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Summary of Vika Analica

Decision Models and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision Making 20140510304

Michael Minor Japans Political Governmen

Based on Michael Minor article about Decision Models and Japanese Foreign Policy
Decision Making, there are three case studies are examined in decision models. The first is
routine that decisions reached as Allison and Halperin which usually describe in bureaucratic
politics. Second is Political that decisions which have the flavor of interest group politics.
The last model is Critical that decisions suggest an approximation.

Table 1 Decision Models and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision Making

Type of Time for Event Issue Participants Action Decision
Number Locus
Issue Decision Anticipations Stakes Channels Output
Routine Ample Yes Low Few Governmental Regular- Routine,
vertical technical
Politica Ample Yes High Many Governmental/Extra Variable Predictable
l -governmental
Critical Constrained No High Very Governmental Ad hoc- Creative
few horizontal
According Richardson, there are 4 actors in the Japanese policy that can be divided
into the bureaucracy, the prime minister executive elite, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
and the internal components of the LDP, opposition parties, and interest group.

a) Type One: The Routine Decision

The routine foreign policy decision involves noncontroversial situation with
political significance. Wherever this decision apply in LDP, the opposition and the
executive elite. Within the bureaucracy, decision output is obtained through
regular vertical channels, according to standard operating procedures.
The case of this decision is about The GATT Tokyo Round of Negotiations.
In 1964-1967, The Kennedy Round of International tariff negotiations led to
pledge for tariff reduction which had been carried out by the government on 1967.
After that, in 1973 the stage had been set for the Tokyo Round of negotiations on
tariff reduction and made some of cabinet ministers involved in the early phase of
negotiation. About this case, the media were not involved and the public opinion
was never sufficiently aroused to express itself in any overt manner. So decision
making for the Tokyo Round after 1978 was largely confined to several ministries
under the general leadership to the minister for External Economic Affairs. And
the minister that involved in this case is the Economic Planning Affairs, the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, International Trade and Industry,
Agriculture and Forestry. In it handling, the concepts used in this decision is a
political bureaucracy. Where in this case, any minister who had negotiated in
accordance with their respective positions.

b) Type Two: The Political Decision

The political decisions are politically sensitive and controversial that could
change Japans international position. In this decision, the same crytalization of
opinion can take place in the political parties which factional politics become a
keynote of the Japanese decision.
The case of this decisions is about Revising the US Japan Scurity Threaty
on May-June 1960. SO at that time, a popular ant-treaty movement developed
after Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi signed a revised treaty in Washington on
January 24, 1960. The treaty was introduced for ratification into the lower house
of the Diet on February 4.
On May 19 there was an incident media originator to enter into anti-Kishi, The
Zengakuren (National Students Federation). So that it caused some faculties of the
University of Tokyo signed a petition demanding the dissolution of the Diet and
new elections. The incident was greater when Eisenhower's press secretary, James
Hagerty, and Ambassador dor MacArthur surrounded by Zengakuren on 10 June.
After that there was violence involving six hundred students were injured on June
15. On June 19, more than 300 thousand of demonstrators surrounded the Diet. So
on June 23, Kishi announced his resignation.

c) Type Three: The Critical Situation

The explanation of critical or crisis divided in 3 dimensions. The first is
organizational behavior in arriving at decision. The second is the nature of the
resulting decisions and the last is defined by situational parameters in term of
organizational behavior.

Onel cogently argues that the pressure of a crisis shapes excellent decisions
through creative adaptation. And in other side, Charles Hermann said if the third
dimension of crisis is the situational milieu that can as involving surprise, high
perceived threats to the decisions and short decision time.
The example of this decision is Tanaka Goes to Beijing. In this case, Deputy
Prime Minister Takeo Miki imposed on group decision making. This occurs due to
open his own candidacy for the post of prime minister in the election. This is
based when Tanaka and Ohira traveled to Beijing with their own proposals and
back in Tokyo with Chinese responses were immediately shown Tanaka and
Then the chairman of the Democratic Socialists and the Japan Socialist Party
took a position in favor of non-partisan Tanaka visits. Wherever in this case, the
opposition politician acting individually. Even Takeiri not report formally to the
party on her journey. So that in this case, Fukui interprets as meaning that Takeiri
become part of a new policy group so formed around Tanaka and Ohira.
The Bureaucracy
In the last week of July, Takeiri still negotiating in Beijing with a working
group was formed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lead some activities. After
Tanaka and Ohira made the decision to go to Beijing in late September, the work
shifted from regular channel for ad hoc groups. During this period the ad hoc
group of bureaucrats working directly for Tanaka and Ohira and is not responsible
to superiors in the bureaucracy foreign ministry
Big Business, Public Opinion, and the Media
In this case, big business did not consolidate their position. So things that
happen can be said of public opinion sufficient to support normalization. In other
words, non-government supports normalization of relations with the PRC.
decision-making from Tanaka to visit Beijing, namely:
1. Prime Minister Tanaka and Foreign Minister Ohira took the initiative in
mobilizing support for normalization with Beijing and took steps to
neutralize such opposition as presented itself
2. there was some opposition in the LDP and segments of big business, but
the opposition gradually fell into line.
3. the policy-making process was dominated and almost totally orchestrated
by a very small ad hoc cadre of Diet members and Ministry officials