ONGCHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Ponente: MENDOZA
FACTS:
The trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, among others for having failed to state all his former placer of
residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, 7 and to support his petition with
the appropriate documentary evidence. Petitioner admits that he failed to
mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, with the
petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial
compliance with 7.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents annexed by the State to its appelants
brief without having been presented and formally offered as evidence
under Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence justified
the reversal of of the Trial Courts decision.

HELD:
YES. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Petition was
denied.

RATIO:
It is settled that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. [T]he
rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat
petitioners argument of substantial compliance with the requirement
under the Revised Naturalization Law.

[T]he reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has
not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to
object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the
appellate court by the State.

Bantolino Case Digest: NONE

Cirtek Employees Labor Union vs Cirtek Electronics
GR 190515

Facts:

This resolves the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent, Cirtek Electronics, Inc., of the Courts
Decision dated November 15, 2010.

Respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on

a ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and
that, as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a resolution of
disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latters
lack of personality to represent the workers in the present case.

Issue: WON petitioner lost its personality to represent the workers

because of its disaffiliation from the Federation of Free Workers.
Held:

The issue of disaffiliation is an intra-union dispute which must be resolved

in a different forum in an action at the instance of either or both the FFW
and the Union or a rival labor organization, not the employer.

Indeed, as respondent-movant itself argues, a local union may disaffiliate at

any time from its mother federation, absent any showing that the same is
prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in
it losing its legal personality altogether. Verily, Anglo-KMU v. Samahan Ng
Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa Sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills At J.P.
Coats enlightens:

A local labor union is a separate and distinct unit primarily designed to

secure and maintain an equality of bargaining power between the employer
and their employee-members. A local union does not owe its existence to
the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. The
mere act of affiliation does not divest the local union of its own personality,
neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently
of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency where the former
acts in representation of the latter. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

MR denied.

ATIENZA V BOARD
OF MEDICINE

10 MAR

G.R. No. 177407 | February 9, 2011 | J. Nachura

Facts:

1. Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson

went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
1995.

2. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred

to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several
diagnostic laboratory tests. She underwent kidney operation after
the tests revealed that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-
visualizing.

3. Private respondents husband Romeo Sioson then filed a

complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the
Board of Medicine for the removal of Edithas fully functional
right kidney, instead of the left, against the doctors who allegedly
participated in the kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega,
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.

4. After Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, Editha filed her

formal offer of documentary evidence, which consisted of certified
photocopies of X-Ray request forms where interpretation of the
ultrasound results were written, for the purpose of proving that
her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated.

5. Petitioner filed his comments/objections to Edithas formal

offer of exhibits, alleging that said exhibits are inadmissible
because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified
and authenticated, intended to establish matters which are
hearsay, and incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are
offered.

6. The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent

was admitted by the BOM. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
of the Order, which was denied on the ground that BOM should
first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its
probative value when it decides the case, and later on determine
whether the evidence is relevant or not.

7. Disagreeing with the BOM, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari

with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack
of merit. Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the exhibits are inadmissible in evidence

Held:
No. Petition denied. To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules
of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are
enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that, it is
the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent,
can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not
the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the
other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not it proves an issue.

Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas

exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his
medical license is misplaced in light of Section 20, Article I of the
Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure. As
pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits
did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at
any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two
kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the
time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131
of the Rules of Court on Disputable presumptions.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms

filed in connection with Edithas medical case, which contained
handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas
exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is
covered by mandatory judicial notice. These exhibits do not
constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas
kidneys because the position and removal may still be established
through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is

also inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

1. Best Evidence Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or

cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the

control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or

other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of

a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors
before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the
right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-
functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical
locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the
RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in
evidence.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of
the exhibits, is allowed, especially as one of the witnesses testified
that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the
exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x
to the new building and ultimately, the originals cannot be
produced.

GOMEZ VS. GOMEZ DIGEST NONE

PEOPLE V TURCO

G.R. No. 137757 | August 14, 2000 | J. Melo

Facts:

Accused-appellant Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was

charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea Tabada.
Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling
her from outside her house. She recognized appellant Turco
immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is her
second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall
her, Escelea opened the door. Turco, with the use of towel,
covered Esceleas face, placed his right hand on the latters neck
and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig
pen which was about 12 meters away from the victims house,
appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass, laid on top
of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and
succeeded in pursuing his evil design-by forcibly inserting his
penis inside Esceleas private part despite Esceleas resistance.
Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports
the incident to anybody.

For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she
was able to muster enough courage to tell her brother-in-law,
Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the victims
father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste
time and immediately asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical
examination and eventually file a complaint after the issuance of
the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and
Escelea were sweethearts.

The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.

In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof

was presented that the rape of the complainant actually happened
considering that although a medical certificate was presented, the
medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in
court to explain the same.

Issue:

W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape

W/N the appellants contention that the medical certificate may

not be considered is with merit

Held:
1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts finding of
credibility in the testimony and evidence presented by the victim,
and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of

medical certificate, while the certificate could be admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records
constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it
involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the
doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his
qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the distinction
between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not
excluded by the law or the rules or is competent. Since
admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and
competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law.
On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once
admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the
Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled
to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule
forbids its reception.

Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the

hearsay rule, hence admissible as evidence, it has very little
probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely
on the medical certificate. In fact, reliance was made on the
testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even without
medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that
a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of
rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer
does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction is proper. In
the instant case, the victims testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.

State of Missouri vs. William Arthur Bull

BARRETT, Commissioner.

A jury has found William Arthur Ball guilty of robbery in the

first degree; the jury also found prior felony convictions and,
therefore, a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment was
imposed. V.A.M.S. 560.120, 560.135, 556.280.

The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about
2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one
of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry
Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man spent ten or
fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also
talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the
taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter
man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in
the day, about 5:50, as John Krekeler was placing rings and
watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men
entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler
immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in
the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized the
taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray shirt
and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to
walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he
"drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both
men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his
back," directing him to the watch repair department and finally
into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn
around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being
dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two
men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door
slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and
rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from
the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and
three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the
trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup
men.

In his motion for a new trial one of the claims is that there was
no direct evidence of an injury or any evidence to show that
Krekeler was put "in fear of some immediate injury to his
person," one of the essential elements of robbery in the first
degree. V.A.M.S. 560.120. Krekeler did not affirmatively
testify that he was in fear but he could well apprehend injury if
he did not comply with their requests and in the circumstances
the jury could reasonably find "the fear" contemplated in the
statute. 77 C.J.S. Robbery 16, p. 459; State v. Thompson,
Mo., 299 S.W.2d 468, 474. The element of fear being a
reasonable inference from the evidence, the facts and
circumstances support and warrant the finding of robbery in the
first degree. State v. Eckenfels, Mo., 316 S.W.2d 532.

Another of the appellant's sufficiently preserved claims in his

motion for a new trial (V.A.M.S. 547.030; Supreme Court
Rule 27.20, V.A.M.R.) has to do with his arrest and the
testimony of the two arresting officers. On November 4, 1958,
about three weeks after the robbery, police officers in a squad
car saw Ball walking on Easton Avenue. The officers stopped
him, told him that they were officers and that he was under
arrest. As officer Powell faced and searched Ball officer Ballard
"holstered" his gun and attempted "to cuff" him. Ball shoved
Powell over and ran down Easton Avenue, the officers ran after
him, Powell being closest. Powell yelled, "Halt Ball, you're
under arrest," and fired one shot high in the air but Ball
continued running and Powell fired four more shots, two at his
legs, one at his buttocks, and he finally fell from a bullet in his
back. It is claimed that this evidence was not material or
relevant, that it was too remote from the date of the robbery to
indicate a consciousness of guilt and since it was of course
prejudicial that he is entitled to a new trial. But unexplained
flight and resisting arrest even thirty days after the supposed
commission of a crime is a relevant circumstance (State v.
Duncan, 336 Mo. 600, 611, 80 S.W.2d 147, 153), the remoteness
of the flight goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its
admissibility. 20 Am.Jur., Sec. 293, p. 274.

When Ball was finally subdued and arrested the officers took
from his person and impounded a brown felt hat, "a brownish"
windbreaker type jacket, trousers, gray shirt and shoes these
were exhibits one and two, Ball admitted that they belonged to
him although his evidence tended to show that he had purchased
the jacket after October 15. In identifying Ball, in addition to the
scar on his face, Krekeler was impressed with the remembered
the brown ensemble, particularly the "tall brown hat." These
items were of course relevant and admissible in evidence and
there is no objection to them. State v. Johnson, Mo., 286 S.W.2d
787, 792. The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a
new trial that a police officer was permitted to testify that
$258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his
person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was
"immaterial and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove
any of the issues involved in this case; that said money as seized
at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Mr. Krekeler
nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly
stolen from the A. L. Krekeler Sons Jewelry Company on the
15th day of October, 1958; that said evidence was considered by
this jury to the prejudice of this defendant convincingly."

The circumstances in which this evidence was introduced were

these: After the clothes were identified and introduced as
exhibits one and two the prosecuting attorney inquired of officer
Powell, "Did you also seize his personal effects?" Defense
counsel immediately objected to any testimony relating to
personal effects found on the defendant "at the time." The court
overruled the objection and state's counsel inquired, "Well
Officer, what personal effects were seized?" Defense counsel,
evidently knowing and anticipating, objected "to any testimony
relevant (sic) to any personal effects seized upon this Defendant
at the time he was arrested by reason of the fact it is immaterial
and irrelevant and tends to neither prove nor disprove any facts
involved and ask that the jury be discharged and a mistrial be
declared." The court overruled the objection and the officer said,
"Ball's personal effects consisted of two hundred and fifty eight
dollars and two cents in cash, with the denominations of the
bill(s), two one hundred dollar bills, a twenty two twenties, a
ten, a five, three ones and two pennies. He had a ladies ring and
a man's wrist-watch. He had a crusifixionalong with a small pen
knife and a black leather wallet. Maybe one or two other
personal articles." All of these items were then marked as
exhibits, from three to nine, offered in evidence and described
by the officer, exhibit three being the bills and pennies
comprising the $258.02. According to the officer Mr. Krekeler
was unable to identify any of these articles or the money as
having come from the jewelry store robbery and there is no
objection in the motion to any of the items other than the money
and some of them were obviously not prejudicial, for example
the keys, a small penknife and wallet.
Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d
356, the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in proof of
the substantive fact of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll
of dimes wrapped in a roll of green paper was found on the
defendant the same day of the burglary and while the fact was a
circumstances admissible in evidence it was held to not
constitute substantive evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis
of the defendant's innocence of burglary. In State v. Gerberding,
Mo., 272 S.W.2d 230, there was no timely or proper objection to
the proof but $4,000 was taken in a robbery and the appellant
had $920 in currency in his topcoat pocket when captured the
day of the robbery. The proof of the money here was evidently
on the theory that Ball did not have or was not likely to have
such a sum of money on his person prior to the commission of
the offense. 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sec. 204, p. 410. As
to this the facts were that he had been out of the penitentiary
about eight months and the inference the state would draw is
that he had no visible means of support and no employment and
could not possibly have $258.02 except from robberies. Of
course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had
worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment
house and that he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games
at a named place. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the
money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from
the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in
evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge here was that
Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21
and $140 in cash from the cash register. There was no proof as
to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was
simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there
was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the
$258.02 (annotation 123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these
circumstances "The mere possession of a quantity of money is in
itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money
charged as taken, because in general all money of the same
denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the
money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and
extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 154,
p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the
record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his
arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and
in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before
the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v. Garrett, 285 Mo.
279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact relevant and in
the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend
to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial the jury
may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. State v.
Bray, Mo. App., 278 S.W.2d 49; People v. Orloff, 65 Cal.App.2d
614, 620-621, 151 P.2d 288; annotation 123 A.L.R.loc. cit. 132-
134 and compare the facts and circumstances in State v. Garrett,
supra. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of
this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason
the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
LOPES VS. HEESEN DIGEST NONE
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON
G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002

FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act
No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act). The antecedent facts of his conviction are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger
ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m. on March
13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer,
Diesmo, received a complaint from passenger Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy
suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit. Diesmo and four (4)
other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect
whom they later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the
accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was
invited to go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by 2 security agents back to the economy
section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back
to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused opened the suitcase, revealing
a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting
the substance to be shabu, the security personnel immediately reported the matter to
the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents.
They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.

But the accused countered this by saying that the Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu was forcibly opened and searched without
his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him.
ISSUE: WON the conviction was valid

HELD: YES

The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. Evidence acquired in violation of this right shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding. Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may
choose between invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving
consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is
against transgression committed by the government or its agent. The constitutional
proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that they
called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase
and the contraband items was therefore carried out without government intervention,
and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does
not apply.

There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental function.
NOTE: In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated
drug;
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him. To

overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex Macapudi as the
owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support his claim. No witnesses
were presented to prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person
named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused. Surely, if he does
exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and
support the claim of the accused. Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if,
as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories
can easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this
Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent
to possess the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ANDRE MARTI

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:

August 14, 1957, the appellant and his common-law wife, Sherly
Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders carrying Four (4) wrapped packages. The appellant
informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend
in Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes asked if she could examine
and inspect the packages. She refused and assures her that the
packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves.

Before the delivery of appellants box to the Bureau of Customs

and Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (Proprietor), following the
standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final
inspection. A peculiar odor emitted from the box and that the
gloves contain dried leaves. He prepared a letter and reported to
the NBI and requesting a laboratory examinations. The dried
marijuana leaves were found to have contained inside the
cellophane wrappers.

The accused appellant assigns the following errors: The lower

court erred in admitting in evidence the illegality of search and
seized objects contained in the four (4) parcels.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the seizing of illegal objects is legal?

HELD:

Yes, appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

RATIONALE:

Article III, Sections 2 and 3, 1987 Constitution

Mapp vs Ohio, exclusionary rule

Stonehill vs Diokno, declared as inadmissible any evidence

obtained by virtue of a defective search warrant, abandoning in
the process the ruling earlier adopted in Mercado vs Peoples
Court.

The case at the bar assumes a peculiar character since the

evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and
obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and
without the intervention and participation of state authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused / appellant validly claim
that his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

The contraband in this case at bar having come into possession of

the government without the latter transgressing appellants rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason whty the same should not be admitted.

FACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS Readily foreclose the

proportion that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and
seizure of the prohibited merchandise, clearly that the NBI agents
made no search and seizure much less an illegal one, contrary to
the postulate of accused / appellant.

CHADWICK vs STATE, having observed that which is open,

where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof

BILL OF RIGHTS

The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of

constitutional democracy, protection against whom, protection
against the STATE.

People vs Maqueda
Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his
house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly
battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers
of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and
Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two
accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning,
when the two accused asked them for directions.

Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to

Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he
narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he
informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such
document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While
he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated
therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the
above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the
accused in this case."

Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to

Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.

Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the
Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear

violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not
informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the
confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer
had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse
to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by
such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already
been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.

The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such
rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of
arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1)
of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a
person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense."

Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial

admission is inadmissible as evidence.

As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean

Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the
tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission
because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily
and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an
investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state
witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private
person therefore admissible.

Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by

the SC:
Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the

offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be
given in evidence against him.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin

Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which
ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from
private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.

On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence;

Held:

(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses

by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Waterous Drug Corporation vs NLRC

G.R. No. 113271. October 16, 1997

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug

Corp.

YSP Inc., a supplier of medicine, sold to Waterous, thru Catolico, 10 bottles of

Voren Tablets at P384 per unit. However, previews P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc.
showed that the price per bottle is P320.00. Verification was made to YSP, Inc.
to determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was
indeed overpriced.
YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the
difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per
sales invoice, which was paid to Ms. Catolico. Said check was sent in an
envelope addressed to Catolico.

Catolico denied receiving the same. However, Saldana, the clerk of Waterous
Drug Corp. confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check amounting
P640 payable to Catolico.

Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of

dishonesty.

NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of respondents (check from YSP)

being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by
complainants.

Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity
of ones person from interference by government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence

Held: Yes.

Ratio: (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights does not protect
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
individuals.

It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an
invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC
ruled that there was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico
from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the
Labor Code for the termination of Employment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALFREDO BON

G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006

FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to 23
February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against
Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, the daughters of
his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to
have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. Both AAA and
BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the man who had
raped them.

The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further considered the
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of the victims and
appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third degree.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908
to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. The proximate
concern as to the appellant is whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which
under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape,
should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?

HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.

Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that the penalty
to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by
two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted rape is
the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been
under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower
than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than
death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.

Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted
rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346
had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem
concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within
reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the
elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced
to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty
with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be
sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.

The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by

reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would,
under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death,
or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of
reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to
death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear
and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and
attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees
lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum
term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prison mayor.

People v Ulysses Garcia Digest None

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VICTOR DIAZ VINECARIO, et al. 420
SCRA 280 (2004)

On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were manning a
checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2735, otherwise
known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men on board namely
appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble) Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped
past of the police officers. When they were ordered to return to the checkpoint, a police
officer asked what the backpack contains which the appellants answered that it was only
a mat. The police officers suspected that it was a bomb and when appellant opened the
bag it turns out that its contents were marijuana. The three were then brought to the
police station and later to Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police
officials without the assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some
documents which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered
them guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article
IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search upon the appellants and the seizure of the alleged 1,700
grams of marijuana violated there constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

HELD:

Although the general rule is that motorists and their vehicles as well as pedestrians
passing through checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine inspection, vehicles may
be stopped and extensively searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law offender
or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offense. Warrantless
search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by the Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
attempted to flee. In light then of Vinecario et al.s speeding away after noticing the
checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, their suspicious
and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents of the backpack which they
passed to one another, and the reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-
appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine
Army, apparently in an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their
inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the
law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law or that the contents of the
backpack were instruments of some offense.

People v Eric Guillermo Case Digest None

People v Lita Ayangao Case Digest None

People v Laguio Case Digest None

People v Gallarde Case Digest None

VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920]

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial
judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to
test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical
examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation
of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the
petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the
constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is
that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.