Author: France is turning blind eye to

Saudi's dangerous power games

Author Pierre Conesa explains how ignoring the kingdom's split
personality in terms of diplomacy could pose problems for France

French president Franois Hollande presents the Crown Prince of

Saudi Arabia, Mohammed bin Nayef, with the Order of the Legion
of Honour on a visit to Paris, 4 March 2016 (AFP)

Hassina Mecha-Thursday 16 March 2017

Pierre Conesa's new book on Saudi's soft power projection opens
with a quote from Richard Holbrooke, former US ambassador to
the UN, that sets the tone for what follows: The Saudis exported
their problems by funding the schools, the madrassas, all over the
Islamic world.
In Doctor Saoud and Mister Jihad (Robert Laffont, 2016, preface by
Hubert Vdrine), Conesa, co-president of the Observatoire des
radicalisations (Radicalisation Observatory), takes a detailed look
at this particular Saudi export and its impact on the region.
In this thoroughly researched book, which won the 2017 Axyntis-
Conflits Prize for Strategic Analysis, Conesa deconstructs Saudi
Arabias soft power, which is as much a projection of strength as it
is a survival strategy for a monarchy struggling to keep the lid on
rising domestic dissent and faced with ever-shifting regional
rivalries for the domination of the Arab-Muslim world, be it with
Egypt, Pan-Arabism or Shia Iran.
Conesa analyses the mechanisms of the soft religious power used
by Saudi Arabia for exporting Wahhabism abroad. He explains
that this particular blend of religion and politics was imprinted in
the genetic make-up of the kingdom - beginning in Nejd, in 1744,
when a tribal chief, Muhammad bin Saud, and a religious leader,
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, joined forces to establish a
kingdom born of the sword and the Salaf (ancestors in Arabic,
designating the first three generations of Muslims).
Conesa explains that the monarchys particular form of tribal-
religious soft power, serving a patrimonial kingdom considered
the legitimate heritage of the royal family of Saud, is built around
a carefully engineered campaign for promoting Saudi interests
abroad. Saudi-backed organisations include the Muslim World
League (MWL), founded in response to Nasserist pan-Arabism,
which finances the construction of mosques around the world; the
Islamic University of Medina, which provides scholarships,
accommodations and living expenses to Muslim theology
students, including foreigners, who subsequently spread Saudi
religious doctrine in their native countries; and the Organisation
of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a permanent inter-state structure
called for by Riyadh, with 57 member states, providing a
platform for exchange and the elaboration of common diplomatic
policies.
A former senior civil servant at the Department of Defence,
Conesa also takes an uncompromising look at Frances diplomatic
overtures toward the Gulf state monarchy which, under President
Franois Hollande, has become a key economic partner.
Middle East Eye: Why isnt the question of the religious
diplomacy of Saudi Arabia being addressed in France?
Pierre Conesa: The religious underpinnings of Saudi diplomacy
are a subject of intense debate in the Arab world, as they are in
the United States. In France, however, they are virtually non-
existent. It is as if a form of sociological resistance were
preventing the analysis of Saudi politics. The Quai dOrsay (French
foreign office) has made some inflammatory remarks about my
book, accusing me of Saudiphobia. But Hubert Vdrines preface
pretty much sums it up: the question of diplomacy for achieving
religious ends needs to be addressed.
The truth behind the French governments hesitation lies in the
potential tens of billions of dollars in contracts that Saudi Arabia
has been promising for years
That is not to say it is a problem specific to Saudi Arabia. The
Vatican, US neo-Evangelical movements, the Jewish Defence
League, and the religious agendas of both Qatar and Turkey under
Erdoan could also be named. But Saudi Salafism is the only form
of religious radicalism that is consistently promoted and funded
with public money and state-controlled national resources.
The truth behind the French governments hesitation lies in the
potential tens of billions of dollars in contracts that Saudi Arabia
has been promising for years. Saudi society is fundamentally
fractured and Riyadh has been Frances number one defence
industry client for over 30 years. When the Saudis buy weapons,
they are buying peace of mind anxiolytics provided by France
and guaranteeing security and defence. The relationship is
perverse.
The Saudi system of religious diplomacy has been in the works for
years, however, without anyone really paying attention to it or
even caring. Yet on closer inspection, the system is particularly
ingenious owing to its hybrid nature: it packs the hard punch of
American-style ready money with the effectiveness of Soviet-era
methods. Its the bastard child of American soft power and Soviet
propaganda.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault and Saudi Foreign

Minister Adel al-Jubeir at the peace conference in Paris on 15
January, 2017 (AFP)
MEE: How would you define Saudi Arabias soft religious
power?
PC: What is interesting about Saudi soft power is that its not just
a projection of power. Its not hard power. It is another kind of
power. The image we project is what allows us to build up a store
of soft power: France and the Declaration of Human Rights,
Israel and the Shoah... Projected image is an important aspect
of international relations.
The Saudi monarchy, from its very creation, had an objective
mission to spread the Wahhabi, or Salafi, version of Islam. The
Wahhabis call themselves Salafis to avoid referring to the
preacher Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a reference that would
elevate him to the status of intermediary between God and the
Muslims.
Saudi Arabia packs the hard punch of American-style ready
money with the effectiveness of Soviet era methods
From the founding of the kingdom in 1932 and up until 1973, the
country was a geopolitical dwarf. Why would anyone worry about
the Saudis? The countrys anti-Nasserist policies were seen as a
good thing in the West. When Afghanistan was invaded, the West
did not realise that Saudi Arabia was pursuing its own diplomatic
agenda. At the time, reports on Saudi money funding Islamists
and extremist Afghan fighters (Sayyaf and Hekmatyar, among
others) were simply ignored.
xWhen Saudi Arabia negotiated with General Muhammad Zia-ul-
Haq [Pakistans chief of army staff who deposed President Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto in a military coup in 1977 and who served as president
of Pakistan from 1978 until his death in 1988], it led to the
establishment of madrassas for Afghan refugees, the schools from
which the Taliban would emerge 15 years later. But again, we
were either unable or unwilling to recognise this at the time. After
postulating on the religious basis of Saudi diplomatic policy, it was
a matter of understanding its mechanisms.
READ France: the new best friend of Gulf state monarchies
Why has Saudi Arabia been so successful internationally? Money,
of course, is a factor, but not the only one. Let us not forget that
Saudi diplomacy first emerged in response to, and even as the
reverse image of, Nassers Egypt. On one side, the pan-Islamism
of Saudi Arabia, on the other, the pan-Arabism of Egypt: the
Islamic University of Medina in opposition to Al-Azhar University,
the Muslim World League to counter the Arab League. This Saudi
opposition to Nasserism fitted the Westerners vision and the
East-West divide. And again, Saudi Arabia was regarded as a
political lightweight governed by a bunch of big children.
MEE: How did Saudi Arabia build up its soft power?
PC: There are different historical periods. Saudi opposition to
Nassers Egypt ended in 1973, Nasserist socialism, in the
aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of 1973, disappeared from the
political arena. But 1973 also marked the start of the oil crisis that
would miraculously turn Saudi Arabia into a cash cow for
industrialists around the world: Saudis could pay for anything up
front, in hard cash.
Then in 1979 started a new period, with a number of Saudi
problems emerging. Regionally, with the Islamic Revolution in
Tehran and the overthrow of the Shah of Iran who had never
played the Shia political card nor tried to stir discontent among
Saudi Shia. Domestically, with the occupation of the Great
Mosque of Mecca by a group of religious radicals protesting the
countrys accelerated modernisation, and internationally, with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
When the Saudis buy weapons, they are buying peace of mind
anxiolytics provided by France.
All of sudden, the divisions on the domestic level appear, as well
as the Shia threat and the idea that Shias are coming back in
history and that Iran is using the voice of revolutionary Islam. The
conflict in Afghanistan was thus an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to
export its most radical nationals to the war, while building up
significant goodwill with Western powers which, thereafter, saw
Saudi Arabia as a regional ally.
This all took place within the framework of a world divided along
East-West lines. Yet as I mentioned earlier, Riyadh had its own
strategic agenda, namely vis--vis Pakistan, which was one of its
closest political allies. It should also be noted that Saudi Arabia
didnt need nuclear weapons because Pakistans nuclear capacity
was seen as an Islamic bomb.
Another critical juncture came in 1989 with the end of the binary
East-West axis. Prior to this date, both of the worlds superpowers
were inevitably drawn into crises of every stripe, each fearing the
other would gain the upper hand should they not take action. The
geopolitical cards having since been reshuffled; nations today are
defined along lines of useful or useless, with regards to the
interests of Western powers, that is. Nobody was overly
concerned by the Second Congo War, the deadliest conflict the
world has seen since World War II.
MEE: How do you explain the animosity between Iran and
Saudi Arabia?
PC: Given the religious nature of the Iranian revolution, Khomeini
quickly made a number of religious claims, including the joint
management of Muslim holy places. Relations between the two
countries have been centred on religious questions since 1979. It
is a faceoff between two theocracies. Iran sees itself as the only
credible geopolitical actor in the region. Iraq and Syria are
imploding. Saudi Arabia does not have the human resources to
match its ambition. Remember that many of Saudi Arabias first
civil servants were Muslim Brotherhood leaders who had fled
persecution under Nasser in the 1960s.
Protesters gather at the Saudi Embassy in Tehran after Saudi
Arabia executed the Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, 2 January
2016 (AFP)
MEE: Youve mentioned that the Muslim world, and in
particular Morocco and Algeria, is particularly alarmed by
the religious agenda of Saudi diplomacy. Why?
PC: Algeria refused to join the anti-terrorist coalition created by
Riyadh, allegedly because it refused to make an alliance with a
country linked to the terrible years of the dirty war [Saudi Arabia
is accused of having favoured Islamism during the Algerian Civil
War of 1991-2002]. As for Morocco, it is a question of religious
legitimacy, relative to the royal family. The Moroccan monarchy is
the only one able to claim descent from the Prophet Mohammed.
That is the Saudi monarchys weak point, that it cannot make
such a claim.
Morocco develops a religious diplomacy and trains imams in a
number of African countries, within the Makelite doctrine. The aim
is to counter the Saudi influence, which is even stronger in poor
countries. In these countries, Saudi Arabia has set up madrassas
to attract the best students, who then go on to study in Medina
before being sent back home. This gives it a strong ability to
influence.
The issue of Shiism is central to Saudi efforts. It comes down to a
question of countering Shia influence. This is the one constant
feature of Saudi religious diplomacy today.
MEE: How do you explain the social resistance of France,
which prevents it, in your opinion, from understanding the
religious underpinnings of Saudi diplomacy?
PC: French society has a complicated relationship to Islam.
Consequently, any critical assessment of Islam, and of Saudi
Arabia in particular, is seen as an Islamophobic argument. Yet this
country is a caricature of Islam, the North Korea of Islam.
Everything there is fake, without faith. There is no real spiritual
debate.
This country is the 'North Korea of Islam'. Everything there is fake,
without faith. There is no real spiritual debate
But we have to be careful because its an enormous market for
the French defence industry the much-vaunted 10 billion in
contracts. Hubert Vdrine also said in his preface that Frances
vision of the secular state is a hurdle to understanding the
religious underpinnings of Saudi diplomacy. This is why Alain
Jupp closed the bureau of religious affairs at Quai dOrsay
[French Ministry of Foreign Affairs] that had been put into place by
his predecessor.
Saudi Arabia recently signed four contracts with PR firms,
including Publicis, Havas and Image 7. It knows it needs to better
its reputation in France. The monarchy is very careful about the
image it projects. Economic and political clout can only be gained
at the highest levels of governments. In the United States, for
example, Riyadh has financed foundations and endowed
university chairs. It has also created a media group, but all
through third parties and non-government organisations. It is a
strategy of influence, not one of presence.
READ: The collapse of Saudi Arabia is inevitable
France is incapable of taking into account the religious realities of
diplomatic relations. It hasnt been able to understand the Taliban,
the Algerian GIA (Armed Islamic Group) and Islamic State through
a global point of view. Same with the upsurge of revolutionary
Shiism and Hezbollahs ability to stand up to Israel. These are the
weak spots of French strategic analysis.
Franois Fillon is the only one who has spoken out on the issue of
Saudi Arabia. French political circles are only just starting to
realise that the Franco-Saudi relationship is not only perverse, it is
contrary to French interests given actions of graduates of the
Islamic University of Medina in Mali and the countries of the Sahel
and Western Africa.
For thirty years Medina graduates have been making a power
grab in the region. To me, this is clearly a key factor in the Malian
crisis. And the Malian model is highly exportable, to places like
Central African Republic and Niger.
MEE: Is Saudi Arabia trying to influence the Muslim
community of France?
PC: There is a process of silent integration in France. The rise of
Salafism has clouded our vision of how French society has
changed. Frances Muslim elite sounded the alarm on the surge of
Salafism in France well before the politicians did. But French
Muslims today are particularly hard hit by social issues. Salafism
promotes an ideology of rupture, with a message of social justice
taking up the discourse of the far left. Though it has only won
over a tiny portion of the French Muslim community, it dominates
the media.
Though Salafism has only won over a tiny portion of the French
Muslim community, it dominates the media
Saudi Arabias diplomatic policy towards western countries
consists of distinguishing between countries that are
communitarian and those that are secular. In countries governed
by principles of community rights, such as Canada, the strategy is
to demand that Muslims be treated on equal footing with other
national communities. Muslim communities can therefore claim
the creation of religious schools (madrassas) and Sharia courts.
And they can petition, of course, to participate in the
representative bodies of Islam.
When the Muslim World League applied for a seat at the French
Council of Muslim Worship, the request was turned down by the
then minister of the interior, Charles Pasqua. In secular countries
like France, the strategy of the MWL is to denounce Islamophobia.
This article was originally published in Middle East Eyes French
edition and was translated by Heather Allen.
Posted by Thavam