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China modernizing despite economic slowdown

Terri Moon 16 is a reporter for DoD news, 5-13-2016, "DoD Report: Chinas
Military Investments Continue," U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,
Chinas investments in military and weaponry
WASHINGTON, May 13, 2016
operations continue on a path to increase its power projection , anti-access
and area denial and operations in cyberspace, space and electromagnetic
emerging domains, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia told Pentagon reporters
today. Abraham M. Denmark described the Defense Departments annual report on military and security
Highlighting Chinas defense
developments involving China, released to Congress today.
strategy and military developments, Denmark said the report provides
factual, descriptive and analytical information to Capitol Hill. It lets the facts
speak for themselves, he said. China continues to focus on preparing for potential conflict in the
Taiwan Strait, Denmark added, but additional missions such as contingencies in the East and South
China seas and on the Korea Peninsula are increasingly important to the [Peoples Liberation Army].
China Sustains Military Growth Chinas leaders seem committed to sustaining
defense spending growth for the foreseeable future, despite its economic
growth deceleration, he said. From 2006 to 2015, Chinas officially disclosed military budget grew
at an average of 9.8 percent per year in inflation-adjusted terms, Denmark said, noting that its published
military budget left out numerous major spending categories, such as research and development and
procuring foreign weapons and equipment. The true expenditure, DoD estimates, in terms of total
Such investments
military-related spending for 2015, exceeded $180 billion in 2015, he added.
are resulting in strides such as Chinas recently unveiled DF-26 missile, a
system capable of precision ground strikes in the Asia-Pacific region , he said.
Besides Chinas ongoing, long-term military trends, its military modernization program
entered a new phase in 2015 comprising three key security developments, Denmark said. The
first trend is Chinas maritime activities, in which it used assertive tactics to reclaim existing
outposts and began building military facilities on large swaths of land in the South China Sea in 2015, he
said. China's leadership demonstrated a willingness to tolerate higher levels of tension in pursuit of its
maritime sovereignty claims, he said. China's strategy is to secure its objectives without jeopardizing the
regional peace that has enabled its military and economic development, which in tum has maintained the
The second trend is China's growing global
Chinese Communist Party's grip on power.
military presence, he said. China's leaders are leveraging the country's power to expand its
international influence -- and its military footprint overseas, Denmark said. The biggest example of
expanding ambitions, he emphasized, was Chinas announcement in November that it would stand up a
military facility in Djibouti. This is a big step forward for the PLA, which has never had an overseas facility
The third security trend is Chinas large-scale reforms to make
before, he noted.
the its military more capable and politically loyal , Denmark said. President Xi Jinping
unveiled sweeping plans that are intended to enhance the PLA's ability to conduct joint operations, by
replacing the old military regions with new geographic commands, he pointed out. The plans also seek to
strengthen the Chinese Communist Party's control over the PLA by establishing new bodies to oversee the
military, Denmark added.

Defensive realism best explains Chinese foreign policy-

disproves the thesis of the DA
Tang 8 Tang Shiping, Professor at the School of International Relations
and Public Affairs at Fudan University (Shanghai), Adjunct Professor at the
Center for Regional Security Studies and former Associate Professor at the
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Science
(Beijing), former Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies at Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), former Co-Director
of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, holds a Ph.D. in Molecular Biology
and Genetics from Wayne State University School of Medicine and an M. A. in
International Studies from the University of California-Berkeley, 2008 (From
Offensive to Defensive Realism: A Social Evolutionary Interpretation of
Chinas Security Strategy, China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of
International Politics, Edited by Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, Published by
Cornell University Press, ISBN 9780801446917, p. 152-156)
Chinas Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism
There is little doubt that Chinas security strategy is still firmly rooted in
realism.37 In seeking to overcome the memory of a century of national [end
page 152] humiliation (bainian guochi) at the hands of the West and Japan,
generations of Chinese have strived to build a strong and prosperous China .
Many Chinese elites believe that because of its size, population, civilization, history and, more recently, its
growing wealth, China should be regarded as a great power (da guo). This strong belief in the utility of
power and the motivation to accumulate power firmly anchors Chinas security strategy within the realist
camp. The more important question is whether China is an offensive realist or a
defensive realist state.38 Mao: Offensive Realism Chinas security strategy under
Mao was largely offensive realist in nature.39 China under Mao expounded an
intolerant ideology of overthrowing all imperialist or reactionary regimes in
Asia and the world at large. More importantly, China under Mao (together with the former
Soviet Union) actively supported revolutions (or insurgencies) in many developing
countries, thus intentionally threatening those countries that it had identified as imperialists or their
lackeys (zougou) and proxies (dailiren). This sense of being threatened was perhaps most severe among
Chinas neighboring states that were allies of the United States and its Western allies (e.g., Southeast
as a staunch Marxist- Leninist, Mao believed that
Asian countries).40 Second,
conflicts in international politics were necessary and inevitable. To transform
the world into a socialist world, struggles including armed strugglesagainst
imperialists and their proxies were necessary . As a result, despite having settled some
major disputes with several neighboring states (e.g., Burma, Mongolia, Pakistan), seeking security through
cooperation was never high on the agenda of Chinas strategy at that time. [end page 153] Third, China
under Mao largely believed that all of the Peoples Republics security
problems were due to other countries evil policies, 41 rather than the
interactions between China and other states . In essence, China under Mao had little
understanding of the dynamics of the security dilemma.42 As a result, other than the Five Principles of
Peaceful Co- existence,43 China under Mao initiated few measures to assure regional states of Chinas
Among China hands, there is
benign intentions. Deng: The Transition to Defensive Realism
little disagreement over the largely defensive realist nature of Chinas
security strategy today, whether China is labeled an integrationist power, a globalist
power, a nonrevisionist and nonimperial power, or simply a state embracing defensive realism and
beyond; or whether Chinas grand strategy and diplomacy is characterized as neo- Bismarckian, New
At the very least, most analysts reject the notion
Diplomacy, or engaging Asia.44
that China is an offensive-realist state (i.e., an expansionist, revisionist, or imperialist one)
today. There are at least four strands of evidence supporting the argument
that post- Mao China has gradually transformed itself into a state embracing
defensive realism. The first is perhaps the most obvious. China has toned down its
revolutionary rhetoric and has backed up its words with deeds. Most clearly, it
has stopped supporting insurgencies in other countries, even if they were
initiated by communist elements. [end page 154] The second is that China has now
clearly recognized some of the most critical aspects of the security dilemma
and its implications.45 Touring several Southeast Asian countries in 1978, Deng Xiaoping was given
his first lesson on the security dilemma. He was surprised to find that Chinas earlier policies of exporting
revolution and its unwillingness to resolve the issue of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia had made many
Deng realized that
Southeast Asian countries suspicious of Chinas intentions.46 As a result,
Chinas security conundrum in the 1960s and 1970s had not been the work of
external forces alone but was rather an outcome of the interaction between
Chinas behavior and the outside world . This interdependent and interactive nature of
security is, of course, one of the major aspects of the security dilemma. The third strand of evidence is that
China has demonstrated self-restraint and willingness to be constrained by
others. This aspect is perhaps most prominently demonstrated in Chinas memberships in international
organizations and institutions as well as its increased presence in treaties since 1980s.47 Because
international organizations, institutions, and treaties are all rule-based,
Chinas increasing membership in them and its compliance with the rules
there were in place before its entry (i.e., that were made by others) unambiguously
signals its willingness to be restrained by others .48 Finally, security through
cooperation, the hallmark of defensive realism, has become a pillar of Chinas
security strategy under Deng. Two aspects of this dimension are worth noting. The first is that
China has pursued a strategy of maintaining amicable relationships with its
neighbors (mulin youhao, wending zhoubian) since Deng, mostly through reassurance
and building [end page 155] cooperation.49 While such a strategy certainly has a dose of hedging
against the bad times of U.S.- China relations embedded in it, the strategy still reduces the anxiety among
neighboring countries about Chinas rise, thus helping to alleviate the security dilemma between China
China has also ventured into multilateral security
and regional states. The second is that
cooperation organizations and institutions, mostly prominently the ASEAN Regional Forum
and the Shanghai Cooperative Organizations. While these security cooperation institutions
may or may not have changed states choice of goals, they have institutionalized a degree of
(security) cooperation among states, thus changing states preferences for strategies. As a
result, the security dilemma between China and regional states has not been
exacerbated but rather alleviated.50 Overall, there is ample evidence to support the
interpretation that Chinas current security strategy is firmly rooted in
defensive realism, with a dose of instrumentalist institutionalism.

Not unique and No internal link. Chinese SOE investment

is up now.
Miner 15
et al; SEAN MINER is China program manager and research associate at the Peterson Institute
for International Economics. The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE; Peterson
Institute) is a private and non-profit think tank focused on international economics, based in
Washington, D.C. According to the 2014 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report (Think Tanks and
Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania), Peterson is number 15 (of 150) in the "Top
Think Tanks Worldwide" - From the Chapter ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED AND
From the paper TOWARD A US-CHINA INVESTMENT TREATY - PIIE Briefing 15-1 - February
2015 -

The perception is that China's SOEs have not invested much in the U nited
States, or that investments from China's SOEs are not welcome. Evidence does
not support these statements. Of the total of 896 investments from China in
the United States, 249 were by Chinese SOEs, about 27 percent of the total.
The SOE deals were generally larger than the deals of private Chinese investors,
accounting for 42 percent, or over $18 billion, of total investments from
China. Of the 249 SOE investments, 177 were greenfield investments, investments in new facilities and factories
rather than purchases of existing companies, worth $2.5 billion, while the other 72 were acquisitions, accounting for $15.5
billion." Acquisitions in the energy industry accounted for more than half the value of SOE investments. 1 lowever SOEs
invested across a wide variety of sectors, including aviation, information technology, health and biotech, basic materials,
and real estate. The Rhodium Group broadly defines "government-owned" to include any firm with more than 20 percent
government ownership. Even so, plenty of big name-brand Chinese SOEs have successfully invested in the United States.
State-ownedChina National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is a prominent example.
Although it failed in its bid for Unocal in 2005 because of political opposition from members of the US
Congress, CNOOC now has investments worth over $3 billion in the U nited
States. CNOOC changed strategy and began investing in minority share
positions and entering into joint ventures with US firms . In another case, TPCO America,
a subsidiary of state-owned Tianjin Pipe Corporation made a greenfield investment in Texas of more than $1 billion. TPCO
is building a massive plant for processing steel into pipes, creating more than a 1,000 jobs in the process. State-owned
AV1C Automobile Industry Holding Company is a majority owner of US-based Nexteer and helped it become a powerful
Dozens of Chinese state-owned firms have invested in
supplier to US auto manufacturers.
the United States, and each has adopted a strategy backed by experience
and flexibility.
South China Sea. Chinas increasing military assertiveness has undercut Obamas pledge to refocus
U.S. military and foreign policy toward Asia, as has opposition by Trump and Democratic presidential
nominee Hillary Clinton to Obamas signature trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

China is not a revisionist powerthey are concerned

about stability- means no militarism
Bader 2016 (Jeffrey A. Bader, Jeffrey Bader is a senior fellow in the John L.
Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. From 2009 until 2011,
Bader was special assistant to the president of the United States for national
security affairs at the National Security Council. In that capacity, he was the
principal advisor to President Obama on Asia. Bader served from 2005 to
2009 as the director of the China Initiative and, subsequently, as the first
director of the John L. Thornton China Center. During his three decade career
with the U.S. government, Bader was principally involved in U.S.-China
relations at the State Department, the National Security Council, and the
Office of the United States Trade Representative. In 2001, as assistant U.S.
trade representative, he led the United States delegation in completing
negotiations on the accession of China and Taiwan into the World Trade
Organization., February 11, 2016, What does China Really Want? Brookings
does-china-really-want/, accessed 11/21/16)
There are countries whose worldview and foreign policy are subject to
dramatic swings reflecting the perspective of their changing leaders . Russia
under Vladimir Putin is a prime examplehe is personally a driving force behind much of his countrys
Its foreign policy has
strategy and approach, at home and abroad. China today is a contrary case.
undergone significant change in recent years, but the underlying strategy
and directions in which it has gone are well grounded in its modern history
and evolving national interests, not the whim of an erratic leader. CHINAS
PRIORITIES To be sure, Xi Jinping is a decisive figure, both bold and innovative.
Actions like creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and island-
building in the South China Sea reflect the temperament of a man not afraid
to lead, for better or worse. In the light of such steps, observers outside China
have wondered whether China is a revisionist power seeking to undermine
the global system of norms in its own interest and whether Xis boldness will
elide into aggressiveness. Rather than seeing modern China as an example of the great man
theory of history, it would be better to look at underlying trends and
fundamentals. Chinas spectacular economic growth in the last three and a
half decades has expanded its capacity and influence. It is not surprising that
a country with massive global trade and investment ties, as well as an
emerging first-class military facilitated by its economic growthneither of
which existed a generation ago thinks about its interests differently. A product
of the major developments of post-1949 ChinaMaoism, the Cultural Revolution, exile to the countryside,
the reforms of the Deng period, and the subsequent surge in economic strengthXi embodies these
Notwithstanding its rapid rise toward
achievements and contradictions, as do his policies.
major power status, China has generally not sought to undermine the
global system. The country, based on interests and ideology, has long
enjoyed a wary relationship with a global system that it did not
createand that ambivalence continues. But China is not behaving in
a way designed to undermine the fundamental pillars of the global
political, economic, and security system . Its priority remains economic
development and domestic stability, neither of which is assured and neither
of which would be aided by reckless adventurism abroad. Suggestions that
China is seeking to expel the United States from the western Pacific and
create an Asia for Asians are overblown. Its conduct in its own neighborhood, however,
especially in maritime areas, has stoked understandable anxiety that it is not a status quo power in Asia.