THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and the HONG KONG & SHANGHAI

BANKING CORPORATION (HSBC) v. JOSE VERA, Judge ad interim of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and MARIANO CU UNJIENG (65 Phil 56)
November 16, 1937

FACTS:
- The criminal case, People v. Cu Unjieng was filed in the Court of First Instance
(CFI) in Manila, with HSBC intervening in the case as private prosecutor.
- The CFI rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing Cu Unjieng to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years of prison mayor. (Jan. 8, 1934)
- Upon appeal, it was modified to an indeterminate penalty of from five years
and six months of prison correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-
seven days of prison mayor, but affirmed the judgments in all other respects.
- Cu Unjieng filed a Motion for Reconsideration and four successive motions for
new trial which were all denied on December 17, 1935. Final judgment was
entered on Dec. 18, 1935. He filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court but got
denied on Nov 1936. The SC subsequently denied Cu Unjiengs petition for
leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or new trial, then
remanded the case to the court of origin for execution of judgment.
- Cu Unjieng filed an application for probation before the trial court, under the
provisions of Act 4221 of the defunct Philippine Legislature. He states he is
innocent of the crime; he has no criminal record; and that he would observe
good conduct in the future.
- CFI Manila Judge Jose Vera set the petition for hearing for probation on April 5,
1937.
- HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the
constitutionality of the Probation Act since it violates the equal protection of
laws and gives unlawful and improper delegation to provincial boards.
- Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those
provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary not lower than
provincial fiscals by respective provincial boards.
- The City Fiscal of Manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues raised
by HSBC, arguing that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Act 4221
bypasses this exclusive power of the Chief Executive.
- Hence this petition in the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the constitutionality of Act 4221 has been properly raised in
these proceedings;
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not Act 4221 is constitutional based on these
three grounds:
a. It encroaches upon the pardoning power of the executive
b. It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c. It denies the equal protection of the laws

HELD/RATIO:
1. Yes. Constitutional questions will not be determined by the courts unless
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case, lis mota. Constitutionality issues may be raised in
prohibition and certiorari proceedings, as they may also be raised in
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus proceedings. The general rule
states that constitutionality should be raised in the earliest possible
opportunity (during proceedings in initial/inferior courts). It may be said that
the state can challenge the validity of its own laws, as in this case. The well-
settled rule is that the person impugning validity must have personal and
substantial interest in the case (i.e. he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result of its enforcement). If Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the
People of the Philippines have substantial interest in having it set aside.

2.
a. No. There exists a distinction between pardon and probation. Pardoning
power is solely within the power of the Executive. Probation has an
effect of temporary suspension, and the probationer is still not exempt
from the entire punishment which the law inflicts upon him as he
remains to be in legal custody for the time being.
b. Yes. The Probation Act does not lay down any definite standards by
which the administrative boards may be guided in the exercise of
discretionary powers, hence they have the power to determine for
themselves, whether or not to apply the law or not. This therefore
becomes a surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards. It is
unconstitutional.
c. Yes. Due to the unwarranted delegation of legislative power, some
provinces may choose to adopt the law or not, thus denying the equal
protection of laws. It is unconstitutional.

PEOPLE v. VERA

July 5, 2013 Leave a comment

FACTS: Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for
reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was
convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon
another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the
law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the
Constitution provides equal protection of laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue
delegation of power because providing probation, in effect, is granting
freedom, as in pardon.

HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as
follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective
provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates
not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer
shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the
direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can
provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation
within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where
no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation.

There is no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law
which permits such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and
impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination,
it is within the constitutional prohibition.

Villegas

Villegas vs. Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS: This case involves an ordinance prohibiting aliens from being

employed or engage or participate in any position or occupation or business
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the
permit fee of P50.00. Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was
employed in Manila, filed a petition to stop the enforcement of such
ordinance as well as to declare the same null and void. Trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: WON said Ordinance violates due process of law and equal protection
rule of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The Ordinance The ordinance in question violates the due process
of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution. Requiring a person before
he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor who may withhold or
refuse it at his will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people
in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the
Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once
an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law.
This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection
under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in
the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas
employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not
apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art
13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police
power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the
deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with
the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to
ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged
Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid
classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by
themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed.
There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers
but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is
well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not
import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification, provided that:

1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the
right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public
safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic
helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the
contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of
legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.