Primary Affects

Perceptrial and Motor Skills, 1964, 18, 119-158.
@ Southern Universities Press 1964

Monograph Supplement 1-V18
WHAT AND WHERE ARE THE PRIMARY AFFECTS?

SOME EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY'
SJLVAN S. TOMKINS AND ROBERT MC CARTER

Princeto??Universiry Philadelphia Psychiatric Hospital
Sumnrary.-A set of 69 facial photographs of models simulating affective

neutrality and the eight primary affects of interest, enjoyment, surprise, distress,
fear, shame, contempt, and anger were presented to a group of 24 firemen whose
task it was to identify the affect in the photograph. The hypotheses, tested and
confirmed were that ( a ) all Ss would identify primary affects in the phoro-
graphs with above chance accuracy, ( b ) groups of Ss would confuse some
affects with others in a systematic fashion, and ( c ) some Ss would show i n d i -
vidual biases in their judgments.
CONTENTS
Introduction .. 119
Method .- 12 1
Correct Recognition of Affects: Findings Relevant to the F~rstHypothesis 122
Common Confusions: Findings Relevant to the Second Hypothesis 128
Correlations Among Judgments .. 134
Confusions ..................... ... 135
Common Confusions Among All Affects -- ....... 143
Affect Sensitivity Contours: Find~ngsRelevant to the Third Hypothesis 150
General Summary .. . .........
. 158
References 159
INTRODUCTION
W e have argued (Tomkins, 1962) that affective responses are the primary
motives of human beings. W e have further ass~unedchat affects are primarily
facial behaviors and secondarily oucer skeleral and inner visceral behavior. W h e n
we become aware of these facial responses (with or without concurrent visceral
responses), we are aware of our affeccs. Later, w e learn ro generare from
memory, images of these same responses which we can become aware of as
affect, with or without repetition of facial, skeletal, or visceral responses. O n
rhe other hand, we have also assumed char one may respond with facial affective
responses without necessarily becoming aware of the feedback from these re-
sponses. I n short, alchough the awareness o f the feedback of the facial response
is the experience of affect, the same experience may lacer be retrieved from
memory, thus bypassing the necessity for a facial response, or the feedback of the
facial response may remain unconscious and not be transformed inro a con-
scious message.
'This research was supported by Grant MH 04685 from the National Institute of Mental
Health, United States Public Health Service.
S. S. TOMKINS 8r R. MC CARTER
Most contemporary investigators have assumed, after the James-Lange

theory, that the inner bodily responses are the chief site of che emotions. Im-
portant as these undoubtedly are, we regard them as of secondary importance
to the expression of emotion through the face. W e regard the relationship be-
tween the face and the viscera as analogous to that between the fingers, forearm,
~ ~ p p arm,
e r shoulders, and body. The finger does not "express" what is in the
forearm, or shoulder, or trunk. I t rather leads than follows the movements in
these organs to which i t is an extension. Just as the fingers respond more
rapidly, with both more precision and complexity chan the grosser and slower
moving arm to which they are attached, so the face expresses affect, both to
others and to the self via feedback, which is more rapid and more complex
chan any srimulation of which the slower moving visceral organs are capable.
There is, further, a division of labor between the face and the inner organs of
affective expression similar to chat between the fingers and the arm. It is the
very gross and slower moving characteristic of the inner organ system which
provides the counterpoint for the melody expressed by che facial solo.
T h e evolution of the human face has moved in the direction of increasing
expressiveness through greater visibility of the facial musculature and of in-
creasing differentiation boch of the musculature and of the patterns of neural
innervation. Thus, i t seems to have been evolved in part as an organ for the
maximal transmission of information, to rhe self and to others, and the in-
formation it transmits is largely concerned with affects. This is true both for
our own face and for the faces of other human beings.
W e have distinguished the following primary affects and the facial re-
sponses, the feedback of which when transformed into conscious form, produces
the experience of affect. Each affect is named at both moderate and high in-
tensity. Thus Interest at high intensity we have called Excitement.
I . INTEREST-EXCITEMENT:
eyebrows down, eyes track, look, listen
2. ENJOYMENT-JOY:
smile, lips widened u p and out, smiling eyes (circular wrinkles)
3. SURPRISE-STARTLE:
eyebrows up, eyes blink
4. DISTRESS-ANGUISH:
cry, arched eyebrows, mouth down, tears, rhythmic sobbing
5. FEAR-TERROR:
eyes frozen open, pale, cold, sweaty, facial trembling, with hair erect
6. SHAME-HUMILIATION: eyes down, head down
7. CONTEMPT-DISGUST:sneer, upper lip u p
8. ANGER-RAGE:frown, clenched jaw, eyes narrowed, red face
These facial affective responses we assume are controlled by innate affect

programs which are inherited as a sub-cortical scrucrure which can inscruct and
concrol a variety of muscles and glands to respond with unique patterns of rate
and duration of activity characteristic of a given affect. These innate responses
are later transformed in various ways through learning, but there is always a
continuing openness to activation of the innate pattern of responses.
PRIMARY AFFECTS: EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY 12 1
Because we have identified the face as the primary site of affect and be-
cause we have assumed that each of the primary affeccs is controlled by an in-
nate "program" which has been inherited, the ability of human beings to recog-
nize these facial responses assumes a more critical theoretical significance than
heretofore. The use of posed affeccs for this purpose is not ideal, but it does
afford one basis for an initial test of this theory. Other types of tests, employ-
ing high-speed moving-picture photography, are in process.
W e do not expecc that the correlation between che facial responses as
posed in still photographs, and the judgment of affecc will be ~erfecc,for a
variety of reasons which we will consider later. W e do expect, however, and
our theory requires, some accuracy and consensus in the judgment of affects
when relatively untrained observers are asked to judge affeccs from posed
photographs.
This investigntion explored the degree of consensus between the judgments
of untrained observers, and our own assumptions concerning the primary affeccs.
W e used child and adult lnodels of both sexes to sirnillate each of the primary
affects according to our assumptions of the facial responses involved and then
asked naive observers co judge each phoco and to check whether ic was a
neutral expression or which one of eight primary affects it best represented.
Three general hypotheses were formulated with respect to our Ss' pec-
formance: ( 1 ) Ss will recognize the primary affects in the photos as posed.
( 2 ) Ss will systematically confuse some of the primary affects with others. ( 3 )
Ss will show individual biases in their judgments of the primary affects.
Test stimuli were a set of 69 photos of facial expressions posed to exemplify

either a neutral feeling or one of the eight primary affects.' There were seven
photos each of interest, surprise, distress, fear, and anger; eight photos each of
neutrality, enjoyment, concernpt, and shame; and nine of distress. The in-
vestigators believed that each of these photos was at least a satisfactory example
of affeccive neutrality or of one of the primary affeccs, and they selected the
best three of each affecc as a subset. Then all 69 photos were mounted on
Ti-in. X 5-in. index cards, which were numbered in random order from 1 to 69.
Answer booklets were supplied. Each booklet had 69 rows, corresponding
to the number of stimuli, and nine columns, corresponding co the number of
posed expressions. At the head of each column was a brief list of alrernative
words referring to each affect. The nine columns and their respective affect
lists were as follows:
' W e are indebted ro the Hoban-Gallob studio of Philadelphia for photography.

S. S. TOMKINS & R. MC CARTER
1 2 3
Neutral Inreresrecl Surprised
Casual Excited Startled
Emotionless Attentive Amazed
Without Feeling Alert Seeing the
Unexpected
4 5 G
Disrressed Joyful Afraid
Sad Happy Frightened
Lonely Smiling Panicky
Pained Pleased Terrified
Delighted
8 9
Angry Disgusted Ashamed
Mad Loathing Guilty
Furious Scornful Shy
Aggressive Mocking Discouraged
Hostile Full of Contempt Feelir~g lnferior
Ss, selected because they colnprised a readily available, comparatively

homogeneous, experimentally naive group of approximately average intelligence
and education, were 24 whice, urban firemen, whose ages ranged from 26 to 63.
Participation in the experiment was voluntary, and each S was paid for raking
part.
Ss were examined in five groups of four co six individuals. They were

seated around a large conference table. The phocos were placed face down nc
one end of the table. N o time limits were imposed. Ss were instructed to smdy
each photo individually, to judge which of che nine affect categories it was
intended co represent, to indicace their judgments in their answer booklecs, and
then to pass the photo to the next S without comment. These instructions,
which were intended co keep the order of stimuli constant and to minimize
collusion and judgmental dependence, were carefully followed.
CORRECT OF AFFECTS: FINDINGSRELEVANT TO
RECOGNITION THE
FIRSTHYPOTHES~S
Restclz~
Every photograph received two scores for each affect. One of these was
a criterion score and had co be either unity or zero. It was unity if, and only
if, the affect in question was the one which the model had cried to express; other-
wise ic was zero. The other score, a judgmental score, was simply the number
of Ss who classified the photo in chat same affect category. This score was
PRIMARY AFFECTS: EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY
TABLE 1
Affect r Zr
Neutrality
Interest
Surprise
Distress
Enjoyment
Fear
Anger
Disgust
Shame
an integer with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 24. These nine pairs
of affect scores were correlated over all 69 stimuli, and a column of point bi-
serial correlation coefficients was generated. Table 1 shows the magnitude of
these coefficients. They range from .631 for surprise to .988 for enjoyment and
average ,858 for all nine affect categories.
T h e number of correct judgments made to each photo was statistically sig-
nificant. Every photograph was classified correctly by at least 6 of the 24
Ss. T h e probability that six or more judgments would be correct is .033 for a
one-tailed binomial test.
Fig. 1 is a graph i n which the ordinate is the per cent of correctly judged
photographs and the abscissa is the per cent of Ss who recognized the posed
affect. From this w e see that a t least 25% of our Ss always agreed with our
criterion and 85% of our Ss agreed with our criterion on 11.6% of the photo-
graphs.
T h e average correlation of .858 between the intended affect, as we in-

strucred the models to pose it, and the judgments of untrained observers reveals
a substantial consensus between these judges and our assumptions concerning
the nature of the primary affects. I t should be noted, however, that such a
consensus depends upon that partial instruction which is given in the nine
caregories of judgment. N o t only d o these provide the same guidance to all
Ss and therefore heighten the degree of consensus, but each affect is described
by more than one word so that different Ss may check the same affect for
slightly differenc reasons. Further, preliminary studies on other Ss who were
asked to respond freely, without benefit of such guidance, achieved much less
S. S. TOMKINS a R. MC CARTER
to-
60 -
50 -
PERCENT OF SUBJECTS
FIG. 1 . Cumulative percentage of correct recognitions of posed affects
consensus, the exact degree depending on how gross or refined was the coding
scheme which w e employed in the grouping of their free responses. T h e de-
pendency of the degree of agreement among judges on the specific category
width of the coding employed is itself a reliable phenomenon, having been
reported again and again, not only in studies on the judgment of emotion from
facial photographs, but also in studies on aesthetic judgments.
Let us now consider how it is possible for such consensus to be attained
and why such consensus is never unanimous.
Such a consensus is possible because of the great familiarity of h u ~ n a n s
with the human face. So great is our familiarity with the human face and so
important is this information that its "constancy" is maintained despite the
most extreme stimulus variations, as Ittelson and Slack (1958) and Engel
( 1956) have shown.
Because of the affective responsiveness of human beings to the faces of
others, because of the importance of the information communicated by the
human face and because of the years of experience in interaction with human
PRIMARY AFFECTS: WIDENCE FOR A THEORY 125
faces, the individual is constantly challenged to organize this information in

Inore skillful and efficient ways so that eventually h e is capable of interpreting
a n extraordinary amount of information from momentary, slight facial responses.
He learns the language of the face.
T h e skill in interpreting the facial expression of others is aided or hindered
by an isomorphism between the visual face of the other and the interoceptive
face of the self. Although the feedback from our own face is in non-visual
modalities, we learn the rules of translation between whac the face looks like
to what it feels like and from both of these to the motor language, so that
eventually we are capable of imitating either whac a face looks like or what it
feels like.
These rules of translation are for the most part not explicitly formulated,
but they are learned either involuntarily as when one smiles to a smile of the
other, yawns to a yawn, becomes angry to anger, frightened to fear, saddened
by the grief of the other, or, in a voluntary way, as when one self-consciously
imitates a facial expression or dissimulates.
These rules of translation between the motor, visual, and kinaesthetic
languages are analogous to the way in which we learn to write as we listen
to a lecture or read a book, or as a mute person learns to speak with his fingers.
Let us now examine the reasons why such consensus fails to achieve unani-
mity.
First is the inadequacy of the stimulus itself. The picture as posed fails in
varying ways to represent the affective response as we describe it to the model.
First, the skill of the model is rarely such that he can translate perfectly what he
is asked to do. Thus he may smile with his mouth but fail to produce the
"smiling" eyes which characteristically accompany the smile of the mouth in
the innately activated smile. Also, for each model, particular affects are in-
hibited so that, for example, our children aged 6 and 7 denied they ever felt
angry and found it all but impossible to mimic our angry expression. Some
adults cannot sneer. Others cannot look ashamed. Further, each face has a
predominanc expression which shines through and concaminaces the attempt to
pose an affect which is underdeveloped relative to the major affect in each
model. Thus a predominantly hostile model does not have a completely warm
smile. A predominantly friendly model does not have a completely pure sneer
of contempt. His mouth's readiness to smile contaminates the pose of disgust.
I t should be possible in the future to obtain more convincing poses if we re-
strict ourselves to that single affect which is the predominanc affect for each per-
son, which is held in a state of readiness on the face at all times, and ask each
model to pose only this his major affect.
N o t only is i t difficult ro guarantee an accurate pose of each affect in a
photograph, but even if it were possible this method has inherent limitations.
126 S. S. TOMKINS & R. MC CARTER
The facial affective response is a set of responses over time. The smile is a
set of widening mouchs. The eye blink in surprise or scarcle is a set of narrow-
ing of the eyelids. The sneer of contempt is a set of liftings of the upper lip.
The cry is a set of rhythmic sobs. The look of shame is a set of eyelid and
head lowerings. The photograph congeals this motion into a still which is
never entirely adequate as a recognizable affeccive response.
Indeed not even a set of moving pictures is always an adequace stimulus for
che recognicion of affect.
The research of Landis and Hunt (1939), employing a moving picture
camera with speeds up to 3000 frames per second, has made it clear that the
speed of response of facial muscles is such that some responses, such as partial
eyelid closures, are too fast to be seen by the naked eye, and that the patterning
of both facial and gross bodily movements is so complex that one must resort
to repeated exposure of the same moving pictures if one is to extract the infor-
mation which is emitced by human beings responding with affect in changes
of facial and bodily movement.
Even if the individual were confronted wich an accurate affect stimulus,
e.g., by a moving picture or by a person responding with real "live" affect, there
would still remain several impediments to unanimous consensus among judges.
First, is the problem of semancic confusion. The relationship between
che primary affects and the words for these is problematic. The relationship be-
tween an affect and its name may be quite variable and somewhat ambiguous,
depending on the circumstances surrounding the learning of the name. Thus, if
a child is angry and shouts rebelliously, "No! No!" i t is an unusual parent who
takes this as an opportunity to teach the child to recognize his own feelings
with a statement "I know you're angry because I'm busy and can't play with
you." More frequently this is an occasion for a variecy of other kinds of in-
terpretation and action. The child's anger may be che occasion of an incerpreta-
tion of his character so that he is taught that the complex of anger and loud
shouting is a sign of a moral defecc. Many years later if he has not learned
otherwise he will be likely to respond co similar displays whether from himself
or other adults or his own children as signs of "badness" and "lack of consider-
ation." If these words have been taught and more specific affect names have
not been taught, it is altogether possible for a human being never to attain a
working knowledge of the correct names for the specific affects wich which he
and others respond.
The visibility and identifiability of the affect system is reduced not only
because there is no standardized semantic inscruccion for such learning, but also
because of the nature of the responses themselves and the difficulties of assigning
names correctly. This is because the affects are innately relatively variable, i.e.,
a person may be angry briefly, or for a few minutes, or constantly. A person
PRIMARY AFFECTS: EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY 127
may be mildly irritable or very angry. There is also some genetic variability in
affective responses, as in all biological endowments. These however are slight
compared with variations due to learning. T h e innate affective response itself
is usually so transformed that by the time the human being attains adulthood
there are many different learned ways of responding facially with fear, anger, or
distress.
Finally, there are learned combinations of affects which are a further source
of the reduced visibility of affects in general, and of the primary affects in par-
ticular. These combinations may produce resultants which correspond to no
simple affect, and for which there may or may not be 3 name in the common
language.
Formal lang~lagesof communication may block or decelerate the skill in
learning the facial language of affect in still another way. The messages in the
formal language of communication are sufficiently complex and urgent to
reduce the visibility of the face in interpersonal interaction. A n extreme instance
would be the case of a ~notoristasking directions from a stranger on how to
reach his destination. T h e spoken words under such conditions are figural,
and the face which utters them mzy barely be seen, forming the vague diffuse
ground together wich trees and billboards along the highway. T o the extent to
which formal messages are salient in interpersonal communicacion, awareness of
facial affect may become secondary, and skill in interpretation may be un-
developed. The more factual or theoretical and the less personal messages
between individuals become, the less likely facial affects are to be interpreted
if cornmunicaced.
Despite the high level of skill ordinarily attained in the perception and in-
terpretation of affect in facial expression, i t is nonetheless a somewhat culmre-
bound skill. The individual who moves from one class to another or one society
to another is faced wich the challenge of learning new "dialects" of fncial lan-
guage to supplement his knowledge of the more universal grammar of emotion.
Ordinarily our skill in perceiving and interpreting the facial expressions of
others is accelerated by the isomorphism of the visual face of the other and the
interoceptive face of the self, achieved through rules of translation. However,
this skill may be decelerated and grossly impaired j~lst by virtue of this iso-
morphism. If parents unduly punish the facial expression of affect or any
particular facial affect, then this source of information may be lost to the in-
dividual as a g ~ l i d eto the perception of the same expression in ochers. O r he
may be sensitized to its expression in others but defend himself against this per-
ception in others as he has been forced to defend himself against the affect in
himself. Thus, he may avoid looking at a face which is in anger or in excite-
ment, or he may avoid friendship or contact with individuals wich vivacious
fncial expressiveness.
The effect of this isomorphism is also reciprocal. Just as the interpretation

of facial expressiveness of the other may be impaired by impairment of one's
facial expression, s o the latter may also be impaired by parents and other models
whose facial expressiveness has itself been inhibited, or who provide insufficient
facial interaction. W e have observed numerous instances of unusual woodenness
and stolidicy of facial expression in children whose parents are also stolid and
relatively immobile in facial expression. In these cases rhere is ordinarily a
convergence of factors which produces the social inheritance of facial im-
mobiliry. In addition to providing a model of stolidity, there is the absence of
affective stimulation, negative sanctions for what is regarded as roo excessive emo-
tional display, and frequently a gross reduction in interpersonal communication.
I n general, then, rhere tends to be a circular reinforcement between parents
and their children which accelerates the skill in interpreting both one's own and
the other's facial expressiveness, or which decelerates or blocks the acquisition of
this skill. In any event, the skills of receiving and sending are intimately inter-
dependent because the face one sees is not so different from the face one lives
behind. I t is easier to learn to read a language and not write it or speak it
than to learn to read the affect language of the face witho~ltlearning to send
the same messages from one's own face and w i r h o ~ ~learning
r to receive and in-
terprec the feedback from one's own facial responses.
COMMONCONFUSIONS:
FINDINGS TO THE SECOND HYPOTHESIS
RELEVANT
Results
For each of the eight primary affects and for neutrality, those three photos
which the investigators had regarded as the best ones obtained the highest
number of correct judgments and were seldom misclassified. Because we
had presumed before the collection of the data that these 27 stimuli were the
most adequate ones, responses to t h a n were analyzed apart from responses to
the other stimuli.
Figs. 2 , 3, and 4 are histograms showing how those 27 photos were classi-
fied by the 2 4 Ss. Table 2 summarizes the data shown in Figs. 2, 3, and 4, the
distribution of responses to the three best photos of each affect.
T h e classification patterns of the three best photos of any affect were
markedly similar. T h e magnitude of their similarity is shown by the coefficients
of concordance presented in Table 3. These nine coefficients have been cor-
rected for continuity and are statistically significant.
In Table 4 w e have presenred the affects which are most commonly con-
fused with each other ( a t the 5 % level of confidence).
I n Fig. 5 we have presented the per cent of responses for each posed
affect which are incorrectly recognized as some other affect compared with the
per cent of responses in which other affects are identified as this affect.
PRIMARY AFFECTS EVIDENCE FOR A THEORY
BEST OSECOWD
BEST 0 THIRD BEST
FIG. 2. Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing enjoyment ( t o p ) ,

interest (center) , and surprise (bottom )
S. S. TOMKINS & R. MC CARTER
UBEST 0SECOND BEST [=I THIRD BEST
100
80
B
7.
'" 6 0
K
Y
C 40 .
0
Y
a.
Y
20
0 - n
ENJDTYENT INTEREST SURPRISE FEAR bNGfR DSGUST SWME DISrRfSS N C U T R U I T I
FIG. 3 . Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing fear ( t o p ) ,

anger (center), and disgust (bottom)
F I G 4. Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing shame ( t o p ) ,

distress (center), and neutrality (bottom)
TABLE 2
PER CENT OF REPORTEDAFFECTSTO THREEBEST PHOTOS OF POSEDAFFECTS
Photo Reported Affect

Enjoy- Inter- Sur- Fear Anger Dis- Shame Dis- Neutral- Total
menc est prise gust cress ~ty
Posed Affect: Enjoyment

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Posed Affect: Interest
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Posed Affect: Surprise
4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Posed Affect: Fear
66.7 12.5 0.0 0.0
62.5 4.2 0.0 0.0
50.0 8.3 0.0 8.3
Posed Affect: Anger
4.2 70.9 16.7 0.0
0.0 62.5 16.7 4.2
0.0 62.5 29.2 0.0
Posed Affect: Disgust
0.0 4.2 79.2 0.0
0.0 8.3 79.2 0.0
0.0 4.2 75.0 8.3
Posed Affect: Shame
0.0 0.0 0.0 79.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 62.5
0.0 0.0 4.2 58.3
Posed Affect: Distress
4.2 0.0 4.2 4.2
0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7
12.2 0.0 8.3 8.3
Posed Affect: Neutrality
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2
TABLE 3
SIMILARITYOF CLASSIFICATION
PATERN OF THREE BEST PHOTOS EXPRESSING
PRIMARYAFFECTSAND NEUTRALITY
Affect Coefficient of P
Category Concordance
Enjoyment ,846 < .01
Interest 302 < .01
Surprise ,925 < .01
Fear .8 11 < .O1
Anger .677 < .05
Disgust ,602 < .05
Shame .721 < .O1
Distress .740 < .01
Neutrality -,943 < .O1
.'. 1V = .785
TABLE 4
AFFECTSMOST COMMONLY WITH EACHOTHER'
CONFUSED
Posed Affect Affects Commonly Confused
with the Posed Affect
Interest Neutrality; Surprise
Surprise Interest
Neutrality Interest
Fear Surprise
Anger Disgust
Shame Distress; Neutral
Distress Shame
'Significant at the 5% confidence level.
TABLE 5
CORRELATION
OP AFFECT RATINGS WITH POSEDAFFECTS
Affect r zr
Neutrality 338 1.213
Interest ,647 ,770
Surprise .G3 1 .743
Distress ,840 1.22 1
Enjoyment ,988 2.568
Fear ,833 1.199
Anger .834 1.201
Disgust .782 1.052
Shame ,922 1.604
5 = 11.571
- A4 = 1.286
.'. r = .858
S. S. TOMKINS &k R. MC CARTER
PERCENT O F
RESPONSES
INCORRECTLY
loE~TlFlE0
TO A POSE0
PHOTO OF
AFFECT
FIG. 5. Affects which are incorrectly recognized versus other affects which are
identified as rhese affects
In Table 5 w e have reproduced the correlations of affect ratings with

posed affects so that they can be compared with the coefficients of concordance.
TABLE 6
AFFECTS WHICHARE NEVERCONFUSED
WITH EACHOTHER
Posed a b c d e f g h I
Affects
a. Enjoyment X X X X X
b. Surprise X * X X X
c. Disgust X X X
d. Distress X X
e. Shame X X
f. Fear X X
g. Interest X
h. Anger X
i. Neutral
XZeroConfusions 5 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 0
*Zero confusions in either direction indicated by X .
In Table 6 we have presented the number of cases in which an affect is

never confused with another affect, the inverse of errors and confusions.
CORRELAT~ONS
AMONG JUDGMENTS
Discassio?~
T h e coefficients of concordance (Table 3) are measures of the extent to
which the group agrees with itself in its judgments of which affects are repre-
sented by each of the three best phocos of posed affects. There is no necessary
relationship between the extent of agreement between these judgments of a
group and the validity of the judgments (as measured by the correlation be-
tween their judgments and E's judgments of whac is represented in each
photo). Theoretically, it would be possible for che group to agree completely
among themselves and to disagree completely with the judgment of Es on what
affect is represented in each photo. Theoretically it would also be possible for
the group to agree s~tbscantiallywith Es and also to agree with each other on their
shared errors. Thus in Fig. 2 ( t o p ) , showing the distribution of responses to
three phocos expressing enjoyment, it would have been possible for almost all Ss
to have agreed with Es on enjoyment, but for a few to judge chat these three faces
expressed interest rather than enjoyment. In actual point of fact, those who did
not accurately judge these faces co express enjoyment distributed their judgments
over interest, discress, and neutrality. They encirely agreed among themselves,
however, that chese faces could not be judged to show surprise, fear, anger,
disgust, or shame.
If we compare Tables 3 and 5 , che rank-order correlacion between arrays is
- .01. This tells us thac che validity of judgmencs of affect ( r = .86) has no
systematic relacionship to the degree of similarity of che classifications of the
three best phocos for each affect. Both those affects which are judged well
and those affects which are judged poorly are equally likely to yield systemacic
errors or common confusions, racher than random errors. Thus enjoyment,
which is judged extremely accurately ( T = .78),also has a high coefficient
of concordance ( . 8 4 ) , and at the same cime shame, which is also judged very
accurately ( T = .92), has a relatively low coefficient of concordance ( . 7 2 ) .
Again, surprise which is the most poorly judged affect ( r = .63) has a very
high coefficient of concordance (.92). The magnitude and direction of syste-
matic errors, whac we are calling common confusions, is chen independent of
how well or how poorly the affecc is judged. The group may agree on the
judgment of a particular affect for three phocos of chat affecc, whether or not
chey are "righc" in their judgments.
The coefficients of concordance are substantial, ranging from .94 co .60.
The average coefficient of concordance is .78, which compares favorably with
the average validicy coefficienc of 3 6 .
CONFUSIONS
These two correlacions taken together cell us thac naive individuals cara
judge posed photos of affect accurately and that, even when they are inac-
curate, they are ofcen in substantial syscematic agreement in their errors. These
systemacic, shared errors we have labeled "common confusions." W e call
them "confusions" to distinguish them from random errors. W e call [hem
136 S. S. TOMKINS s R. MC CARTER
"common" to indicate thac these systematic deviations are shared, rather than
idiosyncratic.
Statistically we have defined them as any sets of errors in judgments about
affects which a group shares, which appear with a frequency a t the 5 % con-
fidence level of a two-tailed binomial distribution. These common confusions
are represented in Table 4. There are a number of what appear to b e pos-
sible common confusions which d o not attain statistical significance. Some of
these may attain such significance wich a larger sample. The problem of speci-
fying common confusions is complicated not only by the relatively small number
of Ss in our study, but also by the high accuracy of judgment of certain affects.
Thus, enjoyment is identified so accurately by almost the entire group of Ss in
our study, thac error, random or systematic, is very slight. Nonetheless, there
is a restriction of the range of errors to neutrality, interest, and distress, wich
zero incorrect judgments for the remaining five affects. Among the three pos-
sible types of error (see Fig. 2, top) neutrality is the most likely one. Despite
a very low probability of confusion of enjoyment with neutrality, it is almost
a "common confusion" by the statistical criterion we have used. Although it
is not a very frequent error, it may yet prove to be a reliable and systematic
error, which is the main error to be predicted if any are made. Common con-
fusions in such cases then turn out to be relatively infrequent and yet a group
phenomenon rather than an idiosyncratic sensitivity of a few members of
every group tested. A n alternative interpretation of such a phenomenon
(should it prove to b e reliable) would be thac in every group tested there
would b e a few members whose special sensitivities in expecting thac faces
will be neutral and have no affect, will produce a systematic error in the in-
terpretation of enjoyment, but that those members of the group who tended
to expect to see disgusted faces would distort angry faces, but not smiling
faces. I n this case the group's common confusions, which involved only a small
number of shared errors, would permit the appearance of some few idiosyncratic
sensitivities which happen to be shared, but exclude as possible errors other
shared idiosyncratic sensitivicies too discrepant from the posed affect.
Let us now examine our theoretical foundations for the prediction of com-
tnoli confusions.
Fine differe?zces betzueerz affects.-According to our theory (Tomkins,
1962), we should first of all expect that gross differences between affects
shouId be discriminated better than fine differences, since discriminations be-
tween affects must in general be learned, and learning involves the possibility of
errors and differences in attained skills. As a special case we should expect
that positive affects should be more readily discriminated from negative affects,
and conversely, that specific positive affects should be discriminated from
each other and specific negative affects should b e discriminated from each
other. This is because of the fundamental and gross difference in the indi-
vidual's own experience of positive and negative affeccs. This gross dis-
crimination supports the quicker learning of the translation of the analogous
visually perceived facial responses of the other into their felt equivalents from
the non-visual feedback of one's own facial responses.
Similarity between affects.-Second, any similarity becween affects should
increase the probability of confusion of one with the other. W e have distin-
g ~ ~ i s h efive
d types of such similarity.
First is the similarity of the neural firings which innately trigger each
affect. Thus surprise, fear, and interest, according to our theory are similar in
each being innately activated by any increasing gradients of neural firing over
time. Surprise we think requires the steepest gradient, fear less steep, and
incerest the least steep of the three gradients. In contrast, we assume char
distress and anger are innately activated by levels of neural firing rather than
gradients of neural firing. These levels of neural firing are assumed to exceed
an optimal level of firing in the case of distress by a given amount, and in the
case of anger to exceed an optimal level by a still greater deviation. Enjoyment
is innately triggered by any decreasing gradient of neural stimulation. O n the
basis of such similarities w e should expect confusions to occur between the af-
fects of surprise, fear, and interest, becween the affects of distress and anger, and
that of enjoyment should be least confused with other affects. The affeccs of
shame and disgust are not included in this theory of the general neural con-
ditions of their activation, since we believe disgust is innately triggered by
noxious foods and odors, being yet an auxiliary defense mechanism associated
with thirst, hunger, and the need for air. Shame we presume to be innately
triggered only by the incomplete reduction of the positive affects, interest or
enjoyment, rather than by the reduction of any neural stimulation.
T h e second type of similariry between affects which is innately determined
is the similariry between the stimulus conditions which may activate each af-
fect. This is a derivative of our theory of the neural conditions for innate
activation. Thus, if a very steep gradient of neural stimulation will activate the
startle or surprise response, then so too will many stimuli which produce such
neural stimulation. Thus a piscol shot, with its approximately square wave
physical properties, will frequently trigger startle, via a steep gradient of
central neural sdmulacion. Similarly, any sudden movement of any object in the
environment may trigger fear if it is very sudden, or incerest if it is less sudden.
It is clear, however, that these external stimulus properties are neither necessary
nor sufficient conditions for producing any of these affeccs, and that, therefore,
the similarities of affects based on neural firing are not identical with the sirni-
larities of affects based on similarities in s t i m ~ ~ l uconditions.
s Thus, a pistol shot
may produce a startle response the first rime it is heard but not the second or
third time. A new face may excite interest on its first appearance but not the
second time. A new object may frighten the first time it is seen but not the
second. The same stimulus may first startle, then frighten and then interest, and
finally excite no affect. T h e correlation berween external stimulus conditions
and neural firing is further attenuated by the activation of affects through
memory o r thought. I may be startled, or frightened, or excited by something
I remember or suddenly think may be about to happen. Therefore, similarities
in stimulus conditions as innate activators are nor perfectly correlated with
central neural firing as an innate activator of affect. However, in general we
should expect chat novelty or suddenness of change in the environment is an
important similarity which would tend to produce confusions in the judgments
of interest, fear, and surprise. In addition, any stimulus condition which deviates
from optimal conditions, such as continuing loud sounds, or overly bright
lights, or intense heat or cold may be presumed to produce confusions in the
judgments of distress and anger whenever the faces are assumed or perceived
to be in such an environment. Again, as with the affects, gradient activated,
this correlation is not perfect and is independent to some extent of neural
firing which is in response to information retrieved from memory o r generated
by thought. A person may be sad, even though he is in an optimal environ-
ment and he may be happy even though the noise is deafening, if he has just
received some good news.
T h e third type of similarity between affects which is based on relatively
innate determinants is that of overlapping components of the affects them-
selves. Thus in startle, fear, and interest there are partial similarities among
these three affects in changes of rare of breathing, in visual tracking of the
source, in opening the mouth, to varying degrees in surprise, fear and interest,
and in opening of the eyes to varying degrees in all three affects. These
similarities are particularly critical in producing common confusions among
these three affects.
A fourth type of similarity among affects which is in part responsible
for common confusions is that of combinations of affects, either simultaneous
or sequential. Thus, an individual may be surprised and afraid at the same
time, afraid and interested a t the' same time, surprised and interested at the
same time, o r in succession but also simultaneously (when, e.g., slight fear
continues after interest has also been aroused). O r the affects of surprise,
fear, and interest may appear in succession to the same object, but in such
rapid succession that the three affects are perceived by the observer as an
undifferentiated totality. These combinations, simultaneous or sequential, may
be based on the similarity of the activator for each of the affects-as when a
sudden movement of something dimly seen is sufficient to innately trigger the
three gradient affects through a sequential attenuation of the s t i m i ~ l i ~by
s
central factors so that the combined gradient of neural firing becomes less
and less steep.
W i t h respect to learned combinations of affect, there is no limit on the
varieties of such mixtures. Thus, a person may learn to feel ashamed every
time he feels excited, may learn to feel fear every time he feels angry, may
learn ro feel sad every time he feels happy ( t h e bitter-sweet smile), or he
may learn to feel these in si~ccession. Depending on what affects are used to
socialize ocher affects in any particular culture, we would have a basis of
predicting what common confusions might arise as a consequence of particular
types of socialization. W e would need to know, for example, in the socialization
of distress whether control of chis affect is taught by physical punishment, or
by expressed disappointment by the parent, by contempt from the parent, and
what was the characterisric affective response by the child to the parent's affect.
If the parenc became angry ac rhe child's crying, did the child become afraid
or angry? If the parent expressed contempt at the child's crying, did che child
respond wirh counter contempt or wich shame? In these cases we would expect
distress-fear, distress-anger, distress-conrempt or distress-shame combinations to
l c characteristic confusions in the judgment of each pair of affects.
r e s ~ ~ in
Fifth, there is a large class of stimulus-affect relationships which p r o d ~ ~ c e
learned similarities among affects chac may be quite different from similarities
based on che similarities in the stimulus conditions or similarities of neural
firing which activate classes of affects on an innate basis. Thus, one may
learn to respond to novelty with excicemenr and shame rather than wich excite-
ment and surprise or with surprise and fear. T h e latter similarities would be
based on similarities of the innare activating conditions. But nothing is more
readily caught than chat one should be ashamed of both novelty and the affecr of
excitemenr which i t would ordinarily innately acrivace. Children are com-
monly shamed for noisy excitement and for sexual excitemenc. Under such
conditions we might expect a confusion co arise between one of che innate
responses to novelty (excitement) and shame. Theoretically there is n o limit
to rhe affecr linkages which may be learned. Therefore, common confusions on
this basis may be expected to occur berareen any two affeccs which are linked
by a shared socialization. So much for general similarity as a determinant of
common confusions between affects.
b z ~ e a s e ddefisity of affect.-The third basis for the prediction of common
confusions is increased density of affect. If the individual's own affect or ex-
perience of affect from others becomes overly intense, overly frequent, and
excessive in duration, the tocal density of such affect will assume monopolistic
proportions such that he will rend to be sensitive ro this affect when it is
present, but also to perceive it when it is not present, and thereby confuse the
dominant affect wich various other competitors. This principle is equally in-
volved in expecting thac others will manifest a particular affect, or that one
will experience a particular affect co the exclusion of others or both. Thus, a
timid person may perceive others as primarily angry and himself experience
primarily fear. T h e prediction of whether he will misjudge photos as mani-
festing his own affect or the affect of others depends in part on which is the
denser of the two affeccs, in part on whether the photo more resembles him-
self or others in critical dimensions (e.g., age, sex, etc.), and in part on whether
the posed affect resembles more his own affect or the affect he expects from
others. Since w e are here concerned with the prediction of common con-
fusions rather than individual sensitivities and insensitivities, we can only
predict common confusions on the basis of affecc density if there are affects
which tend to be overly incense, frequent and enduring in the lives of sub-
groups of individuals within the larger society. Only to the extent to which
[he group we tested was unrepresentative in some important way with respect
to their affect experience could we predict the direction of their common
confusions. If it were the case that, e.g., the very young were happier, or
more timid or angrier than the general population or the very old, or women
were more so than men, we might expect to find evidence for the effect of
such special experience on their judgments of affecc.
Attenuation of affect density.-The fourth basis for the prediction of com-
mon confusions is the attenuation of affect density. In chis case the individual
rarely experiences a particular affect either in himself, or in others, or both.
By virtue of this atcenuation of experience he may fail to detect its presence
when it is there. Thus, the overly anxious person who interacts primarily with
other overly anxious people may fail to perceive that an excited face is ex-
periencing excitement at novelty, because of his assumption chat novelty pro-
duces fear, and his lack of experience in himself or others of any zest for life.
H e fails co perceive excitement because of lack of experience of excitement.
Such actenuation of density may be a consequence either of increased density
of another affect, or of a general impoverishment of affective stimulation. In
the latter case he might see all or nearly all affects as "neutral." T o the extent
to which there is any serious impoverishment of particular affective experience
for members of society as a whole, we may expect a confusion of that affect
with judgments of neucrality. Confusions of neutralicy with the other affects
would, however, b e the consequence of the increased density of affect ex-
perience, such that it tended to be mistakenly identified in neutral faces.
Conjoint increase and attenuation of affect density.-The fifth basis for the
prediction of common confusions (of a particular kind, however), is the con-
joint increase and atcenuation of affect density. In the case of increased density
of affecc experience the individual sees affect where it does not exist. In the
case of decreased density of affect experience the individual does not see ic
where it does exist. In the present case he does not see it where it does exist and
he does not see it where i t does not exist, does confuse i t with another affect,
but does not confuse that other affect with it. There is here an irreversible
confusion such that the affect in question is not seen where it is present, is
confnsed with another affect, but this confusion is not reversible. For example,
if an affecc such as anger is alternarively both heightened in density and at-
tenuated in density by virtue of being severely punished whenever it is exhibited,
it may be attenuated sufficiently s o thac an angry face is judged to be sad, but
sad faces are not judged to be angry. This would be an example of an ir-
reversible common confusion in contrast wich a reversible common confusion
in which anger would be frequently judged to be distress, and distress to be
anger. W e believe thac the reversible common confusion arises from lack of
discrimination of the difference, by virtue of some similarity in the experience of
the two affects. The irreversible common confusion arises, however, from a
taboo on a particular affect which produces both an intensification and a motive
to decrease the experience of the affect. Under such conditions the effect on
the judgments of affect will b e to deny the affect where it is present and
judge another affect which is similar but safer, but that safer affect will not
be misjudged to be the tabooed affect. It may be confused with some other
affects, but not with the tabooed affecc for the same reason thac the tabooed
affect itself is denied. Granted thac such conjoint intensification and attenuation
of a tabooed affecc will produce a judgment of denial of the affecc when
present and a displacement ro a "safer" judgment of affect, what determines the
choice of this safer affect? Consider that w e are dealing with judgments of the
affects of posed faces, and not general affect dynamics. T h e question is not
how does an individual who has suffered a taboo on a particular affect deal
with it and what are the transformations whereby he is enabled both to express
it and to suppress it. The question is rather, given a tabooed affecc, why, and
how, if he cannot see it on a posed photo of that affect does he elect to interpret
it. I n an exueme case he might interpret it as "neutral" or unfeeling. But if he
rather calls anger, for example, distress, why does he d o this rather than judge
it to be some other affect? His choice of an alternative interpretation, we have
argued elsewhere (Tomkins, 1962), is a compromise between fidelity and safety.
H e must remain as close as possible to the apparent nature of the stimulus as is
consistent wich safety. In the case of anger this would mean that the interpreta-
tion must be thac the affect is negative rather than positive. This rules out en-
joyment and interest as possibilities. W i t h i n the choice of negative affects he
will also avoid interpretations of affects which have been used to produce the
taboo. Thus, if he had been threatened every time he became angry so that
he curbed his anger out of fear, then fear would b e n o safer than anger as a
choice for him. T h e same might be true of shame if he had been shamed out of
142 S. S. TOMKINS a R. MC CARTER
expressing his anger. Of the remaining negative affects he will in general

choose thac one which is mosc similar to the tabooed affect. Such similarity
may be either on an innate or on a learned basis. O n an innate basis anger
and distress are mosc similar in thac both are activated by levels of stimulation
which deviate from a n optimal level, and are also activated by similar analogues
in stimulus conditions, so thac the face which is presumed to be exposed to
very loud sounds might reasonably be judged to have responded with anger or
distress, on an innate basis. Many individuals who might have innately responded
to a loud sound with distress (i.e., a sound not loud enough to innately trigger
anger) may learn to respond instead wich anger. They become habitually pes-
simistic with a very low learned threshold for distress. It should be noted that
in the latter case the innate anger response to a very loud sound is interfered
with by the learned distress response. Anyone whose anger became excessively
unsafe might then in fact cope with this by becoming pessimistic and distressed
as a learned substitute. Returning now to the question of the option of in-
terpretation of the tabooed affect of anger, the individual might elect an in-
terpretation of distress on one of two grounds. Either distress is similar enough
on an innate basis, to be a reasonable substitute for anger in the opinion of the
judge, or it has become in the life of the judge the affect which he has learned
as a substitute for anger. Finally, he may elect distress for anger, if rather than
a substitute for anger it is the affect which eventually displaces anger so that
every time he expresses anger he is punished and ends u p crying rather than
being angry. This is also judgment on a similarity basis in that it is the affect
most often experienced either simultaneo~~sly or immediately following the ex-
perience of the punished and tabooed affect.
Deficiencies i n the photos.-Sixth, common confusions reversible and ir-
reversible can be produced by deficiencies in the photos. T o the extent that
an affect is poorly posed i t lends itself to obvious common confusions which
are more apparent than real. If a face shows signs of both anger and distress,
it will of course be judged by some judges to not only show anger, but to show
distress rather than anger. If [he photo presumably showing distress also has
traces of anger in it, then a reversible common confusion will be generated. If
the photo of distress is pure but the photo of anger is mixed, then an irreversible
common confusion will be generated analogous to the case cited above in which
this was the outcome of high density of tabooed affect conjoined with at-
tenuation of the same affect.
Linguistic conventio?zs.-Seventh, common confusions might be generated
by linguistic convencions. Some individuals and some societies lack the words
for differentiating the affects. In the extreme case everything positive becomes
"great," "cool," "neat," and everything negative "lousy," "for the birds," "disgust-
ing," "alarming," "disturbing," and so on. Such a person may see an angry
face, a frightened face, and an ashamed face as "upset," and when asked to
check one of our nine sets of descriptions of affeccs elect that compromise which
seems closest to his favored linguistic label for negative affeccs. If such is
the case for any sizable subset of the society as a whole, non-reversible com-
mon confusion will be generated in which many negative affeccs will be con-
fused with one negative affect and the judgments of positive affeccs will be
similarly restricted in range. These will be nonreversible, not because the dif-
ferent affeccs are differentiated from each other but because they are undif-
ferendated and coordinated to the same linguistic label which in turn is
related to a single best-fitting description.
If these different possible determinants are in fact involved in common
confusions, it is evident that the same common confusion may be either in-
creased in magnitude by the convergence of synergistic determinants or at-
tenuated by the divergence of antagonistic determinants. Further, we will face
the problem of multiple possible interpretations of each common confusion we
find.
COMMONCONFUSIONS AMONGALLAFFECTS
Bearing these possibilities in mind, let us now examine Table 5, which
shows the common confusions among all affects that are reliable a t the 5 %
confidence level. These common confusions are: interest with neutral and
with surprise, surprise wich interest, neutral wich interest, fear with surprise,
anger with disgust, shame with distress and with neutral, and distress with
shame.
Let us examine each of the affects, and their common confusions.
Enjoyment.-The first affecc we will consider is enjoyment. This affect
generates no common confusions. From Table 5 we see chat enjoyment is the
most accurately judged of all the affects, with a validity coefficient of .988, and
from Table 3 we see that it also generates a high degree of agreement among
judges, with a coefficient of concordance of .84, third highest of all the affeccs.
But there are no common confusions which attain statistical significance.
W e would account for this on the basis of the convergence of minimal
similarity of innate activators with other affects, minimal similarity to other
affeccs due to almost n o overlapping of components of the smiling response
wich other facial affective responses, and third, minimal taboo on the expres-
sion of the affecc of enjoyment. If we examine Fig. 2 ( t o p ) we see chat there
are a few Ss who deny enjoyment and call it neutral, and a very small number
who judge it to be interest or even distress. These are idiosyncratic responses
by Ss who will very generally deny affect and report that many of the faces
are neutral, or who will see incerest or distress often where it does not exist.
Such generality of judgments of neutral affects indicates a taboo on affecc per se
rather than on enjoyment. Those who see interesc or distress rather than en-
joyment probably d o so as a consequence of the increased density of such

affective experience in the special cases where it occurs.
There are two other types of analyses which support our conclusions about
enjoyment.
Another source of information on the confusion of one affect with another
is the spectrum of affects which are never confused with each other. This is
represented in Table 6.
In Table 6 there is represented the inverse of error and confusion, the
number of times an affecc is never confused with another affect. Here we
see first that the positive affect of enjoyment is rarely confused with negative
affects and that the negative affects, wich the exception of distress, are rarely
confused with the positive affect of enjoyment, but may be confused wich the
positive affecc of interest, and somewhat wich surprise. Our expectation that
all positive affeccs should be easily discriminated from all negative affects is
not supported.
This shows us chat not only does enjoyment generate no common con-
fusions, but it has a restricted variance of all types of errors (including in-
dividual sensitivities) compared wich all other negative affects, since it has a
total of five other affects with which it is never confused.
I t is superior also to the ocher positive affeccs by the criterion of how
often negative affects are confused with it. If we examine the number of
negative affects which are confused with it, for enjoyment four of the five
negative affects are never judged to be enjoyment, three of the five negative
affects are never judged to be surprise, but only one of the five negative affects
is never judged to be interest.
Our expectation that the positive affects in general will be less confused
with the negacive affects and negacive affects less confused with positive affects
than any specific affect will be confused wich another affecc is not supported,
but enjoyment is the affect which contributes most to whatever difference exists.
Fig. 5 reveals the same trends in a somewhat different form. In this figure
there is represented the per cent of responses for each posed affect which is in-
correctly recognized as some other affect, and the per cenc of responses in
which other affects are identified as this affect. The posed photo of enjoy-
ment is not identified correctly 8.4%, whereas poses of affects other than en-
joyment are identified as enjoyment 9.8%. From Fig. 5 it may be seen that
some affects are relatively equal in their probabilicy of failing to be correctly
identified and their probabilicy of being incorrectly attributed to other affects.
Enjoyment (like disgust) is almost as often confused with other affects,
as other affects are confused with enjoyment, in contrast to those affects such
as anger, in which the affect is confused with other affects more frequently than
other affects are confused wich it, and in contrast to those affects such as sur-
prise in which the converse is the case. Further, not only is enjoyment re-
versible in its confusions but the total per cent of confusions for both di-
rections ( 18.2) is by far the lowest of all the affects. I n contrast, surprise is
almost as well judged with 13.9% errors, but with 34.8% errors in other affects
which are judged incorrectly to be surprise, the total per cent of errors is 48.7.
Interest, swprise, and fear.-Let LIS consider next the trio, interest, surprise,
and fear, since we predicted common confusions should occur among them on
the grounds of their multiple similarities. These similarities are the gradients
of their innate activation, their innate activation by novelty, their overlapping
shared components of response and innate or learned simultaneous, or se-
quential combinations of these three affects.
Our expectations are generally, though not entirely, confirmed.
If the high consensus on enjoyment is in part due to the fact that it is a
positive affect with minimal taboo on its overt expression, the other positive
affect is one of the poorest judged affects. Second only to surprise, the validity
coefficient for interest is a relatively low ,647 (Table 5 ) . But, although it is
not accurately judged, an examination of Fig. 2 (center) shows there is con-
siderable agreement on what kinds of affect interesc is mistaken for. These
are neutrality and surprise (Table 4 ) . Its coefficient of concordance (Table
3 ) is .80. An isolated S judged one photo to represent enjoyment.
In the case of the common confusion of neutrality, the third best photo
was in fact more often judged to be neutral than it was judged to be interest.
This is the only case in which such a reversal occurred. In general each photo
was more often judged correctly than it was misidentified with one particular
other affect.
T h e second common confusion was with surprise. The basis of both
of these confusions, in our opinion, is quite different. T h e confusion of interest
with neutrality arises from the great difficulty w e found in "posing" interest or
excitement. The models complained that they could not turn "interest" on
and off as easily as they could smile. W e worked with each model for hours
at a time and there is no doubt that the appearance of "spontaneous" affect be-
comes increasingly difficult the harder and longer one directs the model to
show one particular affect. While there is n o general taboo for most models on
the expression of interest, they did complain more about the artificiality of
posing this affect than of any other affect. This is understandable in terms of
our theory of the nature of the conditions required for the innate activation of
chis affect, namely, a steep gradient of neural stimulation, which ordinarily re-
quires real novelty for its production. I t is as difficult to mimic "interest" as
it is to tickle oneself, for the reason that unexpectedness is a critical require-
ment for the activation of both responses. I t is our opinion that with better
poses of interesc there would be a significant reduction in the common con-
146 5. S. TOMKINS a R. MC CARTER
fusion with neutrality, though there would remain some confusion on the part
of those Ss who tend to deny affect in general. These would probably continue
co d o so no matter how well the affects were posed.
The confusion with surprise and its converse were predicted, and i t is in
fact a reversible confusion, since surprise is also confused with interest as may
be seen in Table 4.
A n examination of Fig. 2 (bottom) shows thac surprise is also confused
with fear though not quite at the 5% level. An examination of Fig. 3 ( t o p )
(and Table 4 ) shows however thac fear is reliably confused wich surprise. In
terms of our theoretical expectations surprise is activated by the steepest gradient,
fear next and interest third. O n this basis we would expect that surprise shoilld
be confused with fear, as often as fear should be confused with interest, but
that surprise should be confused wich interesc less often than the other two
pairs. W h a t was not confirmed was an expected comlnon reversible confusion
between fear and interest. It appears that despite many similarities in the in-
nate activators and shared overlapping components in the responses themselves
and in the combinations of these two affects, the fact thac one is negative and
the other positive is a difference which outweighs these similarities and thereby
reduces common confusions between them.
Let us now examine interest, surprise, and fear more closely. Interest is
confused with every affect except one (Table 6 ) if w e consider confusions in
either direction, i.e., confusions of interest with other affects, and confusions of
other affects with interest. I t is tied for second highest number of confusions.
O n the one hand, however, all of the negative affects with the exception of
distress are confused wich interesc, but interesc is not confused with any negative
affect.
This apparent unidirectional relationship between interest and the negative
affects is not true for the relationship of interesc to the positive affects since,
as we have seen, interest has reversible common confusions with surprise, as
well as neutrality, and there are weak idiosyncratic reversible confusions be-
tween interest and enjoyment as well.
Fig. 5 shows that for the totality of judgments there are 41.7% incorrect
recognitions of interest, but only 27.9% incorrect responses in which other
affects are recognized as interest. Therefore, despite the fact that interest leads
to an unusual number of errors and confusion (with a rank order of 2 . 5 ) , the
general tendency is for these to be in the judgment of interest itself, rather than
in the attribution of interest to other affects. This is consistent with the as-
sumption that the photos of interest are somewhat poorly posed, thereby gener-
ating confusions in the judgments of interest, but not so many reversible con-
fusions in the attribution of interest to the judgments of other affects. This is
che pattern which we have postulated as predictable whenever a taboo on an
affect generates a retreat from this affect to a safer interpretation. Surprise, o n

the face of it, does not appear to be safer than interesc and, further, the relation-
ship is reversible, but neutrality would be "safer" and might be interpreted in
this fashion except that here too, as wich surprise, the relationship between in-
terest and neutrality is a reversible common confusion. O n all counts there-
fore w e must reject the hypothesis of a general taboo on interest. This is
not, however, to rule out the possibility of some confusion between incerest and
neutrality which may represent a denial of this affect or affect in general.
Let us now consider surprise. It is the affect most poorly judged, wich a
validity coefficient of .63 (Table 5 ) . It should be noced however that chis
validity coefficient was obtained from an analysis of a total of 69 photos
(which include the 27 described in Figs. 2, 3, and 4 ) , some of which we knew
to be very poorly posed. In the three best photos which are represented in
Fig. 2 (bottom) i c is clear that surprise is judged much more accurately than
with the remaining 42 of the total of 69 photos. These judges agree sub-
stantially in their judgments of surprise, even though they may not be entirely
accurate for the 69 photos. The coefficient of concordance is .92, second only
to neutmlicy, .94 (Table 3 ) . This coefficient of concordance, it should be
noced, is computed from the responses to the three best photos, and this is
largely responsible for the discrepancy berween the validity coefficient and the
coefficient of concordance. Even when the validity of the 69 photos is com-
pared with the agreement on the 27 best photos, however, it is not always true
that there need be marked discrepancies. T h e average correlation between these
two coefficients w e have noted before is -.01. This zero correlation is based
o n two subsets of correlations, one of which has a sreep positive slope, and
the other a steep negative slope, which tells us that the selection of a subset of
the better posed pictures improves the validity of the judgments of some of
the posed affects very much, but leaves ochers essentially unaltered. Thus, as
we have seen, enjoyment is validly judged in the sample of 69 photos, also well
judged in the subset of 27 photos, and with substantial agreement among all
judges, and therefore a high coefficient of concordance as well as a high co-
efficient of validity.
Fig. 5 shows us that surprise is judged much more accurately than other
affects are confused with it. Only 13.9% of the responses to surprise are in
error, but 34.8% of the responses to other affects incorrectly identify these as
surprise. These are mostly interesc and fear which are being confused with
surprise. Although surprisc is twice removed from interesc with respect to
similarity of innate activators, the fact that it is possible to be pleasantly or un-
pleasantly surprised might increase the common confusions between interest
and surprise, whereas fear and interesc are not confused wich each other.
Let us now examine fear in more detail. It is a relatively accurately judged
affect, with n validity coefficient of .85 (Table 5 ). Agreement among judges

is equally good. T h e coefficient of concordance is 21. From Fig. 5 we see also
that, although fear is incorrectly recognized in 40% of the responses to the
three best photos, very few responses to the other affeccs ( 14% of the responses)
are misrakenly confused with fear. There are unidirectional common con-
fusions between fear and surprise, but not common confusions between surprise
and fear, and no common confusions from any other affect to fear. And yet
from Table 6 we see that there are only two affeca, enjoyment and disgust,
with which fear is newer confused and which are never confused with fear.
T h e total of two zero confusions is the fourth highest in number of some
degree of confiision between each affect and all other affects. So, although
common confusions are restricted to surprise, and no other affect is com-
monly confused with fear, there is an unusually broad range of idiosyncratic
errors in the recognition of fear but an unusually narrow range of idiosyncratic
errors in attributing fear to other affects. This is suggestive of the mechanism
of the combined i n c r a s e and decrease in density of a tabooed affect which
we postulated to produce irreversible common confusions combined with a re-
duced tendency for the other affect to be confused with it. The same mechan-
ism which wollld produce such a pattern of responses for common confusions
could also operate with respect to the unidirectionality of idiosyncratic errors.
Thus [here are only two affects which are not incorrectly recognized as fear
when fear is being judged, but there are four affeccs in which there is n o error
of attribution of fear to other affect. That is, it appears safer for isolated in-
dividuals to say that fear was really neutral, or anger, or distress than for the
individual to say chat any of these were fear. This argument gains support
from the fact that the same general pattern which we have predicted for tabooed
affect appears in three of the most likely candidates among the five negative
affects-fear, anger, and shame.
Fear, anger, and shame.-In all three cases these are affects which fail ro
be correctly identified when present much more frequently than they are at-
tributed to photos of other posed affects. Thus in Fig. 5 we can see that in
anger the ratio of per cents is 34.9 versus 13.9, in fear it is 40.0 versus 14.0, and
in shame 33.4 versus 17.3. Interest is in this same direction but in a less
pronounced degree, and probably involves another mechanism as we noted
before.
W e interpret this as evidence for the probable operation of n denial
mechanism operating with perception of anger, fear, and shame since these are
incorrectly perceived and identified as non-anger, non-fear, and non-shame, but
other affects are not incorrectly identified so often as anger, fear or shame.
If we also examine Table 6 we see that anger has the second widest spread
of confusions with only one affect (enjoyment) with which it is never confused.
In contrast, in five of the eight other affects there is no confusion of these affects
with anger. T h e affect with which anger is most commonly confused is disgust,
but this is an irreversible common confusion since disgust is not reliably con-
fused with anger. Many individuals apparently shy away from anger, o n an
idiosyncratic basis, but d o not err in the other direction, i.e., d o not as readily
confuse other affects with anger. Here again, as in the case of fear, a tabooed
affect invokes the same mechanism of denial in a subset of the group as a
whole, as in the individual, wich similar patterning of avoidance responses, but
to different affects for the subset of the group compared with isolated in-
dividuals.
Shnme and distress.-Next we shall examine shame and distress. Shame
is commonly confused with distress and neutrality, and distress is commonly con-
fused with shame, so that this common confusion is reversible, but that with
neutrality is not. W e interpret the common confusion of shame with neutrality
to indicate a specific denial of a tabooed affect rather than due co a n artenitation
of the density of the experience of shame, since this confilsion is an irreversible
one of the type we assumed was generated by the conjoinc increase and at-
cen~~acion of density of a tabooed affect. Further, the tendency to call any
negative affect neutral or affectless is in itself a simple denial of affect, quite
apart from the reversibilicy of the relationship.
I n Fig. 5 there is supporting evidence for the assumption that shame is
conjointly avoided when present, but not as frequently identified with other
affects (33.4% vs 17.3%). In marked contrast, distress is avoided less when
present, than it is erroneously seen in other affects (25.1% vs 57%). This
tells us that it is the least tabooed of the negative affects and that other negative
affects are likely to be avoided by being seen as distress. N o other negative
affect shows this patterning found with shame (Fig. 5 ) .
T h e reversible common confusion between shame and distress we interpret
ns based upon similarities, innate and learned. O n an innate basis it fre-
quently happens that a frustration or defeat serious enough to produce in-
creased muscle tonus, which in turn innately activates distress, can at the
same time reduce interest just enough innately to activate shame. A common
example would be chat of a child who is denied something by a parent to which
the child lowers his head in shame as tears come to his eyes. Indeed, what has
been called depression is a conjoint activation of shame and distress. Because
of this common combination of affects, it is not surprising chat each affect will
be confused wich the other by some judges. O n a learned basis, too, if the
distress cry has been socialized by shaming the child, there will be the conse-
quence that whenever distress is felt shame will also be experienced, and thus
prompt a confusion between these two affects.
Nez~trality.-Next we will examine judgments of neutrality. T h e judgment
that faces appear to be neutral occurs with every posed affect, which suggests
that there are no affects which someone may not deny and call neutral. This is
reflected in Fig. 5, in the ratio of 33.4% incorrect responses to neutral photos,
compared with 57% responses of neutrality to other affects. W e interpret this
to mean that there is a widespread tendency for many individuals to avoid the
perception of some affecr or other. T h e neutral photos (Table 4 ) are, how-
ever, commonly confused only with interest, and less often with distress, en-
joyment, shame and fear. T h e common confusion with incerest is symmetrical
since, as we have seen before, interest is commonly confused with neutrality.
This latter was in part due to the poorness of the posed interest, but must in
part be taken as a consequence of a lack of zest. T h e attribution of interest
to the ne~icralface represents, we think, just the opposite projection, due to
a common increased density of excitement in their own experience which causes
judges to see incerest in a neutral face rather than to see no affect. This is
not a surprising state of affairs since it is much more common for human
beings to feel affect than to feel no affecc. W h a t is of interest here is rather
that the common confusion is interest and that the attributions of the four other
affects (distress, enjoyment, shame and fear) represent only individual sensi-
tivities d ~ to
~ increased
e density of experience with these affects. This tells us
that, given a relatively neutral face, any "projection" arising from increased
density of affective experience, so far as the group is concerned, will be limited
to the relatively benign affect of inreresc and not enjoyment o r a negative affecc.
Some individzulj, however, will project negative affects in response to a
neutral face, as well as enjoyment.
These results taken together tell us that there is a widespread tendency
on the part of individuals to avoid perceiving some affect or other and so
see affect as neutral, and a somewhat weaker tendency to project and respond
to actually neutral faces as though they did show some affect. Bur the group
as a whole is prone to confuse only inreresc with neutrality and neutrality with
interest. The former may indicate a lack of zest, but it is balanced by a pro-
jection of zest to a photo which lacks it.
AFFECTSENS~T~VITY
CONTOURS: FINDINGSRELEVANTTO THE
THIRD
HYPOTHESIS
Re.rr~lts
Eighteen error scores, a pair for each of the nine affect categories, were
computed for each S. T h e first type of error score for a given affect consisted
of the number of times that the affecc in question was wrongly ascribed to a
photo expressing some other affect. T h e second type of error score was the
number of times S failed to recognize poses of the affect in question. For ex-
nmple if S misinterpreted a photo posed for fear as one posed for surprise, h e
- - -- = 5 PER CENT LEVEL OF CQlFlDENCE
6. Affect sensitivity contours for an S with above accuracy o f discri mination

(top ~d for an S with poor accuracy of discrimination (bottom)
committed a first type of error with respect to surprise and a second type of
error with respect to fear.
The two error scores for any affect were experimentally independent
Twenty-four rank-order correlation coefficients were computed to determlnc
the relationship between each S's two distributions of error scores. Four of
these 2 4 ipsative coefficients were positive and 20 were negative. The prob-
ability of so one-sided an outcome is ,002. The mean rank-order correlation
coefficient was - .314.
Normative treatment of Ss' errors yielded 18 distributions of error scores,
nine distriburions of the first type of errors and nine distributions of the second
S. S. TOMKINS a R. MC CARTER
---- - 5 PER CENT LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE
FIG. 7. Affect sensitivity contours for an S with superior accuracy in discrimination

of posed fear ( t o p ) and for an S with superior accuracy in discrimination of interest
when interest is absent but with poor accuracy when interest is present, and with a
tendency to report neutrality when neutrality is absent (bottom)
type of errors. Raw scores were then converted to standard scores, facilitating
the construction of an Affect Sensitivity Contour for each S.
These 24 charts, of which seven are reproduced in Figs. 6, 7, S, and 9, per-
mitted a quick visual inspection of each S's performance. Each unit on the
vertical axis is a standard deviation. T h e eight primary affects and neutrality
appear as column heads o n the chart. A horizontal line through the middle
of the chart divides it into two equal portions. T h e shaded area of the upper half
of the chart shows the frequency of the first type of error; and the shaded area
of the lower half, the frequency of the second type of error. Also, 5 % confi-
---- ' 5 PER CENT LEVEL OFCONFIDENCE
FIG. S . Affect sensitivity contour of an S with superior accuracy in discrimination

uf interest when interest is absent and with tendency to report contempt when contempt
is absent
dence limits are indicated on the chart by horizonral dotted lines. The broader
the band-width of the shaded area the greater the density of errors.
Discussion
W e can see from an examination of Figs. 6, 7, S, and 9, that even though
most of the variance of the judgments of affects from photos of facial expres-
sions can be accounted for by the nature of the stimulus, and by comlnon con-
fusions between some of the affects, individual responses tend to be consistenr
and to reveal a large number of idiosyncratic affect sensitivity contours.
T h e affect sensitivity conrours are made u p of two kinds of correct judg-
ments and errors, those to the affect when present, in which case the individual
either judges it present or errs by imputing some other affect to the posed affect,
and those ro rhe affect when absent, in which case he either judges correctly that
the posed affect is a differenr affect or errs by imputing the affect in question
to the wrong posed affect, i.e., he imputes it though it is not there. T h e re-
lationship between these two types of error is negative (-.314 as we have
seen). In general, this means that if an individual errs in judging that an affecr
is present when in fact it is not, he is not likely to overlook it and so make an
error when it is present. Thus, if an S characteristically sees neutral and angry
faces as happy, h e will not fail to see a smiling face as happy. Conversely, if he
fails to see the affect when it is there, he is not likely to see it where it is absent.
Thus, if he fails to see a smiling face as happy, he is not likely to see a neutral
face as happy.
These are general trends which appear to be reliable, but clearly there are
5.5. TOMKINS & R. MC CAKTER
---- ' 5 PER CENT LEVEL,OFCONFIDENCE
AFFECT
ABSENT
REPORT
CORRECT
FIG.9. Affect sensitivity contour of two Ss with the same poor discrimination of
enjoyment when enjoyment is present and generally similar profiles
exceptions. Twenty of the 24 correlations were negative, but four were positive.
I n the latter cases the individual sees some affects correctly when present and
absent, and sees other affects incorrectly when present and absent. T h e former
case presents no special problem. It is simply a consequence of the accuracy of
their judgments. I n the case of the latter, errors in both condirions mean chat,
if a n individual saw an affect when it was absent, he would also fail to see it
when it was present. Thus, if he judged a happy face as angry, h e failed ro
see an angry face as angry, or i f he saw an angry face as happy, he failed to see
a happy face as happy. This latter is somewhat puzzling, and we are not certain
how to interpret it. T h e main effect ( t h e negative correlation between the two
kinds of errors) may be interpreted as either amplification or attenuation of
the density of experience of an affect so that it is seen when present and also
when absent (amplification), or not seen when present but not seen when
absent (attenuation). But in the four cases where the correlation was positive,
it is not a t all clear what it would mean to see incorrectly that an angry face is
happy, and also fail to see a happy face as happy, or conversely, co see a happy
face as sad, but not see a sad face as sad. An examination of all our affect
sensitivity contours reveals that the positive correlations are in fact largely func-
tions of accuracy, i.e., correcr in both conditions rather than incorrect in both
conditions.
Our Ss [hen are primarily accurate, with the majority making mistakes
which are consistent for them. T h e kind of mistake the average S makes is
one of eirher exaggerating an affect, by seeing it present when it is present but
also when it is absent, or of attenuating an affect and failing to see it when it
is present, but not projecting it when it is absent.
Let us now examine some examples of the range of affect sensitivity con-
tours. In Fig. G ( t o p ) we have described an S who is generally above aver-
age in his discrimination of affects, both when they are present and absent.
Only in the case of fear (when absent in the posed photo) and in [he case of
surprise (when absent) does he give slightly below average judgments. In
general, however, the bulk of his judgments ( t h e darker band-width) presents a
relatively narrow spectrum of error, well below the average sensitivity of 0.00
standard scores.
In Fig. 6 (bottom) we have shown an S who is in general below average
in his discrimination of affects, both when present and when absent. I t will be
noted however that there is a strong tendency for there to be a negative cor-
relation between the two conditions. Thus with surprise and contempt, he fails
to identify these affects when they are present but does not project them when
they are absent. Neutrality and distress are also judged very poorly ( a t the .05
level of significance) when these are present. Enjoyment, fear, anger and
shame are all seen when these affects are absent from the posed photos. I t is
understandable why neutrality is judged incorrectly when it is present but not
projected when it is absent. W i t h so many errors of judgment it is unlikely
such an individual would have resort to general denial. H e is too affect-laden
nn individual for such a mechanism. H e is in general denying the presence
of surprise, contempt, distress, and neutrality and converring these affects into
enjoyment, fear, anger, and shame. W e d o not have sufficient other information
about this individual to report on the probable significance of such a pattern.
In Fig. 7 ( t o p ) we have presented the affect sensitivity contour of an S
with superior accuracy in the discrimination of fear. H e has slightly below aver-
age accuracy when fear is absent, which is to say he sometimes sees it where
it isn't, but he allnost never misses it when it is present. H e is ahnost as ac-
curate with anger when it is present and projects it only about average when
it is absent. On the other hand, he is quite poor in his judgments of shame
(when present) and distress (when absent). I t appears that he tends to con-
fuse shame with distress, denying the presence of shame and interpreting it
as distress. W e have previously reported that this is a common confusion for
the group as a whole. However, i t is also a reversible confusion, being made
in both directions. Here, however, it is unidirectional. W e interpret this to
mean that this S has such a low threshold for distress that he fails to recognize
shame as such, but supposes that the eyes and head down indicate sadness
rather than shame. Supporting this impression is an attenuation of the recog-
nition of enjoyment. I t is also of interest that, where distress is so projected,
fear and anger are nonetheless quite accurately judged. This S has in fact made
a distinction which, because of Freud's influence, few psychologists have made.
Freud's assumption that the birth cry was the prototype of anxiety has been
i~ncriticallyaccepted for half a century, so great was Freud's authority.
In Fig. 7 (bottom) we have presented the affect sensitivity contour of an
S with superior accuracy in the discrimination of interest when interest is
absent, but with poor accuracy when interest is present, and with a tendency
ro report neutrality when neutrality is absent. In this case, there is a disjunction
between enjoyment and interest. Enjoyment is judged somewhat above average
when present and when absent, but interest is essentially denied when present
although not projected when absent. This attenuation of interest is transferred
to neutrality, and secondly to contempt, suggestive of a zestless, affectless,
slightly embittered individual. I t should be noted that this too is another com-
mon confusion.
I n Fig. 8 is given the affect sensitivity contour of an S with superior ac-
curacy in the discrimination of interest when interest is absent and with n
tendency to report contempt when contempt is absent. There is also a tendency
(just short of the 5 % level) to fail to see anger when present. W e have re-
ported before that this is a unidirectional common confusion away from anger
to contempt. There is no tendency to identify contempt with anger. It was
upon this basis that we interpreted anger as a tabooed affect, the judgment of
which goes to the presumably safer affect of contempt. Such appears to be
the case here, too. I t should be noted that, when there is a peak in one affect,
there is frequently a valley and a peak in the other direction which generally
indicates the direction of the transformation of judgments.
In Fig. 9 we have shown the affect sensitivity contour of rwo Ss with the
same poor discrimination of enjoyment when enjoyment is present and with
generally similar profiles. Although this method generates a large number of
idiosyncratic profiles, we present these two as examples of the fact that Ss also
may share the same affect sensitivities and insensitivities, across the entire affect
spectrum.
Both Ss fail to identify the smiling faces as happy. I t should be re-
membered that over 90% of our Ss identify these faces accurately, and that
enjoymenc is the most accurately judged of all the affects. Although there is
considerable similarity between these two Ss, there are some differences. T h e
affect which appears to receive most of the judgments of errors to enjoyment
is neutrality. This is very marked in the first S, and much less so in the
second, althoogh both Ss' profiles show a peak on neutrality (when absent). I n
other words, the first S (and to a lesser extent, the second S ) is not denying
affect in general, but is denying the affecc of enjoymenc. The second S, in
addition, denies the presence of distress. One might have expected that the
conjoint denial of happiness and sadness might have resulted in the same radical
increase in judgments of neutrality as for the first S. Although neutrality is the
most elevated category of the affect absent condition, it does not reach the
5% level as happens in the case of the first S. Rather than identifying all of
enjoyment as neutral, this S projects some fear, contempt, and shame as well
as neutrality. T h e first S projects the same degree of contempt and shame but
is about average in the judgment of fear when absent.
Another unexpected elevation occurs for the first S in the projection of
interest, indeed to the same level as neutrality is projected in the second S.
Although it is clear that enjoyment is the major insensitivity and is being trans-
formed into judgments of neutrality, there is surprisingly some elevation in the
other positive affect which somewhat undercuts the impression of a taboo on
enjoyment. It is nonetheless quite possible chat we have here a pattern not
uncommon in engineers, a reinvestment of positive affect of enjoyment (as
it is invested in interpersonal relationships) to interest in the impersonal realm
of nature and "things." However, we cannot be sure of the meaning of these
profiles in the absence of further information. More detailed validity studies
will b e published.
W e have assumed chat the major motives consist of eight primary affects:
interest, enjoyment, surprise, distress, fear, shame, contempt, and anger. W e
have further assumed that each affect is primarily a facial response controlled by
an innate subcortical program. T h e primacy of the face in our theory of
affects generates a new theoretical significance to the recognition of affective
facial expressions in posed photographs.
W e photographed models who were instructed to simulate affective neu-
trality and eight affects, according to our views of the nature of each of the
primary affects. This procedure yielded a set of 69 acceptable stimuli and a sub-
set of 27 particularly good stimuli. All 69 stimuli were presented to a group
of 24 firemen who classified them in nine affective categories.
Our first hypothesis was that Ss would accurately recognize the primary
posed affects in the photos. I t was confirmed. T h e correlation between our
Ss' judgmencs and the affect shown in the stimuli was 3 5 8 .
T h e second hypothesis was char Ss would systematically confuse some of
the primary affects with others. In support of this, nine common confusions
were found, and seven theoretical bases for them were discussed.
T h e third hypothesis was that Ss would show individual biases in their
judgments of the primary affects. Rarely did Ss both ascribe a certain affect to
a photo expressing a second affect and yet fail to recognize poses of the first
affect. A new type of profile analysis was introduced to show individual judg-
mental biases in che identification of posed affects.
mFERENCES
ENGEL,E. The role of concent in binocular resolution. Amer. I. Psychol., 1956, 69,
87-91.
ITTELSON,W. H., & SLACK, C. W. The perception of persons as visual objects. In
R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo (Eds.), Person perceptio~z and interpersonal beha?~ior.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univer. Press, 1958. Pp. 210-228.
LANDIS,C., & HUNT, W . A. T h e startle pattern. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939.
T O M K ~ S.
S , S. Conrcjousnerr, imagery and affeci. Vol. 1. New York: Springer, 1962.
Accepted January 6, 1964.

Primary Affects

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Primary Affects

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Perceptrial and Motor Skills, 1964, 18, 119-158.

@ Southern Universities Press 1964

WHAT AND WHERE ARE THE PRIMARY AFFECTS?

SJLVAN S. TOMKINS AND ROBERT MC CARTER

Sumnrary.-A set of 69 facial photographs of models simulating affective

Most contemporary investigators have assumed, after the James-Lange

These facial affective responses we assume are controlled by innate affect

Test stimuli were a set of 69 photos of facial expressions posed to exemplify

' W e are indebted ro the Hoban-Gallob studio of Philadelphia for photography.

Ss, selected because they colnprised a readily available, comparatively

Ss were examined in five groups of four co six individuals. They were

T h e average correlation of .858 between the intended affect, as we in-

faces, the individual is constantly challenged to organize this information in

The effect of this isomorphism is also reciprocal. Just as the interpretation

FIG. 2. Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing enjoyment ( t o p ) ,

UBEST 0SECOND BEST [=I THIRD BEST

FIG. 3 . Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing fear ( t o p ) ,

F I G 4. Distribution of responses to sets of three photos expressing shame ( t o p ) ,

Photo Reported Affect

Posed Affect: Enjoyment

In Table 5 w e have reproduced the correlations of affect ratings with

In Table 6 we have presented the number of cases in which an affect is

expressing his anger. Of the remaining negative affects he will in general

joyment probably d o so as a consequence of the increased density of such

affect generates a retreat from this affect to a safer interpretation. Surprise, o n

affect, with n validity coefficient of .85 (Table 5 ). Agreement among judges

- - -- = 5 PER CENT LEVEL OF CQlFlDENCE

6. Affect sensitivity contours for an S with above accuracy o f discri mination

---- - 5 PER CENT LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE

FIG. 7. Affect sensitivity contours for an S with superior accuracy in discrimination

---- ' 5 PER CENT LEVEL OFCONFIDENCE

FIG. S . Affect sensitivity contour of an S with superior accuracy in discrimination

---- ' 5 PER CENT LEVEL,OFCONFIDENCE

Accepted January 6, 1964.

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