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Name /8830/ch55 07/19/2004 03:35PM Plate # 0 Morris (Wiley) pg 1368 # 1
CHAPTER FIFTY-FIVE
T he automotive industry has always been a testing ground and a powerful specier for
managerial innovationone need only think back to Fordism, Sloanism, and the
Japanese Model of Manufacturing, which was in fact quite simply the Toyota Model.
The success of the book The Machine That Changed the World is typical of this point of view
(Womack, Jones, and Ross, 1990). The assimilation of managerial techniques by the auto
industryTotal Quality Management (TQM) and just-in-time (JIT), for examplecertainly
has transformed the way in which production is managed in car plants. However, much
more than this, it completely goes beyond the dominant theories on the management of
inventory and quality, and has radically changed perception of the relative importance of
these disciplines throughout the various schools of thought on management.
This chapter explains how and why the concept of the project gradually became for-
malized and deployed in car rms, and how this development generated, directly or indi-
rectly, profound changes in (1) corporate structures and the professional practice in their
technical disciplines and (2) the relationships between carmakers and their subcontractors.
In short, it details how the development of project management transformed the automotive
industry.
Generally speaking, the strategic importance of project management methods is largely
dependent on the importance both of product strategies and the competitive environment.
The mass production of a small number of standardized, relatively undifferentiated products
with a long life cycle does not require mastery of very sophisticated project management
skills. Conversely, mass production of a large number of differentiated products has as a
S direct consequence the fact that the design and marketing of a large number of distinct
N products is hardly conceivable in the absence of the concomitant development of very so-
L
1368
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phisticated project management skills. The history of project management since World War
II follows closely that of the markets (Morris, 1997).
We will trace the evolution of project management in the auto industry through four
stages:
1. From the postwar period up to the 1970s, there was no differentiation between the
product strategies of carmakers in North America and Europe. Disciplined manage-
ment of projects was not a core component in competitive strategy.
2. During the 1970s and 1980s, the gradual saturation of markets changed the competitive
environment radically. Japanese carmakers succeeded in breaking into the North Amer-
ican market using (novel) product proliferation strategies, and the direct consequence of
this business model was an explosive increase in the number of projects to be managed.
The management of projects for new vehicles now assumed strategic importance.
3. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, manufacturers radically reorganized their approach
to the management of projects for new products in order to develop more quickly and
at lower cost a greater number of products of increasingly high quality. The manage-
ment of projects for new vehicles was now at the heart of corporate strategy.
4. By the late 1990s, the limits of the reorganization of the beginning of the decade were
becoming blatantly obvious. In addition, new challenges emerged. Manufacturers initi-
ated a second wave of reorganization. New vehicle project management became more
complex in order to cope with the new challenges, namely: alliances, market globali-
zation, and innovation.
In characterizing the specic position of the project function in rms at each stage, we will
make use of the organizational diagrams of Clark and Wheelwright (1988). However, going
beyond this framework, we shall show that the development of project-oriented logic was
to bring about profound change in the permanent processes of companies, both internally
and in their dealings with outside rms.
From a strategic point of view, the 1950s and 1960s were typied, in Europe and even
more so in North America, by a conventional approach to mass production. The devel-
opment of car manufacturing rms exhibited a gradual formation of product ranges, namely:
a small number of models, long life cycles for models (as long as 12 to 14 years), little
S product diversication, competitiveness focused on cost reduction through standardization,
N and longer series (over 250,000 a year for a model).
L
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The design of these products was conducted using an organizational form of project
craft in an essentially function-oriented corporate structure (see Figure 55.1). Firms were
divided into powerful, compartmentalized, trade-focused entities: the product engineering
ofce, the process engineering department, manufacturing, and so on. There was no direct
linkage between functions. Projects passed in sequence from one function to the next, fol-
lowing a metaphorical relay race. Each project was handled on a case-by-case basis. The
only player joining up functions and acting as arbiter between them was the senior man-
agement team and often the CEO himself or herself.
Technical learning took place within the projects themselves, each project being a gen-
uine locus for the development of new skill sets relating not only to products but also to
production processes. The buildings of new bodies of expertise occurred in and through
successive project development programs. Given this process, the consequences of the risks
associated with major technical learning often became more visible in projects.
The resulting level of performance in terms of duration, cost, and quality in the new
products was mediocre: long development times (ve to seven years), often with delays of
one or two years. Product launches were frequently beset with unforeseen problems of
industrial feasibility. It often took several years before nominal production rates could be
achieved in plants. And, nally, even in a context in which competition was weak because
of lack of market availability of products, it is manifest that a large number of unsuitable
products reached the market, a sign that upstream project targeting and evaluation processes
had been relatively ineffective.
The late 1960s saw, both in Europe and in the United States, the deployment of a new
strategy that was to lead to the arrival of the modern, multiproduct vehicle model range,
to the diversication of models (power trains, bodywork, and ttings), and to the interna-
tional deployment of the companies.
In such circumstances, the project craft of the preceding period was incapable of
coping with the new complexity of product strategies. It is at this point that we see the
beginnings of a professionalization of project management:
The rst project functions were created in the early 1970s, along with periodic review
systems involving corporate management.
The careful guidance of projects to completion was gradually put in place, along with
formalization of development timetables and the deployment of economic reporting tools
S integrating all the variables in the projects concerned.
N
L
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Departmental management
Departmental
project players
Contributors from
outside the company
(industrial market
partners)
Other than this centralization of control, however, there was no change in the relationship
between strategies for the building of technical skills occurring in engineering design ofces
and central process planning departments, on the one hand, and development policies, on
the other (see Figure 55.2). Project teams had neither the political weight nor the expertise
to defend their own logic against the strategies of technical departments. This period can
be characterized as that of the lightweight project manager, a notion given formal ex-
pression by Clark, Hayes, and Wheelwright (1988).
These new forms of project organization and instrumentation certainly brought with
them improvements in new vehicle projects, but the limits of this form of coordination
became clear as early as the beginning of the 1980s. The failures that could be seen in
projects became increasingly prejudicial:
Control of project protability and lead times was often lost, signposting the limitations
of the use of sequential input of trade-focused logic and an excessively hierarchical ap-
proach to the negotiation of compromises (Cabridain, 1988);
Product quality at start-up was disappointing on occasion, reecting an organizational
balance in which there was no powerful internal actor capable of measuring and man-
aging the risks generated by technical innovation strategies.
Last, despite a few hesitant attempts, there was no innovation in the area of project man-
agement on the part of American or European carmakers. The innovation, in fact, came
from a small number of companies, Toyota and Honda in particular. Stalk and Hout (1990)
S have shown that by the end of the 1980s, certain Japanese rms were implementing highly
N
L
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Departmental management
Project committees
Departmental
project players
Contributors from
Project Project Manager's Departmental outside the company
Manager scope (industrial market
project
partners)
supervisors
aggressive product proliferation strategies, the principle of which was to drown competitors
in a ood of very rapidly replaced products. In such an environment, the products of slower
competitors quickly go out of fashion. Stalk and Hout show how the use of such strategies
by Honda and Yamaha won them dominance in the motorcycle market. A similar approach
can be seen in the conquest of the North American market by Japanese carmakers. Table
55.1 (Womack, Jones, and Ross, 1990) shows that from 1955 to 1989
Such proliferation strategies were based on highly effective project management methods.
Comparative studies (Clark and Fujimoto, 1987), updated in 1990 and published in 1995,
highlight a signicant differential in relation to the development performance achieved by
S Japanese rms according to the three metrics chosen by the researchers: lead time, project
N
L
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American Products:
Number on sale 25 38 47 50
Sales/product (000s) 309 322 238 219
European Products:
Number on sale 5 27 27 30
Sales/product (000s) 11 35 26 18
Japanese Products:
Number on sale 0 19 41 58
Sales/product (000s) 0 55 94 73
Total:
Products on sale 30 84 117 142
Sales/product (000s) 259 169 136 112
Market share captured by six largest-selling products 73 43 25 24
Source: Adapted from James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, Daniel Roos, 1990, Figure 5.6, p. 125.
team productivity as measured by the number of engineering hours required to develop the
projects, and the quality of the vehicles placed on the market.
This work was widely disseminated and analyzed by industry professionals. These stud-
ies stimulated intense reection among academics, researchers, and industry professionals.
The conditions were in place for a radical change in the way projects were managed in
North American and European auto rms in the late 1980s.
few perspicacious managers visiting Japan had discovered the Susha system and pointed,
using the example of Toyota, to its strategic dimension for the management of new vehicle
projects.
In the United States, the company that took the heavyweight project manager template
furthest was Chrysler. Early in the 1980s, Chrysler was close to bankruptcy and its project
performance was poor: Development was taking 60 months with little or no cost control,
and vehicles devoid of strong identity were being launched, which was undermining the
companys commercial credibility. The team around Lee Iacocca pointed to the inability of
vertical functional groups (trades) to cooperate and to soft compromises on policy. Vertical
S functional groups were clearly incompatible with innovation and audacious product poli-
N cies.
L
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Departmental management
Departmental
project players
Contributors from
Project Project manager's Departmental outside the company
manager scope (industrial market
project
partners)
supervisors
The new management redened how the development of new vehicles was to be or-
ganized on the basis of range segments functioning as autonomous enterprises in their own
right. All engineering and project management resources, which previously had been con-
ventionally organized by trade, were divided into ve platforms: Top of the Range (Large
Car), Entry Range (Small Car), Jeep, Truck, and Minivan. The entire 10,000-strong work-
force employed in the development of products and engineering design was split into
medium-sized units comprising between 2,000 and 3,000 people and provided with clear
leadership.
In Europe, Renault was the rst manufacturer to put in place powerful project directors
with a genuine entrepreneurial dimension in the late 1980s (Midler, 1993).
These structural changes went on to drive profound modications in project commu-
nication and decision processes. We summarize these modications in ve broad categories
in the text that follows.
The architecture of the design center placed each platform/project physically on the
buildings oors (horizontally), disposing trades vertically (along a vertical axis connected by
escalators). The company implemented simultaneous engineering tools and, more generally,
transverse communication systems (the center thus pioneered intranet and extranet devel-
opment). Support programs were initiated to encourage cross-category culture and contin-
uous learning processes: ongoing vocational training for staff and an aggressive policy of
recruitment of young engineers, along with the overhaul of the system of personnel man-
agement and evaluation (notably by introducing coworker evaluation, etc.).
organizational and contractual frameworks (Banville and Chanaron, 1991; Lamming, 1993;
Garel, Kesseler, and Midler, 1997; Kesseler, 1998). The purchasing process in particular is
completely revolutionized.
Once again, Chrysler can be seen to be, in North America, a precursor in its imple-
mentation of the extended enterprise concept, closely involving suppliers in projects. In
Europe, Renault also consciously committed to codevelopment policies (Midler, 1993; Kes-
seler, 1998).
Project management was not generally developed into a specic professional pattern, as,
for example, in construction. On the contrary, human relations rules organized trans-
versal carrier trajectory, mixing skilled-based and project-based roles. Two ideas are be-
hind that choice: (1) that a key difcult point is to maintain solidarity between project
and functional populations and (2) that alternating the role will enhance the capitalization
of inside project learning. Emphasizing the individual project management expertise ap-
peared in that perspective not as important as developing a more collective project man-
agement competency.
The maturity the project management approach of the rm can be correlated to the
hard/soft orientation of project management learning programs: the deeper in organi-
zational and strategic themes, the heavier the project management function.
The more technical side of project management (planning tools, budgeting . . .) diffused
through highly specialized staff people in the rm.
Emphasizing on the entrepreneurial aspect of project function led to develop cross-
practitioner learning and capitalizing programs. Such project managers exchanges not
only occurred within each rm but also extensively in cross-sector clubs and associations.
Unquestionably, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, Chrysler has been a exemplar
company, especially for the development of new products. During the 1990s and up to the
time of the merger with Daimler, Chrysler was generating by far the highest average prot
per vehicle of any North American auto manufacturer (Harbour and Associates, from 1995
to 1999). In addition, its assembly plants also ranked, according to the same studies, among
the non-Japanese plants with the highest productivity.
In Europe during the rst half of the 1990s, Renault reaped the benets of its break-
through in project management, bringing to market an innovative product range while also
restoring its image in terms of product quality and improving its cost base. The success of
vehicles such as the Twingo and the Megane Scenicwhich were to create new market
niches as the Espace minivan had done in years pastwas the most spectacular result of
the new project systems.
Several factors serve to explain what might seem at rst sight to be a relapse, but that
was in fact another stage in the intensication of innovation-based competition in the au-
tomotive industry; a stage described as one of intensive innovationinnovation that is
both more radical in content and repeated at a faster rate (Hatchuel and Weil, 1999; Ben-
ghozi et al., 2000) and that has been increasingly deployed against the background of global
alliances.
The comparative benet of efcient project systems for the pioneers in the early 1990s
tended to run out of steam as best practices spread rapidly to their competitors. To nd
S new values for differentiation, rms went down the road of innovation policies that were
N far more radical in terms of both engineering and styling. On the one hand, in doing so
L
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they were adding a source of higher risk; on the other, they were facing problems for which
heavyweight types of automotive project organization were unsuited, since the most rel-
evant context for the deployment of technical innovation is not vehicle development but
transverse learning covering both the preliminary project stages and whole product ranges.
No cross-functional and cross-product project existed to address, coordinate, and control
these learning tracks on radical innovative features and technologies (a good example is car
telematics; Lene and Midler, 2003).
The increasing number of projects in rms clearly highlights problems associated with
the heavyweight project management template, problems that were not burdensome when
such forms of organization were the exception. As early as the beginning of the 1990s,
Toyota had taken a critical look at its Susha system (Cusumano and Neoboka, 1998). By
1992 the number of platforms rose from 8 to 18, along with a decline in average production
volume per platform.
Communication and coordination problems became critical. In 1991, a Susha was
communicating and working with 48 departments in 12 engineering divisions, plus the R&D
division. Trade divisions were conducting concurrent dialogues with 15 projects. The rela-
tionship between Sushas and senior management in the plan-product division was all the
more strained because detailed supervision of 15 Sushas was impossible without setting up
an enormous project-focused bureaucracy. Staff in the plan-product division were nding it
difcult to monitor all 15 projects and became disconnected from reality. R&D was per-
ceived as being distantand its interfacing with projects became very problematic. The
inuence and power enjoyed by Sushas were considerable and difcult to control because
of the failings of the system.
As crisis after crisis occurred, the powers of Sushas were strengthened, along with their
responsibilities, which had the effect of locking them in to projects and encouraging the
appearance of a blinkered silo mentalityalbeit transverse silos. The rapidly expanding
number of projects led to the appointment of young, inexperienced Sushas. Coordination
became increasingly difcult, or even impossible. The increased number of departments and
divisions led to narrow specialization in the engineers, making it more and more difcult
for them to understand cross-category logic and interfacing, and this in turn led to less well-
thought-out, less integrated products. Capitalization and transfer of expertise from one proj-
ect to another became extremely problematic. The same solutions were continually being
reinvented. The total workforce assigned to development was not far from 15,000.
The end of the 1990s was also a period of unprecedented strategic shifts in the auto
industry. There were more and more alliances of all kinds. Projects needed to assimilate
this new factor, which was a source of further difculty and new constraints compared with
the previous stage.
These strategic changes led eventually to new developments in automotive project man-
agement, which can be summarized in terms of ve interdependent trends:
can nd in this type of project some of the features of vehicle projects (specically the need
to conduct such exploration by coordinating a plurality of forms of expertisetechnical,
marketing, design, etc.), these projects also have novel characteristics. First, the level of risk
is much higher because of the extent of the innovation in terms of both technology and
product features. This leads projects to be conducted within exploration portfolios in which
efforts are made to maximize synergy and offset risks, rather than mobilizing teams on one-
shot operations, which is the principle underlying conventional projects. (See the chapter
by Jamieson and Morris.) Second, the direct result of such a project is not a product
placed on the market but a concept that is validated and knowledge that is acquired, which
it will be necessary to exploit later in actual products. (See the chapters by Artto, Thiry and
others.) This virtual, intangible character of the result is undoubtedly one of the difculties
of this type of project: The tangible, practical nature of a new product launch is no longer
present as a focus for the contributors to the project.
Mutual understanding within joint project teams. In single-manufacturer project teams, coordination
is based on numerous unarticulated bodies of expertise forged throughout the companys
past history. Once projects begin to be conducted as cooperative endeavors by more than
one manufacturer, the risks of misunderstanding will be high if the participants do not make
substantial efforts to make themselves clear. Such effort is costly and difcult to gauge
correctly, since it runs counter to the participants need to protect their knowledge and
expertise.
S The management of fair and equal treatment of the partners. This becomes a prerequisite for cohesion
N and focus in joint project teams. Studying a joint project by General Motors and Renault,
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Midler, Neffa, and Monnet (2002), adapting Piron (2001), have demonstrated that the prac-
tical implementation of fair treatment in projects could take three forms: Distributive justice
involves the search for a balanced proportionality between the partners, a fair return, in
Pirons words. The point is, for the rms, to nd a fair distribution of goods and powers
based on the goals sought and the resources committed by each. Procedural justice refers to
the feeling that procedures have been fair. The point is for the participants to judge a
decision-making process relative to a reference that is well known and considered legitimate.
The factors that inuence this include a feeling of participation in decision making, an
explanation of decisions, and clarity concerning expectations and the rules of the game, all
of which inuence whether the participants feel they have been treated fairly and equitably.
Finally, interactive justice refers to individual interactions based on fairness in behavior, which
makes it possible for a decision to be considered doable. Hence, respect and courtesy be-
tween allies prove to have an important contribution to make in the fostering of a positive
atmosphere for interpersonal relations during the cooperation process.
Regulation of tensions between the project and the strategies of the parent companies. Cooperation projects
are by their very nature unstable and vulnerable to exogenous events. In the case of the
Renault-GM project, joint decisions have been upset by shocks coming from outside the
project, such as the Renault-Nissan alliance in 1999 and the GM-Fiat alliance in 2000.
However, the nomination of a project general manager representing the interests of both
rms and the governance structures has strengthened the joint program and attenuated the
impact of external events such as the Renault-Nissan and GME-Fiat Alliances or the high
currency rate between the euro and sterling.
S The core issue is how to benet from covert standardization while nevertheless preserving
N differentiation in the nished products. The boundary is, however, far from obvious here.
L
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In multibrand groups, it usually leads to the de facto domination of one brand identity
over the others, which must t in with the constraints imposed by the initial designer of
the platform.
The second issue is how to link up the replacement cycles for platform and products. If
a requirement to use a platform is imposed on a product, it will often mean that recent
innovations cannot be introduced, with the consequence that a risk is taken in a market
characterized by swift obsolescence. But if the platform evolves at the same speed as the
products derived from it, there is no longer much of a distinction between the concept
and the conventional notion of carry-over.
The rst area relates to timing. In the 1980s, suppliers provided input in the later stages of
projects, in the context of relationships that were precisely governed by detailed technical
specications laid down by the car manufacturer. In the 1990s, it became gradually possible
to dene effective arrangements for codevelopment (Garel and Midler, 2000; Kesseler,
1998)that is to say, cooperation between the carmaker and its suppliers on the basis of
overall functional objectives. However, with the increasing importance of innovation policies,
carmaker/supplier cooperation sought to extend itself upstream within development proj-
ects, in colearning arrangements (Lene and Midler, 2001) for the design of innovative
concepts for product features in which more effective coordination of the partners respective
roadmaps was sought. The expanding importance of concept competition phases com-
pared with the more traditional competitive bid processes was the visible sign of this strong
trend, which raises several questions: For example, how should one allocate the costs and
risks involved in such upstream explorative programs, whose outcome is highly uncertain?
What type of regulation of intellectual property issues might encourage the partners to
provide the transparency imperative to the success of the partnership?
The second relates to the spatial and functional boundaries of supply. The last two decades have been
ones in which the functional and spatial scope of the suppliers role has expanded: There
has been a shift from the individual part to the component, followed, in the 1990s, by entire
systems (complete functional assemblies) and modules (an assembly whose boundaries can
be geographically isolated). The principle is to dene interface standards to enable the
producers of components (whether modules or systems) to develop items that are simulta-
S neously less expensive (volume effects), more versatile (offering greater variety), and com-
N patible with open-architecture interiors. Suppliers delivering similar or homogeneous items
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quality, which, however, does not preclude wide variations in quality as perceived by
the consumer. In addition, quality is no longer a competitive advantage but a prereq-
uisite. However, a worrying rise in the cost of vehicle recalls can be seen.
5. A continuous decline is apparent in the costs of assembly and processes (productivity
gains estimated in the region of 7 percent per yearcf. Harbour Report) as well as
components (on the order of 20 percent to 30 percent for each new vehicle). In addition,
manufacturers have included systematic annual volume-linked price reductions in their
contracts with suppliers.
6. These savings are passed on to the consumer through constant enrichment of the fea-
tures offered by vehicles at a constant price level. Moreover, for the last three years the
beginnings of further reductions in prices targeted on certain model ranges have been
observed. In short, there are now more features for a given price in constant, declining
money terms.
7. Architecture is controlled in terms of platforms and modules in order to take advantage
of scale effects on common portions while nevertheless preserving the diversity and
identity of the vehicles. For example, Toyota sells, on the basis of the same platform,
vehicles as different as a sedan, a van, a Lexus, and an SUV.
Summary
From the postwar period until the present time, the development of project management
has radically changed structures and processes within car manufacturing companies. But on
the reverse, we can say that project management had been changed by its implementation
within the automotive context: from technique and tool orientation to more strategic and
organizational approaches, from highly precise contractualized relation patterns to proce-
dural open learning meta-rules. The auto industry was a latecomer to project manage-
ment, compared to military equipment or construction business. But these sectors are now
trying to transform there project management tradition and adopt the project management
practices that were developed in the late 1980s and 1990s in the auto sector. We can see
various reasons behind such a dragging effect: the economic importance and symbolic no-
toriety of the auto sector, of course, but also the importance of researches in management
science and economics in the eld, that happened to evaluate the performances of various
project patters and to trace the transformations round the world.
This process is not yet complete, since performance limits are constantly increasing.
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