Analysis of the Cuban Thaw

By: Hannah Tiner

11 / 23 / 2015

On August 14th, 2015, The United States reopened its embassy in

Havana, Cuba, 54 years after diplomatic ties were cut with the island nation.
The reestablishment of embassies in both countries capitals is a symbol for
the changes in policy that have resulted from recent bilateral talks between
Barack Obama and Ral Castro.

The Cuban Thaw consists of policies easing some economic and

travel restrictions, removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism, and diplomatic steps towards normalization. This revolutionary
shift in policy is the outcome of specific aligning variables, what Latin
American expert William Leogrande calls a constellation of structural factors
that kept the policy of hostility in place for years, but over that period
gradually changed until they reached a tipping point that gave President
Obama the political opportunityperhaps even the imperativeto change
course.

The U.S. policy towards Cuba still boasts the same goal as decades
past, the hope for a democratic, prosperous, and stable Cuba, but the
methods to institute this goal have changed to look less like regime change
and more like normalization. The most defining trait of the Cuban Thaw is the
role of the executive, as Obama has unitarily instituted these changes
without the help of the other branches. A close analysis of recent policy,
considering congressional-executive relations, the role of domestic politics,
and Obamas leadership style will provide a comprehensive understanding of
why and how this policy came about.

History of the freeze

The United States cut ties with Cuba at the height of the Cold War,
when, following the Cuba Revolution, the communist government was closely
allied with the Soviet Union. President Kennedy issued the permanent
embargo in 1962, effectively stopping trade between the countries
(Suddath). Hostilities mounted during the failed Bay of Pigs mission and the
Cuban Missile Crisis. After the fall of the USSR, Cubas economy plummeted,
though the Castros blamed the American sanctions for the decline.

Attempts were made by Presidents Ford and Carter to improve

relations, but progress was stagnated later by George H.W. Bush and then
Clinton when he signed the Helms-Burton (LIBERTAD) Act (Katel). Fidel Castro
handed over power to his brother Ral in 2008 who has taken small but
important steps towards decentralizing the economy and liberalizing the
Cuban work force.

The next year, President Obama came into office with a goal to
normalize relations with Cuba. Negotiations stopped when USAID contractor,
Alan Gross, was arrested in Cuba. Then on December 17th, 2014, Cuba
agreed to exchange a CIA intelligence asset for the remaining members of
the Cuban Five who were imprisoned in the U.S. Alan Gross was released on
humanitarian grounds (Katel).

Tensions begin to thaw

The White House stated the U.S. is beginning to chart a new course
on Cuba (Fact Sheet). The Congressional Research Services report on Cuba
claims Obamas policy of normalization has a three pronged approach:
restoring diplomatic relations, removing Cuba from the state sponsors of
terrorism list, and increasing travel, commerce, and the flow of information
to Cuba.

Obama has called on Congress to take further steps toward

normalization and to lift the embargo. However, support for easing or lifting
sanctions is mixed. While there are bills currently in Congress that would help
ease parts of the embargo, there are at least five House appropriations bills
that include Cuba provisions that would block some of the Administrations
Cuba policy changes and would introduce new economic sanctions on
Cuba( Congressional Research Service). While public opinion has shifted to
favor reestablishing connections with Cuba, there is still debate over how to
engage with a country whose values are frequently at odds with the United
States.

Congress and foreign policy

To understand the current policy, it is necessary to understand

congressional-executive relations and how this has enabled President Obama
to act unilaterally. In the realm of foreign policy, Congress and the Executive
are separate institutions with shared constitutional powers. Congress has the
ability to declare war, enact treaties, and appropriate funds. However, since
the 1970s congressional assertiveness in foreign policy has dramatically
decreased (Shull and Shaw 12). Members of Congress concerned with
reelection and more focused on domestic policy abdicate power to the
Imperial President.
 Barilleaux illustrates this decision-making model saying, Congress
seems trapped in a prisoners dilemma in which more and more members
choose to delegate (defect) their authority to the executive. In return
members of Congress can secure reelection by their constituencies by
deflecting blame and maximizing credit (208). This provides an opening in
which the executive can act unilaterally.

Divided government further extrapolates this phenomenon. Given the

inefficiency of Congress to act when there is divided government, the unitary
executive can overstep preexisting boundaries in order to enact policy.
Barilleaux calls this venture constitutionalism: assertions of constitutional
legitimacy for presidential actions that do not conform to settled
understandings of the presidents constitutional authority (222). In the case
of Cuba, Congress is divided about how to approach the situation. This
inaction allowed the White House to act unitarily towards the goal of
normalization.

However, Congress does have vital powers when it comes to dealing

with Cuba, primarily in regards to the embargo. Possibly its most effective
foreign policy tool, Congress maintains the power to institute or remove
economic sanctions. Sloan et al suggest seeking to enhance its influence on
U.S. foreign policy, the Congress has been energetic in passing economic
sanctions against other countries (16).

The president has implemented policy changes, but the embargo is

ultimately in the hands of Congress, where some legislators remain deeply
suspicious of Havana(George). As Obama mentioned in his speech in
December, The embargo thats been imposed for decades is now codified
in legislation (Statement by the President). It is not one law, but a complex
series of laws restricting trade and travel and cannot be undone by one
action from Congress or the President.

Partisan resistance and public opinion

Congress opposition to lifting the embargo manifests from a

combination of partisan and constituent demands. Republicans have been
most vocal in their criticism of Obamas policy change towards Cuba,
especially Cuban-Americans Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz. Rubio (R., FL) stated
he would block Senate confirmation of an ambassador to Cuba until progress
was made to resolve U.S. property claims and ensure greater political
freedom in Cuba. Cruz (R., TX) said he opposes appropriations of funds to the
embassy in Havana unless and until the president can demonstrate that he
has made some progress in alleviating the misery of our friends, the people
of Cuba (Hook).

Jeb Bush, Chris Christie, and Rick Perry have also condemned Obamas
actions. Republicans have historically been against normalization of relations
with Cuba given the current communist regime. As McCormick points out,
partisan ties often predict foreign policy opinions. He says political liberals
tend to be acommodationists, political conservatives tend to be hardliners,
and political moderates tend to be internationalists (519).

However, public opinion on the issue, even among Republican voters,

has changed. A poll released by the Atlantic Council concludes that a
majority of voters in key heartland states, Tennessee, Ohio, Indiana and
Iowa, are in favor of abolishing restrictions in trade, travel, and investment
in Cuba, including lifting the embargo against Cuba(Sesin). States whose
economies are dependent largely on agriculture could benefit from
engagement with Cuba given the untapped potential of Cuban markets
(Wyngowski). The business opportunities available affect public opinion on
the issue, and how politicians will respond to the concerns of their
constituents.

While some foreign policy issues arent significantly affected by

domestic politics, the Cuban-American voting bloc has been very influential,
especially given that Florida is a swing state (Hook). Kornbluh and Leogrande
argue that the Cuban-American vote, once fairly homogenous, is diversifying.
They say, the exile community's wealth and political savvy made it a crucial
voting bloc, not to be crossed by either party, in a state that can decide
presidential elections.

But attitudes have shifted. The embargo doesnt hold the same
importance for younger Cubans(46). After the Cold War, the exile population
favored strict sanctions and an isolationist policy towards Cuba. However,
the younger generation, either born in America or fleeing Cuba for economic,
rather than political reasons, is more inclined to favor engagement
(Wyngowski).

In a poll conducted in 2014 by Florida International University, 52

percent of Cuban-Americans in the Miami-Dade County favored ending the
U.S. embargo of Cuba. In 1993, 87 percent of Cuban-Americans favored
increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Cuba. Before the Obama
Administrations decision to change its approach to Cuba, the Trimpa Group,
a powerful lobby, launched a campaign to fund key politicians and poll the
public.

Its results were intended to show broad support for change and
give voice to the silent majority, according to the political operatives
behind the efforts (Kornbluh and Leogrande). In May of 2014, the Trimpa
Group and its influential coalition of interest groups sent a letter to President
Obama urging him to engage with Cuba. The combination of public and
interest group support helped set the stage for Obamas executive policy
changes.

Fresh faced leadership

The new policy of normalization would not have been possible without
the current executives in both the United States and Cuba. As opposed to the
hardliners before them, Obama and Castro were notably more flexible and
open to negotiation. When Ral came to power after his brother, he worked
to "update" the Cuban economic model and lift some restraints on personal
freedoms including legalizing "the purchase of mobile phones and
computers. Three years later, it legalized the private sales of automobiles
and real estate. In late 2013, the government abolished the requirement that
Cubans get state permissionthe so-called tarjeta blancabefore traveling
abroad" (Leogrande).

Ral has also promoted more open debate and engagement in political
discourse. He has criticized the "false unanimity" of the Communist Party and
insisted on voicing disagreements. However, Cuban citizens can still be
arrested for opposing the regime. Though most long-term prisoners have
been released, short-term detentions and harassment have significantly
increased (Congressional Research Service). Under Ral, Cuba has made
small but not insignificant steps toward democratization.

President Obama has been considerably more open to negotiating with

Cuba than the presidents before him. In 2004 he recommended lifting the
embargo, citing its failure to spur democratization on the island. During his
campaign Obama said, "If the Cuban leadership begins opening Cuba to
meaningful democratic change, the United States must be prepared to begin
taking steps to normalize relations and to ease the embargo of the last five
decade"(Sherman). The president and his critics differ on what exactly can
be considered "meaningful democratic change", but nonetheless, it was clear
even from his presidential campaign that Obama was open and willing to
negotiate with Cuba.
 The changes in policy towards Cuba have been led by the White House
as opposed to the Department of State (Wyngowski). This is a prime example
of the Obama's leadership style and his tendency to be hands-on and very
involved at each step in the process. He involves many voices in the
conversation, but ultimately is "the decider"(Crowley 24). Obama's
normalization policy towards Cuba echoes the themes he laid out in his West
Point speech in May, 2014. He emphasized American exceptionalism and
that "America must always lead on the world stage" (Full Transcript).
Obama believes it America has an obligation to be engaged and lead
by example. A policy of isolation towards Cuba would be at odds with this
goal. Obama does not foolishly ignore the differences and obstacles between
the U.S. and Cuba. Ral himself agreed there is a "long and complicated
history" between the two countries (Davis and Archibold). Still, the phone
calls and historic face-to-face meetings between the two leaders have been
a step in the right direction.
The normalization of relations with Cuba was the result of a "unique
alignment of political stars" (Kornbluh and Leogrande). A shift in domestic
public opinion, coupled with Ral's progress and Obama's openness to
negotiation allowed for a political opening for the White House to act. The
policy changes are limited by congressional stagnation and divisive ideology.
Though an overarching repeal of the embargo is still an unattainable goal,
the process of normalization has begun.

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