EPICHARIS T. GARCIA, vs.

THE FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE, LOYOLA SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY,

FACTS: That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 4. That on May 30, 1975,
when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-76, Respondent told her about the letter he had
written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; 5. That the reasons stated in said
letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the
school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 6. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in
said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy
the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's
Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for
admission at the UST Graduate School; 7 Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her
pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in
Theology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is
being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more; 8. That Petitioner, considering that time was of the
essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as
a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the
subject she would take; 9. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the
First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11,
1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 2 She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current
semester. She made it more specific in a pleading she called Amended Petition so that she would be allowed cross-enrollment even
beyond the June 11, 1975 deadline for registration and that whatever units may be accredited to her in the UST Ecclesiastical
Faculties be likewise recognized by respondent. Her petition included the letter of respondent Father Lambino which started on a
happy note that she was given the grade of B+ and B in two theology subjects, but ended in a manner far from satisfactory for her,
as shown by this portion thereof: "Now, you will have to forgive me for going into a matter which is not too pleasant. The faculty had
a meeting after the summer session and several members are strongly opposed to having you back with us at Loyola School of
Theology. In the spirit of honesty may I report this to you as their reason: They felt that your frequent questions and difficulties were
not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the
presentation a chance and exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and
problems. The way things are, I would say that the advisability of your completing a program (with all the course work and thesis
writing) with us is very questionable. That you have the requisite intellectual ability is not to be doubted. But it would seem to be in
your best interests to work with a faculty that is more compatible with your orientation. I regret to have to make this report, but I am
only thinking of your welfare."

HELD: Petition lacks merit,

In collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its
classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is
granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay
students admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the
Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to
a degree program; Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said
admission was not an admission to a degree program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate
School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de
Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some
courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Furthermore, petitioner was not charged a single centavo by the Loyola
School of Theology and/or the Ateneo de Manila University in connection with the courses she took in the summer of 1975,
as she was allowed to take it free of charge; That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of
Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue
admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other
considerations such as personality traits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the
nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. The Petition for Mandamus therefore does not lie, as there is no duty,
much less a clear duty, on the part of respondent to admit the petitioner therein in the current year to take up further
courses in the Loyola School of Theology." 5It was likewise alleged in the aforesaid comment that as set forth in the letter of
May 19, 1975, the decision not to allow petitioner to take up further courses in said seminary "is not arbitrary, as it is based
on reasonable grounds, ... ." 6 Then reference was made to the availability of non-judicial remedies which petitioner could
have pursued. 7 The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit. Petitioner sought permission to reply and it
was granted. Thereafter, she had a detailed recital of why under the circumstances she is entitled to relief from the courts. In
a resolution of August 8, 1975, this Court considered the comment of respondent as answer and required the parties to file
their respective memoranda. That they did, and the petition was deemed submitted for decision. As was made clear at the
outset, we do not see merit in it. It must therefore be dismissed.

For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood.
Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman. And even
assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent
 to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to
limitations of space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations."
Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted
that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon . It would follow then that the school
or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. 'The internal conditions
for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (i)
the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure. It would be a poor prospect
for academic freedom if universities had to rely on the literal interpretation of their constitutions in order to acquire for their
academic members control of these four functions, for in one constitution or another most of these functions are laid on the
shoulders of the law governing body .

DLSU VS. CA 541 SCRA 22 (2007)

FACTS:
Mr. James Yap, while eating alone at Manangs Restaurant, overheard the conversation of the two men from Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity bad-mouthing
at Domino Lux (his fraternity). After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the
Student Council.
Then, 5 members of the Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity went to the tambayan of the Domino Lux Fraternity in the campus to look for Mr. Yap (based on
their descriptions.)
March 29, 1995: Mr. Yap was attacked and mauled by respondents Bungubung, Valdes, Reverente and Lee. Mr. Pascual, brod of Mr. Yap, informed
Domino Lux about what happened but the latter decided not to do anything. Mr. Pascual, together with Mr. Cano and Perez, was mauled again by the
respondents.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael
Perez, are members of the Domino Lux Fraternity, while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard
Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
Petitioners filed a complaint to the Disciplinary Board against respondents.
As it appeared that students from DLSU and CSB were involved in the mauling incidents, a joint DLSU-CSB Discipline Board was formed to
investigate the incidents.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding private respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme
penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
Private respondents separately moved for reconsideration before the Office of the Senior Vice-President for Internal Operations of DLSU. The
motions were all denied in a Letter-Resolution.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The following day, June 6, 1995, respondent Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons
acting for and in its behalf to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to
immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar for the second term of school year (SY) 1995.
Other respondents filed for petitions for intervention. The petitioners, except James Yap, filed a petition to dismiss the petitions-in-intervention.
Respondent-Judge granted the petitions for intervention and denied the petition to dismiss by the petitioners (in this case).
Despite the said order, private respondent Aguilar was refused enrollment by petitioner DLSU when he attempted to enroll on September 22, 1995 for
the second term of SY 1995-1996. Thus, on September 25, 1995, Aguilar filed with respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners
(respondents there) in contempt of court.
On October 16, 1995, petitioner DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judges order and writ of preliminary injuction.
On April 12, 1996, the CA granted petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction.
On May 14, 1996, the CHED issued its questioned Resolution No. 181-96, summarily disapproving the penalty of expulsion for all private
respondents. As for Aguilar, he was to be reinstated, while other private respondents were to be excluded.
DLSU still prevent Mr. Aguilar from enrolling and attending his classes which prompted the latters lawyer to send several demand letters. The Court
of Appeals said in its decision that the resolution of CHED is immediately executory in character.
On March 27, 2006, private respondent Aguilar filed his manifestation stating that he has long completed his course at petitioner DLSU. He finished
and passed all his enrolled subjects but despite having completed all the academic requirements for his course, DLSU has not issued a certificate of
completion/graduation in his favor.

HELD: : Ruling:
Petitioner DLSU is now faced with the spectacle of having two different directives from the CHED and the respondent Judge CHED ordering the
exclusion of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr., and the Judge ordering petitioner DLSU to allow them to enroll and
complete their degree courses until their graduation.
According to the SC, This is the reason why we opt to decide the whole case on the merits, brushing aside technicalities, in order to settle the
substantial issues involved. This Court has the power to take cognizance of the petition at bar due to compelling reasons, and the nature and
importance of the issues raised warrant the immediate exercise of our jurisdiction.

1. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to
a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are:
that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2 ) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity
to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted
their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the
Board. Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline Board
considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint.Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic
freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.
The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was proven by substantial evidence. Courts reject alibi when there
are credible eyewitnesses to the crime who can positively identify the accused. Alibi is an inherently weak defense and courts must receive
it with caution because one can easily fabricate an alibi. The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is
neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v. Court of
Industrial Relations, it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Respondents were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible
for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims. The alibi of Aguilar was
supported by a certification signed by an authority. Therefore, alibi assumes commensurate strength. This is but consistent with the
presumption of innocence in favor of accused.
3. The penalty of expulsion imposed by DLSU on private respondents is disproportionate to their misdeed.
It is true that schools have the power to instil discipline in their students as subsumed in their academic freedom and that the establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and
efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. This power, however, does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a
penalty which is not commensurate with the gravity of the misdeed. If the concept of proportionality between the offense committed and the sanction
imposed is not followed, an element of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise to a due process question.
The petition is partially granted. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated July 30, 1996 and dated October 15, 1996, and Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 36, Order dated January 7, 1997 are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, while CHED Resolution 181-96 dated May 14, 1996 is
AFFIRMED.
Final: Petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent Aguilar. On the other hand, it may
exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately
issued.

Colleges and Universities; Administrative Law; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); Republic Act No. 7722; It is the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED), not the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), which has the power of supervision and review over disciplinary
cases decided by institutions of higher learn-ingR.A. No. 7722 transferred to the CHED the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion
cases involving institution of higher learning.The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722. They include
the following: Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission.The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: x x x x n)
promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act; and o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement of
growth or development of higher education. Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED
the DECS power of supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions
of higher learning of their right to academic freedom. The policy of R.A. No. 7722 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion of the
right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all.
The law is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and observance for the continued
intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and effective leadership, the education of
high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage. It is thus safe to assume that when Congress
passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to arise in the future,
which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of higher learning of their right to academic freedom.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative Proceedings; Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED), necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that matter. Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in
stating that [j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions
shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher Education]. This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the
CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus:
Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we. To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the CHED, necessarily
includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for
that matter.

Same; Due Process; Academic Disciplinary Investigations; The Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history.The Due
Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. The constitutional behest
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible. In administrative cases, such as
investigations of students found violating school discipline, [t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands
of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2)
they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Same; Same; Same; Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings; A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due processit is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting
evidence on which a fair decision can be based.Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the
primary rights that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was
denial of due process. A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due processit is enough that the parties are
given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. To be heard does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in courtone may also be heard through pleadings and
where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.

Same; Same; Same; The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary, and cross examination is not an essential part thereof.Private
respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument
was already rejected in Guzman v. National University, 142 SCRA 699 (1986), where this Court held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not
entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline
cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.

Same; Academic Freedom; Words and Phrases; According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an
academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some restraint. According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach,
and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Same; Same; Academic Disciplinary Proceedings; By instilling discipline, the school teaches disciplinethe right to discipline the student finds
basis in the freedom what to teach.It cannot be gainsaid that the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if not
indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach. Indeed, while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right
to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation, such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its
academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for admission to its school.

Same; Same; Same; Alibis and Denials; Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidencewell-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended
parties.Private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. However, in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, the accused must
establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, the defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of
the assailant has been established by witnesses. Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the offended
parties.
Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Proof; The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student discipline cases, is neither proof beyond
reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence.The required proof in administrative cases, such as in student
discipline cases, is neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence but only substantial evidence. According to Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940), it means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.

CSC VS. SOJOR 554 SCRA 160 (2008)

FACTS: respondent Henry A Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC)
in Dumaguete city on August 1, 1991. He was subsequently reappointed by the Board of Trustees when the law mandated that a BOT be formed to
act as the governing body in state colleges. On June 25, 2004, CVPC converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU), the Board of
Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body. Meanwhile the respondent was charged with 3 administrative cases filed by CVPC faculty
members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City namely: (1) Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Falsification of Official
Document; (2) Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; and (3) Nepotism. Respondent argued that
CSC has no jurisdiction over him as presidential appointee. He further argued that only the BOT has the power to remove university officials citing
provisions of R.A. No. 8292. CSC issued a resolution dismissing respondents appeal and authorizing the regional office to proceed with the
investigation and preventively suspending the respondent. When the CSC denied the respondents motion for reconsideration with finality,
respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and prohibition. He alleged that the CSC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions; that CSC encroached
upon the academic freedom of CVPC; and that the power to remove, suspend, and discipline the president of CVPC was exclusively lodged in the
BOT of CVPC. The CA resolved in favor of respondent. It annulled the questioned CSC resolutions and permanently enjoined the CSC from
proceeding with the administrative investigation. Hence this petition was filed by CSC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction in the discipline and removal of state university officials.

HELD: The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. 28 As defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency,
subdivision, and instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. 29 It is further classified into career
and non-career service positions. Career service positions are those where: (1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. These include:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges
and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own
merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director,
Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by
the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service
Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall
under the non-career service; and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 30
Career positions are further grouped into three levels. Entrance to the first two levels is determined through competitive examinations, while entrance
to the third level is prescribed by the Career Executive Service Board. 31 The positions covered by each level are:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which involve non-professional or subprofessional
work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve professional, technical, or scientific work
in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service. 32
On the other hand, non-career service positions are characterized by: (1) entrance not by the usual tests of merit and fitness; and (2) tenure which is
limited to a period specified by law, coterminous with the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to the duration of a particular
project for which purpose employment was made.33 The law states:
The Non-Career Service shall include:
(1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
 (2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential
staff(s);
(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;
(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific
work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which
in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.34
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over all civil service positions in the government
service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.35 We find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart from the general jurisdiction granted
to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules
as:
Section 4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission shall hear and decide administrative cases
instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and actions of its
offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the final authority to pass
upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees .
Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. The Civil Service Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities, imposing
penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary brought before it on
appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by the agencies and such
other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil Service Regional Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the foregoing enumerations.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials; and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the foregoing enumerations.
Section 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. The Civil Service Commission Regional Offices shall have jurisdiction over the
following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices provided that the
alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Office, including Civil Service
examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of are employees of agencies, local or
national, within said geographical areas;
2. Complaints involving Civil Service Commission Regional Office personnel who are appointees of said office; and
3. Petitions to place respondent under Preventive Suspension.
B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Disapproval of appointments brought before it on appeal;
2. Protests against the appointments of first and second level employees brought before it directly or on appeal.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil
service officer. He was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is a non-
career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of the CSC.
II. The power of the BOR to discipline officials and employees is not exclusive. CSC has concurrent jurisdiction over a president of a state
university.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292, or the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997, under which law respondent was appointed during the time material
to the present case, provides that the schools governing board shall have the general powers of administration granted to a corporation. In addition,
Section 4 of the law grants to the board the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of Governing Boards. The governing board shall have the following specific powers and duties in
addition to its general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the board of directors of a
corporation under Section 36 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, otherwise known as the Corporation Code of the Philippines:
xxxx
h) to fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees subject to the provisions of the revised
compensation and classification system and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of service, and such
other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such regulations as it
may promulgate, any provisions of existing law to the contrary not withstanding; and to remove them for cause in accordance
with the requirements of due process of law. (Emphasis supplied)
The above section was subsequently reproduced as Section 7(i) of the succeeding law that converted CVPC into NORSU, R.A. No. 9299. Notably,
and in contrast with the earlier law, R.A. No. 9299 now provides that the administration of the university and exercise of corporate powers of the
board of the school shall be exclusive:
Sec. 4. Administration. The University shall have the general powers of a corporation set forth in Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, as amended,
otherwise known as "The Corporation Code of the Philippines." The administration of the University and the exercise of its corporate
powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Regents and the president of the University insofar as authorized by the Board.
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, there is no question that administrative power over the school exclusively belongs to its BOR. But does this
exclusive administrative power extend to the power to remove its erring employees and officials?
In light of the other provisions of R.A. No. 9299, respondents argument that the BOR has exclusive power to remove its university officials must
fail. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in
addition to its general powers of administration." This provision is essentially a reproduction of Section 4 of its predecessor, R.A. No. 8292,
demonstrating that the intent of the lawmakers did not change even with the enactment of the new law. For clarity, the text of the said section is
reproduced below:
Sec. 7. Powers and Duties of the Board of Regents. The Board shall have the following specific powers and duties in addition to its
general powers of administration and the exercise of all the powers granted to the Board of Directors of a corporation under existing
laws:
xxxx
i. To fix and adjust salaries of faculty members and administrative officials and employees, subject to the provisions of the
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System and other pertinent budget and compensation laws governing hours of
service and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant them, at its discretion, leaves of absence under such
regulations as it may promulgate, any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding; and to remove them for cause
in accordance with the requirements of due process of law.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the BOR of NORSU has the sole power of administration over the university. But this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and
removing its employees and officials.
Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no showing that
such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to
be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both
bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.37
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not
remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC.
This is not a case of first impression.
In University of the Philippines v. Regino,38 this Court struck down the claim of exclusive jurisdiction of the UP BOR to discipline its employees. The
Court held then:
The Civil Service Law (PD 807) expressly vests in the Commission appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases involving
members of the Civil Service. Section 9(j) mandates that the Commission shall have the power to "hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal." And Section 37(a) provides that, "The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more
 than thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office." (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1972 Constitution, all government-owned or controlled corporations, regardless of the manner of their creation, were considered
part of the Civil Service. Under the 1987 Constitution, only government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters fall within
the scope of the Civil Service pursuant to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), which states:
"The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters."
As a mere government-owned or controlled corporation, UP was clearly a part of the Civil Service under the 1973 Constitution and now
continues to be so because it was created by a special law and has an original charter. As a component of the Civil Service, UP is
therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its employees come under the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission .39 (Emphasis supplied)
In the more recent case of Camacho v. Gloria,40 this Court lent credence to the concurrent jurisdiction of the CSC when it affirmed that a case against
a university official may be filed either with the universitys BOR or directly with the CSC. We quote:
Further, petitioner contends that the creation of the committee by the respondent Secretary, as Chairman of the USP Board of Regents, was
contrary to the Civil Service Rules. However, he cites no specific provision of the Civil Service Law which was violated by the respondents
in forming the investigating committee. The Civil Service Rules embodied in Executive Order 292 recognize the power of the Secretary
and the university, through its governing board, to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Of course under EO 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed either with
the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service Commission, although the CSC may delegate the investigation
of a complaint and for that purpose, may deputize any department, agency, official or group of officials to conduct such
investigation.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CSC validly took cognizance of the administrative complaints directly filed before the regional office, concerning violations of civil service
rules against respondent.
III. Academic freedom may not be invoked when there are alleged violations of civil service laws and rules.
Certainly, academic institutions and personnel are granted wide latitude of action under the principle of academic freedom. Academic freedom
encompasses the freedom to determine who may teach, who may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 42 Following
that doctrine, this Court has recognized that institutions of higher learning has the freedom to decide for itself the best methods to achieve their aims
and objectives, free from outside coercion, except when the welfare of the general public so requires. 43 They have the independence to determine who
to accept to study in their school and they cannot be compelled by mandamus to enroll a student. 44
That principle, however, finds no application to the facts of the present case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the
bounds of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of
nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. These are
classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal. 45
This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution the unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory
basis.46 For that reason, a school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit violations of civil service rules under
the justification that he was free to do so under the principle of academic freedom.
Lastly, We do not agree with respondents contention that his appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the pending administrative
cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the alleged acts imputed to him. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v.
Guingona, Jr.47 and Aguinaldo v. Santos48 are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned cases are elective officials,
unlike respondent here who is an appointed official. Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. 49 Under the principle of vox populi
est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-
appointment to a non-career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-appointed respondent Sojor to the post of
university president.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED

MERCADO VS. AMA 618 SCRA 218 (2010)

Facts: The background facts are not disputed and are summarized below.

AMACC is an educational institution engaged in computer-based education in the country. One of AMACCs biggest schools in the country is its
branch at Paraaque City. The petitioners were faculty members who started teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioner Mercado was
engaged as a Professor 3, while petitioner Tonog was engaged as an Assistant Professor 2. On the other hand, petitioners De Leon, Lachica and Alba,
Jr., were all engaged as Instructor 1.5 The petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to
teach, with the following common stipulation:6

1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration
of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO. [Emphasis supplied]

For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its Guidelines on the Implementation of
AMACC Faculty Plantilla.7 Under the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based on extensive teaching experience,
capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. The performance standards under the new screening guidelines were also
used to determine the present faculty members entitlement to salary increases. The petitioners failed to obtain a passing rating based on the
performance standards; hence AMACC did not give them any salary increase. 8

Because of AMACCs action on the salary increases, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC on July 25, 2000, for
underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime and overload compensation, 13th month pay, and for discriminatory practices. 9

On September 7, 2000, the petitioners individually received a memorandum from AMACC, through Human Resources Supervisor Mary Grace
Beronia, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would no longer be renewed The petitioners amended their
labor arbitration complaint to include the charge of illegal dismissal against AMACC. In their Position Paper, the petitioners claimed that their
dismissal was illegal because it was made in retaliation for their complaint for monetary benefits and discriminatory practices against AMACC. The
petitioners also contended that AMACC failed to give them adequate notice; hence, their dismissal was ineffectual. 12

AMACC contended in response that the petitioners worked under a contracted term under a non-tenured appointment and were still within the three-
year probationary period for teachers. Their contracts were not renewed for the following term because they failed to pass the Performance Appraisal
System for Teachers (PAST) while others failed to comply with the other requirements for regularization, promotion, or increase in salary. This move,
according to AMACC, was justified since the school has to maintain its high academic standards.The petitioners were faculty members who started
teaching at AMACC on May 25, 1998. The petitioners executed individual Teachers Contracts for each of the trimesters that they were engaged to
teach, with the following common stipulation: 1. POSITION. The TEACHER has agreed to accept a non-tenured appointment to work in the
College of xxx effective xxx to xxx or for the duration of the last term that the TEACHER is given a teaching load based on the assignment duly
approved by the DEAN/SAVP-COO. For the school year 2000-2001, AMACC implemented new faculty screening guidelines, set forth in its
Guidelines on the Implementation of AMACC Faculty Plantilla. Under the new screening guidelines, teachers were to be hired or maintained based
on extensive teaching experience, capability, potential, high academic qualifications and research background. On September 7, 2000, the petitioners
individually received a memorandum from AMACC, through, informing them that with the expiration of their contract to teach, their contract would
no longer be renewed.

The Labor Arbiter Ruling declared that the petitioners had been illegally dismissed.

On appeal, the NLRC in a Resolution dated July 18, 2005 denied AMACCs appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the LAs ruling. The
NLRC, however, observed that the applicable law is Section 92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (which mandates a probationary
period of nine consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for academic personnel in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a
trimester basis), not Article 281 of the Labor Code (which prescribes a probationary period of six months) as the LA ruled.

The CA Ruling the CA granted AMACCs petition for certiorari and dismissed the petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue: WON the CA correctly found that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the petitioners were illegally dismissed.

HELD: The use of employment for fixed periods during the teachers probationary period is likewise an accepted practice in the teaching profession.
AMACCs right to academic freedom is particularly important in the present case, because of the new screening guidelines for AMACC faculty put
in place for the school year 2000-2001. We agree with the CA that AMACC has the inherent right to establish high standards of competency and
efficiency for its faculty members in order to achieve and maintain academic excellence. The schools prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in accordance with academic freedom that gives the educational institution
the right to choose who should teach. The provision on employment on probationary status under the Labor Code is a primary example of the fine
balancing of interests between labor and management that the Code has institutionalized pursuant to the underlying intent of the Constitution. Labor,
for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve
permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of
their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the
probationary standards are to be applied. Of critical importance in invoking a failure to meet the probationary standards, is that the school should
show as a matter of due process how these standards have been applied. The school, however, cannot forget that its system of fixed-term contract
is a system that operates during the probationary period and for this reason is subject to the terms of Article 281 of the Labor Code. Unless this
reconciliation is made, the requirements of this Article on probationary status would be fully negated as the school may freely choose not to renew
contracts simply because their terms have expired. The inevitable effect of course is to wreck the scheme that the Constitution and the Labor Code
established to balance relationships between labor and management. Given the clear constitutional and statutory intents, we cannot but conclude that
in a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers, Article 281 should
assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. This conclusion is immeasurably strengthened by the petitioners and
the AMACCs hardly concealed expectation that the employment on probation could lead to permanent status, and that the contracts are renewable
unless the petitioners fail to pass the schools standards. While we can grant that the standards were duly communicated to the petitioners and could
be applied beginning the 1st trimester of the school year 2000-2001, glaring and very basic gaps in the schools evidence still exist. The exact terms
of the standards were never introduced as evidence; neither does the evidence show how these standards were applied to the petitioners. Without
these pieces of evidence (effectively, the finding of just cause for the non-renewal of the petitioners contracts), we have nothing to consider and pass
upon as valid or invalid for each of the petitioners. In this light, the CA decision should be reversed. Teachers; Schools;
Academic Freedom; Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom; the freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompass the freedom of the school or college to
determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be
admitted to study.A school enjoys academic freedoma guarantee that enjoys protection from the Constitution no
less. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. The
institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide and adopt its aims and objectives,
and to determine how these objections can best be attained, free from outside coercion or interference, save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic
freedom encompass the freedom of the school or college to determine for itself: (1) who may teach; (2) who may be
taught; (3) how lessons shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher,
subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code.The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide for
itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching limitations under the Labor Code. Academic freedom, too, is
not the only legal basis for AMACCs issuance of screening guidelines. The authority to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management
prerogativethe right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to prescribe work assignments, working
methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and
recall of workers. Thus, AMACC has every right to determine for itself that it shall use fixed-term employment contracts as its medium for hiring its
teachers. It also acted within the terms of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools when it recognized the petitioners to be merely on
probationary status up to a maximum of nine trimesters.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Probationary Employees; Employment on probationary status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize the true
worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution comes into play.Employment on probationary
status affords management the chance to fully scrutinize the true worth of hired personnel before the full force of the security of tenure guarantee of
the Constitution comes into play. Based on the standards set at the start of the probationary period, management is given the widest opportunity
during the probationary period to reject hirees who fail to meet its own adopted but reasonable standards. These standards, together with the just and
authorized causes for termination of employment the Labor Code expressly provides, are the grounds available to terminate the employ ment of a
teacher on probationary status. For example, the school may impose reasonably stricter attendance or report compliance records on teachers on
probation, and reject a probationary teacher for failing in this regard, although the same attendance or compliance record may not be required for a
teacher already on permanent status. At the same time, the same just and authorizes causes for dismissal under the Labor Code apply to probationary
teachers, so that they may be the first to be laid-off if the school does not have enough students for a given semester or trimester. Termination of
employment on this basis is an authorized cause under the Labor Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The company standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their
probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the probationary standards are to be applied.
Labor, for its part, is given the protection during the probationary period of knowing the company standards the new hires have to meet during the
probationary period, and to be judged on the basis of these standards, aside from the usual standards applicable to employees after they achieve
permanent status. Under the terms of the Labor Code, these standards should be made known to the teachers on probationary status at the start of
their probationary period, or at the very least under the circumstances of the present case, at the start of the semester or the trimester during which the
probationary standards are to be applied.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The probationary period for those engaged in teaching job is three (3) years.The fixed-term character of
employment essentially refers to the period agreed upon between the employer and the employee; employment exists only for the duration of the
term and ends on its own when the term expires. In a sense, employment on probationary status also refers to a period because of the technical
meaning probation carries in Philippine labor lawa maximum period of six months, or in the academe, a period of three years for those engaged
in teaching jobs. Their similarity ends there, however, because of the overriding meaning that being on probation connotes, i.e., a process of testing
and observing the character or abilities of a person who is new to a role or job.

CALAWAG VS. UPVISAYAS 703 SCRA 373 (2013)

FACTS: This case involves the consolidated petitions of petitioner Flord Nicson Calawag in G.R. No. 207412 and petitioners Micah P. Espia, Jose
Marie F. Nasalga and Che Che B. Salcepuedes in G.R. No. 207542 (hereinafter collectively known as petitioners), both assailing the decision 1 dated
August 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 05079. The CA annulled the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67, granting a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondent Dean Carlos Baylon of the University of the
Philippines Visayas (UP Visayas).

The petitioners enrolled in the Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from the Department of Science and
Technology-Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. They finished their first year of study with good grades, and thus
were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. The petitioners then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative
thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea to be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members consent to constitute their
respective thesis committees. These details were enclosed in the letters the petitioners sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to approve the composition of
their thesis committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members and the thesis advisers approval of their titles, as well as the approval of
Professor Roman Sanares, the director of the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology.

Upon receipt of the petitioners letters, Dean Baylon wrote a series of memos addressed to Professor Sanares, questioning the propriety of the thesis
topics with the colleges graduate degree program. He subsequently disapproved the composition of the petitioners thesis committees and their
tentative thesis topics. According to Dean Baylon, the petitioners thesis titles connote a historical and social dimension study which is not
appropriate for the petitioners chosen masters degrees. Dean Baylon thereafter ordered the petitioners to submit a two-page proposal containing an
outline of their tentative thesis titles, and informed them that he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the role of the adviser and of
the thesis committees.

The petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC, asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the
petitioners thesis committees and approve their thesis titles. They also asked that the RTC issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
Dean Baylon, and order him to perform such acts while the suit was pending.

The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas eventually assailed this
order before the CA through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO). The petitioner enrolled in the
Master of Science in Fisheries Biology at UP Visayas under a scholarship from the Department of Science and Technology-Philippine Council for
Aquatic and Marine Research and Development. Hefinished his first year of study with good grades, and thus was eligible to start their thesis
tentative in the first semester of their second year. The petitioner then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained
the consent of Dr. Rex Balena to be their thesis adviser. These details were enclosed in the letters the petitioner sent to Dean Baylon, asking him to
approve the composition of their thesis committees. The letter contained the thesis committee members and the thesis advisers approval of their
titles, as well as the approval of Professor Roman Sanares, the director of the Institute of Marine Fisheries and Oceanology.

Upon receipt of the petitioners letters, Dean Baylon questioned the propriety of the thesis topics with the colleges graduate degree program. He
disapproved the composition of the petitioners thesis committees and their tentative thesis topics. According to him,the thesis titles connote a
historical and social dimension study which is not appropriate for the petitioners chosen masters degree. He ordered the petitioner to submit a two-
page proposal containing an outline of their tentative thesis titles and informed them that he is forming an ad hoc committee that would take over the
role of the adviser and of the thesis committees.

The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the RTC asking it to order Dean Baylon to approve and constitute the petitioners
thesis committee and approve of their thesis titles. The petitioner also asked the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
Dean Baylon and order him to perform such acts while the suit was pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitioners request for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
HELD: Schools; University of the Philippines; Under the University of the Philippines (UP) Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete
discretion in approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee.By necessary implication, the deans power to approve includes the
power to disapprove the composition of a thesis committee. Thus, under the UP Systems faculty manual, the dean has complete discretion in
approving or disapproving the composition of a thesis committee. Harmonizing this provision with the Graduate Program Manual of UP Visayas, and
the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program, we agree with the CAs interpretation that the thesis committees composition needs
the approval of the dean after the students have complied with the requisites provided in Article 51 of the Graduate Program Manual and Section IX
of the Guidelines for the Master of Science in Fisheries Program.

Same; Academic Freedom; The academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims
and objectives and how best to attain them.Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide
for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study
in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish
requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts
may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their

Same; Same; Right to Education; Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that [e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.The right to education invoked by Calawag
cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego, 180
SCRA 533 (1989), we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that [e]very citizen has a
right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. The thesis
requirement and the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a person desiring to complete a
course of study would have to comply with. Calawag vs. University of the Philippines Visayas, 703 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 207412 August 7, 2013