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From the Editors Our One-Year Anniversary of Status/ Audio Journal is sooooo Live! Click!

Four Years On: No Easy Answers in Syria New Pages On Jadaliyya

(Part II)
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by Bassam Haddad Mar 30 2015

[See Part I here. Parts II and III are comb ined

b elow]

The Irony of Calamity

Egypt Elections Watch Update
There are no easy answers in Syria. Though
undramatic, this is not how most seem to
approach the Syrian tragedy in practice.

What follows is not a recipe for an answer as

much as it is a reminder against repeating the
same mistakes if/when calling for solutions. If

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 ones vision is not yet clear regarding what path to
take, or what existing combination of forces to
support, one should be steadfast in understanding A Jadaliyya and Ahram Online
what went wrong and the lessons we might have [Dam aged buildings line the streets of Hom s. Im age from
Initiative
learnedeven if we learned differently. For those Reuters, by Yazan Hom sy]
in touch with family, friends, and
As part of the Egypt Elections Watch
reporters/writers/publications in/on Syria, there is no doubt that many on opposing sides of the discourse on (EEW), Jadaliyya and Ahram Online, with the Center
Syria have come to some similar realizationswhether or not they publically profess those realizations or of Contemporary Arab Studies (Georgetown
support their content. University) and the Middle East Studies Program
(George Mason University) as co-sponsors, will
The irony of having no easy answers in Syria is that the least unfavorable exit from this Syrian calamity might
produce articles/posts/profiles on a weekly basis,
involve all the wrong actors, but in unison.
covering organizations, political parties, coalitions,
relevant laws and procedures, and profiles of key
Lessons Learned: The Art of Not Going Backwards individuals related to the Egyptian elections. This is in
addition to news updates summarizing major
Beyond pontification, and over and above the mayhem, the pain, the personal hostilities, political disagreements,
developments surrounding the lead-up to the
and paradigmatic gazes, let us not forget what we have learned about the following: the main players and forces
election, such as emerging or shifting alliances, new
involved; how calls for open revolution produced a decent into mayhem; how some discounted the future by
political positions, and candidacy announcements. If
supporting anything that moves against the regime; and, most of all, how we got here and whose primary you have questions, comments, contributions, and/or
responsibility it is. an eye-witness account, please email us at:
eew@jadaliyya.com. For a listing of EEWs team
There are two caveats to such an inventory. First, the challenge in addressing lessons learned is to avoid black
members please click here.
and white characterizations. Such contrast is both unrealistic and counterproductive. Usually, missing the gray
areas is an analytic liability because it is those very gray areas that animate the arguments of detractors, and
sometimes for good reason. Second, it is just as unproductive to see all things as equally gray. They are not.
Coalitions
There is a hierarchy of responsibility, and it usually rests with those who hold power, whether locally, regionally,
and/or internationally.
Democratic Alliance for Egypt
Thus, we cannot stop at holding the regime responsible in Syria, we also need to hold certain bigger powers Egyptian Bloc
responsible regionally and internationally for their role in producing the mayhem in and beyond Syria. Much of the Islamist Bloc (Alliance for Egypt)
disagreements result from people (analysts, experts, and lay persons) having a fixation on one party or set of Revolution Continues Alliance
problems/causes/actors, as I have argued previously, mimicking a Hollywood production that most of the same
people deplore. The other problematic liberal lens is to consider all parties to be equally bad, with no recognition Parties
of the systemic capacity to inflict structural damage based on power differentials and mechanisms of
exploitation.

The Syrian Regime Al-Adl Party

Egyptian Current Party
Let us begin with not losing sight of the continued legacy of the Syrian regimes ruthlessnessregardless of its Egyptian Social Democratic Party
resistance rhetoric or its enabling of resistance in times gone by. If this all-powerful regime prioritized defeating Egyptian Tahrir Party
Israels belligerence and US imperialism, and the Arab conservative regimes complicity, it would have used the Democratic Workers Party
past forty years to build a most impenetrable state by those very countries and interests that haveboth directly Free Egyptians Party
and indirectlywreaked havoc in Syria, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States. We can Freedom and Justice Party
Ghad Al-Thawra Party (Hizb Ghad Al-Thawra)
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 certainly debate the realities of relative food self-sufficiency, the (mostly forced) social peace, and the modicum Ghad Al-Thawra Party (Hizb Ghad Al-Thawra)
of economic egalitarian leveling of social fortunes in the early years of Ba`thist rule. However, irrespective of Al-Karama Party
these facts the Syrian regime proceeded to suffocate its people politically, and fostered a maturing neoliberal National Progressive Unionist (Tagammu) Party
repression that sucked the blood out of most Syrians, forty years on. National Democratic Party Offshoots
Al-Nour Party
Between 1970 and March 2011, and particularly after 1982, the Syrian regime had what can be approximated to Reform and Development Party-Misruna
be unparalleled control of their populationwhere some quipped that even mosquitos were monitored. That Socialist Popular Alliance Party
period, that entire generation, could have been an opportunity to create the most formidable challenge to all the Al-Wafd Party
culprits the regime purports to fight, whether internally and externally, with its socialist, anti-imperialist rubric. Al-Wasat Party
Instead, the regime filled its many prisons in large measure with Marxists, socialists, nationalists, and any
independent voice that actually, not just rhetorically, lived for the principles professed by the regime. The
difference was that these individuals dared to voice these principles, and/or hold the regime accountable for
abandoning them. Instead, for decades, the strong men of Syria, through the internal police (security branches)
as well as the policies they crafted and knew well, imposed unspeakable daily, even hourly repression and fear
in times of so-called social peace () . They made grown men and women urinate in their pants out of
fear in front of their family as secret service personnel visited their homes at night to ask questionsand those
were the fortunate ones. Such imagery is but a symbol of the normal state of affairs that characterized the forty-
year period for anyone with public aspirations that diverged ever so slightly from those of the regime. Multiply this
by a few decades to conjure a full picture of the pent up tensions, resentment, and revenge-prone attitudes. The
documentation is overwhelming and such practices had nothing to do in essence with any value related to
combatting Israel, imperrialism, or external intervention.
Films in Classes
Moreover, the regimes bourgeoisie or ruling elitewhich came into full bloom after the 1980s, from the top
family to most state officials and willing partners in the private sectorsiphoned off the resources that could
have built sophisticated industries, improved educational systems, nearly eliminated poverty, and fed Syrians for
generations to come. Instead, much of these resources were squandered to create and implicate a crony ruling
class. By 2005, this class or elite (it does not fit a classic definition) was instrumental in calling the
developmental shots from afar, beyond the confines of the state. This was the case because by then the regime More Film Reviews at Jadaliyya
had become so deeply embourgeoisified (I borrow this term from Professor Raymond Hinnebuschblame Revisiting Arna's Children
him) that its socioeconomic interest was hardly distinguishab le from that of crony capitalists, except rhetorically, or
in times profound crisis. Even the die-hard old guard who favored retaining a large public sector was only in From Dance to Transcendence
disagreement about the identity of those capturing private wealth, not the process in question.
The Long and Invisible Road
Just as the scant rainfall and ensuing drought paralyzed the countryside during most of the past decade, so too
did the Syrian regime leave the largest and socioeconomically most-vulnerable portion of its population out to dry From Gun to Pen
by that time. The regime and its intellectuals claim that they have maintained a modicum of services that
prevented broad-based extreme poverty. This is not completely untrue. Yet, by the end of the last decade, that "Budrus": The Potential and Limits of Non-
egalitarian narrative lost all steam with the lifting of fundamental subsidies (especially on oil/energy)a trend Violent Popular Struggle
that was likely to continue given the regimes neoliberal orientation. All people could see by the end of the decade
is the stark contradiction between their fate and that of the few who dominated public and private space, Jadaliyya Features
resources, and even life itself in Syria.

All of the above manifested in the service of regime survival, over any and every principle known to human kind,

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 including socialism and social justice, anti-imperialism, and resistance to tyranny and exploitation in all their
forms. Those who support the socialist and resistance coating as a compelling defense of the Syrian regime
(and there is some substance to such claims) are either complicit in the regimes crimes or uninformed about
Syrias modern history and the trade-offs made, including with same reactionary actors that the Syrian regime
now accuses of conspiracy against it.

After all, as that line in the film Scarface reminds us, look at you now. Why would the Syrian regime allow this to
happen to the supposedly last historical stronghold of anti-imperialism in the region? Well, because this anti-
imperialism was always secondary to regime survival (by any means necessary) as a priority. Thus, there is not
much to discuss in the end. The comparatively higher nationalist credentials (when compared to other Arab
regimes) the Asad regime garnered through the years was squandered systematically by the treatment of its
citizens. Thus, most of those segments of Syrian society who continue to side with the regime do so much more
out of rational choice, considering the alternatives, and much less out of belief in what the regime stands for. The
oft-repeated statements by many Syrians that we were fine and comfortable applies to a small socioeconomic
segment that was socially fortunate and that got accustomed to an abridged form of citizenship. Perhaps Syria
was not fully ripe for a spontaneous uprising in 2011, but if one got started, by hook or by crook, it was bound to
catch ample fire because the regime had been pouring gasoline all over its population for decades.

The Regimes Allies

Egypt Map and Stats

Syrias allies, the states that support the current regime (i.e., Iran, Russia, andto an extentChina) are not You need to upgrade your Flash Player
much of a disappointment, as they are not pretending to fight for democracy (at home or abroad) or for a Syrian Population 82,079,636
revolution. In fact, they are not pretending to fight for pretty much anything lofty in relation to Syria. With some GDP $497.8 billion
variance, their own reprehensible records of repression, exploitation, and/or aggression did not make them Unemployment 9%; Youth Unemployment (ages 15-
contenders for much in that regard. No one in and outside Syria was reaching out to them, assuming they can 24): 24.8%
help Syrians in their fight against dictatorship. By contrast, Hizballah, as a non-state actor that felt compelled to Internet Users 20.136 million (2009)
fight alongside the Syrian regime after watching on the sidelines, has lost significant moral credibility outside its Exchange Rate 5.6124 Egyptian pounds per US
immediate constituency. This is a direct result of its participation in what most see as deeply antithetical to its dollar
professed values, however the intervention is spun (In fact, Hizballahs justification for intervention went through GDP Growth Rate 5.1%
various iterations of a short-list of limited rationales before settling on mostly broad arguments that point to the Military Expenditures 3.4% of GDP (World Rank: 35)
regional threat of remarkable ISIS and jihadist growth of late). Nonetheless, despite widespread criticism and Health Expenditures 6.4% of GDP (World Rank: 94)
condemnation, what remains of Hizballahs military power and moral capital is its potential deterrence against Population Growth Rate 1.96%
Israels expansionist aggression and ethnic cleansingonly now with a nearly destroyed Syrian partner. Those Age Structure 0-14 years: 32.7%; 15-64 years:
who dismiss this role are doing it for the wrong reason. For Israels decision-makers care little about Hizballahs 62.8%; 65 years and over: 4.5%
purity and much more about its enhanced capacity since 2006 to inflict damage and act as a real deterrent, at Literacy 71.4%
least for the time being. Thus, at this point, attempts to purify or dismiss Hizballahs general resistance role are Religious Demographics Muslim (mostly Sunni)
both off mark. The truth remains: no one worth their analytical salt expected Hizballah to support a Syrian uprising 90%; Coptic 9%; other Christian 1%
against the regime that supported its resistance against Israel, even if it was completely independent of any
external actors.

Friends of the Opposition(s) It was a blissfully nave assumption

that a civilian prime minister could
As to the purported friends of the Syrian revolution, the list is long and ranges from ugly to despicable. Let us not
battle a powerful and deeply
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 forget about the rushed, callous, and destructive support of Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United States battle a powerful and deeply
(and friends) for anything that would displace the regime, as though any of these countries ever had the best
embedded military regimethe very
interest of Syrians in mind, or as though they had an iota of interest in fostering an independent, democratic
opposition. Quite the contrary on both counts. regime that appointed himbut I
wanted to believe in him.
Every single one of these countries is on record, at one time or another, for supporting the Syrian regime prior to
the uprising while it had its boot on its own peoples necks. More significantly, every one of these countries was
willing in the early weeks of the Syrian uprising to strike a deal with the Syrian regime that would effectively click | email | tw eet
prolong dictatorship in return for a coterie of compromises that served their actual time-tested pro-dictatorial
interests. Many in the ranks of all levels of the opposition knew this, and privately disrespected those reactionary
allies. Some of us heard such proclamations from defectors (from the ranks of the opposition) later on, and
some of us heard it while they were embraced by those very actors. However, nearly all varieties of opposition
groups/members ignored the implication of their own complicity on the grounds that they needed to get
help/support from somewhere. And support they did get, to ends that made their purported helplessness
Latest Entries
beforehand pale in comparison.
View All Entries
Conservative oil-rich Arab regimes, the champions of the Syrian opposition, have treated their populations
(whether citizens or migrants) in reprehensible ways for decades, often like cattle in the case of the laborers. The New Texts Out Now: Lara Deeb and Jessica
list certainly includes smaller countries like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, who are awash with cash and in Winegar, Anthropologys Politics: Disciplining
no need to practically enslave human beings. Yet they also want to fight for democracy for Syrians. The same the Middle East
applies to Saudi Arabias reprehensible human rights record, an inspiration and a model for the execution and Call for Applicants--Doctoral Dissertation
punishment methods of the stateless IS. The humor of these regimes public positions is interrupted only by Summer Workshop: Researching Lebanon
the grand miscalculations these states have committed in supporting policies that came back to haunt them: a :
growing Frankenstein, who mimics aspects of those very regimes. Taking some pause so as not to inadvertently
Fact Check: The Truth About Shaykh Nimr al-
strengthen ISIS even further, these states will likely come back to support the deepening of mayhem in Syria
Nimr
under the pretense of supporting the moderate opposition.
Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (January 3)
For its part, the United States destroyed Iraq, not once but twice. The United States destroyed the human fabric of :
the country as well prior to the invasion, with a dozen years of suffocating sanctions that harmed the population to
no end. These wars and sanctions produced a most disturbingly brutal chaos, the big bang, from which the

entire sub-region is suffering in various forms. In this context, IS is but one artifact.

All this damage was inflicted on the neighboring country of Iraq, ruled by a savage dictator that the United States Last Week on Jadaliyya (December 28-January
propped up just years prior. Why, then, would a super power that coordinated and participated in such savagery 3)
care about any modicum of human decency in the neighboring country of Syria? Betting on the United States for
Egypt Media Roundup (January 4)
supporting any human value in the region that might directly or indirectly threaten its allies in the region
(Apartheid Israel and Arab dictatorships) is like betting on the Taliban to develop feminist governance. Yet, many La question du patrimoine en Algrie
continue to do precisely that, whether out of helplessness, naivety, or opportunism. There is no need here to Monsoon Revolution
address the entire destructive record of the United States policies in the region during the past half century.
Foreign Policies Media Roundup (November-
Suffice it to say that despite the superficial rhetoric peddled by United States officials, no other country has
December)
contributed as much, even if sometimes unwittingly, to the propping up of dictators, extremists, and, notoriously,
ethnic cleansing (in the case of Israel and Palestine). The record is not only reprehensible, but everything about Palestine Media Roundup (December 24 - 30)
the conduct of US foreign policy today/recentlywhether in terms of the NATO intervention in Libya, the support of Arabian Peninsula Media Roundup (December

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 the authoritarian coup in Egypt, the support of thwarting the uprising in Bahrain, and its counter-productive policy 29)
in Syriaall speak of a continuation of unprincipled and brutal policies in the region.
Cities Media Roundup (December 2015)

It should not be forgotten that all these Arab and US regimes will not support any outcome that compromises Syria Media Roundup (December 30)
their ability to continue to dominate the region with impunity. This occurs alongside otherwise silent partners like Syria: An Interview with Samer Abboud
Israel, who emerges as the biggest winner from plucking all the potential regional challengers to its military NEWTON 2015 Year in Review
belligerence in the area, leaving Egypt, Jordan, and the Arab Gulf states as willing partners in its settler-colonial
Last Week on Jadaliyya (December 21-27)
existence. Judging from the history of interaction (or lack thereof) between Arab Gulf states and Israel, it is a
convenient formula. It meshes perfectly well with the US interest in dealing with compliant Arab states. Why
should anyone expect this arrangement to be disrupted in favor of any type of a genuine Syrian revolution,
Islamist or atheist, socialist or capitalist?

The recent and ongoing assault on Yemen by the very same actors, led by Saudi Arabia this time, speak of the
continuation of unprincipled viciousness that will be inflicted on any country/actor that manages to escape the
hold of these actors and/or disrupt their rule/dominion. These are the friends of the Syrian revolution, leaving the
overwhelming majority of ordinary Syrians stuck between these actors, the Syrian regime, and the fanatic takfiris.

The Opposition

From the early phases, the miraculously quick inception of a Syrian opposition under the rubric of the Syrian
National Council, as well as its equally dependent and ineffectual successors, has been a virtual disaster for any
movement seeking to depose the authoritarian regime. This is caused in part by mimicking some of its practices
regarding favoritism, corruption, and lack of transparency, but mostly because of its failure to develop an
independent platform that includes all potential Syrian opposition groups, including the ones that refused to have
external masters and external intervention in Syria. Along with the seemingly simultaneously ubiquitous and
elusive FSA (Free Syrian Army, what is often termed the Syrian secular opposition), and certainly the regimes
incessant brutality, these early risers helped set the stage for what came next during the second half of 2011 and
matured in 2012 and 2013: a penetrated militarization of the uprising that continued to serve and swell the ranks
of extremists groups that eventually pulled the rug from under any decent notion of a collective uprising.

The arguments that focus exclusively on the regimes role in militarizing the conflict do not take into
consideration the meteoric rise of violence that was either encouraged or spun out of control from the other side,
all with external inpouring of material support from the usual suspect discussed above. Other opposition factions
developed their military wings before, or without, developing a movement, contributing more to radicalization and
to the undermining of the uprising than to deposing the regime. The various dealing with Israel on several
grounds of some of the militants is not just a warning signal, but a good indicator of where the country would be
headed under their control should these specific groups prevail.

How can such opposition groups prevail if their supporters are equally horrific, though globally more brutal, as
the regime they are trying to depose?

As discussed at the outset, that is not to say that the opposition and all its supporters are of one color, or
equally responsible for the chaos, violence, and thuggish-ness that proliferated. In contrast to what some would

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 like to believe, millions of Syrians still vehemently oppose the regime, and just like those trapped by the regime
as the lesser evil among other choices, those other segments of Syrians are trapped by the existing varieties of
militant opposition. Still, many are resisting and building in their own way irrespective, on all sides, and it is these
people who will be the future of Syrian; not the regime and its cronies nor the militant opposition, and one hopes
not the civilian opposition leaders residing in Doha and Istanbul.

The ISIS* Factor

Finally, the ISIS factor is at once very much part of a potential settlement in Syria and a regional factor that is
certainly not limited to resolving the crisis in that country. From the very beginning of the meteoric rise of IS, many
of us warned of taking extreme positions on ISISs future. In this very publication, I cautioned in September 2014
against assuming a continuing whole-sale take-over by ISIS and against dismissing its rise as ephemeral. The
lessons learned regarding the ISIS phenomenon throw into stark relief the impact of the combination of external
superpower aggression and both internal repression and economic exploitation. It is almost comical how pro-
regime analysts blame the rise of radical Islamists primarily on external intervention and how pro-US and pro-
opposition analysts blame that rise primarily on the regimes oppression. The following will center the
discussion on Syria.

(*leaving ISIS as the designation, as opposed to IS, is deliberate).

In Syria, Islamists had absolutely no political place after the 1982 regime-led massacre in Hama. During the past
decade, Arab Gulf fundsnotably from Saudia Arabiasteadily supported cultural and charity-based Islamic
activism and networking. Consequently, the transformation into radicalism needed but a spark. The regimes
brutal repression of protests at the outset, and the eventual support of the friends of Syria (listed above) for the
fight against the regime, ensured that sectarianization quickly followed the militarization of the uprising, with
extremist groups spearheading the effort.

Not anticipating the transformation despite ample warnings, non-Islamist opposition members did not
distinguish between supporting such radical Islamist groups and supporting other opponents of the regime.
Only now, in retrospect, did such lack of discernment strike many (not all) as irresponsible and counter-
revolutionary. The rise of ISIS deflected attention from focusing the fight against the Syrian regime, depleted a
measure of the fighting force of various opposition groups, and bifurcated regional and international pressure
and preferences regarding the potential role of the Syrian regime in any settlement, at least for the time being. All
the while, both Syria and its neighbor Iraq, as social and political entities, are/were being incrementally
damaged, reminding us of the difficulty of seeing the Syrian calamity only as a local issue. It is also a reminder
that the states that developed some sort of oppositiondirect, indirect, principled or notto regional dominance
of the United States and its local allies have been torn apart by wars and invasions. This list includes Syria, Iraq,
and Libya (notwithstanding the Libyan rapprochement with the Bush administration prior to 2008).

The destruction of Syria and Iraq may have well been catalyzed by their respective rulers. However, this
destruction was ultimately supported and encouraged (or directly and savagely managed in the case of Iraq) by
all these actors. For these actors, all voices that reject external dominance with select regional players as
beneficiaries must be contained. To say so is neither a puzzle nor a discovery. This is not to be forgotten, even as

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 a potential deal might be struck between Iran and the United States. After all, why should this (or Iran) be
outside the dominance formula?

Most other players not discussed above are less consequential or are spin-offs of the above actors and
dynamics. In all cases, their impact on the Syrian scene is less immediate. At best, they are a subject of another
treatment.

The Difficult Road Ahead: The Irony of Settling Destructive Stalemates

For now, there is no escaping the grim reality that there are no satisfying answers in Syria. Quick fixes that do not
engage the above-listed contradictions will reproduce the same demons, even if with a time lag. Not all is lost,
so long as we do not place undue hope in the actors and dynamics above. The requirements of a negotiated
settlementan exit from the current mayhem and destruction of Syrian societyare diametrically opposed to the
requirements of revolution. There is a political choice that has to be made. But not all parties are ready or
convinced of this need, for all parties fate is now firmly tied to external actors.

In the mean time, we can separate the social from the political in terms of moving forward. The social dimension,
the continuity of life, does not have to wait for a political solution (or even military solution).

Socially speaking, careful examination of productive rebuilding and regeneration efforts yields that they can no
longer be holistic. They cannot rest on one formula or one solution or one source. They must be a function of
aggregate types of actions and efforts that do not need to be necessarily harmonious. The idea that there needs
to be a center is as increasingly untenable, and undesirable, as it potentially oppressive. In the context of such
decentered moves forward, there will be no icing, but there could be some cake.

Therefore, plugging into one or more of these myriad societal rebuilding efforts that are taking place today,
sometime at the neighborhood level, is a gainful way forward for most Syrians, and supporters of a freer and
reconstructed Syrian society. Identifying some of these efforts, or creating new ones, is a necessary challenge for
any party willing and able to contribute to bringing Syria back from the brink and setting up the building blocks of
any workable future. (We will feature in this publication a list of such social and humanitarian efforts, despite their
divergent political positions). While ultimately sub-optimal and, for many, unsatisfying, the road ahead in these
bleak times in Syria is one of modest and relatively limited initiatives that are often isolated from one another but
nonetheless cumulative. The horizon is not yet clear for venturing into or supporting large-scale reconstruction,
nor should we clamor for it lest we replace one demon with another prematurely.

Politically speaking, the answers are always more difficult. Though there is no shortage of analysis, articles,
books, and think-tank reports, the same best answer many of us offered previously continues to apply: there is
no substitute, despite its difficulty on several counts, to a negotiated political settlement that involves all parties
interested in a sovereign Syria. At this point, the argument that certain parties* should not be part of Syrias future,
whether it is the regime or Jabhat al-Nusra, among others, must be weighed against the alternative: i.e., leaving
out broad sections of the population that must be part of any settlement, irrespective of who represents their
interests. The regime, for instance, is not just the regime and its immediate cronies. For many Syrians, it is a life-
vest, for good or for ill. A similar logic applies to other groups.

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 A concerted effort should be made to emphasize the difference between who represents ones interests today
and who represents Syrias best interests as a country. The truth is that the answer for the former is vastly
different from the answer for the latter according to most Syrians. For supporters of this or that side/group/regime
today in Syria are not choosing among many or even good alternatives. They are also in large measure stuck.
Therefore, as individuals and groups reject the inclusion of this or that party, they are rejecting close to one-
quarter, one-third, or one-half of the population, inadvertently or intentionally, but certainly counter-productively.

Furthermore, rejecting the inclusion of certain parties in negotiation, or calling for their destruction, comes at a
price. A collapse of all semblance of a state is an irresponsible way forward under the current and foreseeable
circumstances. And denying the participation of parties on the grounds that they are reactionary or connected to
outside actors might make a settlement arithmetically meaningless, considering the thick relations between the
opposition (as well as the regime) and foreign actors. It will be a long road before internal parties to the conflict
come to the realization that the sub-optimal outcome is their best choice. (IS is not included here because it is so
far not interested in confining its gaze or ambition to Syria).

The reason why there are no easy answers in Syria is that even this potentially workable solution requires the
participation and conviction of the same set of foreign countries that are part of the problem on all sides. Still, this
is a much better and potentially more accountable route than a single-side sponsorship of an outcome,
considering existing possibilities. However, it would have to take something close to a miracle under the current
circumstances to convince the external powers that the opportunity cost of not favoring such a negotiated solution
in unison, and the compromises they would have to entertain and eventually make, is actually higher than they
can afford. As grim as this might sound, it might have to take a tectonic shift, or a monumental event, in and
around the Syrian scene to spur the adoption of such simple, if improbable, logic.

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Nathan Arries Works at Virginia Industries for the Blind

Why are the gulf Arab states so opposes to the Assad regime?
Like Reply Aug 8, 2015 10:34pm

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