in the nature of private offense,
inasmuch as the law has reposed 'the right to institute such
proceedings exclusively and successively in the offended
person, her parents, grandparents or guardian' . . .
Accordingly, if after filing the complaint the offended party
in the case at bar decided that she was unable to face the
scandal of public trial, or, if for some private reason she
preferred to suffer the outrage in silence, then, corollary to
her right to institute the proceedings, she should have been
allowed to withdraw her complaint and desist from
prosecuting the case (Emphasis supplied)."
Petitioner Concepcion did not submit any motion for reconsideration. Without
waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner Alonte
repaired to this Court. So did petitioner Concepcion.
Without doubt, the petitions at bar raise two (2) fulcrum issues: (1) the
correctness of the ruling of the respondent judge that the desistance of the
complainant is not a ground to dismiss the rape charge against the petitioners, and
(2) the invalidity of petitioners' conviction on the ground of denial of due
process. Cdpr
I agree with the learned disquisition of Mr. Justice Vitug that we should set aside
the conviction of the petitioners for patent violation of their right to due process
of law. I write this Separate Opinion to highlight the erroneousness of the
shocking stance of the State Prosecutor that the rape charge should be dismissed
in view of the desistance of the private complainant. But our ruling giving no
effect on the affidavit of desistance should not based on the reason that it was
procured by threat or intimidation or any payment of money as the respondent
judge opined in his Decision. The respondent judge arrived at this conclusion on
the basis of the affidavits of Atty. Balbin, the counsel of the private complainant.
This is erroneous for Atty. Balbin was never called to the witness stand to testify

on the truth of her affidavits. Her affidavits therefore are hearsay evidence and
should not have been relied upon by the respondent judge. The affidavit of
desistance cannot abort the rape charge against the petitioners on the simple
ground that it did not state that the private complainant-affiant was not raped by
petitioner Alonte. In truth, the private complainant affirmed her earlier
Reply-Affidavit where she narrated in detail how petitioner Alonte raped her.
Moreover, the rape charge has been filed in Court and it is not anymore the
absolute privilege of the complainant to desist from continuing with the case.
This separate opinion unequivocably addresses the issue of whether the
desistance of the victim can stop the further prosecution of the petitioners.
I
In Philippine jurisprudence, desistance has been equated with recantation or
retraction.
To "recant" means to "withdraw or repudiate formally and publicly;" 18 "to
renounce or withdraw a prior statement.'' 19 To "retract" means to "take back;"
"to retract an offer is to withdraw it before acceptance." 20 A recantation usually
applies to a repudiation by a complainant or a witness, either for the prosecution
or the defense, who has previously given an extra-judicial statement 21 or
testimony in court. 22Repudiation may be made in writing, i.e., by sworn
statement, 23 or by testifying on the witness stand. 24
Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. 25 The
general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. 26 This rule applies to crimes, 27 offenses 2 8 as well
as to administrative offenses. 29 The reason is because affidavits of retraction
can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. 30 Moreover, there is always the
probability that they will later be repudiated 31 and there would never be an end
to criminal litigation. 32 It would also be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice simply because the witnesses
who had given them later on changed their minds for one reason or another. This
would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. 33
The general rule notwithstanding, the affidavit should not be peremptorily
dismissed as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances when a recantation may
create serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. 34 A retracted statement or
testimony must be subject to scrupulous examination. The previous statement or
testimony and the subsequent one must be carefully compared and the
circumstances under which each was given and the reasons and motives for the
change carefully scrutinized. The veracity of each statement or testimony must be
tested by the credibility of the witness which is left for the judge to decide. 35 In
short, only where there exists special circumstances in the case which when
coupled with the retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or
statement given, can a retraction be considered and upheld. 36
A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the same rule has been applied to
affidavits of desistance. 37 An affidavit of desistance is understood to be a sworn
statement executed by a complainant in a criminal or administrative case that he
or she is discontinuing the action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever
reason he or she may cite. The court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance
especially when executed as an afterthought. 38 However, as in retractions, an
affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of the records of the case. 39
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a private complainant is also
frowned upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a second look at
the case, there is hardly an instance when this Court upheld it in private crimes
and dismissed the case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed
upon mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant, particularly where there
exist special circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of the
affidavit. 40
Usually in private crimes, an affidavit of desistance is executed by the private
complainant after pardoning and forgiving the offender. In this instance, the court
treats the affidavit as in express pardon. 41 It does not ipso facto dismiss the case
but determines the timeliness and validity thereof.
Private crimes are crimes against chastity such as adultery and concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. Their institution,
prosecution and extinction are governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
viz:
"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without
including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor in any
case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of
guardian, nor in any case, the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already
imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes."
Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the offended
party. In adultery and concubinage, the offended party must implead both the
guilty parties and must not have consented or pardoned the offenders. In
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed
by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian. The
complainant-must not have expressly pardoned the offender.
Article 344 also provides for the extinction of criminal liability in private crimes. It
mentions two modes: pardon and marriage, which when validly and timely made,
result in the total extinction of criminal liability of the offender. 42 The pardon in
private crimes must be made before the institution of the criminal action. 43 In
adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express or implied while in
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express.
In all cases, the pardon must come prior to the institution of the criminal
action. After the case has been filed in court, any pardon made by the private
complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot
extinguish criminal liability. The only act that extinguishes the penal action and
the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between the offender
and the offended party. 44
As this Court declared in the case of Donio-Teves v. Vamenta, Jr.: 45
"The term "private crimes" in reference to felonies which cannot be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the aggrieved party, is
misleading. Far from what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved
party who is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every
violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of public order
and safety which the State is committed to uphold and protect. If
the law imposes the condition that private crimes like adultery
shall not be prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the
offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier "out of consideration
for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." Once a
complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is ascertained and
the action proceeds just as in any other crime. This is shown by the
fact that after filing a complaint, any pardon given by the
complainant to the offender would be unavailing. It is true, the
institution of the action in so-called private crime is at the option
of the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once the choice is
made manifest, the law will be applied in full force beyond the
control of, and inspite of the complainant, his death
notwithstanding."
The filing of a complaint in private crimes is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty
parties. 46 It is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding without
which the fiscal and the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the case. 47 Once
the complaint is filed, the action proceeds just as in any other crime.
We follow the postulate that a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign
state 48 and the right of prosecution for a crime is one of the attributes of the
sovereign power. 49 Thus, criminal actions are usually commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, and the offended party is merely a
complaining witness. 50 In private crimes, however, or those which cannot be
prosecutedde oficio, the offended party assumes a more predominant role since
the right to commence the action or refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively
within his power and option. 51 The sovereign state deems it the wiser policy, in
private crimes, to let the aggrieved party and her family decide whether to
expose to public view the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the
family. 52 But once the offended party files the complaint, her will is ascertained
and the action proceeds just as in any other crime. The decision of the
complainant to undergo the scandal of a public trial necessarily connotes the
willingness to face the scandal. 53 The private complainant is deemed to have
shed off her privacy and the crime ceases to be "private" and becomes "public."
The State, through the fiscal, takes over the prosecution of the case and the
victim's change of heart and mind will not affect the State's right to vindicate the
outrage against the violation of its law. 54
This is the reason why pardon in crimes of chastity must come before the
institution of the criminal action. Pardon by the offended party extinguishes
criminal liability when made while the crime is still "private" and within the
control of the offended party. But once the case is filed in court, the pardon
cannot ipso facto operate to dismiss the case. After the institution of the criminal
action, any pardon given by the complainant to the offender would be
unavailing, 55 except of course when the offender validly marries the offended
party. 56 The offended party's pardon of the offender in a seduction case after
the criminal action had been instituted constitutes no bar to said action.57 A
pardon given in a rape case after the filing of the action in court "comes too late
to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice." 58
Even the death of the offended party cannot extinguish the case once it is filed in
court. 59 If the offended party dies immediately after filing the complaint but
before the institution of the criminal action, his death is not a ground to dismiss
the case. 60 Clearly, the will and participation of the offended party is necessary
only to determine whether to file the complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of
the State prevails.
Article 344 does not include desistance of the offended party from prosecuting the
case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability whether total 61 or
partial. 62 Hence, only when the desistance is grounded on forgiveness and
pardon and is made before the institution of the criminal action, can it extinguish
criminal liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to pardon.
In the case at bar, the "Affidavit of Desistance" of Juvielyn is not an express
pardon of the accused and the crime committed. Private complainant desisted
from prosecuting the case against the petitioners because she wished "to start life
anew and live normally again." She reiterated this reason on the witness stand.
She complained that members of the media were bothering and harassing her and
that she wanted to go back to her normal life. She never said that she forgave the
petitioners. She did not absolve them from their culpability. She did not give any
exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her rape. She did not say that she
consented to petitioner Alonte's acts. Moreover, the rape case is already in court
and it is no longer her right to decide whether or not the charge should be
continued. As we held in Crespo v. Mogul: 63
xxx xxx xxx
"The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information
is filed in court any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
of the court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control
of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already
in court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal
should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the
arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the records of the investigation."
II
The next issue is the validity of the conviction of petitioners. Petitioners contend
that they were convicted without undergoing any trial. Respondent judge insists
otherwise. He claims that petitioners submitted the case on the merits and relied
principally on the Affidavit of Desistance. He recounts the events that took place
before the presentation of private complainant as revealed by the transcripts of
November 7, 1997, viz:
"Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor, the complaining witness/private complainant
Juvielyn Punongbayan is present here in Court, and a while
ago, I was given a copy of her Affidavit of Desistance, so I
would like to present her in order to attest to the veracity of
her Affidavit of Desistance, your Honor, and for the Court to
hear her testimony.
Court
We will have a separate trial, this involved a heinous offense
and that there is not even any plea-bargaining in this case.
Prosecutor Campomanes
Yes, your Honor, I understand that.
Court
So you have to mark now your documentary evidence in
preparation for trial.
Yes, your Honor.
Court
There are many documentary evidence mentioned by the
Supreme Court in its seven (7) page . . . (may I see the
record) seven (7) page resolution, dated September 2, 1997,
and that this case was assigned to this Court as the trial
Judge. This Court has already arraigned the accused and he
pleaded not guilty, and so the next step is pre-trial. The
Order of the Supreme Court is to direct this Court not only
to determine the voluntariness but also the validity of the
Affidavit of Desistance mentioned by the Court which was
also brought to the attention of the Supreme Court. llcd

And to the Department of Justice likewise your Honor.
Court
And that's why the Supreme Court instead of resolving it
sent the records to this Court to determine the voluntariness
and the validity of the Desistance, but they must be
determined after trial on the merits.
Your Honor please, representing the people. Its events now
will prove that there is no more need for the prosecution to
go on trial of this case, considering that the
private complainant herself had already furnished the
Department of Justice a copy of her Affidavit of Desistance.
Court
What does it say there?
That she is no longer interested in further prosecuting this
case, and that she is now desisting in going to full blown
trial, and considering your Honor, further, that this is a
private offense, then, the Department of Justice feels that
it can not be more popish than the Pope.
Court
That is the stand of the Department of the Justice. But the
Supreme Court belongs to a different Department, I am
governed by the Supreme Court, because I am a Judge, I am
not from the Department of Justice.
We are all aware your Honor, that we will just be prolonging
the agony, in fairness to everybody, considering that we are
representing the people, but we are not representing
only . . . the Department of Justice is not only representing
the complainant in this case but we are also for justice to be
rendered to the respondent as well.
Court
I am rendering fair justice to everyone. That is the sense of
this Court. That is the perception of this Court with respect
to the Supreme Court resolution, in the first place, that
Affidavit does not negate the commission of the crime. You
want us to dismiss this case when the Affidavit does not
negate the commission of the crime?
That's why we will be presenting her in Open Court, your
Honor.

Court
Just to affirm that?
No to prove . . .
Court
What happened . . . how about the Prosecution Department,
they have control of the prosecution, and the offended
party herself, has not negated the commission of the crime,
is there anything there to show that she did not . . . that
the accused . . . did not commit the crime charged?
That's why we will be presenting her in Court, whatever is
not here will be clarified.
Court
So, we will go to a trial on the merits you present that
affidavit, that's a part of your evidence.
The people is ready to present that . . . the complaining
witness.
Court
We will have a trial on the merits.
Your Honor please, being a woman, I have extensively
discussed this matter with the complaining witness and she
intimated to this representation that she can not bear
another day of coming here, with all these people staring at
her with everybody looking at her as if she is something . . .
Court
On December 13, 1996, petitioner Punongbayan through
private counsel, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin and the Assistant
State Prosecutor Guiab, Jr. who is not here both were
relieved and changed with a new lady prosecutor, prayed
that the case be tried by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
they cited the following grounds: 'THE GREAT DANGER TO
THE LIVES OF BOTH PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND THE
IMMEDIATE MEMBERS OF HER FAMILY AND THEIR WITNESSES
AS THEY OPENLY IDENTIFIED THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED
MAYOR ALONTE WHO IS ACKNOWLEDGED AS A POWERFUL
POLITICAL FIGURE AND ALMOST AN INSTITUTION IN BIAN
LAGUNA AND [THE] GREAT DANGERS TO THE LIVES OF
WITNESSES WHO OTHERWISE WISH TO COME OUT IN THE
OPEN AND TESTIFY ON THE MORAL AND CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
OF BOTH ACCUSED PERPETRATED UPON VERY YOUNG GIRLS
STUDENTS OF BIAN LAGUNA THAT WILL NOT DO SO IN THE
TERMS OF THE ACCUSED MAYOR" that is why it was the
prayer of the offended party and the Supreme Court granted
the Motion for Change of Venue, and we are now on a new
venue, where the danger to the lives of the witness is no
longer present, on January 7, 1997, Alonte filed an
Opposition thereto, and on April 23, 1997, the
petitioner, the offended party through the Honorable
Secretary of Justice Teofisto Guingona and Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno filed a Manifestation and Motion
for Resolution of the Petition For Change of Venue. Attached
to the motion of the Honorable Secretary of Justice
Guingona and Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno were
the affidavits of the petitioner, her lawyer, Atty. Remedios
Balbin, Dolores Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan and Evelyn
Celso with their contention that the prosecution witnesses
and the private counsel of petitioner are exposed to
kidnapping, harassment, grave threats and tempting offers
of bribe money, that was the stand of your department . . .
And then later on June 28, 1997 . . . we have to review this
case because this involves public interest . . . on June 23,
1997, Atty. Casano in behalf of the oppositors, two (2)
oppositors, filed a motion to dismiss the petition for change
of venue in the Supreme Court on the ground that it has
become moot, he alleges that the petitioner despite the
motion to resume the proceedings in criminal case no.
96-19-B in said motion, the petitioner informed the Court
that she is desisting . . . informed the Supreme Court that
she is desisting from proceeding with the case, it is the
same affidavit she prayed that the trial Court, on her
affidavit of desistance . . . Atty. Casano also submitted to
this Court, to the Supreme Court the manifestation of the
petitioner joining the oppositors' prayer to dismiss her
petition to a change of venue, the manifestation was also
signed by Atty. Remedios Balbin as private prosecutor, the
Supreme Court required Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiab to comment on the motion to dismiss filed
by Atty. Casano which involve the same affidavit that you
have just read. On August 22, 1997, assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Guiab filed his comment, he alleged that he is
not aware of the desistance of the petitioner in criminal
case no. 96-19-B, and in said desistance there is two (2)
legal effect, [that] the public prosecutor has the control and
direction of the prosecution in criminal action, he prayed
for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and reiterated his
petition for change of venue, the Supreme Court granted
the change of venue and in granting the change of venue the
highest tribunal which we are all subordinates, says: for the
record, in their manifestation and motion for the resolution
of petition to a change of venue the Secretary of Justice and
Chief State Prosecutor submitted various affidavits in
support of their allegations that prosecution witnesses and
private legal counsel are exposed to KIDNAPPING,
HARASSMENT, GRAVE THREATS, AND TEMPTING OFFERS OF
BRIBE MONEY all intended to extract an affidavit of
desistance from the private complainant, this is now the
affidavit of desistance in her affidavit dated December 16,
1996, the petitioner the offended party, the herein
offended party Juvielyn Punongbayan alleged etc . . .
etc . . . in support of her petition and then she alleged that
during the last week of February, 1997, she was visited by
one Lourdes Salaysay, she stated that Mrs. Salaysay told her
that Mrs. Alonte, wife of Mayor Alonte requested her to
settle Alonte's case, she was informed that Mrs. Alonte was
offering P10,000,000.00, will send her to school and give her
house and send her parents abroad, Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin is not here now, I am just quoting the Supreme Court,
counsel, private counsel of petitioner also executed an
affidavit dated February 1997, quote: the Supreme Court
quote to them: to put on record the attempting, influence,
directly, in exchange of valuable consideration, that the
Rape charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alone, she alleged
that in two (2) occasions Atty Romero conveyed to me the
message of Mayor Alonte, namely: to drop the rape case
against him, and that he would give a consideration of
P10,000,000.00 'to be apportioned as follows: P5,000,000.00,
for the private complainant, your client and the prosecutor
P3,000,000.00 for me, as private prosecutor, that is what
Atty. Balbin said, P4,000,000.00 for her, the mediator, so
there seems to be a liberal flow of blood money, that is why
the Supreme Court ordered the Court to determine the
validity, and there is another, dated March 19, 1997. I have
to remind everybody about what happened, this thing did
not come from me, I am not fabricating anything this comes
from the highest tribunal jurat, to whom I am responsible,
another affidavit of Atty. Balbin, she narrated the
continuing attempts to bribe her and threatened her, so
there were continuing events, they alleged, the People's
Bureau, Office of the Mayor of Quezon city, extensively
discuss the squatting case with against his client, that after
a brief exchange on the status of the case, they confided to
me his real purpose, that it started of by saying he was the
legal counsel of the gambling lords of Malabon for which he
get a monthly retainer of P15,000.00 exclusive of
transportation expenses, but he also stated that he knows
all the network of the gambling lord through out the country,
which is quite strong and unified, that I then ask him "what
do you mean? " " Is Alonte into gambling too, that he is part
of the network you speak of?", that Atty. Daga did not reply,
but instead said, they are prepared to double the offer
made to by Atty. Romero which was published in the
newspaper at P10,000,000.00, so, its double, double your
money, so its P20,000,000.00, that I told him, its Atty.
Balbin, that all the money in the world, all the money in the
world will not make me change my position against my
client executing a desistance and that Alonte's voluntary
surrender plea of guilty to rape, conviction, and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty will satisfy the ends
of justice, but I told him, that my client's case is not isolated,
there being five (5) other minors similarly place and Alonte's
will be stopped from doing more harm that Atty. Daga, then
told me in Filipino if you do not accede to a desistance, then
they will be force to but because he did not [complete] the
sentence asked him directly, what do you mean, what do
you intend to do, and he replied, go on with the case, [buy]
the judge, [buy] the judge, that I am believing, and I
reacted saying, but they have already done so, Judge
Francisco Bian, Judge Francisco Bian suddenly change his
attitude towards the prosecution, perhaps you are referring
to the next judge when the petition for change of venue is
finally granted that Atty. Daga did not reply, and he
reiterated that his principal, referring to them again as
gambling lords, wanted desistance, after which he excused
himself and left, that I execute this affidavit, as Atty .
Balbin attests to the truth of the incident with Atty. Dionisio
Daga which occurred in the afternoon of March 6, 1997 at
my office, stating . . . ( JUDGE READING THE RECORDS OF
THE CASE )
Court
Then, the Supreme Court said, these affidavits, the one
attached gave specific names, dates and methods . . . a
coercion of corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
96-19-B (JUDGE CONTINUED READING THE RECORDS OF THE
CASE ) that is desisting for pursuing her complaint for Rape
petitioner a minor, they have . . . illicit, influence and due
pressure to prevent . . . Criminal Case No. 96-19-B to any of
its Branch, just to call the Criminal Case No. 96-19-B shall be
raffled, shall result the petitioner's motion to resume
proceedings, filed in Branch 26, in the RTC of Laguna, to
determine the voluntariness and validity of the petitioner's
desistance in the light of the position of the public
prosecutor, Assistant Chief Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab . . . I.
don't know what will be the outcome . . . you may contend
that because of that affidavit of the desistance there is
reasonable doubt . . . etc . . . but still, that will be placing
the cart before the horse . . . you have to go to a regular
trial on the merits . . . because this is a heinous offense
which cannot . . . and during the pre-trial cannot be subject
to a plea-bargaining, and with respect to its new law which
took effect in 1993, that is a new one, it was placed to the
category of a heinous offense . . .
So we go on trial your Honor, and we will present the
complaining witness, and let the Court decide on the basis
of the complainants testimony . . . private complainant's
testimony before this Honorable Court . . .
xxx xxx xxx
That's why we are presenting the private complainant, the
principal witness, the mother who is also a signatory to this
affidavit of desistance, everybody who have been a part and
participant in the making and preparation of this affidavit of
desistance, they have already signed these affidavit of
desistance.
Court
And we also have the affidavits mentioned by the Supreme
Court, because I was . . . all of those documents in the
determination of whether that affidavit is valid.
Yes, your Honor.
Court
We . . . the Court cannot close his eyes to the other
affidavits . . . because . . . that's why precisely the
Supreme Court ordered me to hear this case.
We understand that your Honor.
Court
There are may conflicting matters to be solve . . .
conflicting matters to be tackled in this case.
May we present the private complainant, your
Honor . . ." 64
The records show that the hearing of November 7, 1997 was set for arraignment of
the petitioners. 65 After the counsels made their respective appearances,
Prosecutor Campomanes presented her authority to appear as prosecutor in lieu of
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Guiyab, Jr., both petitioners pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Respondent judge then set the case for pretrial which the parties,
however, waived. The proceedings continued and Prosecutor Campomanes
manifested there was no need for the prosecution to go to trial in view of the
Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainant. Respondent judge, however,
observed that private complainant did not negate the commission of the crime in
her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge expressed his misgivings on the
validity of the Affidavit of Desistance because of the September 2, 1997
Resolution of this Court citing affidavits where allegations of bribery were made
to extract said affidavit from complainant. Prosecutor Campomanes then offered
to present the private complainant to attest to the voluntariness and veracity of
her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge averred whether the court should
proceed to a trial on the merits. Prosecutor Campomanes declared that they could
go on trial and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the
testimony of private complainant and the other witnesses. It was then that private
complainant was presented as a witness.
From the garbled transcripts of the hearing on November 7, 1997, it is not clear
what both respondent judge and the public prosecutor intended the proceedings
to be. Respondent judge repeatedly declared that the proceedings before him was
to be a trial on the merits. The public prosecutor agreed to go to trial, but at the
same time moved to present private complainant and her witnesses to testify on
the voluntariness of her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge and the public
prosecutor were, obviously, not tuned in to each other.
I agree with the majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings could not have
been a trial on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did not conform with the
procedure for trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Section 3
of Rule 119 provides:
"Sec. 3. Order of Trial. The trial shall proceed in the following
order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and,
in the proper case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional
remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence
only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed
submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue
orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged
in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
In the case at bar, petitioners were never instructed to present evidence to prove
their defenses. The parties were never given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There was no
admission by petitioners of the charge in the information as to justify a change in
the order of trial. 66
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death. 67 This rule also applies to all
other criminal cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The reason for this is to assure that the state makes no mistake in
taking life and liberty except that of the guilty. 68 Thus:
"Judges should be reminded that each step in the trial process
serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present
his defense. So with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always
take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case,
whether the prosecution or defense." 69
Second, the admission of private complainant's affidavit of October 21, 1996 was
made solely in response to respondent judge's own questioning. 70 It was this
affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit,
however, was not marked nor was it formally offered before the court. The
Revised Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide that "[t]he court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." 71 Evidence not
formally offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in
disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party desires to submit
for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, 72 otherwise
it is excluded and rejected. 73
Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature of the criminal proceedings before
the court, this doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused who must be given
the widest latitude of action to prove his innocence. 74 It is in petitioners' favor
that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be ,treated as a hearing on the motion
to dismiss, not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny
petitioners due process and all the other rights of an accused under the Bill of
Rights and our Rules in Criminal Procedure. cdtai
Indeed, following respondent judge's finding and assuming that the November 7,
1997 hearing was already a trial on the merits, petitioners were never afforded
their right to confront and cross-examine the witness. The court did not, at the
very least, inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to cross-examine private
complainant with respect to her affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to
cross-examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they cannot
be deemed to have waived said right by inaction. 7
||| (Alonte v. Savellano, Jr., G.R. No. 131652, 131728, [March 9, 1998], 350 PHIL 700-770)
G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO,

PATERNO ECUBIN, PRIOLO BILLONA, FRANCISCO BILLONA, MODESTO
RONQUILLA, CRESCENCIO SAVANDAL and SEVERENO
SAVANDAL, defendants; PABLEO DRAMAYO and PATERNO
ECUBIN, defendants-appellants.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Arturo G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Conrado T. Limcaoco for plaintiff-appellee.

Arturo E. Balbastro for defendants-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

ACCUSATION NOT SYNONYMOUS WITH GUILT. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental
law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability
lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom
is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their
guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been
committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state,
both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if
the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence be
one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken
into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must
not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant
could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act
that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral certainty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE DOUBT DEFINED. By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and
an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral
certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense. We feel that it is better to acquit a man upon the ground of reasonable
doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to confine in the penitentiary for the rest of
his natural life a person who may be innocent.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF TRIAL JUDGE; GENERALLY RESPECTED ON APPEAL. With
the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by
appellants, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense
of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the
well-settled principle that this Court has invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge
who was in a position to weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not
shown in this case, circumstances of weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
There is an element of ingenuity as well as of novelty in the plea made by counsel de oficio in this
appeal of the accused Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, who were sentenced to life
imprisonment for the murder of Estelito Nogaliza. The claim is vigorously pressed that because
the information alleged conspiracy on the part of seven defendants, with only the two appellants
being convicted, two having been utilized as state witnesses and the other three having been
acquitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence as to their culpability, the judgment of
conviction against the appellants cannot stand, there being a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.
To bolster such a contention, certain alleged deficiencies in the proof offered by the prosecution
were noted. A careful study of the evidence of record would leave no other rational conclusion
but that the deceased met his death at the hands of the appellants in the manner as found by the
lower court. Hence the appeal cannot prosper. We affirm.
The gory incident which was attended by a fatality started on the morning of January 9, 1964. The
two accused, now appellants, Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, in the company of the
deceased Estelito Nogaliza, all of Barrio Magsaysay, of the Municipality of Sapao, Surigao del
Norte, saw its chief of police. Their purpose was to shed light on a robbery committed in the
house of the deceased five days before by being available as witnesses. The response was
decidedly in the negative as they themselves were prime suspects, having been implicated by at
least two individuals who had confessed. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were
in the house of their co-accused Priolo Billona, the accused Dramayo invited all those present
including the other accused Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla, Crescencio and Savero Savandal,
for a drinking session at a place at the back of the school house. It was on that occasion that
Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not satisfy in the robbery
case. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao.
The others were to station themselves nearby. 1
Soon the unfortunate victim was sighted. He was accosted by Dramayo with a request for a
cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the
right ear. Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay
prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. It was the former also, who warned the rest of the group to
keep their mouths sealed as to what had just happened. His equanimity appeared undisturbed for
early the next morning, he went to the house of the deceased and informed the latter's widow
Corazon that he had just seen the cadaver of Estelito. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of
police were duly notified. The latter, upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo,
asked him to explain. The answer was that a skin ailment of his daughter was the cause thereof. 2
The death was due to the wounds inflicted, two in the epigastric region, one in the right lumbar
region, and another in the left breast.
It was on the basis of the above testimony offered by the prosecution that the lower court
reached its decision. Its dispositive portion found the accused, now appellants. Pableo Dramayo
and Paterno Ecubin, guilty "beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of [murder], defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by the circumstance of evident
premeditation as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said accused, Pableo
Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin, the penalty of [reclusion perpetua]." 3 Reference was likewise
made in such decision as to why the other co-accused were not convicted, two of them,
Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal being utilized as state witnesses, and the other three,
Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla acquitted.
Why they should not be found guilty was explained in the appealed decision thus: "From the
beginning the accused Modesto Ronquilla maintained that he was not with the group but that he
was fishing in the sea during the night in question. These facts that is, that none of the
prosecution witnesses has testified that any of these three accused actually helped in the killing
of the deceased, Estelito Nogaliza; that these three accused were included in the case only much
later after the filing of this case against Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin; the consistent
Contention of the accused Modesto Ronquilla that he was out in the sea fishing during the night in
question; and the testimonies of the accused Priolo Billona [and] Francisco [and their witnesses,]
Juan Billona, Esperanza Oposa-Billona, Guillerma Ponce, and Anselmo Lisondra, given in a
straight-forward manner, without hesitation, revealing a clear conscience, and the fact that the
testimonies of these witnesses have not been refuted by the PC soldiers [whom they accused of
maltreatment] when they were available to the prosecution, cause the Court to entertain a very
serious doubt as to the guilt of the said accused." 4
The lower court was hardly impressed with the defense of alibi interposed by now appellants
Dramayo and Ecubin, and it must have been their lack of persuasive character that must have led
to the able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Arturo E. Balbastro, stressing the absence of evidence
sufficient to convict, there still being a reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while
conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused were held culpable. To repeat, a

meticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the
offense charged, thus calling for the affirmance of the decision.
1. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of innocence. So it must be,
according to the Constitution. 5 That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on
their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a
standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need, therefore, for the most careful
scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever
defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive
at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.
So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. 6 United States v.
Lasada, 7 decided in 1910, yields this excerpt: "By reasonable doubt is not meant that which of
possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and
an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral
certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to
constitute the offense." 8 To the same effect is an excerpt form the opinion of the late Justice
Tuason in People v. Esquivel. 9 Thus; "In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the court the pertinent
facts as their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and
filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be
tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished.
Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the
state." 10
It is understandable why the stress should be on the absence of sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of alibi interposed hardly meriting
any further discussion. It cannot be denied though that the credible and competent evidence of
record resulted in moral certainty being entertained not only by the trial judge but by us as to the
culpability of appellants. The force of the controlling doctrines, on the other hand, required that
the other three accused be acquitted precisely because, unlike in the case of appellants, the
requisite quantum of proof to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not present. There is no
question as to the other two who testified for the state being like-vise no longer subject to any
criminal liability. The reference then to an opinion of the late Justice Laurel, stressing the need
for adhering to the fundamental postulate that a finding of guilt is allowable only when no
reasonable doubt could be entertained, is unavailing. This is evident from the very citation in the
brief of appellants of the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Manoji. 11 Thus: "Upon the other
hand, there are certain facts which if taken together are sufficient to raise in the mind of the
court a grave doubt as to the guilt of the defendant-appellant, 'that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.' (U.S. v. Lasada [1910], 18 Phil. 90, 96.) The finding of the two gold
teeth of the deceased in the suitcase of Maradani, and the testimony of Erajio Ello that he gave
that hat . . . to Maradani not only engender serious doubt in our minds as be the guilt of the
appellant, but also seems to sustain the theory of the defense and strengthen the suspicion of the

trial court, that Maradani and Salupudin are not foreign to, or entirely ignorant of, the killing of
Seijin Ige. In the light of the facts and circumstances of record, we feel that it is better to acquit
a man upon the ground of reasonable doubt, even though he may in reality be guilty, than to
confine in the penitentiary for the rest of his natural life a person who may be innocent. . . .
" 12 The facts of the present case certainly do not fit within the above mold. Reliance on the part
of appellants on the above decision is therefore futile.
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more
than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their rescue as it was
more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would
have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being
entertained, the two appellants would have been acquitted likewise just because the other five
defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly sentenced. The principal contention
raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the
first time, there had been cases where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants
being acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or
parties responsible for the offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as
to their culpability. 13
2. The brief for appellants did seek to fortify the allegation as to their guilty not having been
sufficiently de monstrated with the contention that the lower court over looked or did not
properly consider material and significant facts of record that ought to have substantially
affected or altered the judgment. Even the most careful reading of such brief, however, with due
recognition of the vigor in which this particular point is pressed, would not destroy the credibility
of the facts as testified to concerning the manner in which the deceased was killed and the
motive that prompted appellants to put an end to his life. That such a version could not have
been concocted is shown by the undeniable fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of
robbery, with the deceased as the offended party. It was understandable then why they would
want to do away with the principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for
the appellants to have committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to
no other conclusion except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel,
while to be expected from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should
not be attended with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has
invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to weigh and
appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this case, circumstances of
weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him. 14
WHEREFORE, the judgment of September 8, 1965 is affirmed with the modification that the
indemnification to the heirs of Estelito Nogaliza should be in the sum of P12,000.00. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
||| (People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, [October 29, 1971], 149 PHIL 107-116)
[G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,

JR., petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M . Gonzales for petitioners.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by
petitioners, in their own behalf and all others allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who
has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of
January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the
Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.
Petitioner, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San
Miguel, Iloilo. cdasia
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
"Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. In addition to violation of section 10 of Art.
XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired." (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class
legislation."
For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory
provisions:
"Sec. 7. Term of office. Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years. which
shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980."
. . ." Batas Pambansa Blg. 51
"Sec. 4. . . .
"Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not
be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes
shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and.
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of
such fact.
". . . (Batas Pambansa Blg. 52) (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied).

"Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials. . . . The election shall be held on
January 30, 1980." (Batas Pambansa, Blg. 52).
"Section 6. Election and Campaign Period. The election period shall be fixed by
the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of
theConstitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29, 1979
and terminate on January 28, 1980." (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the
accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which
provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination."
The question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als., vs.
COMELEC et als. (G.R. No. L-52232) where the issue has been squarely raised. cdasia
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void
for being violative of the Constitution.
I. The procedural aspect.
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities,
hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties
and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan.
Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint,
nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. They, respectively, contest completely different statutory
provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The
action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although
petitioners plead time constraints as the reason of their joint Petition, it would have required
only a modicum more of effort for petitioner Dumlao, on one hand, and petitioners Igot and
Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order to decide the case (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties
have raised the issue of constitutionality early enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and
controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by
the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision.
Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition
seeking Dumlao's disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that
constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a
question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory
opinion from this Court to be "rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record."
Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring Opinion of now
Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as
provided for in section 2, Art. XII-C, for theConstitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and
functions.
1) . . .
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial
and city officials." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
"Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his
receipt of a copy thereof."
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition,
that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one
has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been alleged to have been
adversely affected by the operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional.
Theirs is a generalized grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the
absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress. LibLex
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and
that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera, above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The
Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
". . . it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one
who will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are
many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that 'the expenditure of public
funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
In the same vein, it has been held:
"In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not
only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may,
therefore, question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of
public moneys." (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et
als. 15 SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and
sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. While,
concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation
of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.,
83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC (see Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
(Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing
Philippine Constitution Association vs. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a
taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.
Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested
with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a well-settled ruled that the constitutionality of
an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly
raised an presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e., the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an
"appropriate case" for either petitioner Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are
actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not
being entirely without discretion in the matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard
was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970]); and in
Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzales cases having
been penned by our present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount
public interest involved and the proximity of the elections which will be held only a few days
hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates
for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC
(as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of
intentional or purposeful discrimination. LexLib
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is
neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service,
employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages
are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should
not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might
or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a
good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political
elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be
good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees
from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65,
who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for thesame office from which he
had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the
same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such
denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional
guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30 [1978] citing
Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection
Board, 21 SCRA 336 [1967]; Inchong, etc., et al. vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The
purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if
at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies:
(Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977 ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the
questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule that to justify the nullification of a law, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid
unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC,
82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law, 3rd ed.
1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the competence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one
who desires to become a candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full earlier, and which they challenged, may be divided in
two parts. The first provides:
"a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the
presumption of validity that attached to a challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that
"all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts will not
set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra).
We are constrained to hold that this in one such clear case. Cdphil
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public
office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public
office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with
the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to
hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may
be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections,
time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of
finding between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will
thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not
be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared
valid. Said paragraph reads:
"SEC. 4. Special disqualification. In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article
XII(C) of the Constitution and disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which
are hereby declared as disqualifications for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal
official, who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is
entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired."
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that
". . . the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby
declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-52245, [January 22, 1980], 184 PHIL 369-395)
G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995.]
BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza and Villareal Law Offices for petitioner.

Balgos and Perez for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
POLITICAL LAW; THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; DISQUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR ANY
ELECTIVE LOCAL POSITION; FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE, DEFINED. The Oversight Committee finally
came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991. It provided: "Art. 73.Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position: "(a) . . . "(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or
non-political cases here or abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment. " Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a
law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court certainly
agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must
merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither

expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus
holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente (expressed during the Courts en
banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer
only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and
undue circumscription of the law.
DAVIDE, JR., J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; SEC. 40; R.A. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991); ART. 73, RULES AND
REGULATIONS; UNREASONABLY EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF DISQUALIFICATION. Section 40 of R.A.
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 enumerates those who are
disqualified from running for any elective local position, among whom is a: (e) Fugitive from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad. The term "fugitive from justice" refers
not only to those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but also to those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition
given to it by the Oversight Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final
judgment," as appearing in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, as inordinate and an undue circumscription of the law. Justice Davide
agrees and further submits that it also unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in
the 1991 Local Government Code because it disqualifies all those who have been convicted by
final judgment, regardless of the extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served
or are serving their sentences or have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for
another country. The definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the
word fugitive. This new definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been
shown to sustain it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the
meaning of the term.
2. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATIONS, JUSTIFIED. There are certain fundamental considerations which
do not support the application of the presumption of innocence under the Bill of Rights which
support disqualification. Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority
of Congress to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the
minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a qualified voter, it
logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are disqualified to seek
election for a public office. Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the
Constitution expressly so provides. A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A.
CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., 101; JOAQUIN BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 [1920]).
Accordingly, stricter qualifications for public office may thus be required by law. Thirdly, the
disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of presumption of innocence.
Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the filing of an
information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified because he is a "fugitive from
justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully
evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and
convicted, he has successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the jurisdiction of the
court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had
jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice. In the face
of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt, it may even be truly said that it is not
the challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather
the disqualified person himself who has proven his guilt. Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA
392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to case doubt on the validity of the challenged
disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence
that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 52providing that "the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima facieevidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein

did in fact establish a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal
complaint, in violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
The Court is called upon, in this petition for certiorari, to resolve the conflicting claims
of the parties on the meaning of the term "fugitive from justice" as that phrase is so used
under the provisions of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160).
That law states:
"Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running
for any elective local position:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position of Governor in the
Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed this petition forcertiorari praying for
the reversal of the resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") which dismissed his
petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo
Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. prLL
It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a
criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal
property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County
of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is
claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from
that country.
Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation (SPA 92-065) of
respondent's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of the candidate's disqualification under
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, was filed by petitioner with the COMELEC. On 08
May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's subsequent recourse to this Court (in G.R. No. 105310) from the 08th May
1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due
time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. The
Court, in its resolution of 02 June 1992, held:
"Evidently, the matter elevated to this Court was a pre-proclamation controversy.
Since the private respondent had already been proclaimed as the duly elected
Governor of the Province of Quezon, the petitioner below for disqualification has
ceased to be a pre-proclamation controversy. In Casimiro vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 84462-63 and Antonio vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
84678-79, jointly decided on 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468, this court held that a
pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should
be dismissed. The proper remedy of the petitioner is to pursue the disqualification
suit in a separate proceeding. llcd
"ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to
the filing of the appropriate proceedings in the proper forum, if so desired, within
ten (10) days from notice." 1
Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private
respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the petition. The COMELEC En Banc, on 02 December 1993, denied a
reconsideration of the resolution.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, the core issue of which, such as to be expected,
focuses on whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and
evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by
Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore, disqualified from being a
candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.
Petitioner's position is perspicuous and to the point. The law, he asseverates, needs no
further interpretation and construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160, is rather clear,
he submits, and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General, taking the side of
petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice"
includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,
after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence (Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 399, by F.B. Moreno; Black's Law
Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 671; King vs. Noe, 244 S.C. 344, 137 S.E. 2d 102, 103; Hughes vs.
PFlanz, 138 Federal Reporter 980; Tobin vs. Casaus, 275 Pacific Reporter, 2d., p. 792), and it
may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.
In turn, private respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of
the Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 5332 of RA. 7160, was convened
by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary
for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to
ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy." cdll
Here are some excerpts from the committee's deliberations:
"'CHAIRMAN MERCADO. Session is resumed.
'So, we are in agreement to retain Line 12, Page 36, as is. So next, Page 39.
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kay Benny Marquez.
'REP. CUENCO. What does he want?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Kung puwede i-retain lang iyan. Bahala na kung
kuwestiyunin ang constitutionality nito before the Supreme Court later on.
'REP. CUENCO. Anong nakalagay diyan?
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. Iyong disqualification to run for public office.
'Any person who is a fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here
or abroad."
'Mabigat 'yung abroad.' One who is facing criminal charges with the warrant of
arrest pending, unserved. . .
'HONORABLE SAGUISAG. I think that is even a good point, and what is a
fugitive? It is not defined. We have loose understanding. . .
'CHAIRMAN DE PEDRO. So isingit na rin sa definition of terms iyong 'fugitive.'
'Si Benny umalis na, with the understanding na okay na sa atin ito.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. Whether we have this rule or not she can run. She is not a
fugitive from justice. Mrs. Marcos can run at this point and I have held that for
a long time ago. So can. . .
"MS. DOCTOR. Mr. Chairman. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes.
"MS. DOCTOR. Let's move to. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Wait, wait, wait. Can we just agree on the wording, this is
very important. Manny, can you come up?
"MR. REYES. Let's use the word conviction by final judgment.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment.
Okay, Fugitive means a person convicted by final judgment. Insert that on Line
43 after the semi-colon. Is that approved? No objection, approved (TSN,
Oversight Committee, 07 May 1991).
"xxx xxx xxx
"THE CHAIRMAN. Andy, saan ba naman itong amendment on page 2? Sino ba ang
gumawa nito? Okay, on page 2, lines 43 and 44, 'fugitive from justice.' What
'fugitive?' Sino ba ang gumawa nito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Yes, I think, well, last time, Mr. Chairman, we agree to clarify
the word what is meant by the word 'fugitive.'
"THE CHAIRMAN. 'Fugitive from justice means a person' ba ito, ha?
"MR. SANCHEZ. Means a person. . .
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ha?
"HON. REYES. A person who has been convicted.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, fugitive from justice, oo. Fugitive from justice shall
mean or means one who has been convicted by final judgment. It means one
who has been convicted by final judgment.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kulang pa rin ang ibig sabihin niyan.
"THE CHAIRMAN. Ano? Sige, tingnan natin.
"HON. DE PEDRO. Kung nasa loob ng presuhan, fugitive pa rin siya?
"THE CHAIRMAN. O, tama na yan, fugitive from justice. He has been convicted
by final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up,
post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final
judgment." 3
The Oversight Committee evidently entertained serious apprehensions on the possible
constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 if the disqualification
therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal
charges. A similar concern was expressed by Senator R.A.V. Saguisag who during the
bicameral conference committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives, made
this reservation:
". . . de ipa-refine lang natin 'yung language especially 'yung, the scope of
fugitive. Medyo bothered ako doon, a." 4
The Oversight Committee finally came out with Article 73 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided:
"Art. 73. Disqualifications. The following persons shall be disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
"(a) . . .
"(b) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or
abroad. Fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by
final judgment." 5 (Italics supplied)
Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the
officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas
Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166, 181). The Court
certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling
law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The
Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of
the ponente(expressed during the Court's en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent
that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive)
"who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of
the law.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in
fact, private respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the
COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule
73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself,
not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a
determination of this unresolved factual matter. prLL
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolutions of the Commission on Elections are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the case is hereby REMANDED to the Commission which is
DIRECTED to proceed and resolve the case with dispatch conformably with the foregoing
opinion. No special pronouncement on costs.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Bellosillo and Mendoza, JJ., join J. Davide in his separate opinion.
Davide, Jr., J., see separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) states that the
qualifications for elective provincial, city, municipal, and barangay officials shall be those
provided for in the Local Government Code. The quondam Local Government Code
was B.P. Blg. 337, which was superseded by R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.Section 39 of the latter provides for the qualifications and
election of local elective officials. Section 40 enumerates those who are disqualified from
running for any elective local position, among whom is a:
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.
The term "fugitive from justice" refers not only to those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but also to those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In
his ponencia, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug finds the definition given to it by the Oversight
Committee, i.e., "a person who has been convicted by final judgment," as appearing in
Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991,
as inordinate and an undue circumscription of the law. I agree.

But this is only one side of the coin. I further submit that it also unreasonably
expands the scope of the disqualification in the 1991 Local Government Code because it
disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment, regardless of the extent
of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their sentences or
have evaded service of sentence by jumping bail or leaving for another country. The
definition thus disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive. This new
definition is unwarranted for nothing in the legislative debates has been shown to sustain
it and the clear language of the law leaves no room for a reexamination of the meaning of
the term.
I do not share the doubt of Mr. Justice Vitug on the constitutionality of the
disqualification based on the presumption of innocence clause of the Bill of Rights. There
are certain fundamental considerations which do not support the application of the
presumption. LLpr
Firstly, Section 1, Article V of the Constitution recognizes the authority of Congress
to determine who are disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage. Since the
minimum requirement of a candidate for a public office is that he must be a qualified
voter, it logically follows that Congress has the plenary power to determine who are
disqualified to seek election for a public office.
Secondly, a public office is a public trust. Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution
expressly provides:
Sec. 1. Public office is public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
A public office is not property. (ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Constitutional Law, 1993 ed., 101;
JOAQUIN BERNAS, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary,
1987 ed., 40, citing Cornejo vs. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 [1920]). Accordingly, stricter
qualifications for public office may thus be required by law.
Thirdly, the disqualification in question does not, in reality, involve the issue of
presumption of innocence. Elsewise stated, one is not disqualified because he is presumed
guilty by the filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified
because he is a "fugitive from justice," i.e., he was not brought within the jurisdiction of
the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the
jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully evaded service
of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The disqualification then is based on
his flight from justice. In the face of the settled doctrine that flight is an indication of guilt,
it may even be truly said that it is not the challenged disqualifying provision which
overcomes the presumption of innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who
has proven his guilt. LibLex
Finally, Dumlao vs. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392 [1980]) cannot be invoked to cast doubt
on the validity of the challenged disqualification. Dumlao struck out as violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence that portion of the second paragraph, Section 4
of B.P. Blg. 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes
before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact." It is clear that the law challenged therein did in fact establish
a presumption of guilt from the mere filing of the information or criminal complaint, in
violation of the constitutional right to presumption of innocence.

||| (Marquez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 112889, [April 18, 1995], 313 PHIL
417-433)
[G.R. No. 74259. February 14, 1991.]
GENEROSO P. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Law Firm of Roberto P. Halili for petitioner.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The petitioner seeks reversal of the decision of the respondent court dated February 27, 1986,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Generoso Corpuz y Padre, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, and
there being no modifying circumstances in attendance, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
ranging from Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to Twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to restitute
to the provincial government of Nueva Vizcaya the sum of P50,596.07 which is the
amount misappropriated, and to pay the costs of this suit. Further, the accused is
ordered to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and to pay a
fine equal to the amount embezzled.
SO ORDERED.
As Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Nueva Vizcaya, the
petitioner was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said Office. In this capacity, he
received collections, disbursed funds and made bank deposits and withdrawals pertaining to
government accounts. llcd
On April 13, 1981, his designation as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated, and on April 22,
1981, a Transfer of Accountabilities was effected between the petitioner and his successor. The
Certificate of Turnover revealed a shortage in the amount of P72,823.08. 1
A letter of demand dated April 22, 1981, required the petitioner to produce the missing amount
but he was able to pay only P10,159.50. The balance was demanded in another letter dated
October 12, 1981. This was subsequently reduced by P12,067.51 through the payment to the
petitioner of temporarily disallowed cash items and deductions from his salary before his
dismissal from the service. 2
On September 27, 1982, a final letter of demand for the total deficiency of P50,596.07 was sent
to the petitioner. The demand not having been met, an information for malversation of the said
amount was filed against him with the respondent court on October 11, 1983.
The above facts are not denied by the petitioner. 3 He insists, however, that he is not guilty of
the charge because the shortage imputed to him was malversed by other persons.
His claim is that the P50,000.00 constituting the bulk of the shortage represented the
unliquidated withdrawal made by Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through one of four separate checks
issued and encashed while the petitioner was on official leave of absence. He avers he was later
made to post the amount in his cash book by Acting Deputy Provincial Treasurer Bernardo C.
Aluning and he had no choice but to comply although he had not actually received the said
amount. cdll
The four checks drawn from the Philippine National Bank and the corresponding vouchers dated
are described as follows:
1. Provincial Voucher dated December 22, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956637 dated December 22,
1980.
2. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. SN958525 dated December
23, 1980.
3. Provincial Voucher dated December 23, 1980 from the General Fund in the
amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 956639J dated December 22,
1980.
4. Provincial Voucher dated December 29, 1980 from the Infrastructure Fund in
the amount of P50,000.00 and paid by PNB Check No. 958226 dated December 29,
1980.
Testifying for the prosecution, Pineda insisted he had liquidated all four checks after the amounts
thereof were disbursed, turning over to the petitioner the corresponding withdrawal vouchers,
paid vouchers, and payrolls, (which were all submitted as exhibits). 4 He added that the
petitioner was not really absent on the dates in question as alleged but was in fact the one who
prepared the said checks in the morning before attending to his sick wife in the hospital,
returning to the office in the afternoon. He said that the payroll payments made on December 22,
23 and 29, 1980, were liquidated on December 29, 1980, after the petitioner came back from the
hospital. 5
Acting Provincial Treasurer Perfecto Martinez corroborated Pineda's testimony that the petitioner
was not on official leave on the dates in question. He said that although Check No. 958525 had
already been encashed on December 23, 1980, the encashment was not immediately recorded in
the petitioner's cashbook, "which (was) one way of temporarily hiding the early detection of a
shortage." It was only in March 1981 that the shortage was discovered and, when confronted with
it, the petitioner had no explanation to offer. 6
Aluning denied he had exerted pressure on the petitioner to post the shortage in the petitioner's
cash book. He explained that after receiving the bank statement from the PNB for December 1980,
he discovered that although the amount of P50,000.00 appeared to have been already encashed,
the encashment was not reflected in the petitioner's cash book. As his superior, he required the
petitioner to make the proper entry in the cash book because the amount withdrawn was already
part of the latter's accountability. 7
After considering the evidence of the parties, the Sandiganbayan, through Justice Amante Q.
Alconcel, made the following findings:
The evidence on record is devoid of any explanation from the defense as to the
amount of P595.87. Hence, the accused must be held answerable for the
misappropriation of the said amount.
As to the amount of P50,000.00, We are not disposed to give credence to his claim
that same has not been liquidated by the paymaster, for the following reasons:
First, Check No. 958525 is only one of four (4) checks issued and encashed for the
same purpose, and that is, to pay salary differentials as well as salaries and wages
of provincial officials and employees of the province of Nueva Vizcaya covering the
period, January to December, 1980. Issuance and encashment occurred on
December 23, 1980, and in fact, another check (No. 956639) was also issued and
encashed on the same day. The two (2) other checks (Nos. 956637 and 958526)
were issued and encashed on December 22 and 29, 1980, respectively. Except for
Check No. 958525, which was only entered in accused's Cash Book on March 31,
1981, or three (3) months after its issuance and encashment, all the other three (3)
were duly entered. Then Check No. 956639 which, as pointed out above, was
issued and encashed on the same day as Check No. 958525, was duly entered in his
Cash Book. Non-entry of the latter check on time was a subtle way of camouflaging
the embezzlement of its money equivalent.
Secondly, there seems to be no logical reason why Checks, Nos. 956639 and 958525,
could not have been liquidated together by Diosdado Pineda who used the
proceeds to pay salary differentials of government officials and employees of the
province of Nueva Vizcaya, since these have been issued and encashed on the
same day.
Thirdly, Diosdado Pineda, who was presented as a prosecution witness, swore that
he duly liquidated the proceeds of the four (4) checks as follows:
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO ON DIRECT EXAMINATION:
q. If the payroll is already accomplished, where do you give the payroll?
a. I give it back to the cashier with the corresponding voucher to support the
vouchers paid by me or disbursed by me.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. So that your cash advances will be liquidated?
a. Yes, Your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
q. In the absence of the cashier, to whom do you give these documents?
a. I give them to the cashier only, no other person.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO
q. In his absence, do you keep these documents?
a. Yes, Your Honor.
q. For payrolls that you paid for December 22, 23 and 29, when did you give these
payrolls to the cashier?
a. On December 29, sir.
AJ ESCAREAL:
q. Duly accomplished?
a. Duly accomplished, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Where did you see your cashier on the 29th?
a. At the office, Your Honor.
ATTY. DEL ROSARIO:
q. At what time?
a. In the afternoon, sir.
AJ ALCONCEL:
q. Are you not aware that your cashier was absent on that date?
a. He was present on that day, sir. He would go out because the wife was
supposedly having a check-up but in the afternoon, he would return. (t.s.n.,
March 29, 1985, pp. 16-18)
The cashier referred to by the witness is the accused, Generoso P. Corpuz.
And fourthly, We are not impressed by accused's claim that he was absent on
December 22, 23 and 29, 1980. His witness, Diosdado Pineda, declared otherwise.
His Employee's Leave Card (Exhibit J), wherein his earned leaves are indicated,
shows that during the month of December, 1980, he earned 1.25 days vacation
leave and 1.25 days sick leave, which is the same number of days vacation and sick
leaves that he earned monthly from July 7, 1976 to October 1981. Moreover, even
if it were true that he was absent on December 23, 1980, the day when Check No.
958525 was issued and encashed, yet, the other check which was issued and
encashed on the same day was duly liquidated.
The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason
to disturb them, absent any of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and
reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the facts as established point unmistakably
to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged.
This conclusion is bolstered by the Solicitor General's observation that:
Moreover, petitioner's denial of responsibility for the missing P50,000.00 is
negated by the following factors:
First. When he entered the said amount in his cash book in March, 1981, he did not
make any notation that said amount, though entered, was not actually received.
Second. At the time he signed the certificate of turn-over (Exhibit C), he did not
make any certification that the amount of P50,000.00 should not be charged
against him.
Third. Despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money,
he did not file any case, whether civil, criminal or otherwise, against either or
both.
The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is not a
preliminary requirement to the filing of an information for malversation as long as the prima
facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property
to personal use. 8 And what determines whether the crime of malversation has been committed is
the presence of the following requirements under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code:
(a) That the offender be a public officer.
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office.
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible for a
crime he has not committed is less than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame on others for
his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he who is looking for a scapegoat. The
plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the "untouchables" during the Marcos regime
is a mere emotional appeal that does not impress at all. The suggestion that the supposed
injustice on the petitioner would be abetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must
be rejected as an arrant presumptuousness.
The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties
is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the
scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is
overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of
persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence
he has breached. His conviction must be affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padil
||| (Corpuz v. People, G.R. No. 74259, [February 14, 1991], 271 PHIL 901-910)
G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]
ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
A.M. Navarro Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; TO BE INFORMED OF THE

NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION; ORIGIN AND OBJECTIVES. On the assumption that the
prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction for the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents, there is absolutely
no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be convicted of the said crime without
offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, which is
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Such right, an ancient bulwark of the liberties of men, has its
origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great Britain demanded and received from the
Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It was adopted by the Constitution of the
United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. It
was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately, enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973,
and 1987. It has the following objectives: First. To furnish the accused with such a description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his
conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third,
to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order
that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime
is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable
particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances. In short, the

complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime charged. ASHaTc
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION; DETERMINED BY THE ACTUAL RECITAL OF FACTS STATED IN THE INFORMATION OR
COMPLAINT. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of
the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. It follows then
that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter as provided by Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The succeeding
Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is included in another.
We have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents is included in the offense charged. Moreover,
we held that the information in this case "can also be considered as charging two offenses: the
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents," and since the petitioner failed to object
before trial to such duplicity, he could be validly convicted of both or either of the offenses
charged and proved.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT. Under Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken
chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion
of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; REQUIRED TO OVERCOME ACCUSED'S RIGHT
TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT. The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the
petitioner (1) personally represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2)
knew of the falsity of any of the public and commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at
any time, possession of all or some of the said documents. Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient
circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the petitioner and Catre to commit the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. Neither is
there evidence of petitioner's active participation in the commission of the crime. The
concordant combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the petitioner as proven by the
prosecution's evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, the
petitioner must then be acquitted even though his innocence may be doubted.
5. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; DEFINED; WHEN PRESENT. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of interest. It is, however, settled that the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is likewise required to support a finding of conspiracy. In other words,
conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle that no one shall be found guilty of a crime
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.

6. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE IS THE ACT OF ALL. The information charges the petitioner and his
co-accused Joe Catre as principals who "conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed],
and mutually help[ed] one another," with Catre "representing himself to be a representative of
Everson Commercial Trading of Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which turned
out to be non-existent, fake or fictitious." The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted by the
respondent, only showed that it was Catre who possessed the falsified documents, contracted the
services of Calica, and delivered the documents to the latter for processing. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation, Catre, being the one in possession of the forged documents, is presumed
to be the forger. Catre, however, could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner
was tried. The information states that his address is "unknown," and the record does not show
that a warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for
the petitioner. Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the prosecution are to be
admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to prove the guilt of
Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if
conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty of the offense proved. For, in a
conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose of
such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them.
7. ID.; ID.; TO BE A PARTY THERETO, THE CONSPIRATOR SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED SOME OVERT
ACT AS A DIRECT OR INDIRECT CONTRIBUTION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE CRIME. It is also
essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others that there
be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common
design. Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator
should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the
crime planned to be committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other
co-conspirators. IDaCcS
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the appealed judgment of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 14844 by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and to
pay a fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00).
In short, we held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended because the said section penalizes only
consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated he could,
nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
official and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.
Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that after having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special
law, he could not be convicted anymore of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, an offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a general law;
otherwise, the constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated. In other words, his
acquittal of the crime charged precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents, because both offenses arose from
the same overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844.
In its Comment on the motion for reconsideration signed only by Assistant Solicitor General
Romeo C. de la Cruz and Solicitor Josette Sonia Holgado-Marcilla, the Office of the Solicitor
General disagrees with the petitioner and asserts that the rule on double jeopardy cannot be
successfully invoked in this case considering that no new information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against the petitioner; only one information was filed
against him and his co-accused. For double jeopardy to exist, there must be such new information
and the accused must be able to show that (1) he has been previously brought to trial, (2) in a
court of competent jurisdiction, (3) upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance, (4) for the same offense or an attempt to or frustration thereof as that charged in the
new information, and that (5) the case has been dismissed or terminated without his consent or
after he had pleaded to the information but before judgment was rendered. 1
Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General joins the petitioner in the latter's plea for his
acquittal, but for another ground, namely, insufficiency of evidence.
In the resolution of 22 August 1995, we directed the Solicitor General to inform the Court whether
he agrees with the recommendation of Assistant Solicitor General De la Cruz and Solicitor
Holgado-Marcilla. In his Manifestation of 14 September 1995, the Solicitor General not only
expressed full agreement with the said recommendation, but even added the following
observations:
10. After reading the Court's Decision, the Solicitor General has noted that
petitioner's conviction is based on circumstantial evidence.
11. The law and a host of the Court's ruling declare that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if the following conditions concur:
(1) There is more that one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(3) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt (Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of
Court).
12. In this case, it should be stressed that the inference that petitioner falsified
documents appears to be based on another inference, i.e., that he was in
possession of the same because he accompanied his co-accused Catre in the
transactions. However, other than accompanying Catre, there is no
evidence on record that petitioner had custody of the falsified documents.
13. As to the conspiracy angle, there is likewise no showing that petitioner
interceded for Catre. In fact, it was Catre who talked to Calica. (p. 19-20,
TSN, August 26, 1991) Neither was it shown that petitioner had a hand in
the processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the
shipment from the Bureau of Customs. It was not also proven that he was
instrumental in the approval of the import entry declaration.
14. The elements of conspiracy, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself,
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Manuel, 234 SCRA
532). To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it
must be shown that he performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance
of the conspiracy. (People vs. Roxas, 241 SCRA 369). In this regard, it is
respectfully submitted that there is no overt act conclusively attributable
to petitioner which would pin him down as a co-conspirator.

15. Thus, it is the inexorable duty of the Solicitor General to recommend
petitioner's acquittal, as he so recommends, inasmuch as the People was
not able to adduce evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of petitioner's innocence.
We then required the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the following issues:
(a) the sufficiency of the evidence for the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents, and
(b) the validity of the conviction therefor under an information for the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, vis-a-vis the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in
asserting that the petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on circumstantial evidence
because of the failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court, namely, (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The petitioner further cited portions of the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Customs Broker Constantino Calica
which prove that it was Catre alone who made the introduction to Calica that they were agents of
Eversun Commercial Trading, and that it was Catre who did all the talking and directly transacted
with Calica regarding the terms and conditions of the particular engagement and who actually
delivered the documents to him. There is no evidence that the petitioner had a hand in the
processing of the import entry declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of
Customs or was instrumental in the approval of the import entry declaration. Thus:
Q Now, did Mr. Odon Pecho actually engage your services?
A They are two, sir, Mr. Joe Catre and Mr. Odon Pecho.
Q Who actually transacted with you with regards to your services, is it Mr. Catre or
Mr. Pecho?
A Mr. Joe Catre, sir.
Q So it was Joe Catre?
A Yes, sir.
Q And not Odon Pecho, is that right?
A Well, he is the companion of Mr. Catre and they introduced themselves to me
that they are the authorized representative of the importer.
Q That is right. Who introduced to you?
A Mr. Catre was the one who talks [sic] to me, sir.
Q But in your testimony, the person who delivered to you the documents, the bill
of lading, the commercial invoices, the packing list, the importer's sworn
statement, etc. which was made the basis of the, of your preparation for
the processing of the import entry, who delivered to you these documents
that you mentioned?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And who talked to you about the terms and conditions of this engagement or
contracts?
A Mr. Catre, sir.
Q And not Mr. Odon Pecho?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who actually delivered to you the documents, Mr. Catre or Mr. Pecho?
A It was Mr. Catre, sir, he was the one handling the case.
AJ ESCAREAL
Q [To] Whom did you talk first?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor, he was the one handling the case, the documents, Your
Honor.
Q Do you know how they introduced themselves to you?
A That is the only thing that I remember Your Honor that they came to my office
and told me that they are the importer's representatives and that they are
engaging my services.
Q Who said that?
A Mr. Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about Mr. Pecho?
A No, Your Honor.
Q Did he say anything?
A At that time your Honor, it was Mr. Catre who was doing that talking.
Q Did Mr. Catre give his name to you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did he introduce himself?
A That he is Mr. Joe Catre, Your Honor.
Q How about his companion, did his companion introduce himself to you or he was
introduced by Mr. Catre to you?
A He did not introduce himself to me Your Honor.
Q So during that meeting you do not know that the name of the companion of Mr.
Catre is Odon Pecho.
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And how did your son attend to it?
A Two days after Your Honor, Mr. Catre called our office to assist and help them in
the preparation of the cargo at the arrastre operator because that is usually
being done by the broker when the shipment goes for examination. (t.s.n.,
Hearing of August 26, 1991)
As to the second issue, the Office of the Solicitor General rejects the theory of the petitioner and
submits that the information in this case contains the essential ingredients of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents; therefore, assuming there is sufficient
evidence, the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
I
We shall first take up the second issue since it involves a constitutional right of the accused.
On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for
conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be
convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 2 Such right, an ancient
bulwark of the liberties of men, has its origin in the Bill of Rights which the people of Great
Britain demanded and received from the Prince and Princess of Orange on 13 February 1688. It
was adopted by the Constitution of the United States and was extended to the Philippines by Act
No. 235, or the Philippine Bill of 1902. 3 It was later carried into the Jones Law and, ultimately,
enshrined in the Constitutions of 1935, 1973, and 1987. It has the following objectives:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as
will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they
are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts
must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
intent: these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of
time, place, names (plaintiff or defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged. 4
Conformably therewith, the Rules of Court has prescribed the appropriate rules. 5
What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the actual
recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, they being conclusions of law. 6 An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. 7
It follows then that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged,
is necessarily included in the latter. Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court thus provides:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that
proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved.
The succeeding Section 5 prescribes the rule in determining when an offense includes or is
included in another. We have shown in the challenged decision why the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents is included in the
offense charged. Moreover, we held that the information in this case "can also be considered as
charging two offenses: the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents," and since
the petitioner failed to object before trial to such duplicity, 8 he could be validly convicted of
both or either of the offenses charged and proved. 9
II
We shall now turn to the first issue: whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution had
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioner for the complex crime of
attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents. In light of the
consistent and persistent negative stance of the Office of the Solicitor General, personally

confirmed and reinforced by the Solicitor General in his separate Manifestation, we re-evaluated
the evidence.
In our decision of 14 November 1994, we based the conviction of the petitioner on conspiracy.
The question that logically crops up then is not whether the combination of the circumstantial
evidence proved in this case against the petitioner had established beyond reasonable doubt that
he is guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, as asseverated by him and the public respondent. Rather, the question is
whether the prosecution had discharged its duty to establish conspiracy between the petitioner
and Catre.
The information 10 charges the petitioner and his co-accused Joe Catre as principals 11 who
"conspir[ed], confabulat[ed], conniv[ed], confederat[ed], and mutually help[ed] one another,"
with Catre "representing himself to be a representative of Eversun Commercial Trading of
Cotabato City, a corporation, firm or partnership which turned out to be non-existent, fake or
fictitious." The evidence for the prosecution, as admitted by the respondent, only showed that it
was Catre who possessed the falsified documents, contracted the services of Calica, and
delivered the documents to the latter for processing. In the absence of satisfactory explanation,
Catre, being the one in possession of the forged documents, is presumed to be the
forger. 12 Catre, however, could not provide the explanation because only the petitioner was
tried. The information states that his address is "unknown," and the record does not show that a
warrant for his arrest was issued. The only warrant of arrest that was issued was that for the
petitioner. 13 Assuming that such evidence and the others adduced by the prosecution are to be
admitted to prove the commission of the crime, a prima facie case enough to prove the guilt of
Catre with moral certainty was duly established against Catre as a principal. Accordingly, if
conspiracy were proven, the petitioner would be equally guilty of the offense proved. For, in a
conspiracy, every act of one of the conspirators in furtherance of a common design or purpose of
such a conspiracy is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them. 14
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. 15 Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is
not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. 16 It is, however, settled that
the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is likewise required to support a
finding of conspiracy. It other words, conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself in order to uphold the fundamental principle
that no one shall be found guilty of a crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. 17
It is also essential for one to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others
that there be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design. 18 Except when he is the mastermind in a conspiracy, it is necessary that a
conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the
execution of the crime planned to be committed. 19 The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. 20
Since conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, then the next inquiry
would be whether the prosecution was able to adduce such proof against the petitioner. It is in
this respect that we agree with the People and the petitioner that the prosecution had only
circumstantial evidence against the petitioner.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 21
In the instant case, all that the prosecution was able to prove insofar as the petitioner is
concerned is that he and co-accused Catre are from Surigao del Norte; that he accompanied Catre
in contracting the services of customs broker Constantino Calica; and that he also was with Catre
when the latter went with Dennis Calica, son of Constantino Calica, to the Manila International
Container Port. In all these instances, however, it was Catre who transacted the business and did
all the talking. As a matter of fact, the petitioner was not even introduced to Calica. As
recapitulated by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Memorandum:
[T]here is no evidence that petitioner interceded for Catre. Prosecution witness
Calica testified that it was Catre and not petitioner, who introduced themselves as
agents of Eversun Commercial Trading. He also testified that it was Catre who did
all the talking and directly transacted with him (Calica) regarding the terms and
conditions of the particular engagement and it was also Catre, and not petitioner,
who actually delivered the documents to him (tsn, August 26, 1991). There is no
evidence that petitioner had a hand in the processing of the import entry
declaration for the release of the shipment from the Bureau of Customs. There is
also no evidence that petitioner was instrumental in the approval of the import
entry declaration. In short, there is no showing that petitioner performed an overt
act in furtherance of alleged conspiracy. 22
The evidence for the prosecution likewise failed to prove that the petitioner (1) personally
represented himself as an agent of Eversun Commercial Trading; (2) knew of the falsity of any of
the public and commercial documents in question; and (3) had, at any time, possession of all or
some of the said documents.
Otherwise stated, there is no sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove conspiracy between the
petitioner and Catre to commit the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents. Neither is there evidence of petitioner's active participation in the
commission of the crime. The concordant combination and cumulative effect of the acts of the
petitioner as proven by the prosecution's evidence fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. There is reasonable doubt as to his guilt. And since his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 23 can be overthrown only
byproof beyond reasonable doubt, 24 the petitioner must then be acquitted even though his
innocence may be doubted. 25
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. Our decision of 14

November 1994 is SET ASIDE, and another is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision
of 28 June 1993 and resolution of 12 August 1993 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14844
and ACQUITTING petitioner ODON PECHO of the complex crime of attempted estafa through
falsification of official and commercial documents, without, however, prejudice to any
appropriate administrative action which his office may take against him as may be warranted by
the circumstances in this case.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Pecho v. People, G.R. No. 111399, [September 27, 1996], 331 PHIL 1-20)
[G.R. No. L-65952. July 31, 1984.]

LAURO G. SORIANO, JR., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Dakila F. Castro for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J p:
The principal issue in this petition to review a decision of the Sandiganbayan is whether or not the
preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint conducted by a Fiscal is a "contract or
transaction" so as to bring it within the ambit of Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The factual background is as follows:
Thomas N. Tan was accused of qualified theft in a complaint lodged with the City Fiscal of Quezon
City. The case was docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964 and assigned for investigation to the petitioner
who was then an Assistant City Fiscal. In the course of the investigation the petitioner demanded
P4,000.00 from Tan as the price for dismissing the case. Tan reported the demand to the National
Bureau of Investigation which set up an entrapment. Because Tan was hard put to raise the
required amount only P2,000.00 in bills were marked by the NBI which had to supply one-half
thereof. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 7393 which reads as follows:
"The undersigned Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor accuses LAURO G. SORIANO, for
Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019, otherwise known as
theAnti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of March 1983, at Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, a public officer, being then and still is an Assistant
City Fiscal of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, detailed as the Investigating
Fiscal in the case of MARIANNE Z. LACAMBRA versus THOMAS N. TAN,
docketed as I.S. No. 82-2964, for Qualified Theft, taking advantage of his
official position and with grave abuse of authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand and request from Thomas N.
Tan the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) Philippine Currency,
and actually received from said Thomas N. Tan the amount of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) Philippine Currency, in consideration for a
favorable resolution by dismissing the above-mentioned case, wherein said
accused has to intervene in his official capacity as such Investigating Fiscal.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 22, 1983.
(SGD.) EDGARDO C. LABELLA
Special Prosecutor"
After trial the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Lauro G. Soriano, Jr., GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, as Principal, in the Information, for Violation of Section 3,
paragraph (b), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
MONTH, as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as maximum; to suffer
perpetual disqualification from public office; to suffer loss of all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law; and, to pay costs.
"Of the sum of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) used in the entrapment operations,
and which was fully recovered from the accused, One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00)
shall be returned to private complainant Thomas N. Tan, and the other half, to the
National Bureau of Investigation, National Capital Region."
A motion to reconsider the decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan; hence the instant petition.
The petitioner has raised several legal questions plus one factual question. The latter is to the
effect that the Sandiganbayan convicted him on the weakness of his defense and not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, This claim is not meritorious not only because it is not for
Us to review the factual findings of the court a quo but also because a reading of its decision
shows that it explicitly stated the facts establishing the guilt of the petitioner and the
competence of the witnesses who testified against him.
As stated above, the principal issue is whether or not the investigation conducted by the
petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A.
No. 3019. On this issue the petition is highly impressed with merit.
The afore-mentioned provision reads as follows:
"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: prcd
(a) . . .
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any
contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the
public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."
The petitioner states:
"Assuming in gratia argumenti, petitioner's guilt, the facts make out a case of
Direct Bribery defined and penalized under the provision of Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code and not a violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act
3019, as amended.
"The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all, the
offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise
included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation
of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution
showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which
was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner
undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary
investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of
dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the
exercise of the function of his office. Therefore, it is with pristine clarity that the
offense proved, if at all, is Direct Bribery." (Petition, p. 5.)
Upon the other hand, the respondents claim:

"A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as
used thereof is not limited in its scope or meaning to a commercial or business
transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or
administrative in nature, pending with the government. This must be so, otherwise,
the Act would have so stated in the 'Definition of Terms', Section 2 thereof. But it
did not, perforce leaving no other interpretation than that the expressed purpose
and object is to embrace all kinds of transaction between the government and
other party wherein the public officer would intervene under the law." (Comment,
p. 8.)
It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it
a transaction because this term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A
transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some consideration as in credit transactions
and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
In the light of the foregoing, We agree with the petitioner that it was error for the Sandiganbayan
to have convicted him of violating Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019.
The petitioner also claims that he cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code
because to do so would be violative of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. Wrong. A reading of the information which has been
reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of the right to be informed.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan is modified in that the
petitioner is deemed guilty of bribery as defined and penalized by Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos. The rest of the judgment is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner. Cdpr
SO ORDERED.
||| (Soriano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-65952, [July 31, 1984], 216 PHIL 177-182)
[G.R. No. L-45667. June 20, 1977.]
MANUEL BORJA, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu (Branch VI) and HON. ROMULO R. SENINING, Judge of
the City Court of Cebu (Branch I), respondents.
Hermis I. Montecillo for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Jose F. Racela,
Jr. and Solicitor Carlos N. Ortega for respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The jurisdictional infirmity imputed to respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining of the City Court of
Cebu which was not remedied by respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu in this certiorari proceeding was the absence of an arraignment of petitioner
Manuel Borja, who was accused of slight physical injuries. This notwithstanding, respondent

Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and thereafter, in a decision promulgated on
August 18, 1976, found him guilty of such offense and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for a
period of twenty days of arresto menor. 1 Thereafter, an appeal was duly elevated to the Court
of First Instance of Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. 2 It was then alleged that
without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision
on the appealed case was rendered on November 16, 1976 affirming the judgment of the City
Court. It is the contention of petitioner that the failure to arraign him is violative of his
constitutional right to procedural due process, 3 more specifically of his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and
counsel. 4 There was thus, at the very least, a grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor
General, 5 when asked to comment, agreed that the procedural defect was of such gravity as to
render void the decision of the City Court affirmed by the Court of First Instance. The comment
was considered as answer, with the case being submitted for decision.
Respect for the constitutional rights of an accused as authoritatively construed by this Court, duly
taken note of in the comment of the Solicitor General, thus calls for the grant of the writ of
certiorari prayed for.
1. The plea of petitioner to nullify the proceedings had in the criminal case against him finds
support in the procedural due process mandate of the Constitution. It requires that the accused
be arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has
to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with
full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. Moreover, the sentence to be imposed in
such a case is to be in accordance with a valid law. 6 This Court, in People v. Castillo, 7 speaking
through Justice De Joya and following the language of the American Supreme Court, identified
due process with the accused having "been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, and
proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded with
the authority of a constitutional law, . . . ." 8An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the
means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of the cause he is required to
meet . . ." 9 Its importance was stressed by Justice Moreland as early as 1916 in the leading case
of United States v. Binayoh. 10 He pointed out that upon the accused being arraigned, "there is a
duty laid by the Code [now the Rules of Court] upon the court to inform [him] of certain rights and
to extend to him, on his demand, certain others. This duty is an affirmative one which the court,
on its own motion, must perform, unless waived." 11 To emphasize its importance, he added: "No
such duty, however, is laid on the court with regard to the rights of the accused which he may be
entitled to exercise during the trial. Those are rights which he must assert himself and the
benefits of which he himself must demand. In other words, in the arraignment the court must
act of its own volition, . . . ." 12 In the terse and apt language of the Solicitor General:
"Arraignment is an indispensable requirement in any criminal prosecution." 13 Procedural due
process demands no less.
2. Nor is it only the due process guarantee that calls for the accused being duly arraigned. As
noted, it is at that stage where in the mode and manner required by the Rules, an accused, for
the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him. It is
imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. An arraignment serves
that purpose. Thereafter, he is no longer in the dark. It is true, the complaint or information may
not be worded with sufficient clarity. He would be in a much worse position though if he does not
even have such an opportunity to plead to the charge. With his counsel by his side, he is thus in a
position to enter his plea with full knowledge of the consequences. He is not even required to do
so immediately. He may move to quash. What is thus evident is that an arraignment assures that
he be fully acquainted with the nature of the crime imputed to him and the circumstances under
which it is allegedly committed. It is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed
him. It is not useless formality, much less an idle ceremony.
3. An equally fatal defect in the proceeding had before respondent Judge Senining was that
notwithstanding its being conducted in the absence of petitioner, he was convicted. It was shown
that after one postponement due to his failure to appear, the case was reset for hearing. When
that date came, December 14, 1973, without petitioner being present, although his bondsmen
were notified, respondent Judge, as set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General, "allowed
the prosecution to present its evidence invoking Letter of Instruction No. 40. Only one witness
testified, the offended party herself, and three documents were offered in evidence after which
the prosecution rested its case. Thereupon, respondent City Court set the promulgation of the
decision on December 28, 1973." 14 It could then conclude: "Verily, the records clearly show that
petitioner was not arraigned at all and was not represented by counsel throughout the whole
proceedings in the respondent City Court."15 It is indisputable then that there was a denial of
petitioner's constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel. As categorically affirmed by
Justice Ozaeta for this Court in the leading case of Abriol v. Homeres: 16 "It is the constitutional
right of the accused to be heard in his defense before sentence is pronounced on him." 17 He
added further that such "constitutional right is inviolate." 18 There is no doubt that it could be
waived, but here there was no such waiver, whether express or implied. It suffices to refer to
another leading case, People v. Holgado, 19 where the then Chief Justice Moran emphatically
took note of the importance of the right to counsel: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing
unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would
be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly
in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because
he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence." 20 With
the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being
thus manifest, it is easily understandable why the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null.
4. The provision in the present Constitution allowing trial to be held in absentia is
unavailing. It cannot justify the actuation of respondent Judge Senining. Its
language is clear and explicit. What is more, it is mandatory. Thus: "However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." 21 As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable
requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment." The
express mention in the present Constitution of the need for such a step emphasizes
its importance in the procedural scheme to accord an accused due process. Without
the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the
applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused
should be heard by himself and counsel.
5. Nor did the appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza possess any curative aspect. To quote anew from the comment of the
Solicitor General: "Respondent Court of First Instance . . . considered the appeal
taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the
respondent City Court. Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning
those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably
raised as error the absence of petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence,
commentaries and the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an
arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process
to ensure a fair and impartial trial." 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent
Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of
the crime of slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision
of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is
remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight
physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of
Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
||| (Borja v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-45667, [June 20, 1977], 168 PHIL 83-90)
[G.R. No. L-25769. December 10, 1974.]
FRANCISCO FLORES and FRANCISCO ANGEL, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Arturo Zialcita for petitioner Francisco Flores.

Zosimo Rivas for petitioner Francisco Angel.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Vicente A. Torres for
respondent.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
A plea based on the constitutional right to a speedy trial 1 led this Court to act
affirmatively on a certiorari proceeding for the dismissal of a case then pending in
the Court of Appeals. Considering the length of time that had elapsed, it is readily
discernible why an inquiry into the matter is well-nigh unavoidable. The accusation
for robbery against petitioners Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel was filed as far
back as December 31, 1951. The decision rendered on November 29, 1955 found
them guilty of the crime charged. The notice of appeal was filed on December 8,
1955. 2 For a period of three years, until February 10, 1958, no action was taken by
the Court of Appeals. On that day, there was a resolution remanding the records of
the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness
deemed material for the disposition of the case. 3 Such a resolution was amended
by a second resolution dated August 5, 1959, which granted the motion for counsel
of appellants, now petitioners, to set aside the decision so that evidence for the
defense on certain new facts or matters may be received and that a new decision in
lieu of the old one may be rendered in accordance with the facts as
found. 4 Accordingly, the case was returned to the lower court with the former
decision set aside so that the trial could be had, but nothing was done for about a
year because the offended party failed to appear notwithstanding the six or seven
dates set for such hearing. 5It was further alleged that when thereafter he did take
the witness stand, his testimony was far from satisfactory, characterized as a mere
"fiasco" as he could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime, there was
even a failure to identify the two accused. 6 Instead of rendering a new decision,
the former one having been set aside as required by the Court of Appeals, the lower
court merely sent back the records to the appellate tribunal. 7 At that stage, five
more years having elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought the
dismissal of the cases against them due to such inordinate delay in their disposition,
which covered the period of December 8, 1955 to May 10, 1965, a period of almost a
decade; thus did they invoke their constitutional right to a speedy
trial. 8 Respondent Court of Appeals was unresponsive, notwithstanding the
vigorous plea on the part of counsel for petitioners, its last order being a denial of a
second motion for reconsideration dated January 28, 1966. In the answer on behalf
of the People of the Philippines, the facts as above set forth were substantially
admitted. However, a special and affirmative defense raised was that the case was
not properly captioned, as the People of the Philippines, against whom it is filed, is
not a tribunal or an office exercising Judicial functions and that without the Court
of Appeals being made a party to the petition, it cannot be said that it stated facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Moreover, on the merits, the view was
expressed that under the circumstances, it was not adequately shown that the right
to a speedy trial had been violated, as the Court of Appeals had taken all the steps
necessary to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial.
On the above undisputed facts, there is more than sufficient warrant for the
conclusion that the right to a speedy trial, so zealously guarded in both the 1935
and the present Constitutions, had not been accorded due respect. There is thus
merit in the petition.
1. The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 9 "means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, . . ." 10 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the
shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a
prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in
store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present
any valid defense. As was also pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event
of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained
of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of
the case." 11 The above ruling is a reiteration of the doctrine announced, even
before the1935 Constitution, in Conde v. Rivera, 12 a 1924 decision. In that case,
Justice Malcolm announced categorically that the trial, to comply with the
requirement of the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act, must be "free
from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays." 13 Further: "We lay down the
legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to
relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if
he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom." 14
In the first Supreme Court decision after the 1935 Constitution took effect, People
v. Castaeda, 15 where it was shown that the criminal case had been dragging on
for almost five years and that when the trial did finally take place, it was tainted by
irregularities, this Court set aside the appealed decision of conviction and acquitted
the accused. As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration
of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the
criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be
immediately discharged from the custody of the law." 16 It was on the basis of the
above judgment that the dismissal of a second information for frustrated homicide
was ordered by this Court, where the evidence disclosed that the first information
had been dismissed after a lapse of one year and seven months from the time the
original complaint was filed during which time on the three occasions the case was
set for trial, the private prosecutor twice asked for postponements and once the
trial court itself cancelled the entire calendar for the month it was supposed to
have been heard. 17 The same result followed in Esguerra v. De la Costa, 18 where
the first complaint was filed on August 29, 1936, the accused having been criminally
prosecuted for an alleged abuse of chastity in a justice of the peace court but after
over a year and three months, with the lower court twice dismissing the case, he
still had to face trial for the same offense on a new information, thus compelling
him to resort to a mandamus suit to compel the lower court to terminate the case
was his right to a speedy trial was violated, a remedy deemed appropriate by this
Court.
There was another occasion where Justice Laurel spoke for this Court on this
specific issue. That was in Mercado v. Santos. 19 Here, for a period of about twenty
months, the accused was arrested four times on the charge of falsifying his
deceased wife's will. Twice, the complaints were subsequently withdrawn. The
third time he was prosecuted on the same charge, he was able to obtain a dismissal.
Then came on the part of the provincial fiscal, a motion for reinvestigation. The
lower court was in a receptive mood. It ordered that the case be heard on the
merits. The accused moved to dismiss, but he did not succeed. He tried the Court of
Appeals, but he failed again. He elevated the matter to this Court; he prevailed. It
was stressed in Justice Laurel's opinion: "An accused person is entitled to a trial at
the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the
commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings
pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed." 20 The opinion
likewise considered as not decisive the fact that the provincial fiscal did not
intervene until an information was filed charging the accused with the crime of
falsification the third time. Thus: "The Constitution does not say that the right to a
speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced
and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally,
he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the
manner in which it is authorized to be commenced." 21 The latest decision in point,
Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 22 presented an even clearer case. The information for
damage to property was filed on August 3, 1959. There the matter rested until May
19, 1965, when the accused moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion in
his order of July 10, 1965. Two more years elapsed, the period now covering almost
eight years, when the trial was commenced. When one of the witnesses for the
prosecution failed to appear, the provincial fiscal sought the postponement, but
the accused countered with a motion for dismissal. The lower court acceded, and
this Court sustained him, even if thereafter it changed its mind and reinstated the
case.
Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should be
speedy. In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been
completed. In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the
Court of Appeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded
their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency
in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times
unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to
suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the
previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly
premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. That is the sole
basis for the conclusion reached by us considering the controlling doctrine
announced with such emphasis by this Court time and time again.
2. That is about all that needs be said. The crucial issue has been met. The decisive
question has been answered. There is an affirmation of the worth of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial. Not too much significance should be attached
to the procedural defect pointed out in the answer of the People of the Philippines
that the Court of Appeals should have been made the party respondent. What
cannot be sanctioned was its failure to accord respect to this particular
constitutional right. It did amount at the very least to a grave abuse of discretion.
Whatever deficiency in the pleading may then be singled out, it cannot obscure the
obvious disregard of one of the most important safeguards granted an accused. To
deny petitioners the remedy sought would be to exalt form over substance. At any
rate, the petition could be considered, and rightly so, as being directed at the
Court of Appeals. Moreover, the defenses that could have interposed to justify the
action taken were invoked by the People of the Philippines. They certainly did not
avail. Our decisions on the right to a speedy Trial speak too categorically to be
misread. This is one of those situations then where, in the apt language of the then
Justice, now Chief Justice, Makalintal, "technicalities should give way to the
realities of the situation." 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of
September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order of January 8,
1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966
denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and

considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against petitioners in the
aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed. Costs de oficio.
||| (Flores v. People, G.R. No. L-25769, [December 10, 1974], 158 PHIL 967-975)
[G.R. No. 21741. January 25, 1924.]
AURELIA CONDE, petitioner, vs. PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial

fiscal of Tayabas, and FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of the peace of
Lucena, Tayabas, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SPEEDY TRIAL.

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
2. ID.; ID. The Government of the Philippine Islands should be the last to
set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS; HABEAS CORPUS. WHERE A Prosecuting
officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant
against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for
more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus
to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by
habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been

forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less
than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice
been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the
passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was
filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was
when originally charged.
Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in
order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance
attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed
without her consent, is pal palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to
the public. By the use of upon the appropriate information, could have attended
to the formal preliminary examination, and could have prepared the case for a
trial free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Once before, as intimated, the petitioner had to come to us for redress of
her grievances. We thought then we had pointed out the way for the parties. We
hope propose to do all in our power to assist this poor woman to obtain justice.
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources,
but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been
the Government of the Philippine Island s which should be the last to set an
example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is
thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an
end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against
his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than
a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel
a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J., 439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford [1911],
160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox [1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further our previous
decision in Conde vs. Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth Judicial District, and
the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236. 1
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall
abstain from further attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations
growing out of the facts set forth in previous in formations, and the charges now
pending before the justice of the of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed,
with costs against the respondent fiscal. We append to our order the observation
that, without doubt, the Attorney-General, being fully cognizant of the facts of
record, will take such administrative action as to him seems proper to the end
that incidents of this character may not recur. So ordered.
||| (Conde v. Rivera, G.R. No. 21741, [January 25, 1924], 45 PHIL 650-652)
[G.R. Nos. L-34756-59. March 31, 1973.]
MANUEL MATEO, JR., ROBERTO MARTINEZ alias RUBEN MARTINEZ,

ENRIQUE CONCEPClON and ESMERALDO CRUZ, petitioners, vs. HON.
ONOFRE VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh
Judicial District, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno, Apolinar S. Fojas, Sixto F. Santiago and Damian S. Villaseca for
petitioners.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramierz and Solicitor Guillermo C. Nakar, Jr. for respondent.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J p:
The novel issue presented in this prohibition proceeding arose from the
gnawing fear that the prized ideal of "the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge" 1implicit in the due process guarantee may be set at naught. Petitioners
are among being tried by respondent Judge for the offense of robbery in band
with homicide. Thereafter, an extrajudicial statement by one Rolando Reyes,
who was later on likewise indicted for the same offense, implicating petitioners,
was subscribed before respondent Judge. That was the background of a motion
for his disqualification, as the aforesaid Rolando Reyes, when called upon to
testify as an additional witness for the prosecution impugned his written
declaration stating that it was executed as a result of a threat by a government
agent. It is now contended that such a repudiation would not sit well with
respondent Judge, who had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to
pass on such question with that degree of objectivity required by due process,
although admittedly, such a move did not fall squarely within one of the specific
grounds to inhibit judges. 2 Respondent Judge turned down this plea for
disqualification. Hence this petition, based on the asserted violation of a
constitutional right not to be convicted of an offense without due process of law.
This Court, after t careful consideration of the matter and in the light of past
decisions to be hereafter noted, looks upon such failure of respondent Judge to
disqualify himself as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by prohibition. The
petition is meritorious.
The facts, in the language of the petition, follow: "On or about June 4, 1971, the
American Express Bank at Sangley Point, Cavite, was robbed and an American
serviceman was killed. In connection with that robbery, and the death of the
serviceman, four (4) criminal actions were filed against petitioners and docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. CCC-VII-843 to 846, Cavite, for robbery in band with homicide,
all captioned 'People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Manuel Mateo, et al.,
Accused' . . . The Information fell in the sala of the Honorable Respondent Judge
because the complaints were filed there; and, in fact, it was the Honorable
Respondent Judge who ordered District State Prosecutor Cornelio Melendres [or]
Assistant City Fiscal Enrique A. Cube to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners Manuel Mateo, Jr. and Esmeraldo Cruz were arraigned on June 24, 1971
while petitioners Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez filed a Motion To Dismiss on
the ground of "insufficiency of evidence for failure of prosecution (1) to prove the
existence of conspiracy, and (2) to identify the accused by competent evidence.' On
September 25, 1971, petitioner Roberto Martinez @ Ruben Martinez amplified his
motion to dismiss with a Supplemental Motion based on the claim that 'the pre-trial
identification by prosecution witness Elliot Grey of your accused Roberto Martinez
in a police line-up in the absence of defendant's counsel is unconstitutional; and the
in-court testimony of said Elliot Grey identifying your accused Roberto Martinez is
inadmissible in evidence and should be stricken out from the records'. The
prosecution opposed the motion to dismiss. To date, the motions to dismiss have
not been decided by the Honorable Respondent Judge . . . In the meantime,
another suspect in the Sangley Point Robbery one Rolando Reyes was arrested.
On October 5, 1971, when petitioner's Motion to Dismiss together with the
Opposition thereto were submitted for resolution, the Honorable Presiding Judge in
an Order ruled that 'pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, let the
Motion to Dismiss be resolved until after the prosecution has presented and rested
its evidence as against Rolando Reyes . . . It appears that the said Rolando Reyes
had executed an extrajudicial statement on October 1, 1971 and had signed and
sworn to its truth before the Honorable Respondent Judge; and, in that statement
had implicated petitioners; evidently, the Honorable Respondent Judge was aware
of this, and it was for this reason that he had deferred ruling on petitioner Ruben
Martinez' motions and supplemental motion to dismiss 'until after the prosecution
has presented and rested its evidence as against Rolando Reyes.' Rolando Reyes,
however, was tried separately from and in absence of petitioners; so that the
proceedings against him did not constitute evidence against petitioner. So, on
November 26, 1971, while petitioner Martinez' Motion and Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a 'Motion to Present Additional
Evidence.' . . . On December 4, 1971, petitioner Manuel Mateo filed an Opposition
to the prosecution's Motion to Present Additional Evidence on the ground that 'to
allow the prosecution to present additional evidence in favor of the State after the
prosecution has rested, while the accused has a pending motion to dismiss under
consideration would be prejudicial to the substantial rights of herein accused
because it would effectively deprive him of a fair trial.' . . . On December 24, 1971,
respondent Judge granted the prosecution's 'Motion to Present Additional Evidence'
ruling that 'it is well settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction and elsewhere that it
is within the sound discretion of the court whether or not to allow the presentation
of additional evidence after the parties have rested their case.' . . . On February 3,
1972, the prosecution called Rolando Reyes as an additional witness, and in the
course of his testimony, marked an extrajudicial statement purportedly executed
by him on October 1, 1971 as Exh. 'P' . . . Rolando Reyes repudiated it, stated that
he had executed it because he had been threatened by a government agent. The
statement, Exh. 'P' . . . , purports to have been subscribed and sworn to before the
respondent Judge on October 1, 1971. As soon as the foregoing facts were made of
record in the case, defendants [petitioners herein] verbally moved to suspend the
proceedings to enable them to file a motion to disqualify the Honorable Respondent
Judge; and the motion for suspension was granted. On February 5, 1971, petitioners
filed a Joint Motion for Disqualification of respondent Judge contending that
respondent Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion [should] disqualify himself
from sitting in this case under the second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he,
Reyes, had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter
perforce would have to pass upon that repudiation . . . On February 11, 1972, the
prosecution filed an Opposition to petitioners' Joint Motion for Disqualification . . .
On February 12, 1972, respondent Judge denied petitioners' Joint Motion for
Disqualification." 3
The specific question raised not having been passed upon previously, coupled with
the exhaustive petition submitted by counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W.
Diokno, led this Court, in its resolution of February 25, 1972 to require comment
from respondent Judge, with a temporary restraining order likewise being issued.
The then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Felix Antonio, did so in an
equally well-researched pleading on March 16, 1972 which, by our resolution of
March 22, was considered his answer. Thereafter, with memoranda being submitted
by both parties, the case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4 last year.
There is, to repeat, a highly persuasive and scholarly quality in the manner in which
the plea for petitioners was made. Nonetheless, with due recognition of the
imperative character of the safeguard of due process connoting, at the very least,
an impartial tribunal. the Court cannot consider the circumstances disclosed a
sufficient to call for the disqualification of respondent Judge.
1. It is now beyond dispute that due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of
that degree of objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of
his being fair al being just. Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the
decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as found by a
judge who does not play favorites. For him, the parties stand on equal footing. In
the language of Justice Dizon: "It has been said, in fact, that due process of law
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every
litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial
judge." 4 He should, to quote from another decision "at all times manifest depth
commitment and concern to the cause of justice according to legal norms, a
cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug and pull of purely personal
preferences and prejudices which he shares with the rest of his fellow
mortals." 6 penned by Justice Castro, should strive to be at all times "wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a
hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity." 7 Nor is this to imply that prior to
Gutierrez, there had been no awareness of the due process aspect of an impartial
tribunal even if not explicitly referred to. As noted by Justice Street as far back as
1926 in Government v. Abella, 8 a 1926 decision, if the Supreme Court "were of the
opinion that the litigant had not had a fair trial, a new trial could be
granted." 9 There was a reiteration of such a view in a case decided in 1933, Dais v.
Torres, 10 with Justice Vickers as ponente, in these words: "Although a judge may
not have been disqualified [according to the Code of Civil Procedure], nevertheless
if it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial
because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it
deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." 11

2. Conformably to what was so emphatically asserted in Gutierrez as the
fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of
Court provision on disqualification when revised three years later in 1964 contains
this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those
mentioned above." 12 Thereby, it is made clear to the occupants of the bench that
outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter
that calls for adjudication, there may be other causes that could conceivably erode
the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. That is to betray a sense of
realism, for the factors that lead to preferences or predilections are many and
varied. It is well, therefore, that if any such should make its appearance and prove
difficult to resist, the better course for a judge is to disqualify himself. That way,
he avoids being misunderstood. His reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is even more important, the ideal of an impartial administration of
justice is lived up to. Thus is due process vindicated. There is relevance to what was
said by Justice Sanchez in Pimentel v. Salanga, 13 drawing "attention of all judges
to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try and decide a
case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of
the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But
when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one
party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith
in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought
that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That
passion on the part judge may be generated because of serious charges misconduct
against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject
to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution
before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or
counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be
heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to
others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend
to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If
after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sit a case where his
motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as
giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He
serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice." 14
3. The imperfections of human institutions being such, what is fit and proper is not
always achieved. The invitation to judges to disqualify themselves is not always
heeded. For that matter, it is not always desirable that they should do so. It could
amount in certain cases to their being recreant to their trust. Justice Perfecto's
warning is not to be ignored; "to shirk the responsibility" entails "the risk of being
called upon to account for his dereliction." 15 It could be an instrument whereby a
party could inhibit a judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his
persuasive skill. With all such considerations in mind, there is still cogency in the
approach that would look with favor on the exercise of discretion in favor of
disqualification, given the likelihood that bias or prejudice is unavoidable. Even
before the amendment of Section 1 of Rule 137, this Court, in at least two
decisions, 16 gave its approval to such a move. Then came People v.
Gomez, 17 where this Court, theponente being Justice J. P. Bengzon, held: "Now
considering that the Revised Rules of Court, already in effect when respondent
Judge filed his answer herein containing the prayer to be disqualified from the case,
although not yet in effect when the proceedings at issue were taken in the court
below, states in Section 1 of Rule 137 that, 'A judge may, in the exercise of his
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons'
other than the usual grounds for disqualification, this Court, after considering all
the circumstances of the case, finds as reasonable, respondent Judge's afore-stated
request for disqualification from further sitting in the Richard case, and We rule
that he is thereby deemed, in light of the new Rules, to have inhibited himself from
further taking cognizance of the case." 18
There is even greater deference paid to the due process requirement of impartiality
when, in Luque v. Kayanan, 19 decided in 1969, this Court, through Justice Sanchez,
could categorically rule: "All suitors, we must say, are entitled to nothing short of
the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and impartial
tribunal. It has been said that 'next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of
the fairness and integrity of the judge.' Let it not be said that the administration of
justice in this country suffers from too many human imperfections. To our mind,
respondent judge should inhibit himself since it has become apparent that his
further continuance in Case 4871 would not be in the best interest of justice, which
he is bound to serve." 20There was a reiteration of such a principle in Paredes v.
Gopengco, 21 where the following appears in the opinion of Justice Teehankee for
the Court: "It is pertinent to state that the restriction provided in the Rule against
appeal or stay of the proceedings where the trial judge denies a motion for his
disqualification is not an absolute rule even in civil cases, and has not been taken as
precluding a resort in appropriate cases to the special civil actions of prohibition
and certiorari before the higher courts for determination, ahead of the judgment
on the merits, whether the trial judge committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction refusing to disqualify himself." 22 There
is thus respectable authority for the view that with the possibility of a trial being
tainted by partiality, this Court can step in to assure respect for the demands of due
process.
4. Petitioners can assert then, and rightly so, that we have the power to set aside
the order denying the motion for disqualification. While the discretion in the first
instance belongs to respondent Judge, its exercise is subject to our corrective
authority. Certainly, there can be no question its being considered abused if it can
be shown that to refuse inhibition is to cast valid doubts as to a court's impartiality.
The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party
having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting
to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by
him as the product of intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify
against petitioners, would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the
Constitution requires? The answer must be in the affirmative. Petitioners are thus
entitled to the relief sought. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to
what apparently was asserted before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover,
it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout
with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a government agent
exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not only that.
His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence
of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance
even more telling. It was he who attested to its due execution on October 1, 1971
wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his participation in the crime and in addition
implicated petitioners. At that time, their motion for dismissal of the charges
against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until
after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence against affiant, who
was himself indicted and tried for the same offense, but in a separate proceeding.
It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in effect ruled that such
extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its repudiation on the ground
that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture there is apparent the
situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already
been answered by him. Such a fact became rather obvious. For respondent Judge
was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given his opinion. It
is this inroad in one's, objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the law on
disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more than justified. Hence
the conclusion reached by us.
5. To avoid any further controversies of this nature, lower court judges are
well-advised to limit themselves to the task of adjudication and to leave to others
the role of notarizing declarations. The less an occupant of the bench fritters away
his time and energy in tasks more incumbent on officials of the executive branch,
the less the danger of his being a participant in any event that might lend itself to
the interpretation that his impartiality has been compromised. There is much to be
said for displaying zeal and eagerness in stamping out criminality, but that role is
hardly fit for a judge who must bide his time until the case is before him. He must
ever be on guard lest what is done by him, even from the best of motives, may be
thought of as eroding that objectivity and sobriety which are the hallmarks of
judicial conduct. Thus should he attend to the performance of the sacred trust that
is his.
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is granted. The restraining order is issued
by this Court on February 25, 1972 is made permanent. Without pronouncement as
to costs.
||| (Mateo, Jr. v. Villaluz, G.R. Nos. L-34756-59, [March 31, 1973], 151-A PHIL
21-34)
[G.R. No. L-30104. July 25, 1973.]

HON. GREGORIO N. GARCIA City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO CALO and SIMEON
CARBONNEL, respondents.
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V . Chico and Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for petitioners.

Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J p:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus
far has remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right
to public trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of
discretion in stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of
the other respondents 2 inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia
named as petitioner. 3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit,
although such a procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents
as defendants, the hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate
occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence offered
to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the
premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court
judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. For reasons to be more fully
explained in the light of the facts ascertained the unique aspect of this case
having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation, force likewise
being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner for a
traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus
resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried
jointly by city court Judge in the above manner we rule that there was no
transgression of the right to a public trial, and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I of the City Court of Manila
presided over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate
informations all dated January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions against
respondents Edgardo Calo, and Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco
Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo Calo (on complaint of Francisco
Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109191, for slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal
Case No. F-109192, also for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No.
F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon Carbonnel (id.) (1) Criminal Case
No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109196, for slight physical
injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198 for light threats; (c) Against Francisco
Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109201, for
violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of Manila (resisting an officer); and
(2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for slander." 4 The above was followed by this
recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly held on March 4, 1968,
March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17, 1968, April 20, 1968, May
4, 1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22, 1968, June 29, 1968,
August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial dates except March
4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was arranged by the parties
and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and Carbonnel who, as police
officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the same to be terminated
as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled for trial on the usual
criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was agreed upon as
the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5 Also this: "The trial of
the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then came these allegations in the
petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several
months (from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by
their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as
prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1)
day when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was
absent. This was on April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial
proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by
the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that
this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the
hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit
memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael
Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum with not less than 35 citations of
relevant portions of the transcript of stenographic notes in support of their prayer
for exoneration, and for the conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their
countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this date, said
respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to pointed out any supposed
irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf
is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the
cases."7 It was stated next in the petition: "The promulgation of judgment was first
scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was postponed to September 28, 1968, at
the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as counsel for respondents Calo and
Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in the morning, this time at
the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who had, in the meantime,
also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo and Carbonnel. The
applications for postponement were not grounded upon and supposed defect or
irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent
Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon
Carbonnel, thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of
First Instance a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction . . . [alleging jurisdictional
defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on such petition forthwith issued a restraining
order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After
proceedings duly had, there was an order from him "declaring that 'the
constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely
affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] ;that the trial of these
cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and not in the court
room open to the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to
desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have
rendered already in the criminal cases (in question) . . . pending in his Court, until
further orders of this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petitioners on January 28, 1969,
elevated the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and
prohibition. In its resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents were required to
answer, with a preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As was to be expected
the answer filed by respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other
respondents on March 19, 1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that
there was a failure to respect the right to a public trial of accused persons. Neither
in such pleadings nor in the memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by
counsel was quite evident, was there any persuasive showing of a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of a public trial, the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it
was the mode of approach followed by counsel Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners
that did manifest a deeper understanding of its implications and ramifications.
Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this
petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial
to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under the present
dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed
only a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of
Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed
by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in
an illegal and unjust manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed
inclusion in the Bill of Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It
was merely a reiteration of what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
popularly known as the Jones Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an organic act of the then government of this
country as an unincorporated territory of the United States. 13 Historically, as was
pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United States Supreme Court in the
leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted practice of guaranteeing a
public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English common law heritage." 15 He
then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure, "but it likely evolved long
before the settlement of [the United States] as an accompaniment of the ancient
institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by him that there, "the guarantee to
an accused of the right to a public trial first appeared in a state constitution in
1776." 18 He could conclude his historical survey thus: "Today almost without
exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that all
criminal trials be open to the public." 19Such is the venerable, historical lineage of
the right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains.

The Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it
signify? Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language
is to be given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed.
The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so.
There is to be no ban on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of
no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies
behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further
protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with regularity and not tainted
with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall that Delegate Laurel in his terse
summation of the importance of this right singled out its being a deterrence to
arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is deemed embraced in
procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in the
courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no problem
arises. It is the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are
free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
decency or public morals." 21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties,
and of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the
trial was held. Did that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right?
The answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was
thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge
would reduce the number of those who could be present. Such a fact though is not
indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black
in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial
being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present,
no matter with what offense he may be charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen
hearings had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on
the part of respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran
should erase any doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriate]y the
lack of weight, to any such objection now raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the
accused was held in Bilibid prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial,
assigned the procedure thus taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it
affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered no objection to the
trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The
decision referred to, United States v. Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight
years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.

3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other
objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly
disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at war with
the obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged
abdication by an assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here
there was a failure to abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is
the People of the Philippines for whom a fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot
in law be termed an offended party for such an alleged failure to comply with
official duty. Moreover, even assuming that respondent policemen could be heard
to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge ought to have been aware that thereby
no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city court Judge. As was so
emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v. Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The
case below was commenced and prosecuted without the intervention, mediation or
participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This, notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction of the court was not affected . . . but the court should have cited the
public prosecutor to intervene . . . ," 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge
to assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it
were otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the
extent then that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension
that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to
what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced
him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in
municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The
crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal,
the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a
less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much
more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further
that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen,
but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of
public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied
whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the
eyes of the persons in court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk
of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as
did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court judge rather
than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside,
and declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix
Domingo, dated November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The writ of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding
respondent Judge or any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in
Civil Case No. 74830 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, except that of
dismissing the same. The preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its
resolution of February 26, 1969 against the actuation of respondent Judge is made
permanent. With costs against respondent policemen, Edgardo Calo and Simeon
Carbonnel.
||| (Garcia v. Domingo, G.R. No. L-30104 (Resolution), [July 25, 1973], 152 PHIL
129-139)
[A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. September 13, 2001.]
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE

SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER
PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO PEREZ, KAPISANAN NG MGA

BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO CAYETANO, and
ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
Fortun Narvasa & Salazar Law Offices and Saguisag and Associates Law Offices for
J. Estrada.
SYNOPSIS
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court denying

petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of
former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. This motion was
filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argued that
there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information
and the freedom of the press, on one hand, and, on the other, the right of the
accused to a fair trial. He further elaborated that if there is a clash between
these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information,
and live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the
courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests. On the other hand,
former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterated his objection to the live TV and
radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub
judice rule. ETHSAI
The Court ruled that considering the significance of the trial before the
Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the
records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for
public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in
every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in
the National Museum and in the Records Management and Archives Office for
historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
SYLLABUS

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO
INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN; AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR
DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES ONLY. Considering the significance of the trial before
the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving
the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual
recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public
showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case
to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical
preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES FOR AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING INSIDE THE
COURTROOM. For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be
inconspicuously installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be
regulated, consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial
shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except
annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted.
The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS FOR TELEVISED RECORDING. There are several
reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of historic significance.
They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is under no
man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed
sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted.
This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual
presentation is essential for the education and civic training of the people. Above
all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings
in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights
and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the
event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is
sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts of stenographic notes
taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the tapes. SEIacA
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE FOR THE DELAY OF THE RELEASE OF THE TAPES
FOR BROADCAST. On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for
broadcast, concerns that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the
cameras and will thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles
whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be allayed. The
possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion
may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be
minimized. The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal
before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided. At the same time,
concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial which, it may be assumed,
is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials
will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until
after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the
tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be
avoided.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PRIVACY OF THE ACCUSED IS NOT A BAR TO THE
PRODUCTION OF SUCH DOCUMENTARY. Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a
bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v.
Capulong, this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the filming of
"Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role
of then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people
power. This Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been
regarded as permissible where that person is a public figure and the information
sought to be elicited from him or to be published about him constitute matters of a
public character."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MAKING OF A MOVIE BASED ON THE TRIAL COULD NOT BE
PREVENTED. No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at
least, if a documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later
be produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOCUMENTARY RECORDING OF CELEBRATED CASES; EXPLAINED.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated
cases or causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard
Law School. As he explained: "In fairness let me refer to an American experience
many of my lay friends found similarly moving. An educational television network
filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of resisting arrest, and
broadcast the document in full, in four installments, several months after the case
was concluded concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal. No one could
witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking way in
which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with
uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the
sense of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities. I agree
in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar good
reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is
an educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an
agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its impact on the public
understanding. Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
educational system, is now a desperate need." Professor Freund's observation is as
valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is perceptive for its recognition
of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live TV and radio
broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a
case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual
recordings of the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and
exhibition, after passions have subsided.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS FOR AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE TRIAL.
[A]n audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan,
under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety,
excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be
held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras
shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and the movement
of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the
proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast
of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all
the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under pain of contempt
of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the prohibition; (e) to ensure
that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the proceedings
shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its Division
concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast,
the original thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with
law.
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS; NOT
DIMINISHED BY ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. Due process is timeless.
It is a precious fundamental right that secures and protects, under a rule of law, the
life and liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A cherished fixture in our
bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by advances in
science and technology.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN; CAN BE ACHIEVED VIA OTHER MEDIA COVERAGE OTHER THAN LIVE
RADIO/TV COVERAGE. I see it as being an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an
age-old struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the sovereign. The right of
the public to information, in any event, is not here really being sacrificed. The right
to know can very well be achieved via other media coverage; the windows of
information through which the public might observe and learn are not closed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AUDIO-VISUAL RECORDING OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA WILL BE FOR DOCUMENTARY PURPOSES
ONLY; REASONS. In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues
on the Court opine that there should be an audio-visual recording of the
proceedings for documentary purposes because, first, the hearings are of historic
significance; second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our
people who have a fundamental right to know how their government works; third,
the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civic training of the
people; and fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event
that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is
sought or becomes necessary.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPERIENCE ATTESTS TO THE INTIMIDATING EFFECT OF
CAMERAS AND ELECTRONIC DEVICES IN COURTROOMS. The proposition has novel
features; regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of the cameras
inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings.
No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary,
experience attests to the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in
courtrooms on the litigants, witnesses and jurors. In addition, the natural reticence
of witnesses at the stand can even easily be exacerbated by placing them on
camera in contravention of normal experience. The demeanor of the witnesses can
also have an abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the
credibility of such witnesses. The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may
not adequately address the dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June
2001. There are just too many imponderables.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IT IS NOT PRIVACY THAT CAN CAUSE CONCERN MORE THAN
THE EROSION OF REALITY THAT CAMERAS TEND TO CAST. Most importantly, it
does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against
Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personality innate in every human being,
and there can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is
not the problem of privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality
that cameras tend to cast. TcEDHa
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE RULE MUST BE OF GENERAL APPLICATION. In the
petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether
the cases of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered
by live television and radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to be
addressed by my esteemed colleagues is not even an issue. If it has to be considered
at all, the rule must be of general application and promulgated after a thorough
study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been said and done in
this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to be
helpful and of value.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J p:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for
permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary
of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict
between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press,
on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if
there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor or of the right of
the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are
entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against
attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish
interests. STCDaI
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to
the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will
violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment
trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary"
which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to
render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the
people to information may be served through other means less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and,
after due deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision
prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the
former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its members, 1 the Court denies
the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8)
Justices, 2 has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for
documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices 3 vote against the audio-visual recording
of the trial.
What follows is the opinion of the majority.
Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former
President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court
believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The
recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes.
Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall
have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The
master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management
and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law. 4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously
installed in the courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated,
consistent with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, except such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan may
decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary except
annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted.
The audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording. First, the hearings are of
historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that
"the King is under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet
esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters
of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by audio-visual presentation.
Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the education and civic training of
the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for
documentary purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of
the proceedings in a way that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot
capture the sights and sounds of events. They will be primarily for the use of
appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings, rulings, or decisions of
the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of the transcripts
of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the
tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns
that those taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will
thus be distracted from the proper performance of their roles whether as counsel,
witnesses, court personnel, or judges will be allayed. The possibility that parallel
trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or
even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized. The possibility
that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice
can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial which, it
may be assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of,
televised trials will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public
showing until after the decision of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the
release of the tapes, much of the problem posed by real time TV and radio
broadcast will be avoided.
Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trials can be served
by audio-visual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such
documentary. In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, 5 this Court set aside a
lower court's injunction restraining the filming of "Four Day Revolution," a
documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of then Minister of
National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA. people power. This Court held:
"A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from
him or to be published about him constitute matters of a public character." 6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a
documentary record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be
produced can be checked for its accuracy against such documentary and any
attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.

Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases
or causes clbres was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law
School. As he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay
friends found similarly moving. An educational television network
filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther leader on charges of
resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four
installments, several months after the case was concluded
concluded incidentally, with a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for
the painstaking way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways
whereby law copes with uncertainties and ambiguities through
presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense of gravity with which
judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom,
for the familiar good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial
for documentary purposes, not for the broadcast of live news, and
with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an educational
experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly
safeguarded and with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual
trial is an agency of enlightenment that could have few equals in its
impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our
educational system, is now a desperate need. 7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago.
It is perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair
administration of justice by live TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions
are running high on the issues stirred by a case, while at the same time
acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of the proceedings
of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former
President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the
account of the Sandiganbayan, under the following conditions: (a) the trial shall be
recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof as the Sandiganbayan
determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom and
the movement of TVcrews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for
documentary purposes only and shall be made without comment except such
annotations of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d)
the live broadcast of the recordings before the Sandiganbayan shall have rendered
its decision in all the cases against the former President shall be prohibited under
pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of the
prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the
Sandiganbayan or its Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules
promulgated by it; and (f) simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual
recordings for public broadcast, the original thereof shall be deposited in the
National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation
and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Perez v. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC (Resolution), [September 13, 2001], 417
PHIL 395-409)
[G.R. Nos. 103604-05. September 23, 1993.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ENGRACIO

VALERIANO Y TUMAHIG, MACARIO E. ACABAL @ "MOMONG," JUANITO
RISMUNDO, ABUNDIO NAHID and JOHN DOES, accused. MACARIO E.
ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO
NAHID, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Marcelo G. Flores for accused-appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION; RULE FOR

VALIDITY THEREOF; SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. We find
that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on judgments as it
did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A judgment of
conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the participation of the accused in
the commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after
the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (d) the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate action has been reserved or waived. As we earlier observed, the
challenged decision does not contain the usual dispositive portion. The last two
paragraphs of the decision merely embody its conclusions that: (1) the appellants
are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house of the
victim, . . . the abuse of superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will be in its
maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty now for
murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While the decision leaves
much to be desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings of facts, the law
applicable to the set of facts and what it believes to be the imposable penalty
under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty imposed on
the accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it
otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal
immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have
subsequently filed their written notice of appeal.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED BEFORE THE PROMULGATION THEREOF
WILL NOT DIVEST THE COURT'S JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED;
CASE AT BAR. Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any
sentence and so cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and
immediate commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when
they perfected their appeal. In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Court on bail, we ruled in People vs. Cortez that: ". . . an accused who is
charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, and
is thereafter convicted of the offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail as
a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction
clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong." We
have already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in
the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned contention is highly
illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the trial court still had
jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants. For too obvious reasons,
their notices of appeal which they claim have put an end to the trial court's
jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the promulgation of the
decision. The order is therefore valid and enforceable. Also, it may be recalled that
the accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue before us in a petition
for habeas corpus dated 16 January 1992 and docketed as G.R. Nos. 103602-03. We
dismissed that petition on 17 February 1992 for failure to comply with requirement
no. (2) of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping. Their
motion for reconsideration was denied on 27 May 1993.
3. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES; LIES WITH THE
PROSECUTION. The testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution likewise
do not provide sufficient proof of the accused-appellant's guilt. Visitacion Silvano's
testimony that she saw and identified the accused-appellants at the scene of the
crime taxes the imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to see the
accused-appellants even if she were aided by the light from the truck as she herself
said that she was then in her house, three kilometers away from the house of her
parents-in-law. Wilson Silvano did not testify at all that he saw the persons who
hacked and killed his mother. In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their
guilt, the accused-appellants must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved; that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it
is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is even the constitutional duty of
the court to acquit him. Accordingly, unless the prosecution discharges its burden
of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they need
not even offer evidence in their behalf. The weakness of their defense of alibi thus
becomes irrelevant.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; WHEN ALLEGED AS GENERIC
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES, COURT CANNOT ELEVATE THE SAME AS QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES. The trial court, however, erred in considering nighttime, use of
fire and abuse of superior strength as "attendant qualifying aggravating
circumstances." The information in Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery
and evident premeditation as qualifying aggravating circumstances. Nighttime,
band, use of fire, craft, fraud or disguise and ignominy were alleged as generic
aggravating circumstances only. The trial court cannot elevate the status of any of
the generic aggravating circumstances and consider them as qualifying
circumstances for the crime of murder. Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying
circumstance under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
5. ID.; MURDER; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. It was an error for the trial court to state
that "the penalty now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The
penalty for murder remains to be reclusion temporal maximum to death. But in
view of paragraph (1), Section 19, Article III of the Constitution prohibiting the
imposition of the penalty of death, where death would have been the proper
penalty instead of reclusion perpetua.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; WHEN AVAILABLE.
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused
Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found,
hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court
ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before
the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned
provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his
non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court
can render judgment in the case and promulgation may be made by simply
recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is
served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In two separate informations dated 28 February 1981 and filed with the then Court
of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Negros Oriental, Engracio Valeriano,
Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal, Abundio Nahid and several John Does were
charged with the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. The accusatory portion in
the information for murder, 1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 4585, reads as
follows:
"That sometime in the evening of the 28th of January, 1980, at
Nagbinlod, Municipality of Sta. Catalina, Province of Negros Oriental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and
confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery
and evident premeditation and being then armed with bolos and
'pinuti', did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence on the person of one Rizalina Apatan
Silvano while the latter was about to leave her house and inflicting
upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg
hacked behind the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,'
and did then and there set the house on fire while the aforementioned
Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside said house trying to escape
therefrom, and allowing her to be burned inside said house which was
burned to the ground, thereby causing upon said Rizalina Apatan
Silvano her death and burning her beyond recognition.
That the crime was committed with attendant aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, by a band, by means of fire, craft [,] fraud
or disguise employed; and that means have been employed which
brought added ignominy to the natural effects of their acts.
Contrary to Article 248 in relation to Article 14 of the Revised Penal

Code."
The information for frustrated murder, 2 docketed as Criminal Case No. 4584,
alleged that in the evening of the 28th of January 1980 immediately after the
commission of the murder charged in Criminal Case No. 4585 the accused hacked
and struck Wilson Silvano, son of the victim in the murder case, with bladed
weapons such as bolos and pinuti thereby inflicting upon him multiple hack wounds
which would have produced the crime of murder were it not for the timely and able
medical assistance given to him. It further alleged that the crime was committed
with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia or treachery and the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, by a band, with the aid of armed men or persons who
insure or afford impunity, and that craft, fraud or disguise were employed.
At the arraignment, all the accused, except the John Does who remained
unidentified and at large, pleaded not guilty in both cases. 3 Thereafter, upon
agreement of the parties, joint trial was ordered by the trial court. 4
Trial on the merits was conducted by Branch 37 of the court a quo presided over by
Judge Temistocles B. Diez. But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where
Branch 37 was located and the records of these two cases were burned. The records
were subsequently reconstituted upon petition of the prosecuting fiscal. 5 The
testimonies of the witnesses were retaken, however, before it could commence,
accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the warrant for his arrest issued on 16
November 1987 was returned unserved because he could not be found. 6 An alias
warrant for his arrest was issued on 26 June 1989, 7 but he remains at large up to
the present.
The evidence for the prosecution, as disclosed by the testimonies of its witnesses, is
as follows:
Antonio Silvano, then the barangay captain of Barangay Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina,
Negros Oriental, testified that at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 28 January
1980, or two nights before the 30 January 1980 local election, three men entered
his yard. He recognized these men as Juanito Rismundo, his neighbor since 1964,
Engracio Valeriano, also another neighbor, and Macario Acabal, his sub-barangay
captain. 8 The three men called him, but he did not answer. Instead, his wife,
Rizalina, did and she told them that he was attending a meeting "in the town." They
did not believe her and replied that they just saw Antonio enter the house. Juanito
asked her whether they (Antonio and Rizalina) were selling their votes because they
will buy them but Rizalina answered in the negative. Juanito then said, "You choose,
if you want something to happen to you or not [sic]." Another man, Abundio Nahid,
asked Antonio to come down because they have something to tell him. As Antonio
was about to kick the door open, he saw the men outside his house increasing in
number and were armed with bladed weapons (pinuti). When he turned around,
Antonio smelled gasoline and he saw Abundio Nahid set fire to his store located at
the right side of his house. 9 He and his wife Rizalina escaped to the roof of the
kitchen while the other members of their family who were in that house their son
Elmer Silvano and eldest daughter Celsita Legaspina with her two children - escaped
towards the sugarcane field which was about thirty meters away. When Rizalina fell
from the roof to the floor, Macario Acabal, Juanito Rismundo and Engracio
Valeriano hacked her. Each of them delivered a single blow with Abundio Nahid
hitting her four times. 10
On cross-examination, Antonio Silvano admitted that, as barangay captain of
Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, and as trusted man of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo in whose land
his house is built, he supported the latter as the official candidate of the KBL for
Mayor of Sta. Catalina, as well as the other candidates of her party for the local
election of 30 January 1980, including Lorenzo Teves, the KBL's candidate for
Governor of the Province of Negros Oriental. On the other hand, the accused
supported and campaigned hard for Mrs. Carballo's opponent, a certain Jose
Napigkit who was a candidate of the Pusyon Bisaya and who eventually won in the
election. In his barrio, Mrs. Carballo lost heavily to Napigkit. 11 He further
admitted that although he first reported the incident to the Philippine Constabulary
(PC) which investigated him, he cannot remember if he was made to sign anything
by the PC investigator. On 15 February 1980, he was again investigated but this
time in the office of Governor Teves. There, he was made to subscribe and swear to
an affidavit 12 that, as admitted by the prosecuting fiscal, was made the basis for
the filing of the information. No statement by the PC was presented to the
fiscal. 13
Visitacion Silvano, wife of Wilson who is the son of Antonio and Rizalina, testified
that she heard the shouts for help of her mother-in-law 14 so she woke up Wilson.
He then went down the house and turned on the headlights of the truck parked in
front of their house facing his parents' house which was located three kilometers
away. He ran towards the burning house of his parents but before he reached it, he
was met by Engracio Valeriano and the latter hacked him. When he ran away,
Engracio's companions, Juanito Rismundo, Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid,
chased him until he reached the sugarcane fields. 15 Visitacion stayed in her house
and saw Engracio Valeriano hack her husband. She also saw the other
accused-appellants in the vicinity of the house of her parents-in-law. 16
Dr. Avelino Torres, Chief of Hospital of Bayawan District Hospital, examined the
body of Rizalina Silvano at 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of 29 January 1980 and
was presented as a witness for the prosecution. According to him, the body was
burned and charred beyond recognition but the parts thereof were still intact. It
was still warm and smelt of freshly burned flesh. 17 He found the following
"evidence of hacking:"
"(1) right leg amputated below the knee;
(2) left leg hacked behind the knee;
(3) abdomen hacked with viscerae eviscerated." 18
He concluded that the wounds were inflicted before the body was burned. 19 He
also examined Wilson Silvano at about 1:30 o'clock that same morning and found
seven hack wounds on Wilson. He testified at the trial that without medical
attention, Wilson could have bled to death. 20
Atty. Castulo Caballes, then the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Oriental, stated in court that on 7 February 1980, he was fetched from his
house by someone from the office of Governor Lorenzo Teves and was asked to
assist the Governor in taking the affidavit of Juanito Rismundo. 21 After the latter
"admitted that was his affidavit," he "subscribed to him the oath and so [he] signed
as a notary public." 22 In this affidavit, Rismundo implicated Jose Napigkit as
having ordered the kidnapping and killing of KBL leaders and the burning of their
houses.
Also on 7 February 1980, according to Atty. Elson Bustamante, then Assistant
Provincial Attorney, he was called by Governor Teves to assist in the taking of the
statements also of Juanito Rismundo. The Governor himself propounded the
questions to Juanito who was accompanied by the son of Mrs. Carballo and a PC
soldier named Lodove. Bustamante heard Mrs. Carballo's son tell the Governor that
Juanito went to their (Carballos') house and "confessed" to a certain incident which
happened in Sta. Catalina on 28 January 1980, and since there were PC soldiers still
assigned to the Carballos' residence at that time, they brought Juanito to Governor
Teves, the Provincial Chairman of the KBL. 23
Another prosecution witness, Jufelinito Pareja, then Provincial Fiscal of Negros
Oriental, told the court that on 18 February 1980, accused Macario Acabal was
brought to his office. Acabal subscribed and swore to a statement before him. The
latter first read it to Acabal and after ascertaining that Acabal voluntarily executed

the statement, he administered the oath to said affiant. 24 This sworn statement
also implicated Jose Napigkit.
Accused-appellants put up the defense of alibi. They allege that they were in
different places when the incident in question occurred. Macario Acabal was in sitio
Canggabok, Nagbinlud, Sta. Catalina, attending the wake for deceased barangay
captain Filomeno Cumahig. 25 On 29 January 1980, he was arrested by military
men in the house of his aunt at the breakwater of Poblacion Sta. Catalina. One of
them struck him three times on his left and right chest with an armalite rifle.
Thereafter, he was loaded into a pick-up truck owned by Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and
taken to her house. On 7 February 1980, he was brought to Bayawan and was again
manhandled, causing injuries to him which required treatment at the Bayawan
District Hospital, as certified by Dr. Torres. From the hospital, he was brought to
the municipal jail of Bayawan and then to the Provincial Jail in Dumaguete City.
Later, he was taken to the office of the Governor and was forced to sign an affidavit
(Exhibit "F"). Prior to 28 January 1989, he did not know the other accused in this
case. 26
Juanito Rismundo was in Sitio Dinapo, Bgy. Alangilan, Sta. Catalina, graining corn in
the house of Alfreda Ortega. 27 On 6 February 1980, he met a PC soldier named Boy
Gudobe (Lodove), who was then stationed in Bgy. Kawitan, Sta. Catalina,
accompanied by Diosdado Silvano, grandson of Antonio Silvano, at the Sta. Catalina
market. Gudobe allegedly hit him and, together with Diosdado and a Boy Carballo,
the son of Mrs. Clotilde Carballo, brought him to the Capitol Building in Dumaguete
City. While there, he averred that he was forced by a lawyer to sign an affidavit
(Exhibit "D") in the office of the Governor after he was struck with the handle of a
revolver at the back of his head. 28
Abundio Nahid was in his house in Sugong Milagros, Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental,
about 20 kilometers from Nagbinlud. He charged that Wilson Silvano testified
against him because the Silvanos supported Mrs. Carballo of the KBL while he led
the supporters of Mrs. Carballo's opponent Jose Napigkit of the Pusyon Bisaya. 29
The prosecution presented on rebuttal Mrs. Clotilde Carballo and Fiscal Wilfredo
Salmin. The former testified that on 7 February 1980 accused Juanito Rismundo
voluntarily surrendered to her at her residence in Sta. Catalina and told her that he
wanted to see the Governor. She then asked her son to bring Juanito to Dumaguete
City. 30
Fiscal Wilfredo Salmin belied the claim of Acabal that he (Salmin) went to the
Provincial Jail on 10 February 1980 and forced Acabal to sign a document. He
alleged that on 16 February 1980, not on 10 February 1980 as claimed by Acabal,
Acabal came to his office at the Provincial Attorney's Office and executed a sworn
statement, but Acabal did not sign the same upon the advice of Atty. Geminiano
Eleccion. 31
After the completion of the re-taking of the testimonies of the witnesses in Branch
37, Criminal Cases Nos. 4584 and 4585 were re-raffled to Branch 33 of the trial
court, then presided over by Judge Pacifico S. Bulado. 32
The decision 33 of the trial court, per Judge Pacifico S. Bulado, dated 31 October
1991 but promulgated on 20 December 1991, contained no specific dispositive
portion. Its rulings are found in the last two paragraphs which read as follows:
"The elements of murder in this case, Criminal Case No. 4585 for the
killing of Rizalina Apatan-Silvano having been proved by the
prosecution beyond doubt, the accused JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO
ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the attendant qualifying
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the
house of victim Rizalina Apatan-Silvano in order to forcibly drive her
out of her house and hack her to death, the abuse of superior strength,
the penalty impossable [sic] here will be in its maximum degree, that
is reclusion perpetua taking into account Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua, and for all the accused to indemnify the heirs of
the victim the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this
case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the wounding of the victim Wilson A.
Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated homicide only is
committed by the accused Engracio Valeriano only. But since the
person who actually inflicted the injuries of victim Wilson Silvano,
accused Engracio Valeriano only is nowhere to be found, hence, not
brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large, no penalty
could be imposed on him since he is beyond the jurisdiction of this
court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO RISMUNDO and
ABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved from any
criminal responsibility from frustrated homicide.
The bail bond put up by the three accused, namely: Juanito Rismundo,
Macario Acabal and Abundio Nahid are hereby ordered cancelled and
let a warrant of arrest be issued for their immediate confinement." 34
The trial court rejected the defense of alibi because "[i]t was not shown by
plausible and convincing evidence . . . that it was physically impossible for them to
go to the scene of the crime and to return to the place of residence (People vs. Solis,
182 SCRA 182)." Upon the other hand, it ruled that "the prosecution witnesses . . .
clearly, positively identified them as the culprits, they being neighbors for a long
time and co-workers." 35
Immediately after the promulgation of the decision, counsel for the accused
manifested in open court their intention to appeal the decision. On the same day,
counsel for accused Abundio Nahid filed a notice of appeal with a motion for the
immediate release of his client, which was opposed by the prosecution. The court a
quo denied the motion also on the same day. 36
On 31 December 1991, all the convicted accused filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the denial of the motion for immediate release. The later motion
was denied on 3 January 1992. A day earlier or on 2 January 1992, accused Macario
Acabal and Juanito Rismundo had filed their notice of appeal. 37

The records of both cases were transmitted to us and we accepted the appeal on 26
February 1992.
The accused-appellants raise in their Brief 38 the following assignment of errors:
"I. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CANCELLING THE
BAIL BONDS OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AND ORDERING THEIR
IMMEDIATE ARRESTS WHEN THE ONLY PENALTY IMPOSED BY IT FOR ALL
THE ACCUSED IS "TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM THE SUM OF
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS.
II. THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER AS DEFINED AND PUNISHED UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES (ANTONIO SILVANO, WILSON SILVANO, AND
VISITACION SILVANO), HUSBAND AND CHILDREN, RESPECTIVELY, OF
THE DECEASED RIZALINA APATAN-SILVANO, HAVE POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED THE ACCUSED AS THE CULPRITS WHEN ONLY ANTONIO
SILVANO TESTIFIED AS TO WHO ALLEGEDLY KILLED HIS WIFE, AND
WHILE OTHER TWO (2) WITNESSES ONLY TESTIFIED AS TO THE
WOUNDING OF WILSON SILVANO BY ENGRACIO VALERIANO AND ALL
THESE WITNESSES WERE VERY VOCAL IN THEIR SILENCE AS TO THE
IDENTITIES OF THE ACCUSED FOR A LONG TIME.
IV. AND, THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING ALL THE ACCUSED FOR INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
AND/OR AT LEAST ON THE HYPOTHESIS OF REASONABLE DOUBT."
In support of the first assigned error, they claim that: (a) the trial court could not
have ordered the cancellation of their bail bonds and their arrest and immediate
confinement because the only penalty it imposed on them was "to indemnify the
heirs of the victim the sum of thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos" without imposing
any sentence; it merely suggested that ". . . the penalty impossable [sic] here will
be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua . . ."; and (b) since they
already perfected their appeal immediately after the promulgation of the sentence,
the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case and could not validly cancel their bail
bonds and order their arrest. 39
In its Brief, 40 the Appellee asserts that the judgment appealed from is valid and
enforceable. Although the word "impossable" [sic] is "imprecise," it is clear that
what the judge actually meant was that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was what
the law allowed or mandated him to impose. As to the grant of bail, since they
committed a capital offense and the court had already found that the evidence of
their guilt is strong, the accused-appellants should not be entitled to bail.
We find that the decision substantially complies with the Rules of Court on
judgments as it did sentence the accused-appellants to reclusion perpetua. A
judgment of conviction shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the accused, and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attending the commission, if there are any; (b) the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act to be recovered
from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate action has been reserved or waived. 41 As we earlier
observed, the challenged decision does not contain the usual dispositive portion.
The last two paragraphs of the decision merely embody its conclusions that: (1) the
appellants are guilty of murder, and (2) taking into account the "attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of nighttime, use of fire by burning the house
of the victim, . . . the abuse of superior strength," "the penalty imposable . . . will
be in its maximum degree, that is reclusion perpetua" considering that "the penalty
now for murder is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." While the decision
leaves much to be desired, it nevertheless contains the court's findings of facts, the
law applicable to the set of facts and what it believes to be the imposable penalty
under the law, that is, reclusion perpetua which is actually the penalty imposed on
the accused-appellants. It is obvious that they clearly understood that they were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 4585. Were it
otherwise, they would not have declared in open court their intention to appeal
immediately after the promulgation of the decision and would not have
subsequently filed their written notice of appeal.
Accused-appellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so
cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate
commitment because it already lost jurisdiction over their persons when they
perfected their appeal.
In connection with Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court on bail, we
ruled in People vs. Cortez 42 that:
". . . an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and is thereafter convicted of the
offense charged, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly
imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong."
We have already said that the decision did impose the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Since the order cancelling their bail bonds and directing their arrest is
contained in the decision itself, it is apparent that their abovementioned
contention is highly illogical. At the time the order in question was made, the
trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the accused-appellants. For
too obvious reasons, their notices of appeal which they claim have put an end to
the trial court's jurisdiction over them could not have been filed before the
promulgation of the decision. The order is therefore valid and enforceable. Also,
it may be recalled that the accused-appellants had earlier raised this issue
before us in a petition for habeas corpus dated 16 January 1992 and docketed as
G.R. Nos. 103602-03. We dismissed that petition on 17 February 1992 for failure
to comply with requirement no. (2) of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No.
28-91 on forum shopping. 43Their motion for reconsideration was denied on 27
May 1993.
The trial court, however, erred in considering nighttime, use of fire and abuse of
superior strength as "attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances." The
information in Criminal Case No. 4585 alleged only treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying aggravating circumstances. Nighttime, band, use of fire,
craft, fraud or disguise and ignominy were alleged as generic aggravating
circumstances only. The trial court cannot elevate the status of any of the generic
aggravating circumstances and consider them as qualifying circumstances for the
crime of murder. Moreover, nighttime is not a qualifying circumstance under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was likewise an error for the trial court to state that "the penalty now for murder
is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua." The penalty for murder remains to
bereclusion temporal maximum to death. But in view of paragraph (1), Section 19,
Article III of the Constitution prohibiting the imposition of the penalty of death,
where death would have been the proper penalty in a case, the court must instead
impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 44
The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused
Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found,
hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court
ignored the fact that Engracio jumped bail after he had been arraigned, just before
the retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitution permits trial in absentia after the accused has been arraigned
provided he has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is
unjustified. One who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his
non-appearance during the trial. Accordingly, after the trial in absentia, the court
can render judgment in the case 45 and promulgation may be made by simply
recording the judgment in the criminal docket with a copy thereof served upon his
counsel, provided that the notice requiring him to be present at the promulgation is
served through his bondsmen or warden and counsel. 46
Having disposed of the first issue raised by the accused-appellants, we now come to
the second, third and fourth assigned errors which shall be discussed jointly,
considering that they are interrelated and deal with the question of whether or not
the guilt of the accused-appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused-appellants contend that the trial court erred in relying on the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Silvano, Wilson Silvano and Visitacion
Silvano and in concluding that they clearly and positively identified the
accused-appellants as the culprits. According to them, only Antonio Silvano
testified that he saw the accused burn his house, kill his wife Rizalina and drag her
into the fire. Neither Visitacion Silvano nor Wilson Silvano testified that they saw
what occurred in the elder Silvanos' house. But even the testimony of Antonio
Silvano is not reliable because it lacks truthfulness and validity. They singled out his
testimony that while the fire was raging, his wife told him to save himself as she
will also save herself, then the direction of the wind changed and he jumped from
the roof of the house into the bushes. They concluded that he could not have seen
who killed his wife. 47 Also, the ruling that conclusions and findings of the lower
court are entitled to great weight is not applicable in this case because the judge
who heard the testimonies of the witnesses in its entirety was not the same judge
who penned the decision. They further stressed the delay incurred by Antonio in
reporting the crime to the authorities. The crime was committed on 28 January
1980 but he reported it to the Office of the Governor of Negros Oriental in
Dumaguete City only on 18 February 1980 or some 21 days after its commission.
Finally, they maintain that they have sufficiently established their defense of alibi.
On the other hand, the Appellee seeks the affirmance of the judgment convicting
the accused. The Appellee reasons out that the accused-appellants were positively
identified by prosecution witness Antonio Silvano; and that even while it is true that
only Antonio Silvano saw the murderers, Visitacion and Wilson Silvano testified on
the presence of the accused-appellants at the scene of the crime.
As the Appellee admits, however, the most damning testimony against the
accused-appellants in this case is only that of Antonio Silvano who claimed that he
actually saw them hack and kill his wife. To us, whether such testimony could be
relied upon is altogether a different matter. Although it is a settled rule that the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses should be given the highest
respect because it had the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses
and can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or lying through their
teeth, 48 we cannot rely on that rule in this appeal because the judge who heard
the testimonies of the witnesses was not the same judge who penned the decision.
Judge Temistocles Diez of Branch 37 received and heard the testimonies of the
witnesses but it was Judge Pacifico S. Bulado who rendered the decision. The latter
had no opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying,
which are important considerations in assessing credibility. 49
We have carefully read the transcripts of the testimony of Antonio Silvano. We
cannot give him full faith and credit for the following reasons:
1. Although he testified on cross-examination that he first reported the incident to
and was investigated by the PC, it is clear to this Court that it was only on 15
February 1980, or on the eighteenth day after the incident that he was investigated
at the office of the Governor. Being the barangay captain of Nagbinlud, the owner
of a house that was intentionally set on fire, the father of the man who was hacked
several times and almost died, and the husband of the murder victim whose body
was charred beyond recognition, the compelling call of duty and the mournful cry
for justice cannot tolerate any delay in reporting the incident to the proper
authorities. The prosecution was hard put for an explanation for this delay; it did
not even attempt to make any. If Antonio Silvano could offer no explanation
therefor, it could only mean that he was either unable to identify the real
perpetrators of the crime against his family or he was afraid to do so. For whichever
reason, such failure only bolsters the claim of the defense that the crime was

committed by the "Salvatore" group whose operations Antonio admitted he was very
much aware of, thus:
"Q As such barangay captain you remember that in the month of
January, 1980 there was such a group of armed men referred to
or commonly called as Salvatore, is that correct that used to
roam around in the interior part of Sta. Catalina?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men used to plunder or steal from houses, kill
certain persons and burn also houses, is that correct?
A Yes, that is true.
Q And this group of men known as 'Salvatore' continued to exist even
after January 1980?
A That was only up to 1980.
Q Yes, but after January 1980 this 'Salvatore' group continued to exist
for sometime up to or beyond the year 1980, is that correct?
A They were only about 2 weeks because they were arrested by the
authorities.
Q That is two weeks after January 28, 1980?
A Yes." 50
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether Antonio did report the incident to the PC as no
PC personnel corroborated him thereon and according to him, he did not sign any
statement during the said investigation, which is unusual. The fiscal himself
admitted in open court that no statement taken by the PC was submitted to his
office. 51 If indeed Antonio was investigated by the PC, the investigator should
have formally taken his statement in view of its importance. As no such statement
was proved to exist, it is logical to presume that Antonio did not or could not
disclose to the investigator the names of the perpetrators.
2. Antonio admitted on cross-examination that he had no quarrel and
misunderstanding 52 or grudges 53 whatsoever with the accused-appellants. If that
were so, it is odd that he could not explain why he, a barangay captain who was
expected to attend to the requests and problems of his constituents, deliberately
chose not to respond to the alleged call of the accused-appellants on the night of
the incident and instead allowed his wife to lie to them by saying that he was
attending a meeting. Again, the only plausible explanation for his behavior was that
the men who came belonged to the "Salvatore" group and this terrified him, for he
knew that the group had been roaming around, killing people and burning houses in
his area.
3. Also, on cross-examination, Antonio affirmed as true the contents of his sworn
statement 54 taken two weeks after the incident. In it, he failed to state the fact
that he witnessed the killing of his wife and to identify her killers. 55 Since his
sworn statement was precisely taken to obtain from him vital facts relative to the
incident, more specifically on the killing of his wife, and considering that he had
already stated therein that he saw the accused-appellants, it is contrary to human
nature and inconsistent with experience for him to fail to identify them as the
killers of his wife, if such is the fact. It has been said that where the omission in the
affidavit refers to a very important detail such that the affiant would not have
failed to mention it, the omission could affect the affiant's credibility. 56 Verily, it
was obvious from his answer to Question No. 16 of the investigator that he had no
opportunity to identify the killers:
"Q Question No. 16, 'Q-What else did you do?', and you answered, 'A-My
wife told me to just save myself because she will also save
herself. Thereafter the wind changed it(s) course and (the) fire
grew big and because of this, I had the occasion to jumped (sic)
from our house and thereafter I ran towards the bushes.' . . .
A Yes, sir, that is true.

Q How far is that bush to which you ran from your house which was
burning?
A It is about thirty (30) meters because it is a sugarcane field." 57
4. Antonio categorically declared that Engracio Valeriano, Juanito Rismundo and
Macario Acabal each hacked her once hitting her on the forehead, right leg and left
arm, respectively, while Abundio Nahid hacked her four times, hitting her at the
forehead, left arm, right leg and stomach. 58 In other words, from his testimony,
his wife sustained seven wounds. Yet, the medical evidence belies this. Per the
findings of Dr. Avelino Torres, 59 there were only three "evidence" of hacking, viz.:
at the right leg, left leg and abdomen.
5. Nowhere in his sworn statement did Antonio mention the name of
accused-appellant Abundio Nahid. If in fact he saw the latter who he claimed in his
direct testimony hacked his wife four times, Nahid's name would have occupied a
prominent place in his sworn statement.
The testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution likewise do not provide
sufficient proof of the accused-appellants' guilt. Visitacion Silvano's testimony that
she saw and identified the accused-appellants at the scene of the crime taxes the
imagination. It was humanly impossible for her to see the accused-appellants even
if she were aided by the light from the truck as she herself said that she was then in
her house, three kilometers away from the house of her parents-in-law. Wilson
Silvano did not testify at all that he saw the persons who hacked and killed his
mother.
In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accused-appellants
must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed; it is even the constitutional duty of the court to acquit him. 60 Accordingly,
unless the prosecution discharges its burden of proving the guilt of the
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt, they need not even offer evidence in
their behalf.61 The weakness of their defense of alibi thus becomes irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 4585 is hereby REVERSED. Accused-appellants
MACARIO ACABAL, JUANITO RISMUNDO and ABUNDIO NAHID are ACQUITTED on
ground of reasonable doubt, and their immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered, unless other lawful and valid grounds exist for their further
detention.
The trial court is directed to render judgment against accused-appellant ENGRACIO
VALERIANO in Criminal Case No. 4584.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
||| (People v. Valeriano y Tumahig, G.R. Nos. 103604-05, [September 23, 1993])
G.R. Nos. L-75511-14. March 16, 1987.]
AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
It is settled that if a separate trial is allowed to one of two or more defendants, his
testimony therein imputing guilt to any of the co-accused is not admissible against
the latter who was not able to cross-examine him. 1 The issue in this case is
whether or not such testimony was considered by the respondent court against the
petitioner, who claims that it was in fact the sole basis of his conviction. prLL
The petitioner, along with several others, were charged in four separate
informations with estafa through falsification of public documents for having
allegedly conspired to defraud the government in the total amount of P26,523.00,
representing the cost of repairs claimed to have been undertaken, but actually not
needed and never made, on four government vehicles, through falsification of the
supporting papers to authorize the illegal payments 2 Docketed as CC Nos. 6681,
6682, 6683 and 6684, these cases were tried jointly for all the accused until after
the prosecution had rested, when Genaro Basilio, Alejandro Macadangdang and
petitioner Talino asked for separate trials, which were allowed. 3 They then
presented their evidence at such trials, while the other accused continued
defending themselves in the original proceedings, at which one of them, Pio Ulat,
gave damaging testimony against the petitioner, relating in detail his participation
in the questioned transactions. 4 In due time, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang, Ulat and Renato
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the
other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by the
petitioner on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed
by the Constitution.
In its decision, the respondent court ** makes the following remarks about the
separate trial:
"The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed,
upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino
and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in
deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for the prosecution
as well as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused
can not be taken up.
"It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial
because the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many incriminatory things
against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense.
But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate
trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact,
they were not even required to be present when the other accused
were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now
be considered against said three accused.
"We cannot understand why, after it had heard the long and sordid
story related by Ulat on the stand, the prosecution did not endeavor to
call Ulat and put him on the stand as part of its rebuttal evidence. Had
this been done, there would have been no impediment to the
consideration of Ulat's testimony against all the accused." 5
The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a
matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after
the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. 6 While it is true that Rule 119,
Section 8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial
should be filed, we have held in several cases that this should be done before the
prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the
motion may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where
there appears to be an antagonism in the respective defenses of the accused. 7 In
such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record
against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the
separate trial of the other accused. 8
The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost
circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after
a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious
difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the
respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation.
The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 9 to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in
fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on
their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his
absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in
poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud
their spite in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not
permitted unless the affiant is presented in court 10 and hearsay is barred save
only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration. 11
In United States v. Javier, 12 this Court emphasized:
". . . With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell v. U.S.
[1911], 221 U.S. 325) that it `intends to secure the accused in the right
to be tried, so far as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by
only such witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their
testimony in his presence, and give to the accused an opportunity of
cross-examination. It was intended to prevent the conviction of the
accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and particularly to
preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the
witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination.' In other
words, confrontation is essential because cross-examination is
essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may
have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying. (U.S. v. Anastacio [1906], 6 Phil. 413.) The Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional provision on
behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example U.S.
v. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. v. Bello [1908], 11 Phil., 526;
U.S. v. De la Cruz [1908], 12 Phil. 87.) . . . ."
We have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the
respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the
petitioner. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat
at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned
vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
Thus: LexLib
"If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he had no knowledge nor
participation in the conspiracy to defraud, he would have questioned
this obvious irregularity. He would have asked whoever was following
up the vouchers why two biddings were conducted, why the awards to
`D'Alfenor' were cancelled, when the latter were cancelled, and when
the new bidding was made.
"The very same case is true as regards the accused Agustin Talino.
While his duty to initial or sign the vouchers as regards the adequacy of
funds may have been ministerial, his failure to observe the obvious
irregularity is clear evidence of his complicity in the conspiracy.
"Talino declared that in the morning of May 23, 1980, four vouchers
(including three made out in favor of `D'Alfenor Repair Shop') were
brought to him for his certificate as regards the availability of funds.
He had signed all the four vouchers. In the afternoon of the same day,
three other vouchers were also presented to him for certification as to
funds these three were in substitution of Exhibits `A', `B' and `C' which
he had earlier signed but which, according to Talino, were disallowed
and cancelled. Talino claims that he had examined the supporting
documents of the last three vouchers the RIV, the bids signed by the
repair shops and the abstract of bids. If what Talino says is true, at
least the abstract of bids submitted in the morning, where `D'Alfenor
Motor Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder, must have been different
from the ones submitted together with vouchers in the afternoon. This
would have raised his suspicions as to why these last three abstracts
could be dated as they were (May 18, May 15 and May 11, respectively)
when it was only that morning that the abstracts containing the name
of `D'Alfenor Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact that he readily
approved the substitute vouchers with the substitute winning bidders
is a clear indication that he knew he was facilitating an irregular
transaction.
"It is our view that the evidence on record has established beyond
doubt the participation of both Agustin Talino and Alejandro
Macadangdang in all the four felonies charged in the informations." 13
The petitioner makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's
guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the
testimony of Pio Ulat," 14 but that was not the respondent court speaking. That
was the Solicitor General's analysis. As far as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, the
said testimony was inadmissible against the petitioner because he "did not cross
examine Ulat," and was not even required to be present when the latter was
testifying. In fact, the respondent court even expressed the wish that Ulat had been
presented as rebuttal witness in the separate trial of the petitioner as there would
then have been "no impediment to the use of his testimony against the other
accused." As this was not done, the trial court could not and did not consider Ulat's
testimony in determining the petitioner' s part in the offenses.
The factual findings of the respondent court being supported by substantial

evidence other than Ulat's testimony, we see no reason to disturb them. It is futile
for the petitioner to invoke his constitutional presumption of innocence because his
guilt has in the view of the trial court been established beyond reasonable doubt,
and we agree.
||| (Talino v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. L-75511-14, [March 16, 1987], 232 PHIL
554-561)
[G.R. No. L-12990. January 21, 1918.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LAZARO JAVIER ET
AL., defendants-appellants.
Modesto Castillo, Eusebio Lopez and G.N. Trinidad for appellants.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. THEFT OF LARGE CATTLE; PROOF. A carabao, seen in the possession of

the accused and later found tied in front of a house, was identified as the
carabao, which had been taken from the corral of Doroteo Natividad. Held: That
the accused having offered no satisfactory explanation for their possession of the
carabao, they can properly be convicted of the crime of theft.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES. There are
two principal reasons for the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says:
"That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet
the witnesses face to face." The first reason is the right of cross-examination,
and the second is that the tribunal may have before it the department and
appearance of the witness while testifying.
3. ID.; ID. Exhibit B of the prosecution is the sworn statement before the
justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas, of
the sergeant, now deceased, who was the leader of the patrol of the
Constabulary which encountered the accused, and whose signature was
identified. Held: That Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower
court.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J p:
We find the proven facts as brought out in the trial of this case to be as
follows.
Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon of October 22, 1915, fastened his
carabao valued at P150 in his corral situated in the barrio of Trapiche,
municipality of Tananuan, Province of Batangas. On the following morning when
he went to look after the animal, he found the gate to the corral open and that
the carabao had disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a
patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa, now deceased,
on the 20th of November following, encountered the accused Lazaro Javier,
Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. When the
ladrones saw the Constabulary, they scattered in all directions. On the following
day, the Constabulary found this carabao tied in front of the house of one Pedro
Monterola in the barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of San Pablo. The carabao
was identified by Doroteo Natividad as the one which had been taken from his
corral on the night of October 22, 1915, and by the Constabulary as the one seen
in the possession of the accused.
As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle,
which as applied to cases of this character is that, although the persons who
unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their
identify remains entirely unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in
the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime and they
make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly
convicted of the crime. (See U.S. vs. Divino [1911], 18 Phil. 425.) In the present
instance, the attempt of the accused to insinuate that one of the Constabulary
soldiers testified against them falsely because of enmity is hardly believable.
The foregoing statement of the facts and the law disposes of all but one
assignment of error, namely, that the lower court erred in admitting Exhibit B of
the prosecution as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn statement of sergeant Presca,
now deceased, whose signature was identified, before the justice of the peace
of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of Batangas. Appellant's argument
is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the
witnesses face to face," and the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses
against him." With reference to the clause of the Bill of Rights, which we have
quoted, Justice Day said in a case of Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U.S. [1911],
221 U.S. 325) that it "intends to secure the accused in the right to be tried, so far
as facts provable by witnesses are concerned, by only such witnesses as meet
him face to face at the trial, who give their testimony in his presence, and give
to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination. It was intended to prevent
the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the
witness in the exercise of the right of cross-examination." In other words,
confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second
reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment
and appearance of the witness while testifying. (U.S. vs. Anastasio [1906], 6 Phil.,
413.) The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied this constitutional
provision on behalf of accused persons in a number of cases. (See for example
U.S. vs. Tanjuanco [1902], 1 Phil., 374; U.S. vs. Bello [1908, 12 Phil. 87.) It is for
us now to determine whether the present facts entitle the accused to the
protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some exception
thereto.
The sworn statement of Presa was not made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of Criminal Procedure as to confrontation is
therefore inapplicable. Presa's statement again is not the testimony of a witness
deceased, given in a former action between the same relating to the same
matter. Consequently, the exception provided by section 298. No. 8, of the Code
of Civil Procedure and relied upon by the prosecution in the lower court is also
inapplicable. Nor is the statement of Presca a dying declaration or a deposition
in a former trial or shown to be a part of the preliminary examination. Under
these circumstances, not to burden the opinion with an extensive citation of
authorities, we can rely on the old and historic case of R. vs. Paine (1 Salk., 281
[King's Bench Div]) occurring in the year 1696. It Bristol under oath, but not in P's
presence, was offered. It was objected that B, being dead, the defendant had
lost all opportunity of cross-examining him. The King's Bench consulted with the
Common Pleas, and "it was the opinion of both courts that these depositions
should not be given in evidence, the defendant not being present when they
were taken before the Mayor and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination."
Although we are faced with the alternative of being unable to utilize the
statements of the witness now deceased, yet if there has been no opportunity
for cross-examination and the case is not one coming within one of the
exceptions, the mere necessity alone of accepting the statement will not suffice.
In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in evidence in the lower court.
With such a resolution of this question, we could, as has been done in other
cases, further find this to be versible error and remand the case for a new trial.
We are convinced, however, that this would gain the accused nothing except
delay for the testimony of the owner of the carabao and of the two Constabulary
soldiers, rebutted by no reasonable evidence on behalf of the accused, is
deemed sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts come under article 518, No. 3, connection with article 520, as
amended, of the Penal Code. Accordingly the defendants and appellants are
each sentenced to four years, two months, and one day of presidio
correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay one-third
part of the costs of both instances; the carabao shall be returned to Doroteo
Natividad, if this has not already been done. So ordered.
||| (U.S. v. Javier, G.R. No. L-12990, [January 21, 1918], 37 PHIL 449-453)

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Constitutional Law Due Process

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 [ ATTY AQUINO]

[G.R. Nos. 72335-39. March 21, 1988.]

FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE

[G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986.]

SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON, MARY

Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FINDINGS OF COMMISSION THAT PROCEEDINGS HAVE

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 10

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 14

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 15

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 18

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 20

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 24

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 34

[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.]

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO

[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.]

BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO

Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner Bayani M. Alonte.

Bayani M. Alonte, then incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna and Buenaventura

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 35

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS;

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 36

"That accused Buenaventura 'Wella' Concepcion without having

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 45

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that

Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan,

"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 52

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 53

PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 54

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 57

13. That I have not received other similar offers of valuable

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 59

SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA

SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 62

xxx xxx xxx

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 64

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 66

"It was written in the literature of Old Testament several

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 70

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 75

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 76

G.R. No. L-21325. October 29, 1971.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLEO DRAMAYO,

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 83

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 85

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 86

[G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980.]

PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN,

Raul M . Gonzales for petitioners.

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 87

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 88

G.R. No. 112889. April 18, 1995.]

BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

Estelito P. Mendoza and Villareal Law Offices for petitioner.

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 93

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 94

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

SEC 14- CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS 98